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THE JOURNAL
OF
SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

VOL. I.

EDITED BY WM. T. HARRIS.

ST. LOUIS, MO.:
GEORGE KNAPP & CO., PRINTERS AND BINDERS.
1867.

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P R E F A C E .

In concluding the first volume of this Journal, the editor wishes to say a few things regarding its contents, even at the risk of repeating, in some cases, what has already been said. He hopes that his judgment in the selection of articles will be, in the main, approved. In so novel an undertaking it is not to be expected that the proper elevation and range will be found at once. But the editor thinks that he has acquired some valuable experience that will aid him in preparing the second volume.

The reader will notice, upon looking over the table of contents, that about one-third of the articles relate to Art, and hence recommend themselves more especially to those who seek artistic culture, and wish at the same time to have clear conceptions regarding it.

It is, perhaps, a mistake to select so little that bears on physical science, which is by far the most prominent topic of interest at the present day. In order to provide for this, the editor hopes to print in the next volume detailed criticisms of the "Positive Philosophy," appreciating its advantages and defects of method and system. The "Development Theory," the "Correlation of Physical, Vital and Mental Forces," the abstract theories in our text-books on Natural Philosophy, regarding the nature of attraction, centrifugal and centripetal forces, light, heat, electricity, chemical elements, &c., demand the investigation of the speculative thinker. The exposition of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit will furnish pertinent thoughts relating to method.

While the large selection of translations has met with approval from very high sources, yet there has been some disappointment expressed at the lack of original articles. Considerably more than half of the articles have been original entirely, while all the translations are new. The complaint, however, relates more especially to what its authors are pleased to call the Un-American character of the contents of the Journal. Here the editor feels like pleading ignorance as an excuse. — In what books is one to find the true "American" type of Speculative Philosophy? Certain very honorable exceptions occur to every one, but they are not American in a popular sense. We, as a people, buy immense editions of John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Comte,

Hamilton, Cousin, and others; one can trace the appropriation and digestion of their thoughts in all the leading articles of our Reviews, Magazines and books of a thoughtful character. If this is American philosophy, the editor thinks that it may be very much elevated by absorbing and digesting more refined aliment. It is said that of Herbert Spencer's works nearly twenty thousand have been sold in this country, while in England scarcely the first edition has been bought. This is encouraging for the American thinker: what lofty spiritual culture may not become broadly and firmly rooted here where thoughtful minds are so numerous? Let this spirit of inquiry once extend to thinkers like Plato and Aristotle, Schelling and Hegel—let these be digested and organically reproduced—and what a phalanx of American thinkers we may have to boast of! For after all it is not "American thought" so much as American *thinkers* that we want. To *think*, in the highest sense, is to transcend all *natural limits*—such, for example, as national peculiarities, defects in culture, distinctions in Race, habits, and modes of living—to be *universal*, so that one can dissolve away the external hull and seize the substance itself. The peculiarities stand in the way;—were it not for these, we should find in Greek or German Philosophy just the forms we ourselves need. Our province as *Americans* is to rise to purer forms than have hitherto been attained, and thus speak a "solvent word" of more potency than those already uttered. If this be the goal we aim at, it is evident that we can find no other means so well adapted to rid us of our own idiosyncracies as the study of the greatest thinkers of all ages and all times. May this Journal aid such a consummation!

In conclusion, the editor would heartily thank all who have assisted him in this enterprise, by money and cheering words; he hopes that they will not withdraw in the future their indispensable aid. To others he owes much for kind assistance rendered in preparing articles for the printer. Justice demands that special acknowledgment should be made here of the services of Miss Anna C. Brackett, whose skill in proof-reading, and subtle appreciation of philosophic thought have rendered her editorial assistance invaluable.

St. Louis, December, 1867.

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THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

VOL. I.

1867.

NO. 1—2D ED.

TO THE READER.

For the reason that a journal devoted exclusively to the interests of Speculative Philosophy is a rare phenomenon in the English language, some words may reasonably be expected from the Editors upon the scope and design of the present undertaking.

There is no need, it is presumed, to speak of the immense religious movements now going on in this country and in England. The tendency to break with the traditional, and to accept only what bears for the soul its own justification, is widely active, and can end only in the demand that Reason shall find and establish a philosophical basis for all those great ideas which are taught as religious dogmas. Thus it is that side by side with the naturalism of such men as Renan, a school of mystics is beginning to spring up who prefer to ignore utterly all historical wrappings, and cleave only to the speculative kernel itself. The vortex between the traditional faith and the intellectual conviction cannot be closed by renouncing the latter, but only by deepening it to speculative insight.

Likewise it will be acknowledged that the national consciousness has moved forward on to a new platform during the last few years. The idea underlying our form of government had hitherto developed only one of its essential phases—that of brittle individualism—in which national unity seemed an external mechanism, soon to be entirely dispensed with, and the enterprise of the private man or of the

corporation substituted for it. Now we have arrived at the consciousness of the other essential phase, and each individual recognizes his substantial side to be the State as such. The freedom of the citizen does not consist in the mere Arbitrary, but in the realization of the rational conviction which finds expression in established law. That this new phase of national life demands to be digested and comprehended, is a further occasion for the cultivation of the Speculative.

More significant still is the scientific revolution, working out especially in the domain of physics. The day of simple empiricism is past, and with the doctrine of "The Correlation of forces" there has arisen a stage of reflection that deepens rapidly into the purely speculative. For the further elucidation of this important point the two following articles have been prepared. It is hoped that the first one will answer more definitely the question now arising in the mind of the reader, "What is this Speculative Knowing of which you speak?" and that the second one will show whither Natural Science is fast hastening.

With regard to the pretensions of this Journal, its editors know well how much its literary conduct will deserve censure and need apology. They hope that the substance will make up in some degree for deficiencies in form; and, moreover, they expect to improve in this respect through experience and the kind criticisms of friends.

THE SPECULATIVE.

"We need what Genius is unconsciously seeking, and, by some daring generalization of the universe, shall assuredly discover, a spiritual calculus, a *Novum Organum*, whereby nature shall be divined in the soul, the soul in God, matter in spirit, polarity resolved into unity; and that power which pulsates in all life, animates and builds all organizations, shall manifest itself as one universal deific energy, present alike at the outskirts and centre of the universe, whose centre and circumference are one; omniscient, omnipotent, self-subsisting, uncontained, yet containing all things in the unbroken synthesis of its being."—"CALCULUS," one of *Alcott's "Orphic Sayings."*)

At the end of the sixth book of Plato's Republic, after a characterization of the two grades of sensuous knowing and the grade of the understanding "which is obliged to set out from hypotheses, for the reason that it does not deal with principles but only with results," we find the speculative grade of knowing characterized as "that in which the soul, setting out from an hypothesis, proceeds to an unhypothetical principle, and makes its way without the aid of [sensuous] images, but solely through ideas themselves." The mathematical procedure which begins by assuming definitions, axioms, postulates, and the like, which it never examines nor attempts to deduce or prove, is the example given by Plato of the method of the Understanding, while he makes the speculative Reason "to posit hypotheses by the Dialectic, *not as fixed principles*, but only as starting points, in order that, by removing them, it may arrive at the unhypothetical—the principle of the universe."

This most admirable description is fully endorsed by Aristotle, and fully established in a two-fold manner:

1. In the *Metaphysics* (xi. 7) he shows ontologically, starting with *motion* as an hypothesis, that the *self-moved* is the first principle; and this he identifies with the speculative, and the being of God.

2. In the *De Anima* (iii. 5-8) he distinguishes psychologically the "active intellect" as the highest form of knowing, as that which is its own object. (subject and object,) and hence as containing its own end and aim in itself—as being infinite. He identifies this with the Speculative result, which he found ontologically as the Absolute.

Spinoza in his *Ethics* (Prop. xl. Schol. ii. and Prop. xlv., Cor. ii. of Part II.) has well described the Speculative, which

he names "*Scientia intuitiva*," as the thinking of things under the form of eternity. (*De natura rationis est res sub quadam specie eternitatis percipere.*)

Though great diversity is found in respect to form and systematic exposition among the great philosophers, yet there is the most complete unanimity, not only with respect to the transcendency of the Speculative, but also with reference to the content of its knowing. If the reader of different systems of Philosophy has in himself achieved some degree of speculative culture, he will at every step be delighted and confirmed at the agreement of what, to the ordinary reader, seem irreconcilable statements.

Not only do speculative writers agree among themselves as to the nature of things, and the destiny of man and the world, but their results furnish us in the form of pure thought what the artist has wrought out in the form of beauty. Whether one tests architecture, sculpture, painting, music, or poetry, it is all the same. Goethe has said:

"As all Nature's thousand changes
But one changeless God proclaim;
So in Art's wide kingdoms ranges
One sole meaning, still the same:
This is truth, eternal Reason,
Which from Beauty takes its dress,
And serene through time and season,
Stands for aye in loveliness."

While Art presents this content to the senses, Religion offers it to the conception in the form of a dogma to be held by faith; the deepest Speculative truth is allegorically typified in a historical form, so that it acts upon the mind partly through fantasy and partly through the understanding. Thus Religion presents the same content as Art and Philosophy, but stands between them, and forms a kind of middle

ground upon which the purification takes place. "It is the purgatory between the Inferno of Sense and the Paradise of Reason." Its function is mediation; a continual degrading of the sensuous and external, and an elevation of the supersensual and internal. The transition of Religion into Speculative Philosophy is found in the mystics. Filled with the profound significance of religious symbolism, and seeing in it the explanation of the universe, they essay to communicate their insights. But the form of Science is not yet attained by them. They express themselves, not in those universal categories that the spirit of the race has formed in language for its utterance, but they have recourse to symbols more or less inadequate because ambiguous, and of insufficient universality to stand for the archetypes themselves. Thus "Becoming" is the most pure germinal archetype, and belongs therefore to logic, or the system of pure thought, and it has correspondences on concrete planes, as e. g., *time, motion, life, &c.* Now if one of these concrete terms is used for the pure logical category, we have mysticism. The alchemists, as shown by a genial writer of our day, use the technique of their craft to express the profound mysteries of spirit and its regeneration. The Eleusinian and other mysteries do the like.

While it is one of the most inspiring things connected with Speculative Philosophy to discover that the "Open Secret of the Universe" has been read by so many, and to see, under various expressions, the same meaning; yet it is the highest problem of Speculative Philosophy to seize a method that is adequate to the expression of the "Secret;" for its (the content's) own method of genetic development must be the only adequate one. Hence it is that we can classify philosophic systems by their success in seizing the content which is common to Art and Religion, as well as to Philosophy, in such a manner as to allow its free evolution and to have little in the method that is merely formal or extraneous to the idea itself. The rigid formalism of Spinoza—though manipulated by a clear speculative spirit—is inadequate to the unfolding of its content; for how could the mathematical

method which is that of quantity or external determinations alone, ever suffice to unfold those first principles which attain to the quantitative only in their result?

In this, the profoundest of subjects, we always find in Plato light for the way. Although he has not given us complete examples, yet he has pointed out the road of the true Speculative method in a way not to be mistaken. Instead of setting out with first principles presupposed as true, by which all is to be established, (as mathematics and such sciences do), he asserts that the first starting points must be removed as inadequate. We begin with the immediate, which is utterly insufficient, and exhibits itself as such. We ascend to a more adequate, by removing the first hypothesis; and this process repeats itself until we come to the first principle, which of course bears its own evidence in this, that it is absolutely universal and absolutely determined at the same time; in other words it is the self-determining, the "self-moved," as Plato and Aristotle call it. It is its own other, and hence it is the true infinite, for it is not limited but continued by its other.

From this peculiarity results the difficulty of Speculative Philosophy. The unused mind, accepting with naïveté the first proposition as settled, finds itself brought into confusion when this is contradicted, and condemns the whole procedure. The irony of Socrates, that always begins by positing the ground of his adversary, and reducing it through its own inadequateness to contradict itself, is of this character, and the unsophisticated might say, and do say: "See how illogical is Socrates, for he sets out to establish something, and arrives rather at the destruction of it." The *reductio ad absurdum* is a faint imitation of the same method. It is not sufficient to prove your own system by itself, for each of the opposing systems can do that; but you must show that any and all counter-hypotheses result in your own. God makes the wrath of men to praise Him, and all imperfect things must continually demonstrate the perfect, for the reason that they do not exist by reason of their defects, but through what of truth there is in them, and the imperfection is continually manifesting the *want* of the

perfect. "Spirit," says Hegel, "is self-contained being. But matter, which is spirit outside of itself, [turned inside out,] continually manifests this, its inadequacy, through gravity—attraction to a central point beyond each particle. (If it could get at this central point, it would have no extension, and hence would be annihilated.)"

The soul of this method lies in the comprehension of the negative. In that wonderful exposé of the importance of the negative, which Plato gives in the *Parmenides* and *Sophist*, we see how justly he appreciated its true place in Philosophic Method. Spinoza's "*omnis determinatio est negatio*" is the most famous of modern statements respecting the negative, and has been very fruitful in results.

One would greatly misunderstand the Speculative view of the negative should he take it to mean as some have done, "that the negative is as essential as the positive." For if there are two independent somewhat over against each other, having equal validity, then all unity of system is absolutely impossible—we can have only the Persian Ahriman and Ormuzd; nay, not even these—for unless there is a primal unity, a "*Zerune-Akerene*"—the uncreated one, these are impossible as opposites, for there can be no tension from which the strife should proceed.

The Speculative has insight into the constitution of the positive out of the negative. "That which has the form of Being," says Hegel, "is the self-related;" but relation of all kinds is negation, and hence whatever has the form of being and is a positive somewhat, is a self-related negative. Those three stages of culture in knowing, talked of by Plato and Spinoza, may be characterized in a new way by their relation to this concept.

The first stage of consciousness—that of immediate or sensuous knowing—seizes objects by themselves—isolatedly—without their relations; each seems to have validity in and for itself, and to be wholly positive and real. The negative is the mere absence of the real thing; and it utterly ignores it in its scientific activity.

But the second stage traces relations,

and finds that things do not exist in immediate independence, but that each is related to others, and it comes to say that "Were a grain of sand to be destroyed, the universe would collapse." It is a necessary consequent to the previous stage, for the reason that so soon as the first stage gets over its childish engrossment with the novelty of variety, and attempts to seize the individual thing, it finds its characteristic marks or properties. But these consist invariably of relations to other things, and it learns that these properties, without which the thing could have no distinct existence, are the very destruction of its independence, since they are its complications with other things.

In this stage the negative has entered and has full sway. For all that was before firm and fixed, is now seen to be, not through itself, but through others, and hence the being of everything is its negation. For if this stone exists only through its relations to the sun, which is *not* the stone but something else, then the being of this stone is its own negation. But the second stage only reduces all to dependence and finitude, and does not show us how any real, true, or independent being can be found to exist. It holds fast to the stage of mediation alone, just as the first stage held by the *immediate*. But the dialectic of this position forces it over into the third.

If things exist only in their relations, and relations are the negatives of things, then all that appears positive—all being—must rest upon negation. How is this? The negative is essentially a relative, but since it is the only substrate (for all is relative), it can relate only to itself. But self-relation is always identity, and here we have the solution of the previous difficulty. All positive forms, all forms of immediateness or being, all forms of identity, are self-relations, consisting of a negative or relative, relating to itself. But the most wonderful side of this is the fact that since this relation is that of the *negative*, it *negates* itself in its very relation, and hence its *identity* is a producing of *non-identity*. Identity and distinction are produced by the self-same process, and thus *self-determination* is the origin of all

identity and distinction likewise. This is the speculative standpoint in its completeness. It not only possesses speculative content, but is able to evolve a speculative system likewise. It is not only conscious of the principles, but of their method, and thus all is transparent.

To suppose that this may be made so plain that one shall see it at first sight, would be the height of absurdity. Doubtless far clearer expositions can be made of this than those found in Plato or Proclus, or even in Fichte and Hegel; but any and every exposition must incur the same difficulty, viz: The one who masters it must undergo a thorough change in his innermost. The "Palingenesia" of the intellect is as essential as the "regeneration of the heart," and is at bottom the same thing, as the mystics teach us.

But this great difference is obvious superficially: In religious regeneration it seems the yielding up of the self to an alien, although beneficent power, while in philosophy it seems the complete identification of one's self with it.

He, then, who would ascend into the thought of the best thinkers the world has seen, must spare no pains to elevate his thinking to the plane of pure thought. The completest discipline for this may be found in Hegel's *Logic*. Let one not despair, though he seem to be baffled seventy and seven times; his earnest and vigorous assault is repaid by surprisingly increased strength of mental acumen which he will be assured of, if he tries his powers on lower planes after his attack has failed on the highest thought.

These desultory remarks on the Speculative, may be closed with a few illustrations of what has been said of the negative.

I. Everything must have limits that mark it off from other things, and these limits are its negations, in which it ceases.

II. It must likewise have qualities which distinguish it from others, but these likewise are negatives in the sense that they exclude it from them. Its determining by means of qualities is the making it *not* this and *not* that, but exactly what it is. Thus the affirmation of anything is at the same time the negation of others.

III. Not only is the negative manifest in the above general and abstract form, but its penetration is more specific. Everything has distinctions from others in general, but also from *its* other. *Sweet* is opposed not only to other properties in general, as *white*, *round*, *soft*, etc., but to *its* other, or *sour*. So, too, *white* is opposed to *black*, *soft* to *hard*, *heat* to *cold*, etc., and in general a *positive* thing to a *negative* thing. In this kind of relative, the negative is more essential, for it seems to constitute the intimate nature of the opposites, so that each is reflected in the other.

IV. More remarkable are the appearances of the negative in nature. The element *fire* is a negative which destroys the form of the combustible. It reduces organic substances to inorganic elements, and is that which negates the organic. Air is another negative element. It acts upon all terrestrial elements; upon water, converting it into invisible vapor; upon metals, reducing them to earths through corrosion—eating up iron to form rust, rotting wood into mould—destructive or negative alike to the mineral and vegetable world, like fire, to which it has a speculative affinity. The grand type of all negatives in nature, such as air and fire, is *Time*, the great devourer, and archetype of all changes and movements in nature. Attraction is another appearance of the negative. It is a manifestation in some body of an essential connection with another which is not it; or rather it is an embodied self-contradiction: "that other (the sun) which is not me (the earth) is my true being." Of course its own being is its own negation, then.

Thus, too, the plant is negative to the inorganic—it assimilates it; the animal is negative to the vegetable world.

As we approach these higher forms or negation, we see the negative acting against itself, and this constitutes a process. The food that life requires, which it negates in the process of digestion, and assimilates, is, in the life process, again negated, eliminated from the organism, and replaced by new elements. A negation is made, and this is again negated.

But the higher form of negation appears in the generic; "The species lives, and the individual dies." The generic continually transcends the individual—going forth to new individuals and deserting the old—a process of birth and decay, both negative processes. In conscious Spirit both are united in one movement. The generic here enters the individual as pure *ego*—the undetermined possibility of all determinations. Since it is undetermined, it is

negative to all special determinations. But this *ego* not only exists as subject, but also as object—a process of self-determination or self-negation. And this negation or particularization continually proceeds from one object to another, and remains conscious under the whole, Not dying, as the mere animal does, in the transition from individual to individual. This is the *aperçu* of Immortality.

HERBERT SPENCER.

CHAPTER I.

THE CRISIS IN NATURAL SCIENCE.

During the past twenty years a revolution has been working in physical science. Within the last ten it has come to the surface, and is now rapidly spreading into all departments of mental activity.

Although its centre is to be found in the doctrine of the "Correlation of Forces," it would be a narrow view that counted only the exponents of this doctrine, numerous as they are; the spirit of this movement inspires a heterogeneous multitude—Carpenter, Grove, Mayer, Faraday, Thompson, Tyndall and Helmholtz; Herbert Spencer, Stuart Mill, Buckle, Draper, Lewes, Lecky, Max Müller, Marsh, Liebig, Darwin and Agassiz; these names, selected at random, are suggested on account of the extensive circulation of their books. Every day the press announces some new name in this field of research.

What is the character of the old which is displaced, and of the new which gets established?

By way of preliminary, it must be remarked that there are observable in modern times three general phases of culture, more or less historic.

The first phase is thoroughly dogmatic: it accepts as of like validity, metaphysical abstractions, and empirical observations. It has not arrived at such a degree of clearness as to perceive contradictions between form and content. For the most part, it is characterized by a reverence for external authority. With the revival of learning commences the protest of spirit against this phase. Descartes and Lord Bacon begin the contest, and are followed by the many—Locke, Newton, Leibnitz, Clarke, and the rest. All are animated with the spirit of that time—to come to the matter in hand without so much mediation. Thought wishes to rid itself of its fetters; religions sentiment, to get rid of forms. This reaction against the former stage, which has been called by Hegel the metaphysical, finds a kind of climax in the intellectual movement just preceding the French revolution. Thought no longer is contented to say "*Cogito, ergo sum.*" abstractly, but applies the doctrine in all directions, "*I think; in that deed, I am.*" "*I am a man only in so far as I think.*" In so far as I think, I am an essence. What I get from others is not mine. What I can comprehend, or dissolve in my reason, that is mine." It looks around and spies institutions—"clothes of spirit," as Herr Ten-

felsdroeck calls them. "What are you doing here, you sniveling priest?" says Voltaire; "you are imposing delusions upon society for your own aggrandizement. I had no part or lot in making the church; *cogito, ergo sum*; I will only have over me what I put there!"

"I see that all these complications of society are artificial," adds Rousseau; "man has made them; they are not good, and let us tear them down and make anew." These utterances echo all over France and Europe. "The state is merely a machine by which the few exploit the many"—"off with crowns!" Thereupon they snatch off the crown of poor Louis, and his head follows with it. "Reason" is enthroned and dethroned. Thirty years of war satiates at length this negative second period, and the third phase begins. Its characteristic is to be constructive, not to accept the heritage of the past with passivity, nor wantonly to destroy, but to realize itself in the world of objectivity—the world of laws and institutions.

The first appearance of the second phase of consciousness is characterized by the grossest inconsistencies. It says in general, (see D'Holbach's "*Système de la Nature*") : "The immediate, only, is true; what we know by our senses, alone has reality; all is matter and force." But in this utterance it is unconscious that matter and force are purely general concepts, and not objects of immediate consciousness. What we see and feel is not matter or force in general, but only some special form. The self-refutation of this phase may be exhibited as follows:

I. "What is known is known through the senses: it is matter and force."

II. But by the senses, the particular only is perceived, and this can never be *matter*, but merely a *form*. The general is a mediated result, and not an object of the senses.

III. Hence, in positing matter and force as the content of sensuous knowing, they unwittingly assert mediation to be the content of immediateness.

The decline of this period of science results from the perception of the contradiction involved. Kant was the first to show

this; his labors in this field may be summed up thus:

The universal and necessary is not an empirical result. (General laws can not be sensuously perceived.) The constitution of the mind itself, furnishes the ground for it:—first, we have an *a priori* basis (time and space) necessarily presupposed as the condition of all sensuous perception; and then we have categories presupposed as the basis of every generalization whatever. Utter any general proposition: for example the one above quoted—"all is matter and force"—and you merely posit two categories—Inherence and causality—as objectively valid. In all universal and necessary propositions we announce only the subjective conditions of experience, and not anything in and for itself true (i. e. applicable to things in themselves).

At once the popular side of this doctrine began to take effect. "We know only phenomena; the true object in itself we do not know."

This doctrine of phenomenal knowing was outgrown in Germany at the commencement of the present century. In 1791—ten years after the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason—the deep spirit of Fichte began to generalize Kant's labors, and soon he announced the legitimate results of the doctrine. Schelling and Hegel completed the work of transforming what Kant had left in a negative state, into an affirmative system of truth. The following is an outline of the refutation of Kantian skepticism:

I. Kant reduces all objective knowledge to phenomenal: we furnish the form of knowing, and hence whatever we announce in general concerning it—and all that we call science has, of course, the form of generality—is merely our subjective forms, and does not belong to the thing in itself.

II. This granted, say the later philosophers, it follows that the subjective swallows up all and becomes itself the universal (subject and object of itself), and hence Reason is the true substance of the universe. Spinoza's *substance* is thus seen to become *subject*. We partake of God as intellectually seeing, and we see only God as object, which Malebranche and Berkeley held with other Platonists.

1. The categories (e. g. Unity, Reality, Causality, Existence, etc.) being merely subjective, or given by the constitution of the mind itself—for such universals are presupposed by all experience, and hence not derived from it—it follows:

2. If we abstract what we know to be subjective, we abstract all possibility of a thing in itself, too. For "existence" is a category, and hence if subjective, we may reasonably conclude that nothing objective can have existence.

3. Hence, since one category has no preference over another, and we can not give one of them objectivity without granting it to all others, it follows that there can be no talk of *noumena*, or of things in themselves, *existing* beyond the reach of the mind, for such talk merely applies what it pronounces to be subjective categories, (existence) while at the same time it denies the validity of their application.

III. But since we remove the supposed "*noumena*," the so-called phenomena are not opposed any longer to a correlate beyond the intelligence, and the *noumenon* proves to be *mind itself*.

An obvious corollary from this is, that by the self-determination of mind in pure thinking we shall find the fundamental laws of all phenomena.

Though the Kantian doctrine soon gave place in Germany to deeper insights, it found its way slowly to other countries. Comte and Sir Wm. Hamilton have made the negative results very widely known—the former, in natural science; the latter, in literature and philosophy. Most of the writers named at the beginning are more or less imbued with Comte's doctrines, while a few follow Hamilton. For rhetorical purposes, the Hamiltonian statement is far superior to all others; for practical purposes, the Comtian. The physicist, wishing to give his undivided attention to empirical observation, desires an excuse for neglecting pure thinking; he therefore refers to the well-known result of philosophy, that we cannot know anything of ultimate causes—we are limited to phenomena and laws. Although it must be conceded that this consolation is somewhat similar to that of the ostrich, who cunningly conceals his head in the sand when annoyed

by the hunters, yet great benefit has thereby accrued to science through the undivided zeal of the investigators thus consoled.

When, however, a sufficiently large collection has been made, and the laws are sought for in the chaotic mass of observations, then *thought* must be had. Thought is the only crucible capable of dissolving "the many into the one." Tycho Brahe served a good purpose in collecting observations, but a Kepler was required to discern the celestial harmony involved therein.

This discovery of laws and relations, or of relative unities, proceeds to the final stage of science, which is that of the *absolute comprehension*.

Thus modern science, commencing with the close of the metaphysical epoch, has three stages or phases:

I. The first rests on mere isolated facts of experience; accepts the first phase of things, or that which comes directly before it, and hence may be termed the stage of *immediateness*.

II. The second relates its thoughts to one another and compares them; it develops inequalities; tests one through another, and discovers dependencies everywhere; since it learns that the first phase of objects is phenomenal, and depends upon somewhat lying beyond it; since it denies truth to the immediate, it may be termed the stage of *mediation*.

III. A final stage, which considers a phenomenon in its totality, and thus seizes it in its *noumenon*, and is the stage of the *comprehension*.

To resume: the *first* is that of sensuous knowing; the *second*, that of reflection (the understanding); the *third*, that of the reason (or the speculative stage).

In the sensuous knowing, we have crude, undigested masses all co-ordinated; each is in and for itself, and perfectly valid without the others. But as soon as reflection enters, dissolution is at work. Each is thought in sharp contrast with the rest; contradictions arise on every hand. The third stage finds its way out of these quarrelsome abstractions, and arrives at a synthetic unity, at a system, wherein the antagonisms are seen to form an organism.

The first stage of the development closes with attempts on all hands to put the results in an encyclopaedical form. Humboldt's *Cosmos* is a good example of this tendency, manifested so widely. Matter, masses, and *functions* are the subjects of investigation.

Reflection investigates *functions* and seizes the abstract category of force, and straightway we are in the second stage. Matter, as such, loses its interest, and "correlation of forces" absorbs all attention.

Force is an arrogant category and will not be co-ordinated with matter: if admitted, we are led to a pure dynamism. This will become evident as follows:

I. Force implies confinement (to give it direction): it demands, likewise, an "occasion," or soliciting force to call it into activity.

II. But it cannot be confined except by force; its occasion must be a force likewise.

III. Thus, since its confinement and "occasion" are forces, force can only act upon forces—upon matter only in so far as that is a force. Its nature requires confinement in order to manifest it, and hence it cannot act or exist except in unity with other forces which likewise have the same dependence upon it that it has upon them. Hence a force has no independent subsistence, but is only an element of a combination of opposed forces, which combination is a unity existing in an opposed manner (or composed of forces in a state of tension). This deeper unity which we come upon as the ground of force is properly named *law*.

From this, two corollaries are to be drawn: (1.) That matter is merely a name for various forces, as resistance, attraction and repulsion, etc. (2.) That force is no ultimate category, but, upon reflection, is seen to rest upon law as a deeper category (not law as a mere similarity of phenomena, but as a true unity underlying phenomenal multiplicity).

From the nature of the category of force we see that whoever adopts it as the ultimate, embarks on an ocean of dualism, and instead of "seeing everywhere the one and all" as did Xenophanes, he will see everywhere the self opposed, the contradictory.

The crisis which science has now reached is of this nature. The second stage is at its commencement with the great bulk of scientific men.

To illustrate the self-nugatory character ascribed to this stage we shall adduce some of the most prominent positions of Herbert Spencer, whom we regard as the ablest exponent of this movement. These contradictions are not to be deprecated, as though they indicated a decline of thought: on the contrary, they show an increased activity, (though in the stage of mere reflection,) and give us good omens for the future. The era of stupid mechanical thinkers is over, and we have entered upon the active, *chemical* stage of thought, wherein the thinker is trained to consciousness concerning his abstract categories, which, as Hegel says, "drive him around in their whirling circle."

Now that the body of scientific men are turned in this direction, we behold a vast upheaval towards philosophic thought; and this is entirely unlike the isolated phenomenon (hitherto observed in history) of a single group of men lifted above the surrounding darkness of their age into clearness. We do not have such a phenomenon in our time; it is the spirit of the nineteenth century to move by masses.

CHAPTER II.

THE "FIRST PRINCIPLES" OF THE "UNKNOWNABLE."

The *British Quarterly* speaking of Spencer, says: "These 'First Principles' are merely the foundation of a system of Philosophy, bolder, more elaborate and comprehensive, perhaps, than any other which has been hitherto designed in England."

The persistence and sincerity, so generally prevailing among these correlationists, we have occasion to admire in Herbert Spencer. He seems to be always ready to sacrifice his individual interest for truth, and is bold and fearless in uttering what he believes it to be.

For critical consideration no better division can be found than that adopted in the "First Principles" by Mr. Spencer himself.

to-wit: 1st, the unknowable. 2nd, the knowable. Accordingly, let us examine first his theory of

THE UNKNOWABLE.

When Mr. Spencer announces the content of the "unknowable" to be "ultimate religious and scientific ideas," we are reminded at once of the old adage in jurisprudence—"Omnis definitio in jure civili est periculosa;" the definition is liable to prove self-contradictory in practice. So when we have a content assigned to the unknowable we at once inquire, whence come the distinctions in the unknowable? If unknown they are not distinct to us. When we are told that Time, Space, Force, Matter, God, Creation, etc., are unknowables, we must regard these words as corresponding to no distinct objects, but rather as all of the same import to us. It should be always borne in mind that *all universal negatives are self-contradictory*. Moreover, since all judgments are made by subjective intelligences, it follows that all general assertions concerning the nature of the intellect affect the judgment itself. The naïveté with which certain writers wield these double-edged weapons is a source of solicitude to the spectator.

When one says that he knows that he knows nothing, he asserts knowledge and denies it in the same sentence. If one says "all knowledge is relative," as Spencer does, (p. 68, *et seq.*, of First Principles,) he of course asserts that his knowledge of the fact is relative and not absolute. If a distinct content is asserted of ignorance, the same contradiction occurs.

The perception of this principle by the later German philosophers at once led them out of the Kantian nightmare, into positive truth. The principle may be applied in general to any subjective scepticism. The following is a general scheme that will apply to all particular instances:

I. "We cannot know things in themselves; all our knowledge is subjective; it is confined to our own states and changes."

II. "If this is so, then still more is what we name the 'objective' only a state or change of us as subjective; it is a mere fiction of the mind so far as it is regarded as a 'beyond' or thing in itself."

III. Hence we *do* know the objective; for the scepticism can only legitimately conclude that the objective which we *do* know is of a nature kindred with reason; and that by an *a priori* necessity we can affirm that not only all knowable must have this nature, but also *all possible existence* must.

In this we discover that the mistake on the part of the sceptic consists in taking self-conscious intelligence as something one-sided or subjective, whereas it must be, according to its very definition, subject and object in one, and thus universal.

The difficulty underlying this stage of consciousness is that the mind has not been cultivated to a clear separation of the imagination from the thinking. As Sir Wm. Hamilton remarks, (*Metaphysics*, p. 487,) "Vagueness and confusion are produced by the confounding of objects so different as the images of sense and the unpicturable notions of intelligence."

Indeed the great "law of the conditioned" so much boasted of by that philosopher himself and his disciples, vanishes at once when the mentioned confusion is avoided. Applied to space it results as follows:

I.—Thought of Space.

1. Space, if finite, must be limited from without;
2. But such external limitations would require space to exist in;
3. And hence the supposed limits of space that were to make it finite do in fact *continue it*.

It appears, therefore, that space is of such a nature that it can only end in, or be limited by *itself*, and thus is universally *continuous or infinite*.

II.—Imagination of Space.

If the result attained by pure thought is correct, space is infinite, and if so, it cannot be imagined. If, however, it should be found possible to compass it by imagination, it must be conceded that there really is a contradiction in the intelligence. That the result of such an attempt coincides with our anticipations we have Hamilton's testimony—"imagination sinks exhausted."

Therefore, instead of this result contra-

dicting the first, as Hamilton supposes, it really confirms it.

In fact if the mind is disciplined to separate pure thinking from mere imagining, the infinite is not difficult to think. Spinoza saw and expressed this by making a distinction between "*infinitum actu* (or *rationis*)," and "*infinitum imaginationis*," and his first and second axioms are the immediate results of thought elevated to this clearness. This distinction and his "*omnis determinatio est negatio*," together with the development of the third stage of thinking (according to reason), "*sub quadam specie eternitatis*,"—these distinctions are the priceless legacy of the clearest-minded thinker of modern times; and it behooves the critic of "human knowing" to consider well the results that the "human mind" has produced through those great masters—Plato and Aristotle. Spinoza and Hegel.

Herbert Spencer, however, not only betrays unconsciousness of this distinction, but ignores it in far grosser and self-destructive applications. On page 25, ("First Principles,") he says: "When on the sea shore we note how the hulls of distant vessels are hidden below the horizon, and how of still remoter vessels only the uppermost sails are visible, we realize with tolerable clearness the slight curvature of that portion of the sea's surface which lies before us. But when we seek in imagination to follow out this curved surface as it actually exists, slowly bending round until all its meridians meet in a point eight thousand miles below our feet, we find ourselves utterly baffled. We cannot conceive in its real form and magnitude even that small segment of our globe which extends a hundred miles on every side of us, much less the globe as a whole. The piece of rock on which we stand can be mentally represented with something like completeness; we find ourselves able to think of its top, its sides, and its under surface at the same time, or so nearly at the same time that they seem all present in consciousness together; and so we can form what we call a conception of the rock, but to do the like with the earth we find impossible." "We form of the earth not a conception properly so-called, but only a symbolic conception."

Conception here is held to be adequate when it is formed of an object of a given size; when the object is above that size the conception thereof becomes symbolical. Here we do not have the exact limit stated, though we have an example given (a rock) which is conceivable, and another (the earth) which is not.

"We must predicate nothing of objects too great or too multitudinous to be mentally represented, or we must make our predications by means of extremely inadequate representations of such objects, mere symbols of them." (27 page.)

But not only is the earth an indefinitely multiple object, but so is the rock; nay, even the smallest grain of sand. Suppose the rock to be a rod in diameter; a microscope magnifying two and a half millions of diameters would make its apparent magnitude as large as the earth. It is thus only a question of relative distance from the person conceiving, and this reduces it to the mere sensuous image of the retina. Remove the earth to the distance of the moon, and our conception of it would, upon these principles, become quite adequate. But if our conception of the moon be held inadequate, then must that of the rock or the grain of sand be equally inadequate.

Whatever occupies space is continuous and discrete; i. e., may be divided into parts. It is hence a question of relativity whether the image or picture of it correspond to it.

The legitimate conclusion is that all our conceptions are symbolic, and if that property invalidates their reliability, it follows that we have no reliable knowledge of things perceived, whether great or small.

Mathematical knowledge is conversant with pure lines, points, and surfaces; hence it must rest on inconceivables.

But Mr. Spencer would by no means concede that we do not know the shape of the earth, its size, and many other inconceivable things about it. Conception is thus no criterion of knowledge, and all built upon this doctrine (i. e. depending upon the conceivability of a somewhat) falls to the ground.

But he applies it to the questions of the divisibility of matter (page 50): "If we say that matter is infinitely divisible, we commit ourselves to a supposition not

realizable in thought. We can bisect and rebisect a body, and continually repeat the act until we reduce its parts to a size no longer physically divisible, may then mentally continue the process without limit."

Setting aside conceivability as indifferent to our knowledge or thinking, we have the following solution of this point:

I. That which is extended may be bisected (i. e. has two halves).

II. Thus two extensions arise, which, in turn, have the same property of divisibility that the first one had.

III. Since, then, bisection is a process entirely different to the nature of extension (i. e. does not change an extension into two non-extendeds), it follows that body is infinitely divisible.

We do not have to test this in imagination to verify it; and this very truth must be evident to him who says that the progress must be "continued without limit." For if we examine the general conditions under which any such "infinite progress" is possible, we find them to rest upon the presupposition of a real infinite, thus:

Infinite Progress.

I. Certain attributes are found to belong to an object, and are not affected by a certain process. (For example, divisibility as a process in space does not affect the continuity of space, which makes that process possible. Or again, the process of limiting space does not interfere with its continuity, for space will not permit any limit except space itself.)

II. When the untutored reflection endeavors to apprehend a relation of this nature, it seizes one side of the dualism and is hurled to the other. (It bisects space, and then finds itself before two objects identical in nature with the first; it has effected nothing; it repeats the process, and, by and by getting exhausted, wonders whether it could meet a different result if its powers of endurance were greater. Or else suspecting the true case, says: "no other result would happen if I went on forever.")

III. Pure thought, however, grasps this

process as a totality, and sees that it only arises through a self-relation. The "progress" is nothing but a return to itself, the same monotonous round. It would be a similar attempt to seek the end of a circle by travelling round it, and one might make the profound remark: "If my powers were equal to the task, I should doubtless come to the end." This difficulty vanishes as soon as the experience is made that the line returns into itself. "It is the same thing whether said once or repeated forever," says Simplicius, treating of this paradox.

The "Infinite Progress" is the most stubborn fortress of Scepticism. By it our negative writers establish the impotency of Reason for various ulterior purposes. Some wish to use it as a lubricating fluid upon certain religious dogmas that cannot otherwise be swallowed. Others wish to save themselves the trouble of thinking out the solutions to the Problem of Life. But the Sphinx devours him who does not faithfully grapple with, and solve her enigmas.

Mephistopheles (a good authority on this subject) says of Faust, whom he finds grumbling at the littleness of man's mind:

"Verachte nur Vernunft und Wissenschaft.

Des Menschen allerhöchste Kraft

Und hält 'er sich auch nicht dem Teufel übergeben,
Er müsste doch zu Grunde gehen."

Only prove that there is a large field of the unknowable, and one has at once the *vade mecum* for stupidity. Crude reflection can pour in its distinctions into a subject, and save itself from the consequences by pronouncing the basis incomprehensible. It also removes *all* possibility of Theology, or of the Piety of the Intellect, and leaves a very narrow margin for religious sentiment, or the Piety of the Heart.

The stage of Science represented by the French Encyclopa-dists was immediately hostile to each and every form of religion. This second stage, however, has a choice. It can, like Hamilton or Mansel, let religious belief alone, as pertaining to the unknown and unknowable—which may be *believed* in as much as one likes; or it may "strip off," as Spencer does, "determinations from a religion," by which it is distinguished from other religions, and show

their truth to consist in a common doctrine held by all, to-wit: "The truth of things is unknowable."

Thus the scientific man can baffle all attacks from the religious standpoint; nay, he can even elicit the most unbounded approval, while he saps the entire structure of Christianity.

Says Spencer (p. 46): "Science and Religion agree in this, that the power which the Universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable." He goes on to show that though this harmony exists, yet it is broken by the inconsistency of Religion: "For every religion, setting out with the tacit assertion of a mystery, forthwith proceeds to give some solution of this mystery, and so asserts that it is not a mystery passing human comprehension." In this confession he admits that all religions agree in professing to *reveal* the solution of the Mystery of the Universe to man; and they agree, moreover, that man, as simply a being of sense and reflection, cannot comprehend the revelation; but that he must pass through a profound mediation—be *regenerated*, not merely in his heart, but in *intellect* also. The misty limitations ("vagueness and confusion") of the imagination must give way to the purifying dialectic of pure thought before one can see the Eternal Verities.

These revelations profess to make known the nature of the Absolute. They call the Absolute "Him," "Infinite," "Self-created," "Self-existent," "Personal," and ascribe to this "Him" attributes implying profound mediation. All definite forms of religion, all definite theology, must at once be discarded according to Spencer's principle. Self-consciousness, even is regarded as impossible by him (p. 65.): "Clearly a true cognition of self implies a state in which the knowing and known are one, in which subject and object are identified; and this Mr. Mansel rightly holds to be the annihilation of both." He considers it a degradation (p. 109) to apply personality to God: "Is it not possible that there is a mode of being as much transcending intelligence and will as these transcend mechanical motion?" And again (p. 112) he holds that the mere "negation of absolute knowing contains more religion than all dogmatic theology."

(P. 121.) "All religions are envelopes of truth, which reveal to the lower and conceal to the higher." (P. 66.) "Objective and subjective things are alike inscrutable in their substance and genesis." "Ultimate religious and scientific ideas (p. 68) alike turn out to be mere symbols of the actual and not cognitions of it." (P. 69,) "We come to the negative result that the reality existing behind all appearances must ever be unknown."

In these passages we see a dualism posited in this form: "Everything immediate is *phenomenal*, a manifestation of the hidden and inscrutable essence." This essence is the unknown and unknowable; yet it *manifests* itself in the immediate or *phenomenal*.

The first stage of thought was unconscious that it dealt all the time with a mediated result (a dualism) while it assumed an immediate; that it asserted all truth to lie in the sensuous object, while it named at the same time "*matter and force*," categories of reflection.

The second stage has got over *that* difficulty, but has fallen into another. For if the phenomenon *manifested* the essence it could not be said to be "unknowable, hidden, and inscrutable." But if the essence is *not* manifested by the phenomenon, then we have the so-called phenomenon as a self-existent, and therefore independent of the so-called essence, which stands coördinated to it as another existent, which cannot be known because it does not manifest itself to us. Hence the "phenomenon" is no *phenomenon*, or manifestation of aught but itself, and the "essence" is simply a fiction of the philosopher.

Hence his talk about essence is purely gratuitous, for there is not shown the need of one.

A dialectical consideration of essence and phenomenon will result as follows:

Essence and Phenomenon.

I. If essence is seized as independent or absolute being, it may be taken in two senses:

a. As entirely unaffected by "otherness" (or limitation) and entirely undetermined; and this would be pure nothing, for it cannot distinguish itself or be distinguished from pure nothing.

b. As relating to itself, and hence making itself a duality—becoming its own other; in this case the “other” is a vanishing one, for it is at the same time identical and non-identical—a process in which the essence may be said to appear or become *phenomenal*. The entire process is the absolute or self-related (and hence independent). It is determined, but by itself, and hence not in a finite manner.

II. The Phenomenon is thus seen to arise through the self-determination of essence, and has obviously the following characteristics:

a. It is the “other” of the essence, and yet the own self of the essence existing in this opposed manner, and thus self-nugatory; and this non-abiding character gives it the name of phenomenon (or that which merely *appears*, but is no permanent essence).

b. If this were simply another to the essence, and not the self-opposition of the same, then it would be through itself, and *itself* the essence in its first (or immediate) phase. But this is the essence only as negated, or as returned from otherness.

c. This self-nugatoriness is seen to arise from the contradiction involved in its being other to itself, i. e. outside of its true being. *Without* this self-nugatoriness it would be an abiding, an essence itself, and hence no phenomenon; *with* this self-nugatoriness the phenomenon simply exhibits or “manifests” the essence; in fact, with the appearance and its negation taken together, we have before us a totality of essence and phenomenon.

III. Therefore: *a.* The phenomenal is such because it is not an abiding something. It is dependent upon other or essence. *b.* Whatever it possesses belongs to that upon which it depends, i. e. belongs to essence. *c.* In the self-nugatoriness of the phenomenal we have the entire essence manifested.

This latter point is the important result, and may be stated in a less strict and more popular form thus: The real world (so-called) is said to be in a state of change—origination and decay. Things pass away and others come in their places. Under

this change, however, there is a permanent called Essence.

The imaginative thinking finds it impossible to realize such an abiding as exists through the decay of all external form, and hence pronounces it unknowable. But pure thought seizes it, and finds it a pure self-relation or process of return to itself, which accordingly has duality, thus: *a.* The positing or producing of a somewhat or an immediate, and, *b.* The cancelling of the same. In this quality of beginning and ceasing, this self-relation completes its circle, and is thus, *c.* the entire movement.

All categories of the understanding (cause and effect, matter and form, possibility, etc.) are found to contain this movement when dissolved. And hence they have self-determination for their pre-supposition and explanation. It is unnecessary to add that unless one gives up trying to *imagine* truth, that this is all very absurd reasoning. (At the end of the sixth book of Plato's Republic, ch. xxi., and in the seventh book, ch. xiii., one may see how clearly this matter was understood more than two thousand years ago.)

To manifest or reveal is to make known: and hence to speak of the “manifestation of a hidden and inscrutable essence” is to speak of the making known of an unknowable.

Mr. Spencer goes on: no hypothesis of the universe is possible—creation not conceivable, for that would be something out of nothing—self-existence not conceivable, for that involves unlimited past time.

He holds that “all knowledge is *relative*,” for all explanation is the reducing of a cognition to a more general. He says, (p. 69.) “Of necessity, therefore, explanation must eventually bring us down to the inexplicable—the deepest truth which we can get at must be unaccountable.” This much valued insight has a positive side as well as the negative one usually developed:

I. (*a.*) To explain something we subsume it under a more general.

(*b.*) The “*summum genus*” cannot be subsumed, and

(*c.*) Hence is inexplicable.

II. But those who conclude from this that we base our knowledge ultimately

upon faith (from the supposed fact that we cannot prove our premises) forget that—

(a.) If the subsuming process ends in an unknown, then all the subsuming has resulted in nothing; for to subsume something under an unknown does not explain it. (Plato's Republic. Book VII. chap. xiii.)

(b.) The more general, however, is the more simple, and hence the "*summm genus*" is the purely simple—it is Being. But the simpler the clearer, and the purely simple is the absolutely clear.

(c.) At the "*summm genus*" subsumption becomes the principle of identity—being is being; and thus stated we have simple self-relation as the origin of all clearness and knowing whatsoever.

III. Hence it is seen that it is not the mere fact of subsumption that makes something clear, but rather it is the reduction of it to identity.

In pure being as the *summm genus*, the mind contemplates the pure form of knowing—"a is a," or "a subject is a predicate"—(a is b). The pure "is" is the empty form of mental affirmation, the pure copula; and thus in the *summm genus* the mind recognizes the pure form of itself. All objectivity is at this point dissolved into the thinking, and hence the subsumption becomes identity—(being=*ego*, or "*co-gito, ergo sum*";) the process turns round and becomes synthetic. ("dialectic" or "genetic," as called by some). From this it is evident that self-consciousness is the basis of all knowledge.

CHAPTER III.

THE "FIRST PRINCIPLES" OF THE "KNOWABLE."

As might be expected from Spencer's treatment of the *unknowable*, the *knowable* will prove a confused affair, especially since to the above-mentioned "inscrutability" of the absolute, he adds the doctrine of an "obscure consciousness of it."

holding, in fact, that the knowable is only a relative, and that it cannot be known without at the same time possessing a knowledge of the unknowable.

(P. 82) he says: "A thought involves relation, difference and likeness; whatever does not present each of them does not admit of cognition. And hence we may say that the unconditioned as presenting none of these, is trebly unthinkable." And yet he says. (p. 96): "The relative is itself inconceivable except as related to a real non-relative."

We will leave this infinite self-contradiction thus developed, and turn to the positions established concerning the knowable. They concern the nature of Force, Matter and Motion, and the predicates set up are "persistence," "indestructibility" and similar.

THE KNOWABLE.

Although in the first part "conceivability" was shown to be utterly inadequate as a test of truth; that with it we could not even establish that the earth is round, or that space is infinitely continuous, yet here Mr. Spencer finds that inconceivability is the most convenient of all positive proofs.

The first example to be noticed is his proof of the compressibility of matter (p. 51): "It is an established mechanical truth that if a body moving at a given velocity, strikes an equal body at rest in such wise that the two move on together, their joint velocity will be but half that of the striking body. Now it is a law of which the negative is inconceivable, that in passing from any one degree of magnitude to another all intermediate degrees must be passed through. Or in the case before us, a body moving at velocity 4, cannot, by collision, be reduced to velocity 2, without passing through all velocities between 4 and 2. But were matter truly solid—were its units absolutely incompressible and in unbroken contact—this "law of continuity," as it is called, would be broken in every case of collision. For when, of two such units, one moving at velocity 4 strikes another at rest, the striking unit must have its velocity 4 instantaneously reduced to velocity 2; must pass from velocity 4 to velocity 2 without any

lapse of time, and without passing through intermediate velocities; must be moving with velocities 4 and 2 at the same instant, which is impossible." On page 57 he acknowledges that any transition from one rate of motion to another is inconceivable; hence it does not help the matter to "pass through intermediate velocities." It is just as great a contradiction and just as inconceivable that velocity 4 should become velocity $3.9999+$, as it is that it should become velocity 2; for no change whatever of the motion can be thought (as he confesses) without having two motions in one time. Motion, in fact, is the synthesis of place and time, and cannot be comprehended except as their unity. The argument here quoted is only adduced by Mr. S. for the purpose of antithesis to other arguments on the other side as weak as itself.

On page 241, Mr. Spencer deals with the question of the destructibility of matter: "The annihilation of matter is unthinkable for the same reason that the creation of matter is unthinkable." (P. 54): "Matter in its ultimate nature is as absolutely incomprehensible as space and time." The nature of matter is unthinkable, its creation or destructibility is unthinkable, and in this style of reasoning we can add that its *indestructibility* is likewise unthinkable; in fact the argument concerning self-existence will apply here. (P. 31): "Self-existence necessarily means existence without a beginning; and to form a conception of self-existence is to form a conception of existence without a beginning. Now by no mental effort can we do this. To conceive existence through infinite past time, implies the conception of infinite past time, which is an impossibility." Thus, too, we might argue in a strain identical: indestructibility implies existence through infinite future time, but by no mental effort can infinite time be conceived. And thus, too, we prove and disprove the persistence of force and motion. When occasion requires, the ever-convenient argument of "inconceivability" enters. It reminds one of Sir Wm. Hamilton's "imbecility" upon which are based "sundry of the most important phenomena of intelligence," among which he mentions the category of causality. If causality is founded upon

imbecility, and all experience upon it, it follows that all empirical knowledge rests upon imbecility.

On page 247, our author asserts that the first law of motion "is in our day being merged in the more general one, that motion, like matter, is indestructible." It is interesting to observe that this so-called "First law of motion" rests on no better basis than very crude reflection.

"When not influenced by external forces, a moving body will go on in a straight line with a uniform velocity," is Spencer's statement of it.

This abstract supposed law has necessitated much scaffolding in Natural Philosophy that is otherwise entirely unnecessary; it contradicts the idea of momentum, and is thus refuted:

I. A body set in motion continues in motion after the impulse has ceased from without, for the reason that it retains momentum.

II. Momentum is the product of weight by velocity, and weight is the attraction of the body in question to another body external to it. If all bodies external to the moving body were entirely removed, the latter would have no weight, and hence the product of weight by velocity would be zero.

III. The "external influences" referred to in the so-called "law," mean chiefly attraction. Since no body could have momentum except through weight, another name for attraction, it follows that all free motion has reference to another body, and hence is curvilinear; thus we are rid of that embarrassing "straight-line motion" which gives so much trouble in mechanics. It has all to be reduced back again through various processes to curvilinear movement.

We come, finally, to consider the central point of this system:

THE CORRELATION OF FORCES.

Speaking of persistence of force, Mr. Spencer concedes (p. 252) that this doctrine is not demonstrable from experience. He says (p. 254): "Clearly the persistence of force is an ultimate truth of which no inductive proof is possible." (P. 255):

"By the persistence of force we really mean the persistence of some power which transcends our knowledge and conception." (P. 257): "The indestructibility of matter and the continuity of motion we saw to be really corollaries from the impossibility of establishing in thought a relation between something and nothing." (Thus what was established as a mental impotence is now made to have objective validity.) "Our inability to conceive matter and motion destroyed is our inability to suppress consciousness itself." (P. 258): "Whoever alleges that the inability to conceive a beginning or end of the universe is a *negative* result of our mental structure, can not deny that our consciousness of the universe as persistent is a positive result of our mental structure. And this persistence of the universe is the persistence of that unknown cause, power, or force, which is manifested to us through all phenomena." This "positive result of our mental structure" is said to rest on our "inability to conceive the limitation of consciousness" which is "simply the obverse of our inability to put an end to the thinking subject while still continuing to think." (P. 257): "To think of something becoming nothing, would involve that this substance of consciousness having just existed under a given form, should next assume no form, or should cease to be consciousness."

It will be observed here that he is endeavoring to solve the First Antinomy of Kant, and that his argument in this place differs from Kant's proof of the "Antithesis" in this, that while Kant proves that "The world [or universe] has no beginning," etc., by the impossibility of the origination of anything in a "void time," that Mr. Spencer proves the same thing by asserting it to be a "positive result of our mental structure," and then proceeds to show that this is a sort of "inability" which has a subjective explanation; it is, according to him, merely the "substance of consciousness" objectified and regarded as the law of reality.

But how is it with the "Thesis" to that Antinomy, "The world *has* a beginning in time?" Kant proves this apagogically by showing the absurdity of an "infinite series already elapsed." That our

author did not escape the contradiction has already been shown in our remarks upon the "indestructibility of matter." While he was treating of the unknowable it was his special province to prove that self-existence is unthinkable. (P. 31): He says it means "existence without a beginning," and "to conceive existence through infinite past time, implies the conception of infinite past time, which is an impossibility." Thus we have the Thesis of the Antinomy supported in his doctrine of the "unknowable," and the antithesis of the same proved in the doctrine of the knowable.

We shall next find him involved with Kant's Third Antinomy.

The doctrine of the correlation is stated in the following passages:

(P. 280): "Those modes of the unknowable, which we call motion, heat, light, chemical affinity, etc., are alike transformable into each other, and into those modes of the unknowable which we distinguish as sensation, emotion, thought: these, in their turns, being directly or indirectly re-transformable into the original shapes. That no idea or feeling arises, save as a result of some physical force expended in producing it, is fast becoming a common-place of science; and whoever duly weighs the evidence, will see that nothing but an overwhelming bias in favor of a preconceived theory can explain its non-acceptance. How this metamorphosis takes place—how a force existing as motion, heat or light, can become a mode of consciousness—how it is possible for ærial vibrations to generate the sensation we call sound, or for the forces liberated by chemical changes in the brain to give rise to emotion—these are mysteries which it is impossible to fathom." (P. 284): "Each manifestation of force can be interpreted only as the effect of some antecedent force; no matter whether it be an inorganic action, an animal movement, a thought, or a feeling. Either this must be conceded, or else it must be asserted that our successive states of consciousness are self-created." "Either mental energies as well as bodily ones are quantitatively correlated to certain energies expended in their production, and to certain other energies they initiate; or else nothing must become something

and something, nothing. Since persistence of force, being a *datum* of consciousness, cannot be denied, its unavoidable corollary must be accepted."

On p. 294 he supports the doctrine that "motion takes the direction of the least resistance," mentally as well as physically.

Here are some of the inferences to be drawn from the passages quoted:

1. Every act is determined from without, and hence does not belong to the subject in which it manifests itself.

2. To change the course of a force, is to make another direction "that of the least resistance," or to remove or diminish a resistance.

3. But to change a resistance requires force, which (in motion) must act in "the direction of the least resistance," and hence be entirely determined from without, and governed by the disposition of the forces it meets.

4. Hence, of *will*, it is an absurdity to talk; *freedom* or *moral agency* is an impossibility.

5. That there is self-determination in self-consciousness—that it is "self-created"—is to Mr. Spencer the absurd alternative which at once turns the scale in favor of the doctrine that mental phenomena are the productions of external forces.

After this, what are we to say of the following? (P. 501): "Notwithstanding all evidence to the contrary, there will probably have arisen in not a few minds the conviction that the solutions which have been given, along with those to be derived from them, are essentially materialistic. Let none persist in these misconceptions." (P. 502): "Their implications are no more materialistic than they are spiritualistic, and no more spiritualistic than they are materialistic."

If we hold these positions by the side of Kant's Third Antinomy, we shall see that they all belong to the proof of the "Antithesis," viz.: "There is no freedom, but everything in the world happens according to the laws of nature." The "Thesis," viz.: "That a causality of freedom is necessary to account fully for the phenomena of the world," he has not anywhere supported. We find, in fact, only those thinkers who have in some measure mastered the third phase of culture in thought,

standing upon the basis presented by Kant in the Thesis. The chief point in the Thesis may be stated as follows: 1. If everything that happens presupposes a previous condition, (which the law of causality states,) 2. This previous condition cannot be a permanent (or have been always in existence); for, if so, its consequence, or the effect, would have always existed. Thus the previous condition must be a thing which has happened. 3. With this the whole law of causality collapses; for (a) since each cause is an effect, (b) its determining power escapes into a higher member of the series, and, (c) unless the law changes, wholly vanishes; there result an indefinite series of effects with no cause; each member of the series is a dependent, has its being in another, which again has its being in another, and hence cannot support the subsequent term.

Hence it is evident that this Antinomy consists, first: in the setting up of the law of causality as having absolute validity, which is the antithesis. Secondly, the experience is made that such absolute law of causality is a self-nugatory one, and thus it is to be inferred that causality, to be at all, presupposes an origination in a "self-moved," as Plato calls it. Aristotle (*Metaphysics*, xi. 6-7, and ix. 8) exhibits this ultimate as the "self-active," and the Scholastics take the same, under the designation "*actus purus*, for the definition of God.

The Antinomy thus reduced gives:

I. Thesis: Self-determination must lie at the basis of all causality, otherwise causality cannot be all.

II. Antithesis: If there is self-determination, "the unity of experience (which leads us to look for a cause) is destroyed, and hence no such case could arise in experience."

In comparing the two proofs it is at once seen that they are of different degrees of universality. The argument of the Thesis is based upon the nature of the thing itself, i. e., a pure thought; while that of the Antithesis loses sight of the idea of "*efficient*" cause, and seeks mere continuity in the sequence of time, and thus exhibits itself as the second stage of thought, which leans on the staff of fancy, i. e. mere

representative thinking. This "unity of experience," as Kant calls it, is the same thing, stated in other words, that Spencer refers to as the "positive result of our mental structure." In one sense those are true antinomies—those of Kant, Hamilton, *et al.*—viz. in this: that the "representative stage of thinking finds itself unable to shake off the sensuous picture, and think "*sub quadam specie aternitatis*." To the mind disciplined to the third stage of thought, these are no antinomies; Spinoza, Leibnitz, Plato and Aristotle are not confused by them. The Thesis, properly stated, is a true universal, and exhibits its own truth, as that upon which the law of causality rests; and hence the antithesis itself—less universal—resting upon the law of causality, is based upon the Thesis. Moreover, the Thesis does not deny an infinite succession in time and space, it only states that there must be an efficient cause—just what the law of causality states, but shows, in addition, that this efficient cause must be a "self-determined."

On page 282 we learn that, "The solar heat is the final source of the force manifested by society." "It (the force of society) is based on animal and vegetable products, and these in turn are dependent on the light and heat of the sun."

As an episode in this somewhat abstract discussion, it may be diverting to notice the question of priority of discovery touched upon in the following note (p. 454): "Until I recently consulted his 'Outlines of Astronomy' on another question, I was not aware that, so far back as 1833, Sir John Herschel had enunciated the doctrine that 'the sun's rays are the ultimate source of almost every motion which takes place on the surface of the earth.' He expressly includes all geologic, meteorologic, and vital actions; as also those which we produce by the combustion of coal. The late George Stephenson appears to have been wrongly credited with this last idea."

In order to add to the thorough discussion of this important question, we wish to suggest the claims of Thomas Carlyle, who, as far back as 1830, wrote the following passage in his *Sartor Resartus* (Am. ed. pp. 55-6): "Well sang the Hebrew Psalmist: 'If I take the wings of the

morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the Universe, God is there.' Thou, too, O cultivated reader, who too probably art no psalmist, but a prosaist, knowing God only by tradition, knowest thou any corner of the world where at least force is not? The drop which thou shakest from thy wet hand, rests not where it falls, but to-morrow thou findest it swept away; already, on the wings of the north-wind, it is nearing the tropic of Cancer. How it came to evaporate and not lie motionless? Think—est thou there is aught motionless, without force, and dead?"

"As I rode through the Schwartzwald, I said to myself: That little fire which glows starlike across the dark-growing (*nachtende*) moor, where the sooty smith bends over his anvil, and thou hopest to replace thy lost horseshoe—is it a detached, separated speck, cut off from the whole universe, or indissolubly joined to the whole? Thou fool, that smithy-fire was primarily kindled at the sun; is fed by air that circulates from beyond Noah's deluge, from beyond the Dog star; it is a little ganglion, or nervous centre in the great vital system of immensity."

We have, finally, to consider the correlation theory in connection with the idea of equilibrium.

I. Motion results from destroyed equilibrium. The whole totality does not correspond to itself, its ideal and real contradict each other. The movement is the restoring of the equilibrium, or the bringing into unity the ideal and real. To illustrate: a spring (made of steel, rubber, or any elastic material) has a certain form in which it may exist without tension; this may be called the ideal shape, or simply the ideal. If the spring is forced to assume another shape, its real shape becomes different from the ideal; its equilibrium is destroyed, and force is manifested as a tendency to restore the equilibrium (or unity of the ideal and real). Generalize this: all forces have the same nature; (a) *expansive* forces arise from the ideal existing without—a gas, steam, for example, ideally takes up a more extended space than it has really; it expands to fill it. Or (b) *contractive* forces: the multiplicity ideally exists within; e. g. attrac-

tion of gravitation; matter trying to find the centre of the earth, its ideal. The will acts in this way: The ideal is changed first, and draws the real after it. I first destroy, in thought and will, the identity of of ideal and real; the tension resulting is force. Thinking, since it deals with the universal (or the potential *and* the actual) is an original source of force, and as will result in the sequel from a reverse analysis (see below, V. 3, c) the *only* source of force.

II. Persistence of force requires an un-restorable equilibrium; in moving to restore one equilibrium, it must destroy another—its equivalent.

III. But this contradicts the above developed conception of force as follows: (a) Since force results from destroyed equilibrium, it follows (b) that it requires as much force to destroy the equilibrium as is developed in the restoring of it (and this notion is the basis of the correlation theory). But (c) if the first equilibrium (already destroyed) can only be restored by the destroying of another equal to the same, it has already formed an equilibrium with the second, and the occasion of the motion is removed.

If two forces are equal and opposed, which will give way?

By this dialectic consideration of force, we learn the insufficiency of the theory of correlation as the ultimate truth. Instead of being "the sole truth, which transcends experience by underlying it" (p. 258), we are obliged to confess that this "persistence of force" rests on the category of causality; its thin disguise consists in the substitution of other words for the metaphysical expression, "Every effect must be equal to its cause." And this, when tortured in the crucible, confesses that the only efficient cause is "*causa sui*;" hence the effect is equal to its cause, because it is the cause.

And the correlation theory results in showing that force cannot be, unless self-originated.

That self-determination is the inevitable result, no matter what hypothesis be assumed, is also evident. Taking all counter hypotheses and generalizing them, we have this analysis:

I. Any and every being is determined from without through another. (This theorem includes all anti-self-determination doctrines.)

II. It results from this that any and every being is dependent upon another and is a finite one; it cannot be isolated without destroying it. Hence it results that every being is an element of a whole that includes it as a subordinate moment.

III. Dependent being, as a subordinate element, cannot be said to support any thing attached to it, for its own support is not in itself but in another, namely, the whole that includes it. From this it results that no dependent being can depend upon another dependent being, but rather upon the including whole.

The including whole is therefore not a dependent; since it is for itself, and each element is determined through it, and for it, it may be called the *negative* unity (or the unity which negates the independence of the elements).

Remark.—A chain of dependent beings collapses into one dependent being. Dependence is not converted into independence by simple multiplication. All dependence is thus an element of an independent whole.

IV. What is the *character* of this independent whole, this *negative unity*? "Character" means determination, and we are prepared to say that its determination cannot be through another, for then it would be a dependent, and we should be referred again to the whole, including it. Its determination by which the multiplicity of elements arises is hence its own self-determination. Thus all finitude and dependence presupposes as its condition, self-determination.

V. Self-determination more closely examined exhibits some remarkable results, (which will throw light on the discussion of "Essence and Phenomenon" above):

(1.) It is "*causa sui*;" active and passive; existing dually as determining and determined; this self-diremption produces a distinction in itself which is again cancelled.

(2.) As determiner (or active, or cause), it is the pure universal—the *possibility of any determinations*. But as *determined* (passive or effect) it is the special, the particular, the one-sided reality that enters into change.

(3.) But it is "negative unity" of these two sides, and hence an individual. The pure universal whose negative relation to itself as determiner makes the particular, completes itself to individuality through this act.

(a.) Since its pure universality is the substrate of its determination, and at the same time a self-related activity (or negativity), it at once becomes its own object.

(b) Its activity (limiting or determining)—a pure negativity—turned to itself as object, dissolves the particular in the universal, and thus continually realizes its subjectivity.

(c.) Hence these two sides of the negative unity are more properly subject and object, and since they are identical (*causa sui*) we may name the result "self-consciousness."

The absolute truth of all truths, then, is that self-consciousness is the form of the Total. God is a Person, or rather *the* Person. Through His self-consciousness (thought of Himself) he makes Himself an object to Himself (Nature), and in the same act cancels it again into His own image (finite spirit), and thus comprehends Himself in this self-revelation.

Two remarks must be made here: (1.) This is not "Panthéism;" for it results that God is a Person; and secondly Nature is a self-cancelling side in the process; thirdly, the so-called "finite spirit," or man, is immortal, since otherwise he would not be the last link of the chain; but such he is, because he can develop out of his sensuous life to pure thought, unconditioned by time and space, and hence he can surpass any *fixed* "higher intelligence," no matter how high created.

(2.) It is the result that all profound thinkers have arrived at.

Aristotle (Metaphysics XI. 6 & 7) carries this whole question of motion back to its presupposition in a mode of treatment "*sub quodam specie æternitatis*." He concludes thus: "The thinking, however, of that which is purely for itself, is a think-

ing of that which is most excellent in and for itself.

"The thinking thinks itself, however, through participation with that which is thought by it; it becomes this object in its own activity, in such manner that the subject and object are identical. For the apprehending of thought and essence is what constitutes reason. The activity of thinking produces that which is perceived; so that the activity is rather that which Reason seems to have of a divine nature; speculation [pure thinking] is the most excellent employment; if, then, God is always engaged in this, as we are at times. He is admirable, and if in a higher degree, more admirable. But he *is* in this pure thinking, and life too belongs to Him; for the activity of thought is life. He is this activity. The activity, returning into itself, is the most excellent and eternal life. We say, therefore, that God is an eternal and the best living being. So that life and duration are uninterrupted and eternal; for this is God."

When one gets rid of those "images of sense" called by Spencer "conceivables," and arrives at the "unpicturable notions of intelligence," he will find it easy to reduce the vexed antinomies of force, matter, motion, time, space and causality; arriving at the fundamental principle—self-determination—he will be able to make a science of Biology. The organic realm will not yield to dualistic Reflection. Goethe is the great pioneer of the school of physicists that will spring out of the present activity of Reflection when it shall have arrived at a perception of its own method.

Resume.—Mr. Spencer's results, so far as philosophy is concerned, may be briefly summed up under four general heads: 1. Psychology. 2. Ontology. 3. Theology. 4. Cosmology.

PSYCHOLOGY.

(1.) Conception is a mere picture in the mind; therefore what cannot be pictured cannot be conceived; therefore the Infinite, the Absolute, God, Essence, Matter, Motion, Force—anything, in short, that involves mediation—cannot be conceived; hence they are unknowable.

(2.) Consciousness is self-knowing; but

that subject and object are one, is impossible. We can neither know ourselves nor any real being.

(3.) All reasoning or explaining is the subsuming of a somewhat under a more general category; hence the highest category is unsubsumed, and hence inexplicable.

(4.) Our intellectual faculties may be improved to a certain extent, and beyond this, no amount of training can avail anything. (Biology, vol. 1, p. 188.)

(5.) The "substance of consciousness" is the basis of our ideas of persistence of Force, Matter, etc.

(6.) All knowing is relative; our knowledge of this fact, however, is not relative but absolute.

ONTOLOGY.

(1.) All that we know is phenomenal. The reality passes all understanding. In the phenomenon the essence is "manifested," but still it is not revealed thereby; it remains hidden behind it, inscrutable to our perception.

(2.) And yet, since all our knowledge is relative, we have an obscure knowledge of the hidden and inscrutable essence of the correlate of our knowledge of phenomena. We know that it exists.

(3.) Though what is inconceivable is for that reason unknowable, yet we know that persistence belongs to force, motion and matter; it is a positive result of our "mental structure," although we cannot conceive either destructibility or indestructibility.

(4.) Though self-consciousness is an impossibility, yet it sometimes occurs, since the "substance of consciousness" is the object of consciousness when it decides upon the persistence of the Universe, and of Force, Matter, etc.

THEOLOGY.

The Supreme Being is unknown and unknowable; unrevealed and unrevealable, either naturally or supernaturally; for to reveal, requires that some one shall comprehend what is revealed. The sole doctrine of religion of great value is the doctrine that God transcends the human intellect. When Religion professes to reveal Him to man and declare His attributes, then it is irreligious. Though God is the unknown, yet personality, reason, consciousness, etc., are degrading when applied to Him. The "Thirty-nine Articles" should be condensed into one, thus: There is an Unknown which I know that I cannot know."

"Religions are envelopes of truth which reveal to the lower, and conceal to the higher." "They are modes of manifestation of the unknowable."

COSMOLOGY.

"Evolution is a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; through continuous differentiations and integrations." This is the law of the Universe. All progresses to an equilibration—to a moving equilibrium.

INTRODUCTION TO FICHTE'S SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

TRANSLATED BY A. E. KROEGER.

[NOTE.—In presenting this "Introduction" to the readers of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, we believe we afford them the easiest means of gaining an insight into Fichte's great work on the Science of Knowledge. The present introduction was written by Fichte in 1797, three years after the first publication of his full system. It is certainly written in a remarkably clear and vigorous style, so as to be likely to arrest the attention even of those who have but little acquaintance with the rudiments of the Science of Philosophy. This led us to give it the preference over other essays, also written by Fichte, as Introductions to his Science of Knowledge. A translation of the Science of Knowledge, by Mr. Kroeger is at present in course of publication in New York. This article is, moreover, interesting as being a more complete unfolding of the doctrine of Plato upon Method, heretofore announced.—ED.]

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

De re, quæ agitur, petimus, ut homines, eam non opinionem, sed opus esse, cogitent ac pro certo habeant, non sectæ nos alicujus, aut placiti, sed utilitatis et amplitudinis humanæ fundamenta moliri. Deinde ut, suis commodis æqui, in commune consulant, et ipsi in partem veniant.—*Baco de Verulamio.*

The author of the Science of Knowledge was soon convinced, through a slight acquaintance with the philosophical literature since the appearance of Kant's Critiques, that the object of this great man—to effect a total reform in the study of philosophy, and hence of all science—had resulted in a failure, since not one of his numerous successors appeared to understand what he had really spoken of. The author believed that he had understood the latter; he resolved to devote his life to a representation—totally independent from Kant's—of that great discovery, and he will not give up this resolve. Whether he will succeed better in making himself understood to his age, time alone can show. At all events, he knows that nothing true and useful, which has once been given to mankind, is lost, though only remote posterity should learn how to use it.

Determined, by my academical vocation, I wrote, in the first instance, for my hearers, with whom it was in my power to explain myself in words until I was understood.

This is not the place to testify how much cause I have to be satisfied with my efforts, and to entertain, of some of my

students, the best hopes for science. That book of mine has also become known elsewhere, and there are various opinions afloat concerning it amongst the learned. A judgment, which even pretended to bring forth arguments. I have neither read nor heard, except from my students, but I have both heard and read a vast amount of derision, denunciation, and the general assurance that everybody is heartily opposed to this doctrine, and the confession that no one can understand it. As far as the latter is concerned, I will cheerfully assume all the blame, until others shall represent it so as to make it comprehensible, when students will doubtless discover that my representation was not so very bad after all; or I will assume it altogether and unconditionally, if the reader thereby should be encouraged to study the present representation, in which I shall endeavor to be as clear as possible. I shall continue these representations so long as I am convinced that I do not write altogether in vain. But I write in vain when nobody examines my argument.

I still owe my readers the following explanations: I have always said, and say again, that my system is the same as Kant's. That is to say, it contains the same view of the subject, but is totally independent of Kant's mode of representation. I have said this, not to cover myself by a great authority, or to support my doctrine except by itself, but in order to say the truth and to be just.

Perhaps it may be proven after twenty years. Kant is as yet a sealed book, and

what he has been understood to teach, is exactly what he intended to eradicate.

My writings are neither to explain Kant, nor to be explained by his; they must stand by themselves, and Kant must not be counted in the game at all. My object is—let me say it frankly—not to correct or amplify such philosophical reflections as may be current, be they called anti-Kant or Kant, but to totally eradicate them, and to effect a complete revolution in the mode of thinking regarding these subjects, so that hereafter the Object will be posited and determined by Knowledge (Reason), and not *vice versa*; and this seriously, not merely in words.

Let no one object: "If this system is true, certain axioms cannot be upheld," for I do not intend that anything should be upheld which this system refutes.

Again: "I do not understand this book," is to me a very uninteresting and insignificant confession. No one can and shall understand my writings, without having studied them; for they do not contain a lesson heretofore taught, but something—since Kant has not been understood—altogether new to the age.

Censure without argument tells me simply that my doctrine does not please; and this confession is again very unimportant; for the question is not at all, whether it pleases you or not, but whether it has been proven. In the present sketch I write only for those, in whom there still dwells an inner sense of love for truth; who still value science and conviction, and who are impelled by a lively zeal to seek truth. With those, who, by long spiritual slavery, have lost with the faith in their own conviction their faith in the conviction of others; who consider it folly if anybody attempts to seek truth for himself; who see nothing in science but a comfortable mode of subsistence; who are horrified at every proposition to enlarge its boundaries as involving a new labor, and who consider no means disgraceful by which they can hope to suppress him who makes such a proposition,—with those I have nothing to do.

I should be sorry if *they* understood me. Hitherto this wish of mine has been realized; and I hope, even now, that these present lines will so confuse them that they

can perceive nothing more in them than mere words, while that which represents their mind is torn hither and thither by their ill-concealed rage.

INTRODUCTION.

I. Attend to thyself; turn *thine* eye away from all that surrounds thee and into *thine* own inner self! Such is the first task imposed upon the student by Philosophy. We speak of nothing that is without thee, but merely of thyself.

The slightest self-observation must show every one a remarkable difference between the various immediate conditions of his consciousness, which we may also call representations. For some of them appear altogether dependent upon our freedom, and we cannot possibly believe that there is without us anything corresponding to them. Our imagination, our will, appears to us as free. Others, however, we refer to a Truth as their model, which is held to be firmly fixed, independent of us; and in determining such representations, we find ourselves conditioned by the necessity of their harmony with this Truth. In the knowledge of them we do not consider ourselves free, as far as their contents are concerned. In short: while some of our representations are accompanied by the feeling of freedom, others are accompanied by the feeling of necessity.

Reasonably the question cannot arise—why are the representations dependent upon our freedom determined in precisely this manner, and not otherwise? For in supposing them to be dependent upon our freedom, all application of the conception of a ground is rejected; they are thus, because I so fashioned them, and if I had fashioned them differently, they would be otherwise.

But it is certainly a question worthy of reflection—what is the ground of the system of those representations which are accompanied by the feeling of necessity and of that feeling of necessity itself? To answer this question is the object of philosophy; and, in my opinion, nothing is philosophy but the Science which solves this problem. The system of those representations, which are accompanied by the feeling of necessity, is also called *Experi-*

ence—internal as well as external experience. Philosophy, therefore, to say the same thing in other words, has to find the ground of all Experience.

Only three objections can be raised against this. Somebody might deny that representations, accompanied by the feeling of necessity, and referred to a Truth determined without any action of ours, do ever occur in our consciousness. Such a person would either deny his own knowledge, or be altogether differently constructed from other men; in which latter case his denial would be of no concern to us. Or somebody might say: the question is completely unanswerable, we are in irremovable ignorance concerning it, and must remain so. To enter into argument with such a person is altogether superfluous. The best reply he can receive is an actual answer to the question, and then all he can do is to examine our answer, and tell us why and in what matters it does not appear satisfactory to him. Finally, somebody might quarrel about the designation, and assert: "Philosophy is something else than what you have stated above, or at least something else besides." It might be easily shown to such a one, that scholars have at all times designated exactly what we have just stated to be Philosophy, and that whatever else he might assert to be Philosophy, has already another name, and that if this word signifies anything at all, it must mean exactly this Science. But as we are not inclined to enter upon any dispute about words, we, for our part, have already given up the name of Philosophy, and have called the Science which has the solution of this problem for its object, the *Science of Knowledge*.

II. Only when speaking of something, which we consider *accidental*, i. e. which we suppose might also have been otherwise, though it was not determined by freedom, can we ask for its ground; and by this very asking for its ground does it become accidental to the questioner. To find the ground of anything accidental means, to find something else, from the determinedness of which it can be seen why the accidental, amongst the various conditions it might have assumed, assumed

precisely the one it did. The ground lies—by the very thinking of a ground—beyond its Grounded, and both are, in so far as they are Ground and Grounded, opposed to each other, related to each other, and thus the latter is explained from the former.

Now Philosophy is to discover the ground of all experience; hence its object lies necessarily *beyond all Experience*. This sentence applies to all Philosophy, and has been so applied always heretofore, if we except these latter days of Kant's misconstruers and their facts of consciousness, i. e. of inner experience.

No objection can be raised to this paragraph; for the premise of our conclusion is a mere analysis of the above-stated conception of Philosophy, and from the premise the conclusion is drawn. If somebody should wish to remind us that the conception of a ground must be differently explained, we can, to be sure, not prevent him from forming another conception of it, if he so chooses; but we declare, on the strength of our good right, that *we*, in the above description of Philosophy, wish to have nothing else understood by that word. Hence, if it is not to be so understood, the possibility of Philosophy, as we have described it, must be altogether denied, and such a denial we have replied to in our first section.

III. The finite intelligence has nothing beyond experience; experience contains the whole substance of its thinking. The philosopher stands necessarily under the same conditions, and hence it seems impossible that he can elevate himself beyond experience.

But he can abstract; i. e. he can separate by the freedom of thinking what in experience is united. In Experience, the *Thing*—that which is to be determined in itself independent of our freedom, and in accordance with which our knowledge is to shape itself—and the Intelligence—which is to obtain a knowledge of it—are inseparably united. The philosopher may abstract from both, and if he does, he has abstracted from Experience, and elevated himself above it. If he abstracts from the first, he retains an intelligence *in itself*, i. e. abstracted from its relation to experience; if he abstract from the latter, he re-

tains the *Thing in itself*, i. e. abstracted from the fact that it occurs in experience; and thus retains the Intelligence in itself, or the "Thing in itself," as the explanatory ground of Experience. The former mode of proceeding is called *Idealism*, the latter *Dogmatism*.

Only these two philosophical systems—and of that these remarks should convince everybody—are possible. According to the first system the representations, which are accompanied by the feeling of necessity, are productions of the Intelligence, which must be presupposed in their explanation; according to the latter system they are the productions of a thing in itself which must be presupposed to explain them. If anybody desired to deny this, he would have to prove that there is still another way to go beyond experience than the one by means of abstraction, or that the consciousness of experience contains more than the two components just mentioned.

Now in regard to the first, it will appear below, it is true, that what we have here called Intelligence does, indeed, occur in consciousness under another name, and hence is not altogether produced by abstraction; but it will at the same time be shown that the consciousness of it is conditioned by an abstraction, which, however, occurs naturally to mankind.

We do not at all deny that it is possible to compose a whole system from fragments of these incongruous systems, and that this illogical labor has often been undertaken; but we do deny that more than these two systems are possible in a logical course of proceeding.

IV. Between the object—(we shall call the explanatory ground of experience, which a philosophy asserts, the *object of that philosophy*, since it appears to be only through and for such philosophy)—between the object of *Idealism* and that of *Dogmatism* there is a remarkable distinction in regard to their relation to consciousness generally. All whereof I am conscious is called object of consciousness. There are three ways in which the object can be related to consciousness. Either it appears to have been produced by the representation, or as existing without any

action of ours; and in the latter case, as either also determined in regard to its qualitateness, or as existing merely in regard to its existence, while determinable in regard to its qualitateness by the free intelligence.

The first relation applies merely to an imaginary object; the second merely to an object of Experience; the third applies only to an object, which we shall at once proceed to describe.

I can determine myself by freedom to think, for instance, the *Thing in itself* of the Dogmatists. Now if I am to abstract from the thought and look simply upon myself, I myself become the object of a particular representation. That I appear to myself as determined in precisely this manner, and none other, e. g. as thinking, and as thinking of all possible thoughts—precisely this *Thing in itself*, is to depend exclusively upon my own freedom of self-determination; I have made myself such a particular object out of my own free will. I have not made *myself*; on the contrary, I am forced to think myself in advance as determinable through this self-determination. Hence I am myself my own object, the determinateness of which, under certain conditions, depends altogether upon the intelligence, but the existence of which must always be presupposed. Now this very "I" is the object of Idealism. The object of this system does not occur actually as something real in consciousness, not as a *Thing in itself*—for then Idealism would cease to be what it is, and become Dogmatism—but as "*I*" in *itself*; not as an object of Experience—for it is not determined, but is exclusively determinable through my freedom, and without this determination it would be nothing, and is really not at all—but as something beyond all Experience.

The object of Dogmatism, on the contrary, belongs to the objects of the first class, which are produced solely by free Thinking. The *Thing in itself* is a mere invention, and has no reality at all. It does not occur in Experience, for the system of Experience is nothing else than Thinking accompanied by the feeling of necessity, and can not even be said to be anything else by the dogmatist, who, like every philosopher, has to explain its cause.

True the dogmatist wants to obtain reality for it through the necessity of thinking it as a ground of all experience, and would succeed, if he could prove that experience can be, and can be explained only by means of it. But this is the very thing in dispute, and he cannot presuppose what must first be proven.

Hence the object of Idealism has this advantage over the object of Dogmatism, that it is not to be deduced as the explanatory ground of experience—which would be a contradiction, and change this system itself into a part of experience—but that it is, nevertheless, to be pointed out as a part of consciousness; whereas, the object of Dogmatism can pass for nothing but a mere invention, which obtains validity only through the success of the system.

This we have said merely to promote a clearer insight into the distinction between the two systems, but not to draw from it conclusions against the latter system. That the object of every philosophy, as explanatory ground of Experience, must lie beyond all experience, is required by the very nature of philosophy, and is far from being derogatory to a system. But we have as yet discovered no reasons why that object should also occur in a particular manner within consciousness.

If anybody should not be able to convince himself of the truth of what we have just said, this would not make his conviction of the truth of the whole system an impossibility, since what we have just said was only intended as a passing remark. Still in conformity to our plan we will also here take possible objections into consideration. Somebody might deny the asserted immediate self-consciousness in a free act of the mind. Such a one we should refer to the conditions stated above. This self-consciousness does not obtrude itself upon us, and comes not of its own accord; it is necessary first to act free and next to abstract from the object, and attend to one's self. Nobody can be forced to do this and though he may say he has done it, it is impossible to say whether he has done it correctly. In one word, this consciousness cannot be proven to any one, but everybody must freely produce it within himself. Against the second assertion, that the "Thing in itself" is a mere in-

vention, an objection could only be raised, because it were misunderstood.

V. Neither of these two systems can directly refute the other; for their dispute is a dispute about the first principle: each system if you only admit its first axiom—proves the other one wrong, each denies all to the opposite and these two systems have no point in common from which they might bring about a mutual understanding and reconciliation. Though they may agree on the words of a sentence, they will surely attach a different meaning to the words.

(Hence the reason why Kant has not been understood and why the Science of Knowledge can find no friends. The systems of Kant and of the Science of Knowledge are *idealistic*—not in the general indefinite, but in the just described definite sense of the word; but the modern philosophers are all of them dogmatists, and are firmly resolved to remain so. Kant was merely tolerated, because it was possible to make a dogmatist out of him; but the Science of Knowledge, which cannot be thus construed, is insupportable to these wise men. The rapid extension of Kant's philosophy—when it was thus misunderstood—is not a proof of the profundity, but rather of the shallowness of the age. For in this shape it is the most wonderful abortion ever created by human imagination, and it does little honor to its defenders that they do not perceive this. It can also be shown that this philosophy was accepted so greedily only because people thought it would put a stop to all serious speculation, and continue the era of shallow Empiricism.)

First. Idealism cannot refute Dogmatism. True, the former system has the advantage, as we have already said, of being enabled to point out its explanatory ground of all experience—the free acting intelligence—as a fact of consciousness. This fact the dogmatist must also admit, for otherwise he would render himself incapable of maintaining the argument with his opponent; but he at the same time by a correct conclusion from his principle, changes this explanatory ground into a deception and appearance, and thus renders it incapable of being the explanatory ground of anything else since it cannot maintain its

own existence in its own philosophy. According to the Dogmatist, all phenomena of our consciousness are productions of a *Thing in itself*, even our pretended determinations by freedom, and the belief that we are free. This belief is produced by the effect of the Thing upon ourselves, and the determinations, which we deduced from freedom, are also produced by it. The only difference is, that we are not aware of it in these cases, and hence ascribe it to no cause, i. e. to our freedom. Every logical dogmatist is necessarily a Fatalist; he does not deny the fact of consciousness, that we consider ourselves free—for this would be against reason;—but he proves from his principle that this is a false view. He denies the independence of the *Ego*, which is the basis of the Idealist, *in toto*, makes it merely a production of the Thing, an accident of the World; and hence the logical dogmatist is necessarily also materialist. He can only be refuted from the postulate of the freedom and independence of the *Ego*; but this is precisely what he denies. Neither can the dogmatist refute the Idealist.

The principle of the former, the Thing in itself, is nothing and has no reality, as its defenders themselves must admit, except that which it is to receive from the fact that experience can be explained only by it. But this proof the Idealist annihilates by explaining experience in another manner, hence by denying precisely what dogmatism assumes. Thus the Thing in itself becomes a complete Chimera; there is no further reason why it should be assumed; and with it the whole edifice of dogmatism tumbles down.

From what we have just stated, is more-over evident the complete irreconcilability of both systems; since the *results* of the one destroy those of the other. Wherever their union has been attempted the members would not fit together, and somewhere an immense gulf appeared which could not be spanned.

If any one were to deny this he would have to prove the possibility of such a union—of a union which consists in an everlasting composition of Matter and Spirit, or, which is the same, of Necessity and Liberty.

Now since, as far as we can see at pres-

ent, both systems appear to have the same speculative value, but since both cannot stand together, nor yet either convince the other, it occurs as a very interesting question: What can possibly tempt persons who comprehend this—and to comprehend it is so very easy a matter—to prefer the one over the other; and why skepticism, as the total renunciation of an answer to this problem, does not become universal?

The dispute between the Idealist and the Dogmatist is, in reality, the question, whether the independence of the *Ego* is to be sacrificed to that of the Thing, or *vice versa*? What, then, is it which induces sensible men to decide in favor of the one or the other?

The philosopher discovers from this point of view—in which he must necessarily place himself, if he wants to pass for a philosopher, and which in the progress of Thinking, every man necessarily occupies sooner or later,—nothing farther than that he is forced to represent to himself both: that he is free, and that there are determined things outside of him. But it is impossible for man to stop at this thought; the thought of a representation is but a half a thought, a broken off fragment of a thought; something must be thought and added to it, as corresponding with the representation independent of it. In other words: the representation cannot exist alone by itself, it is only something in connection with something else, and in itself it is nothing. This necessity of thinking it is, which forces one from that point-of view to the question: What is the ground of the representations? or, which is exactly the same, What is that which corresponds to them?

Now the *representation* of the independence of the *Ego* and that of the Thing can very well exist together but not the independence *itself* of both. Only one can be the first, the beginning the independent; the second by the very fact of being the second, becomes necessarily dependent upon the first, with which it is to be connected—now which of the two is to be made the first? Reason furnishes no ground for a decision; since the question concerns not the connecting of one link with another, but the commencement of the first link, which as an absolute first act is alto-

gether conditional upon the freedom of Thinking. Hence the decision is arbitrary; and since this arbitrariness is nevertheless to have a cause, the decision is dependent upon *inclination* and *interest*. The last ground, therefore, of the difference between the Dogmatist and the Idealist is the difference of their interest.

The highest interest, and hence the ground of all other interest, is that which we feel *for ourselves*. Thus with the Philosopher. Not to lose his Self in his argumentation, but to retain and assert it, this is the interest which unconsciously guides all his Thinking. Now, there are two grades of mankind; and in the progress of our race, before the last grade has been universally attained, two chief kinds of men. The one kind is composed of those who have not yet elevated themselves to the full feeling of their freedom and absolute independence, who are merely conscious of themselves in the representation of outward things. These men have only a desultory consciousness, linked together with the outward objects, and put together out of their manifoldness. They receive a picture of their Self only from the Things, as from a mirror; for their own sake they cannot renounce their faith in the independence of those things, since they exist only together with these things. Whatever they are they have become through the outer World. Whosoever is only a production of the Things will never view himself in any other manner; and he is perfectly correct, so long as he speaks merely for himself and for those like him. The principle of the dogmatist is: Faith in the things, for their own sake; hence, mediated Faith in their own desultory self, as simply the result of the Things.

But whosoever becomes conscious of his self-existence and independence from all outward things—and this men can only become by making something of themselves, through their own Self, independently of all outward things—needs no longer the Things as supports of his Self, and cannot use them, because they annihilate his independence and turn it into an empty appearance. The *Ego* which he possesses, and which interests him, destroys that Faith in the Things; he believes in his independence, from inclination, and ~~seizes~~ it with

affection. His Faith in himself is *immediate*.

From this interest the various passions are explicable, which mix generally with the defence of these philosophical systems. The dogmatist is in danger of losing his Self when his system is attacked; and yet he is not armed against this attack, because there is something within him which takes part with the aggressor; hence, he defends himself with bitterness and heat. The idealist, on the contrary, cannot well refrain from looking down upon his opponent with a certain carelessness, since the latter can tell him nothing which he has not known long ago and has cast away as useless. The dogmatist gets angry, misconstrues, and would persecute, if he had the power; the idealist is cold and in danger of ridiculing his antagonist.

Hence, what philosophy a man chooses depends entirely upon what kind of man he is; for a philosophical system is not a piece of dead household furniture, which you may use or not use, but is animated by the soul of the man who has it. Men of a naturally weak-minded character, or who have become weak-minded and crooked through intellectual slavery, scholarly luxury and vanity, will never elevate themselves to idealism.

You can show the dogmatist the insufficiency and inconsequence of his system, of which we shall speak directly; you can confuse and terrify him from all sides; but you cannot *convince* him, because he is unable to listen to and examine with calmness what he cannot tolerate. If Idealism should prove to be the only real Philosophy, it will also appear that a man must be born a philosopher, be educated to be one, and educate himself to be one; but that no human art (no external force) can make a philosopher out of him. Hence, this Science expects few proselytes from men who have already formed their character; if our Philosophy has any hopes at all, it entertains them rather from the young generation, the natural vigor of which has not yet been submerged in the weak-mindedness of the age.

VI. But dogmatism is totally incapable of explaining what it should explain, and this is decisive in regard to its insufficiency.

ey. It is to explain the representation of things, and proposes to explain them as an effect of the Things. Now, the dogmatist cannot deny what immediate consciousness asserts of this representation. What, then, does it assert thereof? It is not my purpose here to put in a conception what can only be gathered in immediate contemplation, nor to exhaust that which forms a great portion of the Science of Knowledge. I will merely recall to memory what every one, who has but firmly looked within himself, must long since have discovered.

The Intelligence, as such, *sees itself*, and this seeing of itself is immediately connected with all that appertains to the Intelligence; and this immediate uniting of *Being* and *Seeing* the nature of the Intelligence consists. Whatever is in the Intelligence, whatever the Intelligence is itself, the Intelligence is *for itself*; and only in so far as it is this *for itself* is it this, as Intelligence.

I think this or that object! Now what does this mean, and how do I appear to myself in this Thinking? Not otherwise than thus: I produce certain conditions within myself, if the object is a mere invention; but if the objects are real and exist without my invention, I simply contemplate, as a spectator, the production of those conditions within me. They are within me only in so far as I contemplate them; my contemplation and their Being are inseparably united.

A Thing, on the contrary, is to be this or that; but as soon as the question is put: *For whom* is it this? Nobody, who but comprehends the word, will reply: *For itself*! But he will have to add the thought of an Intelligence, *for* which the Thing is to be; while, on the contrary, the Intelligence is self-sufficient and requires no additional thought. By thinking it as the Intelligence you include already that for which it is to be. Hence, there is in the Intelligence, to express myself figuratively a twofold — Being and Seeing, the Real and the Ideal; and in the inseparability of this twofold the nature of the Intelligence consists, while the Thing is simply a unit—the Real. Hence Intelligence and Thing are directly opposed to each other; they move in two worlds, between which there is no bridge.

The nature of the Intelligence and its particular determinations Dogmatism endeavors to explain by the principle of Causality; the Intelligence is to be a production, the second link in a series.

But the principle of causality applies to a real series, and not to a double one. The power of the cause goes over into an Other opposed to it, and produces therein a Being, and nothing further; a Being for a possible outside Intelligence, but not for the thing itself. You may give this Other even a mechanical power, and it will transfer the received impression to the next link, and thus the movement proceeding from the first may be transferred through as long a series as you choose to make; but nowhere will you find a link which reacts back upon itself. Or give the Other the highest quality which you can give a thing — *Sensibility* — whereby it will follow the laws of its own inner nature, and not the law given to it by the cause — and it will, to be sure, react upon the outward cause; but it will, nevertheless, remain a mere simple Being, a Being for a possible intelligence outside of it. The Intelligence you will not get, unless you add it in thinking as the primary and absolute, the connection of which, with this your *independent* Being, you will find it very difficult to explain.

The series is and remains a simple one; and you have not at all explained what was to be explained. You were to prove the connection between Being and Representation; but this you do not, nor can you do it; for your principle contains merely the ground of a Being, and not of a Representation, totally opposed to Being. You take an immense leap into a world, totally removed from your principle. This leap they seek to hide in various ways. Rigorously — and this is the course of consistent dogmatism, which thus becomes materialism; — the soul is to them no Thing at all, and indeed nothing at all, but merely a production, the result of the reciprocal action of Things amongst themselves. But this reciprocal action produces merely a change in the Things, and by no means anything apart from the Things, unless you add an observing intelligence. The similes which they adduce to make their system comprehensible, for instance, that of the

harmony resulting from sounds of different instruments, make its irrationality only more apparent. For the harmony is not in the instruments, but merely in the mind of the hearer, who combines within himself the manifold into One; and unless you have such a hearer there is no harmony at all.

But who can prevent Dogmatism from assuming the Soul as one of the Things, *per se*? The soul would thus belong to what it has postulated for the solution of its problem, and, indeed, the category of cause and effect would thereby be made applicable to the Soul and the Things—materialism only permitting a reciprocal action of the Things amongst themselves—and thoughts might now be produced. To make the Unthinkable thinkable, Dogmatism has, indeed, attempted to presuppose Thing or the Soul, or both, in such a manner, that the effect of the Thing was to produce a representation. The Thing, as influencing the Soul, is to be such, as to make its influences representations; GOD, for instance, in Berkeley's system, was such a thing. (His system was dogmatic, not idealistic.) But this does not better matters; we understand only mechanical effects, and it is impossible for us to understand any other kind of effects. Hence, that presupposition contains merely words, but there is no sense in it. Or the soul is to be of such a nature that every effect upon the Soul turns into a representation. But this also we find it impossible to understand.

In this manner Dogmatism proceeds everywhere, whatever phase it may assume. In the immense gulf, which in that system remains always open between Things and Representations, it places a few empty words instead of an explanation, which words may certainly be committed to memory, but in saying which nobody has ever yet thought, nor ever will think, anything. For whenever one attempts to think the manner in which is accomplished what Dogmatism asserts to be accomplished, the whole idea vanishes into empty foam. Hence Dogmatism can only repeat its principle, and repeat it in different forms; can only assert and re-assert the same thing; but it can not proceed from what it asserts to what is to be explained, nor ever

deduce the one from the other. But in this deduction Philosophy consists. Hence Dogmatism, even when viewed from a speculative stand-point, is no Philosophy at all, but merely an impotent assertion. Idealism is the only possible remaining Philosophy. What we have here said can meet with no objection; but it may well meet with incapability of understanding it. That all influences are of a mechanical nature, and that no mechanism can produce a representation, nobody will deny, who but understands the words. But this is the very difficulty. It requires a certain degree of independence and freedom of spirit to comprehend the nature of the intelligence, which we have described, and upon which our whole refutation of Dogmatism is founded. Many persons have not advanced further with their Thinking than to comprehend the simple chain of natural mechanism, and very naturally, therefore, the Representation, if they choose to think it at all, belongs, in their eyes, to the same chain of which alone they have any knowledge. The Representation thus becomes to them a sort of Thing of which we have divers examples in some of the most celebrated philosophical writers. For such persons Dogmatism is sufficient; for them there is no gulf, since the opposite does not exist for them at all. Hence you can not convince the Dogmatist by the proof just stated, however clear it may be, for you can not bring the proof to his knowledge, since he lacks the power to comprehend it.

Moreover, the manner in which Dogmatism is treated here, is opposed to the mild way of thinking which characterizes our age, and which, though it has been extensively accepted in all ages, has never been converted to an express principle except in ours; i. e. that philosophers must not be so strict in their logic: in philosophy one should not be so particular, as for instance, in Mathematics. If persons of this mode of thinking see but a few links of the chain and the rule, according to which conclusions are drawn, they at once fill up the remaining part through their imagination, never investigating further of what they may consist. If, for instance, an Alexander Von Joch tell them: "All things are determined by natural neces-

sity; now our representations depend upon the condition of Things, and our will depends upon our representations: hence all our will is determined by natural necessity, and our theory of a free will is mere deception!"—then these people think it mightily comprehensible and clear, although there is no sense in it; and they go away convinced and satisfied at the stringency of this his demonstration.

I must call to mind, that the Science of Knowledge does not proceed from this mild way of thinking, nor calculate upon it. If only a single link in the long chain it has to draw does not fit closely to the following, this Science does not pretend to have established anything.

VII. Idealism, as we have said above, explains the determinations of consciousness from the activity of the Intelligence, which, in its view, is only active and absolute, not passive; since it is postulated as the first and highest, preceded by nothing, which might explain its passivity. From the same reason actual *Existence* can not well be ascribed to the Intelligence, since such Existence is the result of reciprocal causality, but there is nothing where-with the Intelligence might be placed in reciprocal causality. From the view of Idealism, the Intelligence is a *Doing*, and absolutely nothing else; it is even wrong to call it an *Active*, since this expression points to something existing, in which the activity is inherent.

But to assume anything of this kind is against the principle of Idealism, which proposes to deduce all other things from the Intelligence. Now certain *determined* representations—as, for instance, of a world, of a material world in space, existing without any work of our own—are to be deduced from the action of the Intelligence; but you can not deduce anything determined from an undetermined; the form of all deductions, the category of ground and sequence, is not applicable here. Hence the action of the Intelligence, which is made the ground, must be a *determined* action, and since the action of the Intelligence itself is the highest ground of explanation, that action must be so determined by the Intelligence itself, and not by anything foreign to it. Hence the pre-

supposition of Idealism will be this: the Intelligence acts, but by its very essence it can only act in a certain manner. If this necessary manner of its action is considered apart from the action, it may properly be called Laws of Action. Hence, there are necessary laws of the Intelligence.

This explains also, at the same time, the feeling of necessity which accompanies the determined representations; the Intelligence experiences in those cases, not an impression from without, but feels in its action the limits of its own Essence. In so far as Idealism makes this only reasonable and really explanatory presupposition of necessary laws of the Intelligence, it is called *Critical* or *Transcendental Idealism*. A *transcendent* Idealism would be a system which were to undertake a deduction of determined representations from the free and perfectly lawless action of the Intelligence: an altogether contradictory presupposition, since, as we have said above, the category of ground and sequence is not applicable in that case.

The laws of action of the Intelligence, as sure as they are to be founded in the one nature of the Intelligence, constitute in themselves a system; that is to say, the fact that the Intelligence acts in this particular manner under this particular condition is explainable, and explainable because under a condition it has always a determined mode of action, which again is explainable from one highest fundamental law. In the course of its action the Intelligence gives itself its own laws; and this legislation itself is done by virtue of a higher necessary action or Representation. For instance, the law of Causality is not a first original law, but only one of the many modes of combining the manifold, and to be deduced from the fundamental law of this combination; this law of combining the manifold is again, like the manifold itself, to be deduced from higher laws.

Hence, even Critical Idealism can proceed in a twofold manner. Either it deduces this system of necessary modes of action, and together with it the objective representations arising therefrom, really from the fundamental laws of the Intelligence, and thus causes gradually to arise under the very eyes of the reader or hearer the whole extent of our representations: or

it gathers these laws—perhaps as they are already immediately applied to objects; hence, in a lower condition, and then they are called categories—gathers these laws somewhere, and now asserts, that the objects are determined and regulated by them.

I ask the critic who follows the last-mentioned method, and who does not deduce the assumed laws of the Intelligence from the Essence of the Intelligence, where he gets the material knowledge of these laws, the knowledge that they are just these very same laws; for instance, that of Substantiality or Causality? For I do not want to trouble him yet with the question, how he knows that they are mere immanent laws of the Intelligence. They are the laws which are immediately applied to objects and he can only have obtained them by abstraction from these objects, i. e. from Experience. It is of no avail if he takes them, by a roundabout way, from logic, for logic is to him only the result of abstraction from the objects, and hence he would do indirectly, what directly might appear too clearly in its true nature. Hence he can prove by nothing that his postulated Laws of Thinking are really Laws of Thinking, are really nothing but immanent laws of the Intelligence. The Dogmatist asserts in opposition, that they are not, but that they are general qualities of Things, founded on the nature of Things, and there is no reason why we should place more faith in the unproved assertion of the one than in the unproved assertion of the other. This course of proceeding, indeed, furnishes no understanding that and why the Intelligence should act just in this particular manner. To produce such an understanding, it would be necessary to premise something which can only appertain to the Intelligence, and from those premises to deduce before our eyes the laws of Thinking.

By such a course of proceeding it is above all incomprehensible how the object itself is obtained; for although you may admit the unproved postulates of the critic they explain nothing further than the *qualities and relations* of the Thing: (that it is, for instance, in space, manifested in time, with accidents which must be referred to a substance, &c.) But whence

that which has these relations and qualities? whence then the substance which is clothed in these forms? This substance Dogmatism takes refuge in, and you have but increased the evil.

We know very well: the Thing arises only from an act done in accordance with these laws, and is, indeed, nothing else than *all these relations gathered together by the power of imagination*; and all these relations together are the Thing. The Object is the original Synthesis of all these conceptions. Form and Substance are not separates; the whole formness is the substance, and only in the analysis do we arrive at separate forms.

But this the critic, who follows the above method, can only assert, and it is even a secret whence he knows it, if he does know it. Until you cause the whole Thing to arise before the eyes of the thinker, you have not pursued Dogmatism into its last hiding places. But this is only possible by letting the intelligence act in its whole, and not in its partial lawfulness.

Hence, an Idealism of this character is unproven and unprovable. Against Dogmatism it has no other weapon than the assertion that it is in the right; and against the more perfected criticism no other weapon than impotent anger, and the assurance that you can go no further than itself goes.

Finally a system of this character puts forth only those laws, according to which the objects of external experience are determined. But these constitute by far the smallest portion of the laws of the Intelligence. Hence, on the field of Practical Reason and of Reflective Judgment, this half criticism, lacking the insight into the whole procedure of reason, gropes about as in total darkness.

The method of complete transcendental Idealism, which the Science of Knowledge pursues, I have explained once before in my Essay, *On the Conception of the Science of Knowledge*. I cannot understand why that Essay has not been understood; but suffice it to say, that I am assured it has not been understood. I am therefore compelled to repeat what I have said, and to recall to mind that everything depends upon the correct understanding thereof.

This Idealism proceeds from a single

fundamental Law of Reason, which, is immediately shown as contained in consciousness. This is done in the following manner: The teacher of that Science requests his reader or hearer to think freely a certain conception. If he does so, he will find himself forced to proceed in a particular manner. Two things are to be distinguished here: The act of Thinking, which is required—the realization of which depends upon each individual's freedom,—and unless he realizes it thus, he will not understand anything which the Science of Knowledge teaches; and the necessary manner in which it alone can be realized, which manner is grounded in the Essence of the Intelligence, and does not depend upon freedom; it is something *necessary*, but which is only discovered in and together with a free action; it is something *discovered*, but the discovery of which depends upon an act of freedom.

So far as this goes, the teacher of Idealism shows his assertion to be contained in immediate consciousness. But that this necessary manner is the fundamental law of all reason, that from it the whole system of our necessary representations, not only of a world and the determinedness and relations of objects, but also of ourselves, as free and practical beings acting under laws can be deduced. All this is a mere presupposition, which can only be proven by the actual deduction, which deduction is therefore the real business of the teacher.

In realizing this deduction, he proceeds as follows: *He shows that the first fundamental law which was discovered in immediate consciousness, is not possible, unless a second action is combined with it, which again is not possible without a third action; and so on, until the conditions of the First are completely exhausted, and itself is now made perfectly comprehensible in its possibility.* The teacher's method is a continual progression from the conditioned to the condition. The condition becomes again conditioned, and its condition is next, to be discovered.

If the presupposition of Idealism is correct, and if no errors have been made in the deduction, the last result, as containing all the conditions of the first act, must contain the system of all necessary representations, or the total experience;—a compari-

son, however, which is not instituted in Philosophy itself, but only after that science has finished its work.

For Idealism has not kept this experience in sight, as the preknown object and result, which it should arrive at; in its course of proceeding it knows nothing at all of experience, and does not look upon it: it proceeds from its starting point according to its rules, careless as to what the result of its investigations might turn out to be, the right angle, from which it has to draw its straight line, is given to it; is there any need of another point to which the line should be drawn? Surely not; for all the points of its line are already given to it with the angle. A certain number is given to you. You suppose that it is the product of certain factors. All you have to do is search for the product of these factors according to the well-known rules. Whether that product will agree with the given number, you will find out, without any difficulty, as soon as you have obtained it. The given number is the total experience; those factors are: the part of immediate consciousness which was discovered, and the laws of Thinking; the multiplication is the Philosophizing. Those who advise you, while philosophizing, also to keep an eye upon experience, advise you to change the factors a little, and to multiply falsely, so as to obtain by all means corresponding numbers; a course of proceeding as dishonest as it is shallow. In so far as those final results of Idealism are viewed as such, as consequences of our reasoning, they are what is called the *a priori* of the human mind; and in so far as they are viewed, also—if they should agree with experience—as given in experience, they are called *a posteriori*. Hence the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* are, in a true Philosophy, not two, but one and the same, only viewed in two different ways, and distinguished only by the manner in which they are obtained. Philosophy anticipates the whole experience, *thinks* it only as necessary; and, in so far, Philosophy is, in comparison with real experience, *a priori*. The number is a *posteriori*, if regarded as given; the same number is a *priori*, if regarded as product of the factors. Whosoever says otherwise knows not what he talks about.

If the results of a Philosophy do not agree with experience, that Philosophy is surely wrong; for it has not fulfilled its promise of deducing the whole experience from the necessary action of the intelligence. In that case, either the presupposition of transcendental Idealism is altogether incorrect, or it has merely been incorrectly treated in the particular representation of that science. Now, since the problem, to explain experience from its ground, is a problem contained in human reason, and as no rational man will admit that human reason contains any problem the solution of which is altogether impossible; and since, moreover, there are only two ways of solving it, the dogmatic system, (which, as we have shown, cannot accomplish what it promises) and the Idealistic system, every resolute Thinker will always declare that the latter has been the case; that the presupposition in itself is correct enough, and that no failure in attempts to represent it should deter men from attempting it again until finally it must succeed. The course of this Idealism proceeds, as we have seen, from a fact of consciousness—but which is only obtained by a free act of Thinking—to the total experience. Its peculiar ground is between these two. It is not a fact of consciousness and does not belong within the sphere of experience; and, indeed, how could it be called Philosophy if it did, since Philosophy has to discover the ground of experience, and since the ground lies, of course, beyond the sequence. It is the production of free Thinking, but proceeding according to laws. This will be at once clear, if we look a little closer at the fundamental assertion of Idealism. It proves that the Postulated is not possible without a second, this not without a third, &c., &c.; hence none of all its conditions is possible alone and by itself, but each one is only possible in its union with all the rest. Hence, according to its own assertion, only the Whole is found in consciousness, and this Whole is the experience. You want to obtain a better knowledge of it; hence you must analyze it, not by blindly groping about, but according to the fixed rule of composition, so that it arises under your eyes as a Whole. You are enabled to do this because you have the power of ab-

straction; because in free Thinking you can certainly take hold of each single condition. For consciousness contains not only necessity of Representations, but also freedom thereof; and this freedom again may proceed according to rules. The Whole is given to you from the point of view of necessary consciousness; you find it just as you find yourself. But the composition of this Whole, the order of its arrangement, is produced by freedom. Whosoever undertakes this act of freedom, becomes conscious of freedom, and thus establishes, as it were, a new field within his consciousness; whosoever does not undertake it, for him this new field, dependent thereupon, does not exist. The chemist composes a body, a metal for instance, from its elements. The common beholder sees the metal well known to him; the chemist beholds, moreover, the composition thereof and the elements which it comprises. Do both now see different objects? I should think not! Both see the same, only in a different manner. The chemist's sight is *a priori*; he sees the separates; the ordinary beholder's sight is *a posteriori*; he sees the Whole. The only distinction is this: the chemist must first analyze the Whole before he can compose it, because he works upon an object of which he cannot know the rule of composition before he has analyzed it; while the philosopher can compose without a foregoing analysis, because he knows already the rule of his object, of reason.

Hence the content of Philosophy can claim no other reality than that of necessary Thinking, on the condition that you desire to think of the ground of Experience. The Intelligence can only be thought as active, and can only be thought active in this particular manner! Such is the assertion of Philosophy. And this reality is perfectly sufficient for Philosophy, since it is evident from the development of that science that there is no other reality.

This now described complete critical Idealism, the Science of Knowledge intends to establish. What I have said just now contains the conception of that science, and I shall listen to no objections which may touch this conception, since no one can know better than myself what I intend to accomplish, and to demonstrate the impos-

sibility of a thing which is already realized, is ridiculous.

Objections, to be legitimate, should only be raised against the elaboration of that

conception, and should only consider whether it has fulfilled what it promised to accomplish or not.

ANALYTICAL AND CRITICAL ESSAY UPON THE ÆSTHETICS OF HEGEL.

[Translated from the French of M. Ch. Bénard by J. A. Martling.]

ANALYSIS.

PART I.

Having undertaken to translate into our language the Æsthetics of Hegel, we hope to render a new service to our readers, by presenting, in an analysis at once cursory and detailed, the outline of the ideas which form the basis of that vast work. The thought of the author will appear shorn of its rich developments; but it will be more easy to seize the general spirit, the connection of the various parts of the work, and to appreciate their value. In order not to mar the clearness of our work, we shall abstain from mingling criticism with exposition; but reserve for the conclusion a general judgment upon this book, which represents even to-day the state of the philosophy of art in Germany.

The work is divided into three parts; the first treats of *the beautiful in art in general*; the second, of *the general forms of art in its historic development*; the third contains the *system of the arts — the theory of architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry*.

OF THE BEAUTIFUL IN ART.

In an extended introduction, Hegel lays the foundations of the science of the Beautiful: he defines its object, demonstrates its legitimacy, and indicates its method; he then undertakes to determine the nature and the end of art. Upon each of these points let us endeavor to state, in a brief manner, his thought, and, if it is necessary, explain it.

Æsthetics is *the science of the Beautiful*. The Beautiful manifests itself in nature and in art; but the variety and multiplicity of forms under which beauty presents itself in the real world, does not permit their description and systematic classification. The science of the Beautiful has then as its principal object, art and its works; it is the *philosophy of the fine arts*.

Is art a proper object of science? No, undoubtedly, if we consider it only as an amusement or a frivolous relaxation. But it has a nobler purpose. It will even be a misconception of its true aim to regard it

simply as an auxiliary of morals and religion. Although it often serves as interpreter of moral and religious ideas, it preserves its independence. Its proper object is to reveal truth under sensuous forms.

Nor is it allowable to say that it produces its effects by illusion. Appearance, here, is truer than reality. The images which it places under our eyes are more ideal, more transparent, and also more durable than the mobile and fugitive existences of the real world. The world of art is truer than that of nature and of history.

Can science subject to its formulas the free creations of the imagination? Art and science, it is true, differ in their methods; but imagination, also, has its laws; though free, it has not the right to be lawless. In art, nothing is arbitrary; its ground *is the essence of things*; its form is borrowed from the real world, and the Beautiful is the accord, the harmony of the two terms. Philosophy recognizes in works of art the eternal content of its meditations, the lofty conceptions of intelligence, the passions of man, and the motives of his volition. Philosophy does not pretend to furnish prescriptions to art, but is able to give useful advice; it follows it in its procedures, it points out to it the paths whereon it may go astray; it alone can furnish to criticism a solid basis and fixed principles.

As to the method to be followed, two exclusive and opposite courses present themselves. The one, *empiric* and *historic*, seeks to draw from the study of the masterpieces of art, the laws of criticism and the principles of taste. The other, *rational* and *a priori*, rises immediately to the idea of the beautiful, and deduces from it certain general rules. Aristotle and Plato represent these two methods. The first reaches only a narrow theory, incapable of comprehending art in its universality; the other, isolating itself on the heights of metaphysics, knows not how to descend therefrom to apply itself to particular arts, and to appreciate their works. The true method consists in the union of these two methods, in their reconciliation and simultaneous employment. To a positive acquaintance with works of art, to the discrimination and delicacy of taste necessary to appreciate them, there should be

joined philosophic reflection, and the capacity of seizing the Beautiful in itself, and of comprehending its characteristics and immutable laws.

What is the nature of art? The answer to this question can only be the philosophy of art itself; and, furthermore, this again can be perfectly understood only in its connection with the other philosophic sciences. One is here compelled to limit himself to general reflections, and to the discussion of received opinions.

In the first place, art is a product of human activity, a creation of the mind. What distinguishes it from science is this, that it is the fruit of inspiration, not of reflection. On this account it cannot be learned or transmitted; it is a gift of genius. Nothing can possibly supply a lack of talent in the arts.

Let us guard ourselves meanwhile from supposing that, like the blind forces of nature, the artist does not know what he does, that reflection has no part in his works. There is, in the first place, in the arts a technical part which must be learned, and a skill which is acquired by practice. Furthermore, the more elevated art becomes, the more it demands an extended and varied culture, a study of the objects of nature, and a profound knowledge of the human heart. This is eminently true of the higher spheres of art, especially in Poetry.

If works of art are creations of the human spirit, they are not on that account inferior to those of nature. They are, it is true, *living*, only in appearance; but the aim of art is not to create living beings; it seeks to offer to the spirit an image of life clearer than the reality. In this, it *surpasses* nature. There is also something divine in man, and God derives no less honor from the works of human intelligence than from the works of nature.

Now what is the cause which incites man to the production of such works? Is it a caprice, a freak, or an earnest, fundamental inclination of his nature?

It is the same principle which causes him to seek in science food for his mind, in public life a theatre for his activity. In science he endeavors to cognize the truth, pure and unveiled; in art, truth appears to him not in its pure form, but expressed

by images which strike his sense at the same time that they speak to his intelligence. This is the principle in which art originates, and which assigns to it a rank so high among the creations of the human mind.

Although art is addressed to the sensibility, nevertheless its direct aim is not to excite sensation, and to give birth to pleasure. Sensation is changeful, varied, contradictory. It represents only the various states or modifications of the soul. If then we consider only the impressions which art produces upon us, we make abstraction of the truth which it reveals to us. It becomes even impossible to comprehend its grand effects; for the sentiments which it excites in us, are explicable only through the ideas which attach to them.

The sensuous element, nevertheless, occupies a large place in art. What part must be assigned to it? There are two modes of considering sensuous objects in their connection with our mind. The first is that of simple perception of objects by the senses. The mind then knows only their individual side, their particular and concrete form; the essence, the law, the substance of things escapes it. At the same time the desire which is awakened in us, is a desire to appropriate them to our use, to consume them, to destroy them. The soul, in the presence of these objects, feels its dependence; it cannot contemplate them with a free and disinterested eye.

Another relation of sensuous objects with spirit, is that of speculative thought or science. Here the intelligence is not content to perceive the object in its concrete form and its individuality; it discards the individual side in order to abstract and disengage from it the law, the universal, the essence. Reason thus lifts itself above the individual form perceived by sense, in order to conceive the pure idea in its universality.

Art differs both from the one and from the other of these modes; it holds the mean between sensuous perception and rational abstraction. It is distinguished from the first in that it does not attach itself to the real but to the appearance, to the form of the object, and in that it does not feel any selfish longing to consume it, to cause it to serve a purpose, to utilize it.

It differs from science in that it is interested in this particular object, and in its sensuous form. What it loves to see in it, is neither its materiality, nor the pure idea in its generality, but an appearance, an image of the truth, something ideal which appears in it; it seizes the connective of the two terms, their accord and their inner harmony. Thus the want which it feels is wholly contemplative. In the presence of this vision the soul feels itself freed from all selfish desire.

In a word, art purposely creates images, appearances, designed to represent ideas, to show to us the truth under sensuous forms. Thereby it has the power of stirring the soul in its profoundest depths, of causing it to experience the pure delight springing from the sight and contemplation of the Beautiful.

The two principles are found equally combined in the artist. The sensuous side is included in the faculty which creates—the imagination. It is not by mechanical toil, directed by rules learned by heart that he executes his works; nor is it by a process of reflection like that of the philosopher, who is seeking the truth. The mind has a consciousness of itself, but it cannot seize in an abstract manner the idea which it conceives; it can represent it only under sensuous forms. The image and the idea co-exist in thought, and cannot be separated. Thus the imagination is itself a gift of nature. Scientific genius is rather a general capacity than an innate and special talent. To succeed in the arts, there is necessary a determinate talent which reveals itself early under the form of an active and irresistible longing, and a certain facility in the manipulation of the materials of art. It is this which makes the painter, the sculptor, the musician.

Such is the nature of art. If it be asked, what is its end, here we encounter the most diverse opinions. The most common is that which gives imitation as its object. This is the foundation of nearly all the theories upon art. Now of what use to reproduce that which nature already offers to our view? This puerile talk, unworthy of spirit to which it is addressed, unworthy of man who produces it, would only end in the revelation of its impotency and

the vanity of its efforts; for the copy will always remain inferior to the original. Besides, the more exact the imitation, the less vivid is the pleasure. That which pleases us is not imitation but, creation. The very least invention surpasses all the masterpieces of imitation.

In vain is it said that art ought to imitate beautiful Nature. To select is no longer to imitate. Perfection in imitation is exactness; moreover, choice supposes a rule? Where find the criterion? What signifies, in fine, imitation in architecture, in music, and even in poetry? At most one can thus explain descriptive poetry, that is to say, the most prosaic kind. We must conclude, therefore, that if, in its compositions, art employs the forms of Nature, and must study them, its aim is not to copy and to reproduce them. Its mission is higher—it's procedure freer. Rival of nature, it represents ideas as well as she, and even better; it uses her forms as symbols to express them; and it fashions even these, remodels them upon a type more perfect and more pure. It is not without significance that its works are styled the creations of the genius of man.

A second system substitutes expression for imitation. Art accordingly has for its aim, not to represent the external form of things, but their eternal and living principle, particularly the ideas, sentiments, passions and conditions of the soul.

Less gross than the preceding, this theory is no less false and dangerous. Let us here distinguish two things: the idea and the expression—the content and the form. Now, if Art is designed for expression solely—if expression is its essential object—its content is indifferent. Provided that the picture be faithful the expression lively and animated, the good and the bad, the vicious, the hideous, the ugly, have the same right to figure here as the Beautiful. Immoral, licentious, impious, the artist will have fulfilled his obligation and reached perfection, when he has succeeded in faithfully rendering a situation, a passion, an idea, be it true or false. It is clear that if in this system the object of imitation is changed, the procedure is the same. Art would be only an echo, a harmonious language; a living mirror, where all sentiments and all

passions would find themselves reflected, the base part and the noble part of the soul contending here for the same place. The true, here, would be the real, would include objects the most diverse and the most contradictory. Indifferent as to the content, the artist seeks only to represent it well. He troubles himself little concerning truth in itself. Skeptic or enthusiast indifferently, he makes us partake of the delirium of the Bacchanals, or the unconcern of the Sophist. Such is the system which takes for a motto the maxim, *Art is for art*; that is to say, mere expression for its own sake. Its consequences, and the fatal tendency which it has at all times pressed upon the arts, are well known.

A third system sets up *moral perfection* as the aim of art. It cannot be denied that one of the effects of art is to soften and purify manners (*emollit mores*). In mirroring man to himself, it tempers the rudeness of his appetites and his passions; it disposes him to contemplation and reflection; it elevates his thought and sentiments, by leading them to an ideal which it suggests,—to ideas of a superior order. Art has, from all time, been regarded as a powerful instrument of civilization, as an auxiliary of religion. It is, together with religion, the earliest instructor of nations; it is besides a means of instruction for minds incapable of comprehending truth otherwise than under the veil of a symbol, and by images that address themselves to the sense as well as to the spirit.

But this theory, although much superior to the preceding is no more exact. Its defect consists in confounding the moral effect of art with its real aim. This confusion has inconveniences which do not appear at the first glance. Let care be taken, meanwhile, lest, in thus assigning to art a foreign aim, it be not robbed of its liberty, which is its essence, and without which it has no inspiration—that thereby it be not prevented from producing the effects which are to be expected from it. Between religion, morals and art, there exists an eternal and intimate harmony; but they are, none the less, essentially diverse forms of truth, and, while preserving entire the bonds which unite them, they claim a complete independence. Art has its peculiar laws,

methods and jurisdiction; though it ought not to wound the moral sense, yet it is the sense of the Beautiful to which it is addressed. When its works are pure, its effect on the soul is salutary, but its direct and immediate aim is not this result. Seeking it, it risks losing it, and does lose its own end. Suppose, indeed, that the aim of art should be to instruct, under the veil of allegory: the idea, the abstract and general thought, must be present in the spirit of the artist at the very moment of composition. It seeks, then, a form which is adapted to that idea, and furnishes drapery for it. Who does not see that this procedure is the very opposite of inspiration? There can be born of it only frigid and lifeless works; its effect will thus be neither moral nor religious: it will produce only *ennui*.

Another consequence of the opinion which makes moral perfection the object of art and its creations, is that this end is imposed so completely upon art and controls it to such a degree, that it has no longer even a choice of subjects. The severe moralist would have it represent moral subjects alone. Art is then undone. This system led Plato to banish poets from his republic. If, then, it is necessary to maintain the agreement of morality and art, and the harmony of their laws, their distinct bases and independence must also be recognized. In order to understand thoroughly this distinction between morals and art it is necessary to have solved the moral problem. Morality is the realization of the "ought" by the free will; it is the conflict between passion and reason, inclination and law, the flesh and the spirit. It hinges upon an opposition. Antagonism is, indeed, the very law of the physical and moral universe. But this opposition ought to be cancelled. This is the destiny of beings who by their development and progress continually realize themselves.

Now, in morals, this harmony of the powers of our being, which should restore peace and happiness, does not exist. Morality proposes it as an end to the free will. The aim and the realization are distinct. Duty consists in an incessant striving. Thus, in one respect, morals and art have the same principle and the same

aim; the harmony of rectitude and happiness, of actions and law. But that wherein they differ is, that in morals the end is never wholly attained. It appears separated from the means; the consequence is equally separated from the principle. The harmony of rectitude, and happiness ought to be the result of the efforts of virtue. In order to conceive the identity of the two terms, it is necessary to elevate one's self to a superior point of view, which is not that of morals. In empirical science equally, the law appears distinct from the phenomenon, the essence separated from its form. In order that this distinction may be cancelled, there is necessary a mode of thinking which is superior to that of reflection, or of empirical science.

Art, on the contrary, offers to us in a visible image, the realized harmony of the two terms of existence, of the law of beings and their manifestation, of essence and form, of rectitude and happiness. The beautiful is essence realized, activity in conformity with its end, and identified with it; it is the force which is harmoniously developed under our eyes, in the innermost of existences, and which cancels the contradictions of its nature: happy, free, full of serenity in the very midst of suffering and of sorrow. The problem of art is then distinct from the moral problem. The good is harmony sought for; beauty is harmony realized. So must we understand the thought of Hegel; he here only intimates it, but it will be fully developed in the sequel.

The true aim of art is then to represent the Beautiful, to reveal this harmony. This is its only purpose. Every other aim, purification, moral amelioration, edification, are accessories or consequences. The effect of the contemplation of the Beautiful is to produce in us a calm pure joy, incompatible with the gross pleasures of sense; it lifts the soul above the ordinary sphere of its thoughts; it disposes to noble resolutions and generous actions by the close affinity which exists between the three sentiments and three ideas of the Good, the Beautiful, and the Divine.

Such are the principal ideas which this remarkable introduction contains. The remainder, devoted to the examination of

works which have marked the development of æsthetic science in Germany since Kant is scarcely susceptible of analysis, and does not so much deserve our attention.

The first part of the science of æsthetics, which might be called the Metaphysics of the Beautiful, contains, together with the analysis of the idea of the Beautiful, the general principles common to all the arts. Thus Hegel here treats: *First, of the abstract idea of the Beautiful; second, of the Beautiful in nature; third, of the Beautiful in art, or of the ideal.* He concludes with an examination of the qualities of the artist. But before entering upon these questions, he thought it necessary to point out the place of art in human life, and especially its connections with religion and philosophy.

The destination of man, the law of his nature, is to develop himself incessantly, to stretch unceasingly towards the infinite. He ought, at the same time, to put an end to the opposition which he finds in himself between the elements and powers of his being: to place them in accord by realizing and developing them externally. Physical life is a struggle between opposing forces, and the living being can sustain itself only through the conflict and the triumph of the force which constitutes it. With man, and in the moral sphere, this conflict and progressive enfranchisement are manifested under the form of freedom, which is the highest destination of spirit. Freedom consists in surmounting the obstacles which it encounters within and without, in removing the limits, in effacing all contradiction, in vanquishing evil and sorrow, in order to attain to harmony with the world and with itself. In actual life man seeks to destroy that opposition by the satisfaction of his physical wants. He calls to his aid, industry and the useful arts, but he obtains thus only limited, relative, and transient enjoyments. He finds a nobler pleasure in science, which furnishes food for his ardent curiosity, and promises to reveal to him the laws of nature and to unveil the secrets of the universe. Civil life opens another channel to his activity; he burns to realize his conceptions; he marches to the conquest of the right, and pursues the ideal of justice which he bears

within him. He endeavors to realize in civil society his instinct of sociability, which is also the law of his being, and one of the fundamental inclinations of his moral nature.

But here again, he attains an imperfect felicity; he encounters limits and obstacles which he cannot surmount, and against which his will is broken. He cannot obtain the perfect realization of his ideas, nor attain the ideal which his spirit conceives and toward which it aspires. He then feels the necessity of elevating himself to a higher sphere where all contradictions are canceled; where the idea of the good and of happiness in their perfect accord and their enduring harmony is realized. This profound want of the soul is satisfied in three ways: in art, in religion, and in philosophy. The function of art is to lead us to the contemplation of the true, the infinite, under sensuous forms; for the beautiful is the unity, the realized harmony of two principles of existence, of the idea and the form, of the infinite and the finite. This is the principle and the hidden essence of things, beaming through their visible form. Art presents us, in its works, the image of this happy accord where all opposition ceases, and where all contradiction is canceled. Such is the aim of art: to represent the divine, the infinite under sensuous forms. This is its mission, it has no other and this it alone can fulfill. By this title it takes its place by the side of religion, and preserves its independence. It takes its rank also with philosophy, whose object is the knowledge of the true, of absolute truth.

Alike then as to their general ground and aims, these three spheres are distinguished by the form under which they become revealed to the spirit and consciousness of man. Art, is addressed to sensuous perception and to the imagination; religion is addressed to the soul, to the conscience, and to sentiment; philosophy is addressed to pure thought or to the reason, which conceives the truth in an abstract manner.

Art, which offers us truth under sensuous forms, does not, however, respond to the profoundest needs of the soul. The spirit is possessed of the desire of entering into itself, of contemplating the truth in

the inner recesses of consciousness. Above the domain of art, then, religion is placed which reveals the infinite, and by meditation conveys to the depths of the heart, to the centre of the soul, that which in art we contemplate externally. As to philosophy its peculiar aim is to conceive and to comprehend by the intellect alone, under an abstract form, that which is given as sentiment or as sensuous representation.

I. *Of the Idea of the Beautiful.*

After these preliminaries, Hegel enters upon the questions which form the object of this first part. He treats, in the first place, of *the idea of the beautiful* in itself, in its abstract nature. Freeing his thought from the metaphysical forms which render it difficult of comprehension to minds not familiar with his system, we arrive at this definition, already contained in the foregoing: the Beautiful is the true, that is to say, the essence, the inmost substance of things; the true, not such as the mind conceives it in its abstract and pure nature, but as manifested to the senses under visible forms. It is the sensuous *manifestation of the idea*, which is the soul and principle of things. This definition recalls that of Plato: the Beautiful is the *splendor of the true*.

What are the characteristics of the beautiful? First, it is infinite in this sense, that it is the divine principle itself which is revealed and manifested, and that the form which expresses it, in place of limiting it, realizes it and confounds itself with it; second it is free, for true freedom is not the absence of rule and measure, it is force which develops itself easily and harmoniously. It appears in the bosom of the existences of the sensuous world, as their principle of life, of unity, and of harmony whether free from all obstacle, or victorious and triumphant in conflict always calm and serene.

The spectator who contemplates beauty feels himself equally free, and has a consciousness of his infinite nature. He tastes a pure pleasure, resulting from the felt accord of the powers of his being; a celestial and divine joy, which has nothing in common with material pleasures, and does not suffer to exist in the soul a single impure or gross desire.

The contemplation of the Beautiful awakens no such cravings; it is self-sufficing, and is not accompanied by any return of the me upon itself. It suffers the object to preserve its independence for its own sake. The soul experiences something analagous to divine felicity; it is transported into a sphere foreign to the miseries of life and terrestrial existence.

This theory it is apparent, would need only to be developed to return wholly to the Platonic theory. Hegel limits himself to referring to it. We recognize here, also, the results of the Kantian analysis.

II. *Of the Beautiful in Nature.*

Although science cannot pause to describe the beauties of nature, it ought, nevertheless to study in a general manner, the characteristics of the Beautiful, as it appears to us in the physical world and in the beings which it contains. This is the subject of a somewhat extended chapter with the following title: *Of the Beautiful in Nature*. Hegel herein considers the question from the particular point of view of his philosophy, and he applies his theory of the *Idea*. Nevertheless, the results at which he arrives, and the manner in which he describes the forms of physical beauty, can be comprehended and accepted independently of his system, little adapted, it must be confessed, to cast light upon this subject.

The Beautiful in nature is the first manifestation of the Idea. The successive degrees of beauty correspond to the develop-

ment of life and organization in beings. Unity is an essential characteristic of it. Thus, in the mineral, beauty consists in the arrangement or disposition of the parts, in the force which resides in them, and which reveals itself in this unity. The solar system offers us a more perfect unity and a higher beauty. The bodies in that system, while preserving entire their individual existence, co-ordinate themselves into a whole, the parts of which are independent, although attached to a common centre, the sun. Beauty of this order strikes us by the regularity of the movements of the celestial bodies. A unity more real and true is that which is manifested in organized and living beings. The unity here consists in a relation of reciprocity and of mutual dependence between the organs, so that each of them loses its independent existence in order to give place to a wholly ideal unity which reveals itself as the principle of life animating them.

Life is beautiful in nature: for it is essence, force, the idea realized under its first form. Nevertheless, beauty in nature is still wholly external; it has no consciousness of itself; it is beautiful solely for an intelligence which sees and contemplates it.

How do we perceive beauty in natural beings? Beauty, with living and animate beings, is neither accidental and capricious movements, nor simple conformity of those movements to an end—the uniform and mutual connection of parts. This point of view is that of the naturalist, of the man of science; it is not that of the Beautiful. Beauty is total form in so far as it reveals the force which animates it; it is this force itself, manifested by a totality of forms, of independent and free movements; it is the internal harmony which reveals itself in this secret accord of members, and which betrays itself outwardly, without the eye's pausing to consider the relation of the parts to the whole, and their functions or reciprocal connection, as science does. The unity exhibits itself merely externally as the principle which binds the members together. It manifests itself especially through the sensibility. The point of view of beauty is then that of pure contemplation, not that of reflection,

which analyzes, compares and seizes the connection of parts and their destination.

This internal and visible unity, this accord, and this harmony, are not distinct from the material element; they are its very form. This is the principle which serves to determine beauty in its inferior grades, the beauty of the crystal with its regular forms, forms produced by an internal and free force. A similar activity is developed in a more perfect manner in the living organism, its outlines, the disposition of its members, the movements, and the expression of sensibility.

Such is beauty in individual beings. It is otherwise with it when we consider nature in its totality, the beauty of a landscape, for example. There is no longer question here about an organic disposition of parts and of the life which animates them; we have under our eyes a rich multiplicity of objects which form a whole, mountains, trees, rivers, etc. In this diversity there appears an external unity which interests us by its agreeable or imposing character. To this aspect there is added that property of the objects of nature through which they awaken in us, sympathetically, certain sentiments, by the secret analogy which exists between them and the situations of the human soul.

Such is the effect produced by the silence of the night, the calm of a still valley, the sublime aspect of a vast sea in tumult, and the imposing grandeur of the starry heavens. The significance of these objects is not in themselves; they are only symbols of the sentiments of the soul which they excite. It is thus we attribute to animals the qualities which belong only to man, courage, fortitude, cunning. Physical beauty is a reflex of moral beauty.

To recapitulate, physical beauty, viewed in its ground or essence, consists in the manifestation of the concealed principle, of the force which is developed in the bosom of matter. This force reveals itself in a manner more or less perfect, by unity in inert matter, and in living beings by the different modes of organization.

Hegel then devotes a special examination to the external side, or to beauty of form in natural objects. Physical beauty, considered externally, presents itself successively under the aspects of *regularity* and

symmetry of conformity to law and of *harmony*; lastly, of *purity* and simplicity of matter.

1. *Regularity*, which is only the repetition of a form equal to itself, is the most elementary and simple form. In *symmetry* there already appears a diversity which breaks the uniformity. These two forms of beauty pertain to *quantity*, and constitute mathematical beauty; they are found in organic and inorganic bodies, minerals and crystals. In plants are presented less regular and freer forms. In the organization of animals, this regular and symmetrical disposition becomes more and more subordinated in proportion as we ascend to higher degrees of the animal scale.

2. *Conformity to a law* marks a degree still more elevated, and serves as a transition to freer forms. Here there appears an accord more real and more profound, which begins to transcend mathematical rigor. It is no longer a simple numerical relation, where quantity plays the principal role; we discover a relation of quality between different terms. A law rules the whole, but it cannot be calculated; it remains a hidden bond, which reveals itself to the spectator. Such is the oval line, and above all, the undulating line, which Hogarth has given as the line of beauty. These lines determine, in fact, the beautiful forms of organic nature in living beings of a high order, and, above all, the beautiful forms of the human body, of man and of woman.

3. *Harmony* is a degree still superior to the preceding, and it includes them. It consists in a totality of elements essentially distinct, but whose opposition is destroyed and reduced to unity by a secret accord, a reciprocal adaptation. Such is the harmony of forms and colors, that of sounds and movements. Here the unity is stronger, more *pronounced*, precisely because the differences and the oppositions are more marked. Harmony, however is not as yet true unity, spiritual unity, that of the soul, although the latter possesses within it a principal of harmony. Harmony alone, as yet, reveals neither the soul nor the spirit, as one may see in music and dancing.

Beauty exists also in matter itself, abstraction being made of its form; it consists then, in the unity and *simplicity* which constitutes *purity*. Such is the purity of the sky and of the atmosphere, the purity of colors and of sounds; that of certain substances—of precious stones, of gold, and of the diamond. Pure and simple colors are also the most agreeable.

After having described the beautiful in nature, in order that the necessity of a beauty more exalted and more ideal shall be comprehended, Hegel sets forth the *imperfections* of real beauty. He begins with animal life, which is the most elevated point we have reached, and he dwells upon the characteristics and causes of that imperfection.

Thus first in the animal, although the organism is more perfect than that of the plant, what we see is not the central point of life; the special seat of the operations of the force which animates the whole, remains concealed from us. We see only the outlines of the external form, covered with hairs scales, feathers, skin; secondly, the human body, it is true, exhibits more beautiful proportions, and a more perfect form, because in it life and sensibility are everywhere manifested—in the color, the flesh, the freer movements, nobler attitudes, &c. Yet here, besides the imperfections in details, the sensibility does not appear equally distributed. Certain parts are appropriated to animal functions, and exhibit their destination in their form. Further, individuals in nature, placed as they are under a dependence upon external causes, and under the influence of the elements, are under the dominion of necessity and want. Under the continual action of these causes, physical being is exposed to losing the fullness of its forms and the flower of its beauty; rarely do these causes permit it to attain to its complete, free and regular development. The human body is placed under a like dependence upon external agents. If we pass from the physical to the moral world, that dependence appears still more clearly.

Everywhere there is manifested diversity, and opposition of tendencies and interests. The individual, in the plenitude of his life and beauty, can not pre-

serve the appearance of a free force. Each individual being is limited and particularized in his excellence. His life flows in a narrow circle of space and time; he belongs to a determinate species; his type is given, his form defined, and the conditions of his development fixed. The human body itself offers, in respect to beauty, a progression of forms dependent on the diversity of races. Then come hereditary qualities, the peculiarities which are due to temperament, profession, age and sex. All these causes alter and disfigure the purest and most perfect primitive type.

All these imperfections are summed up in a word: the finite. Human life and animal life realize their idea only imperfectly. Moreover, spirit, not being able to find, in the limits of the real, the sight and the enjoyment of its proper freedom—seeks to satisfy itself in a region more elevated, that of *art*, or of the ideal.

III. *Of the beautiful in Art or of the Ideal.*

Art has as its end and aim the representation of the ideal. Now what is the *ideal*? It is beauty in a degree of perfection superior to real beauty. It is force, life, spirit, the essence of things, developing themselves harmoniously in a sensuous reality, which is its resplendent image, its faithful expression; it is beauty disengaged and purified from the accidents which veil and disfigure it, and which alter its purity in the real world.

The ideal, in art, is not then the contrary of the real, but the real idealized, purified, rendered conformable to its idea, and perfectly expressing it. In a word, it is the perfect accord of the idea and the sensuous form.

On the other hand, the true ideal is not life in its inferior degrees—blind, undeveloped force—but the soul arrived at the consciousness of itself, free, and in the full enjoyment of its faculties: it is life, but

spiritual life—in a word, spirit. The representation of the spiritual principle, in the plenitude of its life and freedom, with its high conceptions, its profound and noble sentiments, its joys and its sufferings: this is the true aim of art, the true ideal.

Finally, the ideal is not a lifeless abstraction, a frigid generality: it is the spiritual principle under the form of the living individual, freed from the bonds of the finite, and developing itself in its perfect harmony with its inmost nature and essence.

We see, thus, what are the characteristics of the ideal. It is evident that in all its degrees it is calmness, serenity, felicity, happy existence, freed from the miseries and wants of life. This serenity does not exclude earnestness; for the ideal appears in the midst of the conflicts of life; but even the roughest experiences, in the midst of intense suffering, the soul preserves an evident calmness as a fundamental trait. It is felicity in suffering, the glorification of sorrow, smiling in tears. The echo of this felicity resounds in all the spheres of the ideal.

It is important to determine, with still more precision, the relations of the *ideal* and the *real*.

The opposition of the ideal and the real has given rise to two conflicting opinions. Some conceive of the ideal as something vague, an abstract, lifeless generality, without individuality. Others extol the natural, the imitation of the real in the most minute and prosaic details. Equal exaggeration! The truth lies between the two extremes.

In the first place, the ideal may be, in fact, something external and accidental, an insignificant form or appearance, a common existence. But that which constitutes the ideal, in this inferior degree, is the fact that this reality, imitated by art, is a creation of spirit, and becomes then something artificial not real. It is an image and a metamorphosis. This image moreover, is more permanent than its model, more durable than the real object. In fixing that which is mobile and transient, in eternizing that which is momentary and fugitive—a flower, a smile—art surpasses nature and idealizes it.

But it does not stop here. Instead of simply reproducing these objects, while

preserving their natural form, it seizes their internal and deepest character, it extends their signification, and gives to them a more elevated and more general significance; for it must manifest the universal in the individual, and render visible the idea which they represent, their eternal and fixed type. It allows this character of generality to penetrate everywhere, without reducing it to an abstraction. Thus the artist does not slavishly reproduce all the features of the object, and its accident, but only the true traits, those conformable to its idea. If, then, he takes nature as a model, he still surpasses and idealizes it. Naturalness, faithfulness, truth these are not exact imitation, but the perfect conformity of the form to the idea; they are the creation of a more perfect form, whose essential traits represent the idea more faithfully and more clearly than it is expressed in nature itself. To know how to disengage the operative, energetic, essential and significant elements in objects,—this is the task of the artist. The ideal, then, is not the real; the latter contains many elements insignificant useless, confused and foreign, or opposed to the idea. The natural here loses its vulgar significance. By this word must be understood the more exalted expression of spirit. The ideal is a transfigured, glorified nature.

As to vulgar and common nature, if art takes it also for its object, it is not for its own sake, but because of what in it is true, excellent, interesting, ingenuous or gay, as in *genre* painting, in Dutch painting particularly. It occupies, nevertheless, an inferior rank, and cannot make pretensions to a place beside the grand compositions of art.

But there are other subjects—a nature more elevated and more ideal. Art, at its culminating stage, represents the development of the internal powers of the soul, its grand passions, profound sentiments, and lofty destinies. Now it is clear that the artist does not find in the real world, forms so pure and ideal that he may safely confine himself to imitating and copying. Moreover, if the form, itself, be given, expression must be added. Besides he ought to secure, in a just measure, the union of the individual and the universal,

of the form and the idea; to create a living ideal, penetrated with the idea, and in which it animates the sensuous form and appearance throughout, so that there shall be nothing in it empty or insignificant, nothing that is not alive with expression itself. Where shall he find in the real world, this just measure, this animation, and this exact correspondence of all the parts and of all the details conspiring to the same end, to the same effect? to say that he will succeed in conceiving and realizing the ideal, by making a felicitous selection of ideas and forms, is to ignore the secret of artistic composition; it is to misconceive the entirely spontaneous method of genius,—inspiration which creates at a single effort,—to replace it by reflective drudgery, which only results in the production of frigid and lifeless works.

It does not suffice to define the ideal in an abstract manner, the ideal is exhibited to us in the works of art under very various and divers forms. Thus sculpture represents it under the motionless features of its figures. In the other arts it assumes the form of movement and of action; in poetry, particularly, it manifests itself in the midst of most varied situations and events, of conflicts between persons animated by divers passions. How and under what conditions, is each art in particular called upon to represent thus the ideal? This will be the object of the theory of the arts. In the general exposition of the principles of art, we may, nevertheless attempt to define the degrees of this development, to study the principal aspects under which it manifests itself. Such is the object of those considerations, the title of which is, *Of the Determination of the Ideal*, and which the author develops in this first part of the work. We can trace only summarily the principal ideas, devoting ourselves to marking their order and connection.

The gradation which the author establishes between the progressively determined form of the ideal is as follows:

1. The ideal, under the most elevated form, is the divine idea, the divine such as the imagination can represent it under

sensuous forms; such is the Greek ideal of the divinities of Polytheism; such the Christian ideal in its highest purity, under the form of God the Father, of Christ, of the Virgin, of the Apostles, etc. It is given, above all, to sculpture and painting, to present us the image of it. Its essential characteristics are calmness, majesty, serenity.

2. In a degree less elevated, but more determined, in the circle of human life, the ideal appears to us, with man, as the victory of the eternal principles which fill the human heart, the triumph of the noble part of the soul over the inferior and passionate. The noble, the excellent, the perfect, in the human soul, is the moral and divine principle which is manifested in it, which governs its will, and causes it to accomplish grand actions; this is the true source of self-sacrifice and of heroism.

3. But the idea, when it is manifested in the real world, can be developed only under the form of *action*. Now, action itself has for its condition a conflict between principles and persons, divided as to interests, ideas, passions, and characters. It is this especially that is represented by poetry—the art *par excellence*, the only art which can reproduce an action in its successive phases, with its complications, its sudden turns of fortune, its catastrophe and its denouement.

Action, if one considers it more closely, includes the following conditions: 1st. A world which serves it as a basis and theatre, a *form of society* which renders it possible, and is favorable to the development of ideal figures. 2d. A determinate situation, in which the personages are placed who render necessary the conflict between opposing interests and passions, whence a collision may arise. 3d. An action, properly so called, which develops itself in its essential moments, which has a beginning, a middle, and an end. This action, in order to afford a high interest, should revolve upon ideas of an elevated order, which inspire and sustain the personages, ennobling their passions, and forming the basis of their character.

Hegel treats, in a general manner, each of these points, which will appear anew, under a more special form, in the study of poetry, and particularly of epic and dramatic poetry.

1. The state of society most favorable to the ideal is that which allows the characters to act with most freedom, to reveal a lofty and powerful personality. This cannot be a social order, where all is fixed and regulated by laws and a constitution. Nor can it be the savage state, where all is subject to caprice and violence, and where man is dependent upon a thousand external causes, which render his existence precarious. Now the state intermediate between the barbarous state and an advanced civilization, is the *heroic* age, that in which the epic poets locate their action, and from which the tragic poets themselves have often borrowed their subjects and their personages. That which characterizes heroes in this epoch is above all, the independence which is manifested in their characters and acts. On the other hand, the hero is all of a piece; he assumes not only the responsibility of his acts and their consequences, but the results of actions he has not perpetrated, of the faults or crimes of his race; he bears in his person an entire race.

Another reason why the ideal existences of art belong to the mythologic ages, and to remote epochs of history, is that the artist or the poet, in representing or recounting events, has a freer scope in his ideal creations. Art, also, for the same reason, has a predilection for the higher conditions of society, those of princes particularly, because of the perfect independence of will and action which characterizes them. In this respect, our actual society, with its civil and political organization, its manners, administration, police, etc., is prosaic. The sphere of activity of the individual is too restricted; he encounters everywhere limits and shackles to his will. Our monarchs themselves are subject to these conditions; their power is limited by institutions, laws and customs. War, peace, and treaties are determined by political relations independent of their will.

The greatest poets have not been able

to escape these conditions; and when they have desired to represent personages nearer to us, as Charles Moor, or Wallenstein, they have been obliged to place them in revolt against society or against their sovereign. Moreover, these heroes rush on to an inevitable ruin, or they fall into the ridiculous situation, of which the Don Quixote of Cervantes gives us the most striking example.

2. To represent the ideal in personages or in an action, there is necessary not only a favorable world from which the subject is to be borrowed, but a situation. This situation can be either indeterminate, like that of many of the immobile personages of antique or religious sculpture, or determinate, but yet of little earnestness. Such are also the greater number of the situations of the personages of antique sculpture. Finally it may be earnest, and furnish material for a veritable action. It supposes, then, an opposition, an action and a reaction, a conflict, a collision. The beauty of the ideal consists in absolute serenity and perfection. Now, collision destroys this harmony. The problem of art consists, then, in so managing that the harmony reappears in the denouement. Poetry alone is capable of developing this opposition upon which the interest, particularly of tragic art turns.

Without examining here the nature of the different *collisions*, the study of which belongs to the theory of dramatic art, we must already have remarked that the collisions of the highest order are those in which the conflict takes place between moral forces, as in the ancient tragedies. This is the subject of true classic tragedy, moral as well as religious, as will be seen from what follows.

Thus the ideal, in this superior degree, is the manifestation of moral powers and of the ideas of spirit, of the grand movements of the soul, and of the characters which appear and are revealed in the development of the representation.

3. In *action*, properly so-called, three things are to be considered which constitute its ideal object: 1. The general interests, the ideas, the universal principles, whose opposition forms the very founda-

tion of the action; 2. The personages. 3. Their character and their passions, or the motives which impel them to act.

In the first place, the eternal principles of religion, of morality, of the family, of the state—the grand sentiments of the soul, love, honor, etc.—these constitute the basis, the true interest of the action. These are the grand and true motives of art, the eternal theme of exalted poetry.

To these legitimate and true powers others are, without doubt, added; the powers of evil; but they ought not to be represented as forming the real foundation and end of the action. "If the idea, the end, and aim, be something false in itself, the hideousness of the ground will allow still less beauty of form. The sophistry of the passions may, indeed, by a true picture, attempt to represent the false under the colors of the true, but it places under our eyes only a whitened sepulchre. Cruelty and the violent employment of force can be endured in representation, but only when they are relieved by the grandeur of the character and ennobled by the aim which is pursued by the *dramatis personæ*. Perversity, envy, cowardice, baseness are only repulsive.

"Evil, in itself is stripped of real interest, because nothing but the false can spring from what is false; it produces only misfortune, while art should present to us order and harmony. The great artists, the great poets of antiquity, never give us the spectacle of pure wickedness and perversity."

We cite this passage because it exhibits the character and high moral tone which prevails in the entire work, as we shall have occasion to observe more than once hereafter.

If the ideas and interests of human life form the ground of the action, the latter is accomplished by the characters upon whom the interest is fastened. General ideas may, indeed, be personated by beings superior to man, by certain divinities like those which figure in the ancient epic poetry and tragedy. But it is to man that action, properly so called, returns; it is he who occupies the scene. Now how reconcile divine action and human action, the will of the gods and that of man! Such is the problem which has made shipwreck of so

many poets and artists. To maintain a proper equipoise it is necessary that the gods have supreme direction, and that man preserve his freedom and his independence without which he is no more than the passive instrument of the will of the gods; fatality weighs upon all his acts. The true solution consists in maintaining the identity of the two terms, in spite of their difference; in so acting that what is attributed to the gods shall appear at the same time to emanate from the inner nature of the *dramatis personæ* and from their character. The talent of the artist must reconcile the two aspects. "The heart of man must be revealed in his gods, personifications of the grand motives which allure him and govern him within." This is the problem resolved by the great poets of antiquity, Homer, Æschylus, and Sophocles.

The general principles, those grand motives which are the basis of the action, by the fact that they are living in the soul of the characters, form, also, the very ground of the *passions*; this is the essence of true pathos. Passion here in the elevated ideal sense, is, in fact, not an arbitrary, capricious, irregular movement of the soul; it is a noble principle, which blends itself with a great idea, with one of the eternal verities of moral or religious order. Such is the passion of Antigone, the holy love for her brother; such, the vengeance of Orestes. It is an essentially legitimate power of the soul which contains one of the eternal principles of the reason and the will. This is still the ideal, the true ideal, although it appears under the form of a passion. It relieves, ennobles and purifies it; it thus gives to the action a serious and profound interest.

It is in this sense that passion constitutes the centre and true domain of art; it is the principle of emotion, the source of true pathos.

Now, this moral verity, this eternal principal which descends into the heart of man and there takes the form of great and noble passion, identifying itself with the will of the *dramatis personæ*, constitutes also, their character. Without this high idea which serves as support and as basis to passion there is no true character. Character is the culminating point of ideal representation. It is the embodiment of

all that precedes. It is in the creation of the characters, that the genius of the artist or of the poet is displayed.

Three principal elements must be united to form the ideal character, *richness, vitality and stability*. Richness consists in not being limited to a single quality, which would make of the person an abstraction, an allegoric being. To a single dominant quality there should be added all those which make of the personage or hero a real and complete man, capable of being developed in diverse situations and under varying aspects. Such a multiplicity alone can give vitality to the character. This is not sufficient however; it is necessary that the qualities be moulded together in such a manner as to form not a simple assemblage and a complex whole, but one and the same individual, having peculiar and original physiognomy. This is the case when a particular sentiment, a ruling passion, presents the salient trait of the character of a person, and gives to him a fixed aim, to which all his resolutions and his acts refer. Unity and variety, simplicity and completeness of detail, these are presented to us in the characters of Sophocles, Shakespeare, and others.

Lastly what constitutes essentially the ideal in character is consistency and stability. An inconsistent, undecided, irresolute character, is the utter want of character. Contradictions, without doubt, exist in human nature, but unity should be maintained in spite of these fluctuations. Something identical ought to be found throughout as a fundamental trait. To be self-determining, to follow a design, to embrace a resolution and persist in it, constitute the very foundation of personality; to suffer one's self to be determined by another, to hesitate, to vacillate, this is to surrender one's will, to cease to be one's self, to lack character; this is in all cases, the opposite of the ideal character.

Hegel on this subject strongly protests against the characters which figure in modern pieces and romances, and of which Werther is the type.

These pretended characters, says he, represent only unhealthiness of spirit, and feebleness of soul. Now true and healthy art does not represent what is false and sickly, what lacks consistency and de-

cision, but that which is true, healthy and strong. The ideal in a word, is the idea realized; man can realize it only as a free person, that is to say, by displaying all the energy and constancy which can make it triumph.

We shall find more than once, in the course of the work, the same ideas developed with the same force and precision.

That which constitutes the very ground of the ideal is the inmost essence of things, especially the lofty conceptions of the spirit, and the development of the powers of the soul. These ideas are manifest in an action in which are placed upon the scene the grand interests of life, the passions of the human heart, the will and the character of actors. But this action is itself developed in the midst of an external nature which moreover, lends to the ideal, colors and a determinate form. These external surroundings must also be conceived and fashioned in the meaning of the ideal, according to the laws of *regularity*, *symmetry*, and *harmony*, of which mention has been made above. How ought man to be represented in his relations with external nature? How ought this prose of life to be idealized! If art, in fact frees man from the wants of material life, it cannot, however, elevate him above the conditions of human existence, and suppress these connections.

Hegel devotes a special examination to this new phase of the question of the ideal, which he designates by this title—*Of the external determination of the ideal*.

In our days we have given an exaggerated importance to this external side, which we have made the principal object. We are too unmindful that art should represent the ideas and sentiments of the human soul, that this is the true ground of its works. Hence all these minute descriptions, this external care given to the picturesque element or to the local color, to furniture, to costumes, to all those artificial means employed to disguise the emptiness and insignificance of the subject, the absence of ideas, the falsity of the situations, the feebleness of the characters, and the improbability of the action.

Nevertheless, this side has its place in art, and should not be neglected. It gives

clearness, truthfulness, life and interest to its works, by the secret sympathy which exists between man and nature. It is characteristic of the great masters to represent nature with perfect truthfulness. Homer is an example of this. Without forgetting the content for the form, picture for the frame, he presents to us a faultless and precise image of the theatre of action. The arts differ much in this respect. Sculpture limits itself to certain symbolic indications; painting, which, has at its disposal means more extended, enriches with these objects the content of its pictures. Among the varieties of poetry, the epic is more circumstantial in its descriptions than the drama or lyric poetry. But this external fidelity should not in any art, extend to the representation of insignificant details, to the making of them an object of predilection, and to subordinating to them the developments which the subject itself claims. The grand point in these descriptions is that we perceive a secret harmony between man and nature, between the action and the theatre on which it occurs.

Another species of accord is established between man and the objects of physical nature, when, through his free activity, he impresses upon them his intelligence and will, and appropriates them to his own use; the ideal consists in causing misery and necessity to disappear from the domain of art, in revealing the freedom which develops itself without effort under our eyes, and easily surmounts obstacles.

Such is the ideal considered under this aspect. Thus the gods of polytheism themselves have garments and arms; they drink nectar and are nourished by ambrosia. The garment is an ornament designed to heighten the glory of the features, to give nobleness to the countenance, to facilitate movement, or to indicate force and agility. The most brilliant objects, the metals, precious stones, purple and ivory, are employed for the same end. All concur to produce the effects of grace and beauty.

In the satisfaction of physical wants the ideal consists, above all, in the simplicity of the means. Instead of being artificial, factitious, complex, the latter emanate directly from the activity of man, and free-

dom. The heroes of Homer themselves slay the oxen which are to serve for the feast, and roast them; they forge their arms, and prepare their couches. This is not, as one might think, a relic of barbarous manners, something prosaic; but we see, penetrating everywhere the delight of invention, the pleasure of easy toil and free activity exercised on material objects. Everything is peculiar to and inherent in his character, and a means for the hero of revealing the force of his arm and the skill of his hand; while in civilized society, these objects depend on a thousand foreign causes, on a complex adjustment in which man is converted into a machine subordinated to other machines. Things have lost their freshness and vitality; they remain inanimate, and are no longer proper, direct creations of the human person, in which the man loves to solace and contemplate himself.

A final point relative to the external form of the ideal is that which concerns the relation of works of art to the public, that is to say, to the nation and epoch for which the artist or the poet composes his works. Ought the artist when he treats a subject, to consult above all, the spirit, taste and manners of the people whom he addresses, and conform himself to their ideas? This is the means of exciting interest in fabulous and imaginary or even historic persons. But then there is a liability to distort history and tradition.

Ought he, on the other hand, to reproduce with scrupulous exactness the manners and customs of another time, to give to the facts and the characters their proper coloring and their original and primitive costume? This is the problem. Hence arise two schools and two opposite modes of representation. In the age of Louis XIV., for example, the Greeks and Romans are conceived in the likeness of Frenchmen. Since then, by a natural reaction, the contrary tendency has prevailed. To-day the poet must have the knowledge of an archeologist, and possess his scrupulous exactness, and pay close attention, above all, to local color, and historic verity has become the principal and essential aim of art.

Truth here, as always, lies between the two extremes. It is necessary to maintain,

at the same time, the rights of art and those of the public, to have a proper regard for the spirit of the epoch, and to satisfy the exigencies of the subject treated. These are the very judicious rules which the author states upon this delicate point.

The subject should be intelligible and interesting to the public to which it is addressed. But this end the poet or the artist will attain only so far as, by his general spirit, his work responds to some one of the essential ideas of the human spirit and to the general interests of humanity. The particularities of an epoch are not of true and enduring interest to us.

If, then, the subject is borrowed from remote epochs of history, or from some far-off tradition, it is necessary that, by our general culture, we should be familiarized with it. It is thus only that we can sympathize with an epoch and with manners that are no more. Hence the two essential conditions; that the subject present the general human character, then that it be in relation with our ideas.

Art is not designed for a small number of scholars and men of science; it is addressed to the entire nation. Its works should be comprehended and relished of themselves, and not after a course of difficult research. Thus national subjects are the most favorable. All great poems are national poems. The Bible histories have for us a particular charm, because we are familiar with them from our infancy. Nevertheless, in the measure that relations are multiplied between peoples, art can borrow its subjects from all latitudes and from all epochs. It should, indeed, as to the principal features, preserve, to the traditions, events, and personages, to manners and institutions, their historic or traditional character; but the duty of the artist, above all, is to place the idea which constitutes its content in harmony with the spirit of his own age, and the peculiar genius of his nation.

In this necessity lies the reason and excuse for what is called anachronism in art. When the anachronism bears only upon external circumstances it is unimportant. It becomes a matter of more moment if we attribute to the characters, the ideas,

and sentiments of another epoch. Respect must be paid to historic truth, but regard must also be had to the manners and intellectual culture of one's own time. The heroes of Homer themselves are more than were the real personages of the epoch which he presents; and the characters of Sophocles are brought still nearer to us. To violate thus the rules of historic reality, is a necessary anachronism in art. Finally, another form of anachronism, which the utmost moderation and genius can alone make pardonable, is that which transfers the religious or moral ideas of a more advanced civilization to an anterior epoch; when one attributes, for example, to the ancients the ideas of the moderns. Some great poets have ventured upon this intentionally; few have been successful in it.

The general conclusion is this: "The artist should be required to make himself the cotemporary of past ages, and become penetrated himself with their spirit. For if the substance of those ideas be true, it remains clear for all time. But to undertake to reproduce with a scrupulous exactness

the external element of history, with all its details and particulars—in a word all the rust of antiquity, is the work of a puerile erudition, which attaches itself only to a superficial aim. We should not wrest from art the right which it has to float between reality and fiction."

This first part concludes with an examination of the qualities necessary to an artist, such as imagination, genius, inspiration, originality, etc. The author does not deem it obligatory to treat at much length this subject, which appears to him to allow only a small number of general rules or psychological observations. The manner in which he treats of many points, and particularly of the imagination, causes us to regret that he has not thought it worth while to give a larger space to these questions, which occupy the principal place in the majority of æsthetical treatises; we shall find them again under another form in the theory of the arts.

[The next number will continue this translation through the treatment of the Symbolic, Classic and Romantic forms of art.]

NOTES ON RAPHAEL'S "TRANSFIGURATION."

[Read before the St. Louis Art Society in November, 1866.]

I. THE ENGRAVING.

He who studies the "Transfiguration" of Raphael is fortunate if he has access to the engraving of it by Raphael Morghen. This engraver, as one learns from the *Encyclopædia*, was a Florentine, and executed this—his most elaborate work—in 1795, from a drawing of Tofanelli, after having discovered that a copy he had partly finished from another drawing, was very inadequate when compared with the original.

Upon comparison with engravings by other artists, it seems to me that this engraving has not received all the praise it deserves; I refer especially to the seizing of the "motives" of the picture, which are so essential in a work of great scope, to give it the requisite unity. What the engraver has achieved in the present instance, I hope to be able to show in some degree. But one will not be able to verify my results if he takes up an engraving by a less fortunate artist; e. g.: one by Pavoni, of recent origin.

II. HISTORICAL.

It is currently reported that Raphael painted the "Transfiguration" at the instance of Cardinal Giulio de Medici, and that in honor of the latter he introduced the two saints—Julian and Lawrence—on the mount; St. Julian suggesting the ill-fated Giuliano de Medici, the Cardinal's father, and St. Lawrence representing his uncle, "Lorenzo the Magnificent," the greatest of the Medici line, and greatest man of his time in Italy. "The haughty Michael Angelo refused to enter the lists in person against Raphael, but put forward as a fitting rival Sebastian del Piombo, a Venetian." Raphael painted, as his mas-

terpiece, the "Transfiguration," and Sebastian, with the help of Michael Angelo, painted the "Raising of Lazarus." In 1520, before the picture was quite finished, Raphael died. His favorite disciple, Giulio Romano, finished the lower part of the picture (especially the demoniac) in the spirit of Raphael, who had completed the upper portion and most of the lower.

III. LEGEND.

The Legend portrayed here—slightly varying from the account in the New Testament but not contradicting it—is as follows: Christ goes out with his twelve disciples to Mount Tabor, and, leaving the nine others at the foot, ascends with the favored three to the summit, where the scene of the Transfiguration takes place. While this transpires, the family group approach with the demoniac, seeking help from a miraculous source.

Raphael has added to this version the circumstance that two sympathetic strangers, passing that way up the mount, carry to the Beatified One the intelligence of the event below, and solicit his immediate and gracious interference.

The Testament account leads us to suppose the scene to be Mount Tabor, south-east of Nazareth, at whose base he had healed many, a few days before, and where he had held many conversations with his disciples. "On the following day, when they were come down, they met the family," says Luke; but Matthew and Mark do not fix so precisely the day.

IV. CHARACTERIZATION.

It may be safely affirmed that there is scarcely a picture in existence in which

the individualities are more strongly marked by internal essential characteristics.

Above, there is no figure to be mistaken: Christ floats toward the source of light—the Invisible Father, by whom *all* is made visible that *is* visible. On the right, Moses appears in strong contrast to Elias on the left—the former the law-giver, and the latter the spontaneous, fiery, eagle-eyed prophet.

On the mountain top—prostrate beneath, are the three disciples—one recognizes on the right hand, John, gracefully bending his face down from the overpowering light, while on the left James hides his face in his humility. But Peter, the bold one, is fain to gaze directly on the splendor. He turns his face up in the act, but is, as on another occasion, mistaken in his estimate of his own endurance, and is obliged to cover his eyes, involuntarily, with his hand.

Below the mount, are two opposed groups. On the right, coming from the hamlet in the distance, is the family group, of which a demoniac boy forms the centre. They, without doubt, saw Christ pass on his way to this solitude, and, at length, concluded to follow him and test his might which had been “noised abroad” in that region. It is easy to see the relationship of the whole group. First the boy, actually “possessed,” or a maniac; then his father—a man evidently predisposed to insanity—supporting and restraining him. Kneeling at the right of the boy is his mother, whose fair Grecian face has become haggard with the trials she has endured from her son. Just beyond her is her brother, and in the shade of the mountain, is her father. In the foreground is her sister. Back of the father, to the right, is seen an uncle (on the father's side) of the demoniac boy, whose features and gestures show him to be a simpleton, and near him is seen the face of the father's sister, also a weak-minded person. The parents of the father are not to be seen, for the obvious reason that old age is not a characteristic of persons predisposed to insanity. Again, it is marked that in a family thus predisposed, some will be brilliant to a degree resembling genius, and others will be simpletons. The whole group at the right are supplicating the nine disciples, in the most earnest manner, for relief. The disciples, grouped on the

left, are full of sympathy, but their looks tell plainly that they can do nothing. One, at the left, and near the front, holds the books of the Law in his right hand, but the letter needs the spirit to give life, and the mere Law of Moses does not help the demoniac, and only excites the sorrowful indignation of the beautiful sister in the foreground.

The curious student of the New Testament may succeed in identifying the different disciples: Andrew, holding the books of the Law, is Peter's brother, and bears a family resemblance. Judas, at the extreme left, cannot be mistaken. Matthew looks over the shoulder of Bartholomew, who is pointing to the demoniac; while Thomas—distinguished by his youthful appearance—bends over toward the boy with a look of intense interest. Simon (?), kneeling between Thomas and Bartholomew, is indicating to the mother, by the gesture with his left hand, the absence of the Master. Philip, whose face is turned towards Judas, is pointing to the scene on the mount, and apparently suggesting the propriety of going for the absent master. James, the son of Alpheus, resembles Christ in features, and stands behind Jude, his brother, who points up to the mount while looking at the father.

V. ORGANIC UNITY.

(a) Doubtless every true work of art should have what is called an “organic unity.” That is to say, all the parts of the work should be related to each other in such a way that a harmony of design arises. Two entirely unrelated things brought into the piece would form two centres of attraction and hence divide the work into two different works. It should be so constituted that the study of one part leads to all the other parts as being necessarily implied in it. This common life of the whole work is the central idea which necessitates all the parts, and hence makes the work an organism instead of a mere conglomerate or mechanical aggregate—a fortuitous concourse of atoms which would be a chaos only.

(b). This central idea, however, cannot be represented in a work of art without

contrasts and hence there must be antitheses present.

(c) And these antitheses must be again reduced to unity by the manifest dependence of each side upon the central idea.

What is the central idea of this picture?

(a) Almost every thoughtful person that has examined it, has said: "Here is the Divine in contrast with the Human, and the dependence of the latter upon the former." This may be stated in a variety of ways. The Infinite is there above, and the Finite here below seeking it.

(b) The grandest antithesis is that between the two parts of the Picture, the above and the below. The transfigured Christ, there, dazzling with light; below, the shadow of mortal life, only illuminated by such rays as come from above. *There*, serenity; and here, rending calamity.

Then there are minor antitheses.

(1) Above we have a Twofold. The three celestial light-seekers who soar rapturously to the invisible source of light, and below them, the three disciples swooning beneath the power of the celestial vision. (2) Then below the mountain we have a similar contrast in the two groups; the one broken in spirit by the calamity that "pierces their own souls," and the other group powerfully affected by sympathy, and feeling keenly their impotence during the absence of their Lord.

Again even, there appear other antitheses. So completely does the idea penetrate the material in this work of art, that everywhere we see the mirror of the whole. In the highest and most celestial we have the antithesis of Christ and the twain; Moses the law or letter, Elias the spirit or the prophet, and Christ the living unity. Even Christ himself, though comparatively the point of repose of the whole picture, is a contrast of soul striving against the visible body. So, too, the antitheses of the three disciples, John, Peter, James,—grace, strength, and humility. Everywhere the subject is exhaustively treated; the family in its different members, the disciples with the different shades of sympathy and concern. (The maniac boy is a perfect picture of a being, torn asunder by violent internal contradiction.)

(c) The unity is no less remarkable.

First, the absolute unity of the piece, is the transfigured Christ. To it, mediately or immediately, everything refers. All the light in the picture streams thence. All the action in the piece has its motive power in Him;—first, the two celestials soar to gaze in his light; then the three disciples are expressing, by the posture of every limb, the intense effect of the same light. On the left, the mediating strangers stand imploring Christ to descend and be merciful to the miserable of this life. Below, the disciples are painfully reminded of Him absent, by the present need of his all-healing power, and their gestures refer to his stay on the mountain top; while the group at the right are frantic in supplications for his assistance.

Besides the central unity, we find minor unities that do not contradict the higher unity, for the reason that they are only reflections of it, and each one carries us, of its own accord, to the higher unity, and loses itself in it. To illustrate: Below, the immediate unity of all (centre of interest) is the maniac boy, and yet he convulsively points to the miraculous scene above, and the perfect unrest exhibited in his attitude repels the soul irresistibly to seek another unity. The Christ above, gives us a comparatively serene point of repose, while the unity of the Below or finite side of the picture is an absolute antagonism, hurling us beyond to the higher unity.

Before the approach of the distressed family, the others were intently listening to the grave and elderly disciple, Andrew, who was reading and expounding the Scriptures to them. This was a different unity, and would have clashed with the organic unity of the piece; the approach of the boy brings in a new unity, which immediately reflects all to the higher unity.

VI. SENSE AND REASON *vs.* UNDERSTANDING.

At this point a few reflections are suggested to render more obvious, certain higher phases in the unity of this work of art, which must now be considered.

A work of art, it will be conceded, must, first of all, appeal to the senses. Equally,

too, its content must be an idea of the Reason, and this is not so readily granted by every one. But if there were no idea of the Reason in it, there would be no unity to the work, and it could not be distinguished from any other work *not* a work of art. Between the Reason and the Senses there lies a broad realm, called the "Understanding" by modern speculative writers. It was formerly called the "discursive intellect." The Understanding applies the criterion "*use*." It does not know *beauty*, or, indeed, anything which is *for itself*; it knows only what is good for something else. In a work of art, after it has asked what it is good for, it proceeds to construe it all into prose, for it is the *prose faculty*. It must have the picture tell us what is the *external fact* in nature, and not trouble us with any transcendental imaginative products. It wants imitation of nature merely.

But the artist frequently neglects this faculty, and shocks it to the uttermost by such things as the abridged mountain in this picture, or the shadow cast toward the sun, that Eckermann tells of.

The artist must never violate the sensuous harmony, nor fail to have the deeper unity of the Idea. It is evident that the sensuous side is always cared for by Raphael.

Here are some of the effects in the picture that are purely sensuous and yet of such a kind that they immediately call up the idea. The source of light in the picture is Christ's form; *below*, it is reflected in the garments of the conspicuous figure in the foreground. Above, is Christ; opposite and below, a female that suggests the Madonna. In the same manner Elias, or the inspired prophet, is the opposite to the maniac boy; the former inspired by the *celestial*; the latter, by the *demonic*. So Moses, the law-giver, is antithetic to the old disciple that has the roll of the Law in his hand. So, too, in the posture, Elias floats freely, while Moses is brought against the tree, and mars the impression of free self-support. The heavy tables of the Law seem to draw him down, while Elias seems to have difficulty in descending sufficiently to place himself in subordination to Christ.

Even the contradiction that the understanding finds in the abridgment of the

mountain, is corrected sensuously by the perspective at the right, and the shade that the edge of the rock casts which isolates the above so completely from the below.

We see that Raphael has brought them to a secluded spot just near the top of the mountain. The view of the distant vale tells us as effectually that this is a mountain top as could be done by a full length painting of it. Hence the criticism rests upon a misunderstanding of the fact which Raphael has portrayed.

VII. ROMANTIC vs. CLASSIC.

Finally, we must recur to those distinctions so much talked of, in order to introduce the consideration of the grandest strokes of genius which Raphael has displayed in this work.

The distinction of Classic and Romantic Art, of Greek Art from Christian: the former is characterized by a complete repose, or equilibrium between the Sense and Reason—or between matter and form. The idea seems completely expressed, and the expression completely adequate to the idea.

But in Christian Art we do not find this equilibrium; but everywhere we find an intimation that the idea is too transcendent for the matter to express. Hence, Romantic Art is self-contradictory—it *expresses* the *inadequacy of expression*.

"I have that within which passeth show;
These but the *trappings* and the *suits* of woe."

In Gothic Architecture, all strives upward and seems to derive its support from above, (i.e. the Spiritual, light). All Romantic Art points to a *beyond*. The Madonnas seem to say: "I am a beyond which cannot be represented in a sensuous form;" "a saintly contempt for the flesh hovers about their features," as some one has expressed it.

But in this picture, Christ himself, no more a child in the Madonna's arms, but even in his meridian glory, looks beyond, and expresses dependence on a Being who is not and cannot be represented. His face is serene, beatific; He is at unity with this Absolute Being, but the unity is an internal one, and his upraised gaze towards the

source of light is a plain statement that the True which supports him is not a sensuous one. "God dwelleth not in temples made with hands; but those who would approach Him must do it in *spirit* and in *truth*."

This is the idea which belongs to the method of all modern Art; but Raphael has not left this as the general spirit of the picture merely, but has emphasized it in a way that exhibits the happy temper of his genius in dealing with refractory subjects. And this last point has proved too much for his critics. Reference is made to the two saints painted at the left. How fine it would be, thought the Cardinal de Medici, to have St. Lawrence and St. Julian painted in there, to commemorate my father and uncle! They can represent mediators, and thereby connect the two parts of the picture more closely!

Of course, Raphael put them there! "Alas!" say his critics. "what a fatal mistake! What have those two figures to do there but to mar the work! All for the gratification of a selfish pride!"

Always trust an Artist to dispose of the Finite; he, of all men, knows how to digest it and subordinate it to the idea.

Raphael wanted just such figures in just that place. Of course, the most natural thing in the world that could happen, would be the ascent of some one to bear the message to Christ that there was need of him below. But what is the effect of that upon the work as a piece of Romantic Art? It would destroy that characteristic, unless confined to special forms. Raphael, however seizes upon this incident to show the entire spiritual character of the upper part of the picture. The disciples are dazzled so, that even the firm Peter cannot endure the light at all. Is this a physical light?

Look at the messengers that have come up the mountain! Do their eyes indicate anything bright, not to say dazzling? They stand there with supplicating looks and gestures, but see no transfiguration. It must be confessed, Cardinal de Medici, that your uncle and father are not much complimented, after all; they are merely natural men, and have no inner sense by which to see the Eternal Verities that illumine the mystery of existence! Even if you are a Cardinal, and they were Popes' counselors, they never saw anything higher in Religion than what should add comfort to us here below.

No! The transfiguration, as Raphael clearly tells us, was a Spiritual one: Christ, on the mountain with his favored three disciples, opened up such celestial clearness in his exposition of the truth, that they saw Moses and Elias, as it were, combined in one Person, and a new Heaven and a new earth arose before them, and they were lost in that revelation of infinite splendor.

In closing, a remark forces itself upon us with reference to the comparative merits of Raphael and Michael Angelo.

Raphael is the perfection of Romantic Art. Michael Angelo is almost a Greek. His paintings all seem to be pictures of statuary. In his grandest—The Last Judgment—we have the visible presence as the highest. Art with him could represent the Absolute. With Raphael it could only, in its loftiest flights, express its own impotence.

Whether we are to consider Raphael or Michael Angelo as the higher artist, must be decided by an investigation of the merits of the "Last Judgment."

INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I.

The object of this series is to furnish, in as popular a form as possible, a course of discipline for those who are beginning the study of philosophy. Strictly *popular*, in the sense the word is used—i. e. sig-

nifying that which holds fast to the ordinary consciousness of men, and does not take flights beyond—I am well aware, no philosophy can be. The nearest approach to it that can be made, consists in starting from the common external views, and drawing them into the speculative, step by

step. For this purpose the method of definitions and axioms, with deductions therefrom, as employed by Spinoza, is more appropriate at first, and afterwards a gradual approach to the *Dialectic*, or true philosophic method. In the mathematical method (that of Spinoza just alluded to) the content may be speculative, but its form, never. Hence the student of philosophy needs only to turn his attention to the content at first; when that becomes in a measure familiar, he can then the more readily pass over to the true form of the speculative content, and thus achieve complete insight. A course of discipline in the speculative content, though under an inadequate form, would make a grand preparation for the study of Hegel or Plato; while a study of these, or, in short, of any writers who employ speculative *methods* in treating speculative *content*—a study of these without previous acquaintance with the content is well nigh fruitless. One needs only to read the comments of translators of Plato upon his speculative passages, or the prevailing verdicts upon Hegel, to be satisfied on this point.

The course that I shall here present will embody my own experience to a great extent, in the chronological order of its development. Each lesson will endeavor to present an *aperçu* derived from some great philosopher. Those coming later will presuppose the earlier ones, and frequently throw new light upon them.

As one who undertakes the manufacture of an elegant piece of furniture needs carefully elaborated tools for that end, so must the thinker who wishes to comprehend the universe be equipped with the tools of thought, or else he will come off as poorly as he who should undertake to make a carved mahogany chair with no tools except his teeth and finger nails. What complicated machinery is required to transmute the rough ores into an American watch! And yet how common is the delusion that no elaboration of tools of thought is required to enable the commonest mind to manipulate the highest subjects of investigation! The alchemy that turned base metal into gold is only a symbol of that cunning alchemy of thought that by means of the philosopher's stone (scientific meth-

od) dissolves the base *facts* of experience into universal truths.

The uninitiated regards the philosophic treatment of a theme as difficult solely by reason of its technical terms. "If I only understood your use of words, I think I should find no difficulty in your thought." He supposes that under those bizarre terms there lurks only the meaning that he and others put into ordinary phrases. He does not seem to think that the concepts likewise are new. It is just as though an Indian were to say to the carpenter, "I could make as good work as you, if I only had the secret of using my finger-nails and teeth as you do the plane and saw." Speculative philosophy—it cannot be too early inculcated—does *not* "conceal under cumbersome terminology views which men ordinarily hold." The ordinary reflection would say that Being is the ground of thought, while speculative philosophy would say that thought is the ground of Being; whether of other being, or of itself as being—for it is *causa sui*.

Let us now address ourselves to the task of elaborating our technique—the tools of thought—and see what new worlds become accessible through our mental telescopes and microscopes, our analytical scalpels and psychological plummets.

I.—A PRIORI AND A POSTERIORI.

A priori, as applied to knowledge, signifies that which belongs to the nature of the mind itself. Knowledge which is before experience, or not dependent on it, is *a priori*.

A posteriori or *empirical* knowledge is derived from experience.

A criterion to be applied in order to test the application of these categories to any knowledge in question, is to be found in *universality* and *necessity*. If the truth expressed has universal and necessary validity it must be *a priori*, for it could not have been derived from experience. Of empirical knowledge we can only say: "It is true so far as experience has extended." Of *a priori* knowledge, on the contrary, we affirm: "It is universally and necessarily true and no experience of its opposite can possibly occur; from the very nature of things it *must* be so."

II.—ANALYTICAL AND SYNTHETICAL.

A judgment which in the predicate, adds nothing new to the subject, is said to be *analytical*, as e. g. "Horse is an animal;"—the concept "animal" is already contained in that of "horse."

Synthetical judgments, on the contrary, add in the predicate something new to the conception of the subject, as e. g. "This rose is red," or "The shortest distance between two points is a straight line;"—in the first judgment we have "red" added to the general concept "rose;" while in the second example we have *straightness*, which is quality, added to *shortest*, which is quantity.

III.—APODEICTICAL.

Omitting the consideration of a *posteriori* knowledge for the present, let us investigate the *a priori* in order to learn something of the constitution of the intelligence which knows—always a proper subject for philosophy. Since, moreover, the *a priori analytical* ("A horse is an animal") adds nothing to our knowledge, we may confine ourselves, as Kant does, to a *a priori synthetical* knowledge. The axioms of mathematics are of this character. They are universal and necessary in their application, and we know this without making a single practical experiment. "Only one straight line can be drawn between two points," or the proposition: "The sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles,"—these are true in all possible experiences, and hence transcend any actual experience. Take any *a posteriori* judgment, e. g. "All bodies are heavy," and we see at once that it implies the restriction, "So far as we have experienced," or else is a mere analytical judgment. The *universal and necessary* is sometimes called the *apodeictical*. The conception of the *apodeictical* lies at the basis of all true philosophical thinking. He who does not distinguish between *apodeictic* and *contingent* judgments must pause here until he can do so.

IV.—SPACE AND TIME.

In order to give a more exhaustive application to our technique, let us seek the

universal conditions of experience. The mathematical truths that we quoted relate to Space, and similar ones relate to Time. No experience would be possible without presupposing Time and Space as its logical condition. Indeed, we should never conceive our sensations to have an origin outside of ourselves and in distinct objects, unless we had the conception of Space *a priori* by which to render it possible. Instead, therefore, of our being able to generalize particular experiences, and collect therefrom the idea of Space and Time in general, we must have added the idea of Space and Time to our sensation before it could possibly become an experience at all. This becomes more clear when we recur to the *apodeictic* nature of Space and Time. Time and Space are thought as *infinite*, i. e., they can only be limited by themselves, and hence are universally continuous. But no such conception as *infinite* can be derived analytically from an object of experience, for it does not contain it. All objects of experience must be *within* Time and Space, and not *vice versa*. All that is limited in extent and duration presupposes Time and Space as its logical condition, and this we know, not from the senses but from the constitution of Reason itself. "The third side of a triangle is less than the sum of the two other sides." This we never measured, and yet we are certain that we cannot be mistaken about it. It is so in all triangles, present, past, future, actual, or possible. If this was an inference *a posteriori*, we could only say: "It has been found to be so in all cases that have been measured and reported to us."

V.—MIND.

Mind has a certain *a priori* constitution; this is our inference. It must be so, or else we could never have any experience whatever. It is the only way in which the possibility of *apodeictic* knowledge can be accounted for. What I do not get from without I must get from within, if I have it at all. Mind, it would seem from this, cannot be, according to its nature, a finite affair—a thing with properties. Were it limited in Time or Space, it could never (without transcending itself) conceive Time

and Space as universally continuous or infinite. Mind is not within Time and Space, it is as universal and necessary as the *apodeictic* judgments it forms, and hence it is the substantial essence of all that exists. Time and Space are the logical conditions of finite existences, and Mind is the logical condition of Time and Space. Hence it is ridiculous to speak of *my* mind and *your* mind, for mind is rather the universal substrate of all individuality than owned by any particular individual.

These results are so startling to the one who first begins to think, that he is tempted to reject the whole. If he does not do this, but scrutinizes the whole fabric keenly, he will discover what he supposes to be fallacies. We cannot anticipate the an-

swer to his objections here, for his objections arise from his inability to distinguish between his imagination and his thinking and this must be treated of in the next chapter. Here, we can only interpose an earnest request to the reader to persevere and thoroughly refute the whole argument before he leaves it. But this is only one and the most elementary position from which the philosophic traveler sees the Eternal Verities. Every perfect analysis—no matter what the subject be—will bring us to the same result, though the degrees of concreteness will vary,—some leaving the solution in an abstract and vague form,—others again arriving at a complete and satisfactory view of the matter in detail.

SEED LIFE.

BY E. V.

Ah! woe for the endless stirring,
The hunger for air and light,
The fire of the blazing noonday
 Wrapped round in a chilling night!

The muffled throb of an instinct
That is kin to the mystic To Be;
Strong muscles, cut with their fetters,
 As they writhe with claim to be free.

A voice that cries out in the silence,
And is choked in a stifling air;
Arms full of an endless reaching,
 While the "Nay" stands everywhere.

The burning of conscious selfhood,
That fights with pitiless fate!
God grant that deliverance stay not,
 Till it come at last too late;

Till the crushed out instinct waver,
And fainter and fainter grow,
And by suicide, through unusing,
 Seek freedom from its woe.

Oh! despair of constant losing
The life that is clutched in vain!
Is it death or a joyous growing
 That shall put an end to pain?

A DIALOGUE ON IMMORTALITY.

BY ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.

[Translated from the German, by Chas. L. Bernays.]

Philaletes.—I could tell you that after your death, you will be what you were previous to your birth; I could tell you that we are never born, and that we only seem to die—that we have always been precisely the same that we are now, and that we shall always remain the same—that *Time* is the apparatus which prevents us from being aware of all this; I could tell you that our consciousness stands always in the centre of *Time*—never on one of its termini; and that any one among us, therefore, has the immovable centre of the whole infinite *Time* in himself. I then could tell you that those who by that knowledge, are assured that the present time always originates in ourselves, can never doubt the indestructibility of their own essence.

Thrasymachus.—All of that is too long and too ambiguous for me. Tell me, briefly what I shall be after death.

Phil.—All and nothing.

Thras.—There we are! Instead of a solution to the problem you give me a contradiction; that is an old trick.

Phil.—To answer transcendental questions in language that is only made for immanent perceptions, may in fact lead us into contradictions.

Thras.—What do you mean by “transcendental” and “immanent” perceptions?

Phil.—Well! *Transcendental* perception is rather the knowledge, which, by exceeding any possibility of experience, tends to discover the essence of things as they are by themselves; *immanent* perception it is, if it keeps inside of the limits of experience. In this case, it can only speak of appearances. You as an individual, end with your death. Yet individuality is not your true and final essence, but only a mere appearance of it. It is not the *thing in itself*, but only its appearance, established in the form of time, thereby having a beginning and an end. That which is essential in you, knows neither of beginning nor ending, nor of Time itself; it knows no limits such as belong to a given indi-

viduality, but exists in all and in each. In the first sense, therefore, you will become nothing after your death; in the second sense you are and remain all. For that reason I said you would be all and nothing. You desired a short answer, and I believe that hardly a more correct answer could be given *briefly*. No wonder too that it contains a contradiction; for your life is in Time, while your immortality is in Eternity.

Thras.—Without the continuation of my individuality, I would not give a farthing for all your “immortality.”

Phil.—Perhaps you could have it even cheaper. Suppose that I warrant to you the continuation of your individuality, but under the condition that a perfectly unconscious slumber of death for three months should precede its resuscitation.

Thras.—Well, I accept the condition.

Phil.—Now, in an absolutely unconscious condition, we have no measure of time; hence it is perfectly indifferent whether, whilst we lie asleep in death in the unconscious world, three months or ten thousand years are passing away. We do not know either of the one or of the other, and have to accept some one's word with regard to the duration of our sleep, when we awake. Hence it is indifferent to you whether your individuality is given back to you after three months or after ten thousand years.

Thras.—That I cannot deny.

Phil.—Now, suppose that after ten thousand years, one had forgotten to awake you at all, then I believe that the long, long state of non-being would become so habitual to you that your misfortune could hardly be very great. Certain it is, any way, that you would know nothing of it; nay, you would even console yourself very easily, if you were aware that the secret mechanism which now keeps your actual appearance in motion, had not ceased during all the ten thousand years for a single moment to establish and to move other beings of the same kind.

Thras.—In that manner you mean to cheat me out of my individuality, do you? I will not be fooled in that way. I have bargained for the continuation of my individuality, and none of your motives can console me for the loss of that; I have it at heart, and never will abandon it.

Phil.—It seems that you hold individuality to be so noble, so perfect so incomparable, that there can be nothing superior to it; you therefore would not like to exchange it for another one, though in that, you could live with greater ease and perfection.

Thras.—Let my individuality be as it may, it is always myself. It is I—I myself—who want to be. That is the individuality which I insist upon, and not such a one as needs argument to convince me that it may be my own or a better one.

Phil.—Only look about you! That which cries out—"I, I myself, wish to exist"—that is not yourself alone, but all that has the least vestige of consciousness. Hence this desire of yours, is just that which is not individual, but common rather to all without exception; it does not originate in individuality, but in the very nature of existence itself; it is essential to anybody who lives, nay, it is that through which it is at all; it seems to belong only to the individual because it can become conscious only in the individual. What cries in us so loud for existence, does so only through the mediation of the individual; immediately and essentially it is the *will* to exist or to live, and this *will* is one and the same in all of us. Our existence being only the free work of the will, existence can never fail to belong to it as far at least, as that eternally dissatisfied will, can be satisfied. The individualities are indifferent to the will; it never speaks of them; though it seems to the individual, who, in himself is the immediate percipient of it as if it spoke only of his own individuality. The consequence is, that the individual cares for his own existence with so great anxiety, and that he thereby secures the preservation of his kind. Hence it follows that individuality is no perfection, but rather a restriction or imperfection; to get rid of it is not a loss but a gain.

Hence if you would not appear at once childish and ridiculous, you should abandon that care for mere individuality, for childish and ridiculous it will appear when you perceive your own essence to be the universal will to live.

Thras.—You yourself and all philosophers are childish and ridiculous, and in fact it is only for a momentary diversion that a man of good common sense ever consents to squander away an idle hour with the like of you. I leave your talk for weightier matters.

[The reader will perceive by the positions here assumed that Schopenhauer has a truly speculative stand-point; that he holds self-determination to be the only substantial (or abiding) reality. But while Aristotle and those like him have seized this more definitely as the self-conscious thinking, it is evident that Schopenhauer seizes it only from its immediate side, i. e. as the *will*. On this account he meets with some difficulty in solving the problem of immortality, and leaves the question of conscious identity hereafter not a little obscure. Hegel, on the contrary, for whom Schopenhauer everywhere evinces a hearty contempt, does not leave the individual in any doubt as to his destiny, but shows how individuality and universality coincide in self-consciousness, so that the desire for eternal existence is fully satisfied. This is the legitimate result that *Philalethes* arrives at in his last speech, when he makes the individuality the product of the will; for if the will is the essential that he holds it to be, and the product of its activity is individuality, of course individuality belongs eternally to it. At the close of his *Philosophy of Nature* (Encyclopæd, vol. II.) Hegel shows how death which follows life in the mere animal—and in man as mere animal—enters consciousness as one of its necessary elements, and hence does not stand opposed to it as it does to animal life. Conscious being (*Spirit* or *Mind* as it may be called.) is therefore immortal because it contains already, within itself, its limits or determinations, and thus cannot, like finite things, encounter dissolution through external ones.—ED.]

GOETHE'S THEORY OF COLORS.

From an exposition given before the St. Louis Philosophical Society. Nov. 2d, 1866.

I.—Color arises through the reciprocal action of light and darkness.

(a.) When a light object is seen through a medium that dims it, it appears of different degrees of yellow; if the medium is dark or dense, the color is orange, or approaches red. Examples: the sun seen in the morning through a slightly hazy atmosphere appears yellow, but if the air is thick with mist or smoke the sun looks red.

(b.) On the other hand a dark object, seen through a medium slightly illuminated, looks blue. If the medium is very strongly illuminated, the blue approaches a light blue; if less so, then indigo; if still less, the deep violet appears. Examples: a mountain situated at a great distance, from which very few rays of light come, looks blue, because we see it through a light medium, the air illuminated by the sun. The sky at high altitudes appears of a deep violet; at still higher ones, almost perfectly black; at lower ones, of a faint blue. Smoke—an illuminated medium—appears blue against a dark ground, but yellow or fiery against a light ground.

(c.) The process of bluing steel is a fine illustration of Goethe's theory. The steel is polished so that it reflects light like a mirror. On placing it in the charcoal furnace a film of oxydization begins to form so that the light is reflected through this dimming medium; this gives a straw color. Then, as the film thickens, the color deepens, passing through red to blue and indigo.

(d.) The prism is the grand instrument in the experimental field of research into light. The current theory that light, when pure, is composed of seven colors, is derived from supposed actual verifications with this instrument. The Goethean explanation is by far the simplest, and, in the end, it propounds a question which the Newtonian theory cannot answer without admitting the truth of Goethe's theory.

II.—The phenomenon of refraction is produced by interposing different transparent media between the luminous object and the illuminated one, in such a manner that there arises an apparent displacement of one of the objects as viewed from the other. By means of a prism the displacement is caused to lack uniformity; one part of the light image is displaced more than another part; several images, as it were, being formed with different degrees of displacement, so that they together make an image whose edges are blurred in the line of displacement. If the displacement were perfectly uniform, no color would arise, as is demonstrated by the achromatic prism or lens. The difference of degrees of refraction causes the elongation of the image into a spectrum, and hence a mingling of the edges of the image with the outlying dark surface of the wall, (which dark surface is essential to the production of the ordinary spectrum). Its *rationale* is the following:

(a.) The light image refracted by the prism is extended over the dark on one side, while the dark on the other side is extended over it.

(b.) The bright over the dark produces the blue in different degrees. The side nearest the dark being the deepest or violet, and the side nearest the light image being the lightest blue.

(c.) On the other side, the dark over light produces yellow in different degrees; nearest the dark we have the deepest color, (orange approaching to red) and on the side nearest the light, the light yellow or saffron tint.

(d.) If the image is large and but little refracted (as with a water prism) there will appear between the two opposite colored edges a colorless image, proving that the colors arise from the mingling of the light and dark edges, and not from any peculiar property of the prism which should "de-

compose the ray of light," as the current theory expresses it. If the latter theory were correct the decomposition would be throughout, and the whole image be colored.

(e.) If the image is a small one, or it is very strongly refracted, the colored edges come together in the middle, and the mingling of the light yellow with the light blue produces *green*—a new color which did not appear so long as the light ground appeared in the middle.

(f.) If the refraction is still stronger, the edges of the opposite colors lap still more, and the green vanishes. The Newtonian theory cannot explain this, but it is to be expected according to Goethe's theory.

(g.) According to Goethe's theory, if the object were a dark one instead of a light one, and were refracted on a light surface, the order of colors would be reversed on each edge of the image. This is the same experiment as one makes by looking through a prism at the bar of a window appearing against the sky. Where in the light image we had the yellow colors we should now expect the blue, for now it is dark over light where before it was light over dark. So, also, where we had blue we should now have yellow. This experiment may be so conducted that the current doctrine that violet is refracted the most, and red the least, shall be refuted.

(h.) This constitutes the *experimentum crucis*. If the prism be a large water prism, and a black strip be pasted across the middle of it, parallel with its axis, so that in the midst of the image a dark shadow intervenes, the spectrum appears inverted in the middle, so that the red is seen where the green would otherwise appear, and those rays supposed to be the least refrangible are found refracted the most.

(i.) When the two colored edges do not meet in this latter experiment, we have blue, indigo, violet, as the order on one side; and on the other, orange, yellow, saffron; the deeper colors being next to the dark image. If the two colored edges come together the union of the orange with the violet produces the perfect red (called by Goethe "*purpur*").

(j.) The best method of making experiments is not the one that Newton employed—that of a dark room and a pencil of light—but it is better to look at dark and bright stripes on grounds of the opposite hue, or at the bars of a window, the prism being held in the hand of the investigator. In the Newtonian form of the experiment one is apt to forget the importance of the dark edge where it meets the light.

[For further information on this interesting subject the English reader is referred to Eastlake's translation of Goethe's *Philosophy of Colors*, published in London.]

THE JOURNAL

OF

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

VOL. I.

1867.

NO. 2. (2d Ed.)

SECOND PART OF GOETHE'S FAUST.

Translated from ROSENKRANZ'S "Deutsche Literatur." by D. J. SNIDER.

Goethe began nothing if the whole of the work did not hover before his mind. By this determinateness of plan he preserved a most persevering attachment to the materials of which he had once laid hold; they were elements of his existence, which for him were immortal, because they constituted his inmost being. He could put off their execution for years, and still be certain that his love for them would return, that his interest in them would animate him anew. Through this depth of conception he preserved fresh to the end his original purpose; he needed not to fear that the fire of the first enthusiasm would go out; at the most different times he could take up his work again with youthful zeal and strength. Thus in the circle of his poetical labors, two conceptions that are in internal opposition to one another, accompanied him through his whole life. The one portrays a talented but fickle man, who, in want of culture, attaches himself to this person, then to that one, in order to become spiritually independent. This struggle carries him into the breadth of life, into manifold relations whose spirit he longs to seize and appropriate; such is Wilhelm Meister. The other is the picture of an absolutely independent personality that has culti-

vated its lordly power in solitary loftiness, and aspires boldly to subject the world to itself; such is Faust. In the development of both subjects there is a decisive turning-point which is marked in the first by the "Travels"; in the second, by the Second Part of the Tragedy. Up to this point, both in Wilhelm Meister and in Faust, subjective conditions prevail, which gradually purify themselves to higher views and aims. For the one, the betrothal with Natalia closes the world of wild, youthful desire; for the other, the death of Margaret has the same effect. The one steps into civil society and its manifold activity with the earnest endeavor to comprehend all its elements, to acquire, preserve and beautify property, and to assist in illuminating and ennobling social relations; the other takes likewise a practical turn, but from the summit of Society, from the stand-point of the State itself. If, therefore, in the "Apprenticeship" and First Part of the Tragedy, on account of the excess of subjective conditions, a closer connection of the character and a passionate pathos are necessary, there appears, on the contrary, in the Travels and Second Part of the Tragedy a thoughtfulness which moderates everything — a cool designingness;

the particular elements are sharply characterized, but the personages seem rather as supporters of universal aims, in the accomplishment of which their own personality is submerged; the Universal and its language is their pathos, and the interest in their history, that before was so remarkably fascinating, is blunted of its keenness.

We have seen "Faust" grow, fragment by fragment, before our eyes. So long as there existed only a First Part, two views arose. The one maintained that it was in this incompleteness what it should be, a wonderful Torso; that this magnificent poem only as a fragment could reflect the World in order to indicate that man is able to grasp the Universe in a one-sided, incomplete manner only; that as the poet touched the mysteries of the World, but did not give a complete solution, so the Enigmatical, the Prophetic, is that which is truly poetic, infinitely charming, really mystic. This view was considered as genial, particularly because it left to every one free play—in fact, invited every one in his imagination to fill up the outlines; for it could not be defended from a philosophic nor from an artistic standpoint. Knowing seeks not. If knowledge, Art aims not at halfness of execution. If Dante in his Divine Comedy had neglected any element of nature or of history, if he had not wrought out all with equal perseverance in corresponding proportion, could it be said that his poem would stand higher without this completion? Or, conversely, shall we praise it as a merit that Novalis' *Ofterdingen* has remained mere fragments and sketches? This would be the same as if we should admire the Cologne cathedral less than we now do were it complete. Another view supposed that a Second Part was indeed possible, and the question arose, in what manner shall this possibility be thought? Here again two opposite opinions showed themselves. According to the one, Faust must perish; reconciliation with God would be unbecoming to the northern nature of this Titanic character; the teeth-grashing defiance, the insatiate restless-

ness, the crushing doubt, the heaven deriding fierceness, must send him to hell. In this the spirit of the old legend was expressed as it was at the time of the Reformation—for in the middle ages the redemption of the sinner through the intercession of the Virgin Mary first appeared—as the *Volksbuch* simply but strikingly narrates it, as the Englishman, Marlowe, has dramatized it so excellently in his "Doctor Faustus." But all this was not applicable to the Faust of Goethe, for the poet had in his mind an alteration of the old legend, and so another party maintained that Faust must be saved. This party also asserted that the indication of the poet in the Prologue led to the same conclusion; that God could not lose his bet against the Devil; that the destruction of Faust would be blasphemous irony on Divine Providence. This assertion of the necessity of Faust's reconciliation found much favor in a time, like ours, which has renounced not indeed the consciousness and recognition of Evil, but the belief in a separate extra-human Devil; which purposes not merely the punishment but also the improvement of the criminal; which seeks even to annul the death penalty, and transfer the atonement for murder to the inner conscience and to the effacing power of the Mind. But how was Poetry to exhibit such a transition from internal strife to celestial peace? Some supposed, as Heinrichs, that since Faust's despair resulted originally from science, which did not furnish to him that which it had at first promised, and, since his childish faith had been destroyed by scepticism, he must be saved through the scientific comprehension of Truth, of the Christian religion; that Speculative Philosophy must again reconcile him with God, with the world, and with himself. They confessed indeed that this process—study and speculation—cannot be represented in poetry, and therefore a Second Part of Faust was not to be expected. Others, especially poets, took Faust in a more general sense; he was to penetrate not only Science but Life in its entirety; the most manifold

action was to move him, and the sweat of labor was to be the penance which should bring him peace and furnish the clearness promised by the Lord. Several sought to complete the work—all with indifferent success.

In what manner the poet himself would add a Second Part to the First, what stand-point he himself would take, remained a secret; now it is unsealed; the poem is unrolled before us complete; with wondering look we stand before it, with a beating heart we read it, and with modest anxiety, excited by a thousand feelings and misgivings, we venture cursorily to indicate the design of the great Master; for years shall pass away before the meaning of the all-comprehensive poem shall be unveiled completely in its details. Still this explanation of particulars in poetry is a subordinate matter. The main tendency of a poem must be seen upon its face, and it would be a sorry work if it did not excite a living interest the first time that it was offered to the enjoyment of a people—if this interest should result from microscopic explanations and fine unravelling of concealed allusions—if enthusiasm should not arise from the poetry as well as from the learning and acuteness of the poet. Such particulars, which are hard to understand, almost every great poem will furnish; latterly, the explanatory observations on epic poems have become even stereotyped; it must be possible to disregard them; through ignorance of them nothing essential must be lost.

The First Part had shown us Faust in his still cell, engaged in the study of all sciences. The results of his investigation did not satisfy the boundless seeker, and as an experiment he bound himself to the Devil to see if the latter could not slake his burning thirst.

Thus he rushed into Life. Earthly enjoyment surrounded him, Love enchained him, Desire drove him to sudden, to bad deeds; in the mad *Walpurgisnacht*, he reached the summit of waste worldliness. But, deeper than the Devil supposed, Faust felt for his Margaret; he

desired to save the unfortunate girl, but he was obliged to learn that this was impossible, but that only endurance of the punishment of crime could restore the harassed mind to peace. The simple story of love held everything together here in a dramatic form. The Prologue in Heaven, the Witch-kitchen, the *Walpurgisnacht*, and several contemplative scenes, could be left out, and there still would remain a theatrical Whole of remarkable effect.

The relation to Margaret—her death—had elevated Faust above everything subjective. In the continuation of his life, objective relations alone could constitute the motive of action. The living, fresh breath of the First Part resulted just from this fact, that every thing objective, universal, was seized from the point of subjective interest; in the Second Part, the Universal, the Objective, stands out prominently; subjective interests appear only under the presupposition of the Objective; the form becomes allegorical.

A story, an action which rounds itself off to completion, is wanting, and therefore the dramatic warmth which pulsates through every scene of the First Part is no longer felt. The unity which is traced through the web of the manifold situation, is the universal tendency of Faust *to create a satisfaction for himself through work*. Mephistopheles has no longer the position of a being superior by his great understanding and immutable coldness, who bitterly mocks Faust's striving, but he appears rather as a powerful companion who skilfully procures the material means for the aims of Faust, and, in all his activity, only awaits the moment when Faust shall finally acknowledge himself to be satisfied. But the striving of Faust is infinite; each goal, when once reached, is again passed by; nowhere does he rest, not in Society, not in Nature, not in Art, not in War, not in Industry; only the thought of Freedom itself, the presentiment of the happiness of standing with a free people upon a free soil wrung from the sea, thrills the old man with a momentary

satisfaction—and he dies. Upon pictures and wood-cuts of the middle ages representations of dying persons are found, in which the Devil on one side of the death-bed and angels on the other await eagerly the departing soul to pull it to themselves. Goethe has revived this old idea of a jealousy and strife between the angels and the Devil for Man. Mephistopheles, with his horde of devils, struggles to carry away the soul of Faust to hell, but he forgets himself in unnatural lust, and the angels bear the immortal part of Faust to that height where rest and illumination of the dying begin.

Such an allegorical foundation could not be developed otherwise than in huge masses; the division of each mass in itself, so that all the elements of the thought lying at the bottom should appear, was the proper object of the composition. The First Part could also be called allegorical, in so far as it reflected the universal Essence of Spirit in the Individual; but it could not be said of it in any other sense than of every poem; Allegory in its stricter sense was not to be found; the shapes had all flesh and blood, and no design was felt. In the Second Part everything passes over into the really Allegorical, to which Goethe, the older he grew, seems to have had the greater inclination: the *Xenien*, the *Trilogie der Leidenschaft*, the *Lieder zur Loge*, the *Maskenzüge*, *Epimenides Erwachen*, the cultivation of the Eastern manners, all proceeded from a didactic turn which delighted in expressing itself in gnomes, pictures, and symbolical forms. With wonderful acuteness Goethe has always been able to seize the characteristic determinations, and unfold them in neat, living language; however, it lies in the nature of such poems that they exercise the reflective faculty more than the heart, and it was easy to foresee that the Second Part of Faust would never acquire the popularity of the First Part; that it would not, as the latter, charm the nation, and educate the people to a consciousness of itself, but that it would always have a sort of esoteric existence. Many will be

repelled by the mythological learning of the second and third acts; and the more so, as they do not see themselves recompensed by the dialectic of an action;—however, we would unhesitatingly defend the poet against this reproach; a poem which has to compass the immeasurable material of the world, cannot be limited in this respect. What learning has not Dante supposed in his readers! Humbly have we sought it, in order to acquire an understanding of his poem, in the certainty of being richly rewarded; the censure which has been cast upon it for this reason has effected nothing. Indeed, such fault-finders would here forget what the first acknowledged Part of Faust has compelled them to learn. With this difference of plan, the style must also change. Instead of dramatic pathos, because action is wanting, description, explanation, indication, have become necessary; and instead of the lively exchange of dialogue, the lyrical portion has become more prominent, in order to embody with simplicity the elements of the powerful world-life. The descriptions of nature deserve to be mentioned in particular. The most wanton fancy, the deepest feeling, the most accurate knowledge, and the closest observation into the individual, prevail in all these pictures with an indescribable charm.

We shall now give a short account of the contents of each act. In a more complete exposition we would point out the places in which the power of the particular developments centres; in these outlines it is our design to confine ourselves to tracing out the universal meaning. To exhibit by single verses and songs the wonderful beauty of the language, particularly in the lyrical portions, would seem to be as superfluous as the effort to prove the existence of a Divine Providence by anecdotes of strange coincidences.

The first act brings us into social life; a multitude of shapes pass by us—the most different wishes, opinions, and humors, are heard; still, a secret unity, which we shall note even more closely, per-

vades the confused tumult. In a delightful spot, lying upon the flowery sward, we see Faust alone, tormented by deep pangs, seeking rest and slumber. Out of pure pity, indifferent whether the unfortunate man is holy or wicked, elves hover around him and fan him to sleep, in order that the past may be sunk into the Lethe of forgetfulness; otherwise, a continuance of life and endeavor is impossible. The mind has the power to free itself from the past, and throw it behind itself, and treat as if it had never been. The secret of renewing ourselves perpetually consists in this, that we can destroy ourselves within ourselves, and, as a veritable Phoenix, be resurrected from the ashes of self-immolation. Still, this negative action suffices not for our freedom; the Positive must be united to us; there must arise, with "tremendous quaking," the sun of new activity and fresh endeavor, whereby the stillness of nightly repose, the evanishment of all thoughts and feelings which had become stable, passes away in refreshing slumber. Faust awakened, feels every pulse of nature beating with fresh life. The glare of the pure sunlight dazzles him—the fall of waters through the chasms of the rock depicts to him his own unrest; but from the sunlight and silvery vapor of the whirlpool there is created the richly colored rainbow, which is always quietly glistening, but is forever shifting: it is Life. After this solitary encouragement to new venture and endeavor, the court of the Emperor receives us, where a merry masquerade is about to take place. But first, from all sides, the prosaic complaints of the Chancellor, the Steward, the Commander-in-Chief, the Treasurer, fall upon the ear of the Emperor: money, the cement of all relations, is wanting to the State; for commerce, for pleasure, for luxury, money is the indispensable basis. At this point, Mephistopheles presses forward to the place of the old court-fool, who has just disappeared, and excites the hope of bringing to light concealed treasure. To the Chancellor this way seems not exactly

Christian, the multitude raises a murmur of suspicion, the Astrologer discusses the possibility—and the proposition is adopted. After this hopeful prospect, the masquerade can come off without any secret anxieties disturbing their merriment. The nature of the company is represented in a lively manner. No one *is* what he *seems* to be; each has thrown over himself a concealing garment; each knows of the other that he is not that which his appearance or his language indicates; this effort to hide his own being—to pretend and to dream himself into something different from himself—to make himself a riddle to others in all openness, is the deepest, most piquant charm of social interests.

The company will have enjoyment—it unites itself with devotion to the festive play, and banishes rough egotism, whose casual outbreaks the watchful herald sharply reproves; but still, in the heart of every one, there remains some intention which is directed to the accomplishment of earthly aims. The young Florentine women want to please; the mother wishes her daughter to make the conquest of a husband; the fishermen and bird-catchers are trying their skill; the wood-chopper, buffoons, and parasites, are endeavoring, as well as they can, to make themselves valid; the drunkard forgets everything over his bottle; the poets, who could sing of any theme, drown each other's voices in their zeal to be heard, and to the satirist there scarcely remains an opportunity for a dry sarcasm. The following allegorical figures represent to us the inner powers which determine social life. First, the Graces appear, for the first demand of society is to behave with decency; more earnest are the Paræ, the continuous change of duration—still, they work only mechanically; but the Furies, although they come as beautiful maids, work dynamically through the excitement of the passions. Here the aim is to conquer. *Victoria* is throned high upon a sure-footed elephant, which Wisdom guides with skilful wand, while Fear and Hope go along on each

side; between these the Deed wavers until it has reached the proud repose of victory. But, as soon as this happens, the quarrelsome, hateful Thersites breaks forth, to soil the glory with his biting sneer. But his derision effects nothing. The Herald, as the regulating Understanding and as distributive Justice, can reconcile the differences and mistakes which have arisen, and he strikes the scoffer in such a manner that he bursts and turns into an adder and a bat. Gradually the company returns to its external foundation; the feeling of *Wealth* must secure to it inexhaustible pleasure. But Wealth is two-fold: the earthly, money—the heavenly, poetry. Both must be united in society, if it would not feel weak and weary. The Boy Driver—that is, Poetry, which knows how to bring forth the Infinite in all the relations of life, and through the same to expand, elevate and pacify the heart—is acknowledged by Plutus, the god of common riches, as the one who can bestow that which he himself is too poor to give. In the proud fulness of youth, bounding lightly around with a whip in his hand, the lovely Genius, who rules all hearts, drives with horses of winged speed through the crowd. The buffoon of Plutus, lean Avarice, is merrily ridiculed by the women; Poetry, warned by the fatherly love of Plutus, withdraws from the tumult which arises for the possession of the golden treasures. Gnomes, Giants, Satyrs, Nymphs, press on with bacchantic frenzy; earthly desire glows through the company, and it celebrates great Pan, Nature, as its God, as the Giver of powerful Wealth and fierce Lust. A whirling tumult threatens to seize hold of everybody—a huge tongue of flame darts over all; but the majesty of the Emperor, the self-conscious dignity of man, puts an end to the juggling game of the half-unchained Earth-spirit, and restores spiritual self-possession.

Still Mephistopheles keeps the promise which he has made. He succeeds in revivifying the company by fresh sums of money, obtained in conformity with his

nature, not by unearthing buried treasures from the heart of the mountains by means of the wishing-rod, but by making paper money! It is not, indeed, real coin, but the effect is the same, for in society everything rests upon the caprice of acceptance; its own life and preservation are thereby guaranteed by itself, and its authority, here represented by the Emperor, has infinite power. The paper notes, this money stamped by the airy imagination, spread everywhere confidence and lively enjoyment. It is evident that the means of prosperity have not been wanting, nor stores of eatables and drinkables, but a form was needed to set the accumulated materials in motion, and to weave them into the changes of circulation. With delight, the Chancellor, Steward, Commander-in-Chief, Treasurer, report the flourishing condition of the army and the citizens; presents without stint give rise to the wildest luxury, which extends from the nobles of the realm down to the page and fool, and in such joyfulness everybody can unhesitatingly look about him for new means of pleasure. Because the company has its essence in the production of the notes, its internal must strive for the artistic; every one feels best when he, though known, remains unrecognized, and thus a theatrical tendency develops itself. For here the matter has nothing to do with the dramatic as real art, in reference to the egotism which binds the company together. The theatre collects the idle multitude, and it has nothing to do but to see, to hear, to compare, and to judge. Theatrical enjoyment surpasses all other kinds in comfort, and is at the same time the most varied. The Emperor wishes that the great magician, Faust, should play a drama before himself and the court, and show Paris and Helen. To this design Mephistopheles can give no direct aid; in a dark gallery he declares, in conversation with Faust, that the latter himself must create the shapes, and therefore must go the Mothers. Faust shudders at their names. Mephistopheles gives him

a small but important key, with which he must enter the shadowy realm of the Mothers for a glowing tripod, and bring back the same; by burning incense upon it, he would be able to create whatever shape he wished. As a reason why he is unable to form them, Mephistopheles says expressly that he is in the service of big-necked dwarfs and witches, and not of heroines, and that the Heathen have their own Hell, with which he, the Christian and romantic Devil, has nothing to do. And yet he possesses the key to it, and hence it is not unknown to him. And why does Faust shudder at the name of the Mothers? Who are these women that are spoken of so mysteriously? If it were said, the Imagination, *Mothers* would be an inept expression; if it were said, the Past, Present, and Future, Faust's shuddering could not be sufficiently accounted for, since how should Time frighten him who has already lived through the terrors of death? From the predicates which are attached to the Mothers, how they everlastingly occupy the busy mind with all the forms of creation; how from the shades which surround them in thousand-fold variety, from the Being which is Nothing, All becomes; how from their empty, most lonely depth the living existence comes forth to the surface of Appearance; from such designations scarcely anything else can be understood by the realm of the Mothers than the world of Pure Thought. This explanation might startle at the first glance, but we need only put Idea for Thought—we need only remember the Idea-world of Plato in order to comprehend the matter better. The eternal thoughts, the Ideas, are they not the still, shadowy abyss in which blooming Life buds—into whose dark, agitated depths it sends down its roots? Mephistopheles has the key; for the Understanding, which is negative Determination, is necessary in order not to perish in the infinite universality of Thought; it is itself, however, only the Negative, and therefore cannot bring the actual Idea, Beauty, to appearance, but he, in his devilish

barrenness, must hand this work over to Faust; he can only recommend to the latter moderation, so as not to lose himself among the phantoms, and he is curious to know whether Faust will return. But Faust shudders because he is not to experience earthly solitude alone, like that of the boundless ocean, when yet star follows star and wave follows wave; the deepest solitude of the creative spirit; the retirement into the invisible, yet almighty Thought, the sinking into the eternal idea is demanded of him. Whoever has had the boldness of this Thought—whoever has ventured to penetrate into the magic circle of the Logical, and its world-subduing Dialectic, into this most simple element of infinite formation and transformation, has overcome all, and has nothing more to fear, as the Homunculus afterwards expresses it, because he has beheld the naked essence, because Necessity has stripped herself to his gaze. But it is also to be observed that the tripod is mentioned, for by this there is an evident allusion to subjective Enthusiasm and individual Imagination, by which the Idea in Art is brought out of its universality to the determinate existence of concrete Appearance. Beauty is identical in content with Truth, but its form belongs to the sphere of the Sensuous.

While Faust is striving after Beauty, Mephistopheles is besieged by women in the illuminated halls, to improve their looks and assist them in their love affairs. After this delicate point is settled, no superstition is too excessive, no sympathetic cure too strange—as, for example, a tread of the foot—and the knave fools them until they, with a love-lorn page, become too much for him.

Next, the stage, by its decorations, which represents Grecian architecture, causes a discussion of the antique and romantic taste; Mephistopheles has humorously taken possession of the prompter's box, and so the entertainment goes on, in parlor fashion, till Faust actually appears, and Paris and Helen, in the name of the all-powerful Mothers, are

formed from the incense which ascends in magic power. The Public indulges itself in an outpouring of egotistical criticism, the men despise the unmanly Paris, and interest themselves deeply in the charms of Helen; the women ridicule the coquettish beauty with envious moralizing, and fall in love for the nonce with the fair youth. But as Paris is about to lead away Helen, Faust, seized with the deepest passion for her wonderful beauty, falls upon the stage and destroys his own work. The phantoms vanish; still the purpose remains to obtain Helen; that is, the artist must hold on to the Ideal, but he must know that it is the Ideal. Faust confuses it with common Actuality, and he has to learn that absolute Beauty is not of an earthly, but of a fleeting, ethereal nature.

The second act brings us away from our well-known German home to the bottom of the sea and its mysterious secrets. Faust is in search of Helen; where else can he find her, perfect Beauty, than in Greece? But first he seeks her, and meets therefore mere shapes, which unfold themselves from natural existence, which are not yet actual humanity. Indeed, since he seeks natural Beauty—for spiritual Beauty he has already enjoyed in the heavenly disposition of Margaret—the whole realm of Nature opens upon us; all the elements appear in succession: the rocks upon which the earnest Sphixes rest, in which the Ants, Dactyls, Gnomes work, give the surrounding ground; the moist waters contain in their bosom the seeds of all things. The holy fire infolds it with eager flame: according to the old legend, Venus sprang from the foam of the sea.

Next we find ourselves at Wittenberg, in the ancient dwelling, where it is easy to see by the cobwebs, dried-up ink, tarnished paper, and dust, that many years have passed since Faust went out into the world. Mephistopheles, from the old coat in which he once instructed the knowledge-seeking pupil, shakes out the lice and crickets, which swarm around the old master with a joyful greeting, as

also Parseeism makes Ahriman the father of all vermin. F lies on his bed, sleeps and dreams the lustful story of Leda, which, in the end, is nothing more than the most decent and hence producible representation of generation. While Mephistopheles in a humorous and, as well as the Devil can, even in an idyllic manner, amuses himself, while he inquires sympathetically after Wagner of the present Famulus, a pupil, who, in the meanwhile, has become a Baccalaureate, comes storming in, in order to see what the master is doing who formerly inculcated such wise doctrines, and in order to show what a prodigiously reasonable man he has himself become. A persiflage of many expressions of the modern German Natural Philosophy seems recognizable in this talk. Despising age, praising himself as the dawn of a new life, he spouts his Idealism, by means of which he creates everything, Sun, Moon and Stars, purely by the absoluteness of subjective Thought. Mephistopheles, though the pupil assails him bitterly, listens to his wise speeches with lamb-like patience, and, after this refreshing scene, goes into Wagner's laboratory. The good man has stayed at home, and has applied himself to Chemistry, to create, through its processes, men. To his tender, humane, respectable, intelligent mind, the common way of begetting children is too vulgar, and unworthy of spirit. Science must create man; a real materialism will produce him. Mephistopheles comes along just at this time, to whom Wagner beckons silence, and whispers anxiously to him his undertaking, as in the glass retort the hermaphroditic boy, the Homunculus, begins to stir. But alas! the Artificial requires enclosed space. The poor fellow can live only in the glass retort, the outer world is too rough for him, and still he has the greatest desire to be actually born. A longing, universal feeling for natural life sparkles from him with clear brilliancy, and cousin Mephistopheles takes him along to the classic *Walpurgisnacht*, where Homunculus hopes to find a favorable moment.

Mephistopheles is related to the little man for this reason, because the latter is only the product of nature, because God's breath has not been breathed into him as into a real man.

After these ironical scenes, the fearful night of the Pharsalian Fields succeeds, where the antique world terminated its free life. This plain, associated with dark remembrances and bloody shadows, is the scene of the classical *Walpurgisnacht*. Goethe could choose no other spot, for just upon this battle-field the spirit of Greek and Roman antiquity ceased to be a living actuality. As an external reason, it is well known that Thessaly was to the ancients the land of wizards, and especially of witches, so that from this point of view the parallel with the German Blocksberg is very striking. Faust, driven by impatience to obtain Helen, is in the beginning sent from place to place to learn her residence, until Chiron takes him upon the neck which had once borne that most loving beauty, and, with a passing sneer at the conjectural troubles of the Philologist, tells him of the Argonauts, of the most beautiful man, of Hercules, until he stops his wild course at the dwelling of the prophetic Manto, who promises to lead Faust to Helen on Olympus. Mephistopheles wanders in the meanwhile among Sphinxes, Griffons, Sirens, &c. To him, the Devil of the Christian and Germanic world, this classic ground is not at all pleasing; he longs for the excellent Blocksberg of the North, and its ghostly visages; with the Lamie indeed he resolves to have his own sport, but is roguishly bemocked; finally, he comes to the horrible Phoreyads, and after their pattern he equips himself with one eye and a task for his own amusement; that is, he becomes the absolutely Ugly, while Faust is wooing the highest Beauty. In the Christian world the Devil is also represented as fundamentally ugly and repulsive: but he can also, under all forms, appear as an angel of light. In the Art-world, on the contrary, he can be known only as the Ugly. In all these

scenes there is a mingling of the High and the Low of the Horrible and the Ridiculous, of Vexation and Whimsicality, of the Enigmatical and the Perspicuous, so that no better contradictions could be wished for a *Walpurgisnacht*. The Homunculus on his part is ceaselessly striving to come to birth, and betakes himself to Thales and Anaxagoras, who dispute whether the world arose in a dry or wet way. Thales leads the little man to Nereus, who, however, refuses to aid the seeker, partly because he has become angry with men who, like Paris and Ulysses, have always acted against his advice, and partly because he is about to celebrate a great feast. Afterwards they go to Proteus, who at first is also reticent, but soon takes an interest in Homunculus as he beholds his shining brilliancy, for he feels that he is related to the changing fire, and gives warning that as the latter can become everything, he should be careful about becoming a man, for it is the most miserable of all existences. In the meanwhile, the Peneios roars; the earth-shaking Seismos breaks forth with a loud noise: the silent and industrious mountain-spirits become wakeful. But always more clearly the water declares itself as the womb of all things: the festive train of the Telehines points to the hoary Cabiri: bewitchingly resound the songs of the Sirens: Hippocamps, Tritons, Nereids, Pselli and Marci arise from the green, pearl-decked ground: the throne of Nereus and Galatea arches over the crystalline depths: at their feet the eager Homunculus falls to pieces, and all-moving Eros in darting flames streams forth. Ravishing songs float aloft, celebrating the holy elements, which the ever-creating Love holds together and purifies. Thales is just as little in the right as Anaxagoras; together, both are right, for Nature is kindled to perpetual new life by the marriage of fire and water.

The difference between this *Walpurgisnacht* and the one in the First Part lies in the fact, that the principle of the latter is the relation of Spirit to God. In the Christian world the first question

is, what is the position of man towards God? therefore there appear forms which are self-contradictory, lacerated spiritually, torn in pieces by the curse of condemnation to all torture. Classic Life has for its basis the relation to Nature; the mysterious Cabiri were only the master-workmen of Nature. Nature finds in man her highest goal; in his fair figure, in the majesty of his form, she ends her striving; and therefore the contradictions of the classic *Walpurgisnacht* are not so foreign to Mephistopheles, who has to do with Good and Bad, that he does not feel his contact with them, but still they are not native to him. The general contradiction which we meet with, and which also in Mephistopheles expresses itself by the cloven foot at least, is the union of the human and animal frame; the human is at first only half-existent, on earth in Sphinxes, Orcads, Sirens, Centaurs; in water, in Hippocamps, Tritons, Nymphs, Dorids, &c. For the fair bodies of the latter still share the moist luxuriance of their element. Thus Nature expands itself in innumerable creations in order to purify itself in man, in the self-conscious spirit, in order to pacify and shut off in him the infinite impulse to formation, because it passes beyond him to no new form. He is the embodied image of God. The inclosed Homunculus, with his fiery trembling eagerness to pass over into an independent actuality, is, as it were, the serio-comic representation of this tendency, until he breaks the narrow glass, and now is what he should be, the union of the elements, for this is Eros according to the most ancient Greek conception, as we still find even in the Philosophers.

In the third act Goethe has adhered to the old legend, according to which, Faust, by means of Mephistopheles, obtained Helen as a concubine, and begot a son, Justus Faustus. Certainly, the employment of this feature was very difficult; and still, even in our days, a poet, L. Bechstein, has been wrecked upon this rock. He has Helen marry Faust; they beget a child; but finally, when Faust makes his

will, and turns away unlovingly from wife and child, it is discovered that the Grecian Helen, who in the copper-plates is also costumed completely in the antique manner, is a German countess of real flesh and blood, who has been substituted by the Devil—an undecieving which ought to excite the deepest sympathy. Goethe has finely idealized this legend; he has expressed therein the union of the romantic and classic arts. The third act, this Phantasmagory, is perhaps the most perfect of all, and executed in the liveliest manner. Noble as is the diction of the first and second acts, especially in the lyrical portions, it is here nevertheless by far surpassed. Such a majesty and simplicity, such strength and mildness, unity and variety, in so small a space, are astonishing. First resounds the interchange of the dignity of Æschylus and Sophocles, with the sharp-stepped wit of Aristophanes; then is heard the tone of the Spanish romances, an agreeable iambic measure—a sweet, ravishing melody; finally, new styles break forth, like the fragments of a prophecy; ancient and modern rhythms clash, and the harmony is destroyed.—Helen returns, after the burning of Troy, to the home of her spouse, Menelaus; the stewardess, aged, wrinkled, ugly, but experienced and intelligent, Phoreyas, receives her mistress in the citadel by command. Opposed to Beauty, as was before said, Mephistopheles can only appear as Ugliness, because in the realm of beautiful forms the Ugly is the Wicked. There arises a quarrel between the graceful yet pretentious youth of the Chorus and world-wise yet stubborn Old Age. Helen has to appease it, and she learns with horror from Phoreyas that Menelaus is going to sacrifice her.—Still (as, on the one hand, Grecian fugitives, after the conquest of Constantinople, instilled everywhere into German Life the taste for classic Beauty, and as, on the other hand, one of the Ottomans in Theophrasia—like Faust—won a Helen, and thereby everywhere arose a striving after the appropriation of the Antique), the old stewardess saves her,

and bears her through the air together with her beautiful train, to the Gothic citadel of Faust, where the humble and graceful behavior of the iron men towards the women, in striking contrast to their hard treatment on the banks of the Eurotas, at once wins the female heart. The watchman of the tower, Lynceus, lost in wondering delight over the approaching beauty, forgets to announce her, and has brought upon himself a heavy punishment; but Helen, the cause of his misdemeanor, is to be judge in his case, and she pardons him.

Faust and all his vassals do homage to the powerful beauty, in whom the antique pathos soon disappears. In the new surroundings, in the mutual exchange of quick and confiding love, the sweet rhyme soon flows from their kissing lips. An attack of Menelaus interrupts the loving courtship; but Valor, which in the battle for Beauty and favor of the ladies, seeks its highest honor and purport, is unconquerable, and the swift might of the army victoriously opposes Menelaus. Christian chivalry protects the jewel of beauty which has fled to it for safety, against all barbarism pressing on from the East.—Thus the days of the lovers pass rapidly away in secret grottoes amid pastoral dalliance; as once Mars refreshed himself in the arms of Venus, so in the Middle Ages knights passed gladly from the storm of war to the sweet service of women in quiet trustfulness. Yet the son whom they beget, longs to free himself from this idle, Arcadian life. The nature of both the mother and the father drives him forward, and soon consummates the matter. Beautiful and graceful as Helen, the insatiate longing for freedom glows in him as in Faust. He strikes the lyre with wonderful, enchanting power; he revels wildly amid applauding maidens; he rushes from the bottom of the valley to the tops of the mountains, to see far out into the world, and to breathe freely in the free air. His elastic desire raises him, a second Icarus, high in the clouds; but he soon falls dead at the feet of the

parents, while an aureola, like a comet, streaks the heavens. Thus perished Lord Byron. He is a poet more romantic than Goethe, to whom, however, Art gave no final satisfaction, because he had a sympathy for the sufferings of nations and of mankind, which called him pressingly to action. His poems are full of this striving. In them he weeps away his grief for freedom. Walter Scott, who never passed out of the Middle Ages, is read more than Byron. But Byron is more powerful than he, because the Idea took deeper root, and that demoniacal character concentrated in itself all the struggles of our agitated time. Divine poesy softened not the wild sorrow of his heart, and the sacrifice of himself for the freedom of a beloved people and land could not reproduce classic Beauty. The fair mother, who evidently did not understand the stormy, self-conscious character of her son, sinks after him into the lower world. As everything in this phantasmagory is allegorical, I ask whether this can mean anything else than that freedom is necessary for beauty, and beauty also for freedom? Euphronion is boundless in his striving; the warnings of the parents are unavailing; he topples over into destruction. But Helen, i.e. Beauty, cannot survive him, for all beauty is the expression of freedom, of independence, although it does not need to know the fact. Only Faust, who unites all in himself, who strives to reach beyond Nature and Art, Present and Past—that is, the knowing of the True—survives her; upon her garments, which expand like a cloud, he moves forth. What remains now, since the impulse of spiritual Life, the clarification of Nature in Art, the immediate spiritual Beauty, have vanished? Nothing but Nature in her nakedness, whose choruses of Oreads, Dryads and Nymphs swarm forth into the mountains, woods, and vineyards, for bacchantic revelry—an invention which belongs to the highest effort of all poetry. It is a great kindness in the Devil, when Phoreyas at last discloses herself as Mephistopheles, and

where there is need offers herself as commentator.

The life of Art, of Beauty, darkens like a mist; upon the height of the mountain, Faust steps out of the departing cloud, and looks after it as it changes to other forms. His restless mind longs for new activity. He wants to battle with the waters, and from them win land; that is, the land shall be his own peculiar property, since he brings it forth artificially. As that money which he gave to the Emperor was not coined from any metal, but was a product of Thought; as that Beauty which charmed him was sought with trouble, and wrung from Nature; and as he, seizing the sword for the protection of Beauty, exchanged Love for the labor of chivalry,—so the land, the new product of his endeavor, not yet *is*, but he will first create it by means of his activity. A war of the Emperor with a pretender gives him an opportunity to realize his wish. He supports the Emperor in the decisive battle. Mephistopheles is indifferent to the Right and to freedom; the material gain of the war is the principal thing with him; so he takes along the three mighty robbers, Bully, Havequick, and Holdfast. (See 2d Samuel, 23: 8.) The elements must also fight—the battle is won—and the grateful Emperor grants the request of Faust to leave the sea-shore for his possession. The State is again pacified by the destruction of the pretender; a rich booty in his camp repays many an injury; the four principal officers promise a joyful entertainment; but the Church comes in to claim possession of the ground, capital and interest, in order that the Emperor may be purified from the guilt of having had dealings with the suspicious magician. Humbly the Emperor promises all; but as the archbishop demands tithe from the strand of the sea which is not yet in existence, the Emperor turns away in great displeasure. The boundless rapacity of the Church causes the State to rise up against it. This act has not the lyrical fire of the previous ones; the action, if the war can

thus be called, is diffuse; the battle, as broad as it is, is without real tension; the three robbers are allegorically true, if we look at the meaning which they express, but are in other respects not very attractive. In all the brilliant particulars, profound thoughts, striking turns, piquant wit, and wise arrangement, there is still wanting the living breath, the internal connection, to exhibit a complete picture of the war. And still, from some indications, we may believe that this tediousness is designed, in order to portray ironically the dull uniformity, the spiritual waste of external political life, and the littleness of Egoism. For it must be remembered that the war is a civil war; the genuine poetic war, where people is against people, falls into Phantasmagory. The last scene would be in this respect the most successful. The continued persistency of the spiritual lord to obtain, in the name of the heavenly church, earthly possessions, the original acquiescence of the Emperor, but his final displeasure at the boundless shamelessness of the priest, are excellently portrayed, and the pretentious pomp of the Alexandrine has never done better service.

In the fifth act we behold a wanderer, who is saved from shipwreck, and brought to the house of an aged couple, Philemon and Baucis. He visits the old people, eats at their frugal table, sees them still happy in their limited sphere, but listens with astonishment to them as they tell of the improvements of their rich neighbor, and they express the fear of being ousted by him. Still, they pull the little bell of their chapel to kneel and pray with accustomed ceremony in presence of the ancient God.—The neighbor is Faust. He has raised dams, dug canals, built palaces, laid out ornamental gardens, educated the people, sent out navies. The Industry of our time occupies him unceasingly; he revels in the wealth of trade, in the turmoil of men, in the commerce of the world. That those aged people still have property in the middle of his possessions is extremely

disagreeable to him, for just this little spot where the old mossy church stands, the sound of whose bell pierces his heart, where the airy lindens unfold themselves to the breeze, he would like to have as a belvedere to look over all his creations at a glance. Like a good man whose head is always full of plans, he means well to the people, and is willing to give them larger possessions where they can quietly await death, and he sends Mephistopheles to treat with them. But the aged people, who care not for eating and drinking, but for comfort, will not leave their happy hut; their refusal brings on disputes, and the dwelling, together with the aged couple and the lindens, perishes by fire in this conflict between the active Understanding and the poetry of Feeling, which, in the routine of pious custom, clings to what is old. Faust is vexed over the turn which affairs have taken, particularly over the loss of the beautiful lindens, but consoles himself with the purpose to build in their stead a watch-tower. Then, before the palace, appear in the night, announcing death, four hoary women, Starvation, Want, Guilt, and Care, as the Furies who accompany the external prosperity of our industrial century. Still, Care can only press through the key-hole of the chamber of the rich man, and places herself with fearful suddenness at his side. The Negative of Thought is to be excluded by no walls. But Faust immediately collects himself again; with impressive clearness he declares his opinion of life, of the value of the earthly Present; Care he hates, and does not recognize it as an independent existence. She will nevertheless make herself known to him at the end of his life, and passes over his face and makes him blind. Still, Faust expresses no solicitude, though deprived of his eyes by Care; no alteration is noticed in him, he is bent only upon his aims; the energy of his tension remains uniform: Spirit, Thought, is the true eye; though the external one is blinded, the internal one remains open and wakeful. The transition from this point to the conclusion is properly this: that from

the activity of the finite Understanding only a Finite can result. All industry, for whose development Mephistopheles is so serviceable, as he once was in war, cannot still the hunger of Spirit for Spirit. Industry creates only an aggregate of prosperity, no true happiness. Our century is truly great in industrial activity. But it should only be the means, the point of entrance for real freedom, which is within itself the Infinite. And Faust has come to this, even on the brink of the grave. Mephistopheles, after this affair with Care, causes the grave of the old man to be dug by the shaking Lemures. Faust supposes, as he hears the noise of the spades, that his workmen are busily employed. Eagerly he talks over his plans with Mephistopheles, and at last he glows at the good fortune of standing upon free ground with a free people. Daily he feels that man must conquer Freedom and Life anew, and the presentiment that the traces of his uninterrupted striving would not perish in the Ages, is the highest moment of his whole existence. This confession of satisfaction kills him, and he falls to the earth dead. After trying everything, after turning from himself to the future of the race, after working unceasingly, he has ripened to the acknowledgment that the Individual only in the Whole, that Man only in the freedom of humanity, can have repose. Mephistopheles believes that he has won his bet, causes the jaws of Hell to appear, and commands the Devils to look to the soul of Faust. But Angels come, strewing roses from above; the roses, the flowers of Love, cause pain where they fall: the Devils and Mephistopheles himself complain uproariously. He lashes himself with the falling roses, which cling to his neck like pitch and brimstone, and burn deeper than Hell-fire. First, he berates the Angels as hypocritical puppets, yet, more closely observed, he finds that they are most lovely youths. Only the long cloaks fit them too modestly, for, from behind particularly, the rascals had a very desirable look. While he is seeking out a tall fellow for himself, and is

plunged wholly in his pederastic lust, the Angels carry away the immortal part of Faust to Heaven. Mephistopheles now reproaches himself with the greatest bitterness, because he has destroyed, through so trivial a desire, the fruits of so long a labor. This *reductio ad absurdum* of the Devil must be considered as one of the happiest strokes of humor. The holy innocence of the Angels is not for him; he sees only their fine bodies; his lowness carries him into the Unnatural and Accidental, just where his greatest interest and egotism come in play. This result will surprise most people; but, if they consider the nature of the Devil, it will be wholly satisfactory; in all cunning he is at last bemocked as a fool, and he destroys himself through himself.

In conclusion, we see a woody, rocky wilderness, settled with hermits. It is not Heaven itself, but the transition to the same, where the soul is united to perfect clearness and happiness. Hence we find the glowing devotion and repentance of the *Pater ecstaticus*, the contemplation of the *Pater profundus*, the wrestling of the *Pater serapiticus*, who, taking into his eyes the holy little boys because their organs are too weak for the Earth, shows them trees, rocks, waterfalls. The Angels bring in Faust, who, as Dr. Marianus, in the highest and purest cell, with burning prayer to the approaching Queen of Heaven, seeks for grace. Around Maria is a choir of penitents, among whom are the Magna Pectatrix, the Mulier Samaritana, and Maria Ægyptiaca. They pray for the earthly soul; and one of the penitents, once called Margaret, kneeling, ventures a special intercession. The Mater Gloriosa appoints Margaret to lead the soul of Faust to higher spheres, for he shall follow her in anticipation. A fervent prayer streams from the lips of Doctor Marianus; the Chorus mysticus concludes with the assurance of the certainty of bliss through educating, purifying love. Aspiration, the Eternal feminine, is in Faust, however deeply he penetrates into every sphere of worldly activity. The

analogy between Margaret and the Beatrice of Dante is here undeniable; also, the further progress of Faust's life we must consider similar, as he, like Dante, grows in the knowledge and feeling of the Divine till he arrives at its complete intuition; Dante beholds the Trinity perfectly free and independent, without being led farther by anybody. From this point of view, that the poet wanted to exhibit reconciliation as becoming, as a product of infinite growth, is found the justification of the fact that he alludes so slightly to God the Father and to Christ the Redeemer, and, instead, brings out so prominently the worship of the Virgin, and the devotion of Woman. Devotion has a passive element which finds its fittest poetical support in women. These elements agree also very well with the rest of the poem, since Goethe, throughout the entire drama, has preserved the costume of the Middle Ages; otherwise, on account of the evident Protestant tendency of Faust, it would be difficult to find a necessary connection with the other parts of the poem.

As regards the history of Faust in itself, dramatically considered, the first four acts could perhaps be entirely omitted. The fifth, as it shows us that all striving, if its content is not religion (the freedom of the Spirit), can give no internal satisfaction, as it shows us that in the earnest striving after freedom, however much we may err, still the path to Heaven is open, and is only closed to him who does not strive, would have sufficiently exhibited the reconciliation. But Goethe wants to show not only this conclusion, which was all the legend demanded of him, but also the becoming of this result. Faust was for him, and through him for the nation, and indeed for Europe, the representative of the world-comprehending, self-conscious internality of Spirit, and therefore he caused all the elements of the World to crystallize around this centre. Thus the acts of the Second Part are pictures, which, like frescoes, are painted beside one another upon the same wall, and Faust has actually become what was so often

before said of him, a perfect manifestation of the Universe.

If we now cast a glance back to what we said in the beginning, of the opposition between the characters of Wilhelm Meister and Faust, that the former was *the determined from without*, the latter *the self-determining from within*, we can also seize this opposition so that Meister is always in pursuit of Culture, Faust of Freedom. Meister is therefore always desirous of new impressions, in order to have them work upon himself, extend his knowledge, complete his character. His capacity and zeal for Culture, the variety of the former, the diligence of the latter, forced him to a certain tameness and complaisance in relation to others. Faust, on the contrary, will himself work. He will possess only what he himself creates. Just for this reason he binds himself to the Devil, because the latter has the greatest worldly power, which Faust applies unsparingly for his own purposes, so that the Devil in reality finds in him a hard, whimsical, insatiate master. To Wilhelm the acquaintance of the Devil would indeed have been very interesting from a moral, psychological, and æsthetic point of view, but he never would have formed a fraternity with him. This *autonomia* and *autarkia* of Faust have given a powerful impulse to the German people and German literature. But if, in the continuation of Faust, there was an expectation of the same Titanic nature, it was disappointed. The monstrosity of the tendencies, however, does not cease; a man must be blind not to see them. But in the place of pleasure, after the catastrophe with Margaret, an active participation in the world enters; a feature which Klinger and others have retained. But Labor in itself can still give no satisfaction, but its content, too, must be considered. Or, rather, the external objectivity of Labor is indifferent; whether one is savant, artist, soldier, courtier, priest, manufacturer, merchant, &c., is a mere accident; whether he wills Freedom or not is not accidental, for Spirit is in and for itself free. With the narrow studio, in fellow-

ship with Wagner, Faust begins; with Trade, with contests about boundaries, with his look upon the sea, which unites the nations, he ends his career.

In the World, Freedom indeed realizes itself; but as absolute, it can only come to existence in God.

It is, therefore, right when Goethe makes the transition from civil to religious freedom. Men cannot accomplish more than the realization of the freedom of the nations, for Mankind has its concrete existence only in the nations; if the nations are free, it is also free. Faust must thus be enraptured by this thought in the highest degree. But with it, he departs from the world—Heaven has opened itself above him. But, though Heaven sheds its grace, and lovingly receives the striving soul which has erred, still it demands repentance and complete purification from what is earthly. This struggle, this wrestling of the soul, I find expressed in the most sublime manner in the songs of the hermits and the choruses, and do not know what our time has produced superior in spiritual power, as well as in unwavering hope, though I must confess that I am not well enough versed in the fertile modern lyric literature of Pietism, to say whether such pearls are to be found in it.

Moreover, it is evident that the pliable Meister and the stubborn Faust are the two sides which were united in Goethe's genius. He was a poet, and became a courtier; he was a courtier, and remained a poet. But in a more extensive sense this opposition is found in all modern nations, particularly among the Germans. They wish to obtain culture, and therefore shun no kind of society if they are improved. But they wish also to be free. They love culture so deeply that they perhaps, for a while, have forgotten freedom. But then the Spirit warns them. They sigh, like Faust, that they have sat so long in a gloomy cell over Philosophy, Theology, &c. With the fierceness of lions, they throw all culture aside for the sake of freedom, and in noble delusion form an alliance—even with the Devil.

A CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS.

Translated from the German of J. G. FICHTE, by A. E. KROEGER.

[NOTE.—Below we give to our readers the translation of another Introduction to the Science of Knowledge, written by Fichte immediately after the one published in our previous number. Whereas that first Introduction was written for readers who have as yet no philosophical system of their own, the present one is intended more particularly for those who have set philosophical notions, of which they require to be disabused.—EDITOR.]

I believe the first Introduction published in this Journal to be perfectly sufficient for unprejudiced readers, i.e. for readers who give themselves up to the writer without preconceived opinions; who, if they do not assist him, neither do they resist him in his endeavors to carry them along. It is otherwise with readers who have already a philosophical system. Such readers have adopted certain maxims from their system, which have become fundamental principles for them; and whatsoever is not produced according to these maxims, is now pronounced false by them without further investigation, and without even reading such productions: it is pronounced false, because it has been produced in violation of their universally valid method. Unless this class of readers is to be abandoned altogether—and why should it be?—it is, above all, necessary to remove the obstacle which deprives us of their attention; or, in other words, to make them distrust their maxims.

Such a preliminary investigation concerning the *method* is, above all, necessary in regard to the Science of Knowledge, the whole structure and significance whereof differs utterly from the structure and significance of all philosophical systems which have hitherto been current. The authors of these previous systems started from some conception or another; and, utterly careless whence they got it, or out of what material they composed it, they then proceeded to analyze it, to combine it with others, regarding the origin whereof they were equally unconcerned; and this their argumentation itself is their philosophy. Hence their philosophy consists in *their*

own thinking. Quite different does the Science of Knowledge proceed. That which this Science makes the object of its thinking is not a dead conception, remaining passive under the investigation, and receiving life only from it, but is rather itself living and active; generating out of itself and through itself cognitions, which the philosopher merely observes in their genesis. His business in the whole affair is nothing further than to place that living object of his investigation in proper activity, and to observe, grasp and comprehend this its activity as a Unit. He undertakes an experiment. It is his business to place the object in a position which permits the observation he wishes to make; it is his business to attend to all the manifestations of the object in this experiment, to follow them and connect them in proper order; but it is not his business to *cause* the manifestations in the object. That is the business of the object itself: and he would work directly contrary to his purpose if he did not allow the object full freedom to develop itself—if he undertook but the least interference in this, its self-developing.

The philosopher of the first mentioned sort, on the contrary, does just the reverse. He produces a product of art. In working out his object he only takes into consideration its matter, and pays no attention to an internal self-developing power thereof. Nay, this power must be deadened before he undertakes his work, or else it might resist his labor. It is from the dead matter, therefore, that he produces something, and solely by means of his own power, in accordance with his previously resolved-upon conception.

While thus in the Science of Knowledge there are two utterly distinct series of mental activity—that of the Ego, which the philosopher observes, and that of the observations of the philosopher—all other philosophical systems have only one series of thinking, viz., that of the thoughts of the philosopher; for his object is not introduced as thinking at all.

One of the chief grounds of so many objections to and misunderstandings of the Science of Knowledge lies in this: that these two series of thinking have not been held apart, or that what belonged to the one has been taken to belong to the other. This error occurred because Philosophy was held to consist only of one series. The act of one who produces a work of art is most certainly—since his object is not active—the appearance itself; but the description of him who has undertaken an experiment, is not the appearance itself, but the conception thereof.*

* NOTE.—The same mistaking of one series of thinking in transcendental idealism for the other series, lies at the basis of the assertion, that, besides the system of idealism, another realistic system is also possible as a logical and thorough system. The realism which forces itself upon all, even the most decided idealist—namely, the assumption that things exist independently and outside of us—is involved in the idealistic system itself; and is, moreover, explained and deduced in that system. Indeed, the deduction of an objective truth, as well in the world of appearances as in the world of intellect, is the only purpose of all philosophy.

(It is the philosopher who says in his own name: everything that is for the Ego is also through the Ego. But the Ego itself, in that philosopher's philosophy, says: as sure as I am I, there exists outside of me a something which exists not through me. The philosopher's idealistic assertion is therefore met by the realistic assertion of the Ego in the same one system; and it is the philosopher's business to show from the fundamental principle of his philosophy how the Ego comes to make such an assertion. The philosopher's stand-point is the purely speculative; the Ego's stand-point in his system is the realistic stand-point of life and science; the philosopher's system is Science of Knowledge, whilst the Ego's system is common Science. But common Science is comprehensible only through the Science of Knowledge, the realistic system comprehensible only through the idealistic system. Realism forces itself upon us; but it has in itself no known and comprehensible ground. Idealism furnishes this ground, and is only to

After this preliminary remark, the further application whereof we shall examine in the course of our article, let us now ask: how does the Science of Knowledge proceed to solve its problem?

The question it will have to answer is, as we well know, the following: whence comes the system of those representations which are accompanied by the feeling of necessity? Or, how do we come to claim objective validity for what is only subjective? Or, since objective validity is generally characterized as *being*, how do we come to accept a being? Now, since this question starts from a reflection that returns into itself—starts from the observation, that the immediate object of consciousness is after all merely consciousness itself,—it seems clear enough that the question can speak of no other being than of a being for us. It would be indeed a complete contradiction, to mistake it for a question concerning some being which had no relation to our consciousness. Nevertheless, the philosophers of our philosophical age are of all things most apt to plunge into such absurd contradictions.

The proposed question, how is a being for us possible? abstracts itself from all being; i.e. it must not be understood, as if the question posited a not-being; for in that case the conception of being would only be negated, but not abstracted from. On the contrary, the question does not entertain the conception of being at all, either positively or negatively. The proposed question asks for the ground of the predicate of being, whether it be applied positively or negatively; but all ground lies beyond the grounded, i.e. is opposed to it. The answer must therefore, if it is to be an answer to this question, also abstract from all being. To maintain, *a priori*, in advance of an attempt, that such an abstraction is impossible in the answer, because it is im-

make realism comprehensible. Speculation has no other purpose than to furnish this comprehensibility of all reality, which in itself would otherwise remain incomprehensible. Hence, also, Idealism can never be a mode of thinking, but can only be *speculation*.

possible in itself, would be to maintain likewise, that such an abstraction is impossible in the question; and hence, that the question itself is not possible, and that the problem of a science of metaphysics, as the science which is to solve the problem of the ground of being for us, is not a problem for human reason.

That such an abstraction, and hence such a question, is contrary to reason, cannot be proven by objective grounds to those who maintain its possibility; for the latter assert that the possibility and necessity of the question is grounded upon the highest law of reason—that of self-determination (Practical legislation), under which all other laws of reason are subsumed, and from which they are all derived, but at the same time determined and limited to the sphere of their validity. They acknowledge the arguments of their opponents willingly enough, but deny their application to the present case; with what justice, their opponents can determine only by placing themselves upon the basis of this highest law, but hence, also, upon the basis of an answer to the disputed question, by which act they would cease to be opponents. Their opposition, indeed, can only arise from a subjective defect—from the consciousness that they never raised this question, and never felt the need of an answer to it. Against this their position, no objective grounds can, on the other hand, be made valid by those who insist on an answer to the question, for the doubt which raises that question is grounded upon previous acts of freedom which no demonstration can compel from any one.

III.

Let us now ask: who is it that undertakes the demanded abstraction from all being? or, in which of the two series does it occur? Evidently, in the series of philosophical argumentation, for another series does not exist.

That to which the philosopher holds, and from which he promises to explain all that is to be explained, is the consciousness, the subject. This subject he will, therefore, have to comprehend free

from all representation of being, in order first to show up in it the ground of all being—of course, for itself. But if he abstracts from all being of and for the subject, nothing pertains to it but an acting. Particularly in relation to being is it the acting. The philosopher will therefore have to comprehend it in its acting, and from this point the aforementioned double series will first arise.

The fundamental assertion of the philosopher, as such, is this: as soon as the Ego is for itself, there necessarily arises for it at the same time an external being; the ground of the latter lies in the former; the latter is conditioned by the former. Self-consciousness and consciousness of a Something which is not that Self, is necessarily united; but the former is the conditioning and the latter the conditioned. To prove this assertion—not, perhaps, by argumentation, as valid for a system of a being in itself, but by observation of the original proceeding of reason, as valid for reason—the philosopher will have to show, firstly, how the Ego is and becomes for itself; and secondly, that this its own being for itself is not possible, unless at the same time there arises for it an external being which is not it.

The first question, therefore, would be: how is the Ego for itself? and the first postulate: think thyself! construe the conception of thyself, and observe how thou proceedest in this construction.

The philosopher affirms that every one who will but do so, must necessarily discover that in the thinking of that conception, his activity, as intelligence, returns into itself, makes itself its own object.

If this is correct and admitted, the manner of the construction of the Ego, the manner of its being for itself (and we never speak of another being), is known; and the philosopher may then proceed to prove that this act is not possible without another act, whereby there arises for the Ego an external being.

It is thus, indeed, that the Science of Knowledge proceeds. Let us now consider with what justice it so proceeds.

IV.

First of all: what in the described act belongs to the philosopher as philosopher, and what belongs to the Ego he is to observe? To the Ego nothing but the return to itself; everything else to the description of the philosopher, for whom, as mere fact, the system of all experience, which in its genesis the Ego is now to produce under his observation, has already existence.

The Ego returns *into itself*, is the assertion. Has it not then already being in advance of this return into itself, and independently thereof? Nay, must it not already be for itself, if merely for the possibility of making itself the object of its action? Again, if this is so, does not the whole philosophy presuppose what it ought first to explain?

I answer, by no means. First through this act, and only by means of it—by means of an acting upon an acting—does the Ego *originally* come to be *for itself*. It is only *for the philosopher* that it has previous existence as a fact, because the philosopher has already gone through the whole experience. He must express himself as he does, to be but understood, and he can so express himself, because he long since has comprehended all the conceptions necessary thereunto.

Now, to return to the observed Ego: what is this its return into itself? Under what class of modifications of consciousness is it to be posited? It is no *comprehending*, for a comprehending first arises through the opposition of a non-Ego, and by the determining of the Ego in this opposition. Hence it is a mere *contemplation*. It is therefore not consciousness, not even self-consciousness. Indeed, it is precisely because this act alone produces no consciousness, that we proceed to another act through which a non-Ego originates for us, and that a progress of philosophical argumentation and the required deduction of the system of experience becomes possible. That act only places the Ego in the possibility of self-consciousness—and thus of all other consciousness—but does not generate real

consciousness. That act is but a part of the whole act of the intelligence, whereby it effects its consciousness; a part which only the philosopher separates from the whole act, but which is not originally so separated in the Ego.

But how about the philosopher, as such? This self-constructing Ego is none other than his own. He can contemplate that act of the Ego only in himself, and, in order to contemplate it, must realize it. He produces that act arbitrarily and with freedom.

But—this question may and has been raised—if your whole philosophy is erected upon something produced by an act of mere arbitrariness, does it not then become a mere creature of the brain, a pure imaginary picture? How is the philosopher going to secure to this purely subjective act its objectivity? How will he secure to that which is purely empirical and a moment of time—i.e. the time in which the philosopher philosophizes—its originality? How can he prove that his present free thinking in the midst of the series of his representations does correspond to the necessary thinking, whereby he first became for himself, and through which the whole series of his representations has been started?

I answer: this act is in its nature objective. I am for myself; this is a fact. Now I could have thus come to be for myself only through an act, for I am free; and only through this thus determined act, for only through it do I become for myself every moment, and through every other act something quite different is produced. That acting, indeed, is the very conception of the Ego; and the conception of the Ego is the conception of that acting; both conceptions are quite the same; and that conception of the Ego can mean and cannot be made to mean anything but what has been stated. *It is so, because I make it so.* The philosopher only makes clear to himself what he really thinks, and has ever thought, when he thinks or thought *himself*; but that he does think himself is to him immediate fact of consciousness. That ques-

tion concerning the objectivity is grounded on the very curious presupposition that the Ego is something else than its own thought of itself, and that something else than this thought and outside of it—God may know what they do mean!—is again the ground of it, concerning the actual nature of which outside something they are very much troubled. Hence, if they ask for such an objective validity of the thought, or for a connection between this object and the subject, I cheerfully confess that the Science of Knowledge can give them no instruction concerning it. If they choose to, they may themselves enter, in this or any other case, upon the discovery of such a connection, until they, perhaps, will recollect that this Unknown which they are hunting is, after all, again their thought, and that whatsoever they may invent as its ground will also be their thought, and thus *ad infinitum*; and that, indeed, they cannot speak of or question about anything without at the same time thinking it.

Now, in this act, which is arbitrary and in time for the philosopher as such, but which is for the Ego—which he constructs, by virtue of his just deduced right, for the sake of subsequent observations and conclusions—necessarily and originally; in this act, I say, the philosopher looks at himself, and immediately contemplates his own acting; he knows what he does, because *he does it*. Does a consciousness thereof arise in him? Without doubt; for he not only contemplates, but *comprehends* also. He comprehends his act as an *acting generally*, of which he has already a conception by virtue of his previous experience; and as this *determined*, into itself *returning* acting, as which he contemplates it in himself. By this characteristic determination he elevates it above the sphere of *general acting*.

What acting may be, can only be *contemplated*, not developed from and through conceptions; but that which this contemplation contains is *comprehended* by the mere opposition of pure *being*.

Acting is not being, and being is not acting. Mere conception affords no other determination for each link; their real essence is only discovered in contemplation.

Now this whole procedure of the philosopher appears to *me*, at least, very possible, very easy, and even natural; and I can scarcely conceive how it can appear otherwise to my readers, and how they can see in it anything mysterious and marvellous. Every one, let us hope, can think *himself*. He will also, let us hope, learn that by being required to thus think himself, he is required to perform an act dependent upon his own activity, an internal act; and that if he realizes this demand, if he really affects himself through self-activity, he also most surely *acts* thus. Let us further hope that he will be able to distinguish *this* kind of acting from its *opposite*, the acting whereby he thinks external objects, and that he will find in the latter sort of thinking the thinking and the thought to be opposites (the activity, therefore, tending upon something distinct from itself), while in the former thinking both were one and the same (and hence the activity a return into itself). He will comprehend, it is to be hoped, that—since the thought of himself arises *only* in this manner (an opposite thinking producing a quite different thought)—the thought of himself is nothing but the thought of this act, and the word Ego nothing but the designation of this act—that Ego and an *into itself returning activity* are completely identical conceptions. He will understand, let us hope, that if he but for the present problematically presupposes with transcendental Idealism that all consciousness rests upon and is dependent upon self-consciousness, he must also *think* that return into itself as preceding and conditioning all other acts of consciousness; indeed, as the primary act of the subject; and, since there is nothing for him which is not in his consciousness, and since everything else in his consciousness is conditioned by this act, and therefore cannot condition the act in

the same respect,—as an act, utterly unconditioned and hence absolute *for him*; and he will thus further understand that the above *problematical presupposition*, and this *thinking of the Ego as originally posited through itself*, are again quite identical; and that hence transcendental Idealism, if it proceeds systematically, can proceed in no other manner than it does in the Science of Knowledge.

This contemplation of himself, which is required of the philosopher in his realization of the act through which the Ego arises for him, I call *intellectual contemplation*. It is the immediate consciousness that I act and what I act; it is that through which I know something because I do it. That there is such a power of intellectual contemplation cannot be demonstrated by conceptions, nor can conception show what it is. Every one must find it immediately in himself, or he will never learn to know it. The requirement that we ought to show *it* what it is by argumentation, is more marvellous than would be the requirement of a blind person to explain to him, without his needing to use sight, what colors are.

But it can be certainly proven to every one in his own confessed experience that this intellectual contemplation does occur in every moment of his consciousness. I can take no step, cannot move hand or foot, without the intellectual contemplation of my self-consciousness in these acts; only through this contemplation do I know that *I* do it, only through it do I distinguish my acting and in it myself from the given object of my acting. Every one who ascribes an activity to himself appeals to this contemplation. In it is the source of life, and without it is death.

But this contemplation never occurs alone as a complete act of consciousness, as indeed sensuous contemplation also never occurs alone, nor completes consciousness; both contemplations must be *comprehended*. Not only this, but the intellectual contemplation is also always connected with a *sensuous* contempla-

tion. I cannot find myself acting without finding an object upon which I act, and this object in a sensuous contemplation which I comprehend; nor without sketching an image of what I intend to produce by my act, which image I also comprehend. Now, then, how do I know and how can I know what I intend to produce, if I do not immediately contemplate myself in this sketching of the image which I intend to produce, i.e. in this sketching of the conception of my *purpose*, which sketching is certainly an act. Only the totality of this condition in uniting a given manifold completes consciousness. I become conscious only of the conceptions, both of the object upon which I act, and of the purpose I intend to accomplish; but I do not become conscious of the contemplations which are at the bottom of both conceptions.

Perhaps it is only this which the zealous opponents of intellectual contemplation wish to insist upon, namely, that that contemplation is only possible in connection with a sensuous contemplation; and surely the Science of Knowledge is not going to deny it. But this is no reason why they should deny intellectual contemplation. For with the same right we might deny sensuous contemplation, since it also is possible only in connection with intellectual contemplation; for whatsoever is to become *my* representation must be related to me, and the consciousness (1) occurs only through intellectual contemplation. (It is a remarkable fact of our modern history of philosophy, that it has not been noticed as yet how all that may be objected to intellectual contemplation can also be objected to sensuous contemplation, and that thus the arguments of its opponents turn against themselves.)

But if it must be admitted that there is no immediate, isolated consciousness of intellectual contemplation, how does the philosopher arrive at a knowledge and isolated representation thereof? I answer, doubtless in the same manner in which he arrives at the isolated representation of sensuous contemplation, by

drawing a conclusion from the evident facts of consciousness. This conclusion runs as follows: I propose to myself to think this or that, and the required thought arises; I propose to myself to do this or that, and the representation that it is being done arises. This is a fact of consciousness. If I look at it by the light of the laws of mere sensuous consciousness, it involves no more than has just been stated, i.e. a sequence of certain representations. I become conscious only of this *sequence* in a series of time movements, and only such a time sequence can I assert. I can merely state: I know that if I propose to myself a certain thought, with the characteristic that it is to have existence, the representation of this thought, with the characteristic that it really has existence, follows; or, that the representation of a certain manifestation as one which ought to occur, is immediately followed in time by the representation of the same manifestation as one which really did occur. But I can, on no account, state that the first representation contains the *real* ground of the second one which followed; or, that by thinking the first one the second one *became real* for me. I merely remain passive, the placid scene upon which representations follow representations, and am on no account the active principle which produces them. Still I constantly assume the latter, and cannot relinquish that assumption without relinquishing my self. What justifies me in it? In the sensuous ingredients I have mentioned, there is no ground to justify such an assumption; hence it is a peculiar and immediate consciousness, that is to say, a contemplation, and not a sensuous contemplation, which views a material and permanent being, but a contemplation of a pure activity, which is not permanent but progressive, not a being but a life.

The philosopher, therefore, discovers this intellectual contemplation as fact of consciousness (for him it is a fact, for the original Ego a fact and act both together—a deed-act), and he thus discovers it not immediately, as an isolated

part of his consciousness, but by distinguishing and separating what in common consciousness occurs in unseparated union.

Quite a different problem it is to explain this intellectual contemplation, which is here presupposed as fact in its *possibility*, and by means of this explanation to defend it against the charge of deception and deceptiveness which is raised by dogmatism; or, in other words, to prove the *faith* in the reality of this intellectual contemplation, from which faith transcendental idealism confessedly starts—by a something still higher; and to show up the interest which leads us to place faith in its reality, or in the system of Reason. This is accomplished by showing up the *Moral Law* in us, in which the Ego is characterized as elevated through it above all the original modifications, as impelled by an absolute, or in itself (in the Ego), grounded activity; and by which the Ego is thus discovered to be an absolute Active. In the consciousness of this law, which doubtless is an immediate consciousness, and not derived from something else, the contemplation of self-activity and freedom is grounded. *I am given to myself through myself as something which is to be active in a certain manner; hence, I am given to myself through myself as something active generally; I have the life in myself, and take it from out of myself. Only through this medium of the Moral Law do I see MYSELF; and if I see myself through that law, I necessarily see myself as self-active; and it is thus that there arises in a consciousness—which otherwise would only be the consciousness of a sequence of my representations—the utterly foreign ingredient of an activity of myself.*

This intellectual contemplation is the only stand-point for all Philosophy. From it all that occurs in consciousness may be explained, but only from it. Without self-consciousness there is no consciousness at all; but self-consciousness is only possible in the way we have shown, i.e. I am only active. Beyond it

I cannot be driven; my philosophy then becomes altogether independent of all arbitrariness, and a product of stern necessity, i.e. in so far as necessity exists for free Reason; it becomes a product of *practical* necessity. I can not go beyond this stand-point, because conscience says I shall not go beyond it; and thus transcendental idealism shows itself up to be the only moral philosophy—the philosophy wherein speculation and moral law are intimately united. Conscience says: I shall start in my thinking from the pure Ego, and shall think it absolutely self-active; not as determined by the things, but as determining the things.

The conception of activity which becomes possible only through this intellectual contemplation of the self-active Ego, is the only one which unites both the worlds that exist for us—the sensuous and the intelligible world. Whatsoever is opposed to my activity—and I must oppose something to it, for I am finite—is the sensuous, and whatsoever is to arise through my activity is the intelligible (moral) world.

I should like to know how those who smile so contemptuously whenever the words “intellectual contemplation” are mentioned, think the consciousness of the moral law; or how they are enabled to entertain such conceptions as those of Virtue, of Right, &c., which they doubtless do entertain. According to them, there are only two contemplations *à priori*—Time and Space. They surely form these conceptions of Virtue, &c., in Time (the form of the inner sense), but they certainly do not hold them to be time itself, but merely a certain filling up of time. What is it, then, wherewith they fill up time, and get a basis for the construction of those conceptions? There

is nothing left to them but Space; and hence their conceptions of Virtue, Right, &c., are perhaps quadrangular and circular; just as all the other conceptions which they construct (for instance, that of a tree or of an animal) are nothing but limitations of Space. But they do not conceive their Virtue and their Right in this manner. What, then, is the basis of their construction? If they attend properly, they will discover that this basis is activity in general, or freedom. Both of these conceptions of virtue and right are to them certain limitations of their general activity, exactly as their sensuous conceptions are limitations of space. How, then, do they arrive at this basis of their construction? We will hope that they have not derived activity from the dead permanency of matter, nor freedom from the mechanism of nature. They have obtained it, therefore, from immediate contemplation, and thus they confess a third contemplation besides their own two.

It is, therefore, by no means so unimportant, as it appears to be to some, whether philosophy starts from a fact or from a deed-act (i.e. from an activity which presupposes no object, but produces it itself, and in which, therefore, the *acting* is immediately *deed*). If philosophy starts from a fact, it places itself in the midst of being and finity, and will find it difficult to discover therefrom a road to the infinite and super-sensuous; but if it starts from a deed-act, it places itself at once in the point which unites both worlds and from which both can be overlooked at one glance.

[Translators frequently use the term “intuition” for what I have here called “contemplation”; “deed-act” is my rendering of “That-Handlung.” A. E. K.]

NOTES ON MILTON'S LYCIDAS.

By ANNA C. BRACKETT.

Every work of art, whether in sculpture, painting, or music, must have a definite content; and only in having such has it any claim to be so called. This content must be spiritual; that is, it must come from the inner spirit of the artist, and translate itself by means of the work into spirit in the spectator or listener. Only in the recognition of this inner meaning, which lives behind the outside and shimmers through it, can consist the difference between the impression made on me by the sight of a beautiful painting and that produced on an inferior animal, as the retina of his eye paints with equal accuracy the same object. For what is this sense of beauty which thrills through me, while the dog at my side looks at the same thing and sees nothing in seeing all which the eye can grasp? Is it not the response in me to the informing spirit behind all the outward appearance?

But if this sense of beauty stops in passive enjoyment, if the sense of sight or of hearing is simply to be intoxicated with the feast spread before it, we must confess that our appreciation of beauty is a very sensuous thing. Content though some may be simply to enjoy, in the minds of others the fascination of the senses only provokes unrest. We say with Goethe: "I would fain understand that which interests me in so extraordinary a manner"; for this work of art, the product of mind, touches me in a wonderful way, and must be of universal essence. Let me seek the reason, and if I find it, it will be another step towards "the solvent word."

Again, in a true work of art this content must be essentially *one*; that is, one profound thought, to which all others, though they may be visible, must be gracefully subordinate; otherwise we are lost in a multiplicity of details, and miss the unity which is the sole sign of the creative mind.

Nor need we always be anxious as to whether the artist consciously meant to say thus and so. Has there ever lived a true artist who has not "builded better than he knew"? If this were not so, all works of art would lose their significance in the course of time. Are the half-uttered meanings of the statues of the Egyptian gods behind or before us to-day? Do they not perplex us with prophecies rather than remembrances as we wander amazed among them through the halls of the British Museum? A whole nation striving to say the one word, and dying before it was uttered! Have we heard it clearly yet?

The world goes on translating as it gains new words with which to carry on the work. It is not so much the artist that is before his age as the divine afflatus guiding his hand, which leads not only the age but him. Through that divine inspiration he speaks, and he says mysterious words which perhaps must wait for centuries to be understood. In that fact lies his right to his title; in that, alone, lies the right of his production to be called a work of art.

Doubtless all readers are familiar with Dr. Johnson's criticisms on Milton's Lycidas, and these we might pass by without comment, for it would evidently be as impossible for Dr. Johnson's mind to comprehend or be touched by the poetry of Lycidas as for a ponderous sledgehammer to be conscious of the soft, perfume-laden air through which it might move. The monody is censured by him because of its irregularly recurring rhymes; and in the same breath we are told that it is so full of art that the author could not have felt sorrow while writing it. We know how intricately the rhymes are woven in Milton's sonnets, where he seems to have taken all pains to select the most difficult arrangements, and to carry them through without deviation, and we say only that the first criticism

contradicts the last. But some more appreciative critics, while touched by the beauty, repeat the same, and say there is "more poetry than sorrow" in the poem. More poetry than sorrow! Sorrow is the grand key-note, and strikes in always over and through all the beauty and poetry like a wailing chord in a symphony, that is never absent long, and ever and anon drowns out all the rest. Sorrow, pure and simple, is the thread on which all the beautiful fancies are strung. It runs through and connects them all, and there is not a paragraph in the whole poem that is not pierced by it. It is the occasion, the motive, the inner inspiration, and the mastery over it is the conclusion of all. Around it, the constant centre, group themselves all the lovely pictures, and they all face it and are subordinate to it.

The soul of the poet is so tossed by the immediate sorrow that it surrenders itself entirely to it, and so, losing its will, is taken possession of by whatever thought, evoked by the spell of association, rises in his mind; as when he speaks of Camus and St. Peter. Ever and anon the will makes an effort to free itself and to determine its own course, but again and again the wave of sorrow sweeps up, and the vainly struggling will goes down before it.

Nothing lay closer to Milton's heart than the interests of what he believed the true church; and nothing touched him more than the abuses which were then prevalent in the church of England. In the safe harbor of his father's country home, resting on his oars before the appointed time for the race in which he was to give away all his strength and joy, surrounded and inspired by the fresh, pure air from the granite rocks of Puritanism, all his growing strength was gathering its energies for the struggle. This just indignation and honest protest must find its way in the poem through the grief that sweeps over him, and which, because so deep, touches and vivifies all his deepest thoughts. But even that strong under-current of conviction

has no power long to steady him against the wave of sorrow which breaks above his head, none the less powerful because it breaks in a line of white and shivers itself into drops which flash diamond colors in the warm and pure sunlight of his cultured imagination. More poetry than sorrow! Then there is more poetry in *Lycidas* than in any other poem of the same length in our language.

It would be impossible here to go through the poem with the close care to all little points which is necessary to enable one fully to comprehend its exquisite beauty and finish. It is like one of Beethoven's symphonies, where at first we are so occupied with the one grand thought that we surrender ourselves entirely to it, and think ourselves completely satisfied. But as we appropriate that more and more fully, within and around it wonderful melodies start and twine, and this experience is repeated again and again till the music seems almost infinite in its contents. Let us, then, briefly go over the burden of the monody, our chief effort being to show how perfectly at one it is throughout, how natural the seemingly abrupt changes,—only pausing now and then to speak of some special beauty which is so marked that one cannot pass it by in silence. If we succeed in showing a continued and natural thought in the whole, and a satisfactory solution for the collision which gives rise to the poem, our end will have been accomplished.

Milton begins in due order by giving, as prelude, his reason for singing. But he has written only seven full lines before, in the eighth, the key-note is struck by the force of sorrow, which, after saying "*Lycidas* is dead," lingers on the strain, and repeats, to heighten the grief, "dead ere his prime." The next line, the ninth, is still more pathetic in its echoing repetition and its added cause for mourning. (In passing, let us say that the effect is greatly increased in reading this line if the first word be strongly emphasized.) Because he hath not left his peer, all should sing for him. No more excuse is needed. Sorrow pleases itself in call-

ing up the neglected form, and then passionately turns to the only solace that it can have—"Some melodious tear."

This, of course, brings the image of the Muses, and, as that thought comes, once more we have a new attempt at a formal beginning in the second paragraph (line 15). First, is the invocation, and then, recurring to the first thought, Milton says it is peculiarly appropriate for him to sing of Lycidas. Why? Because they had been so long together; and as the thought of happier things arises, the sweet memories, linked by the chain of association, come thronging so tumultuously that he forgets himself in reverie. The music, at first slow and sweet, grows more and more strong and rapid till even the rustic dance-measure comes in merrily. Most naturally here the key-note is again struck by the force of contrast, and the despair of the sorrow that wakes from the forgetfulness of pleasant dreams to the consciousness of loss, strikes as rapidly its minor chords till it seems as if hope were entirely lost.

Nothing is more unreasonable than this despair of sorrow. Tossed in its own wild passion, it sees nothing clearly, and, seeking for some adequate cause, heaps blindly unmerited reproaches on anything, on all things. So, recoiling before its power, stung with its pain, the poet turns reproachfully to the nymphs, blaming them for their negligence. But before the words are fairly uttered he realizes his folly. Lycidas was beloved by them, but if Calliope could not save even her own son, how powerless are they against the step of inevitable fate! This strikes deep down in the thunder of the bass notes, and the thought comes which perhaps cannot be more powerfully expressed than by the old Hebrew refrain, "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity." After all, why seek for anything, even for fame? Man's destiny is ruled by irresponsible necessity. Life is worth nothing, and would it not be better, instead of "scorning delights and living laborious days," to yield one's self to the pleasures of the passing moment? "All is vanity and vexation of spirit."

When any soul reaches this point, it seems as if help must come from outside of itself or it will go irrevocably down. Sorrow, despair, are always represented by darkness. Is it an accident that the celestial notes which first strike through the descending bass, come from the god of light, Phœbus Apollo? Clear, and sweet, and sudden, they cleave the closing shadows; the sun-light comes in again, and the music climbs up and grows serenely steady.

Relieved from this Inferno, the soul comes once more to self-consciousness, and, in its effort to guide itself, what more natural than that it should recur to the idea expressed in the fiftieth line, and attempt to make something like order by carrying out that idea. Reason takes command, and the strain flows smoothly, till, by the exercise of her power, the true cause of the misfortune is recognized and a just indignation (line 100) takes its place. But, in yielding to this, the immediate feeling regains possession, reason resigns her sway, and the soul is set afloat again on the uncertain sea of association. See how sudden and sweet the transition from fiery reproach and invective to the gentlest tenderness, in line 102. It begins with a thunder-peat and dies out in a wail of affection, expressed by the one word "sacred." This forms the connection between this paragraph and the next, a delicate yet perfect link, for as all his love overflows in that one word, the old happier days come up again; and where should these memories carry him but to the university where they had found so much common pleasure and inspiration? Here the sorrow, before entirely personal, becomes wider as the singer feels that others grieve with him for lost talent and power.

Were they not both destined for the church for which their university studies were only a preparation? Most naturally the subtle chain of association brings up the thought of the great apostle with the keys of heaven and hell. How sorely the church needed true teachers! The earnest spirit that was ready to assail every form of wrong, eagerly followed out the

thought which was in the future to burn into its very life. From line 113 to line 131 notice the succession of feelings. A sense of irreparable loss—indignation—mark the *three* words, “creep,” “intrude,” and “climb,” no one of which could be spared. Then comes disgust, expressed by “Blind mouths.” Ruskin, in his “King’s Treasures,” very happily observes that no epithet could be more sweeping than this; for, as the office of a bishop is to oversee the flock, and that of a pastor to feed it, the utter want of all qualification for the sacred office is here most forcibly expressed. Contempt follows; then pity for those who, desiring food, are fed only with wind; detestation of the secret and corrupt practices of the Romish church; and finally hope, coming through the possible execution of Archbishop Laud, whose death, it seemed to the young Puritan, was the only thing needed to bring back truth, simplicity, and safety. Drifting with these emotions, the singer has followed the lead of his fancies, and, just as before, when light came with healing for his despair, Hope recalls him to himself, till he returns again in line 132, as in line 85, to the regular style of his poem. He is as one who, waking from wildering dreams, collects his fugitive thoughts, and tries to settle them down for the necessary routine of the day. A more regular and plainly accented strain, recognized as heard before, comes into the music, as he pleases himself in fancying that the sad consolation is still left him of ornamenting the hearse. It is useless to speak of the exquisite finish of these lines, or of how often one word—as “fresh,” for instance, in line 138—calls up before the mind such pictures that one lingers and lingers over the passage, as the poet’s fancy in vain effort lingered, striving to forget his sorrow. This strain comes in like some of the repeating melodies in the second part of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, where it seems as if the soul had found a new, sweet thought, and was turning it over and over as loth to pause, and as in sudden hope of some

relief through its potency. But the heavy key-note strikes again through it all, in line 154, with a crash that drowns all the sweetness and beauty. We hear the rush of the cruel, insatiate sea, as its waves dash against the shore of the stormy Hebrides, and the conflict of wave and wind takes possession of us. What thought is more desolate than that of a solitary human form, tossed hither and thither in the vast immensity of ocean! Perhaps, even now, it floats by “the great vision of the guarded mount.” It seems to the poet that all should turn toward England in her sorrow, and it pains him to think of St. Michael’s steadfast eyes gazing across the waves of the bay toward “Namancos and Bayona’s hold.” “Rather turn hither, and let even your heavenly face relax with human grief; and ye, unheeding monsters of the deep, have pity, and bear him gently over the roughening waves.” This he says because he feels his own impotence. All the love he bears Lycidas cannot serve him now; he is lost, and helpless, and alone, and uncared for. By opposition here, the light strikes in once more, and now with a clearer, fuller glow than at either previous time. At first (line 76) it came in the form of trust in “all-judging Jove”; then (line 130) in hope, through belief in impersonal justice; now it takes the form of Christian faith. The music mounts higher and higher into celestial harmonies, losing entirely its original character, and sounds like a majestic choral of triumph and peace.

This properly ends the poem with line 185. There is nothing more to be said. The tendency is all upward, and the collisions are overcome. One knows that here, and here for the first time, have we reached a movement that is self-sustained. There is no more danger of being carried off our basis by any wave of despairing sorrow. The soul has found a solution at last, and it knows that it is a trustworthy one.

The music is finished; but now, that nothing may be wanting for perfect effect, we have the scenery added, and

this in such word-painting as has never been surpassed. Who could ever weary of line 187—"While the still morn went out with sandals gray"—either for its melody, or for its subtle appeal to our senses of hearing and sight? And the slowly growing and dying day! Who else has ever so "touched the tender stops" of imagination?

But these woods and pastures are too full of haunting memories; we seek for newer ones, where the soul, relieved from the associations which perpetually call up the loss of the human and now lifeless embodiment of spirit, shall be free to think only of the eternal holding and possessing which can be sundered by no accident of time or space.

ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S ÆSTHETICS.

Translated from the French of M. CH. BENARD, by J. A. MARTLING.

PART II.

OF THE GENERAL FORMS OF ART AND ITS HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT.

The first part of Hegel's Æsthetics contains the questions relating to the nature of art in general. The second unfolds its principal forms in the different historic epochs. It is a species of philosophy of the history of art, and contains a great number of views and descriptions which cannot appear in this analysis. We shall take so much the more care, without suffering ourselves to be turned aside by details, to indicate plainly the course of the ideas, and to omit nothing essential.

The idea of the Beautiful, or the Ideal, manifests itself under three essential and fundamental forms—the *symbolic*, the *classic*, and the *romantic*. They represent the three grand epochs of history—the oriental, the Greek, and the modern.

In the East, thought, still vague and indeterminate, seeks its true expression, and cannot find it. In the presence of the phenomena of nature and of human life, spirit, in its infancy, incapable of seizing the true sense of things, and of comprehending itself, exhausts itself in vain efforts to express certain grand but confused or obscure conceptions. Instead of uniting and blending together in a harmonious whole the content and the form, the idea and its image, it attains only a rude and superficial approximation, and the result is the symbol with its enigmatic and mysterious meaning.

In classic art, on the contrary, this harmonious blending of the form and the idea is accomplished. Intelligence, having taken cognizance of itself and of its freedom, capable of self-control, of penetrating the significance of the phenomena of the universe, and of interpreting its laws, finds here also the exact correspondence, the measure, and the proportion, which are the characteristics of beauty. Art creates works which represent the beautiful under its purest and most perfect form.

But spirit cannot rest in this precise accord of the form and the idea in which the infinite and the finite blend. When it comes to be reflected upon itself, to penetrate farther into the depths of its inner nature, to take cognizance of its spirituality and its freedom, then the idea of the infinite appears to it stripped of the natural forms which envelop it. This idea, present in all its conceptions, can no longer be perfectly expressed by the forms of the finite world; it transcends them, and then this unity, which constitutes the characteristic of classic art, is broken. External forms, sensuous images, are no longer adequate to the expression of the soul and its free spirituality.

I. OF SYMBOLIC ART.

After these general considerations,

Hegel treats successively the different forms of art. Before speaking of symbolic art, he furnishes an exposition of the *symbol* in general.

The symbol is an image which represents an idea. It is distinguished from the signs of language in this, that between the image and the idea which it represents there is a natural relation, not an arbitrary or conventional one. It is thus that the lion is the symbol of courage; the circle, of eternity; the triangle, of the Trinity.

The symbol, however, does not represent the idea perfectly, but by a single side. The lion is not merely courageous, the fox cunning. Whence it follows that the symbol, having many meanings, is equivocal. This ambiguity ceases only when the two terms are conceived separately and then brought into relation; the symbol then gives place to *comparison*.

Thus conceived, the symbol, with its enigmatic and mysterious character, is peculiarly adapted to an entire epoch of history, to oriental art and its extraordinary creations. It characterizes that order of monuments and emblems by which the people of the East have sought to express their ideas, and have been able to do it only in an equivocal and obscure manner. These works of art present to us, instead of beauty and regularity, a strange, imposing, fantastic aspect.

In the development of this form of art in the East, many degrees are noticeable. Let us first examine its origin.

The sentiment of art, like the religious sentiment or scientific curiosity, is born of *wonder*. The man who is astonished at nothing lives in a state of imbecility and stupidity. This state ceases when his spirit, freeing itself from matter and from physical wants, is struck by the spectacle of the phenomena of nature, and seeks their meaning, when it has the presentiment of something grand and mysterious in them, of a concealed power which is revealed there.

Then it experiences also the need of representing that inner sentiment of a general and universal power. Particular

objects—the elements, the sea, rivers, mountains—lose their immediate sense and significance, and become for spirit images of this invisible power.

It is then that art appears; it arises from the necessity of representing this idea by sensuous images, addressed at once to the senses and the spirit.

The idea, in religions, of an absolute power, is manifested at first by the worship of physical objects. The Divinity is identified with nature itself. But this rude worship cannot endure. Instead of seeing the absolute in real objects, man conceives it as a distinct and universal being; he seizes, although very imperfectly, the relation which unites this invisible principle to the objects of nature; he fashions an image, a symbol designed to represent it. Art is then the interpreter of religious ideas.

Such is art in its origin; the symbolic form is born with it. Let us now follow it in the successive stages of its development, and indicate its progress in the East before it attained to the Greek ideal.

That which characterizes symbolic art is that it strives in vain to discover pure conceptions, and a mode of representation which befits them. It is the conflict between the content and the form, both imperfect and heterogeneous. Hence the incessant struggle of these two elements of art, which vainly seek to harmonize. The stages of its development exhibit the successive phases or modes of this struggle.

At the outset, however, this conflict does not yet exist, or art is not conscious of it. The point of departure is a unity yet undivided, in whose depths the discord between the two principles ferments. Thus the creations of art, but little distinct from the objects of nature, are as yet scarcely symbols.

The end of this epoch is the disappearance of the symbol. It takes place by the reflective separation of the two terms. The idea being clearly conceived, the symbol on its side being perceived as distinct from the idea, from their conjunction arises the *reflex* symbol, or the

comparison, the allegory, etc.—These principles having been laid down *à priori*, Hegel seeks among the people of the East the forms of art which correspond to these various degrees of oriental symbolism. He finds them chiefly among the ancient Persians, in India, and in Egypt.

1. *Persian Art.*—At the first moment of the history of art, the divine principle, God, appears identified with nature and man. In the worship of the Lama, for example, a real man is adored as God. In other religions, the sun, the mountains, the rivers, the moon, and animals, are also the objects of religious worship.

The spectacle of this unity of God and nature is presented to us in the most striking manner in the life and religion of the ancient Persians, in the Zend-Avesta.

In the religion of Zoroaster, light is God himself. God is not distinguished from light viewed as a simple expression, an emblem or sensuous image of the Divinity. If light is taken in the sense of the good and just Being, of the conserving principle of the Universe which diffuses everywhere life and its blessings, it is not merely an image of the good principle; the sovereign good itself is light. It is the same with the opposition of light and darkness, the latter being considered as the impure element in everything—the hideous, the bad, the principle of death and destruction.

Hegel seeks to demonstrate this opinion by an analysis of the principal ideas which form the content of the Zend-Avesta. According to him, the worship which the Zend-Avesta describes is still less symbolic. All the ceremonies which it imposes as a religious duty upon the Parsees are those serious occupations that seek to extend to all purity in the physical and moral sense. One does not find here any of those symbolic dances which imitate the course of the stars, or any of those religious acts which have no value except as images and signs of general conceptions. There is, then, in it no art properly so called. Compared with ruder images, or with the insignifi-

cant idols of other peoples, the worship of light, as pure and universal substance, presents something beautiful, elevated, grand, more conformable to the nature of the supreme good and of truth. But this conception remains vague; the imagination creates neither a profound idea nor a new form. If we see appearing general types, and the forms which correspond to them, it is the result of an artificial combination, not a work of poetry and art.

Thus this unity of the invisible principle and visible objects constitutes only the first form of the symbol in art. To attain to the symbolic form properly so called, it is necessary that the distinction and the separation of the two terms appear clearly indicated and represented to us. It is this which takes place in the religion, art, and poetry of India, which Hegel calls the symbolic of the *imagination*.

2. *Indian Art.*—The character of the monuments which betray a more advanced form, and a superior degree of art, is then the separation of the two terms. Intelligence forms abstract conceptions, and seeks forms which express them. Imagination, properly so called, is born; art truly begins. It is not, however, yet the true symbol.

What we encounter at first are the productions of an imagination which is in a state of complete ferment and agitation. In the first attempt of the human spirit to separate the elements and to reunite them, its thought is still confused and vague. The principle of things is not conceived in its spiritual nature; the ideas concerning God are empty abstractions; at the same time, the forms which represent Him bear a character exclusively sensuous and material. Still plunged in the contemplation of the sensuous world, having neither measure nor fixed rule to determine reality, man exhausts himself in useless efforts to penetrate the general meaning of the universe, and can employ, to express the profoundest thoughts, only rude images and representations, in which there flashes out the

opposition between the idea and the form. The imagination passes thus from one extreme to the other, lifting itself very high to plunge yet lower, wandering without support, without guide, and without aim, in a world of representations at once imposing, fantastic, and grotesque.

Hegel characterizes the Indian mythology and the art which corresponds to it, thus: "In the midst of these abrupt and inconsiderate leaps, of this passage from one excess to another, if we find anything of grandeur and an imposing character in these conceptions, we see afterwards the universal being precipitated into the most ignoble forms of the sensuous world. The imagination can escape from this contradiction only by extending indefinitely the dimensions of the form. It wanders amid gigantic creations, characterized by the absence of all measure, and loses itself in the vague or the arbitrary."

Hegel develops and confirms these propositions by following the Indian imagination in the principal points which distinguish its art, its poetry, and its mythology. He makes it apparent that, in spite of the fertility, the splendor, and the grandeur of these conceptions, the Indians have never had a clear idea of persons and events—a faculty for history; that in this continual mingling of the finite and the infinite there appears the complete absence of practical intelligence and reason. Thought is suffered to run after the most extravagant and monstrous chimeras that the imagination can bring forth. Thus the conception of Brahma is the abstract idea of being with neither life nor reality, deprived of real form and personality. From this idealism pushed to the extreme, the intelligence precipitates itself into the most unbridled naturalism. It deifies objects of nature, the animals. The divinity appears under the form of an idiot man, deified because he belongs to a caste. Each individual, because he is born in that caste, represents Brahma in person. The union of man with God is lowered to the level of a simply material fact. Thence also the *rôle*

which the law of the generation of beings plays in this religion, which gives rise to the most obscene representations. Hegel, at the same time, sets forth the contradictions which swarm in this religion, and the confusion which reigns in all this mythology. He establishes a parallel between the Indian trinity and the Christian Trinity and shows their difference. The three persons of this trinity are not persons; each of them is an abstraction in relation to the others; whence it follows that if this trinity has any analogy with the Christian Trinity, it is inferior to it, and we ought to be guarded against recognizing the Christian tenet in it.

Examining next the part which corresponds to Greek polytheism, he demonstrates likewise its inferiority; he makes apparent the confusion of those innumerable theogonies and cosmogonies which contradict and destroy themselves; and where, in fine, the idea of natural and not of spiritual generation is uppermost, where obscenity is frequently pushed to the last degree. In the Greek fables, in the theogony of Hesiod in particular, one frequently obtains at least a glimpse of a moral meaning. All is more clear and more explicit, more strongly coherent, and we do not remain shut up in the circle of the divinities of nature.

Nevertheless, in refusing to Indian art the idea of the truly beautiful, and indeed of the truly sublime, Hegel recognizes that it offers to us, principally in its poetry, "scenes of human life full of attractiveness and sweetness, many agreeable images and tender sentiments, most brilliant descriptions of nature, charming features of childlike simplicity and artless innocence in love; at the same time, occasionally, much grandeur and nobleness."

But as to that which concerns fundamental conceptions in their totality, the spiritual cannot disengage itself from the sensuous. We encounter the most insipid triviality in connection with the most elevated situations—a complete absence of precision and proportion. The sublime is only the measureless; and as to

whatever lies at the foundation of the myth, the imagination, dizzy, and incapable of mastering the flight of the thought, loses itself in the fantastic, or brings forth only enigmas which have no significance for reason.

3. *Egyptian Art*.—Thus the creations of the Indian imagination appear to realize only imperfectly the idea of the symbolic form itself. It is in Egypt, among the monuments of Egyptian art, that we find the type of the true symbol. It is thus characterized:

In the first stage of art, we started from the confusion and identity of content and form, of spirit and nature. Next form and content are separated and opposed. Imagination has sought vainly to combine them, and is successful only in making clear their disproportion. In order that thought may be free, it is necessary that it get rid of its material form—that it destroy it. The *moment* of destruction, of negation, or annihilation, is then necessary in order that spirit arrive at consciousness of itself and its spirituality. This idea of death as a *moment* of the divine nature is already contained in the Indian religion; but it is only a changing, a transformation, and an abstraction. The gods are annihilated and pass the one into the other, and all in their turn into a single being—Brahma, the universal being. In the Persian religion, the two principles, negative and positive—Ormuzd and Ahriman—exist separately and remain separated. Now this principle of negation, of death and resurrection, as moments and attributes of the divine nature, constitutes the foundation of a new religion; this thought is expressed in it by the forms of its worship, and appears in all its conceptions and monuments. It is the fundamental characteristic of the art and religion of Egypt. Thus we see the glorification of death and of suffering, as the annihilation of sensuous nature, appear in the consciousness of peoples in the worships of Asia Minor, of Phrygia and Phœnicia.

But if death is a necessary “moment” in the life of the absolute, it does not rest

in that annihilation; this is, in order to pass to a superior existence, to arrive, after the destruction of visible existence, by resurrection, at divine immortality. Death is only the birth of a more elevated principle and the triumph of spirit.

Henceforth, physical form, in art, loses its independent value and its separate existence; still further, the conflict of form and idea ought to cease. Form is subordinated to idea. That fermentation of the imagination which produces the fantastic, quiets itself and is calm. The previous conceptions are replaced by a mode of representation, enigmatic, it is true, but superior, and which offers to us the true character of the symbol.

The idea begins to assert itself. On its side, the symbol takes a form more precise; the spiritual principle is revealed more clearly, and frees itself from physical nature, although it cannot yet appear in all its clearness.

The following mode of representation corresponds to this idea of symbolic art: in the first place, the forms of nature and human actions express something other than themselves; they reveal the divine principle by qualities which are in real analogy with it. The phenomena and the laws of nature which, in the different kingdoms, represent life, birth, growth, death and the resurrection of beings, are preferred. Such are the germination and the growth of plants, the phases of the course of the sun, the succession of the seasons, the phenomena of the increase and decrease of the Nile, etc. Here, because of the real resemblance and of natural analogies, the fantastic is abandoned. One observes a more intelligent choice of symbolic forms. There is an imagination which already knows how to regulate itself and to control itself—which shows more of calmness and reason.

Here, then, appears a higher conciliation of idea and form, and at the same time an extraordinary tendency towards art, an irresistible inclination which is satisfied in a manner wholly symbolic, but superior to the previous modes. It

is the proper tendency towards art, and principally towards the figurative arts. Hence the necessity of finding and fashioning a form, an emblem which may express the idea and may be subordinated to it; of creating a work which may reveal to spirit a general conception; of presenting a spectacle which may show that these forms have been chosen for the purpose of expressing profound ideas.

This emblematic or symbolic combination can be effected in various ways. The most abstract expression is number. The symbolism of numbers plays a very important part in Egyptian art. The sacred numbers recur unceasingly in flights of steps, columns, etc. There are, moreover, symbolic figures traced in space, the windings of the labyrinth, the sacred dances which represent the movements of the heavenly bodies. In a higher grade is placed the human form, already moulded to a higher perfection than in India. A general symbol sums up the principal idea; it is the phoenix, which consumes itself and rises from its ashes.

In the myths which serve for the transition, as those of Asia Minor—in the myth of Adonis mourned by Venus; in that of Castor and Pollux, and in the fable of Proserpine, this idea of death and resurrection is very apparent.

It is Egypt, above all, which has symbolized this idea. Egypt is the land of the symbol. However, the problems are not resolved. The enigmas of Egyptian art were enigmas to the Egyptians themselves.—However this may be in the East, the Egyptians, among eastern nations, are the truly artistic people. They show an indefatigable activity in satisfying that longing for symbolic representation which torments them. But their monuments remain mysterious and mute. The spirit has not yet found the form which is appropriate to it; it does not yet know how to speak the clear and intelligible language of spirit. "They were, above all, an architectural people; they excavated the soil, scooped out lakes, and, with their instinct of art, elevated gigantic structures into the light of

day, and executed under the soil works equally immense. It was the occupation, the life of this people, which covered the land with monuments, nowhere else in so great quantity and under forms so varied."

If we wish to characterize in a more precise manner the monuments of Egyptian art, and to penetrate the sense of them, we discover the following aspects:

In the first place, the principal idea, the idea of death, is conceived as a "moment" of the life of spirit, not as a principle of evil; this is the opposite of the Persian dualism. Nor is there an absorption of beings into the universal Being, as in the Indian religion. The invisible preserves its existence and its personality; it preserves even its physical form. Hence the embalmings, the worship of the dead. Moreover, the imagination is lifted higher than this visible duration. Among the Egyptians, for the first time, appears the clear distinction of soul and body, and the dogma of immortality. This idea, nevertheless, is still imperfect, for they accord an equal importance to the duration of the body and that of the soul.

Such is the conception which serves as a foundation for Egyptian art, and which betrays itself under a multitude of symbolic forms. It is in this idea that we must seek the meaning of the works of Egyptian architecture. Two worlds—the world of the living and that of the dead; two architectures—the one on the surface of the ground, the other subterranean. The labyrinths, the tombs, and, above all, the pyramids, represent this idea.

The pyramid, image of symbolic art, is a species of envelope, cut in crystalline form, which conceals a mystic object, an invisible being. Hence, also, the exterior, superstitious side of worship, an excess difficult to escape, the adoration of the divine principle in animals, a gross worship which is no longer even symbolic.

Hieroglyphic writing, another form of Egyptian art, is itself in great part symbolic, since it makes ideas known by images borrowed from nature, and which have some analogy with those ideas.

But a defect betrays itself, especially in the representations of the human form. In fact, though a mysterious and spiritual force is there revealed, it is not true personality. The internal principle fails; action and impulse come from without. Such are the statues of Memnon, which are animate, have a voice, and give forth a sound, only when struck by the rays of the sun. It is not the human voice which comes from within—an echo of the soul. This free principle, which animates the human form, remains here concealed, wrapped up, mute, without proper spontaneity, and is only animated under the influence of nature.

A superior form is that of the myth of Osiris, the Egyptian god *par excellence*—that god who is engendered, born, dies, and is resuscitated. In this myth, which offers various significations, physical, historical, moral, and religious or metaphysical, is shown the superiority of these conceptions over those of Indian art.

In general, in Egyptian art, there is revealed a profounder, more spiritual, and more moral character. The human form is no longer a simple, abstract personification. Religion and art attempt to spiritualize themselves; they do not attain their object, but they catch sight of it and aspire to it. From this imperfection arises the absence of freedom in the human form. The human figure still remains without expression, colossal, serious, rigid. Thus is explained those attitudes of the Egyptian statues, the arms stiff, pressed against the body, without grace, without movement, and without life, but absorbed in profound thought, and full of seriousness.

Hence also the complication of the elements and symbols, which are intermingled and reflected the one in the other; a thing which indicates the freedom of spirit, but also an absence of clearness and definiteness. Hence the obscure, enigmatic character of those symbols, which always cause scholars to despair—enigmas to the Egyptians themselves. These emblems involve a multitude of

profound meanings. They remain there as a testimony of fruitless efforts of spirit to comprehend itself, a symbolism full of mysteries, a vast enigma represented by a symbol which sums up all these enigmas—the sphinx. This enigma Egypt will propose to Greece, who herself will make of it the problems of religion and philosophy. The sense of this enigma, never solved, and yet always solving, is—“Man, *know thyself*.” Such is the maxim which Greece inscribed on the front of her temples, the problem which she presented to her sages as the very end of wisdom.

4. *Hebrew Poetry*.—In this review of the different forms of art and of worship among the different nations of the East, mention should be made of a religion which is characterized precisely by the rejection of all symbol, and in this respect is little favorable to art, but whose poetry bears the impress of grandeur and sublimity. And thus Hegel designates Hebrew Poetry by the title of *Art of the Sublime*. At the same time he casts a glance upon Mahometan pantheism, which also proscribes images, and banishes from its temples every figurative representation of the Divinity.

The sublime, as Kant has well described it, is the attempt to express the infinite in the finite, without finding any sensuous form which is capable of representing it. It is the infinite, manifested under a form which, making clear this opposition, reveals the immeasurable grandeur of the infinite as surpassing all representation in finite forms.

Now, here, two points of view are to be distinguished. Either the infinite is the Absolute Being conceived by thought as the immanent substance of things, or it is the Infinite Being as distinct from the beings of the real world, but elevating itself above them by the entire distance which separates it from the finite, so that, compared with it, they are only pure nothing. God is thus purified from all contact, from all participation with sensuous existence, which disappears and is annihilated in His presence.

To the first point of view corresponds oriental pantheism. God is there conceived as the absolute Being, immanent in objects the most diverse, in the sun, the sea, the rivers, the trees, etc.

A conception like this cannot be expressed by the figurative arts, but only by poetry. Where pantheism is pure, it admits no sensuous representation, and proscribes images. We find this pantheism in India. All the superior gods of the Indian mythology are absorbed in the Absolute unity, or in Brahm. Oriental pantheism is developed in a more formal and brilliant manner in Mahometanism, and in particular among the Persian Mahometans.

But the truly sublime is that which is represented by Hebrew poetry. Here, for the first time, God appears truly as Spirit, as the invisible Being in opposition to nature. On the other side, the entire universe, in spite of the richness and magnificence of its phenomena, compared with the Being supremely great, is nothing by itself. Simple creation of God, subject to his power, it only exists to manifest and glorify him.

Such is the idea which forms the ground of that poetry, the characteristic of which is sublimity. In the beautiful, the idea pierces through the external reality of which it is the soul, and forms with it a harmonious unity. In the sublime, the visible reality, where the Infinite is manifested, is abased in its presence. This superiority, this exaltation of the Infinite over the finite, the infinite distance which separates them, is what the art of the sublime should express. It is religious art—preëminently, sacred art; its unique design is to celebrate the glory of God. This rôle, poetry alone can fill.

The prevailing idea of Hebrew poetry is God as master of the world, God in his independent existence and pure essence, inaccessible to sense and to all sensuous representation which does not correspond to his grandeur. God is the Creator of the universe. All gross ideas concerning the generation of beings give place to that of a spiritual creation:—

“Let there be light; and there was light.” That sentence indicates a creation by word—expression of thought and of will.

Creation then takes a new aspect, nature and man are no longer deified. To the Infinite is clearly opposed the finite, which is no longer confounded with the divine principle as in the symbolic conceptions of other peoples. Situations and events are delineated more clearly. The characters assume a more fixed and precise meaning. They are human figures which offer no more anything fantastic and strange; they are perfectly intelligible and accessible to us.

On the other side, in spite of his powerlessness and his nothingness, man obtains here freer and more independent place than in other religions. The immutable character of the divine will gives birth to the idea of law to which man must be subject. His conduct becomes enlightened, fixed, regular. The perfect distinction of human and divine, of finite and infinite, brings in that of good and evil, and permits an enlightened choice. Merit and demerit is the consequence of it. To live according to justice in the fulfilment of law is the end of human existence, and it places man in direct communication with God. Here is the principle and explanation of his whole life, of his happiness and his misery. The events of life are considered as blessings, as recompenses, or as trials and chastisements.

Here also appears the miracle. Elsewhere, all was prodigious, and, by consequence, nothing was miraculous. The miracle supposes a regular succession, a constant order, and an interruption of that order. But the whole entire creation is a perpetual miracle, designed for the glorification and praise of God.

Such are the ideas which are expressed with so much splendor, elevation and poetry in the Psalms—classic examples of the truly sublime—in the Prophets, and the sacred books in general. This recognition of the nothingness of things, of the greatness and omnipotence of God, of the unworthiness of man in his presence, the complaints, the lamentations, the outcry

of the soul towards God, constitute their pathos and their sublimity.

OF THE REFLEX SYMBOL.

Fable, Apologue, Allegory, etc.—We have run over the different forms which symbolism presents among the different peoples of the East, and we have seen it disappear in the sublime, which places the infinite so far above the finite that it can no longer be represented by sensuous forms, but only celebrated in its grandeur and its power.

Before passing to another epoch of art, Hegel points out, as a transition from the oriental symbol to the Greek ideal, a mixed form whose basis is *comparison*. This form, which also belongs principally to the East, is manifested in different kinds of poetry, such as *the fable, the apologue, the proverb, allegory, and comparison*, properly so called.

The author develops in the following manner the nature of this form, and the place which he assigns to it in the development of art:

In the symbol, properly so called, the idea and the form, although distinct and even opposed, as in the sublime, are reunited by an essential and necessary tie; the two elements are not strangers to one another, and the spirit seizes the relation immediately. Now the separation of the two terms, which has already its beginning in the symbol, ought also to be clearly effected, and find its place in the development of art. And as spirit works no longer spontaneously but with reflection, it is also in a reflective manner that it brings the two terms together. This form of art, whose basis is comparison, may be called the *reflexive symbolic* in opposition to the *irreflexive symbolic*, whose principal forms we have studied.

Thus, in this form of art, the connection of the two elements is no more, as heretofore, a connection founded upon the nature of the idea; it is more or less the result of an artificial combination which depends upon the will of the poet, or his vigor of imagination, and on his genius, for invention. Sometimes it starts from a sensuous phenomenon to

which he lends a spiritual meaning, an idea, by making use of some analogy. Sometimes it is an idea which he seeks to clothe with a sensuous form, or with an image, by a certain resemblance.

This mode of conception is clear but superficial. In the East it plays a distinct part, or appears to prevail as one of the characteristic traits of oriental thought. Later, in the grand composition of classic or romantic poetry, it is subordinated; it furnishes ornaments and accessories, allegories, images, and metaphors; it constitutes secondary varieties.

Hegel then divides this form of art, and classes the varieties to which it gives rise. He distinguishes, for this purpose, two points of view: first, the case when the sensuous fact is presented first to spirit, and spirit afterwards gives it a signification, as in the *fable, the parable, the apologue, the proverb, the metamorphoses*; second, the case where, on the other hand, it is the idea which appears first to the spirit, and the poet afterwards seeks to adapt to it an image, a sensuous form, by way of comparison. Such are the *enigma, the allegory, the metaphor, the image, and the comparison*.

We shall not follow the author in the developments which he thinks necessary to give to the analysis of each of these inferior forms of poetry or art.*

II. OF CLASSIC ART.

The aim of art is to represent the ideal, that is to say, the perfect accord of the

* One cannot but be astonished not to see, in this review of the principal forms of Oriental art, Chinese art at least mentioned. The reason is, that, according to Hegel, art—the fine arts, properly speaking—have no existence among the Chinese. The spirit of that people seems to him anti-artistic and prosaic. He thus characterizes Chinese art in his Philosophy of History: "This race, in general, has a rare talent for imitation, which is exercised not only in the things of daily life, but also in art. It has not yet arrived at the representation of the beautiful as beautiful. In painting, it lacks perspective and shading. European images, like everything else, it copies well. A Chinese painter knows exactly how many scales there are on the back of a carp, how many notches a leaf has; he knows perfectly the form of trees and the curvature of their branches; but the sublime, the ideal, and the beautiful, do not belong at all to the domain of his art and his ability."—*Philosophie der Geschichte*.

two elements of the beautiful, the idea and the sensuous form. Now this object symbolic art endeavors vainly to attain. Sometimes it is nature with its blind force which forms the ground of its representations; sometimes it is the spiritual Being, which it conceives in a vague manner, and which it personifies in inferior divinities. Between the idea and the form there is revealed a simple affinity, an external correspondence. The attempt to reconcile them makes clearer the opposition; or art, in wishing to express spirit, only creates obscure enigmas. Everywhere there is betrayed the absence of true personality and of freedom. For these are able to unfold, only with the clear consciousness of itself that spirit achieves. We have met, it is true, this idea of the nature of spirit as opposed to the sensuous world, clearly expressed in the religion and poetry of the Hebrew people. But what is born of this opposition is not the Beautiful; it is the Sublime. A living sentiment of personality is further manifest in the East, in the Arabic race. In the scorching deserts, in the midst of free space, it has ever been distinguished by this trait of independence and individuality, which betrays itself by hatred of the stranger, thirst for vengeance, a deliberate cruelty; also by love, by greatness of soul and devotion, and above all, by passion for adventure. This race is also distinguished by a mind free and clear, ingenious and full of subtlety, lively, brilliant—of which it has given so many proofs in the arts and sciences. But we have here only a superficial side, devoid of profundity and universality; it is not true personality supported on a solid basis, on a knowledge of the spirit and of the moral nature.

All these elements, separate or united, cannot, then, present the Ideal. They are antecedents, conditions, and materials, and, together, offer nothing which corresponds to the idea of real beauty. This ideal beauty we shall find realized, for the first time, among the Greek race and in Classic art, which we now propose to characterize.

In order that the two elements of beauty may be perfectly harmonized, it is necessary that the first, the idea, be the spirit itself, possessed of the consciousness of its nature and of its free personality. If one is then asked, what is the form which corresponds to this idea, which expresses the personal, individual spirit? the only answer is, *the human form*; for it alone is capable of manifesting spirit.

Classic art, which represents free spirituality under an individual form, is then necessarily anthropomorphic. Anthropomorphism is its very essence, and we shall do it wrong to make of this a reproach. Christian art and the Christian religion are themselves anthropomorphic, and this they are in a still higher degree since God made himself really man, since Christ is not a mere divine personification conceived by the imagination, since he is both truly God and truly man. He passed through all the phases of earthly existence; he was born, he suffered, and he died. In classic art sensuous nature does not die, but it has no resurrection. Thus this religion does not fully satisfy the human soul. The Greek ideal has for basis an unchangeable harmony between the spirit and the sensuous form, the unalterable serenity of the immortal gods; but this calm is somewhat frigid and inanimate. Classic art did not take in the true essence of the divine nature, nor penetrate the depths of the soul. It could not unveil the innermost powers in their opposition, or re-establish their harmony. All this phase of existence, wickedness, misfortune, moral suffering, the revolt of the will, gnawings and rendings of the soul, were unknown to it. It did not pass beyond the proper domain of sensuous beauty, but it represented it perfectly.

This ideal of classic beauty was realized by the Greeks. The most favorable conditions for unfolding it were found combined among them. The geographical position, the genius of that people, its moral character, its political life, all

could not but aid the accomplishment of that idea of classic beauty whose characteristics are proportion, measure, and harmony. Placed between Asia and Europe, Greece realized the accord of personal liberty and public manners, of the state and the individual, of spirit general and particular. Its genius, a mixture of spontaneity and reflection, presented an equal fusion of contraries. The feeling of this auspicious harmony pierces through all the productions of the Greek mind. It was the moment of youth in the life of humanity—a fleeting age, a moment unique and irrevocable, like that of beauty in the individual.

Art attains, then, the culminating point of sensuous beauty under the form of plastic individuality. The worship of the Beautiful is the entire life of the Greek race. Thus religion and art are identified. All forms of Greek civilization are subordinate to art.

It is important here to determine the new position of the artist in the production of works of art.

Art appears here not as a production of nature, but as a creation of the individual spirit. It is the work of a free spirit which is conscious of itself, which is self-possessed, which has nothing vague or obscure in its thought, and finds itself hindered by no technical difficulty.

This new position of the Greek artist manifests itself in content, form, and technical skill.

With regard to the content, or the ideas which it ought to represent, in opposition to symbolic art, where the spirit gropes and seeks without power to arrive at a clear notion, the artist finds the idea already made in the dogma, the popular faith, and a complete, precise idea, of which he renders to himself an account. Nevertheless, he does not enslave himself with it; he accepts it, but reproduces it freely. The Greek artists received their subjects from the popular religion; which was an idea originally transmitted from the East, but already transformed in the consciousness of the people. They,

in their turn, transformed it into the sense of the beautiful; they both reproduced and created it.

But it is above all upon the form that this free activity concentrates and exercises itself. While symbolic art wearies itself in seeking a thousand extraordinary forms to represent its ideas, having neither measure nor fixed rule, the Greek artist confines himself to his subject, the limits of which he respects. Then between the content and the form he establishes a perfect harmony, for, in elaborating the form, he also perfects the content. He frees them both from useless accessories, in order to adapt the one to the other. Henceforth he is not checked by an immovable and traditional type; he perfects the whole, for content and form are inseparable; he develops both in the serenity of inspiration.

As to the technical element, ability combined with inspiration belongs to the classic artist in the highest degree. Nothing restrains or embarrasses him. Here are no hindrances as in a stationary religion, where the forms are consecrated by usage—in Egypt, for example. And this ability is always increasing. Progress in the processes of art is necessary to the realization of pure beauty and the perfect execution of works of genius.

After these general considerations upon classic art, Hegel studies it more in detail. He considers it, 1st, in its development; 2d, in itself, as realization of the ideal; 3d, in the causes which have produced its downfall.

1. In what concerns the development of Greek art, the author dwells long upon the history and progress of mythology. This is because religion and art are confused. The central point of Greek art is Olympus and its beautiful divinities.

The following are what are, according to Hegel, the principal stages of the development of art, and of the Greek mythology.

The first stage of progress consists in a reaction against the symbolic form, which it is interested in destroying. The Greek gods came from the East; the Greeks

borrowed their divinities from foreign religions. On the other hand, we can say they invented them; for invention does not exclude borrowing. They transformed the ideas contained in the anterior traditions. Now, upon what had this transformation any bearing? In it is the history of polytheism and antique art, which follows a parallel course, and is inseparable from it.

The Grecian divinities are, first of all, moral personages invested with the human form. The first development consists, then, in rejecting those gross symbols which, in the oriental naturalism, form the object of worship, and which disfigure the representations of art. This progress is marked by the degradation of the animal kingdom. It is clearly indicated in a great number of ceremonies and fables of polytheism, by sacrifices of animals, sacred hunts, and many of the exploits attributed to heroes, in particular the labors of Hercules. Some of the fables of Æsop have the same meaning.

The metamorphoses of Ovid are also disfigured myths, or fables become burlesque, of which the content, easy to be recognized, contains the same idea.

This is the opposite of the manner in which the Egyptians considered animals. Nature, here, in place of being venerated and adored, is lowered and degraded. To wear an animal form is no longer deification; it is the punishment of a monstrous crime. The gods themselves are shamed by such a form, and they assume it only to satisfy the passions of the sensual nature. Such is the signification of many of the fables of Jupiter, as those of Danaë, of Europa, of Leda, of Ganymede. The representation of the generative principle in nature, which constitutes the content of the ancient mythologies, is here changed into a series of histories where the father of gods and men plays a rôle but little edifying, and frequently ridiculous. Finally, all that part of religion which relates to sensual desires is crowded into the background, and represented by subordinate divinities: Circe,

who changes men into swine; Pan, Silenus, the Satyrs, and the Fauns. The human form predominates, the animal being barely indicated by ears, by little horns, etc.

Another advance is to be noted in the *oracles*. The phenomena of nature, in place of being an object of admiration and worship, are only signs by which the gods make known their will to mortals. These prophetic signs become more and more simple, till at last it is, above all, the voice of man which is the organ of the oracle. The oracle is ambiguous, so that the man who receives it is obliged to interpret it, to blend his reason with it. In dramatic art, for example, man does not act solely by himself; he consults the gods, he obeys their will; but his will is confounded with theirs—a place is reserved for his liberty.

The distinction between the *old* and the *new* divinities marks still more this progress of moral liberty. Among the former, who personify the powers of nature, a gradation is already established. In the first place, the untamed and lower powers, Chaos, Tartarus, Erebus; then Uranus, Gea, the Giants, and the Titans; in a higher rank, Prometheus, at first the friend of the new gods, the benefactor of men, then punished by Jupiter for that apparent beneficence; an inconsequence which is explained through this, that if Prometheus taught industry to men, he created an occasion of discords and dissensions, by not giving them instruction more elevated—morality, the science of government, the guarantees of property. Such is the profound sense of that myth, and Plato thus explains it in his dialogues.

Another class of divinities equally ancient, but already ethical, although they recall the fatality of the physical laws, are the Eumenides, Dice, and the Furies. We see appearing here the ideas of right and justice, but of exclusive, absolute, strict, unconscious right, under the form of an implacable vengeance, or, like the ancient Nemesis, of a power which abases all that is high, and re-establishes

equality by levelling; a thing which is the opposite of true justice.

Finally, this development of the classic ideal reveals itself more clearly in the *theogony* and *genealogy* of the gods, in their origin and their succession, by the abasement of the divinities of the previous races; in the hostility which flashes out between them, in the resolution which has carried away the sovereignty from the old to place it in the hands of the new divinities. Meanwhile the distinction develops itself to the point of engendering strife, and the conflict becomes the principal event of mythology.

This conflict is that of nature and spirit, and it is the law of the world. Under the historic form, it is the perfecting of human nature, the successive conquest of rights and property, the amelioration of laws and of the political constitution. In the religious representations, it is the triumph of the moral divinities over the powers of nature.

This combat is announced as the grandest catastrophe in the history of the world: moreover, this is not the subject of a particular myth; it is the principal, decisive fact which constitutes the centre of this mythology.

The conclusion of all this in respect to the history of art and to the development of the ideal, is that art ought to act like mythology, and reject as unworthy all that is purely physical or animal, that which is confused, fantastic, or obscure, all gross mingling of the material and the spiritual. All these creations of an ill-regulated imagination find here no more place; they must flee before the light of the Soul. Art purifies itself of all caprice, fancy, or symbolic accessory, of every vague and confused idea.

In like manner, the new gods form an organized and established world. This unity affirms and perfects itself more in the later developments of plastic art and poetry.

Nevertheless, the old elements, driven back by the accession of moral forces, preserve a place at their side, or are combined with them. Such is, for ex-

ample, the significance and the aim of the mysteries.

In the new divinities, who are ethical persons, there remains also an echo, a reflex of the powers of nature. They present, consequently, a combination of the physical and the ethical element, but the first is subordinate to the second. Thus, Neptune is the sea, but he is besides invoked as the god of navigation and the founder of cities; Apollo is the Sun, the god of light, but he is also the god of spiritual light, of science, and of the oracles. In Jupiter, Diana, Hercules, and Venus, it is easy to discover the physical side combined with the moral sense.

Thus, in the new divinities, the elements of nature, after having been debased and degraded, reappear and are preserved. This is also true of the forms of the animal kingdom; but the symbolic sense is more and more lost. They figure no longer as accessories combined with the human form, but are reduced to mere emblems or attributes indicating signs—as the eagle by the side of Jupiter, the peacock before Juno, the dove near Venus—where the principal myth is no more than an accidental fact, of little importance in the life of the god, and which, abandoned to the imagination of the poets, becomes the text of licentious histories.

2. After having considered the development of the ideal in Greek art, a development parallel to that of religion and mythology, we have to consider it in its principal characteristics, such as it has emanated from the creative activity or from the imagination of the poet and the artist.

This mythology has its origin in the previous religions, but its gods are the creation of Homer and Hesiod. Tradition furnished the materials; but the idea which each god ought to represent, and, besides, the form which expresses it in its purity and simplicity, this is what was not given. This ideal type the poets drew from their genius, discovering also the true form which befitted it. Thereby they were creators of that mythology

which we admire in Greek art, and which is confounded with it.

The Greek gods have no less their origin in the spirit and the credences of the Greek people, and in the national belief; the poets were the interpreters of the general thought, of what there was most elevated in the imagination of the people. Henceforth, the artist, as we have seen above, takes a position wholly different from that which he held in the East. His inspiration is personal. His work is that of a free imagination, creating according to its own conceptions. The inspiration does not come from without; what they reveal is the ideas of the human spirit, what there is deepest in the heart of man. Also, the artists are truly poets; they fashion, according to their liking, the content and the form, in order to draw from them free and original figures. Tradition is shorn, in their hands, of all that is gross, symbolic, repulsive, and deformed; they eliminate the idea which they wish to illustrate, and individualize it under the human form. Such is the manner, free though not arbitrary, in which the Greek artists proceed in the creation of their works.

They are poets, but also prophets and diviners. They represent human actions in divine actions, and, reciprocally, without having the clear and decided distinctions. They maintain the union, the accord, of the human and the divine. Such is the significance of the greater part of the apparitions of the gods in Homer, when the gods, for example, consult the heroes, or interfere in the combats.

Meanwhile, if we wish to understand the *nature of this ideal*, to determine in a more precise manner the character of the divinities of Greek art, the following remarks are suggested, considering them at the same time on the *general*, the *particular*, and the *individual* sides.

The first attribute which distinguishes them is something general, substantial. The immortal gods are strangers to the miseries and to the agitations of human existence. They enjoy an unalterable calmness and serenity, from which they

derive their repose and their majesty. They are not, however, vague abstractions, universal and purely ideal existences. To this character of generality is joined individuality. Each divinity has his traits and proper physiognomy, his particular rôle, his sphere of activity, determined and limited. A just measure, moreover, is here observed: the two elements, the general and the individual, are in perfect accord.

At the same time, this moral character is manifested under an external and corporeal form itself, its most perfect expression, in which appears the harmonious fusion of the external form with the internal principle animating it.

This physical form, as well as the spiritual principle which is manifested in it, is freed from all the accidents of material life, and from the miseries of finite existence. It is the human body with its beautiful proportions and their harmony; all announces beauty, liberty, grace. It is thus that this form, in its purity, corresponds to the spiritual and divine principle which is incarnate in it. Hence the nobleness, the grandeur, and the elevation of those figures, which have nothing in common with the wants of material life, and seem elevated above their bodily existence. They are immortal divinities with human features. The body, in spite of its beauty, appears as a superfluous appendage; and, nevertheless, it is an animated and living form which presents the indestructible harmony of the two principles, the soul and the body.

But a contradiction presents itself between the spirit and the material form. This harmonious whole conceals a principle of destruction which will make itself felt more and more. We may perceive in these figures an air of sadness in the midst of greatness. Though absorbed in themselves, calm and serene, they lack freedom from care and inward satisfaction; something cold and impassive is found in their features, especially if we compare them with the vivacity of modern sentiment. This divine peace, this indifference to all that is mortal and tran-

sient, forms a contrast with the moral greatness and the corporeal form. These placid divinities complain both of their felicity and of their physical existence. We read upon their features the destiny which weighs them down.

Now, what is the particular art most appropriate to represent this ideal? Evidently it is *sculpture*. It alone is capable of showing us those ideal figures in their eternal repose, of expressing the perfect harmony of the spiritual principle and the sensuous form. To it has been confided the mission of realizing this ideal in its purity, its greatness, and its perfection.

Poetry—above all, dramatic poetry, which makes the gods act, and draws them into strife and combat, contrary to their greatness and their dignity—is much less capable of answering this purpose.

If we consider these divinities in their particular and no longer in their general character, we see that they form a plurality, a whole, a totality, which is *polytheism*. Each particular god, while having his proper and original character, is himself a complete whole; he also possesses the distinctive qualities of the other divinities. Hence the richness of these characters. It is for this reason that the Greek polytheism does not present a systematic whole. Olympus is composed of a multitude of distinct gods, who do not form an established hierarchy. Rank is not rigorously fixed, whence the liberty, the serenity, the independence of the personages. Without this apparent contradiction, the divinities would be embarrassed by one another, shackled in their development and power. In place of being true persons, they would be only allegorical beings, or personified abstractions.

As to their sensuous representation, sculpture is, moreover, the art best adapted to express this particular characteristic of the nature of the gods. By combining with immovable grandeur the individuality of features peculiar to each of them, it fixes in their statues the most

perfect expression of their character, and determines its definite form. Sculpture, here again, is more ideal than poetry. It offers a more determined and fixed form, while poetry mingles with it a crowd of actions, of histories and accidental particulars. Sculpture creates absolute and eternal models; it has fixed the type of true, classic beauty, which is the basis of all other productions of Greek genius, and is here the central point of art.

But in order to represent the gods in their true *individuality*, it does not suffice to distinguish them by certain particular attributes. Moreover, classic art does not confine itself to representing these personages as immovable and self-absorbed; it shows them also in movement and in action. The character of the gods then particularizes itself, and exhibits the special features of which the physiognomy of each god is composed. This is the accidental, positive, historic side which figures in mythology, and also in art, as an accessory but necessary element.

These materials are furnished by history or fable. They are the antecedents, the local particulars, which give to the gods their living individuality and originality. Some are borrowed from the symbolic religions, which preserve a vestige thereof in the new creation; the symbolic element is absorbed in the new myth. Others have a national origin, which, again, is connected with heroic times and foreign traditions. Others, finally, spring from local circumstances, relating to the propagation of the myths, to their formation, to the usages and ceremonies of worship, etc. All these materials, fashioned by art, give to the Greek gods the appearance, the interest, and the charm, of living humanity. But this traditional side, which in its origin had a symbolic sense, loses it little by little; it is designed only to complete the individuality of the gods—to give to them a more human and more sensuous form—to add, through details frequently unworthy of divine majesty, the side of the arbitrary and accidental. Sculpture, which

represents the pure ideal, ought, without wholly excluding it in fact, to allow it to appear as little as possible; it represents it as accessory in the head-dress, the arms, the ornaments, the external attributes. Another source for the more precise determination of the character of the gods is their intervention in the actions and circumstances of human life. Here the imagination of the poet expands itself as an inexhaustible source in a crowd of particular histories, of traits of character and actions, attributed to the gods. The problem of art consists in combining, in a natural and living manner, the actions of divine personages and human actions, in such a manner that the gods appear as the general cause of what man himself accomplishes. The gods, thus, are the internal principles which reside in the depths of the human soul; its own passions, in so far as they are elevated, and its personal thought; or it is the necessity of the situation, the force of circumstances, from whose fatal action man suffers. It is this which pierces through all the situations where Homer causes the gods to intervene, and through the manner in which they influence events.

But through this side, the gods of classic art abandon more and more the silent serenity of the ideal, to descend into the multiplicity of individual situations, of actions, and into the conflict of human passions. Classic art thus finds itself drawn to the last degree of individualization; it falls into the agreeable and the graceful. The divine is absorbed in the finite, which is addressed exclusively to the sensibility, and no longer satisfies thought. Imagination and art, seizing this side and exaggerating it more and more, corrupt religion itself. The severe ideal gives place to merely sensuous beauty and harmony; it removes itself more and more from the eternal ideas which form the ground of religion and art, and these are dragged down to ruin.

3. In fact, independently of the external causes which have occasioned the *decadence* of Greek art and precipitated its downfall, many internal causes, in the

very nature of the Greek ideal, rendered that downfall inevitable. In the first place, the Greek gods, as we have seen, bear in themselves the germ of their destruction, and the defect which they conceal is unveiled by the representations of classic art itself. The plurality of the gods and their diversity makes them already accidental existences; this multiplicity cannot satisfy reason. Thought dissolves them and makes them return to a single divinity. Moreover, the gods do not remain in their eternal repose; they enter into action, take part in the interests, in the passions, and mingle in the collisions of human life. The multitude of relations, in which they are engaged as actors in this drama, destroys their divine majesty—contradicts their grandeur, their dignity, their beauty. In the true ideal itself, that of sculpture, we observe something, the inanimate, impassive, cold, a serious air of silent mournfulness which indicates that something higher weighs them down—destiny, supreme unity, blind divinity, the immutable fate to which gods and men are alike subject.

But the principal cause is, that, absolute necessity making no integral part of their personality, and being foreign to them, the particular, individual side is no longer restrained in its downward course; it is developed more and more without hindrance and without limit. They suffer themselves to be drawn into the external accidents of human life, and fall into all the imperfections of anthropomorphism. Hence the ruin of these beautiful divinities of art is inevitable. The moral consciousness turns away from them and rejects them. The gods, it is true, are ethical persons, but under the human and corporeal form. Now, true morality appears only in the conscience, and under a purely spiritual form. The point of view of the beautiful is neither that of religion nor that of morality. The infinite, invisible spirituality is the divine for the religious consciousness. For the moral consciousness, the good is an idea, a conception, an obligation, which com-

mands the sacrifice of sense. It is in vain, then, to be enthusiastic over Greek art and beauty, to admire those beautiful divinities. The soul does not recognize herself wholly in the object of her contemplation or her worship. What she conceives as the true ideal is a God, spiritual, infinite, absolute, personal, endowed with moral qualities, with justice, goodness, etc. It is this whose image the gods of Greek polytheism, in spite of their beauty, do not present us.

As to the *transition* from the Greek mythology to a new religion and a new art, it could no longer be effected in the domain of the imagination. In the origin of Greek art, the transition appears under the form of a conflict between the old and the new gods, in the very domain of art and imagination. Here it is upon the more serious territory of history that this revolution is accomplished. The new idea appears, not as a revelation of art, nor under the form of myth and of fable, but in history itself, by the course of events, by the appearance of God himself upon earth, where he was born, lived, and arose from the dead. Here is a field of ideas which Art did not invent, and which it finds too high for it. The gods of classic art have existence only in the imagination; they were visible only in stone and wood; they were not both flesh and spirit. This real existence of God in flesh and spirit, Christianity, for the first time, showed in the life and actions of a God present among men. This transition cannot, then, be accomplished in the domain of art, because the God of revealed religion is the real and living God. Compared with Him, his adversaries are only imaginary beings, who cannot be taken seriously and meet Him on the field of history. The opposition and conflict cannot, then, present the character of a serious strife, and be represented as such by Art or Poetry. Therefore, always, whenever any one has attempted to make of this subject, among moderns, a poetic theme, he has done it in an impious and frivolous manner, as in "The War of the Gods," by Parny.

On the other hand, it would be useless to regret, as has been frequently done in prose and in verse, the loss of the Greek ideal and pagan mythology, as being more favorable to art and poetry than the Christian faith, to which is granted a higher moral verity, while it is regarded as inferior in respect to art and the Beautiful.

Christianity has a poetry and an art of its own; an ideal essentially different from the Greek ideal and art. Here all parallel is superficial. Polytheism is anthropomorphism. The gods of Greece are beautiful divinities under the human form. As soon as reason has comprehended God as Spirit and as Infinite Being, there appear other ideas, other sentiments, other demands, which ancient art is incapable of satisfying, to which it cannot attain, which call, consequently, for a new art, a new poetry. Thus, regrets are superfluous; comparison has no more any significance, it is only a text for declamation. What one could object to seriously in Christianity, its tendencies to mysticism, to asceticism—which, in fact, are hostile to art—are only exaggerations of its principle. But the thought which constitutes the ground of Christianity and true Christian sentiment, far from being opposed to art, is very favorable to it. Hence springs up a new art, inferior, it is true, in certain respects, to antique art—in sculpture, for example—but which is superior in other respects, as is its idea when compared with the pagan idea.

In all this, we are making but a resumé of the ideas of the author. We must do him the justice to say, that, wherever he speaks of Christian art, he does it worthily, and exhibits a spirit free from all sectarian prejudice.

If we cast, meanwhile, a glance at the external causes which have brought about this decadence, it is easy to discover them in the situations of ancient society, which prophesied the downfall of both art and religion. We discover the vices of that social order where the state was everything, the individual nothing by himself.

This is the radical vice of the Greek state. In such an identification of man and the state, the rights of the individual are ignored. The latter then seeks to open for himself a distinct and independent way, separates himself from the public interest, pursues his own ends, and finally labors for the ruin of the state. Hence the egoism which undermines this society little by little, and the ever-increasing excesses of demagogism.

On the other hand, there arises in the souls of the best a longing for a higher freedom in a state organized upon the basis of justice and right. In the meantime man falls back upon himself, and, deserting the written law, religious and civil, takes his conscience for the rule of his acts. Socrates marks the advent of this idea. In Rome, in the last years of the republic, there appears, among energetic spirits, this antagonism and this detachment from society. Noble characters present to us the spectacle of private virtues by the side of feebleness and corruption in public morals.

This protest of moral consciousness against the increasing corruption finds expression in art itself; it creates a form of poetry which corresponds to it, *satire*.

According to Hegel, *satire*, in fact, belongs peculiarly to the Romans; it is at least the distinctive and original characteristic, the salient feature, of their poetry and literature. "The spirit of the Roman world is the dominance of the dead letter, the destruction of beauty, the absence of serenity in manners, the ebbing of the domestic and natural affections;—in general, the sacrifice of individuality, which devotes itself to the state, the tranquil greatness in obedience to law. The principle of this political virtue, in its frigid and austere rudeness, subdued national individualities abroad, while at home the law was developed with the same rigor and the same exactitude of forms, even to the point of attaining perfection. But this principle was contrary to true art. So one finds at Rome no art which presents a character of beauty, of liberty, of grandeur. The Romans

received and learned from the Greeks sculpture, painting, music, and poetry—epic, lyric, and dramatic. What is regarded as indigenous among them is the comic farces, the *fescennines* and *atellanes*. The Romans can claim as belonging to them in particular only the forms of art which, in their principle, are prosaic, such as the didactic poem. But before all we must place satire."

III. OF ROMANTIC ART.

This, expression, employed here to designate modern art, in its opposition to Greek or classic art, bears nothing of the unfavorable sense which it has in our language and literature, where it has become the synonym of a liberty pushed even to license, and of a contempt for all law. Romantic art, which, in its highest development, is also Christian art, has laws and principles as necessary as classic art. But the idea which it expresses being different, its conditions are also; it obeys other rules, while observing those that are the basis of all art and the very essence of the beautiful.

Hegel, in a general manner, thus characterizes this form of art, contrasting it with antique art, the study of which we have just left.

In classic art, the spirit constitutes the content of the representation; but it is combined with the sensuous or material form in such a manner that it is harmonized perfectly with it, and does not surpass it. Art reached its perfection when it accomplished this happy accord, when the spirit idealized nature, and made of it a faithful image of itself. It is thus that classic art was the perfect representation of the ideal, the reign of beauty.

But there is something higher than the beautiful manifestation of spirit under the sensuous form. The spirit ought to abandon this accord with nature, to retire into itself, to find the true harmony in its own world, the spiritual world of the soul and the conscience. Now, that development of the spirit which, not being able to satisfy itself in the world of sense, seeks a higher harmony in itself, is the fundamental principle of romantic art.

Here beauty of form is no longer the supreme thing; beauty, in this sense, remains something inferior, subordinate; it gives place to the spiritual beauty which dwells in the recesses of the soul, in the depths of its infinite nature.

Now, in order thus to take possession of itself, it is essential that spirit have a consciousness of its relation to God, and of its union with Him; that not only the divine principle reveal itself under a form true and worthy of it, but that the human soul, on its part, lift itself toward God, that it feel itself filled with His essence, that the Divinity descend into the bosom of humanity. The anthropomorphism of Greek thought ought to disappear, in order to give place to anthropomorphism of a higher order.

Hence all the divinities of polytheism will be absorbed in a single Deity. God has no longer anything in common with those individual personages who had their attributes and their distinct rôles, and formed a whole, free, although subject to destiny.

At the same time, God does not remain shut up in the depths of his Being; he appears in the real world also; he opens his treasures and unfolds them in creation. He is, notwithstanding, revealed less in nature than in the moral world, or that of liberty. In fine, God is not an ideal, created by the imagination; he manifests himself under the features of living humanity.

If we compare, in this respect, romantic art with classic art, we see that Sculpture no longer suffices to express this idea. We should vainly seek in the image of the gods fashioned by sculpture that which announces the true personality, the clear consciousness of self and reflected will. In the external, this defect is betrayed by the absence of the eye, that mirror of the soul. Sculpture is deprived of the glance, the ray of the soul emanating from within. On the other hand, the spirit entering into relation with external objects, this immobility of sculpture no longer responds to the longing for activity, which calls for exercise

in a more extended career. The representation ought to embrace a vaster field of objects, and of physical and moral situations.

As to the manner in which this principle is developed and realized, romantic art presents certain striking differences from antique art.

In the first place, as has been said, instead of the ideal divinities, which exist only for the imagination, and are only human nature idealized, it is God himself who makes himself man, and passes through all the phases of human life, birth, suffering, death, and resurrection. Such is the fundamental idea which art represents, even in the circle of religion.

The result of this religious conception is to give also to art, as the principal ground of its representations, strife, conflict, sorrow and death, the profound grief which the nothingness of life, physical and moral suffering inspire. Is not all this, in fact, an essential part of the history of the God-man, who must be presented as a model to humanity? Is it not the means of being drawn near to God, of resembling him, and of being united to him? Man ought, then, to strip off his finite nature, to renounce that which is a mere nothing, and, through this negation of the real life, propose to himself the attainment of what God realized in his mortal life.

The infinite sorrow of this sacrifice, this idea of suffering and of death, which were almost banished from classic art, find, for the first time, their necessary place in Christian art. Among the Greeks, death has no seriousness, because man attaches no great importance to his personality and his spiritual nature. On the other hand, now that the soul has an infinite value, death becomes terrible. Terror in the presence of death and the annihilation of our being, is imprinted strongly on our souls. So also among the Greeks, especially before the time of Socrates, the idea of immortality was not profound; they scarcely conceived of life as separable from physical existence. In the Christian faith, on the contrary,

death is only the resurrection of the spirit, the harmony of the soul with itself, the true life. It is only by freeing itself from the bonds of its earthly existence that it can enter upon the possession of its true nature.

Such are the principal ideas which form the religious ground of romantic or Christian Art. In spite of some explanations which recall the special system of the author, one cannot deny that they are expressed with power and truthfulness.

Meanwhile, beyond the religious sphere, there are developing certain interests which belong to the mundane life, and which form also the object of the representations of art; they are the passions, the collisions, the joys, and the sufferings, which bear a terrestrial or purely human character, but in which appear notwithstanding the very principle which distinguishes modern thought, to-wit: a more vivid, more energetic, and more profound sentiment of human *personality*, or, as the author calls it, *subjectivity*.

Romantic art differs no less from classic art in the form of the mode of representation, than in the ideas which constitute the content of its works. And, in the first place, one necessary consequence of the preceding principle is, the new point of view under which nature or the physical world is viewed. The objects of nature lose their importance, or, at least, they cease to be divine. They have neither the symbolic significance which oriental art gave them, nor the particular aspect in virtue of which they were animated and personified in Greek art and mythology. Nature is effaced; she retires to a lower plane; the universe is condensed to a single point, in the focus of the human soul. That, absorbed in a single thought, the thought of uniting itself to God, beholds the world vanish, or regards it with an indifferent eye. We see also appearing a heroism wholly different from antique heroism, a heroism of submission and resignation.

But, on the other hand, precisely

through the very fact, that all is concentrated in the focus of the human soul, the circle of ideas is found to be infinitely enlarged. The interior history of the soul is developed under a thousand diverse forms, borrowed from human life. It beams forth, and art seizes anew upon nature, which serves as adornment and as a theatre for the activity of the spirit. Hence the history of the human heart becomes infinitely richer than it was in ancient art and poetry. The increasing multitude of situations, of interests, and of passions, forms a domain as much more vast as spirit has descended farther into itself. All degrees, all phases of life, all humanity and its developments, become inexhaustible material for the representations of art.

Nevertheless, art occupies here only a secondary place; as it is incapable of revealing the content of the dogma, religion constitutes still more its essential basis. There is therefore preserved the priority and superiority which faith claims over the conceptions of the imagination.

From this there results an important consequence and a characteristic difference for modern art. It is that in the representation of sensuous forms art no longer fears to admit into itself the real with its imperfections and its faults. The beautiful is no longer the essential thing; the ugly occupies a much larger place in its creations. Here, then, vanishes that ideal beauty which elevates the forms of the real world above the mortal condition, and replaces it with blooming youth. This free vitality in its infinite calmness—this divine breath which animates matter—romantic art has no longer, for essential aim, to represent these. On the contrary, it turns its back on this culminating point of classic beauty; it accords, indeed, to the ugly a limitless rôle in its creations. It permits all objects to pass into representation in spite of their accidental character. Nevertheless, those objects which are indifferent or commonplace, have value only so far as the sentiments of the soul are reflected in them. But at the

highest point of its development art expresses only spirit—pure, invisible spirituality. We feel that it seeks to strip itself of all external forms, to mount into a region superior to sense, where nothing strikes the eye, where no sound longer vibrates upon the ear.

Furthermore, we can say, on comparing in this respect ancient with modern art, that the fundamental trait of romantic or Christian art is the musical element, the lyric accent in poetry. The lyric accent resounds everywhere, even in epic and dramatic poetry. In the figurative arts this characteristic makes itself felt, as a breath of the soul and an atmosphere of feeling.

After having thus determined the general character of romantic art, Hegel studies it more in detail; he considers it, successively, under a two-fold point of view, the religious and the profane; he follows it in its development, and points out the causes which have brought about its decadence. He concludes by some considerations upon the present state of art and its future.

Let us analyze rapidly the principal ideas contained in these chapters.

1st. As to what concerns the religious side, which we have thus far been considering, Hegel, developing its principle, establishes a parallel between the religious idea in classic and romantic art; for romantic art has also its ideal, which, as we have seen already, differs essentially from the antique idea.

Greek beauty shows the soul wholly identified with the corporeal form. In romantic art beauty no more resides in the idealization of the sensuous form, but in the soul itself. Undoubtedly one ought still to demand a certain agreement between the reality and the idea; but the determinate form is indifferent, it is not purified from all the accidents of real existence. The immortal gods in presenting themselves to our eyes under the human form, do not partake of its wants and miseries. On the contrary, the God of Christian art is not a solitary God, a stranger to the conditions of mor-

tal life; he makes himself man, and shares the miseries and the sufferings of humanity. The representation of religious love is the most favorable subject for the beautiful creations of Christian art.—Thus, in the first place, love in God is represented by the history of Christ's *redemption*, by the various phases of his life, of his passion, of his death, and of his resurrection. In the second place, love in man, the union of the human soul with God, appears in the holy family, in the maternal love of the Virgin, and in the love of the disciples. Finally, love in humanity is manifested by the spirit of the Church, that is to say, by the Spirit of God present in the society of the faithful, by the return of humanity to God, death to terrestrial life, martyrdom, repentance and conversion, the miracles and the legends.

Such are the principal subjects which form the ground of religious art. It is the Christian ideal in whatever in it is most elevated. Art seizes it and seeks to express it—but does this only imperfectly. Art is here necessarily surpassed by the religious thought, and ought to recognize its own insufficiency.

If we pass from the religious to the *profane ideal*, it presents itself to us under two different forms. The one, although representing human personality, yet develops noble and elevated sentiments, which combine with moral or religious ideas. The other shows us only persons who display, in the pursuit of purely human and positive interests, independence and energy of character. The first is represented by chivalry. When we come to examine the nature and the principle of the chivalric ideal, we see that what constitutes its content is, in fact, *personality*. Here, man abandons the state of inner sanctification, the contemplative for the active life. He casts his eyes about him and seeks a theatre for his activity. The fundamental principle is always the same, the soul, the human person, pursuing the infinite. But it turns toward another sphere, that of action and real life. The Ego is replete

with self only, with its individuality, which, in its eyes, is of infinite value. It attaches little importance to general ideas, to interests, to enterprises which have for object general order. Three sentiments, in the main, present this personal and individual character—*honor*, *love*, and *fidelity*. Moreover, separate or united, they form, aside from the religious relationships which can be reflected in them, the true content of chivalry.

The author analyzes these three sentiments; he shows in what they differ from the analogous sentiments or qualities in antique art. He endeavors, above all, to prove that they represent, in fact, the side of human personality, with its infinite and ideal character. Thus honor does not resemble bravery, which exposes itself for a common cause. Honor fights only to make itself known or respected, to guarantee the inviolability of the individual person. In like manner, *love*, also, which constitutes the centre of the circle, is only the accidental passion of one person for another person. Even when this passion is idealized by the imagination and ennobled by depth of sentiment, it is not yet the ethical bond of the family and of marriage. Fidelity presents the moral character in a higher degree, since it is disinterested; but it is not addressed to the general good of society in itself; it attaches itself exclusively to the person of a master. Chivalric fidelity understands perfectly well, besides, how to preserve its advantages and its rights, the independence and the honor of the person, who is always only conditionally bound. The basis of these three sentiments is, then, free personality. This is the most beautiful part of the circle which is found beyond religion, properly so called. All here has for immediate end, man, with whom we can sympathize through the side of personal independence. These sentiments are, moreover, susceptible of being placed in connection with religion in a multitude of ways, as they are able to preserve their independent character.

"This form of romantic art was devel-

oped in the East and in the West, but especially in the West, that land of reflection, of the concentration of the spirit upon itself. In the East was accomplished the first expansion of liberty, the first attempt toward enfranchisement from the finite. It was Mahometanism which first swept from the ancient soil all idolatry, and religions born of the imagination. But it absorbed this internal liberty to such a degree that the entire world for it was effaced; plunged in an intoxication of ecstasy, the oriental tastes in contemplation the delights of love, calmness, and felicity."

3. We have seen human personality developing itself upon the theatre of real life, and there displaying noble, generous sentiments, such as honor, love, and fidelity. Meanwhile it is in the sphere of real life and of purely human interests that liberty and independence of character appear to us. The ideal here consists only in energy and perseverance of will, and passion as well as *independence of character*. Religion and chivalry disappear with their high conceptions, their noble sentiments, and their thoroughly ideal objects. On the contrary, what characterizes the new wants, is the thirst for the joys of the present life, the ardent pursuit of human interests in what in them is actual, determined, or positive. In like manner, in the figurative arts, man wishes objects to be represented in their palpable and visible reality.

The destruction of classic art commenced with the predominance of the agreeable, and it ended with satire. Romantic art ends in the exaggeration of the principle of personality, deprived of a substantial and moral content, and thenceforth abandoned to caprice, to the arbitrary, to fancy and excess of passion. There is left further to the imagination of the poet only to paint forcibly and with depth these characters; to the talent of the artist, only to imitate the real; to the spirit, to exhibit its rigor in piquant combinations and contrasts.

This tendency is revealed under three principal forms: 1st, *independence of in-*

dividual character, pursuing its proper ends, its particular designs, without moral or religious aim; 2d, the exaggeration of the chivalric principle, and the spirit of *adventure*; 3d, the separation of the elements, the union of which constitutes the very idea of art, through the destruction of art itself—that is to say, the predilection for common reality, *the imitation of the real*, mechanical ability, caprice, fancy, and *humor*.

The first of these three points furnishes to Hegel the occasion for a remarkable estimate of the characters of Shakspeare, which represent, in an eminent degree, this phase of the romantic ideal. The distinctive trait of character of the *dramatis personæ* of Shakspeare is, in fact, the energy and obstinate perseverance of a will which is exclusively devoted to a specific end, and concentrates all its efforts for the purpose of realizing it. There is here no question either of religion or of moral ideas. They are characters placed singly face to face with each other, and their designs, which they have spontaneously conceived, and the execution of which they pursue with the unyielding obstinacy of passion. Macbeth, Othello, Richard III., are such characters. Others, as Romeo, Juliet, and Miranda, are distinguished by an absorption of soul in a unique, profound, but purely personal sentiment, which furnishes them an occasion for displaying an admirable wealth of qualities. The most restricted and most common still interest us by a certain consistency in their acts, a certain brilliancy, an enthusiasm, a freedom of imagination, a spirit superior to circumstances, which causes us to overlook whatever there is common in their action and discourse.

But this class, where Shakspeare excels, is extremely difficult to treat. To writers of mediocrity, the quicksand is inevitable. They risk, in fact, falling into the insipid, the insignificant, the trivial, or the repulsive, as a crowd of imitators have proven.

It has been vouchsafed only to a few great masters to possess enough genius

and taste to seize here the true and the beautiful, to redeem the insignificance or vulgarity of the content by enthusiasm and talent, by the force and energy of their pencil, and by a profound knowledge of human passions.

One of the characteristics of romantic art is, that, in the religious sphere, the soul, finding for itself satisfaction in itself, has no need to develop itself in the external world. On the other hand, when the religious idea no longer makes itself felt, and when the free will is no longer dependent except on itself, the *dramatis personæ* pursue aims wholly individual in a world where all appears arbitrary and accidental, and which seems abandoned to itself and delivered up to chance. In its irregular pace, it presents a complication of events which intermingle without order and without cohesion.

Moreover, this is the form which events affect in romantic, in opposition to classic art, where the actions and events are bound to a common end, to a true and necessary principle which determines the form, the character, and the mode of development of external circumstances. In romantic art, also, we find general interests, moral ideas; but they do not ostensibly determine events; they are not the ordering and regulating principle. These events, on the contrary, preserve their free course, and affect an accidental form.

Such is the character of the greater part of the grand events in the middle ages, the crusades, for example, which the author names for this reason, and which were the grand adventures of the Christian world.

Whatever may be the judgment which one forms upon the crusades and the different motives which caused them to be undertaken, it cannot be denied, that with an elevated religious aim—the deliverance of the holy sepulchre—there were mingled other interested and material motives, and that the religious and the profane aim did not contradict nor corrupt the other. As to their general form, the crusades present utter absence of unity. They are undertaken by masses,

by multitudes, who enter upon a particular expedition according to their good pleasure and their individual caprice. The lack of unity, the absence of plan and direction, causes the enterprises to fail, and the efforts and endeavors are wasted in individual exploits.

In another domain, that of profane life, the road is open also to a crowd of adventurers, whose object is more or less imaginary, and whose principle is love, honor, or fidelity. To battle for the glory of a name, to fly to the succor of innocence, to accomplish the most marvellous things for the honor of one's lady.—such is the motive of the greater part of the beautiful exploits which the romances of chivalry, or the poems of this epoch and subsequent epochs, celebrate.

These vices of chivalry cause its ruin. We find the most faithful picture of it in the poems of Ariosto, and Cervantes.

But what best marks the destruction of romantic art and of chivalry is the *modern romance*, that form of literature which takes their place. The romance is chivalry applied to real life; it is a protest against the real; it is the ideal in a society where all is fixed, regulated in advance by laws, by usages contrary to the free development of the natural longings and sentiments of the soul; it is the chivalry of common life. The same principle which caused a search for adventures, throws the personages into the most diverse and the most extraordinary situations. The imagination, disgusted with that which is, cuts out for itself a world according to its fancy, and creates for itself an ideal wherein it can forget social customs, laws, positive interests. The young men and young women, above all, feel the want of such aliment for the heart, or of such distraction against *ennui*. Ripe age succeeds youth; the young man marries and enters upon positive interests. Such is also the *dénoûment* of the greater part of romances, where prose succeeds poetry—the real, the ideal.

The destruction of romantic art is announced by symptoms still more striking, by the *imitation of the real*, and the

appearance of the *humorous* style, which occupies more and more space in art and literature. The artist and the poet can there display much talent, enthusiasm, and spirit; but these two styles are no less striking indexes of an epoch of decadence.

It is, above all, the humorous style which marks this decadence, by the absence of all fixed principle and all rule. It is a pure play of the imagination which combines, according to its liking, the most different objects, alters and overturns relations, tortures itself to discover novel and extraordinary conceptions. The author places himself above the subject, regards himself as freed from all conditions imposed by the nature of the content as well as the form, and imagines that all depends on his wit and the power of his genius. It is to be observed, that what Hegel calls the downfall of art in general, and of romantic art in particular, is precisely what we call the romantic school in the art and literature of our time.

Such are the fundamental forms which art presents in its historic development. If the art of the *renaissance*, or modern art properly so called, finds no place in this sketch, it is because it does not constitute an original and fundamental form. The *renaissance* is a return to Greek art; and as to modern art, it is allied to both Greek and Christian.

But it remains for us to present some conclusions upon the future destiny of art—a point of highest interest, to which this review of the forms and monuments of the past must lead. The conclusions of the author, which we shall consider elsewhere, are far from answering to what we might have expected from so remarkable a historic picture.

What are, indeed, these conclusions? The first is, that the rôle of art, to speak properly, is finished—at least, its original and distinct rôle. The circle of the ideas and beliefs of humanity is completed. Art has invested them with the forms which it was capable of giving them. In the future, it ought, then, to occupy a

secondary place. After having finished its independent career, it becomes an obscure satellite of science and philosophy, in which are absorbed both religion and art. This thought is not thus definitely formulated, but it is clearly enough indicated. Art, in revealing thought, has itself contributed to the destruction of other forms, and to its own downfall. The new art ought to be elevated above all the particular forms which it has already expressed. "Art ceases to be attached to a determinate circle of ideas and forms; it consecrates itself to a new worship, that of humanity. All that the heart of man includes within its own immensity—its joys and its sufferings, its interests, its actions, its destinies—become the domain of art." Thus the content is human nature; the form, a free combination of all the forms of the past. We shall hereafter consider this new eclecticism in art.

Hegel points out, in concluding, a final form of literature and poetry, which is the unequivocal index of the absence of

peculiar, elevated and profound ideas, and of original forms—that sentimental poetry, light or descriptive, which to-day floods the literary world and the drawing-rooms with its verses; compositions without life and without content, without originality or true inspiration; a commonplace and vague expression of all sentiment, full of aspirations and empty of ideas, where, through all, there makes itself recognized an imitation of some illustrious geniuses—themselves misled in false and perilous ways; a sort of current money, analogous to the epistolary style. Everybody is poet; and there is scarcely one true poet. "Wherever the faculties of the soul and the forms of language have received a certain degree of culture, there is no person who cannot, if he take the fancy, express in verse some situation of the soul, as any one is in condition to write a letter."

Such a style, thus universally diffused, and reproduced under a thousand forms, although with different shadings, easily becomes fastidious.

INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER II.

We hope to see those necessities of thought which underlie all Philosophical systems. We set out to account for all the diversities of opinion, and to see identity in the world of thought. But necessity in the realm of thought may be phenomenal. If there be anything which is given out as fixed, we must try its validity.

Many of the "impossibilities" of thought are easily shown to rest upon ignorance of psychological appliances. The person is not able because he does not know *how*—just as in other things. We must take care that we do not confound the incapacity of ignorance with the necessity of thought. (The reader will find an example of this in Sir William Hamilton's "Metaphysics," p. 527.) One of those "incapacities" arises from neglecting the following:

Among the first distinctions to be learned by the student in philosophy is that between the imaginative form of thinking and *pure* thinking. The former is a sensuous grade

of thinking which uses *images*, while the latter is a more developed stage, and is able to think objects in and for themselves. Spinoza's statement of this distinction applied to the thinking of the Infinite—his "*Infininitum imaginationis*" and "*Infininitum actu vel rationis*"—has been frequently alluded to by those who treat of this subject.

At first one might suppose that when finite things are the subject of thought, it would make little difference whether the first or second form of thinking is employed. This is, however, a great error. The Philosopher must always "think things under the form of eternity" if he would think the truth.

Imagination pictures objects. It represents to itself only the bounded. If it tries to realize the conception of infinitude, it represents a limited somewhat, and then *Reflection* or the *Understanding* (a form of thought lying between *Imagination* and *Reason*) passes beyond the limits and annuls them. This process may be continued indefinitely, or until *Reason* (or pure thinking) comes in

and solves the dilemma. Thus we have a dialogue resulting somewhat as follows:

Imagination. Come and see the Infinite just as I have pictured it.

Understanding [peeping cautiously about it]. Where is your frame? Ah! I see it now clearly. How is this! Your frame does not include all. There is a "beyond" to your picture. I cannot tell whether you intend the inside or outside for your picture of the Infinite; I see it on both.

Imag. [tries to extend the frame, but with the same result as before]. I believe you are right! I am well nigh exhausted by my efforts to include the unlimited.

Un. Ah! you see the Infinite is merely the negative of the finite or positive. It is the negative of those conditions which you place there in order to have any representation at all!

[While the Understanding proceeds to deliver a course of wise saws and moral reflections on the "inability of the Finite to grasp the Infinite," sitting apart upon its bipod—for tripod it has none, one of the legs being broken—it self-complacently and oracularly admonishes the human mind to cultivate humility; Imagination drops her brush and pencil in confusion at these words. Very opportunely *Reason* steps in and takes an impartial survey of the scene.]

Reason. Did you say that the Infinite is unknowable?

Un. Yes. "To think is to limit, and hence to think the Infinite is to limit it, and thus to destroy it."

Reason. Apply your remarks to Space. Is not Space infinite?

Un. If I attempt to realize Space I conceive a bounded, but I at once perceive that I have placed my limits *within* Space, and hence my realization is inadequate. The Infinite, therefore, seems to be a beyond to my clear conception.

Reason. Indeed! When you reflect on Space, do you not perceive that it is of such a nature that it can be limited only by itself? Do not all its limits imply Space to exist in?

Un. Yes, that is the difficulty.

Reason. I do not see the "difficulty." If Space can be limited only by itself, its limit continues it instead of bounding it. Hence it is universally continuous or infinite.

Un. But a mere negative.

Reason. No, not a mere negative, but the negative of all negation, and hence truly affirmative. It is the exhibition of the utter

impossibility of any negative to it. All attempts to limit it, continue it. It is its own other. Its negative is itself. Here, then, we have a truly affirmative infinite in contradistinction to the *negative* infinite—the "infinite progress" that you and Imagination were engaged upon when I came in.

Un. What you say seems to me a distinction in words merely.

Reason. Doubtless. All distinctions are merely in words until one has learned to see them independent of words. But you must go and mend that tripod on which you are sitting; for how can one think at ease and exhaustively, when he is all the time propping up his basis from without?

Un. I cannot understand you. [Exit.]

NOTE.—It will be well to consider what application is to be made of these distinctions to the mind itself, whose form is consciousness. In self-knowing, or consciousness, the subject knows itself—it is its own object. Thus in this phase of activity we have the affirmative Infinite. The subject is its own object—is continued by its other or object. This is merely suggested here—it will be developed hereafter.

CHAPTER III.

In the first chapter we attained—or at least made the attempt to attain—some insight into the relation which Mind bears to Time and Space. It appeared that Mind is a *Transcendent*, i.e. something which Time and Space inhere in, rather than a somewhat, conditioned by them. Although this result agrees entirely with the immortal instincts of man, which assert the immortality of the soul, and the unsubstantiality of the existences within Time and Space, yet, as a logical result of thinking, it seems at first very unreliable. The disciplined thinker will indeed find the distinctions "*à priori*" and "*à posteriori*" inadequately treated; but his emendations will only make the results there established more wide-sweeping and conclusive.

In the second chapter we learned caution with respect to the manner of attempting to realize in our minds the results of thought. If we have always been in the habit of regarding Mind as a property or attribute of the individual, we have conceived it not according to its true nature, but have allowed Imagination to mingle its activity in the thinking of that which is of a universal nature. Thus we are prone to say to ourselves,

"How can a mere attribute like Mind be the logical condition of the solid realities of Space and Time." In this we have quietly assumed the whole point at issue. No system of thinking which went to work logically ever proved the Mind to be an attribute; only very elementary grades of thinking, which have a way of assuming in their premises what they draw out analytically in their conclusions, ever set up this dogma. This will become clearer at every step as we proceed.

We will now pursue a path similar to that followed in the first chapter, and see what more we can learn of the nature of Mind. We will endeavor to learn more definitely what constitutes its *à priori* activity, in order, as there indicated, to achieve our object. Thus our present search is after the "Categories" and their significance. Taking the word "category" here in the sense of "*à priori* determination of thought," the first question is: "Do any categories exist? Are there any thoughts which belong to the nature of mind itself?" It is the same question that Locke discusses under the head of "Innate Ideas."

I.—"Every act of knowing or cognizing is the translating of an unknown somewhat into a known, as a scholar translates a new language into his own." If he did not already understand one language, he could never translate the new one. In the act of knowing, the object becomes known in so far as I am able to recognize predicates as belonging to it. "This is *red*"; unless I know already what "red" means, I do not cognize the object by predicating *red* of it. "Red is a color"; unless I know what *color* means, I have not said anything intelligible—I have not expressed an act of cognition. The object becomes known to us in so far as we recognize its predicates—and hence we could never know anything unless we had at least one predicate or conception with which to commence. If we have one predicate through which we cognize some object, that act of cognition gives us a new predicate, for it has dissolved or "translated" a somewhat, that before was unknown, into a known; the "not-me" has, to that extent, become the "me." Without any predicates to begin with, all objects would remain forever outside of our consciousness. Even consciousness itself would be impossible, for the very act of self-cognition implies that the predicate "myself" is well known.

It is an act of identification: "I am myself"; the subject is, as predicate, completely known, or dissolved back into the subject. I cognize myself as myself; there is no alien element left standing over against me. Thus we are able to say that there must be an *à priori* category in order to render possible any act of knowing whatever. Moreover, we see that this category must be identical with the *Ego* itself, for the reason that the process of cognition is at the same time a recognition; it predicates only what it recognizes. Thus, fundamentally, in knowing, Reason knows itself. Self-consciousness is the basis of knowledge. This will throw light on the first chapter; but let us first confirm this position by a psychological analysis.

II.—What is the permanent element in thought? It can easily be found in language—its external manifestation. Logic tells us that the expression of thought involves always a subject and predicate. Think what you please, say what you please, and your thought or assertion consists of a subject and predicate—positive or negative—joined by the copula, *is*. "Man lives" is equivalent to "man is living." "Man" and "living" are joined by the word "is." If we abstract all content from thought, and take its pure form in order to see the permanent, we shall have "is" the copula,—or, putting a letter for subject and attribute, we shall have "*a is a*" (or "*a is b*") for the universal form of thought. The mental act is expressed by "is." In this empty "is" we have the category of pure Being, which is the "*summum genus*" of categories. Any predicate other than *being* will be found to contain being *plus* determinations, and hence can be subsumed under being. We shall get new light on this subject if we examine the ordinary doctrine of *explanation*.

III.—In order to explain something, we subsume it under a more general. Thus we say, "Horse is an animal"; and, "An animal is an organic being," etc. A definition contains not only this subsumption, but also a statement of the specific difference. We define *quadruped* by subsuming it ("It is an animal"), and giving the specific difference ("which has four feet").

As we approach the "*summum genus*," the predicates become more and more empty; "they become more *extensive* in their application, and less *comprehensive* in their content." Thus they approach pure sim-

plidity, which is attained in the "summun genus." This pure simple, which is the limit of subsumption and abstraction, is pure Being—Being devoid of all determinateness. When we have arrived at Being, subsuming becomes simple identifying—Being is Being, or *a* is *a*—and this is precisely the same activity that we found self-consciousness to consist of in our first analysis (I.), and the same activity that we found all mental acts to consist of in our second analysis (II.)

IV.—Therefore, we may affirm on these grounds, that the "summun genus," or primitive category, is the Ego itself in its simplest activity as the "is" (or pure *Being*, if taken substantively).

Thus it happens that when the Mind comes to cognize an object, it must first of all recognize itself in it in its simplest activity—it must know that the object *is*. We cannot know anything else of an object without presupposing the knowledge of its *existence*.

At this point it is evident that this category is not derived from experience in the sense of an *impression from without*. It is the activity of the *Ego* itself, and is its (the *Ego's*) first self-externalization (or its first becoming object to itself—its first act of self-consciousness). The essential activity of the Ego itself consists in recognizing itself, and this involves self-separation, and then the annulling of this separation in the same act. For in knowing myself as an object I separate the Ego from itself, but in the very act of *knowing* it I make it identical again. Here are two negative processes involved in knowing, and these are indivisibly one: first, the negative act of separation; secondly, the negative act of annulling the separation by the act of recognition. That the application of categories to the external world is a process of self-recognition, is now clear: we know, in so far as we recognize predicates in the object; we say, "The Rose *is*, it is *red*, it is *round*, it is *fragrant*," &c. In this we separate what belongs to the rose from it, and place it outside of it, and then, through the act of predication, unite it again. "The Rose *is*" contains merely the recognition of being; but being is separated from it, and joined to it in the act of predication. Thus we see that the fundamental act of self-consciousness, which is a self-separation and self-identification united in one act of recognition,—we see that this fundamental act is repeated in all acts of

knowing. We do not know even the rose without separating it from itself, and identifying the two sides thus formed. (This contains a deeper thought, which we may suggest here. That the act of knowing puts all objects into this crucible, is an intimation on its part that no object can possess true, abiding being without this ability to separate itself from itself in the process of self-identification. Whatever cannot do this is no essence, but may be only an element of a process in which it ceaselessly loses its identity. But we shall recur to this again.)

Doubtless we could follow out this activity through various steps, and deduce all the categories of pure thought. This is what Plato has done in part, what Fichte has done in his Science of Knowledge ("Wissenschaftslehre.") and Hegel in his Logic. A science of these pure intelligibles unlocks the secret of the Universe; it furnishes that "Royal Road" to all knowledge; it is the far-famed Philosopher's Stone that alone can transmute the base dross of mere talent into genius.

V.—Let us be content if at the close of this chapter we can affirm still more positively the conclusions of our first. Through a consideration of the *a priori* knowledge of Time and Space, and their logical priority, as conditions, to the world of experience, we inferred the transcendency of Mind. Upon further investigation, we have now discovered that there are other forms of the Mind more primordial than Space and Time, and more essentially related to its activity; for all the categories of pure thought—Being, Negation, &c.—are applicable to Space and to Time, and hence more universal than either of them alone; these categories of pure thought, moreover, as before remarked, could never have been derived from experience. Experience is not possible without presupposing these predicates. "They are the tools of intelligence through which it cognizes." If we hold by this stand-point exclusively, we may say, with Kant, that we furnish the subjective forms in knowing, and for this reason cannot know the "thing in itself." If these categories are merely subjective—i.e. given in the constitution of the Mind itself—and we do not know what the "thing in itself" may be, yet we can come safely out of all skepticism here by considering the universal nature of these categories or "forms of the mind." For if Being, Negation, and Existence, are forms of

mind and purely subjective, so that they do not belong to the "thing in itself," it is evident that such an object cannot *be* or *exist*, or in any way have validity, either positively or negatively. Thus it is seen from the nature of mind here exhibited, that Mind is the *noumenon* or "thing in itself" which Philosophy seeks, and thus our third chapter confirms our first.

NOTE.—The MATERIALISM of the present day holds that thought is a modification of force, correlated with heat, light, electricity, &c.; in short, that organization produces ideas. If so, we are placed within a narrow idealism, and can only say of what is held for *truth*: "I am so correlated as to hold this view; I shall be differently correlated to-morrow, perhaps, and hold another view." Yet in this very statement the Ego takes the stand-point of universality—it speaks of possibilities—which it could never do were it merely a correlate. For to hold a possibility is to be able to annul in thought the limits of the real, and hence to elevate itself to the point of universality. But this is *self-correlation*; we have a movement in a circle, and hence self-origination, and hence a spontaneous fountain of force. The Mind, in conceiving of the possible, annuls the real, and thus creates its own motives; its acting according to motives, is thus acting according to its own acts—an obvious circle again.

In fine, it is evident that the idealism which the correlationist logically falls into is as strict as that of any school of professed idealism which he is in the habit of condemning. The *persistent force* is the general *idea* of force, not found as any *real* force, for each *real* force is individualized in some particular way. But it is evident that a particular force cannot be correlated with *force in general*, but only with a special form like itself. But the general force is the only abiding one; each particular one is in a state of transition into another—a perpetual losing of individuality. Hence the true abiding force is not a *real* one existing objectively, but only an *ideal* one existing subjectively in thought. But through the fact that thought can seize the true and abiding which can exist for itself nowhere else, the correlationist is bound to infer the transcendency of Mind just like the idealist. Nay, more; when he comes to speak considerably, he will say that Mind, for the very reason that it thinks the true, abiding force, cannot be correlated with any determined force.

CHAPTER IV.

Philosophers usually begin to construct their systems in full view of their final principle. It would be absurd for one to commence a demonstration if he had no clear idea of what he intended to prove. From the final principle the system must be worked back to the beginning in the philosopher's mind before he can commence his demonstration. Usually, the order of demonstration which he follows is not the order of discovery; in such case, his system proceeds by external reflections. All mathematical proof is of this order. One constructs his demonstration to lead from the known to the unknown, and uses many intermediate propositions that do not of necessity lead to the intended result. With another theorem in view, they might be used for steps to that, just as well. But there is a certain inherent development in all subjects, when examined according to the highest method, that will lead one on to the exhaustive exposition of all that is involved therein. This is called the *dialectic*. This dialectic movement cannot be used as a philosophic instrument, unless one has seen the deepest *aperçu* of Science; if this is not the case, the *dialectic* will prove merely destructive, and not constructive. It is therefore a mistake, as has been before remarked, to attempt to introduce the beginner of the study of Philosophy at once into the dialectic. The content of Philosophy must be first presented under its sensuous and reflective forms, and a gradual progress established. In this chapter an attempt will be made to approach again the ultimate principle which we have hitherto fixed only in a general manner as *Mind*. We will use the method of external reflection, and demonstrate three propositions: 1. There is an independent being; 2. That being is self-determined; 3. Self-determined being is in the form of personality, i.e. is an *Ego*.

I.—1. Dependent being, implying its complement upon which it depends, cannot be explained through itself, but through that upon which it depends.

2. This being upon which it depends cannot be also a dependent being, for the dependent being has no support of its own to lend to another; all that it has is borrowed. "A chain of dependent beings collapses into one dependent being. Dependence is not converted into independence by mere multiplication."

3. The dependent, therefore, depends upon the

independent and has its explanation in it. Since all being is of one kind or the other, it follows that all being is independent, or a complemental element of it. Reciprocal dependence makes an independent including whole, which is the *negative unity*.

Definition.—One of the most important imple-ments of the thinker is the comprehension of “negative unity.” It is a unity resulting from the reciprocal cancelling of elements; e.g. *Salt* is the negative unity of *acid* and *alkali*. It is called *negative* because it negates the independence of the elements within it. In the negative unity *Water*, the elements oxygen and hydrogen have their independence negated.

II. — 1. The independent being cannot exist without determinations. Without these, it could not distinguish itself or be distinguished from nought.

2. Nor can the independent being be determined (i.e. limited or modified in any way) from without, or through another. For all that is determined through another is a dependent somewhat.

3. Hence the independent being can be only a self-determined. If self-determined, it can exist through itself.

NOTE.—Spinoza does not arrive at the third position, but, after considering the second, arrives at the first one, and concludes, since determination through another makes a somewhat *finite*, that the independent being must be undetermined. He does not happen to discover that there is another kind of determination, to-wit, self-determination, which can consist with independence. The method that he uses makes it entirely an accidental matter with him that he discovers what speculative results he does—the dialectic method would lead inevitably to self-determination, as we shall see later. It is Hegel’s *aperçu* that we have in the third position; with Spinoza the independent being remained an undetermined *substance*, but with Hegel it became a self-determining *subject*. All that Spinoza gets out of his substance he must get in an arbitrary manner; it does not follow from its definition that it shall have modes and attributes, but the contrary. This *aperçu*—that the independent being, i.e. every really existing, separate entity is self-determined—is the central point of speculative philosophy. What self-determination involves, we shall see next.

III. — 1. Self-determination implies that the *constitution* or *nature* be self-originated. There is nothing about a self-determined that is created by anything without.

2. Thus self-determined being exists dually—it is (a) as *determining*, and (b) as *determined*. (a) As determining, it is the active, which contains merely the possibility of determinations; (b) as determined, it is the passive result—the matter upon which the subject acts.

3. But since both are the same being, each side returns into itself: (a) as determining or active, it acts only upon its own determining, and (b) as passive or determined, it is, as result of the former, the self-same active itself. Hence its movement is a movement of self-recognition—a positing of distinction which is cancelled in the same act. (In self-recognition something is made an object, and identified with the subject in the same act.) Moreover, the determiner, on account of its pure generality, (i.e. its having no concrete determinations as yet,) can only be *ideal*—can only exist as the *Ego* exists, in thought; not as a thing, but as a *generic* entity. The passive side can exist only as the self exists in consciousness—as that which is in opposition and yet in identity at the same time. No finite existence could endure this contradiction, for all such must possess a *nature* or *constitution* which is self-determined; if not, each finite could negate all its properties and qualities, and yet remain itself—just as the person does when he makes abstraction of all, in thinking of the *Ego* or pure self.

Thus we find again our former conclusion:—All finite or dependent things must originate in and depend upon independent or absolute being, which must be an *Ego*. The *Ego* has the form of Infinity (see Chap. II.—*The Infinite is its own Other*).

Resumé.—The first chapter states the premises which Kant lays down in his Transcendental Æsthetic (*Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*), and draws the true logical conclusions, which are positive, and not negative, as he makes them. The second chapter gives the Spinozan distinction of the Infinite of the Imagination and Infinite of Reason. The third chapter gives the logical results which Kant should have drawn from his Transcendental Logic. The fourth chapter gives Spinoza’s fundamental position logically completed, and is the great fundamental position of Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel, with reference to the Absolute.

MUSIC AS A FORM OF ART.

Read before the St. Louis Art Society, February, 1867.

I. UPON ART-CRITICISM.

A work of art is the product of the inspired moment of the artist. It is not to be supposed that he is able to give an account of his work in the terms of the understanding. Hence the artist is not in a strict sense a critic. The highest order of criticism must endeavor to exhibit the unity of the work by showing how the various motives unfold from the central thought. Of course, the artist must be rare who can see his work doubly—first sensuously, and then rationally. Only some Michael Angelo or Goethe can do this. The common artist sees the sensuous form as the highest possible revelation—to him his *feeling* is higher than the intellectual vision. And can we not all—critics as well as artists—sympathize with the statement, that the mere calculating intellect, the cold understanding, “all light and no heat,” can never rise into the realm where art can be appreciated? It is only when we contemplate the truly speculative intellect—which is called “love” by the mystics, and by Swedenborg “love and wisdom united in a Divine Essence”—that we demur at this supreme elevation of feeling or sentiment. The art critic must have all the feeling side of his nature aroused, as the first condition of his interpretation; and, secondly, he must be able to dissolve into thought the emotions which arise from that side. If feeling were more exalted than thought, this would be impossible. Such, however, is the view of such critics as the Schlegels, who belong to the romantic school. They say that the intellect considers only abstractions, while the heart is affected by the concrete whole. “Speetres and goitred dwarfs” for the intellect, but “beauty’s rose” for the feeling heart. But this all rests on a misunderstanding. The true art critic does not undervalue feeling. It is to him the essential basis upon which he builds. Unless the work of art affects his feelings, he has nothing to think about; he can go no further; the work, to him, is not a work of art at all. But if he is aroused and charmed by it, if his emotional nature is stirred to its depths, and he feels inspired by those spiritual intimations of Eternity which true art always excites, then he has a content to work upon, and this thinking of his amounts simply to a recognition, in other forms, of this eternal element that glows through the work of art.

Hence there is no collision between the artist and the critic, if both are true to their ideal.

It certainly is no injury to the work of art to

show that it treats in some form the Problem of Life, which is the mystery of the Christian religion. It is no derogation to Beethoven to show how he has solved a problem in music, just as Shakspeare in poetry, and Michael Angelo in painting. Those who are content with the mere feeling, we must always respect if they really have the true art feeling, just as we respect the simple piety of the uneducated peasant. But we must not therefore underrate the conscious seizing of the same thing—not place St. Augustine or Martin Luther below the simple-minded peasant. Moreover, as our society has for its aim the attainment of an insight into art *in general*, and not the exclusive enjoyment of any particular art, it is all the more important that we should hold by the only connecting link—the only universal element—*thought*. For thought has not only universal *content*, like feeling, but also universal *form*, which feeling has not.

Another reason that causes persons to object to art interpretation, is perhaps that such interpretation reminds them of the inevitable moral appended *ad nauseam* to the stories that delighted our childhood. But it must be remembered that these morals are put forward as the *object* of the stories. The art critic can never admit for one moment that it is the object of a work of art simply to be didactic. It is true that all art is a means of culture; but that is not its object. Its object is to combine the idea with a sensuous form, so as to embody, as it were, the Infinite; and any motive external to the work of art itself, is at once felt to be destructive to it.

II. UPON THE INTERPRETATION OF ART.

1. The Infinite is not manifested *within* any particular sphere of finitude, but rather exhibits itself in the collision of a Finite with another Finite *without* it. For a Finite must by its very nature be limited from without, and the Infinite, therefore, not only includes any given finite sphere, but also its negation (or the other spheres which, joined to it, make up the whole).

2. Art is the manifestation of the Infinite in the Finite, it is said. Therefore, this must mean that art has for its province the treatment of the collisions that necessarily arise between one finite sphere and another.

3. In proportion as the collision portrayed by art is comprehensive, and a type of all collisions in the universe, is it a high work of art. If, then, the collision is on a small scale, and between low spheres, it is not a high work of art.

4. But whether the collision presented be of a high order or of a low order, it bears a general resemblance to every other collision—the Infinite is always like itself in all its manifestations. The lower the collision, the more it becomes merely symbolical as a work of art, and the less it adequately represents the Infinite.

Thus the lofty mountain peaks of Bierstadt, which rise up into the regions of clearness and sunshine, beyond the realms of change, do this only because of a force that contradicts gravitation, which continually abases them. The contrast of the high with the low, of the clear and untrammelled with the dark and impeded, symbolizes, in the most natural manner, to every one, the higher conflicts of spirit. It strikes a chord that vibrates, unconsciously perhaps, but, nevertheless, inevitably. On the other hand, when we take the other extreme of painting, and look at the "Last Judgment" of Michael Angelo, or the "Transfiguration" of Raphael, we find comparatively no ambiguity; there the Infinite is visibly portrayed, and the collision in which it is displayed is evidently of the highest order.

5. Art, from its definition, must relate to Time and Space, and, in proportion as the grosser elements are subordinated and the spiritual adequately manifested, we find that we approach a form of art wherein the form and matter are both the products of spirit.

Thus we have arts whose matter is taken from (a) *Space*, (b) *Time*, and (c) *Language* (the product of Spirit).

Space is the grossest material. We have on its plane, I. Architecture, II. Sculpture, and III. Painting. (In the latter, color and perspective give the artist power to represent distance and magnitude, and internality, without any one of them in fact. Upon a piece of ivory no larger than a man's hand, a "Heart of the Andes" might be painted.) In Time we have IV. Music; while in Language we have V. Poetry (in the three forms of Epic, Lyric, and Dramatic) as the last and highest of the forms of art.

6. An interpretation of a work of art should consist of a translation of it into the form of science. Hence, first, one must seize the general content of it—or the collision portrayed. Then, secondly, the form of art employed comes in, whether it be Architecture, Sculpture, Painting, Music, or Poetry. Thirdly, the relation which the content has to the form brings out the superior merits, or the limits and defects, of the work of art in question. Thus, at the end, we have universalized the piece of art—digested it, as it were. A true interpretation does not destroy a work of art, but rather furnishes a guide to its highest enjoyment. We have the double pleasure of immediate sensuous enjoyment produced by the artistic execu-

tion, and the higher one of finding our rational nature mirrored therein, so that we recognize the eternal nature of Spirit there manifested.

7. The peculiar nature of music, as contrasted with other arts, will, if exhibited, best prepare us for what we are to expect from it. The less definitely the mode of art allows its content to be seized, the wider may be its application. Landscape painting may have a very wide scope for its interpretation, while a drama of Goethe or Shakspeare definitely seizes the particulars of its collision, and leaves no doubt as to its sphere. So in the art of music, and especially instrumental music. Music does not portray an object directly, like the plastic arts, but it calls up the internal feeling which is caused by the object itself. It gives us, therefore, a reflection of our impressions excited in the immediate contemplation of the object. Thus we have a reflection of a reflection, as it were.

Since its material is Time rather than Space, we have this contrast with the plastic arts:—Architecture, and more especially Sculpture and Painting, are obliged to select a special moment of time for the representation of the collision. As Goethe shows in the Laokoon, it will not do to select a moment at random, but that point of time must be chosen in which the collision has reached its height, and in which there is a tension of all the elements that enter the contest on both sides. A moment earlier, or a moment later, some of these elements would be eliminated from the problem, and the comprehensiveness of the work destroyed. When this proper moment is seized in Sculpture, as in the Laokoon, we can see what has been before the present moment, and easily tell what will come later. In Painting, through the fact that coloring enables more subtle effects to be wrought out, and deeper internal movements to be brought to the surface, we are not so closely confined to the "supreme moment" as in Sculpture. But it is in Music that we first get entirely free from that which confines the plastic arts. Since its form is time, it can convey the whole movement of the collision from its inception to its conclusion. Hence Music is superior to the Arts of Space in that it can portray the internal creative process, rather than the dead results. It gives us the content, in its whole process of development, in a *fluid* form, while the Sculptor must fix it in a *rigid* form at a certain stage. Goethe and others have compared Music to Architecture—the latter is "frozen Music"; but they have not compared it to Sculpture nor Painting, for the reason that in these two arts there is a possibility of seizing the form of the individual more definitely, while in Architecture and Music the point of repose does not appear as the human form, but only as the more general one of self-relation or

harmony. Thus quantitative ratios—mathematical laws—pervade and govern these two forms of Art.

8. Music, more definitely considered, arises from vibrations, producing waves in the atmosphere. The cohesive attraction of some body is attacked, and successful resistance is made; if not, there is no vibration. Thus the feeling of victory over a foreign foe is conveyed in the most elementary tones, and this is the distinction of *tone* from *noise*, in which there is the irregularity of disruption, and not the regularity of self-equality.

Again, in the obedience of the whole musical structure to its fundamental scale-note, we have something like the obedience of Architecture to Gravity. In order to make an exhibition of Gravity, a column is necessary; for the solid wall does not isolate sufficiently the function of support. With the column we can have exhibited the effects of Gravity drawing down to the earth, and of the support holding up the shelter. The column in classic art exhibits the equilibrium of the two tendencies. In Romantic or Gothic Architecture it exhibits a preponderance of the aspiring tendency—the soaring aloft like the plant to reach the light—a contempt for mere gravity—slender columns seeming to be let down from the roof, and to draw up something rather than to support anything. On the other hand, in Symbolic Architecture (as found in Egypt), we have the overwhelming power of gravity exhibited so as to crush out all humanity—the Pyramid, in whose shape Gravity has done its work. In Music we have continually the conflict of these two tendencies, the upward and downward. The Music that moves upward and shows its ground or point of repose in the octave above the scale-note of the basis, corresponds to the Gothic Architecture. This aspiring movement occurs again and again in chorals; it, like all romantic art, expresses the Christian solution of the problem of life.

III. BEETHOVEN'S SONATA IN C SHARP MINOR. (*Opus 27, No. 2.*)

The three movements of this sonata, which Beethoven called a *fantasie-sonata*, are not arranged in the order commonly followed. Usually sonatas begin with an *allegro* or some quick movement, and pass over to a slow movement—an *adagio* or *andante*—and end in a quick movement. The content here treated could not allow this form, and hence it commences with what is usually the second movement. Its order is, 1. *Adagio*, 2. *Allegretto*, 3. *Finale* (*presto agitato*).

(My rule with reference to the study of art may or may not be interesting to others; it is this: always to select a master-piece, so recognized, and keep it before me until it yields its

secret, and in its light I am able to see commonplace to be what it really is, and be no longer dazzled by it. It requires faith in the commonly received verdict of critics and an immense deal of patience, but in the end one is rewarded for his pains. Almost invariably, I find immediate impressions of uncultured persons good for nothing. It requires long familiarity with the best things to learn to see them in their true excellence.)

This sonata is called by the Austrians the "Moonlight Sonata," and this has become the popular name in America. It is said to have been written by Beethoven when he was recovering from the disappointment of his hopes in a love-episode that had an unfortunate termination. (See Marx's "L. v. Beethoven, Leben und Schaffen.") From this magnificent work of Art-Criticism, I have drawn the outlines of the following interpretation.) The object of his affection was a certain young countess, Julia Guicciardi; and it appears from Beethoven's letter to a friend at the time (about 1800), that the affection was mutual, but their difference in rank prevented a marriage. When this sonata appeared (in 1802) it was inscribed to her.

ADAGIO.—The first movement is a soft, floating movement, portraying the soul musing upon a memory of what has affected it deeply. The surrounding is dim, as seen in moonlight, and the soul is lit up by a reflected light—a glowing at the memory of a bliss that is past. It is not strange that this has been called the Moonlight Sonata, just for this feeling of borrowed light that pervades it. As we gaze into the moon of memory, we almost forget the reflection, and fancy that the sun of immediate consciousness is itself present. But anon a flitting cloudlet (a twinge of bitter regret) obscures the pale beam, or a glance at the landscape—not painted now with colors as in the day-time, but only *claire-obscur*—brings back to us the sense of our separation from the day and the real. Sadly the soft, gliding movement continues, and distant and more distant grows the prospect of experiencing again the remembered happiness. Only for a passing moment can the throbbing soul realize in its dreams once more its full completeness, and the plaintive minor changes to major; but the spectral form of renunciation glides before its face, and the soul subsides into its grief, and yields to what is inevitable. Downward into the depths fall its hopes; only a sepulchral echo comes from the bass, and all is still. Marx calls this "The Song of the Renouncing Soul." It is filled with the feeling of separation and regret; but its slow, dreamy movement is not that of stern resolution which should accompany renunciation. Accordingly, we have—ALLEGRETTO.

The present and real returns; we no longer

dwell on the past; "We must separate; only this is left." In this movement we awake from the dream, and we feel the importance of the situation. Its content is "Farewell, then!"—the phrase expressing this, lingers in its striving to shake off the grasp and get free. The hands will not let go each other. The phrase runs into the next and back to itself, and will not be cut off. In the trio, there seems to be the echoing of sobs that come from the depths of the soul as the sorrowful words are repeated. The buried past still comes back and holds up its happy hours, while the shadows of the gloomy future hover before the two renunciants!

This movement is very short, and is followed by the *FINALE* (*presto agitato*).

"No grief of the soul that can be conquered except through action," says Goethe—and Beethoven expresses the same conviction in the somewhat sentimental correspondence with the fair countess. This third movement depicts the soul endeavoring to escape from itself, to cancel its individualism through contact with the real.

The first movement found the being of the soul involved with another—having, as it were, lost its essence. If the being upon which it depends reflects it back by a reciprocal dependence, it again becomes integral and independent. This cannot be; hence death or renunciation. But renunciation leaves the soul recoiling upon its finitude, and devoid of the universality it would have obtained by receiving its being through another which reciprocally depended upon it. Hence the necessity of Goethe's and Beethoven's solution—the soul must find surcease of sorrow through action, through will, or practical self-determination. *Man becomes universal in his deed.*

How fiercely the soul rushes into the world of action in this *Finale*! In its impetuosity it storms through life, and ever and anon falls down breathless before the collision which it encounters in leaping the chasms between the different spheres. In its swoon of exhaustion there comes up from the memory of the past the ghost of the lost love that has all the while accompanied him, though unnoticed, in his frantic race. Its hollow tones reverberate through his being, and he starts from his dream and drowns his memory anew in the storm of action. At times we are elevated to the creative moment of the artist, and feel its inspiration and lofty enthusiasm; but again and again the exhausted soul collapses, and the same abysmal crash comes in at the bass each time. The grimmest loneliness, that touches to the core, comes intruding itself upon our rapture. Only in the contest with the "last enemy" we feel at length that the soul has proved itself

valid in a region where distinctions of rank sunder and divide no more.

This solution is not quite so satisfactory as could be desired. If we would realize the highest solution, we must study the Fifth Symphony, especially its second movement.

IV. BEETHOVEN'S FIFTH SYMPHONY. (Part II.)

Marx finds in this symphony the problem so often treated by Beethoven—the collision of freedom with fate. "Through night to day, through strife to victory!" Beethoven, in his conversation with Schindler, speaking of the first "motive" at the beginning, said, "Thus Fate knocks at the door." This knocking of Fate comes in continually during the first movement. "We have an immense struggle portrayed. Life is a struggle—this seems to be the content of this movement." The soul finds a solution to this, and sings its psalm of joy.

In the second movement (*andante*) we have an expression of the more satisfactory solution of the Problem of Life, which we alluded to when speaking of the Sonata above.

It ("the storm-tossed soul") has in that consoling thought reached the harbor of infinite rest—infinite rest in the sense of an "activity which is a true repose."

The soul has found this solution, and repeats it over to assure itself of its reality (1, 1, 1, 7, 1, 2, 1—these are the notes which express it.) Then it wishes to make the experience of the universality of this solution—it desires to try its validity in all the spheres where Fate ruled previously. It sets out and ascends the scale three steps at a time (5, 1, 1, 2, 3—1, 3, 3, 4, 5); it reaches 5 of the scale, and ought to reach 8 the next time. It looks up to it as the celestial sun which Gothic Architecture points toward and aspires after. Could it only get there, it would find true rest! But its command of this guiding thought is not yet quite perfect—it can not wield it so as to fly across the abyss, and reach that place of repose without a leap—a "mortal leap." For the ascent by threes has reached a place where another three would bring it to 7 of the scale—the point of absolute unrest; to step four, is to contradict the rhythm or method of its procedure. It pauses, therefore, upon 5; it tries the next three thoughtfully twice, and then, hearing below once more the mocking tones of Fate, it springs over the chasm and clutches the support above, while through all the spheres there rings the sound of exultation.

But to reach the goal by a leap—to have no bridge across the gulf at the end of the road—is not a satisfactory solution of the difficulty. Hence we have a manifold endeavor—a striving to get at the true method, which wanders at

first in the darkness, but comes at length to the light; it gets the proper form for its idea, and gives up its unwieldy method of threes (1, 2, 3—3, 4, 5), and ascends by the infinite form of 1, 3, 5—3, 5, 8—5, 8, 3, &c., which gives it a complete access to, and control over, all above and below.

The complete self-equipoise expressed in that solution which comes in at intervals through the

whole, and the bold application of the first method, followed by the faltering when it comes to the defect—the grand exultation over the final discovery of the true method—all these are indescribably charming to the lover of music almost the first time he listens to this symphony, and they become upon repetition more and more suggestive of the highest that art can give.

THE ALCHEMISTS.*

We have referred in a previous article to the transition of Religion into Speculative Philosophy. The Mystics who present this phase of thought, "express themselves, not in those universal categories that the Spirit of the race has formed in language for its utterance, but they have recourse to symbols more or less ambiguous, and of insufficient universality to stand for the Archetypes themselves." The Alchemists belong to this phase of spirit, and we propose to draw from the little book named at the head of our article, some of the evidences of this position. It is there shown that, instead of the transmutation of metals, the regeneration of man was in view. Those much-abused men agreed that "The highest wisdom consists in this," (quoting from the Arabic author, Alipili,) "for man to know himself, because in him God has placed his eternal Word, by which all things were made and upheld, to be his Light and Life, by which he is capable of knowing all things, both in time and eternity." While they claim explicitly to have as object of their studies the mysteries of Spirit, they warn the reader against taking their remarks upon the metals in a literal sense, and speak of those who do so as being in error. They describe their processes in such a way as to apply to man alone; pains seem to have been taken to word their descriptions so as to be utterly absurd when applied to anything else. In speaking of the "Stone," they refer to three states, calling them black, white, and red; giving minute descriptions of each, so as to leave no doubt that man is represented, first, as in a "fallen condition"; secondly, in a "repenting condition"; and thirdly, as "made perfect through grace." This subordination

of the outer to the inner, of the body to the soul, is the constantly recurring theme. Instead of seeking a thing not yet found—which would be the case with a stone for the transmutation of metals—they agree in describing the "Stone" as already known. They refer constantly to such speculative doctrines as "Nature is a whole everywhere," showing that their subject possesses universality. This metal or mineral is described thus: "Minerals have their roots in the air, their heads and tops in the earth. Our Mercury is aerial; look for it, therefore, in the air and the earth." The author of the work from which we quote the passage, says by way of comment: "In this passage 'Minerals' and 'our Mercury' refer to the same thing, and it is the subject of Alchemy, the Stone; and we may remember that Plato is said to have defined or described *Man* as a growth, having his root in the air, his tops in the earth. Man walks indeed upon the surface of the earth, as if nothing impeded his vision of heaven; but he walks nevertheless at the bottom of the atmosphere, and between these two, his *root* in air, he must work out his salvation." A great number of these "Hermetic writers" established their reputation for wit and wisdom by discoveries in the practical world, and it is difficult to believe that such men as Roger Bacon, Van Helmont, Ramond Lull, Jerome Cardan, Geber ("the Wise"), Avicenna, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and others not inferior, could have deceived themselves as the modern theory implies, viz., that they were searching a chemical recipe for the manufacture of gold. The symbolic form of statement was esteemed at that time as the highest form of popular

* "Remarks upon Alchemy and the Alchemists, showing that the Philosopher's Stone was a Symbol,"—Published by James Miller, New York, 1867.

exposition for the Infinite and the religious problems concerning God, the Soul, and the Universe. It seems that those writers considered such words as "God," "Spirit," "Heaven," and words of like deep import, as not signifying the thing intended only so far as the one who used them comprehended them. Thus if God was spoken of by one who sensuously imaged Him, here was idolatry, and the second commandment was broken. To the Platonist, "God" was the name of the Absolute Universal, and hence included *subject* as well as *object* in thinking. Hence if one objectified God by conceiving Him, he necessarily limited God, or, rather, had no real knowledge of Him. Said Sextus, the Pythagorean: "Do not investigate the name of God, because you will not find it. For everything which is called by a name, receives its appellation from that which is more worthy than itself, so that it is one person that calls, and another that hears. Who is it, therefore, that has given a name to God? *God*, however, is not a name for God, but an indication of what we conceive of him." From such passages we can see why the Alchemists called this "Ineffable One," *Mercury, Luna, Sol, Argent vive, Phæbus, Sulphur, Antimony, Elixir, Alcahest, Salt*, and other whimsical names, letting the predicates applied determine the nature of what was meant.

If a writer, speaking of "Alcahest," should say that it is a somewhat that rises in the east and sets in the west, gives light to the earth, and causes the growth of plants by its heat, etc., we should not misunderstand his meaning—it would be giving us the nature of the thing without the common name. Every one attaches some sort of significance to the words "life," "God," "reason," "instinct," etc., and yet who comprehends them? It is evident that in most cases the word stands for the thing, and hence when one speaks of such things by name, the hearer yawns and looks listless, as if he thought: "Well, I know all about that—I learned that when a child, in the Catechism." The Alchemists (and Du Fresnoy names nearly a thousand of these prolific writers) determined that no one should flatter himself that he knew the nature of the subject before he saw the predicates applied. Hence the strange names about which such spiritual doctrines were inculcated. "If we have concealed anything," says Geber, "ye sons of learning, wonder not; for we have not concealed it from you, but have delivered it in such language as that it may be hid from evil men, and that the unjust and vile might not know it. But, ye sons of Truth, search, and you shall find this most excellent gift of God, which he has reserved for you."

EDITORIALS.

ORIGINALITY.

It is natural that in America more than elsewhere, there should be a popular demand for originality. In Europe, each nation has, in the course of centuries, accumulated a stock of its own peculiar creations. America is sneered at for the lack of these. We have not had time as yet to develop spiritual capital on a scale to correspond to our material pretensions. Hence we, as a people, feel very sensitive on this point, and whenever any new literary enterprise is started, it is met on every hand by inquiries like these: "Is it original, or only an importation of European ideas?" "Why not publish something indigenous?" It grows cynical at the sight of erudition, and vents its spleen with indignation: "Why rifle the graves of centuries? You are no hyena! Does not the spring bring forth its flowers, and every summer its swarms of gnats? Why build a bridge of rotten

coffin planks, or wear a wedding garment of mummy wrappage? Why desecrate the Present, by offering it time-stained paper from the shelves of the Past?"

In so far as these inquiries are addressed to our own undertaking, we have a word to offer in self-justification. We have no objection to originality of the right stamp. An originality which cherishes its own little idiosyncrasies we despise. If we must differ from other people, let us differ in having a wide cosmopolitan culture. "All men are alike in possessing defects," says Goethe; "in excellencies alone it is that great differences may be found."

What philosophic originality may be, we hope to show by the following consideration:

It is the province of Philosophy to dissolve and make clear to itself the entire phenomena of the world. These phenomena consist of two kinds: *first*, the products of nature, or imme-

mediate existence; *second*, the products of spirit, including what modifications man has wrought upon the former, and his independent creations. These spiritual products may be again subdivided into *practical* (in which the *will* predominates)—the institutions of civilization—and *theoretical* (in which the *intellect* predominates)—art, religion, science, &c. Not only must Philosophy explain the immediate phenomena of nature—it must also explain the mediate phenomena of spirit. And not only are the institutions of civilization proper objects of study, but still more is this theoretic side that which demands the highest activity of the philosopher.

To examine the thoughts of man—to unravel them and make them clear—must constitute the earliest employment of the speculative thinker; his first business is to comprehend the thought of the world; to dissolve for himself the solutions which have dissolved the world before him. Hence, the prevalent opinion that it is far higher to be an “original investigator” than to be engaged in studying the thoughts of others, leaves out of view the fact that the thoughts of other men are just as much objective phenomena to the individual philosopher as the ground he walks on. They need explanation just as much. If I can explain the thoughts of the profoundest men of the world, and make clear wherein they differed among themselves and from the truth, certainly I am more original than they were. For is not “original” to be used in the sense of *primariness*, of approximation to the absolute, universal truth? He who varies from the truth must be secondary, and owe his defections to somewhat alien to his being, and therefore be himself subordinate thereto. Only the Truth makes Free and Original. How many people stand in the way of their own originality! If an absolute Science should be discovered by anybody, we could all become absolutely original by mastering it. So much as I have mastered of science, I have dissolved into me, and have not left it standing alien and opposed to me, but it is now my own.

Our course, then, in the practical endeavor to elevate the tone of American thinking, is plain: we must furnish convenient access to the deepest thinkers of ancient and modern times. To prepare translations and commentary, together with original exposition, is our object. Originality will take care of itself. Once disciplined in Speculative thought, the new growths of our national life will furnish us objects whose comprehension shall constitute original philosophy without parallel. Meanwhile it must be confessed that those who set up this cry for originality are not best employed. Their ideals are commonplace, and

their demand is too easily satisfied with the mere whimsical, and they do not readily enough distinguish therefrom the excellent.

CONTENTS OF THE JOURNAL.

Thus far the articles of this journal have given most prominence to art in its various forms. The speculative content of art is more readily seen than that of any other form, for the reason that its sensuous element allows a more genial exposition. The critique of the Second Part of Faust, by Rosenkranz, published in this number, is an eminent example of the effect which the study of Speculative Philosophy has upon the analytical understanding. Is not the professor of logic able to follow the poet, and interpret the products of his creative imagination? The portion of Hegel's *Æsthetics*, published in this number, giving, as it does, the historical groundwork of art, furnishes in a genial form an outline of the Philosophy of History. Doubtless the characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon mind make it difficult to see in art what it has for such nations as the Italians and Germans; we have the reflective intellect, and do not readily attain the stand-point of the creative imagination.

STYLE.

In order to secure against ambiguity, it is sometimes necessary to make inelegant repetitions, and, to give to a limiting clause its proper degree of subordination, such devices as parentheses, dashes, etc., have to be used to such a degree as to disfigure the page. Capitals and italics are also used without stint to mark important words. The adjective has frequently to be used substantively, and, if rare, this use is marked by commencing it with a capital.

There are three styles, which correspond to the three grades of intellectual culture. The sensuous stage uses simple, categorical sentences, and relates facts, while the reflective stage uses hypothetical ones, and marks relations between one fact and another; it introduces antithesis. The stage of the Reason uses the disjunctive sentence, and makes an assertion exhaustive by comprehending in it a multitude of interdependencies and exclusions. Thus it happens that the style of a Hegel is very difficult to master, and cannot be translated adequately into the sensuous style, although many have tried it. A person is very apt to blame the style of a deep thinker when he encounters him for the first time. It requires an “expert swimmer” to follow the discourse, but for no other reason than that the mind has not acquired the strength requisite to grasp in one thought a wide extent of conceptions.

THE JOURNAL

OF

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

Vol. I.

1867.

No. 3.

THE MONADOLGY.

[Translated from the French of LEIBNITZ, by F. H. HEDGE.]

1. The Monad, of which we shall here speak, is merely a simple substance entering into those which are compound; simple, that is to say, without parts.

2. And there must be simple substances, since there are compounds; for the compound is only a collection or aggregate of simples.

3. Where there are no parts, neither extension, nor figure, nor divisibility is possible; and these Monads are the veritable Atoms of Nature—in one word, the Elements of things.

4. There is thus no danger of dissolution, and there is no conceivable way in which a simple substance can perish naturally.

5. For the same reason, there is no way in which a simple substance can begin naturally, since it could not be formed by composition.

6. Therefore we may say that the Monads can neither begin nor end in any other way than all at once; that is to say, they cannot begin except by creation, nor end except by annihilation; whereas that which is compounded, begins and ends by parts.

7. There is also no intelligible way in which a Monad can be altered or changed in its interior by any other creature, since it would be impossible to transpose anything in it, or to conceive in it any internal movement—any movement ex-

cited, directed, augmented or diminished within, such as may take place in compound bodies, where there is change of parts. The Monads have no windows through which anything can enter or go forth. It would be impossible for any accidents to detach themselves and go forth from the substances, as did formerly the Sensible Species of the Schoolmen. Accordingly, neither substance nor accident can enter a Monad from without.

8. Nevertheless Monads must have qualities—otherwise they would not even be entities; and if simple substances did not differ in their qualities, there would be no means by which we could become aware of the changes of things, since all that is in compound bodies is derived from simple ingredients, and Monads, being without qualities, would be indistinguishable one from another, seeing also they do not differ in quantity. Consequently, a *plenum* being supposed, each place could in any movement receive only the just equivalent of what it had had before, and one state of things would be indistinguishable from another.

9. Moreover, each Monad must differ from every other, for there are never two beings in nature perfectly alike, and in which it is impossible to find an internal difference, or one founded on some intrinsic denomination.

10. I take it for granted, furthermore,

that every created being is subject to change—consequently the created Monad; and likewise that this change is continual in each.

11. It follows, from what we have now said, that the natural changes of Monads proceed from an internal principle, since no external cause can influence the interior.

12. But, besides the principle of change, there must also be a detail of changes, embracing, so to speak, the specification and the variety of the simple substances.

13. This detail must involve multitude in unity or in simplicity: for as all natural changes proceed by degrees, something changes and something remains, and consequently there must be in the simple substance a plurality of affections and relations, although there are no parts.

14. This shifting state, which involves and represents multitude in unity, or in the simple substance, is nothing else than what we call Perception, which must be carefully distinguished from *apperception*, or consciousness, as will appear in the sequel. Here it is that the Cartesians have especially failed, making no account of those perceptions of which we are not conscious. It is this that has led them to suppose that spirits are the only Monads, and that there are no souls of brutes or other Entelechies. It is owing to this that they have vulgarly confounded protracted torpor with actual death, and have fallen in with the scholastic prejudice, which believes in souls entirely separate. Hence, also, ill affected minds have been confirmed in the opinion that the soul is mortal.

15. The action of the internal principle which causes the change, or the passage from one perception to another, may be called Appetition. It is true, the desire cannot always completely attain to every perception to which it tends, but it always attains to something thereof, and arrives at new perceptions.

16. We experience in ourselves the fact of multitude in the simple substance, when we find that the least thought of which we are conscious includes a variety in its object. Accordingly, all who admit that the soul is a simple substance, are bound to admit this multitude in the Monad, and

Mr. Boyle should not have found any difficulty in this admission, as he has done in his dictionary—Art. Rorarius.

17. Besides, it must be confessed that Perception and its consequences are inexplicable by mechanical causes—that is to say, by figures and motions. If we imagine a machine so constructed as to produce thought, sensation, perception, we may conceive it magnified—the same proportions being preserved—to such an extent that one might enter it like a mill. This being supposed, we should find in it on inspection only pieces which impel each other, but nothing which can explain a perception. It is in the simple substance, therefore—not in the compound, or in machinery—that we must look for that phenomenon; and in the simple substance we find nothing else—nothing, that is, but perceptions and their changes. Therein also, and therein only, consist all the internal acts of simple substances.

18. We might give the name of Entelechies to all simple substances or created Monads, inasmuch as there is in them a certain completeness (perfection), (*ἔχουσι τὸ ἐντελεές*). There is a sufficiency (*αὐτάρκεια*) which makes them the sources of their own internal actions, and, as it were, incorporeal automata.

19. If we choose to give the name of soul to all that has perceptions and desires, in the general sense which I have just indicated, all simple substances or created Monads may be called souls. But as sentiment is something more than simple perception, I am willing that the general name of Monads and Entelechies shall suffice for those simple substances which have nothing but perceptions, and that the term souls shall be confined to those whose perceptions are more distinct, and accompanied by memory.

20. For we experience in ourselves a state in which we remember nothing, and have no distinct perception, as when we are in a swoon or in a profound and dreamless sleep. In this state the soul does not differ sensibly from a simple Monad; but since this state is not permanent, and since the soul delivers herself from it, she is something more.

21. And it does not by any means follow, in that case, that the simple substance is without perception: that, indeed, is impossible, for the reasons given above; for it cannot perish, neither can it subsist without affection of some kind, which is nothing else than its perception. But where there is a great number of minute perceptions, and where nothing is distinct, one is stunned, as when we turn round and round in continual succession in the same direction; whence arises a vertigo, which may cause us to faint, and which prevents us from distinguishing anything. And possibly death may produce this state for a time in animals.

22. And as every present condition of a simple substance is a natural consequence of its antecedent condition, so its present is big with its future.

23. Then, as on awaking from a state of stupor, we become conscious of our perceptions, we must have had perceptions, although unconscious of them, immediately before awaking. For each perception can have no other natural origin but an antecedent perception, as every motion must be derived from one which preceded it.

24. Thus it appears that if there were no distinction—no relief, so to speak—no enhanced flavor in our perceptions, we should continue forever in a state of stupor; and this is the condition of the naked Monad.

25. And so we see that nature has given to animals enhanced perceptions, by the care which she has taken to furnish them with organs which collect many rays of light and many undulations of air, increasing their efficacy by their union. There is something approaching to this in odor, in taste, in touch, and perhaps in a multitude of other senses of which we have no knowledge. I shall presently explain how that which passes in the soul represents that which takes place in the organs.

26. Memory gives to the soul a kind of consecutive action which imitates reason, but must be distinguished from it. We observe that animals, having a perception of something which strikes them, and of

which they have previously had a similar perception, expect, through the representation of their memory, the recurrence of that which was associated with it in their previous perception, and incline to the same feelings which they then had. For example, when we show dogs the cane, they remember the pain which it caused them, and whine and run.

27. And the lively imagination, which strikes and excites them, arises from the magnitude or the multitude of their previous perceptions. For often a powerful impression produces suddenly the effect of long habit, or of moderate perceptions often repeated.

28. In men as in brutes, the consecutiveness of their perceptions is due to the principle of memory—like empirics in medicine, who have only practice without theory. And we are mere empirics in three-fourths of our acts. For example, when we expect that the sun will rise tomorrow, we judge so empirically, because it has always risen hitherto. Only the astronomer judges by an act of reason.

29. But the cognition of necessary and eternal truths is that which distinguishes us from mere animals. It is this which gives us Reason and Science, and raises us to the knowledge of ourselves and of God; and it is this in us which we call a reasonable soul or spirit.

30. It is also by the cognition of necessary truths, and by their abstractions, that we rise to acts of reflection, which give us the idea of that which calls itself "I," and which lead us to consider that this or that is in us. And thus, while thinking of ourselves, we think of Being, of substance, simple or compound, of the immaterial, and of God himself. We conceive that that which in us is limited, is in him without limit. And these reflective acts furnish the principal objects of our reasonings.

31. Our reasonings are founded on two great principles, that of "*Contradiction*," by virtue of which we judge that to be false which involves contradiction, and that to be true which is opposed to, or which contradicts the false.

32. And that of the "*Sufficient Reason*,"

by virtue of which we judge that no fact can be real or existent, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason why it is thus, and not otherwise, although these reasons very often cannot be known to us.

33. There are also two sorts of truths—those of reasoning and those of fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary, and their opposite is impossible; those of fact are contingent, and their opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary, we may discover the reason of it by analysis, resolving it into simpler ideas and truths, until we arrive at those which are ultimate.*

34. It is thus that mathematicians by analysis reduce speculative theorems and practical canons to definitions, axioms and postulates.

35. And finally, there are simple ideas of which no definition can be given; there are also axioms and postulates,—in one word, *ultimate** *principles*, which cannot and need not be proved. And these are “Identical Propositions,” of which the opposite contains an express contradiction.

36. But there must also be a sufficient reason for truths contingent, or truths of fact—that is, for the series of things diffused through the universe of creatures—or else the process of resolving into particular reasons might run into a detail without bounds, on account of the immense variety of the things of nature, and of the infinite division of bodies. There is an infinity of figures and of movements, present and past, which enter into the efficient cause of my present writing; and there is an infinity of minute inclinations and dispositions of my soul, present and past, which enter into the final cause of it.

37. And as all this detail only involves other anterior or more detailed contingencies, each one of which again requires a similar analysis in order to account for it, we have made no advance, and the sufficient or final reason must be outside of the series of this detail of contingencies,† endless as it may be.

38. And thus the final reason of things must be found in a necessary Substance, in

which the detail of changes exists eminently as their source. And this is that which we call God.

39. Now this Substance being a sufficient reason of all this detail, which also is everywhere linked together, *there is but one God, and this God suffices.*

40. We may also conclude that this supreme Substance, which is Only,‡ Universal, and Necessary—having nothing outside of it which is independent of it, and being a simple series of possible beings—must be incapable of limits, and must contain as much of reality as is possible.

41. Whence it follows that God is perfect, perfection being nothing but the magnitude of positive reality taken exactly, setting aside the limits or bounds in that which is limited. And there, where there are no bounds, that is to say, in God, perfection is absolutely infinite.

42. It follows also that the creatures have their perfections from the influence of God, but they have their imperfections from their proper nature, incapable of existing without bounds; for it is by this that they are distinguished from God.

43. It is true, moreover, that God is not only the source of existences, but also of essences, so far as real, or of that which is real in the possible; because the divine understanding is the region of eternal truths, or of the ideas on which they depend, and without Him there would be nothing real in the possibilities, and not only nothing existing, but also nothing possible.

44. At the same time, if there be a reality in the essences or possibilities, or in the eternal truths, this reality must be founded in something existing and actual, consequently in the existence of the necessary Being, in whom essence includes existence, or with whom it is sufficient to be possible in order to be actual.

45. Thus God alone (or the necessary Being) possesses this privilege, that he must exist if possible; and since nothing can hinder the possibility of that which includes no bounds, no negation, and consequently no contradiction, that alone is

* *Primitifs.*

† i. e., Accidental causes.

‡ *Unique.*

sufficient to establish the existence of God *a priori*. We have likewise proved it by the reality of eternal truths. But we have also just proved it *a posteriori* by showing that, since contingent beings exist, they can have their ultimate and sufficient reason only in some necessary Being, who contains the reason of his existence in himself.

46. Nevertheless, we must not suppose, with some, that eternal verities, being dependent upon God, are arbitrary, and depend upon his will, as Des Cartes, and afterward M. Poiret, appear to have conceived. This is true only of contingent truths, the principle of which is fitness, or the choice of the best; whereas necessary truths depend solely on His understanding, and are its internal object.

47. Thus God alone is the primitive Unity, or the simple original substance of which all the created or derived Monads are the products; and they are generated, so to speak, by continual fulgurations of the Divinity, from moment to moment, bounded by the receptivity of the creature, of whose existence limitation is an essential condition.

48. In God is *Power*, which is the source of all; then *Knowledge*, which contains the detail of Ideas; and, finally, *Will*, which generates changes or products according to the principle of optimism. And this answers to what, in created Monads, constitutes the subject or the basis, the perceptive and the appetitive faculty. But in God these attributes are absolutely infinite or perfect, and in the created Monads, or in the Entelechies (or *perfectihabiis*, as Hermolaus Barbarus translates this word), they are only imitations according to the measure of their perfection.

49. The creature is said to act externally, in so far as it possesses perfection, and to suffer from another (creature) so far as it is imperfect. So we ascribe action to the Monad, so far as it has distinct perceptions, and passion, so far as its perceptions are confused.

50. And one creature is more perfect than another, in this: that we find in it that which serves to account *a priori* for

what passes in the other; and it is therefore said to act upon the other.

51. But in simple substances this is merely an ideal influence of one Monad upon another, which can pass into effect only by the intervention of God, inasmuch as in the ideas of God one Monad has a right to demand that God, in regulating the rest from the commencement of things, shall have regard to it; for since a created Monad can have no physical influence on the interior of another, it is only by this means that one can be dependent on another.

52. And hence it is that actions and passions in creatures are mutual; for God, comparing two simple substances, finds reasons in each which oblige him to accommodate the one to the other. Consequently that which is active in one view, is passive in another—active so far as what we clearly discern in it serves to account for that which takes place in another, and passive so far as the reason of that which passes in it is found in that which is clearly discerned in another.

53. Now, as in the ideas of God there is an infinity of possible worlds, and as only one can exist, there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God, which determines him to one rather than another.

54. And this reason can be no other than fitness, derived from the different degrees of perfection which these worlds contain, each possible world having a claim to exist according to the measure of perfection which it enfolds.

55. And this is the cause of the existence of that Best, which the wisdom of God discerns, which his goodness chooses, and his power effects.

56. And this connection, or this accommodation of all created things to each, and of each to all, implies in each simple substance relations which express all the rest. Each, accordingly, is a living and perpetual mirror of the universe.

57. And as the same city viewed from different sides appears quite different, and is perspective multiplied, so, in the infinite multitude of simple substances, there are given, as it were, so many different worlds which yet are only the perspec-

tives of a single one, according to the different points of view of each Monad.

58. And this is the way to obtain the greatest possible variety with the greatest possible order—that is to say, the way to obtain the greatest possible perfection.

59. Thus this hypothesis (which I may venture to pronounce demonstrated) is the only one which properly exhibits the greatness of God. And this Mr. Boyle acknowledges, when in his dictionary (Art. Rorarius) he objects to it. He is even disposed to think that I attribute too much to God, that I ascribe to him impossibilities; but he can allege no reason for the impossibility of this universal harmony, by which each substance expresses exactly the perfections of all the rest through its relations with them.

60. We see, moreover, in that which I have just stated, the *a priori* reasons why things could not be other than they are. God, in ordering the whole, has respect to each part, and specifically to each Monad, whose nature being representative, is by nothing restrained from representing the whole of things, although, it is true, this representation must needs be confused, as it regards the detail of the universe, and can be distinct only in relation to a small part of things, that is, in relation to those which are nearest, or whose relations to any given Monad are greatest. Otherwise each Monad would be a divinity. The Monads are limited, not in the object, but in the mode of their knowledge of the object. They all tend confusedly to the infinite, to the whole; but they are limited and distinguished by the degrees of distinctness in their perceptions.

61. And compounds symbolize in this with simples. For since the world is a *plenum*, and all matter connected, and as in a *plenum* every movement has some effect on distant bodies, in proportion to their distance, so that each body is affected not only by those in actual contact with it, and feels in some way all that happens to them, but also through their means is affected by others in contact with those by which it is immediately touched—it follows that this communication extends to any distance. Consequently, each body

feels all that passes in the universe, so that he who sees all, may read in each that which passes everywhere else, and even that which has been and shall be, discerning in the present that which is removed in time as well as in space. “*Συμπνέει πάντα*,” says Hippocrates. But each soul can read in itself only that which is distinctly represented in it. It cannot unfold its laws at once, for they reach into the infinite.

62. Thus, though every created Monad represents the entire universe, it represents more distinctly the particular body to which it belongs, and whose Entelechy it is: and as this body expresses the entire universe, through the connection of all matter in a *plenum*, the soul represents also the entire universe in representing that body which especially belongs to it.

63. The body belonging to a Monad, which is its Entelechy or soul, constitutes, with its Entelechy, what may be termed a living (thing), and, with its soul, what may be called an animal. And the body of a living being, or of an animal, is always organic; for every Monad, being a mirror of the universe, according to its fashion, and the universe being arranged with perfect order, there must be the same order in the representative—that is, in the perceptions of the soul, and consequently of the body according to which the universe is represented in it.

64. Thus each organic living body is a species of divine machine, or a natural automaton, infinitely surpassing all artificial automata. A machine made by human art is not a machine in all its parts. For example, the tooth of a brass wheel has parts or fragments which are not artificial to us; they have nothing which marks the machine in their relation to the use for which the wheel is designed; but natural machines—that is, living bodies—are still machines in their minutest parts, *ad infinitum*. This makes the difference between nature and art, that is to say, between the Divine art and ours.

65. And the author of nature was able to exercise this divine and infinitely wonderful art, inasmuch as every portion of nature is not only infinitely divisible, as

the ancients knew, but is actually subdivided without end—each part into parts, of which each has its own movement. Otherwise, it would be impossible that each portion of matter should express the universe.

66. Whence it appears that there is a world of creatures, of living (things), of animals, of Entelechies, of souls, in the minutest portion of matter.

67. Every particle of matter may be conceived as a garden of plants, or as a pond full of fishes. But each branch of each plant, each member of each animal, each drop of their humors, is in turn another such garden or pond.

68. And although the earth and the air embraced between the plants in the garden, or the water between the fishes of the pond, are not themselves plant or fish, they nevertheless contain such, but mostly too minute for our perception.

69. So there is no uncultured spot, no barrenness, no death in the universe—no chaos, no confusion, except in appearance, as it might seem in a pond at a distance, in which one should see a confused motion and swarming, so to speak, of the fishes of the pond, without distinguishing the fishes themselves.

70. We see, then, that each living body has a governing Entelechy, which in animals is the soul of the animal. But the members of this living body are full of other living bodies—plants, animals—each of which has its Entelechy, or regent soul.

71. We must not, however, suppose—as some who misapprehended my thought have done—that each soul has a mass or portion of matter proper to itself, or forever united to it, and that it consequently possesses other inferior living existences, destined forever to its service. For all bodies are in a perpetual flux, like rivers. Their particles are continually coming and going.

72. Thus the soul does not change its body except by degrees. It is never deprived at once of all its organs. There are often metamorphoses in animals, but never Metempsychosis—no transmigration of souls. Neither are there souls entirely separated

(from bodies), nor genii without bodies. God alone is wholly without body.

73. For which reason, also, there is never complete generation nor perfect death—strictly considered—consisting in the separation of the soul. That which we call generation, is development and accretion; and that which we call death, is envelopment and diminution.

74. Philosophers have been much troubled about the origin of forms, of Entelechies, or souls. But at the present day, when, by accurate investigations of plants, insects and animals, they have become aware that the organic bodies of nature are never produced from chaos or from putrefaction, but always from seed, in which undoubtedly there had been a *preformation*; it has been inferred that not only the organic body existed in that seed before conception, but also a soul in that body—in one word, the animal itself—and that, by the act of conception, this animal is merely disposed to a grand transformation, to become an animal of another species. We even see something approaching this, outside of generation, as when worms become flies, or when caterpillars become butterflies.

75. Those animals, of which some are advanced to a higher grade, by means of conception, may be called *spermatic*; but those among them which remain in their kind—that is to say, the greater portion—are born, multiply, and are destroyed, like the larger animals, and only a small number of the elect among them, pass to a grander theatre.

76. But this is only half the truth. I have concluded that if the animal does not begin to be in the order of nature, it also does not cease to be in the order of nature, and that not only there is no generation, but no entire destruction—no death, strictly considered. And these *a posteriori* conclusions, drawn from experience, accord perfectly with my principles deduced *apriori*, as stated above.

77. Thus we may say, not only that the soul (mirror of an indestructible universe) is indestructible, but also the animal itself, although its machine may often perish in part, and put off or put on organic spoils.

78. These principles have furnished me with a natural explanation of the union, or rather the conformity between the soul and the organized body. The soul follows its proper laws, and the body likewise follows those which are proper to it, and they meet in virtue of the præestablished harmony which exists between all substances, as representations of one and the same universe.

79. Souls act according to the laws of final causes, by appetitions, means and ends; bodies act according to the laws of efficient causes, or the laws of motion. And the two kingdoms, that of efficient causes and that of final causes, harmonize with each other.

80. Des Cartes perceived that souls communicate no force to bodies, because the quantity of force in matter is always the same. Nevertheless, he believed that souls might change the direction of bodies. But this was because the world was at that time ignorant of the law of nature, which requires the conservation of the same total direction in matter. Had he known this, he would have hit upon my system of præestablished harmony.

81. According to this system, bodies act as if there were no souls, and souls act as if there were no bodies; and yet both act as though the one influenced the other.

82. As to spirits, or rational souls, although I find that at bottom the same principle which I have stated—namely, that animals and souls begin with the world and end only with the world—holds with regard to all animals and living things, yet there is this peculiarity in rational animals, that although their spermatric animalcules, as such, have only ordinary or sensitive souls, yet as soon as those of them which are *elected*, so to speak, arrive by the act of conception at human nature, their sensitive souls are elevated to the rank of reason and to the prerogative of spirits.

83. Among other differences which distinguish spirits from ordinary souls, some of which have already been indicated, there is also this: that souls in general are living mirrors, or images of the universe of creatures, but spirits are, further-

more, images of Divinity itself, or of the Author of Nature, capable of cognizing the system of the universe, and of imitating something of it by architectonic experiments, each spirit being, as it were, a little divinity in its own department.

84. Hence spirits are able to enter into a kind of fellowship with God. In their view he is not merely what an inventor is to his machine (as God is in relation to other creatures), but also what a prince is to his subjects, and even what a father is to his children.

85. Whence it is easy to conclude that the assembly of all spirits must constitute the City of God—that is to say, the most perfect state possible, under the most perfect of monarchies.

86. This City of God, this truly universal monarchy, is a moral world within the natural; and it is the most exalted and the most divine among the works of God. It is in this that the glory of God most truly consists, which glory would be wanting if his greatness and his goodness were not recognized and admired by spirits. It is in relation to this Divine City that he possesses, properly speaking, the attribute of *goodness*, whereas his wisdom and his power are everywhere manifest.

87. As we have established above, a perfect harmony between the two natural kingdoms—the one of efficient causes, the other of final causes—so it behooves us to notice here also a still further harmony between the physical kingdom of nature and the moral kingdom of grace—that is to say, between God considered as the architect of the machine of the universe, and God considered as monarch of the divine City of Spirits.

88. This harmony makes all things conduce to grace by natural methods. This globe, for example, must be destroyed and repaired by natural means, at such seasons as the government of spirits may require, for the chastisement of some and the recompense of others.

89. We may say, furthermore, that God as architect contains entirely God as legislator, and that accordingly sins must carry their punishment with them in the order of nature, by virtue even of the mechan-

cal structure of things, and that good deeds in like manner will bring their recompense, through their connection with bodies, although this cannot, and ought not always to, take place on the spot.

90. Finally, under this perfect government, there will be no good deed without its recompense, and no evil deed without its punishment, and all must redound to the advantage of the good—that is to say, of those who are not malcontents—in this great commonwealth, who confide in Providence after having done their duty, and who worthily love and imitate the Author of all good, pleasing themselves with the contemplation of his perfections, following the nature of pure and genuine Love, which makes us blest in the happiness of

the loved. In this spirit, the wise and good labor for that which appears to be conformed to the divine will, presumptive or antecedent, contented the while with all that God brings to pass by his secret will, consequent and decisive,—knowing that if we were sufficiently acquainted with the order of the universe we should find that it surpasses all the wishes of the wisest, and that it could not be made better than it is, not only for all in general, but for ourselves in particular, if we are attached, as is fitting, to the Author of All, not only as the architect and efficient cause of our being, but also as our master and the final cause, who should be the whole aim of our volition, and who alone can make us blest.

A CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS.

[Translated from the German of J. G. FICHTE, by A. E. KROEGER.]

[NOTE.—The following completes Fichte's Second Introduction to the Science of Knowledge, or his Criticism of Philosophical Systems. In the first division of what follows, Fichte traces out his own transcendental standpoint in the Kantian Philosophy, and next proceeds, in the second division, to connect it with what was printed in our previous number, criticising without mercy the dogmatic standpoint. By the completion of this article, we have given to the readers of our *Journal* Fichte's own great Introductions to that Science of Knowledge, which is about to be made accessible to American readers through the publishing house of Messrs. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia. Our readers are, therefore, especially prepared to enter upon a study of Fichte's wonderful system, for none of these Introductions, as indeed none of Fichte's works of Science, have ever before been published in the English language. In a subsequent number we shall print Fichte's "Sun-clear Statement regarding the true nature of the Science of Knowledge," a masterly exhibition of the treatment of scientific subjects in a popular form. We hope that all who have read, or will read these articles, will also enter upon a study of the great work which they are designed to prepare for; the study is worth the pains.—EDITOR.]

I.

It is not the habit of the *Science of Knowledge*, nor of its author, to seek protection under any authority whatever. The person who has first to see whether this doctrine agrees with the doctrine of somebody else before he is willing to be convinced by it, is not one whom this science calculates to convince, because the absolute self-activity and independent faith in himself which this science presupposes, is wanting in him.

It was therefore quite a different motive than a desire to recommend his doctrines, which led the author of the *Science of Knowledge* to state that his doctrine was in perfect harmony with Kant's doctrine,

and was indeed the very same. In this opinion he has been confirmed by the continued elaboration of his system, which he was compelled to undertake. Nevertheless, all others who pass for students of Kant's philosophy, and who have spoken on the subject—whether they were friends or opponents of the *Science of Knowledge*—have unanimously asserted the contrary; and by their advice, even Kant himself, who ought certainly best to understand himself, asserts the contrary. If the author of the *Science of Knowledge* were disposed towards a certain manner of thinking, this would be welcome news to him. Moreover, since he considers it no disgrace to have misunderstood Kant, and

foresees that to have misunderstood him will soon be considered no disgrace by general opinion, he ought surely not to hesitate to assume that disgrace, especially as it would confer upon him the honor of being the first discoverer of a philosophy which will certainly become universal, and be productive of the most beneficial results for mankind.

It is indeed scarcely explicable why friends and opponents of the Science of Knowledge so zealously contradict that assertion of its author, and why they so earnestly request him to prove it, although he never promised to do so, nay, expressly refused, since such a proof would rather belong to a future History of Philosophy than to a present representation of that system. The opponents of the Science of Knowledge in thus calling for a proof, are certainly not impelled by a tender regard for the fame of the author of that Science; and the friends of it might surely leave the subject alone, as I myself have no taste for such an honor, and seek the only honor which I know, in quite a different direction. Do they clamor for this proof in order to escape my charge, that they did not understand the writings of Kant? But such an accusation from the lips of the author of the Science of Knowledge is surely no reproach, since he confesses as loudly as possible, that he also has not understood them, and that only after he had discovered in his own way the Science of Knowledge, did he find a correct and harmonious interpretation of Kant's writings. Indeed, that charge will soon cease to be a reproach from the lips of anybody. But perhaps this clamor is raised to escape the charge that they did not recognize their own doctrine, so zealously defended by them, when it was placed before them in a different shape from their own. If this is the case, I should like to save them this reproach also, if there were not another interest, which to me appears higher than theirs, and to which their interest *shall* be sacrificed. The fact is, I do not wish to be considered for one moment more than I am, nor to ascribe to myself a merit which I do not possess.

I shall therefore, in all probability, be

compelled to enter upon the proof which they so earnestly demand, and hence improve the opportunity at present offered to me.

The Science of Knowledge starts, as we have just now seen, from an intellectual contemplation, from the absolute self-activity of the Ego.

Now it would seem beyond a doubt, and evident to all the readers of Kant's writings, that this man has declared himself on no subject more decisively, nay, I might say contemptuously, than in denying this power of an intellectual contemplation. This denial seems so thoroughly rooted in the Kantian System, that, after all the elaboration of his philosophy, which he has undertaken *since* * the appearance of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and by means of which, as will be evident to any one, the propositions of that first work have received a far higher clearness and development than they originally possessed;—he yet, in one of his latest works, feels constrained to repeat those assertions with undiminished energy, and to show that the present style of philosophy, which treats all labor and exertion with contempt, as well as a most disastrous fanaticism, have resulted from the phantom of an intellectual contemplation.

Is any further proof needed, that a Philosophy, which is based on the very thing so decidedly rejected by the Kantian System, must be precisely the opposite of that system, and must be moreover the very senseless and disastrous system, of which Kant speaks in that work of his? Perhaps, however, it might be well first to inquire, whether the same word may not express two utterly different conceptions in the two systems. In Kant's terminology, all contemplation is directed upon a *Being* (a permanent Remaining); and intellectual contemplation would thus signify in his system the immediate consciousness of a non-sensuous Being, or the immediate consciousness (through pure thinking) of the thing *per se*; and hence a creation of the

* Critique of Practical Reason; Critique of the Power of Judgment; and Critique of a Pure Doctrine of Religion.—Translator.

thing *per se* through its conception, in nearly the same manner as the existence of God is demonstrated from the mere conception of God;—those who do so must look upon God's existence as a mere sequence of their thinking. Now Kant's system—taking the direction it did take—may have considered it necessary in this manner to keep the thing *per se* at a respectful distance. But the Science of Knowledge has finished the thing *per se* in another manner; that Science knows it to be the completest perversion of reason, a purely irrational conception. To that science all being is necessarily *sensuous*, for it evolves the very conception of Being from the form of sensuousness. That science regards the intellectual contemplation of Kant's system as a phantasm, which vanishes the moment one attempts to think it, and which indeed is not worth a name at all. The intellectual contemplation, whereof the Science of Knowledge speaks, is not at all directed upon a Being, but upon an Activity; and Kant does not even designate it, (unless you wish to take the expression "*Pure apperception*" for such a designation). Nevertheless, it can be clearly shown where in Kant's System it ought to have been mentioned. I hope that the *categorical imperative* of Kant occurs in consciousness, according to his System. Now what sort of consciousness is this of the categorical imperative? This question Kant never proposed to himself, because he never treated of the basis of *all* Philosophy. In his *Critique of Pure Reason* he treated only of theoretical Philosophy, and could therefore not introduce the categorical imperative; in his *Critique of Practical Reason*, he treated only of practical Philosophy, wherein the question concerning the manner of consciousness could not arise.

This consciousness is doubtless an immediate, but no sensuous consciousness—hence exactly what I call intellectual contemplation. Now, since we have no classical author in Philosophy, I give it the latter name, with the same right with which Kant gives it to something else, which is a mere nothing; and with the same right I insist that people ought first to

become acquainted with the significance of my terminology before proceeding to judge my system.

My most estimable friend, the Rev. Mr. Schulz—to whom I had made known my indefinite idea of building up the whole Science of Philosophy on the pure Ego, long before I had thoroughly digested that idea, and whom I found less opposed to it than any one else—has a remarkable passage on this subject. In his review of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, he says: "The pure, active self-consciousness, in which really every one's Ego consists, must not be confounded—for the very reason because it can and must teach us in an immediate manner—with the *power of contemplation*, and must not be made to involve the doctrine that we are in possession of a *supersensuous, intellectual power of contemplation*. For we call *contemplation a representation*, which is *immediately* related to an object. But pure self-consciousness is not *representation*, but is rather that which first makes a representation to become really a representation. If I say, 'I represent something to myself,' it signifies just the same as if I said, 'I am conscious that I have a representation of this object.'"

According to Mr. Schulz, therefore, a representation is that whereof consciousness is possible. Now Mr. Schulz also speaks of pure self-consciousness. Undoubtedly he knows whereof he speaks, and hence, as philosopher, he most truly has a representation of pure self-consciousness. It was not of this consciousness of the philosopher, however, that Mr. Schulz spoke, but of original consciousness; and hence the significance of his assertion is this: Originally (i. e. in common consciousness without philosophical reflection) mere self-consciousness does not constitute full consciousness, but is merely a necessary compound, which makes full consciousness first possible. But is it not the same with *sensuous* contemplation? Does *sensuous* contemplation constitute a consciousness, or is it not rather merely that whereby a representation first becomes a representation? Contemplation without conception is confess-

edly blind. How, then, can Mr. Schulz call (sensuous) contemplation (excluding from it self-consciousness) representation? From the standpoint of the philosopher, as we have just seen, self-consciousness is equally representation; from the standpoint of original contemplation, sensuous contemplation is equally *not* representation. Or does the conception constitute a representation? The conception without contemplation is confessedly empty. In truth, self-consciousness, sensuous contemplation, and conception, are, in their isolated separateness, not representations—they are only that through which representations become possible. * According to Kant, to Schulz, and to myself, a complete representation contains a threefold: 1st. That whereby the representation relates itself to an object, and becomes the representative of a *Something*—and this we unanimously call the *sensuous contemplation* (even if I am myself the object of my representation, it is by virtue of a sensuous contemplation, for then I become to myself a permanent in time); 2d. That through which the representation relates itself to the subject, and becomes *my* representation; this I also call contemplation (but *intellectual contemplation*), because it has the same relation to the complete representation which the sensuous contemplation has; but Kant and Schulz do not want it called so; and, 3d. That through which both are united, and only in this union become representation; and this we again unanimously call *conception*.

But to state it tersely: what is really the Science of Knowledge in two words? It is this: Reason is absolutely self-determined; Reason is only for Reason; but for Reason there is also nothing but Reason. Hence, everything, which Reason is, must be grounded in itself, and out of itself, but not in or out of another—some external other, which it could never grasp without giving up itself. In short, the Science of Knowledge is transcendental idealism. Again, what is the content of the Kantian system in two words? I confess that I cannot conceive it possible how any one can understand even one sentence of Kant, and harmonize it with others, ex-

cept on the same presupposition which the Science of Knowledge has just asserted. I believe that that presupposition is the everlasting refrain of his system; and I confess that one of the reasons why I refused to prove the agreement of the Science of Knowledge with Kant's system was this: It appeared to me somewhat too ridiculous and too tedious to show up the forest by pointing out the several trees in it.

I will cite here one chief passage from Kant. He says: "The highest principle of the possibility of all contemplation in relation to the understanding is this: that all the manifold be subject to the conditions of the original unity of apperception." That is to say, in other words, "That something which is contemplated be also *thought*, is only possible on condition that the possibility of the original unity of apperception can coexist with it." Now since, according to Kant, contemplation also is possible only on condition that it be thought and comprehended—otherwise it would remain blind—and since contemplation itself is thus subject to the conditions of the possibility of thinking—it follows that, according to Kant, not only Thinking immediately, but by the mediation of thinking, contemplation also, and hence *all consciousness*, is subject to the conditions of the original unity of apperception.

Now, what is this condition? It is true, Kant speaks of conditions, but he states only one as a fundamental condition. What is this condition of the original unity of apperception? It is this (see § 16 of the *Critique of Pure Reason*), "that my representations *can* be accompanied by the '*I think*'"—the word "*I*" alone is italicised by Kant, and this is somewhat important; that is to say, *I am the thinking* in this thinking.

Of what "*I*" does Kant speak here? Perhaps of the Ego, which his followers quietly heap together by a manifold of representations, in no single one of which it was, but in all of which collectively it now is said to be. Then the words of Kant would signify this: I, who think D, am the same I who thought A, B and C,

and it is only through the thinking of my manifold thinking, that I first became I to myself—that is to say, the *identical* in the manifold? In that case Kant would have been just such a pitiable tattler as these Kantians; for in that case the possibility of all thinking would be conditioned, according to him, by another thinking, and by the thinking of this thinking; and I should like to know how we could ever arrive at a thinking.

But, instead of tracing the consequences of Kant's statement, I merely intended to cite his own words. He says again: "This representation, '*I think*,' is an act of spontaneity, i. e. it cannot be considered as belonging to *sensuousness*." (I add: and hence, also, not to inner sensuousness, to which the above described identity of consciousness most certainly does belong.) Kant continues: "I call it pure apperception, in order to distinguish it from the empirical (just described) apperception, and because it is that self-consciousness, which, in producing the representation '*I think*,'—which must accompany all other representations, and is *in all consciousness one and the same*—can itself be accompanied by no other representation."

Here the character of pure self-consciousness is surely clearly enough described. It is in all consciousness the same—hence undeterminable by any accident of consciousness; in it the Ego is only determined through itself, and is thus absolutely determined. It is also clear here, that Kant could not have understood this pure apperception to mean the consciousness of our individuality, nor could he have taken the latter for the former; for the consciousness of my individuality, as an *I*, is necessarily conditioned by, and only possible through, the consciousness of another individuality, a *Thou*.

Hence we discover in Kant's writings the conception of the *pure Ego* exactly as the Science of Knowledge has described it, and completely determined. Again, in what relation does Kant, in the above passage, place this pure Ego to all consciousness? As *conditioning the same*. Hence, according to Kant, the possibility of all

consciousness is conditioned by the possibility of the pure Ego, or by pure self-consciousness, just as the Science of Knowledge holds. In thinking, the conditioning is made the prior of the conditioned—for this is the significance of that relation; and thus it appears that, according to Kant, a systematic deduction of all consciousness, or, which is the same, a System of Philosophy, must proceed from the pure Ego, just as the Science of Knowledge proceeds; and Kant himself has thus suggested the idea of such a Science.

But some one might wish to weaken this argument by the following distinction: It is one thing to *condition*, and another to *determine*.

According to Kant, all consciousness is only *conditioned* by self-consciousness; i. e. the *content* of that consciousness may have its ground in something else than self-consciousness; provided the results of that grounding do not *contradict* the conditions of self-consciousness; those results need not *proceed* from self-consciousness, provided they do not cancel its possibility.

But, according to the Science of Knowledge, all consciousness is *determined* through self-consciousness; i. e. everything which occurs in consciousness is *grounded, given* and *produced* by the conditions of self-consciousness, and a ground of the same in something other than self-consciousness does not exist at all.

Now, to meet this argument, I must show that in the present case the *determinateness* follows immediately from the *conditionedness*, and that, therefore, the distinction drawn between both is not valid in this instance. Whosoever says, "All consciousness is conditioned by the possibility of self-consciousness, and as such I now propose to consider it," knows in this his investigation, nothing more concerning consciousness, and abstracts from everything he may believe, further to know concerning it. He deduces what is required from the asserted principle, and only what he thus has *deduced* as consciousness is for him consciousness, and everything else is and remains nothing. Thus the derivability from self-consciousness *determines*

for him the extent of that which he holds to be consciousness, because he starts from the presupposition that all consciousness is *conditioned* by the possibility of self-consciousness.

Now I know very well that Kant has by no means *built up* such a system; for if he had, the author of the Science of Knowledge would not have undertaken that work, but would have chosen another branch of human knowledge for his field. I know that he has by no means *proven* his categories to be conditions of self-consciousness; I know that he has simply asserted them so to be; that he has still less deduced time and space, and that which in original consciousness is *inseparable* from them—the matter which fills time and space—as such conditions; since of these he has not even expressly stated, as he has done in the case of the categories, that they are such conditions. But I believe I know quite as well that Kant has *thought* such a system; that all his writings and utterances are fragments and results of this system, and that his assertions get meaning and intention only through this presupposition. Whether he did not himself think this system with sufficient clearness and definiteness to enable him to utter it for others; or whether he did, indeed, think it thus clearly and merely *did not want* so to utter it, as some remarks would seem to indicate, might, it seems to me, be left undecided; at least somebody else must investigate this matter, for I have never asserted anything on this point.* But, however such an investigation may result, this *merit* surely belongs altogether to the great man; that he first of all consciously sepa-

rated philosophy from external objects, and led that science into the Self. This is the spirit and the inmost soul of all his philosophy, and this also is the spirit and soul of the Science of Knowledge.

I am reminded of a chief distinction which is said to exist between the Science of Knowledge and Kant's system, and a distinction which but recently has been again insisted upon by a man who is justly supposed to have understood Kant, and who has shown that he also has understood the Science of Knowledge. This man is Reinhold, who, in a late essay, in endeavoring to prove that I have done injustice to *myself*, and to other 'successful' students of Kant's writings—in stating what I have just now reiterated and proved, i. e. that Kant's system and the Science of Knowledge are the same—proceeds to remark: "The *ground* of our assertion, that there is an external something corresponding to our representations, is most certainly held by the *Critique of Pure Reason* to be contained in the Ego; but only in so far as *empirical knowledge* (experience) has taken place in the Ego as a fact; that is to say, the *Critique of Pure Reason* holds that this empirical knowledge has its ground in the pure Ego only in relation to its *transcendental content*, which is the *form* of that knowledge; but in regard to its *empirical content*, which gives that knowledge objective validity, it is grounded in the Ego through a something *which is not the Ego*." Now, a scientific form of philosophy was not possible so long as that something, which is not Ego, was looked for outside of the Ego as ground of the objective reality of the transcendental content of the Ego."

Thus Reinhold. I have not convinced my readers, or demonstrated my proof, until I have met this objection.

The (purely historical) question is this: Has Kant really placed the ground of experience (in its empirical content) *in a something different from the Ego*?

I know very well that all the Kantians, except Mr. Beck, whose work appeared after the publication of the Science of Knowledge, have really understood Kant to say this. Nay, the last interpreter of

* For instance—*Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 108: "I purposely pass by the definition of these categories, *although I may be in possession of it*." Now, these categories can be defined, each by its determined relation to the possibility of self-consciousness, and whoever is in possession of these definitions, is necessarily possessed of the Science of Knowledge. Again, p. 109: "*In a system of pure reason* this definition might justly be required of me, but in the present work they would only obscure the main point." Here he clearly opposes two systems to each other—the *System of Pure Reason* and the "present work," i. e. the *Critique of Pure Reason*—and the latter is said *not* to be the former.

Kant, Mr. Schulz, whom Kant himself has endorsed, thus interprets him. How often does Mr. Schulz admit that *the objective ground of the appearances is contained in something which is a thing in itself*; &c., &c. We have just seen how Reinhold also interprets Kant.

Now it may seem presumptuous for one man to arise and say: "Up to this moment, amongst a number of worthy scholars who have devoted their time and energies to the interpretation of a certain book, not a single one has understood that book otherwise than *utterly falsely*; they all have discovered in that system the very doctrine which it refutes—dogmatism, instead of transcendental idealism; and *I alone understand it rightly*." Yet this presumption might be but seemingly so; for it is to be hoped that other persons will adopt that one man's views, and that, therefore, he will not always stand alone. There are other reasons why it is not very presumptuous to contradict the whole number of Kantians, but I will not mention them here.

But what is most curious in this matter is this—the discovery that Kant did not intend to speak of a something different from the Ego, is by no means a new one. For ten years everybody could read the most thorough and complete proof of it in Jacobi's "Idealism and Realism," and in his "Transcendental Idealism." In those works Jacobi has put together the most evident and decisive passages from Kant's writings on this subject, in Kant's own words. I do not like to do again what has once been done, and cannot be done better; and I refer my readers with the more pleasure to those works, as they, like all philosophical writings of Jacobi, may be even yet of advantage to them.

A few questions, however, I propose to address to those interpreters of Kant. Tell me, how far does the applicability of the categories extend, according to Kant, particularly of the category of causality? Clearly only to the field of appearances, and hence only to that which is already in us and for us. But in what manner do we then come to accept a something differ-

ent from the Ego, as the ground of the empirical content of Knowledge? I answer: only by drawing a conclusion from the grounded to the ground; hence by applying the category of causality. Thus, indeed, Kant himself discovers it to be, and hence rejects the assumption of *things, &c., &c., outside of us*. But his interpreters make him forget for the present instance the validity of categories generally, and make him arrive, by a bold leap, from the world of appearances to the thing *per se* outside of us. Now, how do these interpreters justify this inconsequence?

Kant evidently speaks of a thing *per se*. But what is this thing to him? A *noumenon*, as we can find in many passages of his writings. Reinhold and Schulz also hold it to be a *noumenon*. Now, what is a *noumenon*? According to Kant, to Reinhold, and Schulz, a something, which our *thinking*—by laws to be shown up, and which Kant has shown up—*adds* to the appearance, and which *must* so be added in *thought*;* which, therefore, is produced *only through our thinking*; not, however, through our *free*, but through a *necessary* thinking, which is only *for our thinking*—for us thinking beings.

But what do those interpreters make of this *noumenon* or thing in itself? The thought of this thing in itself is grounded in sensation, and sensation they again assert to be grounded in the thing in itself. Their globe rests on the great elephant, and the great elephant—rests on the globe. Their thing in itself, which is a mere thought, they say *affects* the Ego. Have they then forgotten their first speech, and is the thing, *per se*, which a moment ago was but a mere thought, now turned into something more? Or do they seriously mean to apply to a mere thought, the exclusive predicate of reality, i. e. causality? And such teachings are put forth as the

* Here is the corner stone of Kant's realism. I *must think* something as thing in itself, i. e. as independent of *me, the empirical*, whenever I occupy the standpoint of the empirical; and because I *must think* so, I never become conscious of this activity in my thinking, *since it is not free*. Only when I occupy the standpoint of philosophy can I *draw the conclusion* that I am active in this thinking.

astonishing discoveries of the great genius, who, with his torch, lights up the retrograde philosophical century. /

It is but too well known to me that the Kantianism of the Kantians is precisely the just described system—is really this monstrous composition of the most vulgar dogmatism, which allows things *per se* to make impressions upon us, and of the most decided idealism, which allows all being to be generated only through the thinking of the intelligence, and which knows nothing of any other sort of being. From what I am yet going to say on this subject, I except two men—Reinhold, because with a power of mind and a love of truth which do credit to his heart and head, he has abandoned this system, (which, however, he still holds to be the Kantian system, and I only disagree with him on this purely historical question,) and Schulz, because he has of late been silent on philosophical questions, which leaves it fair to assume that he has begun to doubt his former system.

But concerning the others, it must be acknowledged by all who have still their inner sense sufficiently under control to be able to distinguish between being and thinking and not to mix both together, that a system which thus mixes being and thinking receives but too much honor if it is spoken of seriously. To be sure, very few men may be properly required to overcome the natural tendency towards dogmatism sufficiently to lift themselves up to the free flight of Speculation. What was impossible for a man of overwhelming mental activity like Jacobi, how can it be expected of certain other men, whom I would rather not name? But that these incurable dogmatists should have persuaded themselves that Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* was food for them; that they had the boldness to conclude—since Kant's writings had been praised (God may know by what chance!) in some celebrated journal—they might also now follow the fashion and become Kantians; that since then, for years, they, in their intoxication, have be-written many a ream of valuable paper, without ever, in all this time, having come to their senses, or un-

derstood but one period of all they have written; that up to the present day, though they have been somewhat rudely shaken, they have not been able to rub the sleep out of their eyes, but rather prefer to beat and kick about them, in the hope of striking some of these unwelcome disturbers of their peace; and that the German public, so desirous of acquiring knowledge, should have bought their blackened paper with avidity, and attempted to suck up the spirit of it—nay, should even, perhaps, have copied and recopied these writings without ever clearly perceiving that there was no sense in them: all this will forever, in the annals of philosophy, remain the disgrace of our century, and our posterity will be able to explain these occurrences of our times only on the presupposition of a mental epidemic, which had taken hold of this age.

But, will these interpreters reply: your argument is, after all—if we abstract from Jacobi's writings, which, to be sure, are rather hard to swallow, since they quote Kant's own words—no more than this: it is absurd; hence Kant cannot have meant to say it. Now, if we admit the absurdity, as unfortunately we must, why, then, might not Kant have said these absurdities, just as well as we others, amongst whom there are some, of whom you yourself confess the merits, and to whom you doubtless will not deny all sound understanding?

I reply: to be the inventor of a system is one thing, and to be his commentators and successors, another. What, in case of the latter, would not testify to an absolute want of sound sense, might certainly evince it in the former. The ground is this: the latter are not yet possessed of the idea of the whole—for if they were so possessed, there would be no necessity for them to study the system; they are merely to construct it out of the *parts* which the inventor hands over to them; and all these parts are, in their minds, not fully determined, rounded off, and made smooth, until they are united into a natural whole. Now, this construction of the parts may require some time, and during this time it may

occur that these men determine some parts inaccurately, and hence place them in contradiction with the whole, of which they are not yet possessed. The discoverer of the idea of the whole, on the contrary, proceeds from this idea, in which all parts are united, and these parts he separately places before his readers, because only thus can he communicate the whole. The work of the former is a synthetizing of that which they do not yet possess, but are to obtain through the synthesis; the work of the latter is an analyzing of that which he already possesses. It is very possible that the former may not be aware of the contradiction in which the several parts stand to the whole which is to be composed of them, for they may not have got so far yet as to compare them. But it is quite certain that the latter, who proceeded from the composite, must have thought, or believed that he thought, the contradiction which is in the parts of his representation—for he certainly at one time held all the parts together. It is not absurd to think dogmatism now, and in another moment transcendental idealism; for this we all do, and must do, if we wish to philosophize about both systems; but it is absurd to think both systems as *one*. The interpreters of Kant's system do not necessarily think it thus as one; but the author of that system must certainly have done so if his system was intended to effect such a union.

Now, I, at least, am utterly incapable of believing such an absurdity on the part of any one who has his senses; how, then, can I believe Kant to have been guilty of it? Unless Kant, therefore, declares expressly in so many words, *that he deduces sensation from an impression of the thing, per se*, or, to use his own terminology, *that sensation must be explained in philosophy, from a transcendental object which exists outside of us*, I shall not believe what these interpreters tell us of Kant. But if he does make this declaration, I shall consider the *Critique of Pure Reason* rather as the result of the most marvellous accident than as the product of a mind.

But, say our opponents, does not Kant state expressly that "The object is given

to us," and "that this is possible because the object affects us as in a certain manner," and "that there is a power of attaining representations by the manner in which objects affect us, which power is called *sensuousness*." Nay, Kant says even this: "How should our knowledge be awakened into exercise if it were not done by objects that touch our senses and partly produce representations themselves, while partly putting our power of understanding into motion, to compare, connect and separate these representations, and thus to form the *raw material* of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge which is called experience." Well, these are probably all the passages which can be adduced by our opponents. Now, putting merely passages against passages, and words against words, and abstracting altogether from the idea of the whole, which I assume these interpreters never to have had, let me ask first, if these passages could really not be united with Kant's other frequently repeated statements, viz., that it is folly to speak of an impression produced upon us by an external transcendental object,—how did it happen that these interpreters preferred to sacrifice the many statements, which assert a transcendental idealism, to these *few* passages, which assert a dogmatism, than *vice versa*? Doubtless because they did not attempt the study of Kant's writings with an impartial mind, but had their heads full of that dogmatism—which constitutes their very being—as the only correct system, which they assumed such a sensible man as Kant must necessarily also hold to be the only correct system; and because they thus did not seek to be taught by Kant, but merely to be confirmed by him in their old way of thinking.

But cannot these seemingly opposite statements be united? Kant speaks in these passages of *objects*. What this word is to signify, we clearly must learn from Kant himself. He says: "It is the understanding which adds the object to the appearance, by *connecting* the manifold of the appearance *in one consciousness*. When this is done, we say we know the

object, for we have effected a synthetical unity in the manifold of the contemplation, and the conception of this unity is the representation of the object = X. But this X is not the transcendental object (i. e. the thing *per se*), for of that we know not even so much."

What, then, is this object? That which the understanding adds to the appearance, a mere thought. Now, the object affects—i. e. something which is a mere thought affects. What does this mean? If I have but a spark of logic, it means simply: it affects in so far as it is; hence it is only thought as affecting. Let us now see what Kant means when he speaks about the "power to obtain representations by the manner in which objects affect us." Since we only think the affection itself, we doubtless only think likewise that which is common to the affection. Or: if you posit an object with the thought that it has affected you, you think yourself in this case affected; and if you think that this occurs in respect to all the objects of your perception, you think yourself as liable to be affected generally—or, in other words, you ascribe to yourself, through this your thinking, receptivity or sensuousness.

But do we not thus assume, after all, affection to explain knowledge? Let me state the difference in one word: it is true, all our knowledge proceeds from an affection, but not an affection through an object. This is Kant's doctrine, and that of the Science of Knowledge. As Mr. Beck has overlooked this important point, and as Reinhold does not call sufficient attention to that which makes the positing of a non-Ego possible, I consider it proper to explain the matter in a few words. In doing so I shall use my own terminology, and not Kant's, because I naturally have my own more at my command.

When I posit myself, I posit myself as a limited; in consequence of the contemplation of my self-positing, I am finite.

This, my limitedness—since it is the condition which makes my self-positing possible—is an original limitedness. Somebody might wish to explain this still further, and either deduce the limitedness of myself as the reflected, from my neces-

sary limitedness as the reflecting; which would result in the statement: I am finite to myself, because I can think only the finite;—or he might explain the limitedness of the reflecting from that of the reflected, which would result in the statement: I can think only the finite, because I am finite. But such an explanation would explain nothing, for I am originally neither the reflecting nor the reflected, but both in their union; which union I cannot think, it is true, because I separate, in thinking, the reflecting from the reflected.

All limitedness is, by its very conception, a determined, and not a general limitedness.

From the possibility of an Ego, we have thus deduced the necessity of a general limitedness of the Ego. But the determinedness of this limitedness cannot be deduced, since it is, as we have seen, that which conditions all Egoness. Here, therefore, all deduction is at an end. This determinedness appears as the absolutely accidental, and furnishes the merely empirical of our knowledge. It is this determinedness, for instance, by virtue of which I am, amongst all possible rational beings, a man, and amongst all men this particular person, &c., &c.

This, my limitation, in its determinedness, manifests itself as a limitation of my practical power (here philosophy is therefore driven from the theoretical to the practical sphere); and the immediate perception of this limitation is a feeling (I prefer to use this word instead of Kant's "sensation," for feeling only becomes sensation by being related in thinking to an object); for instance, the feeling of sweet, red, cold, &c.

To forget this original feeling, leads to a bottomless transcendental idealism, and to an incomplete philosophy, which cannot explain the simply sensible predicates of objects. Now, the endeavor to explain this original feeling from the causality of a something, is the dogmatism of the Kantians, which I have just shown up, and which they would like to put on Kant's shoulders. This, their something, is the everlasting thing *per se*. All transcendental explanation, on the contrary, stops at

the immediate feeling, from the reason just pointed out. It is true, the *empirical* Ego, which transcendental idealism observes, explains this feeling to itself by the law, "No limitation without a limiting;" and thus, through contemplation of the limiting, produces extended matter, of which it now, as of its ground, predicates the merely subjective sensation of feeling; and it is only by virtue of this synthesis that the Ego makes itself an object. The continued analysis and the continued explanation of its own condition, give to the Ego its own system of a universe; and the observation of the laws of this explanation gives to the philosopher his science. It is here that Kant's *Realism* is based, but his Realism is a *transcendental idealism*.

This whole determinedness, and hence also the total of feelings which it makes possible, is to be regarded as *a priori*—i. e. absolutely, without any action of our own—determined. It is Kant's *receptivity*, and a particular of this receptivity is an *affection*. Without it, consciousness is unexplainable.

There is no doubt that it is an immediate fact of consciousness—I feel *myself* thus or thus determined. Now, when the oft-lauded philosophers attempt to *explain* this feeling, is it not clear that they attempt to append something to it which is not immediately involved in the fact? and how can they do this, except through thinking, and through a thinking according to a category, which category is here that of the real ground? Now, if they have not an immediate contemplation of the thing *per se* and its relations, what else can they possibly know of this category, but that *they* are compelled to think according to it? They assert nothing but that they are compelled to add in thought a thing as the ground of this feeling. But this we cheerfully admit in regard to the standpoint which they occupy. Their thing is produced by their thinking; and now it is at the same time to be a thing *per se*, i. e. not produced by thinking.

I really do not comprehend them; I can neither think this thought, nor think an understanding which does think it; and

by this declaration, I hope I have done with them forever.

VII.

Having finished this digression, we now return to our original intention, which was to describe the procedure of the Science of Knowledge, and to justify it against the attacks of certain philosophers. We said, the philosopher observes himself in the act whereby he constructs for himself the conception of himself; and we now add, he also *thinks this act of his*.

For the philosopher, doubtless, knows whereof he speaks; but a mere contemplation gives no consciousness; only that is known which is conceived and thought. This conception or comprehension of his activity is very well possible for the philosopher, since he is already in possession of experience; for he has a conception of *activity in general, and as such*, namely, as the opposite of the equally well known conception of *Being*; and he also has a conception of this *particular* activity, as that of an *intelligence*, i. e. as simply an ideal activity, and not the real causality of the practical Ego; and moreover, a conception of the peculiar character of this particular activity as an *in itself returning activity*, and not an activity directed upon an external object.

But here as well as everywhere it is to be well remembered that the contemplation is and remains the basis of the conception, i. e. of that which is conceived in the conception. We cannot absolutely create or produce by thinking; we can only think that which is immediately contemplated by us. A thinking, which has no contemplation for its basis, which does not embrace a contemplation entertained in the same undivided moment, is an empty thinking, or is really no thinking at all. At the utmost it may be the thinking of a mere sign of the conception, and if this sign is a word, as seems likely, the mere thoughtless utterance of this word. I determine my contemplation by the thinking of an opposite; this and nothing else is the meaning of the expression—I comprehend the contemplation.

Through thinking, the activity, which the philosopher thinks, becomes *objective* to him, i. e. it floats before him, in so far as he thinks it, as something which checks or limits the freedom (the undeterminedness) of his thinking. This is the true and original significance of objectivity. As certain as I think, I think a determined something; or, in other words, the freedom of my thinking, which might have been directed upon an infinite manifold of objects, is now, when I think, only directed upon that limited sphere of my thinking which the present object fills. It is limited to this sphere. *I restrict myself with freedom* to this sphere, if I contemplate *myself* in the doing of it. *I am restricted* by this sphere, if I contemplate only the *object* and forget myself, as is universally done on the standpoint of common thinking. What I have just now said is intended to correct the following objections and misunderstandings.

All thinking is necessarily directed upon a being, say some. Now the Ego of the Science of Knowledge is not to have being; hence it is unthinkable, and the whole Science, which is built upon such a contradiction, is null and void.

Let me be permitted to make a preliminary remark concerning the spirit which prompts this objection. When the wise men, who urge it, take the conception of the Ego as determined in the Science of Knowledge, and examine it by the rules of their logic, they doubtless think that conception, for how else could they compare and relate it to something else? If they really could not think it, they would not be able to say a word about it, and it would remain altogether unknown to them. But they have really, as we see, happily achieved the thinking of it, and so must be able to think it. Yet, because according to their traditional and misconceived rules, they *ought to have been* unable to think it, they would now rather deny the possibility of an act, while doing it, than give up their rule; they would believe an old book rather than their own consciousness. How little can these men be aware of what they really do! How me-

chanically, and without any inner attention and spirit, must they produce their philosophical specimens! Master Jourdan after all was willing to believe that he had spoken prose all his lifetime, without knowing it, though it did appear rather curious; but these men, if they had been in his place, would have proven in the most beautiful prose that they could not speak prose, since they did not possess the rules of speaking prose, and since the conditions of the possibility of a thing must always precede its reality. Nay, if critical idealism should continue to be a burden to them, it is to be expected that they will next go to Aristotle for advice as to whether they really live, or are already dead and buried. By doubting the possibility of ever becoming conscious of their freedom and Egoness, they are covertly already doubting this very point.

Their objection might therefore be summarily put aside, since it contradicts, and thus annihilates itself. But let us see where the real ground of the misunderstanding may be concealed.

All thinking necessarily proceeds from a being, say they. Now what does this mean? If it is to mean what we have just shown up, namely, that there is in all thinking a thought, an object of the thinking, to which this particular thinking confines itself, and by which it *seems* to be limited, then their premise must undoubtedly be admitted; and it is not the Science of Knowledge which is going to deny it. This objectivity for the mere thinking does doubtless also belong to the Ego, from which the Science of Knowledge proceeds; or, which means the same, to the act whereby the Ego constructs itself for itself. But it is only through thinking and only for thinking that it has this objectivity; it is merely an *ideal* being.

If, however, the being, of their above assertion, is to mean not a *mere ideal*, but a *real* being, i. e. a something, limiting not only the ideal, but also the actually productive, the practical activity of the Ego—that is to say, a something permanent in time and persistent in space—then that assertion of theirs is unwarranted.

If it were correct, no science of philosophy were possible, for the conception of the Ego would be unthinkable; and self-consciousness, nay, even consciousness, would also be impossible. If it were correct, we, it is true, should be compelled to stop philosophizing; but this would be no gain to them, for they would also have to stop refuting us. But do they not themselves repudiate the correctness of their assertion? Do they not think themselves every moment of their life as free and as having causality? Do they not, for instance, think themselves the free, active authors of the very sensible and very original objections, which they bring up from time to time against our system? Now, is then this "themselves" something which checks and limits their causality, or is it not rather the very opposite of the check, namely, the very causality itself? I must refer them to what I have said in § v. on this subject. If such a sort of being were ascribed to the Ego, the Ego would cease to be Ego; it would become a *thing*, and its conception would be annihilated. It is true that afterwards—not afterwards as a posteriority in time, but afterwards in the series of the dependence of thinking—we also ascribe such a being to the Ego, which, nevertheless, remains and must remain Ego in the original meaning of the word; this being consisting partly of extension and persistency in space, and in this respect it becomes a *body*, and partly identity and permanency in time, and in this respect it becomes a *soul*. But it is the business of philosophy to prove, and genetically to explain how the Ego comes to think itself thus, and all this belongs not to that which is presupposed, but to that which is to be deduced. The result, therefore, remains thus: the Ego is originally only an *acting*; if you but think it as an *active*, you have already an Empirical, and hence a conception of it, which must first be deduced.*

* To state the main point in a few words: *All being* signifies a *limitation of free activity*. Now this activity is regarded either as that of the mere intelligence, and then that which is posited as limiting this activity has a mere *ideal being*, mere *objectivity in regard to consciousness*.—This objectivity is in every representa-

But our opponents claim that they do not make their assertion without all proof; they want to prove it by logic, and, if God is willing, by the logical proposition of contradiction.

If there is anything which clearly shows the lamentable condition of philosophy as a science in these our days, it is that such occurrences can take place. If anybody were to speak about mathematics, natural sciences, or any other science, in a manner which would indicate beyond a doubt his complete ignorance concerning the first principles of such a science, he would be at once sent back to the school from which he ran away too soon. But in philosophy it is not to be thus. If in philosophy a man shows in the same manner his complete ignorance, we are, with many bows and compliments to the sharp-sighted man, to give him publicly that private schooling which he so sadly needs, and without betraying the least smile or gesture of disgust. Have, then, the philosophers in two thousand years made clear not a single proposition which might now be considered as established for that science without further proof? If there is such a proposition, it is certainly that of the distinction of logic, as a purely formal science, from real philosophy or metaphysics. But what is really the true meaning of this terrible logical proposition of contradiction which is to crush at one stroke our whole system? As far as I know, simply this: *if* a conception is already determined by a certain characteristic, then it must not be determined by another opposite characteristic. But by what characteristic the conception is originally to be characterized, this logical theorem does not say, nor can say, for it presupposes the original determination, and is applicable only in so far as that is presupposed. Concerning the original determination another science will have to decide.

These wise men tell us that it is *contra-*

tion (even in that of the Ego, of virtue, of the moral law, &c., or in that of complete phantasms, as, for instance, a squared circle, a sphynx, &c.) *object of the mere representation*. Or the free activity is regarded as *having actual causality*; and then that which limits it, has *actual existence, the real world*.

dictory not to determine a conception by the predicate of actual being. Yet how can this be contradictory, unless the conception has first been thus determined by the predicate of actual being, and has then had that predicate denied to it? But who authorized them to determine the conception by that predicate? Do not these adepts in logic perceive that they postulate their principle, and turn around in an evident circle? Whether there really be a conception, which is originally—by the laws of the synthetizing, not of the merely analyzing reason—not determined by that predicate of actual being, this they will have to go and learn from contemplation; logic only warns them against afterwards again applying the same predicate to that conception; of course also, in the same respect, in which they have denied the determinability of the conception by that predicate.

But certainly if they have not yet elevated themselves to the consciousness of that contemplation, which is not determined by the predicate of being, (for that they should unconsciously possess that contemplation itself, Reason herself has taken care of,) then *all their* conceptions, which can be derived only from sensuous contemplation, are very properly determined by the predicate of this actual being. In that case, however, they must not believe that logic has taught them this asserted connection of thinking and being, for their knowledge of it is altogether derived from their unfortunate empirical self. They, standing on the standpoint of knowing no other conceptions than those derived from sensuous contemplation, would, of course, contradict *themselves* if they were to think one of *their* conceptions without the predicate of actual being. We, on our part, are also well content to let them retain this rule for themselves, since it is most assuredly universally valid for the whole sphere of *their* possible thinking; and to let them always-carefully keep an eye on this rule, so that they may not violate it. As for ourselves, however, we cannot use this their rule any longer, for we possess a few conceptions more, resting in a sphere over which their rule does not ex-

tend, and about which they can speak nothing, since it does not exist for them. Let them, therefore, attend to their own business hereafter, and leave us to attend to ours. Even in so far as we grant them the rule, namely, that every thinking must have an object of thinking; it is by no means a logical rule, but rather one which logic presupposes, and through which logic first becomes possible. *To think*, is the same as to determine objects; both conceptions are identical; logic furnishes the *rules* of this determining, and hence presupposes clearly enough the determining generally as a part of consciousness. That all thinking has an object can be shown only in contemplation. Think! and observe in this thinking how you do it, and you will doubtless find that you oppose to your thinking an object of this thinking.

Another objection, somewhat related to the above, is this: If you do not proceed from a being, how can you, without being illogical, deduce a being? You will never be able to get anything else out of what you take in hand than what is already contained in it, unless you proceed dishonestly and use juggler tricks.

I reply: Nor do we deduce being in the sense in which you use the word, i. e. as *being, per se*. What the philosopher takes up is an *acting*, which acts according to certain laws, and what he establishes is the series of necessary acts of this acting. Amongst these acts there occurs one which to the acting itself appears as a being, and which by laws to be shown up, *must* so appear to it. The philosopher who observes the acting from a higher standpoint, never ceases to regard it as an acting. A being exists only for the observed Ego, which thinks realistically; but for the philosopher there is acting, and only acting, for he thinks idealistically.

Let me express it on this occasion in all clearness: The essence of transcendental idealism generally, and of the Science of Knowledge particularly, consists in this, that the conception of being is not at all viewed as a *first* and *original* conception, but simply as a *derived* conception; derived from the opposition of activity. Hence it is considered only as a *negative*

conception. The only positive for the idealist is *Freedom*; being is the mere negative of freedom. Only thus has idealism a firm basis, and is in harmony with itself. But dogmatism, which believed itself safely reposing upon being, as a basis no further to be investigated or grounded, regards this assertion as a stupidity and horror, for it is its annihilation. That wherein the dogmatist, amongst all the inflictions which he has experienced from time to time, still found a hiding place—namely, some original being, though it were but a raw and formless *matter*—is now utterly destroyed, and he stands naked and defenceless. He has no weapons against this attack except the assurance of his hearty disgust, and his confession, that he does not understand, and positively cannot and will not think, what is required of him. We cheerfully give credence to this statement, and only beg that he will also place faith in our assurance, that we find it not at all difficult to think our system. Nay, if this should be too much for him, we can even abstain from it, and leave him to believe whatever he chooses on this point. That we do not and cannot force him to adopt our system, because its adoption depends upon freedom, has already been often enough admitted.

I say that the dogmatist has nothing left but the assurance of his incapacity, for the idea of intrenching himself behind general logic, and conjuring the shade of the Stagirite, because he knows not how to defend his own body, is altogether new, and will find few imitators even in this universal state of despair; since the least school knowledge of what logic really is, will suffice to make every one reject this protection.

Let no one be deceived by these opponents, if they adopt the language of idealism, and admitting with their lips the correctness of its views, protest that they know well enough that being is only to signify *being for us*. They are dogmatists. For every one who asserts that all thinking and consciousness must proceed from a being, makes being something primary; and it is this which constitutes dogmatism. By such a confusion of speech they but

demonstrate the utter confusion of their conceptions; for what may a *being for us* mean, which is, nevertheless, to be an original *not-derived* being? Who, then, are those "*we*," for whom alone this being is? Are they *intelligences* as such? Then the statement "there is something for the intelligence," signifies, this something is represented by the intelligence; and the statement "it is *only* for the intelligence," signifies, it is *only* represented. Hence the conception of a being, which, from a certain point of view, is to be independent of the representation, must, after all, be derived from the representation, since it is to be, only through it; and these men would, therefore, be more in harmony with the Science of Knowledge than they believed. Or are those "*we*" themselves things, original things, things in themselves? How, then, can anything be *for* them; how can they even be *for* themselves, since the conception of a thing involves merely that it is, but not that the thing is *for itself*? What may the word *for* signify to them? Is it, perhaps, but an innocent adornment which they have adopted for the sake of fashion?

VIII.

The Science of Knowledge has said, "It is not possible to abstract from the Ego." This assertion may be regarded from two points of view—either from the standpoint of common consciousness, and then it means, "We never have another representation than that of ourselves; throughout our whole life, and in all moments of our life, we think only I, I, I, and nothing but I." Or it may be viewed from the standpoint of the philosopher, and then it will have the following significance: "The Ego must necessarily be added in thought to whatever occurs in consciousness;" or as Kant expresses it, "All my representations must be thought as accompanied by—I think." What nonsense were it to maintain the first interpretation to be the true one, and what wretchedness to refute it in that interpretation. But in the latter interpretation the assertion of the Science of Knowledge will doubtless be acceptable to every one who is but able to understand it; and if it had only been thus understood.

before, we should long ago have been rid of the thing *per se*, for it would have been seen that we are always the Thinking, whatever we may think, and that hence nothing can occur in us which is independent of us, because it all is necessarily related to our thinking.

IX.

"But," confess other opponents of the Science of Knowledge, "as far as our own persons are concerned, we cannot, under the conception of the Ego, think anything else than our own dear persons as opposed to other persons. Ego (I) signifies my particular person, named, for instance, Caius or Sempronius, as distinguished from other persons not so named. Now, if I should abstract, as the Science of Knowledge requires me to do, from this individual personality, there would be nothing left to me which might be characterized as *I*; I might just as well call the remainder *It*."

Now, what is the real meaning of this objection, so boldly put forth? Does it speak of the original real synthesis of the conception of the individual (their own dear persons and other persons), and do they therefore mean to say, "there is nothing synthesized in this conception but the conception of an object generally—of the *It*, and of other objects (*Its*)—from which the first one is distinguished?" Or does that objection fly for protection to the common use of language, and do they therefore mean to say, "In language, the word *I* (Ego) signifies only individuality?" As far as the first is concerned, every one, who is as yet possessed of his senses, must see that by distinguishing one object from its equals, i. e. from other objects, we arrive only at a *determined object*, but not at a *determined person*. The synthesis of the conception of the personality is quite different. The *Egoness* (the in itself returning activity, the subject-objectivity, or whatever you choose to call it,) is originally opposed to the *It*, to the mere objectivity; and the positing of these conceptions is absolute, is conditioned by no other positing, is thetical, not synthetical. This conception of the *Egoness*, which has arisen in our Self, is now transferred to

something, which in the first positing was posited as an *It*, as a mere object, and is synthetically united with it; and it is only through this conditional synthesis that there first arises for us a *Thou*. The conception of *Thou* arises from the union of the *It* and the *I*. The conception of the Ego in this opposition; hence, as conception of the individual, is the synthesis of the *I* with itself. That which posits itself in the described act, not generally, but *as Ego*, is *I*; and that which in the same act is posited as Ego, not *through itself*, but *through me*, is *Thou*. Now it is doubtless possible to abstract from this product of a synthesis, for what we ourselves have synthesized we doubtless can analyze again, and when we so abstract, the remainder will be the general Ego, i. e. the not-object. Taken in this interpretation, the objection would be simply absurd.

But how if our opponents cling to the use of language? Even if it is true that the word "*I*" has hitherto signified in language only the individual, would this make it necessary that a distinction in the original synthesis is not to be remarked and named, simply because it has never before been noticed? But is it true? Of what use of language do they speak? Of the philosophical language? I have shown already that Kant uses the conception of the pure Ego in the same meaning I attach to it. If he says, "I am the thinking in this thinking," does he then only oppose himself to other persons, and not rather to all object of thinking generally? Kant says again, "The fundamental principle of the necessary unity of apperception is itself identical, and hence an analytical proposition." This signifies precisely what I have just stated, i. e. that the Ego arises through no synthesis, the manifold whereof might be further analyzed, but through an absolute thesis. But this Ego is the *Egoness* generally; for the conception of individuality arises clearly enough through synthesis, as I have just shown; and the fundamental principle of individuality is therefore a synthetical proposition. Reinhold, it is true, speaks of the Ego simply as of the representing; but this does not affect the present case; for when I dis-

distinguish myself as the representing from the represented, do I then distinguish myself from other persons, and not rather from all object of representation as such? But take even the case of these same much lauded philosophers, who do not, like Kant and like the Science of Knowledge, presuppose the Ego in advance of the manifold of representation, but rather heap it together, out of that manifold; do they, then, hold their one thinking in the manifold thinking to be only the thinking of the individual, and not rather of the intelligence generally? In one word: is there any philosopher of repute, who before them has ventured to discover that the Ego signifies only the individual, and that if the individuality is abstracted from, only an object in general remains?

Or do they mean ordinary use of language? To prove this use, I am compelled to cite instances from common life. If you call to anybody in the darkness "Who is there?" and he, presupposing that his voice is well-known to you, replies, "It is I," then it is clear that he speaks of himself as this particular person, and wishes to be understood: "It is I, who am named thus or thus, and it is not any one of all the others, named otherwise;" and he so desires to be understood, because your question, "*Who is there?*" presupposes already that it is a rational being who is there, and expresses only that you wish to know which particular one amongst all the rational beings it may be.

But if you should, for instance—permit me this example, which I find particularly applicable—sew or cut at the clothing of some person, and should unawares cut the person himself, then he would probably cry out: "Look here, this is *I*; you are cutting *me*!" Now, what does he mean to express thereby? Not that he is this particular person, named thus or thus, and none other; for that you know very well; but that that which was cut was not his dead and senseless clothing, but his living and sensitive self, which you did not know before. By this "*It is I*," the person does not distinguish himself from other persons, but from things. This distinction occurs continually in life; and

we cannot take a step or move our hand without making it.

In short, Egoness and Individuality are very different conceptions, and the synthesis of the latter is clearly to be observed. Through the former conception, we distinguish ourselves from all that is external to us—not merely from all persons that are external to us—and hence we embrace by it not our particular personality, but our general spirituality. It is in this sense that the word is used, both in philosophical and in common language. The above objection testifies, therefore, not only to an unusual want of thought, but also to great ignorance in philosophical literature.

But our opponents insist on their incapability to think the required conception, and we must place faith in their assertions. Not that they lack the general conception of the pure Ego, for if they did, they would be obliged to desist from raising objections, just as a piece of log must desist. But it is the *conception of this conception* which they lack, and which they cannot attain. They have that conception in themselves, but do not know that they have it. The ground of this their incapability does not lie in any particular weakness of their thinking faculties, but in a weakness of their whole character. Their Ego, in the sense in which they take the word—i. e. their individual person—is the last object of their acting, and hence also the limit of their explicit thinking. It is to them, therefore, the only true substance, and reason is only an accident thereof. Their person does not exist as a particular expression of reason; but reason exists to help their person through the world; and if the person could get along just as well without reason, we might discharge reason from service, and there would be no reason at all. This, indeed, lurks in the whole system of their conceptions, and through all their assertions, and many of them are honest enough not to conceal it. Now, they are quite correct as far as they assert this incapacity in respect to their own persons—they only must not state as objective that which has merely subjective

validity. In the Science of Knowledge the relation is exactly reversed: Reason alone is in itself, and individuality is but accidental; reason is the object, and personality the means to realize it; personality is only a particular manner of manifesting reason, and must always more and more lose itself in the universal form of reason. Only reason is eternal; individuality must always die out. And whosoever is not prepared to succumb to this order of things, will also never get at the true understanding of the Science of Knowledge.

X.

This fact that they can never understand the Science of Knowledge unless they first comply with certain conditions, has been told them often enough. They do not want to hear it again, and our frank warning affords them a new opportunity to attack us. Every conviction, they assert, must be capable of being communicated by conceptions—nay, it must even be possible to compel its acknowledgment. They say it is a bad example to assert that our Science exists for only certain privileged spirits, and that others cannot see or understand anything of it.

Let us see, first of all, what the Science of Knowledge does assert on this point. It does not assert that there is an original and inborn distinction between men and men, whereby some are made capable of thinking and learning what the others, by their nature, cannot think or learn. Reason is common to all, and is the same in all rational beings. Whatsoever one rational being possesses as a talent, all others possess also. Nay, we have even in this present article expressly admitted that the conceptions upon which the Science of Knowledge insists, are actually effective in all rational beings; for their efficacy furnishes the ground of a possibility of consciousness. The pure Ego, which they charge is incapable of thinking, lies at the bottom of all their thinking, and occurs in all their thinking, since all thinking is possible only through it. Thus far everything proceeds mechanically. But to get an insight into this

asserted necessity—to think again this thinking—does not lie in mechanism, but, on the contrary, requires an elevation, through *freedom*, to a new sphere, which our immediate existence does not place in our possession. Unless this faculty of freedom has already existence, and has already been practised, the Science of Knowledge can accomplish nothing in a person. It is this power of freedom which furnishes the premises upon which the structure is to rest.

They certainly will not deny that every science and every art presupposes certain primary rudiments, which must first be acquired before we can enter into the science or art. "But," say they, "if you only require a knowledge of the rudiments, why do you not teach them to us, if we lack them? Why do you not place them before us definitely and systematically? Is it not your own fault if you plunge us at once *in medias res*, and require the public to understand you before you have communicated the rudiments?" I reply: that is exactly the difficulty! These rudiments cannot be systematically forced upon you—they cannot be taught to you by compulsion! In one word, they are a knowledge which we can get only from ourselves. Everything depends upon this, that by the constant use of freedom, with *clear consciousness* of this freedom, we should become thoroughly conscious and enamored of this our freedom. Whenever it shall have become the well-matured object of education—from tenderest youth upwards—to *develop* the inner power of the scholar, but not to *give it a direction*; to educate man for his own use, and as instrument of his own will, but not as the soulless instrument of others;—then the Science of Knowledge will be universally and easily comprehensible. Culture of the whole man, from earliest youth—this is the only way to spread philosophy. Education must first content itself to be more negative than positive—more a mutual interchange *with* the scholar than a working *upon* him; more negative as far as possible—i. e. education must at least propose to itself this negativeness as its object, and must be positive only as a means of

being, negative. So long as education, whether with or without clear consciousness, proposes to itself the opposite object—labors only for usefulness through others, without considering that the using principle lies also in the individual; so long as education thus eradicates in earliest youth the root of self-activity, and accustoms man not to determine himself but to await a determination through others—so long, talent for philosophy will always remain an extraordinary favor of nature, which cannot be further explained, and which may therefore be called by the indefinite expression of “philosophical genius.”

The chief ground of all the errors of our opponents may perhaps be this, that they have never yet made clear to themselves what *proving* means, and that hence they have never considered that there is at the bottom of all demonstration something absolutely undemonstrable.

Demonstration effects only a conditioned, mediated certainty; by virtue of it, something is certain if another thing is certain. If any doubt arises as to the certainty of this other, then this certainty must again be appended to the certainty of a third, and so on. Now, is this retrogression carried on *ad infinitum*, or is there anywhere a final link? I know very well that some are of the former opinion; but these men have never considered that if it were so, they would not even be capable of entertaining the idea of certainty—no, not even of hunting after certainty. For what this may mean: to be certain; they only know by being themselves certain of something; but if everything is certain only on condition, then nothing is certain, and there is even no conditioned certainty. But if there is a final link, regarding which no question can be raised, why it is certain, then, there is an undemonstrable at the base of all demonstration.

They do not appear to have considered what it means: to have proven something to *somebody*. It means: we have demonstrated to him that a certain other certainty is contained, by virtue of the laws of thinking, which he admits, in a certain

first certainty which he assumes or admits, and that he must necessarily assume the first if he assumes the second, as he says he does. Hence all communication of a conviction by proof, presupposes that both parts are at least agreed on something. Now, how could the Science of Knowledge communicate itself to the dogmatist, since they are positively *not agreed in a single point*, so far as the *material* of knowledge is concerned, and since thus the common point is wanting from which they might jointly start.*

Finally, they seem not to have considered that even where there is such a common point, no one can think into the soul of the other; that each must calculate upon the self-activity of the other, and cannot furnish him the necessary thoughts, but can merely advise how to construct or think those thoughts. The relation between free beings is a reciprocal influence upon each other through freedom, but not a causality through mechanically effective power. And thus the present dispute returns to the chief point of dispute, from which all our differences arise. They presuppose everywhere the relation of causality, because they indeed know no higher relation; and it is upon this that they base their demand: we ought to graft our conviction on their souls without any activity on their own part. But we proceed from freedom, and—which is but fair—presuppose freedom in them. Moreover, in thus presupposing the universal validity of the mechanism of cause and effect, they immediately contradict themselves; what they say and

* I have repeated this frequently. I have stated that I could absolutely have no point in common with certain philosophers, and that they are not, and cannot be, where I am. This seems to have been taken rather for an hyperbole, uttered in indignation, than for real earnest; for they do not cease to repeat their demand: “Prove to us thy doctrine!” I must solemnly assure them that I was perfectly serious in that statement, that it is my deliberate and decided conviction. Dogmatism proceeds from a *being* as the Absolute, and hence its system never rises above being. Idealism knows no being, as something for itself existing. In other words: Dogmatism proceeds from necessity—Idealism from freedom. They are, therefore, in two utterly different worlds.

what they do, are in palpable contradiction. For, in *presupposing* the mechanism of cause and effect, they elevate themselves beyond it; their thinking of the mechanism is not contained in the mechanism itself. The mechanism cannot seize itself, for the simple reason that it is mechanism. Only free consciousness can seize itself. Here, therefore, would be a way to convince them of their error. But the difficulty is that this thought lies utterly beyond the range of their vision, and that they lack the agility of mind to think, when they think an object, not only the object, but also their thinking of the object; wherefore this present remark is utterly incomprehensible to them, and is indeed written only for those who are awake and see.

We reiterate, therefore, our assurance: we *will* not convince them, because one cannot *will* an impossibility; and we will not refute their system for them, because we cannot. True, we can refute it easily enough *for us*; it is very easy to throw it down—the mere breath of a free man destroys it. But we cannot refute it for *them*. We do not write, speak or teach *for them*, since there is positively no point from which we could reach them. If we speak *of* them, it is not for their own sake, but for the sake of others—to warn these against their errors, and persuade these not to listen to their empty and insignificant prattle. Now, they must not consider this, our declaration, as degrading for them. By so doing, they but evince their bad conscience, and publicly degrade themselves amongst us. Besides, they are in the same position in regard to us. They also cannot refute or convince us, or say anything, which could have an effect upon us. This we confess ourselves, and would not be in the least indignant if they said it. What we tell them, we tell them not at all with the evil purpose of causing them anger, but merely to save us and them unnecessary trouble. We should be truly glad if they were thus to accept it.

Moreover, there is nothing degrading in the matter itself. Every one who to-day, charges his brother with this incapacity,

has once been necessarily in the same condition. For we all are born in it, and it requires time to get beyond it. If our opponents would only not be driven into indignation by our declaration, but would reflect about it, and inquire whether there might not be some truth in it, they might then probably get out of that incapacity. They would at once be our equals, and we could henceforth live in perfect peace together. The fault is not ours, if we occasionally are pretty hard at war with them.

From all this it also appears, which I consider expedient to remark here, that a philosophy, in order to be a science, need not be *universally valid*, as some philosophers seem to assume. These philosophers demand the impossible. What does it mean: a philosophy is really universally valid? Who, then, are all these for whom it is to be valid? I suppose not to every one who has a human face, for then it would also have to be valid for children and for the common man, for whom thinking is never object, but always the means for his real purpose. Universally valid, then, for the philosophers? But who, then, are the philosophers? I hope not all those who have received the degree of doctor from some philosophical faculty, or who have printed something which they call philosophical, or who, perhaps, are themselves members of some philosophical faculty? Indeed, how shall we even have a fixed conception of the philosopher, unless we have first a fixed conception of philosophy—i. e. unless we first possess that fixed philosophy? It is quite certain that all those who believe themselves possessed of philosophy, as a science, will deny to all those who do not recognize their philosophy the name of philosopher, and hence will make the acknowledgment of their philosophy the criterion of a philosopher. This they must do, if they will proceed logically, for there is only one philosophy. The author of the *Science of Knowledge*, for instance, has long ago stated that he is of this opinion in regard to his system—not in so far as it is an *individual representation* of that system, but in so far as it is a system of

transcendental idealism—and he hesitates not a moment to repeat this assertion. But does not this lead us into an evident circle? Every one will then say, “My philosophy is universally valid for all philosophers;” and will say so with full right if he only be himself convinced, though no other mortal being should accept his doctrine; “for,” he will add, “he who does not recognize it as valid is no philosopher.”

Concerning this point, I hold the following: If there be but one man who is fully and at all times equally convinced of his philosophy, who is in complete harmony with himself in this his philosophy, whose free judgment in philosophizing agrees perfectly with the judgment daily life forces upon him, then in this one man philosophy has fulfilled its purpose and completed its circle; for it has put him down again at the very same point from which he started with all mankind; and henceforth philosophy as a science really exists, though no other man else should comprehend and accept it; nay, though that one man might not even know how to teach it to others.

Let no one here offer the trivial objection that all systematic authors have ever been convinced of the truth of their systems. For this assertion is utterly false, and is grounded only in this, that few know what conviction really is. This can only be experienced by having the fullness of conviction in one's self. Those authors were only convinced of one or the other point in their system, which perhaps was not even clearly conscious to themselves, but not of the whole of their system—they were convinced only in certain moods. This is no conviction. Conviction is that which depends on no time and no change of condition; which is not accidental to the soul, but which is the soul itself. One can be convinced only of the unchangeably and eternally True: to be convinced of error is impossible. But of such true convictions very few examples may probably exist in the history of philosophy; perhaps but one; perhaps not even this one. I do not speak of the ancients. It is even doubtful whether they

ever proposed to themselves the great problem of philosophy. But let me speak of modern authors. Spinoza could not be convinced; he could only *think*, not *put faith* in his philosophy; for it was in direct contradiction with his necessary conviction in daily life, by virtue of which he was forced to consider himself free and self-determined. He could be convinced of it only in so far as it contained truth; or as it contained a part of philosophy as a science. He was clearly convinced that mere objective reasoning would necessarily lead to his system; for in that he was correct; but it never occurred to him that in thinking he ought to reflect upon his own thinking, and in that he was wrong, and thus made his speculation contradictory to his life. Kant might have been convinced; but, if I understand him correctly, he was not convinced when he wrote his *Critique*. He speaks of a *deception, which always recurs, although we know that it is a deception*. Whence did Kant learn, as he was the first who discovered this pretended deception, that it always recurs, and in whom could he have made the experience that it did so recur? Only in himself. But to know that one deceives one's self, and still to deceive one's self is not the condition of conviction and harmony within—it is the symptom of a dangerous inner disharmony. My experience is that no deception recurs, for reason contains no deception. Moreover, of what deception does Kant speak? Clearly of the belief that things *per se* exist externally and independent of us. But who entertains this belief? Not common consciousness, surely, for common consciousness only speaks *of itself*; and can therefore say nothing but that things exist for it (i. e. for us, on this standpoint of common consciousness); and that certainly is no deception, for it is our own truth. Common consciousness knows nothing of a thing *per se*, for the very reason that it is common consciousness, which surely never goes beyond itself. It is a false philosophy which first makes common consciousness assert such a conception, whilst only that false philosophy discovered it in its own sphere. Hence

this so-called deception—which is easily got rid of, and which true philosophy roots out utterly—that false philosophy has itself produced, and as soon as you get your philosophy perfected, the scales will fall from your eyes, and the deception will never recur. You will, in all your life thereafter, never believe to know more than that you are finite, and finite in *this determined manner*, which you must explain to yourself, by the existence of *such a determined world*; and you will no more think of breaking through this limit than of ceasing to be yourself. Leibnitz, also, may have been convinced, for, properly understood—and why should he not have properly understood himself?—he is right. Nay, more—if highest ease and freedom of mind may suggest conviction; if the ingenuity to fit one's philosophy into all forms, and apply it to all parts of human knowledge—the power to scatter all doubts as soon as they appear, and the manner of using one's philosophy more as an instrument than as an object, may testify of perfect clearness; and if self-reliance, cheerfulness and high courage in life may be signs of inner harmony, then Leibnitz was perhaps convinced, and the only example of conviction in the history of philosophy.

XI.

In conclusion, I wish to refer in a few words to a very curious misapprehension. It is that of mistaking the Ego, as intellectual contemplation, from which the Science of Knowledge proceeds, for the Ego, as idea, with which it concludes. In the Ego, as intellectual contemplation, we have only the form of the Egoness, the in itself returning activity, sufficiently described above. The Ego in this form is only *for the philosopher*, and by seizing it thus, you enter philosophy. The Ego, as idea, on the contrary, is *for the Ego* itself, which the philosopher considers. He does not establish the latter Ego as his own, but as the idea of the natural but perfectly cultured man; just as a real being does not exist for the philosopher, but merely for the Ego he observes.

The Ego as idea is the rational being—firstly, in so far as it completely represents

in itself the universal reason, or as it is altogether rational, and only rational, and hence it must also have ceased to be individual, which it was only through sensuous limitation; and secondly, in so far as this rational being has also realized reason in the eternal world, which, therefore, remains constantly posited in this idea. The world remains in this idea as world generally, as *substratum* with these determined mechanical and organic laws; but all these laws are perfectly suited to represent the final object of reason. The idea of the Ego and the Ego of the intellectual contemplation have only this in common, that in neither of them the thought of the individual enters; not in the latter, because the Egoness has not yet been determined as individuality; and not in the former, because the determination of individuality has vanished through universal culture. But both are opposites in this, that the Ego of the contemplation contains only the *form* of the Ego, and pays no regard to an actual material of the same, which is only thinkable by its thinking of a world; while in the Ego of the Idea the complete material of the Egoness is thought. From the first conception all philosophy proceeds, and it is its fundamental conception; to the latter it does not return, but only determines this idea in the practical part as highest and ultimate object of reason. The first is, as we have said, original contemplation, and becomes a conception in the sufficiently described manner; the latter is only idea, it cannot be thought determinately and will never be actual, but will always more and more approximate to the actuality.

XII.

These are, I believe, all the misunderstandings which are to be taken into consideration, and to correct which a clear explanation may hope somewhat to aid. Other modes of working against the new system cannot and need not be met by me.

If a system, for instance, the beginning and end, nay, the whole essence of which, is that individuality be theoretically forgotten and practically denied, is denounced as egotism, and by men who, for the very

reason because they are covertly theoretical egotists and overtly practical egotists, cannot elevate themselves into an insight into this system; if a conclusion is drawn from the system that its author has an evil heart, and if again from this evil-heartedness of the author the conclusion is drawn that the system is false; then arguments are of no avail; for those who make these assertions know very well that they are not true, and they have quite different reasons for uttering them than because they believed them. The system bothers them little enough; but the author may, perhaps, have stated on other occasions things which do not please them, and may, perhaps—God knows how or where!—be in their way. Now such persons are perfectly in conformity with their mode of thinking, and it would be an idle undertaking to attempt to rid them of their na-

ture. But if thousands and thousands who know not a word of the Science of Knowledge, nor have occasion to know a word of it, who are neither Jews nor Pagans, neither aristocrats nor democrats, neither Kantians of the old or of the modern school, or of any school, and who even are not originals—who might have a grudge against the author of the Science of Knowledge, because he took away from them the original ideas which they have just prepared for the public—if such men hastily take hold of these charges, and repeat and repeat them again without any apparent interest, other than that they might appear well instructed regarding the secrets of the latest literature; then it may, indeed, be hoped that for their own sakes they will take our prayer into consideration, and reflect upon what they wish to say before they say it.

INTRODUCTION TO IDEALISM.

[From the German of SCHELLING. Translated by TOM DAVIDSON.]

I.—IDEA OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

1. All knowing is based upon the agreement of an objective with a subjective. For we *know* only the true, and truth is universally held to be the agreement of representations with their objects.

2. The sum of all that is purely objective in our knowledge we may call Nature; while the sum of all that is subjective may be designated the *Ego*, or Intelligence. These two concepts are mutually opposed. Intelligence is originally conceived as that which solely represents—Nature as that which is merely capable of representation; the former as the conscious—the latter as the unconscious. There is, moreover, necessary in all knowledge a mutual agreement of the two—the conscious and the unconscious *per se*. The problem is to explain this agreement.

3. In knowledge itself, in my knowing, objective and subjective are so united that it is impossible to say to which of the two the priority belongs. There is here no first and no second—the two are contem-

poraneous and one. In my efforts to explain this identity, I must first have it undone. In order to explain it, inasmuch as nothing else is given me as a principle of explanation beyond these two factors of knowledge, I must of necessity place the one before the other—set out from the one in order from it to arrive at the other. From which of the two I am to set out is not determined by the problem.

4. There are, therefore, only two cases possible:

A. *Either the objective is made the first, and the question comes to be how a subjective agreeing with it is superinduced.*

The idea of the subjective is not contained in the idea of the objective; they rather mutually exclude each other. The subjective, therefore, must be *superinduced* upon the objective. It forms no part of the conception of Nature that there should be something intelligent to represent it. Nature, to all appearance, would exist even were there nothing to represent it. The problem may therefore likewise be ex-

pressed thus: How is the Intelligent superinduced upon Nature? or, How comes Nature to be represented?

The problem assumes Nature, or the objective, as first. It is, therefore, manifestly, a problem of natural science, which does the same. That natural science really, and without knowing it, approximates, at least, to the solution of this problem can be shown here only briefly.

If all knowledge has, as it were, two poles, which mutually suppose and demand each other, they must reciprocally be objects of search in all sciences. There must, therefore, of necessity, be two fundamental sciences; and it must be impossible to set out from the one pole without being driven to the other. The necessary tendency of all natural science, therefore, is to pass from Nature to the intelligent. This, and this alone, lies at the bottom of the effort to bring theory into natural phenomena. The final perfection of natural science would be the complete mentalization of all the laws of Nature into laws of thought. The phenomena, that is, the material, must vanish entirely, and leave only the laws—that is, the formal. Hence it is that the more the accordance with law is manifested in Nature itself, the more the wrappage disappears—the phenomena themselves become more mental, and at last entirely cease. Optical phenomena are nothing more than a geometry whose lines are drawn through the light; and even this light itself is of doubtful materiality. In the phenomena of magnetism all trace of matter has already disappeared, and of those of gravitation; which even physical philosophers believed could be attributed only to direct spiritual influence, there remains nothing but the law, whose action on a large scale is the mechanism of the heavenly motions. The complete theory of Nature would be that whereby the whole of Nature should be resolved into an intelligence. The dead and unconscious products of Nature are only unsuccessful attempts of Nature to reflect itself, and dead Nature, so-called, is merely an unripe Intelligence; hence in its phenomena the intelligent character peers through, though yet unconsciously.

Its highest aim, namely, that of becoming completely self-objective, Nature reaches only in its highest and last reflection, which is nothing else than man, or, more generally, what we call reason, by means of which Nature turns completely back upon itself, and by which is manifested that Nature is originally identical with what in us is known as intelligent and conscious.

This may perhaps suffice to prove that natural science has a necessary tendency to render Nature intelligent. By this very tendency it is that it becomes natural philosophy, which is one of the two necessary fundamental sciences of philosophy.

B. Or the subjective is made the first, and the problem is, how an objective is superinduced agreeing with it.

If all knowledge is based upon the agreement of these two, then the task of explaining this agreement is plainly the highest for all knowledge; and if, as is generally admitted, philosophy is the highest and loftiest of all sciences, it is certainly the main task of philosophy.

But the problem demands only the explanation of that agreement generally, and leaves it entirely undecided where the explanation shall begin, what it shall make its first, and what its second. Moreover, as the two opposites are mutually necessary to each other, the result of the operation must be the same, from whichever point it sets out.

To make the objective the first, and derive the subjective from it, is, as has just been shown, the task of natural philosophy.

If, therefore, there is a transcendental philosophy, the only course that remains for it is the opposite one, namely: to set out from the subjective as the first and the absolute, and deduce the origin of the objective from it.

Into these two possible directions of philosophy, therefore, natural and transcendental philosophy have separated themselves; and if all philosophy must have for its aim to make either an Intelligence out of Nature or a Nature out of Intelligence, then transcendental philosophy, to which the latter task belongs, is the

other necessary fundamental science of philosophy.

II.—COROLLARIES.

In the foregoing we have not only deduced the idea of transcendental philosophy, but have also afforded the reader a glance into the whole system of philosophy, composed, as has been shown, of two principal sciences, which, though opposed in principle and direction, are counterparts and complements of each other. Not the whole system of philosophy, but only one of the principal sciences of it, is to be here discussed, and, in the first place, to be more clearly characterized in accordance with the idea already deduced.

1. If, for transcendental philosophy, the subjective is the starting point, the only ground of all reality, and the sole principle of explanation for everything else, it necessarily begins with universal doubt regarding the reality of the objective.

As the natural philosopher, wholly intent upon the objective, seeks, above all things, to exclude every admixture of the subjective from his knowledge, so, on the other hand, the transcendental philosopher seeks nothing so much as the entire exclusion of the objective from the purely subjective principle of knowledge. The instrument of separation is absolute scepticism—not that half-scepticism which is directed merely against the vulgar prejudices of mankind and never sees the foundation—but a thorough-going scepticism, which aims not at individual prejudices, but at the fundamental prejudice, with which all others must stand or fall. For over and above the artificial and conventional prejudices of man, there are others of far deeper origin, which have been placed in him, not by art or education, but by Nature itself, and which pass with all other men, except the philosopher, as the principles of knowledge, and with the mere self-thinker as the test of all truth.

The one fundamental prejudice to which all others are reducible, is this: that there are things outside of us; an opinion which, while it rests neither on proofs nor on conclusions (for there is not a single irrefra-

gable proof of it), and yet cannot be uprooted by any opposite proof (*naturam furcâ expellas, tamen usque redibit*), lays claim to immediate certainty; whereas, inasmuch as it refers to something quite different from us—yea, opposed to us—and of which there is no evidence how it can come into immediate consciousness, it must be regarded as nothing more than a prejudice—a natural and original one, to be sure, but nevertheless a prejudice.

The contradiction lying in the fact that a conclusion which in its nature cannot be immediately certain, is, nevertheless, blindly and without grounds, accepted as such, cannot be solved by transcendental philosophy, except on the assumption that this conclusion is implicitly, and in a manner hitherto not manifest, not founded upon, but identical, and one and the same with an affirmation which is immediately certain; and to demonstrate this identity will really be the task of transcendental philosophy.

2. Now, even for the ordinary use of reason, there is nothing immediately certain except the affirmation *I am*, which, as it loses all meaning outside of immediate consciousness, is the most individual of all truths, and the absolute prejudice, which must be assumed if anything else is to be made certain. The affirmation *There are things outside of us*, will therefore be certain for the transcendental philosopher, only through its identity with the affirmation *I am*, and its certainty will be only equal to the certainty of the affirmation from which it derives it.

According to this view, transcendental knowledge would be distinguished from ordinary knowledge in two particulars.

First—That for it the certainty of the existence of external objects is a mere prejudice, which it oversteps, in order to find the grounds of it. (It can never be the business of the transcendental philosopher to prove the existence of things in themselves, but only to show that it is a natural and necessary prejudice to assume external objects as real.)

Second—That the two affirmations, *I am* and *There are things outside of me*, which in the ordinary consciousness run together,

are, in the former, separated and the one placed before the other, with a view to demonstrate as a fact their identity, and that immediate connection which in the other is only felt. By the act of this separation, when it is complete, the philosopher transports himself to the transcendental point of view, which is by no means a natural, but an artificial one.

3. If, for the transcendental philosopher, the subjective alone has original reality, he will also make the subjective alone in knowledge directly his object; the objective will only become an object indirectly to him, and, whereas, in ordinary knowledge, knowledge itself—the act of knowing—vanishes in the object, in transcendental knowledge, on the contrary, the object, as such, will vanish in the act of knowing. Transcendental knowledge is a knowledge of knowing, in so far as it is purely subjective.

Thus, for example, in intuition, it is only the objective that reaches the ordinary consciousness; the act of intuition itself is lost in the object; whereas the transcendental mode of intuition rather gets only a glimpse of the object of intuition through the act. Ordinary thought, therefore, is a mechanism in which ideas prevail, without, however, being distinguished as ideas; whereas transcendental thought interrupts this mechanism, and in becoming conscious of the idea as an act, rises to the idea of the idea. In ordinary action, the acting itself is forgotten in the object of the action; philosophizing is also an action, but not an action only. It is likewise a continued self-intuition in this action.

The nature of the transcendental mode of thought consists, therefore, generally in this: that, in it, that which in all other thinking, knowing, or acting escapes the consciousness, and is absolutely non-objective, is brought into consciousness, and becomes objective; in short, it consists in a continuous act of becoming an object to itself on the part of the subjective.

The transcendental art will therefore consist in a readiness to maintain one's self continuously in this duplicity of thinking and acting.

III.—PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENT OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

This arrangement is preliminary, inasmuch as the principles of arrangement can be arrived at only in the science itself.

We return to the idea of science.

Transcendental philosophy has to explain how knowledge is possible at all, supposing that the subjective in it is assumed as the chief or first element.

It is not, therefore, any single part, or any particular object of knowledge, but knowledge itself, and knowledge generally, that it takes for its object.

Now all knowledge is reducible to certain original convictions or original fore-judgments; these different convictions transcendental philosophy must reduce to one original conviction; this one, from which all others are derived, is expressed in the first principle of this philosophy, and the task of finding such is no other than that of finding the absolutely certain, by which all other certainty is arrived at.

The arrangement of transcendental philosophy itself is determined by those original convictions, whose validity it asserts. Those convictions must, in the first place, be sought in the common understanding. If, therefore, we fall back upon the standpoint of the ordinary view, we find the following convictions deeply engraven in the human understanding:

A. That there not only exists outside of us a world of things independent of us, but also that our representations agree with them in such a manner that there is nothing else in the things beyond what they present to us. The necessity which prevails in our objective representations is explained by saying that the things are unalterably determined, and that, by this determination of the things, our ideas are also indirectly determined. By this first and most original conviction, the first problem of the philosophy is determined, *viz.*: to explain how representations can absolutely agree with objects existing altogether independently of them. Since it is upon the assumption that things are exactly as we represent them—that we certainly, therefore, know things as they are in themselves—that the possibility of all ex-

perience rests, (for what would experience be, and where would physics, for example, wander to, but for the supposition of the absolute identity of being and seeming?) the solution of this problem is identical with theoretical philosophy, which has to examine the possibility of experience.

B. The second equally original conviction is, that ideas which spring up in us freely and without necessity are capable of passing from the world of thought into the real world, and of arriving at objective reality.

This conviction stands in opposition to the first. According to the first, it is assumed that objects are unalterably determined, and our ideas by them; according to the other, that objects are alterable, and that, too, by the causality of ideas in us. According to the first, there takes place a transition from the real world into the world of ideas, or a determining of ideas by something objective; according to the second, a transition from the world of ideas into the real world, or a determining of the objective by a (freely produced) idea in us.

By this second conviction, a second problem is determined, *viz.*: how, by something merely thought, an objective is alterable, so as completely to correspond with that something thought.

Since upon this assumption the possibility of all free action rests, the solution of this problem is practical philosophy.

C. But with these two problems we find ourselves involved in a contradiction. According to B, there is demanded the dominion of thought (the ideal) over the world of sense; but how is this conceivable, if (according to A) the idea, in its origin, is already only the slave of the objective? On the other hand, if the real world is something quite independent of us, and in accordance with which, as their pattern, our ideas must shape themselves (by A), then it is inconceivable how the real world, on the other hand, can shape itself after ideas in us (by B). In a word, in the theoretical certainty we lose the practical; in the practical we lose the theoretical. It is impossible that there

should be at once truth in our knowledge and reality in our volition.

This contradiction must be solved, if there is to be a philosophy at all; and the solution of this problem, or the answering of the question: How can ideas be conceived as shaping themselves according to objects, and at the same time objects as shaping themselves to ideas?—is not the first, but the highest, task of transcendental philosophy.

It is not difficult to see that this problem is not to be solved either in theoretical or in practical philosophy, but in a higher one, which is the connecting link between the two, neither theoretical nor practical, but both at once.

How at once the objective world conforms itself to ideas in us, and ideas in us conform themselves to the objective world, it is impossible to conceive, unless there exists, between the two worlds—the ideal and the real—a preëstablished harmony. But this preëstablished harmony itself is not conceivable, unless the activity, whereby the objective world is produced, is originally identical with that which displays itself in volition, and *vice versa*.

Now it is undoubtedly a *productive* activity that displays itself in volition; all free action is productive and productive only with consciousness. If, then, we suppose, since the two activities are one only in their principle, that the same activity which is productive *with* consciousness in free action, is productive *without* consciousness in the production of the world, this preëstablished harmony is a reality, and the contradiction is solved.

If we suppose that all this is really the case, then that original identity of the activity, which is busy in the production of the world, with that which displays itself in volition, will exhibit itself in the productions of the former, and these will necessarily appear as the productions of an activity at once conscious and unconscious.

Nature, as a whole, no less than in its different productions, will, of necessity, appear as a work produced with consciousness, and, at the same time, as a produc-

tion of the blindest mechanism. It is the result of purpose, without being demonstrable as such. The philosophy of the aims of Nature, or teleology, is therefore the required point of union between theoretical and practical philosophy.

D. Hitherto, we have postulated only in general terms the identity of the unconscious activity, which has produced Nature, and the conscious activity, which exhibits itself in volition, without having decided where the principle of this activity lies—whether in Nature or in us.

Now, the system of knowledge can be regarded as complete only when it reverts to its principle. Transcendental philosophy, therefore, could be complete only when that identity—the highest solution of its whole problem—could be demonstrated in its principle, the *Ego*.

It is therefore postulated that, in the subjective—in the consciousness itself—that activity, at once conscious and unconscious, can be shown.

Such an activity can be no other than the *æsthetic*, and every work of art can be conceived only as the product of such. The ideal work of art and the real world of objects are therefore products of one and the same activity; the meeting of the two (the conscious and the unconscious) *without* consciousness, gives the real—with consciousness, the *æsthetic* world.

The objective world is only the primal, still unconscious, poetry of the mind; the universal *organum* of philosophy, the keystone of its whole arch, is the philosophy of art.

IV.—ORGAN OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

1. The only immediate object of transcendental consideration is the subjective (II.); the only organ for philosophizing in this manner is the *inner sense*, and its object is such that, unlike that of mathematics, it can never become the object of external intuition. The object of mathematics, to be sure, exists as little outside of knowledge, as that of philosophy. The whole existence of mathematics rests on intuition; it exists, therefore, only in intuition; and this intuition itself is an ex-

ternal one. In addition to this, the mathematician never has to deal immediately with the intuition—the construction itself—but only with the thing constructed, which, of course, can be exhibited outwardly; whereas the philosopher looks only at the act of construction itself, which is purely an internal one.

2. Moreover, the objects of the transcendental philosopher have no existence, except in so far as they are freely produced. Nothing can compel to this production, any more than the external describing of a figure can compel one to regard it internally. Just as the existence of a mathematical figure rests on the outer sense, so the whole reality of a philosophical idea rests upon the inner sense. The whole object of this philosophy is no other than the action of Intelligence according to fixed laws. This action can be conceived only by means of a peculiar, direct, inner intuition, and this again is possible only by production. But this is not enough. In philosophizing, one is not only the object considered, but always at the same time the subject considering. To the understanding of philosophy, therefore, there are two conditions indispensable: first, that the philosopher shall be engaged in a continuous internal activity, in a continuous production of those primal actions of the intelligence; second, that he shall be engaged in continuous reflection upon the productive action;—in a word, that he shall be at once the contemplated (producing) and the contemplating.

3. By this continuous duplicity of production and intuition, that must become an object which is otherwise reflected by nothing. It cannot be shown here, but will be shown in the sequel, that this becoming-reflected on the part of the absolutely unconscious and non-objective, is possible only by an *æsthetic* act of the imagination. Meanwhile, so much is plain from what has already been proved, that all philosophy is productive. Philosophy, therefore, no less than art, rests upon the productive faculty, and the difference between the two, upon the different direction of the productive power. For whereas

production in art is directed outward, in order to reflect the unconscious by products, philosophical production is directed immediately inward, in order to reflect it in intellectual intuition. The real sense by which this kind of philosophy must be grasped, is therefore the æsthetic sense, and hence it is that the philosophy of art is the true organum of philosophy (III.)

Out of the vulgar reality there are only two means of exit—poetry, which transports us into an ideal world, and philosophy, which makes the real world vanish before us. It is not plain why the sense for philosophy should be more generally diffused than that for poetry, especially among that class of men, who, whether by memory-work (nothing destroys more directly the productive) or by dead speculation (ruinous to all imaginative power), have completely lost the æsthetic organ.

4. It is unnecessary to occupy time with common-places about the sense of truth, and about utter unconcern in regard to results, although it might be asked, what other conviction can yet be sacred to him who lays hands upon the most certain of all—that there are things outside of us? We may rather take one glance more at the so-called claims of the common understanding.

The common understanding in matters of philosophy has no claims whatsoever, except those which every object of examination has, *viz.*, to be completely explained.

It is not, therefore, any part of our business to prove that what it considers true, is true, but only to exhibit the unavoidable character of its illusions. This implies that the objective world belongs only to the necessary limitations which render self-consciousness (which is I) possible; it is enough for the common understanding, if from this view again the necessity of its view is derived.

For this purpose it is necessary, not only that the inner works of the mental activity should be laid open, and the mechanism of necessary ideas revealed, but also that it should be shown by what peculiarity of our nature it is, that what has reality only in our intuition, is reflected to us as something existing outside of us.

As natural science produces idealism out of realism, by mentalizing the laws of Nature into laws of intelligence, or superinducing the formal upon the material (I.), so transcendental philosophy produces realism out of idealism, by materializing the laws of Nature, or introducing the material into the formal.

GENESIS.

By A. BRONSON ALCOTT.

“God is the constant and immutable Good; the world is Good in a state of becoming, and the human soul is that in and by which the Good in the world is consummated.”—PLATO.

I.—VESTIGES.

Behmen, the subtlest thinker on Genesis since Plato, conceives that Nature fell from its original oneness by fault of Lucifer before man rose physically from its ruins; and moreover, that his present existence, being the struggle to recover from Nature's lapse, is embarrassed with double difficulties by deflection from rectitude on his part. We think it needs no Lucifer other than mankind collectively conspiring, to account for Nature's mishaps, or Man's. Since, assuming man to be Nature's ances-

tor, and Nature man's ruins rather, himself is the impediment he seeks to remove; and, moreover, conceiving Nature as corresponding in large—or macrocosmically—to his intents, for whatsoever embarrassments he finds therein, himself, and none other, takes the blame. Eldest of creatures, and progenitor of all below him, personally one and imperishable in essence, it follows that if debased forms appear in Nature, it must be consequent on Man's degeneracy prior to their genesis. And it is only as he lapses out of his integrity, by

debasement of his essence, that he impairs his original likeness, and drags it into the prone shapes of the animal kingdom—these being the effigies and vestiges of his individualized and shattered personality. Behold these upstarts of his loins, everywhere the mimics jeering at him saucily, or gaily parodying their fallen lord.

"Most happy he who hath fit place assigned
To his beasts, and disforested his mind;
Can use his horse, goat, wolf, and every beast,
And is not ape himself to all the rest."*

It is man alone who conceives and brings forth the beast in him, that swerves and dies; perversion of will by mis-choice being the fate that precipitates him into serpentine form, clothed in duplicity, cleft into sex,

"Parts of that Part which once was all."

It is but one and the same soul in him, entertaining a dialogue with himself, that is symbolized in The Serpent, Adam, and the Woman; nor need there be fabulous "Paradises Lost or Regained," for setting in relief this serpent symbol of temptation, this Lord or Lucifer in our spiritual Eden:

"First state of human kind,
Which one remains while man doth find
Joy in his partner's company;
When two, alas! adulterate joined,
The serpent made the three."

II.—THE DEUCE.

"I inquired what iniquity was, and found it to be no substance, but perversion of the Will from the Supreme One towards lower things."—*St. Augustine.*

Better is he who is above temptation than he who, being tempted, overcomes; since the latter but suppresses the evil inclination in his breast, which the former has not. Whoever is tempted has so far sinned as to entertain the tempting lust stirring within him, and betraying his lapse from singleness or holiness. The virtuous choose, and are virtuous by choice; while the holy, being one, are above all need of deliberating, their volitions an-

swering spontaneously to their desires. It is the cleft personality, or *other* within, that confronts and seduces the Will; the Adversary and Deuce we become individually, and thus impersonate in the Snake.†

III.—SERPENT SYMBOL.

One were an Œdipus to expound this serpent mythology; yet failing this, were to miss finding the keys to the mysteries of Genesis, and Nature were the chaos and abyss; since hereby the one rejoins man's parted personality, and recreates lost mankind. Coeval with flesh, the symbol appears wherever traces of civilization exist, a remnant of it in the ancient Phallus worship having come to us disguised in our May-day dance. Nor was it confined to carnal knowledge merely. The serpent symbolized divine wisdom, also; and it was under this acceptance that it became associated with those "traditional teachers of mankind whose genial wisdom entitled them to divine honors." An early Christian sect, called Ophites, worshipped it as the personation of natural knowledge. So the injunction, "Be ye wise as serpents and harmless as doves," becomes the more significant when we learn that *seraph* in the original means a serpent; *cherub*, a dove; these again symbolizing facts in osteological science as connected with the latest theories of the invertebrated cra-

* It is a miserable thing to have been happy; and a self-contracted wretchedness is a double one. Had felicity always been a stranger to humanity, our present misery had been none; and had not ourselves been the authors of our ruins, less. We might have been made unhappy, but, since we are miserable, we chose it. He that gave our outward enjoyments might have taken them from us, but none could have robbed us of innocence but ourselves. While man knew no sin, he was ignorant of nothing that it imported humanity to know; but when he had sinned, the same transgression that opened his eyes to see his own shame, shut them against most things else but it and the newly purchased misery. With the nakedness of his body, he saw that of his soul, and the blindness and dismay of his faculties to which his former innocence was a stranger, and that which showed them to him made them. We are not now like the creatures we were made, having not only lost our Maker's image but our own; and do not much more transcend the creatures placed at our feet, than we come short of our ancient selves."—*Glanvill.*

* "Had man withstood the trial, his descendants would have been born one from another in the same way that Adam—i. e. mankind—was, namely, in the image of God; for that which proceeds from the Eternal has eternal manner of birth."—*Behmen.*

nium accepted by eminent naturalists, and so substantiating the symbol in nature; this being ophiomorphous, a series of spires, crowned, winged, webbed, finned, footed in structure, set erect, prone, trailing, as charged with life in higher potency or lower; man, supreme in personal uprightness, and holding the sceptre of dominion as he maintains his inborn rectitude, or losing his prerogative as he lapses from his integrity, thus debasing his form and parcelling his gifts away in the prone shapes distributed throughout Nature's kingdoms; or, again, aspiring for lost supremacy, he uplifts and crowns his fallen form with forehead, countenance, speech, thereby liberating the genius from the slime of its prone periods, and restoring it to rectitude, religion, science, fellowship, the ideal arts.*

"Unless above himself he can
Erect himself, how poor a thing is man."

IV.—EMBRYONS.

"The form is in the archetype before it appears in the work, in the divine mind before it exists in the creature."—*Leibnitz*.

As the male impregnates the female, so mind charges matter with form and fecundity; the spermatie world being life in transmission and body in embryo. So the egg is a genesis and seminary of forms, (the kingdoms of animated nature sleeping coiled in its yolk) and awaits the quickening magnetism that ushers them into light. Herein the human embryo unfolds in series the lineaments of all forms in the living hierarchy, to be fixed at last in its microcosm, unreeling therefrom its faculties into filamental organs, spinning so minutely the threads, "that were it physically possible to dissolve away all other members of the body, there would still remain the full and perfect figure of a man. And it is this perfect cerebro-spinal axis,

this statue-like tissue of filaments, that, physically speaking, is the man." The mind above contains him spiritually, and reveals him physically to himself and his kind. Every creature assists in its own formation, souls being essentially creative and craving form.

"For the creature delights in the image of the Creator; and the soul of man will in a manner clasp God to herself. Having nothing mortal, she is wholly inebriated from God; for she glories in the harmony under which the human body exists."*

V.—PROMETHEUS.

"Imago Dei in animo; mundi, in corpore."

Man is a soul, informed by divine ideas, and bodying forth their image. His mind is the unit and measure of things visible and invisible. In him stir the creatures potentially, and through his personal volitions are conceived and brought forth in matter whatsoever he sees, touches, and treads under foot. The planet he spins.

He omnipresent is,
All round himself he lies,
Osiris spread abroad;
Upstaring in all eyes,
Nature his globed thought,
Without him she were not,
Cosmos from chaos were not spoken,
And God bereft of visible token.

A theosmeter—an instrument of instruments—he gathers in himself all forces, partakes in his plenitude of omniscience, being spirit's acme, and culmination in nature. A quickening spirit and mediator between mind and matter, he conspires with all souls, with the Soul of souls, in generating the substance in which he immerses his form, and wherein he embosoms his essence. Not elemental, but fundamental, essential, he generates elements and forces, expiring while consuming, and perpetually replenishing his waste; the

* "I maintain that the different types of the human family have an independent origin, one from the other, and are not descended from common ancestors. In fact, I believe that men were created in nations, not in individuals; but not in nations in the present sense of the word; on the contrary, in such crowds as exhibited slight, if any, diversity among themselves, except that of sex."—*Agassiz*.

* "Thou hast possessed my reins, thou hast covered me in my mother's womb. My substance was not hid from thee when I was made in a secret place, and there curiously wrought as in the lowest parts of the earth: there thine eyes did see my substance yet being imperfect: and in thy Book were all my members written, which in continuance were fashioned when as yet there was none of them."—*PSALM cxxxix: 13, 15, 16.*

final conflagration a current fact of his existence. Does the assertion seem incredible, absurd? But science, grown luminous and transcendent, boldly declares that life to the senses is ablaze, refeeding steadily its flame from the atmosphere it kindles into life, its embers the spent remains from which rises perpetually the new-born Phoenix into regions where flame is lost in itself, and light its resolute emblem.*

"Thee, Eye of Heaven, the great soul envies not,
By thy male force is all we have, begot."

VI.—IDEAL METHOD.

"It has ever been the misfortune of the mere materialist, in his mania for matter on the one hand and dread of ideas on the other, to invert nature's order, and thus hang the world's picture as a man with his heels upwards."—*Cudworth*.

This inverse order of thought conducts of necessity to conclusions as derogatory to himself as to Nature's author. Assuming matter as his basis of investigation, force as father of thought, he confounds faculties with organs, life with brute substance, and must needs pile his atom atop of atom, cement cell on cell, in constructing his column, scone mounting scone aspiringly as it rises, till his shaft of gifts crown itself surreptitiously with the ape's glorified effigy, as Nature's frontispiece and head. Life's atomy with life omitted altogether, man wanting. Not thus reads the ideal naturalist the Book of lives. But opening at spirit, and thence proceeding to ideas and finding their types in matter, life unfolds itself naturally in organs, faculties begetting forces, mind moulding things substantially, its connections and interdependencies appear in series and degrees

* "Man feeds upon air, the plant collecting the materials from the atmosphere and compounding them for his food. Even life itself, as we know it, is but a process of combustion, of which decomposition is the final conclusion; through this combustion all the constituents return back into air, a few ashes remaining to the earth from whence they came. But from these embers, slowly invisible flames, arise into regions where our science has no longer any value."—*Schleiden*.

as he traces the leaves, thought the key to originals, man the connexus, archetype, and classifier of things; he, straightway, leading forth abreast of himself the animated creation from the chaos,—the primeval Adam naming his mates, himself their ancestor, contemporary and survivor.

VII.—DIALOGIC.

If the age of iron and brass be hard upon us, fast welding its fetters and chains about our foreheads and limbs, here, too, is the Promethean fire of thought to liberate letters, science, art, philosophy, using the new agencies let loose by the Dædalus of mechanic invention and discovery, in the service of the soul, as of the senses. Having recovered the omnipresence in nature, graded space, tunnelled the abyss, joined ocean and land by living wires, stolen the chemistry of atom and solar ray, made light our painter, the lightning our runner, thought is pushing its inquiries into the unexplored regions of man's personality, for whose survey and service every modern instrument lends the outlay and means—facilities ample and unprecedented—new instruments for the new discoverers. Using no longer contentedly the eyes of a toiling circuitous logic, the genius takes the track of the creative thought, intuitively, cosmically, ontologically. A subtler analysis is finely disseminated, a broader synthesis accurately generalized from the materials accumulated on the mind during the centuries, the globe's contents being gathered in from all quarters: the book of creation, newly illustrated and posted to date. The new Calculus is ours: an organon alike serviceable to naturalist and metaphysician: a Dialogic for resolving things into thoughts, matter into mind, power into personality, man into God, many into one; soul in souls seen as the creative controlling spirit, pulsating in all bodies, inspiring, animating, organizing, immanent in the atoms, circulating at centre and circumference, willing in all wills, personally embosoming all persons in unbroken synthesis of Being.

ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S *ÆSTHETICS*.

Translated from the French of CH. BENARD, by J. A. MARTLING.

PART III.

SYSTEM OF THE PARTICULAR ARTS.

Under the head of "System of the Particular Arts," Hegel sets forth, in this third part, the theory of each of the arts—*Architecture, Sculpture, Painting, Music and Poetry*.

Before proceeding to the division of the arts, he glances at the different *styles* which distinguish the different epochs of their development. He reduces them to three styles: the *simple* or severe, the *ideal* or beautiful, and the graceful.

1. At first the simple and natural style presents itself to us, but it is not the truly natural or true simplicity. That supposes a previous perfection. Primitive simplicity is gross, confused, rigid, inanimate. Art in its infancy is heavy and trifling, destitute of life and liberty, without expression, or with an exaggerated vivacity. Still harsh and rude in its commencements, it becomes by degrees master of form, and learns to unite it intimately with content. It arrives thus at a severe beauty. This style is the Beautiful in its lofty simplicity. It is restricted to reproducing a subject with its essential traits. Disdaining grace and ornament, it contents itself with the general and grand expression which springs from the subject, without the artist's exhibiting himself and revealing his personality in it.

2. Next in order comes the beautiful style, the *ideal* and pure style, which holds the mean between simple expression and a marked tendency to the graceful. Its character is vitality, combined with a calm and beautiful grandeur. Grace is not wanting, but there is rather a natural carelessness, a simple complacency, than the desire to please—a beauty indifferent to the exterior charms which blossom of themselves upon the surface. Such is the ideal of the beautiful style—the style of Phidias and Homer. It is the culminating point of art.

3. But this movement is short. The ideal style passes quickly to the graceful, to the agreeable. Here appears an aim different from that of the realization of the beautiful, which pure art ought to propose to itself, to wit: the intention of pleasing, of producing an impression on the soul. Hence arise works of a style elaborate with art, and a certain seeking for external embellishments. The subject is no more the principal thing. The attention of the artist is distracted by ornaments and accessories—by the decorations, the trimmings, the simpering airs, the attitudes and graceful postures, or the vivid colors and the attractive forms, the luxury of ornaments and draperies, the learned making of verse. But the general effect remains without grandeur and without nobleness. Beautiful proportions and grand masses give place to moderate dimensions, or are masked with ornaments. The graceful style begets the style *for effect*, which is an exaggeration of it. The art then becomes altogether conspicuous; it calls the attention of the spectator by everything that can strike the senses. The artist surrenders to it his personal ends and his design. In this species of *tête-à-tête* with the public, there is betrayed through all, the desire of exhibiting his wit, of attracting admiration for his ability, his skill, his power of execution. This art—without naturalness, full of coquetry, of artifice and affectation, the opposite of the severe style which yields nothing to the public—is the style of the epochs of decadence. Frequently it has recourse to a last artifice, to the affectation of profundity and of simplicity, which is then only obscurity, a mysterious profundity which conceals an absence of ideas and a real impotence. This air of mystery, which parades itself, is in its turn, hardly better than coquetry; the principle is the same—the desire of producing an effect.

The author then passes to the *Division*

of the Arts. The common method classes them according to their means of representation, and the senses to which they are addressed. Two senses only are affected by the perception of the beautiful: *sight*, which perceives forms and colors, and *hearing*, which perceives sounds. Hence the division into *arts of design* and *musical art*. *Poetry*, which employs speech, and addresses itself to the imagination, forms a domain apart. Without discarding this division, Hegel combines it with another more philosophical principle of classification, and one which is taken no longer from the external means of art, but from their internal relation to the very content of the ideas which it is to represent.

Art has for object the representation of the ideal. The arts ought then to be classed according to the measure in which they are more or less capable of expressing it. This gradation will have at the same time the advantage of corresponding to historic progress, and to the fundamental forms of art previously studied.

According to this principle, the arts marshal themselves, and succeed one another, to form a regular and complete system, thus:

1. First *Architecture* presents itself. This art, in fact, is incapable of representing an idea otherwise than in a vague, indeterminate manner. It fashions the masses of inorganic nature, according to the laws of matter and geometrical proportions; it disposes them with regularity and symmetry in such a manner as to offer to the eyes an image which is a simple reflex of the spirit, a dumb symbol of the thought. Architecture is at the same time appropriated to ends which are foreign to it: it is destined to furnish a dwelling for man and a temple for Divinity; it must shelter under its roof, in its enclosure, the other arts, and, in particular, sculpture and painting.

For these reasons architecture should, historically and logically, be placed first in the series of the arts.

2. In a higher rank is Sculpture, which already exhibits spirit under certain determinate traits. Its object, in fact, is

spirit individualized, revealed by the human form and its living organism. Under this visible appearance, by the features of the countenance, and the proportions of the body, it expresses ideal beauty, divine calmness, serenity—in a word, the classic ideal.

3. Although retained in the world of visible forms, Painting offers a higher degree of spirituality. To form, it adds the different phases of visible appearance, the illusions of perspective, color, light and shades, and thereby it becomes capable, not only of reproducing the various pictures of nature, but also of expressing upon canvas the most profound sentiments of the human soul, and all the scenes of ethical life.

4. But, as an expression of sentiment, *Music* still surpasses painting. What it expresses is the soul itself, in its most intimate and profound relations; and this by a sensuous phenomenon, equally invisible, instantaneous, intangible—sound—sonorous vibrations, which resound in the abysses of the soul, and agitate it throughout.

5. All these arts culminate in Poetry, which includes them and surpasses them, and whose superiority is due to its mode of expression—*speech*. It alone is capable of expressing all ideas, all sentiments, all passions, the highest conceptions of the intelligence, and the most fugitive impressions of the soul. To it alone is given to represent an action in its complete development and in all its phases. It is the universal art—its domain is unlimited. Hence it is divided into many species, of which the principal are *epic*, *lyric* and *dramatic* poetry.

These five arts form the complete and organized system of the arts. Others, such as the *art of gardening*, *dancing*, *engraving*, etc., are only accessories, and more or less connected with the preceding. They have not the right to occupy a distinct place in a general theory; they would only introduce confusion, and disfigure the fundamental type which is peculiar to each of them.

Such is the division adopted by Hegel. He combines it, at the same time, with his

general division of the forms of the historic development of art. Thus architecture appears to him to correspond more particularly to the *symbolic* type; sculpture is the *classic* art, *par excellence*; painting and music fill the category of the *romantic* arts. Poetry, as art universal, belongs to all epochs.

I. ARCHITECTURE.—In the study of architecture, Hegel follows a purely historic method. He limits himself to describing and characterizing its principal forms in the different epochs of history. This art, in fact, lends itself to an abstract theory less than the others. There are here few principles to establish; and when we depart from generalities, we enter into the domain of mathematical laws, or into the technical applications, foreign to pure science. It remains, then, only to determine the sense and the character of its monuments, in their relation to the spirit of the people, and the epochs to which they belong. It is to this point of view that the author has devoted himself. The division which he adopts on this subject, and the manner in which he explains it, are as follows:

The object of architecture, independent of the positive design and the use to which its monuments are appropriated, is to express a general thought, by forms borrowed from inorganic nature, by masses fashioned and disposed according to the laws of geometry and mechanics. But whatever may be the ideas and the impressions which the appearance of an edifice produces, it never furnishes other than an obscure and enigmatic emblem. The thought is vaguely represented by those material forms which spirit itself does not animate.

If such is the nature of this art, it follows that, essentially symbolic, it must predominate in that first epoch of history which is distinguished by the symbolic character of its monuments. It must show itself there freer, more independent of practical utility, not subordinated to a foreign end. Its essential object ought to be to express ideas, to present emblems, to symbolize the beliefs of those peoples, incapable as they are of otherwise express-

ing them. It is the proper language of such an epoch—a language enigmatic and mysterious; it indicates the effort of the imagination to represent ideas, still vague. Its monuments are problems proposed to future ages, and which as yet are but imperfectly comprehended.

Such is the character of oriental architecture. There the end is valueless or accessory; the symbolic expression is the principal object. Architecture is *independent*, and sculpture is confounded with it.

The monuments of Greek and Roman architecture present a wholly different character. Here, the aim of utility appears clearly distinct from expression. The purpose, the design of the monument comes out in an evident manner. It is a dwelling, a shelter, a temple, etc.

Sculpture, for its part, is detached from architecture, and assigns its end to it. The image of the god, enclosed in the temple, is the principal object. The temple is only a shelter, an external attendant. Its forms are regulated according to the laws of numbers, and the proportions of a learned eurythmy; but its true ornaments are furnished to it by sculpture. Architecture ceases then to be independent and symbolic; it becomes dependent, subordinated to a positive end.

As to Christian architecture or that of the Middle Ages, it presents the union of the two preceding characteristics. It is at once devoted to a useful end, and eminently expressive or symbolic—*dependent* and *independent*. The temple is the house of God; it is devoted to the uses and ceremonies of worship, and shows throughout its design in its forms; but at the same time these symbolize admirably the Christian idea.

Thus the symbolic, classic and romantic forms, borrowed from history, and which mark the whole development of art, serve for the division and classification of the forms of architecture. This being especially the art which is exercised in the domain of matter, the essential point to be distinguished is whether the monument which is addressed to the eyes includes in itself its own meaning, or whether it is considered as a means to a foreign end,

or finally whether, although in the service of a foreign end, it preserves its independence.

The *basis* of the division being thus placed, Hegel justifies it by describing the characters of the monuments belonging to these three epochs. All this descriptive part can not be analyzed: we are obliged to limit ourselves to securing a comprehension of the general features, and to noting the most remarkable points.

(a) Since the distinctive characteristic of symbolic architecture is the expression of a general thought, without other end than the representation of it, the interest in its monuments is less in their positive design than in the religious conceptions of the people, who, not having other means of expression, have embodied their thought, still vague and confused, in these gigantic masses and these colossal images. Entire nations know not how otherwise to express their religious beliefs. Hence the symbolic character of the structures of the Babylonians, the Indians and the Egyptians, of those works which absorbed the life of those peoples, and whose meaning we seek to explain to ourselves.

It is difficult to follow a regular order in the absence of chronology, when we review the multiplicity of ideas and forms which these monuments and these symbols present. Hegel thinks, nevertheless, that he is able to establish the following gradations:

In the first rank are the simplest monuments, such as seem only designed to serve as a bond of union to entire nations, or to different nations. Such gigantic structures as the tower of Belus or Babylon, upon the shores of the Euphrates, present the image of the union of the peoples before their dispersion. Community of toil and effort is the aim and the very idea of the work; it is the common work of their united efforts, the symbol of the dissolution of the primitive family and of the formation of a vaster society.

In a rank more elevated, appear the monuments of a more determined character, where is noticeable a mingling of architecture and sculpture, although they belong to the former. Such are those sym-

bols which, in the East, represent the generative force of nature; the *phallus* and the *lingam* scattered in so great numbers throughout Phrygia and Syria, and of which India is the principal seat; in Egypt, the obelisks, which derive their symbolic significance from the rays of the sun; the Memnons, colossal statues which also represent the sun and his beneficent influence upon nature; the sphinxes, which one finds in Egypt in prodigious numbers and of astonishing size, ranged in rows in the form of avenues. These monuments, of an imposing sculpture, are grouped in masses, surrounded by walls so as to form buildings.

They present, in a striking manner, the twofold character indicated above: free from all positive design, they are, above all, symbols; afterward, sculpture is confounded with architecture. They are structures without roof, without doors, without aisles, frequently forests of columns where the eye loses itself. The eye passes over objects which are there for their own sake, designed only to strike the imagination by their colossal aspect and their enigmatic sense, not to serve as a dwelling for a god, and as a place of assemblage for his worshippers. Their order and their disposition alone preserve for them an architectural character. You walk on into the midst of those human works, mute symbols which remind you of divine things; your eyes are everywhere struck with the aspect of those forms and those extraordinary figures, of those walls besprinkled with hieroglyphics, books of stone, as it were, leaves of a mysterious book. Everything there is symbolically determined—the proportions, the distances, the number of columns, etc. The Egyptians, in particular, consecrated their lives to constructing and building these monuments, by instinct, as a swarm of bees builds its hive. This was the whole life of the people. It placed there all its thought, for it could no otherwise express it.

Nevertheless, that architecture, in one point, by its chambers and its halls, its tombs, begins to approach the following class, which exhibits a more positive design, and of which the type is a house.

A third rank marks the transition of symbolic to classic architecture. Architecture already presents a character of utility, of conformity to an end. The monument has a precise design; it serves for a particular use taken aside from the symbolic sense. It is a temple or a tomb. Such, in the first place, is the subterranean architecture of the Indians, those vast excavations which are also temples, species of subterranean cathedrals, the caverns of Mithra, likewise filled with symbolic sculpture. But this transition is better characterized by the double architecture, (subterranean and above ground) of the Egyptians, which is connected with their worship of the dead. An individual being, who has his significance and his proper value; the dead one, distinct from his habitation which serves him only for covering and shelter, resides in the interior. The most ancient of these tombs are the pyramids, species of crystals, envelopes of stone which enclose a kernel, an invisible being, and which serve for the preservation of the bodies. In this concealed dead one, resides the significance of the *monument* which is subordinate to him.

Here, then, *Architecture* ceases to be independent. It divides itself into two elements—the end and the means; it is the means, and it is subservient to an end. Further, sculpture separates itself from it, and obtains a distinct office—that of shaping the image within, and its accessories. Here appears clearly the special design of architecture, conformity to an end; also it assumes inorganic and geometric forms, the abstract, mathematical form, which befits it in particular. The pyramid already exhibits the design of a house, the rectangular form.

(b) Classic architecture has a two-fold point of departure—symbolic architecture and necessity. The adaptation of parts to an end, in symbolic architecture, is accessory. In the house, on the contrary, all is controlled, from the first, by actual necessity and convenience. Now classic architecture proceeds both from the one and from the other principle, from necessity and from art, from the useful and

from the beautiful, which it combines in the most perfect manner. Necessity produces regular forms, right angles, plane surfaces. But the end is not simply the satisfaction of a physical necessity; there is also an idea, a religious representation, a sacred image, which it has to shelter and surround, a worship, a religious ceremonial. The temple ought then, like the temple fashioned by sculpture, to spring from the creative imagination of the artist. There is necessary a dwelling for the god, fashioned by art and according to its laws.

Thus, while falling under the law of conformity to an end, and ceasing to be independent, architecture escapes from the useful and submits to the law of the beautiful; or rather, the beautiful and useful meet and combine themselves in the happiest manner. Symmetry, eurythmy, organic forms the most graceful, the most rich, and the most varied, join themselves as ornaments to the architectural forms. The two points of view are united without being confounded, and form an harmonious whole; there will be, at the same time, a useful, convenient and beautiful architecture.

What best marks the transition to Greek architecture, is the appearance of the column, which is its type. The column is a support. Therein is its useful and mechanical design; it fulfils that design in the most simple and perfect manner, because with it the power of support is reduced to its minimum of material means. From another side, in order to be adapted to its end and to beauty, it must give up its natural and primitive form. The beautiful column comes from a form borrowed from nature; but carved, shaped, it takes a regular and geometric configuration. In Egypt, human figures serve as columns; here they are replaced by caryatides. But the natural, primitive form is the tree, the trunk, the flexible stock, which bears its crown. Such, too, appears the Egyptian column; columns are seen rising from the vegetable kingdom in the stalks of the lotus and other trees; the base resembles an onion. The leaf shoots from the root, like that of a reed, and the capital pre-

sents the appearance of a flower. The mathematical and regular form is absent. In the Greek column, on the contrary, all is fashioned according to the mathematical laws of regularity and proportion. The beautiful column springs from a form borrowed from nature, but fashioned according to the artistic sense.

Thus the characteristic of classic architecture, as of architecture in general, is the union of beauty and utility. Its beauty consists in its regularity, and although it serves a foreign end, it constitutes a whole perfect in itself; it permits its essential aim to look forth in all its parts, and through the harmony of its relations, it transforms the useful into the beautiful.

The character of classic architecture being subordination to an end, it is that end which, without detriment to beauty, gives to the entire edifice its proper signification, and which becomes thus the principal regulator of all its parts; as it impresses itself on the whole, and determines its fundamental form. The first thing as to a work of this sort, then, is to know what is its purpose, its design. The general purpose of a Grecian temple is to hold the statue of a god. But in its exterior, the character of the temple relates to a different end, and its spirit is the life of the Greek people.

Among the Greeks, open structures, colonnades and porticoes, have as object the promenade in the open air, conversation, public life under a pure sky. Likewise the dwellings of private persons are insignificant. Among the Romans, on the contrary, whose national architecture has a more positive end in utility, appears later the luxury of private houses, palaces, villas, theatres, circuses, amphitheatres, aqueducts and fountains. But the principal edifice is that whose end is most remote from the wants of material life; it is the temple designed to serve as a shelter to a divine object, which already belongs to the fine arts—to the statue of a god.

Although devoted to a determinate end, this architecture is none the less free from it, in the sense, that it disengages itself

from organic forms; it is more free even than sculpture, which is obliged to reproduce them; it invents its plan, the general configuration, and it displays in external forms all the richness of the imagination; it has no other laws than those of good taste and harmony; it labors without a direct model. Nevertheless, it works within a limited domain, that of mathematical figures, and it is subjected to the laws of mechanics. Here must be preserved, first of all, the relations between the width, the length, the height of the edifice; the exact proportions of the columns according to their thickness, the weight to be supported, the intervals, the number of columns, the style, the simplicity of the ornaments. It is this which gives to the theory of this art, and in particular of this form of architecture, the character of dryness and abstraction. But there dominates throughout, a natural eurythmy, which their perfectly accurate sense enabled the Greeks to find and fix as the measure and rule of the beautiful.

We will not follow the author in the description which he gives of the particular characteristics of architectural forms; we will omit also some other interesting details upon building in wood or in stone as the primitive type, upon the relation of the different parts of the Greek temple. In here following Vitruvius, the author has been able to add some discriminating and judicious remarks. What he says, in particular, of the column, of its proportions and of its design, of the internal unity of the different parts and of their effects as a whole, adds to what is already known a philosophical explication which satisfies the reason. We remark, especially, this passage, which sums up the general character of the Greek temple: "In general, the Greek temple presents an aspect which satisfies the vision, and, so to speak, surfeits it. Nothing is very elevated, it is regularly extended in length and breadth. The eye finds itself allured by the sense of extent, while Gothic architecture mounts even beyond measurement, and shoots upward to heaven. Besides, the ornaments are so managed that they do

not mar the general expression of simplicity. In this, the ancients observe the most beautiful moderation."

The connection of their architecture with the genius, the spirit, and the life of the Greek people, is indicated in the following passage: "In place of the spectacle of an assemblage united for a single end, all appears directed towards the exterior, and presents us the image of an animated promenade. There men who have leisure abandon themselves to conversations without end, wherein rule gayety and serenity. The whole expression of such a temple remains truly simple and grand in itself, but it has at the same time an air of serenity, something open and graceful." This prepares and conducts us to another kind of architecture, which presents a striking contrast to the preceding Christian or Gothic architecture.

(c) We shall not further attempt to reproduce, even in its principal features, the description which Hegel gives, in some pages, of Romantic or Gothic architecture. The author has proposed to himself, as object, in the first place, to compare the two kinds of architecture, the Greek and the Christian, then to secure the apprehension of the relation of this form of architecture to the Christian idea. This is what constitutes the peculiar interest of this remarkable sketch, which, by its vigor and severity of design, preserves its distinctive merit when compared with all descriptions that have been made of the architecture of the Middle Ages.

Gothic architecture, according to Hegel, unites, in the first place, the opposite characters of the two preceding kinds. Notwithstanding, this union does not consist in the simple fusion of the architectural forms of the East and of Greece. Here, still more than in the Greek temple, the house furnishes the fundamental type. An architectural edifice which is the house of God, shows itself perfectly in conformity with its design and adapted to worship; but the monument is also there for its own sake, independent, absolute. Externally, the edifice ascends, shoots freely into the air.

The conformity to the end, although it presents itself to the eyes, is therefore effaced, and leaves to the whole the appearance of an independent existence. The monument has a determinate sense, and shows it; but, in its grand aspect and its sublime calm, it is lifted above all end in utility, to something infinite in itself.

If we examine the relation of this architecture to the inner spirit and the idea of Christian worship, we remark, in the first place, that the fundamental form is here the house wholly closed. Just as, in fact, the Christian spirit withdraws itself into the interior of the conscience, just so the church is an enclosure, sealed on all sides, the place of meditation and silence. "It is the place of the reflection of the soul into itself, which thus shuts itself up materially in space. On the other hand, if, in Christian meditation, the soul withdraws into itself, it is, at the same time, lifted above the finite, and this equally determines the character of the house of God. Architecture takes, then, for its independent signification, elevation towards the infinite, a character which it expresses by the proportions of its architectural forms." These two traits, depth of self-examination and elevation of the soul towards the infinite, explain completely the Gothic architecture and its principal forms. They furnish also the essential differences between Gothic and Greek architecture.

The impression which the Christian church ought to produce in contrast with this open and serene aspect of the Greek temple, is, in the first place, the calmness of the soul which reflects into itself, then that of a sublime majesty which shoots beyond the confines of sense. Greek edifices extend horizontally; the Christian church should lift itself from the ground and shoot into the air.

The most striking characteristic which the house of God presents, in its whole and its parts, is, then, the free flight, the shooting in points formed either by broken arches or by right lines. In Greek architecture, exact proportion between support and height is everywhere observed. Here,

on the contrary, the operation of supporting and the disposition at a right angle—the most convenient for this end—disappears or is effaced. The walls and the column shoot without marked difference between what supports and what is supported, and meet in an acute angle. Hence

the acute triangle and the ogee, which form the characteristic traits of Gothic architecture.

We are not able to follow the author in the detailed explication of the different forms and the divers parts of the Gothic edifice, and of its total structure.

THE METAPHYSICS OF MATERIALISM.

By D. G. BRINTON.

Ubi tres physici, ibi duo athei,—the proverb is something musty. Natural science is and always has been materialistic. The explanation is simple. There is as great antagonism between chemical research and metaphysical speculation, as there is between what

“ Youthful poets dream,
On summer's eve by haunted stream,”

and book-keeping by double entry, and nothing is more customary than to deny what we do not understand. Of late years this scientific materialism has been making gigantic strides. Since the imposing fabric of the Hegelian philosophy proved but a house built on sands, the scales and metre have become our only gods.

Germany—mystic, metaphysical Germany—strange to say, leads the van in this crusade against all faith and all idealism. Vogt, the geologist, Moleschott, the physiologist, Virchow, the greatest of all living histologists, Büchner, Tiedemann, Reuchlin, Meldeg, and many others, not only hold these opinions, but have left the seclusion of the laboratory and the clinic to enter the arena of polemics in their favor. We do not mention the French and English advocates of “positive philosophy.” Their name is Legion.

It is not our design to enter at all at large into these views, still less to dispute them, but merely to give the latest and most approved defence of a single point of their position, a point which we submit is the kernel of the whole controversy, and which we believe to be the very Achilles heel and crack in the armor

of their panoply of argument—that is, *the Theory of the Absolute*. Demonstrate the possibility of the Absolute, and materialism is impossible; disprove it, and all other philosophies are empty nothings,—*vox et præterea nihil*. Here, and only here, is materialism brought face to face with metaphysics; here is the combat à l'outrance in which one or the other must perish. No one of its apostles has accepted the proffered glaive more heartily, and defended his position with more wary dexterity, than Moleschott, and it is mainly from his work, entitled *Der Kreislauf des Lebens*, that we illustrate the present metaphysics of materialism.

Our first question is, What is the test of truth, what sanctions a law? Until this is answered, all assertion is absurd, and until it is answered correctly, all philosophy is vain. The response of the naturalist is: “The necessary sequence of cause and effect is the prime law of the experimentalist—a law which he does not ask from revelation, but will find out for himself by observation.” The source of truth is sensation; the uniform result of manifold experience is a law. Here a double objection arises: first, that the term “a necessary sequence” presupposes a law, and begs the question at issue; and, secondly, that, this necessity unproved, such truth is nothing more than a probability, for it is impossible to be certain that our next experiment may not have quite a different result. Either this is not the road to absolute truth, or absolute truth is unattainable. The latter horn of the dilemma is at once accepted; we neither know,

nor can know, a law to be absolute; to us, the absolute does not exist. Matter and force with their relations are there, but what we know of them is a varying quantity, is of this age or the last, of this man or that, dependent upon the extent and accuracy of empirical science; we cannot speak of what we do not know, and we know no law that conceivable experience might not contradict.

But how, objects the reader, can this be reconciled with the pure mathematics? Here seem to be laws above experience, laws admitting no exception.

The response leads us back to the origin of our notions of *Space* and *Time*, on the the former of which mathematics is founded. The supposition that they are innate ideas is of course rejected by the materialist; for he looks upon innate ideas as fables; he considers them perceptions derived positively from the senses, but they do not belong to the senses alone, nor are they perceptions merely; "they are ideas, but ideas that without the sensuous perceptions of proximity and sequence could never have arisen. Nay, more—the perception of space must precede that of time," for it is only through the former that we can reach the latter. The plainest laws of space, those which were the earliest impressions on the *tabula rasa* of the infant mind, and which the hourly experience of life verifies, are called, by the mathematician, *axioms*, and on these simplest generalizations of our perceptions he bases the whole of his structure. Axioms, therefore, are the uniform results of experiments, the possible conditions of which are extremely limited, and the factors of which have been subjected to all these conditions.

It follows from a denial of the absolute that all existence is concrete. Indeed, we may say that the corner stone of the edifice of materialism is embraced in the terse sentence of Moleschott—*all existence is existence through attributes*. Existence *per se* (*Fürsichsein*) is a meaningless term, and substance apart from attribute, the *ens ineffabile*, is a pedantic figment and nothing more. Finally, there can be no attribute except through a relation.

Let this trilogy of existence, attribute and relation, be clearly before the mind, and the position that the positive philosophy bears to all others becomes at once luminous enough. There is no existence apart from attributes, no attributes but through relations, no relations but to other existences. To exemplify: a stone is heavy, hard, colored, perhaps bitter to the taste. Now, says the idealist, this weight, this hardness, this color, this bitterness, these are not the stone, they are merely its properties or attributes, and the stone itself is some substance behind them all, to which they adhere and which we cannot detect with our senses; further, he might add, if a moderate in his school, these attributes are independently existent, the bitterness is there when we are not tasting it, and the attribute of color, though there be no light. All this the materialist denies. To him, the attributes and nothing else constitute the stone, and these attributes have no existence apart from their relations to other objects. The bitterness exists only in relation to the organs of taste, and the color to the organs of sight, and the weight to other bodies of matter. Nothing, in short, can be said to exist to us that is not cognizable by our senses. But, objects some one, there may be an existence which is not to us, which is as much beyond our ken as color is beyond the conception of the born blind. The expression was used advisedly: no such existence can become the subject of rational language. "Does not all knowledge predicate a knower, consequently a relation of the subject to the observer? Such a relation is an attribute. Without it, knowledge is inconceivable. Neither God nor man can raise himself above the knowledge furnished by these relations to his organs of apprehension."

A disagreeable sequence to this logic will not fail to occur to every one. If all knowledge comes from the organs of sense, then differently formed organs must furnish very different and contradictory knowledge, and one is as likely to be correct as another. The radiate animal, who sees the world through a cornea alone, must have quite another notion of light, color,

and relative size, from the spider whose eye is provided with lenses and a vitreous humor. Consonantly with the theory, each of these probably opposing views is equally true. This ugly dilemma is foreseen by our author, for he grants that "the knowledge of the insect, its knowledge of the action of the outer world, is altogether a different one from that of man," but he avoids the ultimate result of this reasoning.

To sum up the views of this school: matter is eternal, force is eternal, but each is impossible without the other; what bears any relation to our senses we either know or can know; what does not, it is absurd to discuss; the highest thought is but the physical elaboration of sensations, or, to use the expression of Carl Vogt, "thought is a secretion of the brain as urine is of the kidneys. Without phosphorus there is no thought." "And so," concludes Moleschott, "only when thought is based on fact, only when the reason is granted no sphere of action but the historical which arises from observation, when the perception is at the same time thought, and the understanding sees with consciousness,

does the contradiction between Philosophy and Science disappear."

This, then, is the last word of materialism, this the solution it now offers us of the great problem of Life. We enter no further into its views, for all collateral questions concerning the origin of the ideas of the true, the good and the beautiful, the vital force, and the spiritual life, depend directly on the question we have above mentioned. Let the reader turn back precisely a century to the *Système de la Nature*, so long a boasted bulwark of the rationalistic school, and judge for himself what advance, if any, materialism has made in fortifying this, the most vital point of her structure. Let him ask himself anew whether the criticism of Hume on the law of cause and effect can in any way be met except after the example of Kant, by the assumption of the absolute idea, and we have little doubt what conclusion he will arrive at in reference to that system which, while it boasts to offer the only method of discovering truth, starts with the flat denial of all truth other than relative.

LETTERS ON FAUST.

By H. C. BROCKMEYER.

I.

DEAR II.—Yours of a recent date, requesting an epistolary criticism of "Goethe's Faust," has come to hand, and I hasten to assure you of a compliance of some sort. I say a compliance of some sort, for I cannot promise you a criticism. This, it seems to me, would be both too little and too much; too little if understood in the ordinary sense, as meaning a mere statement of the *relation* existing between the work and myself; too much if interpreted as pledging an expression of a work of the creative imagination, as a totality, in the terms of the understanding, and submitting the result to the canons of art.

The former procedure, usually called criticism, reduced to its simplest forms, amounts to this: that I, the critic, report

to you, that I was amused or bored, flattered or satirized, elevated or degraded, humanized or brutalized, enlightened or mystified, pleased or displeased, by the work under consideration; and—since it depends quite as much upon my own humor, native ability, and culture acquired, which set of adjectives I may be able to report, as it does upon the work—I cannot perceive what earthly profit such a labor could be to you. For that which is clear to you may be dark to me; hence, if I report that a given work is a "perfect riddle to me," you will only smile at my simplicity. Again, that which amuses me may bore you, for I notice that even at the theatre, some will yawn with *ennui* while others thrill with delight, and applaud the play. Now, if each of these should tell you how *he* liked the performance, the one

would say "excellent," and the other "miserable," and you be none the wiser. To expect, therefore, that I intend to enter upon a labor of this kind, is to expect too little.

Besides, such an undertaking seems to me not without its peculiar danger; for it may happen that the work measures or criticises the critic, instead of the latter the former. If, for example, I should tell you that the integral and differential calculus is all fog to me—mystifies me completely—you would conclude my knowledge of mathematics to be rather imperfect, and thus use my own report of that work as a sounding-lead to ascertain the depth of my attainment. Nay, you might even go further, and regard the work as a kind of Doomsday Book, on the title page of which I had "written myself down an ass." Now, as I am not ambitious of a memorial of this kind, especially when there is no probability that the pages in contemplation—Goethe's *Faust*—will perish any sooner than the veritable Doomsday Book itself, I request you, as a special favor, not to understand of me that I propose engaging in any undertaking of this sort.*

Nor are you to expect an inquiry into the quantity or quality of the author's food, drink or raiment. For the present infantile state of analytic science refuses all aid in tracing such *primary* elements, so to speak, in the composition of the poem before us; and hence such an investigation would lead, at best, to very secondary and remote conclusions. Nor shall we be permitted to explore the likes and dislikes of the poet, in that fine volume of

* In this connection, permit me, dear friend, to mention a discovery which I made concerning my son Isaac, now three years old. Just imagine my surprise when I found that every book in my possession—Webster's Spelling-book not excepted—is a perfect riddle to him, and mystifies him as completely as ever the works of Goethe, Hegel, Emerson, or any other thinking man, do or did the learned critics. But my parental pride, so much elated by the discovery of this remarkable precocity in my son—a precocity which, at the age of three years, (!) shows him possessed of all the incapacity of such "learned men"—was shocked, nay, mortified, by the utter want of appreciation which the little fellow showed of this, his exalted condition!

scandal, for the kindred reason that neither crucible, reagent nor retort are at hand which can be of the remotest service.

By the by, has it never occurred to you, when perusing works of the kind last referred to, what a glowing picture the pious Dean of St. Patrick's, the *saintly Swift*, has bequeathed to us of their producers, when he places the great authors, the historical Gullivers of our race, in all their majesty of form, astride the public thoroughfare of a Lilliputian age, and marches the inhabitants, in solid battalions, through between their legs? you recollect what he says?

Nor yet are you to expect a treat of that most delightful of all compounds, the table talk and conversation—or, to use a homely phrase, the *literary dishwater* retailed by the author's scullion. To expect such, or the like, would be to expect too little.

On the other hand, to expect that I shall send you an expression, in the terms of the understanding, of a work of the creative imagination, as a totality, and submit the result to the canons of art, is to expect too much. For while I am ready, and while I intend to comply with the first part of this proposition, I am unable to fulfil the requirement of the latter part—that is, I am not able to submit the result to the canons of art. The reason for this inability it is not necessary to develop in this connection any further than merely to mention that I find it extremely inconvenient to lay my hand upon the aforementioned canons just at this time.

I must, therefore, content myself with the endeavor to summon before you the *Idea* which creates the poem—each act, scene and verse—so that we may see the part in its relation to the whole, and the whole in its concrete, organic articulation. If we succeed in this, then we may say that we *comprehend* the work—a condition precedent alike to the beneficial enjoyment and the rational judgment of the same.

II.

In my first letter, dear friend, I endeavored to guard you against misapprehension

as to what you might expect from me. Its substance, if memory serves me, was that I did not intend to write on Anthropology or Psychology, nor yet on street, parlor or court gossip, but simply about a work of art.

I deemed these remarks pertinent in view of the customs of the time, lest that, in my not conforming to them, you should judge me harshly without profit to yourself. With the same desire of keeping up a fair understanding with you, I must call your attention to some terms and distinctions which we shall have occasion to use, and which, unless explained, might prove shadows instead of lights along the path of our intercourse.

I confess to you that I share the (I might say) abhorrence so generally entertained by the reading public, of the use of any general terms whatsoever, and would avoid them altogether if I could only see how. But in reading the poem that we are to consider, I come upon such passages as these :

(*Choir of invisible Spirits.*)

"Woe! Woe!

Thou hast destroyed it,

The beautiful world!

It reels, it crumbles,

Crushed by a demigod's mighty hand!"

and I cannot see how we are to understand these spirits, or the poet who gave them voice, unless we attack this very general expression "The beautiful world," here said to have been destroyed by Faust.

I am, however, somewhat reconciled to this by the example of my neighbor—a non-speculative, practical farmer—now busily engaged in harvesting his wheat. For I noticed that he first directed his attention, after cutting the grain, to collecting and tying it together in bundles; and I could not help but perceive how much this facilitated his labor, and how difficult it would have been for him to collect his wheat, grain by grain, like the sparrow of the field. Though wheat it were, and not chaff, still such a mode of handling would reduce it even below the value of chaff.

Just think of handling the wheat crop of these United States, the two hundred and twenty-five millions of bushels a year,

in this manner! It is absolutely not to be thought of, and we must have recourse to agglomeration, if not to generalization. But the one gives us general *masses*, and the other general *terms*. The only thing that we can do, therefore, is, in imitation of our good neighbor of the wheat field, to handle bundles, bushels, and bags, or—what is still better, if it can be done by some daring system of intellectual elevators—whole ship loads of grain at a time, due care being taken that we tie wheat to wheat, oats to oats, barley to barley, and not promiscuously.

Now, with this example well before our minds, and the necessity mentioned, which compels us to handle—not merely the wheat crop of the United States for one year, but—whatever has been raised by the intelligence of man from the beginning of our race to the time of Goethe the poet, together with the ground on which it was raised, and the sky above—for no less than this seems to be contained in the expression "The beautiful world"—I call your attention first to the expression "form and matter," which, when applied to works of intelligence, we must take the liberty of changing into the expression "form and content;" for since there is nothing in works of this kind that manifests gravity, it can be of no use to say so, but may be of some injury.

The next is the expression "works of art," which sounds rather suspicious in some of its applications—sounds as if it was intended to conceal rather than reveal the worker. Now I take it that the "works of art" are the works of the intelligence, and I shall have to classify them accordingly. Another point with reference to this might as well be noticed, and that is that the old expressions "works of art" and "works of nature" do not contain, as they were intended to, all the works that present themselves to our observation—the works of science, for example. Besides, we have government, society, and religion, all of which are undoubtedly distinct from the "works of art" no less than from the "works of nature," and to tie them up in the same bundle with either of them, seems to me to be

like tying wheat with oats, and therefore to be avoided, as in the example before our minds. This seems to be done in the expression "works of self-conscious intelligence," and "works of nature."

But if we reflect upon the phrases "works of self-conscious intelligence" and "works of nature," it becomes obvious that there must be some inaccuracy contained in them; for how can two distinct

subjects have the same predicate? It would, therefore, perhaps be better to say "the works of self-conscious intelligence" and the "*products* of nature."

Without further rasping and filing of old phrases, I call your attention, in the next place, to the most general term which we shall have occasion to use—"the world."

Under this we comprehend:

I. The natural world—Gravity;

II. The spiritual world—Self-determination.

I. Under the natural world we comprehend the terrestrial globe, and that part of the universe which is involved in its processes; these are:

- | | | | |
|-----|-------------------------------|---|---------------------------|
| (a) | (1.) Mechanic=Gravity, | } | Meteorologic=Electricity. |
| | (2.) Chemic=Affinity, | | |
| (b) | (1.) Organic=Galvanism, | } | Vital=Sensation. |
| | (2.) Vegetative=Assimilation, | | |

II. Under "The Spiritual World," the world of conscious intelligence, we comprehend:

- (a) The real world=implement, mediation.
 (b) The actual world=self-determination.

(a) The real world contains whatever derives the end of its existence only, from self-conscious intelligence.

- | | | |
|----------------------------|---|------------|
| (1.) The family=Affection. | } | Mediation. |
| (2.) Society=Ethics, | | |
| (3.) State=Rights, | | |

(b) The actual world contains whatever derives the end and the *means* of its existence from self-conscious intelligence.

- | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|---------------------|
| (1.) Art=Manifestation, | } | Self-determination. |
| (2.) Religion=Revelation, | | |
| (3.) Philosophy=Definition, | | |

From this it appears that we have divided the world into three large slices—the Natural, the Real, and the Actual—with gravity for one and self-determination for the other extreme, and mediation between them.

III.

In my last, I gave you some general terms, and the sense in which I intend to use them. I also gave you a reason why I should use them, together with an illustration. But I gave you no reason why I used these and no others—or I did not advance anything to show that there are *objects* to which they *necessarily* apply. I only take it for granted that there are some objects presented to your observation and mine, that gravitate or

weigh something, and others that do not. To each I have applied as nearly as I could the ordinary terms. Now this procedure, although very unphilosophical, I can justify only by reminding you of the object of these letters.

If we now listen again to the chant of the invisible choir,

"Thou hast destroyed it,
The beautiful world,"

it will be obvious that this can refer only to the world of mediation and self-determination, to the world of spirit, of self-conscious intelligence, for the world of gravitation is not so easily affected. But how is this—how is it that the world of self-conscious intelligence is so easily affected, is so dependent upon the individ-

ual man? This can be seen only by examining its genesis.

In the genesis of Spirit we have three stages — manifestation, realization, and actualization. The first of these, upon which the other two are dependent and sequent, falls in the individual man. For, in him it is that Reason manifests itself before it can realize, or embody itself in this or that political, social, or moral institution. And it is not merely necessary that it should so manifest itself in the individual; it must also realize itself in these institutions before it can actualize itself in Art, Religion, and Philosophy. For in this actualization it is absolutely dependent upon the former two stages of its genesis for a content. From this it appears that Art *shows* what Religion *teaches*, and what Philosophy *comprehends*; or that Art, Religion and Philosophy have the same content. Nor is it difficult to perceive why this world of spirit or self-conscious intelligence is so dependent upon the individual man.

Again, in the sphere of manifestation and reality, this content, the self-conscious intelligence, is the *self-consciousness* of an individual, a nation, or an age. And art, in the sphere of actuality, is this or that work of art, this poem, that painting, or yonder piece of sculpture, with the self-consciousness of this or that individual, nation, or age, for its content. Moreover, the particularity (the individual, nation, or age) of the content constitutes the individuality of the work of Art. And not only this, but this particularity of the self-consciousness furnishes the very contradiction itself with the development and solution of which the work of art is occupied. For the self-consciousness which constitutes the content, being the *self-consciousness* of an individual, a nation, or an age, instead of being self-conscious intelligence in its pure universality, contains in that very particularity the contradiction which, in the sphere of manifestation and reality, constitutes the collision, conflict, and solution.*

* From this a variety of facts in the character and history of the different works of art become apparent. The degree of the effect

Now, if we look back upon the facts stated, we have the manifestation, the realization, and the actualization of self-conscious intelligence as the three spheres or stages in the process which evolves and involves the entire activity of man, both practical and theoretical. It is also obvious that the realization of self-conscious intelligence in the family, society, and the state, and its actualization in Art, Religion, and Philosophy, depend in their genesis upon its manifestation in the individual. Hence a denial of the possibility of this manifestation is a denial of the possibility of the realization and actualization also.

Now if this denial assume the form of a conviction in the consciousness of an individual, a nation, or an age, then there results a contradiction which involves in the sweep of its universality the entire spiritual world of man. For it is the self-consciousness of that individual, nation, or age, in direct conflict with itself, not with this or that particularity of itself, but with its entire content, in the sphere of manifestation, with the receptivity for, the production of, and the aspiration after, the Beautiful, the Good, and the True, within the individual himself; in the sphere of realization with the Family, with Society, and with the State; and finally, in the sphere of actuality with Art, Religion, and Philosophy.

Now this contradiction is precisely what is 'presented in the proposition, "Man cannot know truth." This you will remember was, in the history of modern thought, the result of Kant's philosophy. And Kant's philosophy was the philosophy of Germany at the time of the conception of Goethe's Faust. And Goethe was the truest poet of Germany, and thus he sings:

"So then I have studied philosophy,
Jurisprudence and medicine,
And what is worse, Theology,
Thoroughly, but, alas! in vain,
And here I stand with study hoar,
A fool, and know what I knew before;
Am called Magister, nay, LL.D.,

produced, for example, is owing to the degree of validity attached to the two sides of the contradiction. If the duties which the individual

And for ten years, am busily
Engaged, leading through fen and close,
My trusting pupils by the nose;
Yet see that nothing can be known.
This burns my heart, this, this alone !"

Here, you will perceive in the first sentence of the poem, as was meet, the fundamental contradiction, the theme, or the "argument," as it is so admirably termed by critics, is stated in its naked abstractness, just as Achilles' wrath is the first sentence of the *Iliad*.

This theme, then, is nothing more nor less than the self-consciousness in contradiction with itself, in conflict with its own content. Hence, if the poem is to portray this theme, this content, in its totality, it must represent it in three spheres: first, Manifestation—Faust in conflict with himself; second, Realization—Faust in conflict with the Family, Society, and the State; thirdly, Actualization—Faust in conflict with Art, Religion, and Philosophy.

Now, my friend, please to examine the poem once more, reflect closely upon what has been said, and then tell how much of the poem can you spare, or how much is

owes to the family and the state come into conflict, as in the *Antigone* of Sophocles, and the consciousness of the age has not subordinated the ideas upon which they are based, but accords to each an equal degree of validity, we have a content replete with the noblest effects. For this is not a conflict between the abstract good and bad, the positive and the negative, but a conflict within the good itself. So likewise the universality of the effect is apparent from the content. If this is the self-consciousness of a nation, the work of art will be national. To illustrate this, and, at the same time, to trace the development of the particularity spoken of into a collision, we may refer to that great national work of art—the *Iliad* of Homer. The particularity which distinguishes the national self-consciousness of the Greeks is the preëminent validity attached by it to one of the before-mentioned modes of the actualization of self-conscious intelligence—the sensuous. Hence its worship of the Beautiful. This preëminence and the consequent subordination of the moral and the rational modes to it, is the root of the contradiction, and hence the basis of the collision which forms the content of the poem. Its motive modernized would read about as follows: "The son of one of our Senators goes to England; is received and hospitably entertained at the house of a lord. During his stay he falls in love and subsequently elopes with the young wife of his entertainer. For this outrage, perpetrated by the young hopeful, the entire fighting material of the island get

there in the poem as printed, which does not flow from or develop this theme?

IV.

In my last, dear friend, I called your attention to the theme, to the content of the poem in a general way, stating it in the very words of the poet himself. To trace the development of this theme from the abstract generality into concrete detail is the task before us.

According to the analysis, we have to consider, first of all, the sphere of *Manifestation*.

In this we observe the three-fold relation which the individual sustains to self-conscious intelligence, viz: Receptivity for, and production of, and aspiration for, the True, the Good, and the Beautiful. Now if it is true that man cannot know truth, then it follows that he can neither receive nor produce the True. For how shall he know that whatever he may receive and produce is true, since it is specially denied that he can know it. This conclusion as conviction, however, does not affect immediately the third relation—the aspira-

themselves into their ships, not so much to avenge the injured husband as to capture the runaway wife."

But—now mark—adverse winds ensue, powers not human are in arms against them, and before these can be propitiated, a princess of the blood royal, pure and undefiled, must be sacrificed!—is sacrificed, and for what? That all Greece may proclaim to the world that pure womanhood, pure manhood, family, society, and the state, are nothing, must be sacrificed on the altar of the Beautiful. For in the sacrifice of Iphigenia, all that could perish in Helen, and more too—for Iphigenia was pure and Helen was not—was offered up by the Greeks, woman for woman, and nothing remained but the Beautiful, for which she henceforth became the expression. For in this alone did Helen excel Iphigenia, and all women.

But how is this? Have not the filial, the parental, the social, the civil relations, sanctity and validity? Not as against the realization of the Beautiful, says the Greek. Nor yet the state? No; "I do not go at the command of Agamemnon, but because I pledged fealty to Beauty." "But then," Sir Achilles, "if the Beautiful should present itself under some individual form—say that of Briseis—you would for the sake of its possession disobey the will of the state?" "Of course." And the poet has to sing, "Achilles' wrath!" and not "the recovery of the runaway wife," the grand historical action.

tion—nor quench its gnawing. And this is the first form of conflict in the individual. Let us now open the book and place it before us.

The historic origin of our theme places us in a German University, in the professor's private studio.

It is well here to remember that it is a German University, and that the occupant of the room is a *German* professor. Also that it is the received opinion that the Germans are a *theoretical* people; by which we understand that they act from conviction, and not from instinct. Moreover, that their conviction is not a mere holiday affair, to be rehearsed, say on Sunday, and left in charge of a minister, paid for the purpose, during the balance of the week, but an actual, vital fountain of action. Hence, the conviction of such a character being given, the acts follow in logical sequence.

With this remembered, let us now listen to the self-communion of the occupant of the room.

In bitter earnest the man has honestly examined, and sought to possess himself of the intellectual patrimony of the race. In poverty, in solitude, in isolation, he has labored hopefully, earnestly; and now he casts up his account and finds—what? "That nothing can be known." His hair is gray with more than futile endeavor, and for ten years his special calling has been to guide the students to waste their lives, as he has done his own, in seeking to accomplish the impossible—to know. This is the worm that gnaws his heart! As compensation, he is free from superstition—fears neither hell nor devil. But this sweeps with it all fond delusions, all conceit that he is able to know, and to teach something for the elevation of mankind. Nor yet does he possess honor or wealth—a dog would not lead a life like this.

Here you will perceive how the first two relations are negated by the conviction that man cannot know truth, and how, on the wings of aspiration, he sallies forth into the realm of magic, of mysticism, of subjectivity. For if reason, with its mediation, is impotent to create an object for

this aspiration, let us see what emotion and imagination, *without* mediation, can do for subjective satisfaction.

And here all is glory, all is freedom! The imagination seizes the totality of the universe, and revels in ecstatic visions. What a spectacle! But, alas! a spectacle only! How am I to know, to comprehend the fountain of life, the centre of which articulates this totality?

See here another generalization: the practical world as a whole! Ah, that is my sphere; here I have a firm footing; here I am master; here I command spirits! Approach, and obey your master!

"Spirit. Who calls?"

Faust. Terrific face!

Sp. Art thou he that called?

Thou trembling worm!

Faust. Yes; I'm he; am Faust, thy peer.

Sp. Peer of the Spirit thou comprehendest—not of me!

Faust. What! not of thee! Of whom, then? I, the image of Deity itself, and not even thy peer?"

No, indeed, Mr. Faust, thou dost not include within thyself the totality of the practical world, but only that part thereof which thou dost comprehend—only thy *vocation*, and hark! "It knocks!"

Oh, death! I see, 't is my vocation; indeed, "It is my *famulus*!"

And this, too, is merely a delusion; this great mystery of the practical world shrinks to this dimension—a bread-professorship.

It would seem so; for no theory of the practical world is possible without the ability to know truth. As individual, you may imitate the individual, as the brute his kind, and thus transmit a craft; but you cannot seize the practical world in transparent forms and present it as a harmonious totality to your fellow-man, for that would require that these transparent intellectual forms should possess objective validity—and this they have not, according to your conviction. And so it cannot be helped.

But see what a despicable thing it is to be a bread-professor!

And is this the mode of existence, this the reality, the only reality to answer the aspiration of our soul—the aspiration

which sought to seize the universe, to kindle its inmost recesses with the light of intelligence, and thus illumine the path of life? Alas, Reason gave us error—Imagination, illusion—and the practical world, the *Will*, a bread-professorship! Nothing else? Yes; a bottle of laudanum!

Let us drink, and rest forever! But hold, is there nothing else, really? No emotional nature? Hark! what is that? Easter bells! The recollections of my youthful faith in a revelation! They must be examined. We cannot leave yet.

And see what a panorama, what a strange world lies embedded with those recollections. Let us see it in all its varied character and reality, on this Easter Sunday, for example.

V.

I have endeavored before to trace the derivation of the content of the first scene of the poem, together with its character, from the abstract theme of the work. In it we saw that the fundamental conviction of Faust leaves him naked—leaves him nothing but a bare avocation, a mere craft, and the precarious recollections of his youth (when he believed in revealed truths) to answer his aspirations. These recollections arouse his emotions, and rescue him from nothingness (suicide)—they fill his soul with a content.

To see this content with all its youthful charm, we have to retrace our childhood's steps before the gates of the city on this the Easter festival of the year—you and I being mindful, in the meantime, that the public festivals of the Church belong to the so-called external evidences of the truth of the Christian Religion.

Well, here we are in the suburbs of the city, and what do we see? First, a set of journeymen mechanics, eager for beer and brawls, interspersed with servant girls; students whose tastes run very much in the line of strong beer, biting tobacco, and the well-dressed servant girls aforesaid; citizens' daughters, perfectly outraged at the low taste of the students who run after the servant girls, "when they might have the very best of society;" citizens dissatisfied with the new mayor of

the city—"Taxes increase from day to day, and nothing is done for the welfare of the city." A beggar is not wanting. Other citizens, who delight to speak of war and rumors of war in distant countries, in order to enjoy their own peace at home with proper contrast; also an "elderly one," who thinks that she is quite able to furnish what the well-dressed citizens' daughters wish for—to the great scandal of the latter, who feel justly indignant at being addressed in public by such an old witch (although, "between ourselves, she did show us our sweethearts on St. Andrew's night"); soldiers, who sing of high-walled fortresses and proud women to be taken by storm; and, finally, farmers around the linden tree, dancing a most furious gallopade—a real Easter Sunday or Monday "before the gate"—of any city in Germany, even to this day.

And into this real world, done up in holiday attire, but not by the poet—into this paradise, this very heaven of the people, where great and small fairly yell with delight—Faust enters, assured that here he can maintain his rank as a man; "here I dare to be a man!" And, sure enough, listen to the welcome:

"Nay, Doctor, 'tis indeed too much
To be with us on such a day,
To join the throng, the common mass,
You, you, the great, the learned man!
Take, then, this beaker, too," &c.

And here goes—a general health to the Doctor, to the man who braved the pestilence for us, and who even now, does not think it beneath him to join us in our merry-making—hurrah for the Doctor; hip, hip, &c.

And is not this something, dear friend? Just think, with honest Wagner, when he exclaims, "What emotions must crowd thy breast, O great man, while listening to such honors?" and you will also say with him:

"Thrice blest the man who draws such profits rare,
From talents all his own!"

Why, see! the father shows you to his son; every one inquires—presses, rushes to see you! The fiddle itself is hushed, the dancers stop. Where you go, they fall into lines; caps and hats fly into the air!

But a little more, and they would fall upon their knees, as if the sacred Host passed that way!

And is not this great? Is not this the very goal of human ambition? To Wagner, dear friend, it is; for the very essence of an avocation is, and must be, "success in life." But how does it stand with the man whose every aspiration is the True, the Good, and the Beautiful? Will a hurrah from one hundred thousand throats, all in good yelling order, assist him? No.

To Wagner it is immaterial whether he *knows* what he *needs*, provided he sees the day when the man who has been worse to the people than the very pestilence itself, receives public honors; but to Faust, to the man really in earnest—who is not satisfied when he has squared life with life, and obtained zero for a result, or who does not merely *live to make a living*, but demands a rational end for life, and, in default of that rational end, spurns life itself—to such a man this whole scene possesses little significance indeed. It possesses, however, *some* significance, even for him! For if it is indeed true that man cannot know truth—that the high aspiration of his soul has no object—then this scene demonstrates, at least, that Faust possesses power over the practical world. If he cannot *know* the world, he can at least swallow a considerable portion of it, and this scene demonstrates that he can exercise a great deal of choice as to the parts to be selected; do you see this conviction?

Do you see this conviction? Do you see this dog? Consider it well; what is it, think you? Do you perceive how it encircles us nearer and nearer—becomes more and more certain, and, if I mistake not, a luminous emanation of gold, of honor, of power, follows in its wake. It seems to me as if it drew soft magic rings, as future fetters, round our feet! See, the circles become smaller and smaller—'t is almost a certainty—'t is already near; come, come home with us!

The temptation here spread before us by the poet, to consider the dog "*well*," is almost irresistible; but all we can say in

this place, dear friend, is that if you will look upon what is properly called an *avocation* in civil society, eliminate from it all higher ends and motives other than the simple one of making a living—no matter with what pomp and circumstance—no doubt you will readily recognize the *POODLE*. But we must hasten to the studio to watch further developments, for the conflict is not as yet decided. We are still to examine the possibility of a divine revelation to man, who cannot know truth.

And for this purpose our newly acquired conviction, that we possess power over the practical world—although not as yet in a perfectly clear form before us—comfortably lodged behind the stove, where it properly belongs, we take down the original text of the New Testament in order to realize its meaning, in our own loved mother tongue. It stands written: "In the beginning was the Word." Word? Word? Never! *Meaning* it ought to be! Meaning what? Meaning? No; it is *Power*! No; *Deed*! Word, meaning, power, deed—which is it? Alas, how am I to know, unless I can know truth? 'Tis even so, our youthful recollections dissolve in mist, into thin air—and nothing is left us but our newly acquired conviction, the restlessness of which during this examination has undoubtedly not escaped your attention, dear friend. ("Be quiet, there, behind the stove." "See here, poodle, one of us two has to leave this room!") What, then, is the whole content of this conviction, which, so long as there was the hope of a possibility of a worthy object for our aspiration, seemed so despicable? What is it that governs the practical world of finite motives, the power that adapts means to ends, regardless of a final, of an infinite end? Is it not the Understanding? and although Reason—in its search after the *final end*, with its perfect system of absolute means, of infinite motives and interests—begets subjective chimeras, is it not demonstrated that the understanding possesses objective validity? Nay, look upon this dog well; does it not swell into colossal proportions—is no dog at all, in fact, but the

very power that holds absolute sway over the finite and negative—the understanding itself—Mephistopheles in proper form?

And who calls this despicable? Is it not Reason, the power that begets chimeras, and it alone? And shall we reject the real, the actual—all in fact that possesses objective validity—because, forsooth, the power of subjective chimeras declares it negative, finite, perishable? Never. “No fear, dear sir, that I’ll do this. Precisely what I have promised is the very aim of all my endeavor. Conceited fool that I was! I prized myself too highly”—claimed kin with the infinite. “I belong only in thy sphere”—the finite. “The Great Spirit scorns me. Nature is a sealed book to me; the thread of thought is severed. Knowing disgusts me. In the depths of sensuality I’ll quench the burning passion.”

Here, then, my friend, we arrive at the final result of the conflict in the first sphere of our theme—in the sphere of manifestation—that of the individual. We started with the conviction *that man cannot know truth*. This destroyed our spiritual endeavors, and reduced our practical avocation to an absurdity. We sought refuge in the indefinite—the mysticism of the past—and were repelled by its subjectivity. We next examined the theoretical side of the practical world, and found this likewise an impossibility and suicide—a mere blank nothingness—as the only resource. But here we were startled by our emotional nature, which unites us with our fellow-man, and seems to promise some sort of a bridge over into

the infinite—certainly demands such a transition. Investigating this, therefore, with all candor, we found our fellow-men wonderfully occupied—occupied like the kitten pursuing its own tail! At the same time it became apparent that we might be quite a dog in this kitten dance, or that the activity of the understanding possessed objective validity. With this conviction fairly established, although still held in utter contempt, we examined the last resource: the possibility of a divine revelation of truth to men that cannot know truth. The result, as the mere statement of the proposition would indicate, is negative, and thus the last chance of obtaining validity for anything except the activity of the understanding vanishes utterly. But with this our contempt for the understanding likewise vanishes. For whatever our aspiration may say, it has no object to correspond to it, and is therefore merely subjective, a hallucination, a chimera, and the understanding is the highest attainable for us. Here, therefore, the subjective conflict ends, for we have attained to objectivity, and this is the highest, since there is nothing else that possesses validity for man. Nor is this by any means contemptible in itself, for it is the power over the finite world, and the net result is: That if you and I, my friend, have no reason, cannot know truth, we do have at least a stomach, a capacity for sensual enjoyment, and an understanding to administer to the same—to be its servant. This, at least, is demonstrated by the kitten dance of the whole world.

INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER V.

NECESSITY, CHANCE, FREEDOM.

I.

All things are necessitated; each is necessitated by the totality of conditions; hence, whatever is must be so, and under the conditions cannot be otherwise.

Remark.—This is the most exhaustive statement of the position of the “under-

standing.” Nothing seems more clear than this to the thinker who has advanced beyond the sensuous grade of consciousness and the stages of Perception.

II.

But things change—something new begins and something old ceases; but, still, in each case, the first principle must apply, and the new thing—like the old—be

so "because necessitated by the totality of conditions."

Remark.—The reader will notice that with the conception of *change* there enters a second stage of mediation. First, we have simple mediation in which the ground and grounded are both real. Secondly, we have the passage of a potentiality into a reality, and *vice versa*. Therefore, with the consideration of change we have encountered a contradiction which becomes apparent upon further attempt to adjust the idea of necessity to it.

III.

If the same totality of conditions necessitates both states of the thing—the new and the old—it follows that this totality of conditions is adapted to both, and hence is indifferent to either, i. e. it allows either, and hence cannot be said to necessitate one to the exclusion of the other, for it allows one to pass over into the other, thereby demonstrating that it did not restrict or confine the first to be what it was. Hence it now appears that chance or contingency participated in the state of the thing.

IV.

But the states of the thing belong to the totality, and hence when the thing changes the totality also changes, and we are forced to admit two different totalities as the conditions of the two different states of the thing.

Remark.—Here we have returned to our startingpoint, and carried back our contradiction with us. In our zeal to relieve the thing from the difficulty presented—that of changing spontaneously—we have posited duality in the original totality, and pushed our *change* into it. But it is the same contradiction as before, and we must continue to repeat the same process forever in the foolish endeavor to go round a circle until we arrive at its end, or, what is the same, its beginning.

V.

If it requires a different totality of conditions to render possible the change of a thing from one state to another, then if a somewhat changes the totality changes. But there is nothing outside of the totality

to necessitate it, and it therefore must necessitate itself.

VI.

Thus necessity and necessitated have proved in the last analysis to be one. This, however, is necessity no longer, but spontaneity, for it begins with itself and ends with itself. (a) As *necessitating* it is the active determiner which of course contains the *potentiality* upon which it acts. Had it no potentiality it could not change. (b) As *necessitated* it is the potentiality *plus* the limit which its activity has fixed there. (c) But we have here self-determination, and thus the *existence* of the Universal in and for itself, which is the *Ego*.

Remark.—It cannot be any other mode of existence than the Ego, for that which dissolves all determinations and is the universal potentiality is only *one* and cannot be distinguished into *modes*, for it creates and destroys these. The ego can abstract all else and yet abide—it is the *actus purus*—its negativity annulling all determinations and finitudes, while it is directed full on itself, and is in that very act complete self-recognition. (See proof of this in Chapter IV., III., 3.)

VII.

Thus the doctrine of necessity presupposes self-determination or Freedom as the form of the Total, and necessity is only one side—the realized or *determined* side—of the process isolated and regarded in this state of isolation. Against this side stands the potentiality which, if isolated in like manner, is called Chance or Contingency.

CHAPTER VI.

OF MEDIATION.

The comprehension of mediation lies at the basis of the distinction of sensuous knowing from the *understanding*. The transition from *intuition* to *abstract thinking* is made at first unconsciously, and for this reason the one who has begun the process of mediation handles the "mental spectres" created by abstraction with the utmost naïveté, assuming for them absolute validity in the world at large. It is only

the speculative insight that gains mastery over such abstractions, and sees the Truth. If this view could be unfolded in a popular form, it would afford a series of solvents for the thinker which are applicable to a great variety of difficult problems. For it must be remembered that the abstract categories of the understanding—such as *essence and phenomenon, cause and effect, substance and attribute, force and manifestation, matter and form*, and the like, give rise to a series of *antinomies*, or contradictory propositions, when applied to the Totality. From the standpoint of mediation—that of simple reflection, “common sense” so called—these antinomies seem utterly insoluble. The reason of this is found in the fact that “common sense” places implicit faith in these categories (just mentioned), and never rises to the investigation of them by themselves. To consider the validity of these categories by themselves is called a *transcendental* procedure, for it passes beyond the ordinary thinking which uses them without distrust.

The transcendental investigation shows that the insolubility attributed to these antinomies arises from the mistake of the thinker, who supposes the categories he employs to be exhaustive. Speculative insight begins with the perception that they are not exhaustive; that they have by a species of enchantment cast a spell upon the mind, under which every thing seems dual, and the weary seeker after Truth wanders through a realm of abstractions each of which assumes the form of a solid reality—now a giant, and now a dwarf, and now an impassible river, impenetrable forest, or thick castle wall defended by dragons.

The following questions will illustrate the character of the problems here described:

“Why deal with abstractions—why not hold fast by the concrete reality?”

(This position combats mediation under its form of *abstraction*.)

“Can we not know *immediately* by intuition those objects that philosophy strives in vain to comprehend? in short, are not God, Freedom and Immortality certain to us and yet indemonstrable?”

(This position combats mediation as involved in a *system* of Philosophy.)

These questions arise only in the mind that has already gone beyond the doctrine that it attempts to defend, and hence a self refutation is easily drawn out of the source from whence they originate.

ABSTRACTION.

(a) It will be readily granted that all knowing involves *distinction*. We must distinguish one object from another.

(b) But the process of distinguishing is a process that involves abstraction. For in separating this object from that, I contrast its marks, properties, *attributes*, with those of the other. In seizing upon one characteristic I must isolate it from all others, and this is nothing more nor less than abstraction.

(c) Therefore it is absurd to speak of knowing without abstraction, for this enters into the simplest act of perception.

(d) Nor is this a subjective defect, an “impotency of our mental structure,” as some would be ready to exclaim at this point. For it is just as evident that *things themselves* obtain reality only through these very characteristics. One thing preserves its distinctness from another by means of its various *determinations*. Without these determinations all would collapse into *one*, nay, even “*one*” would vanish, for distinction being completely gone, *oneness* is not possible. This is the “*Principle of Indiscernibles*” enunciated by Leibnitz. Thus distinction is as necessary objectively as subjectively. The thing *abstracts* in order to be *real*. It defends itself against what lies without it by specializing itself into single properties, and thus becoming in each a mere abstraction.

(e) Moreover, besides this prevalence of abstraction in the *theoretic* field, it is still more remarkable in the *practical* world. The business man decries abstractions. He does not know that every act of the will is an abstraction, and that it is also preceded by an abstraction. When he exhorts you to “leave off abstractions and deal with concrete realities,” he does this: (1.) he regards you as he thinks you are; (2.)

he conceives you as different, i. e. as a *practical* man; (3.) he exhorts you to change from your real state to the possible one which he conceives of (through the process of abstraction). The simplest act with design—that of going to dinner, for example—involves abstraction. If I raise my arm on purpose, I first abstract from its real position, and think it under another condition.

(f) But the chief point in all this is to mark how the mind frees itself from the untruth of abstraction. For it must be allowed that all abstractions are false. The isolation of that which is not sufficient for its own existence, (though as we have seen, a necessary constituent of the process of *knowing* and of *existing*,) sets up an untruth as existent. Therefore the mind thinks this isolation only as a moment of a *negative unity*, (i. e. as an element of a process). This leads us to the consideration of mediation in the more general form, involved by the second question.

IMMEDIATE KNOWING.

(a) *Definition*.—"Immediate" is a predicate applied to what is directly through itself. The immediateness of anything is the phase that first presents itself. It is the undeveloped—an *oak* taken immediately is an *acorn*; man taken immediately is a child at birth.

(b) *Definition*.—"Mediation" signifies the process of realization. A *mediate* or *mediated* somewhat is what it is through another, or through a process.

(c) *Principle*.—Any concrete somewhat

exists through its relations to all else in the universe; hence all concrete somethings are *mediated*. "If a grain of sand were destroyed the universe would collapse."

(d) *Principle*.—An absolutely *immediate* somewhat would be a pure nothing, for the reason that no determination could belong to it, (for determination is negative, and hence mediation). Hence all immediateness must be phenomenal, or the result of abstraction from the concrete whole, and this, of course, exhibits the contradiction of an immediate which is mediated (a "*result*.")

(e) The solution of this contradiction is found in "self-determination," (as we have seen in former chapters). The self-determined is a mediated; it is *through the process* of determination; but is likewise an *immediate*, for it is its own mediation, and hence it is the beginning and end—it *begins with its result, and ends in its beginning*, and thus it is a circular process.

This is the great *aperçu* of all speculative philosophy.

(f) *Definition*.—Truth is the form of the Total, or that which actually exists.

(g) Hence a knowing of Truth must be a knowing of the self-determined, which is both immediate and mediate. This is a process or *system*. Therefore the knowing of it cannot be simply *immediate*, but must be in the form of a system. Thus the so-called "immediate intuition" is not a knowing of truth unless inconsistent with what it professes.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BAADER.

[The following letter from Dr. Franz Hoffmann to the St. Louis Philosophical Society has been handed us for publication. It gives us pleasure to lay before our readers so able a presentation of the claims of Baader, and we trust that some of our countrymen will be led by it to investigate the original sources herein referred to.]

We are requested to correct a mistatement that occurs in the first paragraph regarding the objects of the Philosophical Society. It was not founded for the special purpose of "studying German Philosophy from Kant to Hegel," although it has many members who are occupied chiefly in that field. The Society includes among its members advocates of widely differing systems, all, however, working in the spirit of the Preamble to the Constitution, which says: "The object of this Society is to encourage the study and development of Speculative Philosophy; to foster an application of its results to Art, Science, and Religion; and to establish a philosophical basis for the professions of Law, Medicine, Divinity, Politics, Education, Art, and Literature." We are indebted to Dr. A. Strothotte for the translation of the letter.—EDITOR.]

WÜRZBURG, Dec. 23, 1866.

Mr. President: In the first number of Vol. XLIX of the "*Zeitschrift für Philosophie*," published at Halle, in Prussia, edited by Fichte, Ulrici and Wirth, notice is taken of a philosophical society, organized at St. Louis, with the object of pursuing the study of German philosophy from Kant to Hegel.

This fact promises a correlation of philosophical movements between North America and Germany which is of great importance. I presume, however, that you have already been led, or that you will be led, to go back beyond Kant to the first traces of German philosophy, and proceed from Hegel to the present time.

Now, although a thorough and compre-

hensive view of Hegel's philosophy is in the first place to be recommended, yet the other directions in the movement of thought must not be lost sight of.

In the Berlin organ of the Philosophical Society of the Hegelians—*Der Gedanke*—edited by Michelet, may be found, as you perhaps know, an index of the works of Hegel's school, by Rosenkranz, whereas on the other hand the rich literature of the anti-Hegelian writers is nowhere met with in any degree of completeness. Many of them, however, are noticed in Fichte's journal, and in the more recent works on the history of philosophy, particularly in those of Erdmann, and still more in those of Ueberweg.

Among the prominent movements in philosophical thinking, during and after the time of Hegel, the profound utterances of a great and genial teacher, Franz Baader, reach a degree of prominence, even higher than is admitted by Erdmann and Ueberweg. This may be readily perceived by referring to the dissertation on Franz Baader, by Carl Philipp Fischer, of Erlangen, and still more by having recourse to Hamberger, Lutterbeck, and to my own writings.

* * * * *

I take the liberty of recommending to you and to the members of the Philosophical Society of St. Louis, the study of the works of a philosopher who certainly will have a great future, although his doctrines in the progress of time may undergo modifications, reforms and further developments. If Hegel had lived longer, the influence of Baader upon him would have been greater yet than became visible during his last years. He has thrown Schelling out of his pantheism, and pressed him towards a semi-panteism, or towards a deeper theism. The influence of Baader on the philosophers after Hegel—J. H. Fichte, Weisse, Sempler, C. Ph. Fischer and others—is much greater than is commonly admitted. Whether they agree to it or not, still it is a fact that Baader is the central constellation of the movement of the German spirit, from pantheism to a deeper ideal-realistic theism. Such a genius, whatever position may be taken with regard to him, cannot be left unnoticed, without running the risk of being left behind the times. I ask nothing for Baader, but to follow the maxim—"Try all and keep the best." I regret that so great a distance prevents me from sending your honorable Society some of my explanatory writings, which are admitted to be clear and thorough. It may suffice if I add a copy of my prospectus; and let me here remark, that a collection of my writings, in four large volumes, will be published by

Deichert, in Erlangen. The first volume, perhaps, will be ready at Easter, 1867.

Erdmann, in his elements of the history of philosophy, has treated of the doctrines of Baader, too briefly it is true, but with more justice than he has used in his former work on the history of modern philosophy, and he bears witness that his esteem of Baader increases more and more. But he evidently assigns to him a wrong position, by considering Oken and Baader as extremes, and Hegel as the mean, while Oken and Hegel are the extremes, and Baader the mean. The most important phenomenon in the school of Hegel is the *Idee der Wissenschaft* of Rosenkranz, (*Logik und Metaphysik*), which represents Hegel in a sense not far distant from the standpoint of Baader. * * *

* * * * * C. H. Fischer's Characteristics of Baader's Theosophy speaks with high favor of him, but still I have to take several exceptions. According to my opinion, all the authors by him referred to, as Schelling, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Dauber and Baader, we must call theosophers—or call none of them so, but *philosophers*, in order to avoid misunderstanding. Then I do not see how Schelling can be called the "most genial philosopher of modern times," and yet Baader the more, yea, the *most* profound. Finally, a want of system must be admitted, but too great importance is attributed to this. If, however, systematism could decide here, then not Schelling but Hegel is the greatest philosopher of modern times. At all events Fischer's Memorial at the Centennial Birthday of Baader is significant, and is written with great spirit and warmth. The most important work of C. Ph. Fischer, bearing on this subject, is his elements of the system of philosophy, or *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. This is one of the most important of the works of the philosophers after Hegel and Baader. The Athenäum of Froeschhammer, (*Journal for Philosophy*), appeared only for three years. It had to cease its publication, because on the one side the Ultramontanist party agitated against it, and on the other side it met with insufficient support. Its reissue would be desirable, but just now not practicable, for want of interest on the part of the public, although it could bear comparison with any other philosophical journal.

Here let me say, that from Baader there proceeded a strong impulse toward the revival of the study of the long-forgotten spiritual treasures of the mystics and theosophers of the middle ages, and of the time of the Reformation. From this impulse monographs have made their appearance about Scotus Erigena, Albertus Mag-

nus—at least biographies of them—Thomas Aquinas, Meister Eckhart, Tauler, Nicholas Cusanus, Weigel, J. Böhme, Oettinger, etc. The most important of these I deem to be *Scotus Erigena*, by Joh. Huber, Christlieb and Kaulich; *Meister Eckhart*, by Bach, and *J. Böhme*, by J. Hamberger. Bach on *Eckhart* is especially instructive with respect to the connection between modern philosophy and the theosophy of Eckhart and his school, to which also Nicholas Cusanus belonged.

I presume that it will yet be discovered that Copernicus was at least acquainted with Nicholas Cusanus, if he did not even sympathize with his philosophy. The director of the observatory at Krakau, Kerlinski, is at present preparing a monograph on Copernicus, which will probably throw light on this subject. Prowe's

pamphlet on Copernicus, which I have noticed in Glaser's journal, refers to the investigations of Kerlinski, who has recently published a beautiful edition of the works of Copernicus. As in the early ages, first in the Pythagorean school, they approached the true doctrine of the Universe, so in the middle ages it appears in the school of Eckhart, for in a certain sense, and with some restriction, Nicholas Cusanus was the precursor of Copernicus.

I beg you, my dear sir, to communicate this letter to your honorable Society: should you see fit to publish it in a journal, you are at liberty to do so.

I remain, Sir, with great respect,

Truly, yours,

DR. FRANZ HOFFMANN,

Prof. of Philos. at the University of Wurzburg.

IN THE QUARRY.

By A. C. B.

Impatient, stung with pain, and long delay,
 I chid the rough-hewn stone that round me lay;
 I said—"What shelter art thou from the heat?
 What rest art thou for tired and way-worn feet?
 What beauty hast thou for the longing eye?
 Thou nothing hast my need to satisfy!"
 And then the patient stone fit answer made—
 "Most true I am no roof with welcome shade;
 I am no house for rest, or full delight
 Of sculptured beauty for the weary sight;
 Yet am I still, material for all;
 Use me as such—I answer to thy call.
 Nay, tread me only under climbing feet,
 So serve I thee, my destiny complete;
 Mount by me into purer, freer air,
 And find the roof that archeth everywhere;
 So what but failure seems, shall build success;
 For all, as possible, thou dost possess."

Who by the Universal squares his life,
 Sees but success in all its finite strife;
 In all that is, his truth-enlightened eyes
 Detect the May-be through its thin disguise;
 And in the Absolute's unclouded sun,
 To him the two already are the one.

THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

Vol. I.

1867.

No. 4.

INTRODUCTION TO THE OUTLINES OF A SYSTEM OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY;

OR,

ON THE IDEA OF SPECULATIVE PHYSICS AND THE INTERNAL ORGANIZA-
TION OF A SYSTEM OF THIS SCIENCE.

1799.

[Translated from the German of SCHELLING, by TOM DAVIDSON.]

I.

WHAT WE CALL NATURAL PHILOSOPHY IS A
NECESSARY SCIENCE IN THE SYSTEM
OF KNOWING.

The Intelligence is productive in two modes—that is, either blindly and unconsciously, or freely and consciously;—unconsciously productive in external intuition, consciously in the creation of an ideal world.

Philosophy removes this distinction by assuming the unconscious activity as originally identical, and, as it were, sprung from the same root with the conscious; this identity is by it *directly* proved in the case of an activity at once clearly conscious and unconscious, which manifests itself in the productions of genius, *indirectly*, outside of consciousness, in the products of *Nature*, so far as in them all, the most complete fusion of the Ideal with the Real is perceived.

Since philosophy assumes the unconscious, or, as it may likewise be termed, the real activity as identical with the conscious or ideal, its tendency will originally be to bring back everywhere the real to the

ideal—a process which gives birth to what is called Transcendental Philosophy. The regularity displayed in all the movements of Nature—for example, the sublime geometry which is exercised in the motions of the heavenly bodies—is not explained by saying that Nature is the most perfect geometry; but conversely, by saying that the most perfect geometry is what produces in Nature;—a mode of explanation whereby the Real itself is transported into the ideal world, and those motions are changed into intuitions, which take place only in ourselves, and to which nothing outside of us corresponds. Again, the fact that Nature, wherever it is left to itself, in every transition from a fluid to a solid state, produces, of its own accord, as it were, regular forms—which regularity, in the higher species of crystallization, namely, the organic, seems to become purpose even; or the fact that in the animal kingdom—that product of the blind forces of Nature—we see actions arise which are equal in regularity to those that take place with consciousness, and even external works of art, perfect in their kind;—all

this is not explained by saying that it is an unconscious productivity, though in its origin akin to the conscious, whose mere reflex we see in Nature, and which, from the stand-point of the natural view, must appear as one and the same blind tendency, which exerts its influence from crystallization upwards to the highest point of organic formation (in which, on one side, through the art-tendency, it returns again to mere crystallization) only acting upon different planes.

According to this view, inasmuch as Nature is only the visible organism of our understanding, Nature *can* produce nothing but what shows regularity and design, and Nature is *compelled* to produce that. But if Nature can produce only the regular, and produces it from necessity, it follows that the origin of such regular and design-evincing products must again be capable of being proved necessary in Nature, regarded as self-existent and real, and in the relation of its forces;—*that therefore, conversely, the Ideal must arise out of the Real, and admit of explanation from it.*

If, now, it is the task of Transcendental Philosophy to subordinate the Real to the Ideal, it is, on the other hand, the task of Natural Philosophy to explain the Ideal by the Real. The two sciences are therefore but one science, whose two problems are distinguished by the opposite directions in which they move; moreover, as the two directions are not only equally possible, but equally necessary, the same necessity attaches to both in the system of knowing.

II.

SCIENTIFIC CHARACTER OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.

Natural Philosophy, as the opposite of Transcendental Philosophy, is distinguished from the latter chiefly by the fact that it posits Nature (not, indeed, in so far as it is a product, but in so far as it is at once productive and product) as the self-existent; whence it may be most briefly designated as the Spinozism of Physics.

It follows naturally from this that there is no place in this science for idealistic methods of explanation, such as Transcendental Philosophy is fitted to supply, from the circumstance that for it Nature is nothing more than the organ of self-consciousness, and everything in Nature is necessary merely because it is only through the medium of such a Nature that self-consciousness can take place; this mode of explanation, however, is as meaningless in the case of physics, and of our science which occupies the same stand-point with it, as were the old teleological modes of explanation, and the introduction of a universal reference to final causes into the thereby metamorphosed science of Nature. For every idealistic mode of explanation, dragged out of its own proper sphere and applied to the explanation of Nature, degenerates into the most adventurous nonsense, examples of which are well known. The first maxim of all true natural science, viz., to explain everything by the forces of Nature, is therefore accepted in its widest extent in our science, and even extended to that region, at the limit of which all interpretation of Nature has hitherto been accustomed to stop short; for example, to those organic phenomena which seem to pre-suppose an analogy with reason. For, granted that in the actions of animals there really is something which pre-supposes such analogy, on the principle of realism, nothing further would follow than that what we call reason is a mere play of higher and necessarily unknown natural forces. For, inasmuch as all thinking is at last reducible to a producing and reproducing, there is nothing impossible in the thought that the same activity by which Nature reproduces itself anew in each successive phase, is reproductive in thought through the medium of the organism (very much in the same manner in which, through the action and play of light, Nature, which exists independently of it, is created immaterial, and, as it were, for a second time), in which circumstance it is natural that what forms the limit of our intuitive faculty, no longer falls within the sphere of our intuition itself.

III.

NATURAL PHILOSOPHY IS SPECULATIVE PHYSICS.

Our science, as far as we have gone, is thoroughly and completely realistic; it is therefore nothing other than Physics, it is only *speculative* Physics; in its tendency it is exactly what the systems of the ancient physicists were, and what, in more recent times, the system of the restorer of Epicurean philosophy is, viz., Lesage's Mechanical Physics, by which the speculative spirit in physics, after a long scientific sleep, has again, for the first time, been awakened. It cannot be shown in detail here (for the proof itself falls within the sphere of our science), that on the mechanical or atomistic basis which has been adopted by Lesage and his most successful predecessors, the idea of speculative physics is incapable of realization. For, inasmuch as the first problem of this science, that of inquiring into the *absolute* cause of motion (without which Nature is not in itself a finished whole), is absolutely incapable of a mechanical solution, seeing that mechanically motion results only from motion *ad infinitum*, there remains for the real construction of speculative physics only one way open, viz., the dynamic, which lays down that motion arises not only from motion, but even from rest; that, therefore, there is motion in the rest of Nature, and that all mechanical motion is the merely secondary and derivative motion of that which is solely primitive and original, and which wells forth from the very first factors in the construction of a nature generally (the fundamental forces).

In hereby making clear the points of difference between our undertaking and all those of a similar nature that have hitherto been attempted, we have at the same time shown the difference between speculative physics and so-called empirical physics; a difference which in the main may be reduced to this, that the former occupies itself solely and entirely with the original causes of motion in nature, that is, solely with the dynamical phenomena; the latter, on the contrary, inasmuch as it never reaches a final source of motion in nature,

deals only with the secondary motions, and even with the original ones only as mechanical (and therefore likewise capable of mathematical construction). The former, in fact, aims generally at the inner spring-work and what is *non-objective* in Nature; the latter, on the contrary, only at the *surface* of Nature, and what is objective, and, so to speak, *outside* in it.

IV.

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SPECULATIVE PHYSICS.

Inasmuch as our inquiry is directed not so much upon the phenomena of Nature as upon their final grounds, and our business is not so much to deduce the latter from the former as the former from the latter, our task is simply this: to erect a science of Nature in the strictest sense of the term; and in order to find out whether speculative physics are possible, we must know what belongs to the possibility of a doctrine of Nature viewed as science.

(a) The idea of knowing is here taken in its strictest sense, and then it is easy to see that, in this acceptance of the term, we can be said to know objects only when they are such that we see the principles of their possibility, for without this insight my whole knowledge of an object, e.g. of a machine, with whose construction I am unacquainted, is a mere seeing, that is, a mere conviction of its existence, whereas the inventor of the machine has the most perfect knowledge of it, because he is, as it were, the soul of the work, and because it preëxisted in his head before he exhibited it as a reality.

Now, it would certainly be impossible to obtain a glance into the internal construction of Nature, if an invasion of Nature were not possible through freedom. It is true that Nature acts openly and freely; its acts however are never isolated, but performed under a concurrence of a host of causes, which must first be excluded if we are to obtain a pure result. Nature must therefore be compelled to act under certain definite conditions, which either do not exist in it at all, or else exist only as modified by others.—Such an invasion of Nature we call an experiment. Every experiment is a question put to Nature, to which she is

compelled to give a reply. But every question contains an implicit *à priori* judgment; every experiment that is an experiment, is a prophecy; experimenting itself is a production of phenomena. The first step, therefore, towards science, at least in the domain of physics, is taken when we ourselves begin to produce the objects of that science.

(b) We know only the self-produced; knowing, therefore, in the *strictest* acceptance of the term, is a *pure knowing à priori*. Construction by means of experiment, is, after all, an absolute self-production of the phenomena. There is no question but that much in the science of Nature may be known comparatively *à priori*; as, for example, in the theory of the phenomena of electricity, magnetism, and even light. There is such a simple law recurring in every phenomenon that the results of every experiment may be told beforehand; here my knowing follows immediately from a known law, without the intervention of any particular experience. But whence then does the law itself come to me? The assertion is, that all phenomena are correlated in one absolute and necessary law, from which they can all be deduced; in short, that in natural science all that we know, we know absolutely *à priori*. Now, that experiment never leads to such a knowing, is plainly manifest, from the fact that it can never get beyond the forces of Nature, of which itself makes use as means.

As the final causes of natural phenomena are themselves not phenomenal, we must either give up all attempt ever to arrive at a knowledge of them, or else we must altogether put them into Nature, endow Nature with them. But now, that which we put into Nature has no other value than that of a pre-supposition (hypothesis), and the science founded thereon must be equally hypothetical with the principle itself. This it would be possible to avoid only in one case, viz., if that pre-supposition itself were involuntary, and as necessary as Nature itself. Assuming, for example, what must be assumed, that the sum of phenomena is not a mere world, but of necessity a Nature—that is, that this whole is not merely a

product, but at the same time productive, it follows that in this whole we can never arrive at absolute identity, inasmuch as this would bring about an absolute transition of Nature, in as far as it is productive, into Nature as product, that is, it would produce absolute rest; such wavering of Nature, therefore, between productivity and product, will, of necessity, appear as a universal duplicity of principles, whereby Nature is maintained in continual activity, and prevented from exhausting itself in its product; and universal duality as the principle of explanation of Nature will be as necessary as the idea of Nature itself.

This absolute hypothesis must carry its necessity within itself, but it must, besides this, be brought to empiric proof; for, inasmuch as all the phenomena of Nature cannot be deduced from this hypothesis as long as there is in the whole system of Nature a single phenomenon which is not necessary according to that principle, or which contradicts it, the hypothesis is thereby at once shown to be false, and from that moment ceases to have validity as an hypothesis.

By this deduction of all natural phenomena from an absolute hypothesis, our knowing is changed into a construction of Nature itself, that is, into a science of Nature *à priori*. If, therefore, such deduction itself is possible, a thing which can be proved only by the fact, then also a doctrine of Nature is possible as a science of Nature; a system of purely speculative physics is possible, which was the point to be proved.

Remark.—There would be no necessity for this remark, if the confusion which still prevails in regard to ideas perspicuous enough in themselves did not render some explanation with regard to them requisite.

The assertion that natural science must be able to deduce all its principles *à priori*, is in a measure understood to mean that natural science must dispense with all experience, and, without any intervention of experience, be able to spin all its principles out of itself—an affirmation so absurd that the very objections to it deserve pity.

Not only do we know this or that through experience, but we originally know nothing at all except through experience, and by means of experience, and in this sense the whole of our knowledge consists of the data of experience. These data become à priori principles when we become conscious of them as necessary, and thus every datum, be its import what it may, may be raised to that dignity, inasmuch as the distinction between à priori and à posteriori data is not at all, as many people may have imagined, one originally cleaving to the data themselves, but is a distinction made solely with respect to our knowing, and the kind of our knowledge of these data, so that every datum which is merely historical for me—i. e. a datum of experience—becomes, notwithstanding, an à priori principle as soon as I arrive, whether directly or indirectly, at insight into its internal necessity. Now, however, it must in all cases be possible to recognize every natural phenomenon as absolutely necessary; for, if there is no chance in nature at all, there can likewise be no original phenomenon of Nature fortuitous; on the contrary, for the very reason that Nature is a system, there must be a necessary connection for everything that happens or comes to pass in it, in some principle embracing the whole of Nature. Insight into this internal necessity of all natural phenomena becomes, of course, still more complete, as soon as we reflect that there is no real system which is not, at the same time, an organic whole. For if, in an organic whole, all things mutually bear and support each other, then this organization must have existed as a whole previous to its parts—the whole could not have arisen from the parts, but the parts must have arisen out of the whole. It is not, therefore, we know Nature, but Nature is, à priori, that is, everything individual in it is predetermined by the whole or by the idea of a Nature generally. But if Nature is à priori, then it must be possible to recognize it as something that is à priori, and this is really the meaning of our affirmation.

Such a science, like every other, does

not deal with the hypothetical, or the merely probable, but depends upon the evident and the certain. Now, we may indeed be quite certain that every natural phenomenon, through whatever number of intermediate links, stands in connection with the last conditions of a Nature; the intermediate links themselves, however, may be unknown to us, and still lying hidden in the depths of Nature. To find out these links is the work of experimental research. Speculative physics have nothing to do but to show the need of these intermediate links;* but as every new discovery throws us back upon a new ignorance, and while one knot is being loosed a new one is being tied, it is conceivable that the complete discovery of all the intermediate links in the chain of Nature, and therefore also our science itself, is an infinite task. Nothing, however, has more impeded the infinite progress of this science than the arbitrariness of the fictions by which the want of profound insight was so long doomed to be concealed. This fragmentary nature of our knowledge becomes apparent only when we separate what is merely hypothetical from the pure out-come of science, and thereupon set out to collect the fragments of the great whole of Nature again into a system. It is, therefore, conceivable that speculative physics (the soul of real experiment) has, in all time, been the mother of all great discoveries in Nature.

V.

OF A SYSTEM OF SPECULATIVE PHYSICS GENERALLY.

Hitherto the idea of speculative physics has been deduced and developed; it is another business to show how this idea must be realized and actually carried out.

The author, for this purpose, would at

* Thus, for example, it becomes very clear through the whole course of our inquiry, that, in order to render the dynamic organization of the Universe evident in all its parts, we still lack that central phenomenon of which Bacon already speaks, which certainly lies in Nature, but has not yet been extracted from it by experiment. [Remark of the Original. Compare below, third note to "General Remark."

once refer to his *Outlines of a System of Natural Philosophy*, if he had not reason to suspect that many even of those who might consider those *Outlines* worthy of their attention, would come to it with certain preconceived ideas, which he has not presupposed, and which he does not desire to have presupposed.

The causes which may render an insight into the tendency of those *Outlines* difficult, are (exclusive of defects of style and arrangement) mainly, the following :

1. That many persons, misled perhaps by the word *Natural Philosophy*, expect to find transcendental deductions from natural phenomena, such as, in different fragments, exist elsewhere, and will regard natural philosophy generally as a part of transcendental philosophy, whereas it forms a science altogether peculiar, altogether different from, and independent of, every other.

2. That the notions of dynamical physics hitherto diffused, are very different from, and partially at variance with, those which the author lays down. I do not speak of the modes of representation which several persons, whose business is really mere experiment, have figured to themselves in this connection ; for example, where they suppose it to be a dynamical explanation, when they reject a galvanic fluid, and accept instead of it certain vibrations in the metals ; for these persons, as soon as they observe that they have understood nothing of the matter, will revert, of their own accord, to their previous representations, which were made for them. I speak of the modes of representation which have been put into philosophic heads by Kant, and which may be mainly reduced to this : that we see in matter nothing but the occupation of space in definite degrees, in all difference of matter, therefore, only mere difference of occupation of space (i. e. density,) in all dynamic (qualitative) changes, only mere changes in the relation of the repelling and attracting forces. Now, according to this mode of representation, all the phenomena of Nature are looked at only on their lowest plane, and the dynamical physics of these philoso-

phers begin precisely at the point where they ought properly to leave off. It is indeed certain that the last result of every dynamical process is a changed degree of occupation of space—that is, a changed density ; inasmuch, now, as the dynamical process of Nature is one, and the individual dynamical processes are only shreds of the one fundamental process—even magnetic and electric phenomena, viewed from this stand-point, will be, not actions of particular materials, but changes in the constitution of matter itself ; and as this depends upon the mutual action of the fundamental forces, at last, changes in the relation of the fundamental forces themselves. We do not indeed deny that these phenomena at the extreme limit of their manifestation are changes in the relation of the principles themselves ; we only deny that these changes are nothing more ; on the contrary, we are convinced that this so-called dynamical principle is too superficial and defective a basis of explanation for all Nature's phenomena, to reach the real depth and manifoldness of natural phenomena, inasmuch as by means of it, in point of fact, no qualitative change of matter as such is constructible (for change of density is only the external phenomenon of a higher change). To adduce proof of this assertion is not incumbent upon us, till, from the opposite side, that principle of explanation is shown by actual fact to exhaust Nature, and the great chasm is filled up between that kind of dynamical philosophy and the empirical attainments of physics—as, for example, in regard to the very different kinds of effects exhibited by simple substances—a thing which, let us say at once, we consider to be impossible.

We may therefore be permitted, in the room of the hitherto prevailing dynamic mode of representation, to place our own without further remark—a procedure which will no doubt clearly show wherein the latter differs from the former, and by which of the two the Doctrine of Nature may most certainly be raised to a Science of Nature.

VI.

INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SYSTEM OF
SPECULATIVE PHYSICS.

1.

An inquiry into the Principle of speculative physics must be preceded by inquiries into the distinction between the speculative and the empirical generally. This depends mainly upon the conviction that between empiricism and theory there is such a complete opposition that there can be no third thing in which the two may be united; that, therefore, the idea of Experimental Science is a mongrel idea, which implies no connected thought, or rather, which cannot be thought at all. What is pure empiricism is not science, and, *vice versâ*, what is science is not empiricism. This is not said for the purpose of at all depreciating empiricism, but is meant to exhibit it in its true and proper light. Pure empiricism, be its object what it may, is history (the absolute opposite of theory), and, conversely, history alone is empiricism.*

Physics, as empiricism, are nothing but a collection of facts, of accounts of what has been observed—what has happened under natural or artificial circumstances. In what we at present designate physics, empiricism and science run riot together, and for that very reason they are neither one thing nor another.

Our aim, in view of this object, is to separate science and empiricism as soul and body, and by admitting nothing into science which is not susceptible of an *à priori* construction, to strip empiricism of all theory, and restore it to its original nakedness.

The opposition between empiricism and science rests therefore upon this: that the

* If only those warm panegyrist of empiricism, who exalt it at the expense of science, did not, true to the idea of empiricism, try to palm off upon us as empiricism their own judgments, and what they have put into nature, and imposed upon objects; for though many persons think they can talk about it, there is a great deal more belonging to it than many imagine—to eliminate purely the accomplished from Nature, and to state it with the same fidelity with which it has been eliminated.—*Remark of the Original.*

former regards its object in *being*—as something already prepared and accomplished; science, on the other hand, views its object in *becoming*, and as something that has yet to be accomplished. As science cannot set out from anything that is a product—that is, a thing—it must set out from the unconditioned; the first inquiry of speculative physics is that which relates to the unconditioned in natural science.

2.

As this inquiry is, in the Outlines, deduced from the highest principles, the following may be regarded as merely an illustration of those inquiries:

Inasmuch as everything of which we can say that it *is*, is of a conditioned nature, it is only *being itself* that can be the unconditioned. But seeing that individual being, as a conditioned, can be thought only as a particular limitation of the productive activity (the sole and last substrate of all reality) *being itself* is *thought* as the same productive activity in its unlimitedness. For the philosophy of nature, therefore, nature is originally only productivity, and from this as its principle science must set out.

So long as we know the totality of objects only as the sum of being, this totality is a mere world—that is, a mere product for us. It would certainly be impossible in the science of Nature to rise to a higher idea than that of being, if all permanence (which is thought in the idea of being) were not deceptive, and really a continuous and uniform reproduction.

In so far as we regard the totality of objects not merely as a product, but at the same time necessarily as productive, it rises into *Nature* for us, and this *identity of the product and the productivity*, and this alone is implied, even in the ordinary use of language by the idea of Nature.

Nature as a mere product (*natura naturata*) we call Nature as object (with this alone all empiricism deals). Nature as productivity (*natura naturans*) we call Nature as subject (with this alone all theory deals).

As the object is never unconditioned, something absolutely non-objective must

be put into Nature; this absolutely non-objective is nothing else but that original productivity of Nature. In the ordinary view it vanishes in the product: conversely in the philosophic view the product vanishes in the productivity.

Such identity of the product and the productivity in the original conception of Nature is expressed by the ordinary views of Nature as a whole, which is at once the cause and the effect of itself, and is in its duplicity (which goes through all phenomena) again identical. Furthermore, with this idea the identity of the Real and the Ideal agrees—an identity which is thought in the idea of every product of Nature, and in view of which alone the nature of art can be placed in opposition thereto. For whereas in art the idea precedes the act—the execution—in Nature idea and act are rather contemporary and one; the idea passes immediately over into the product, and cannot be separated from it.

This identity is cancelled by the empirical view, which sees in Nature only the effect (although on account of the continual wandering of empiricism into the field of science, we have, even in purely empirical physics, maxims which presuppose an idea of Nature as subject—as, for example, Nature chooses the shortest way; Nature is sparing in causes and lavish in effects); it is also cancelled by speculation, which looks only at *cause* in Nature.

3.

We can say of Nature as object that it *is*, not of Nature as subject; for this is being or productivity.

This absolute productivity must pass over into an empirical nature. In the idea of absolute productivity, is the thought of an ideal infinity. The ideal infinity must become an empirical one.

But empirical infinity is an infinite becoming. Every infinite series is but the exhibition of an intellectual or ideal infinity. The original infinite series (the ideal of all infinite series) is that wherein our intellectual infinity evolves itself, viz., *Time*. The activity which sustains this series is the same as that which sustains our consciousness; consciousness, how-

ever, is *continuous*. Time, therefore, as the evolution of that activity, cannot be produced by composition. Now, as all other infinite series are only imitations of the originally infinite series, Time, no infinite series can be otherwise than continuous. In the original evolution the retarding agent (without which the evolution would take place with infinite rapidity) is nothing but *original reflection*; the necessity of reflection upon our acting in every organic phase (continued duplicity in identity) is the secret stroke of art whereby our being receives *permanence*.

Absolute continuity, therefore, exists only for the intuition, but not for the *reflection*. Intuition and reflection are opposed to each other. The infinite series is continuous for the productive *intuition*—interrupted and composite for the *reflection*. It is on this *contradiction* between intuition and reflection that those sophisms are based, in which the possibility of all motion is contested, and which are solved at every successive step by the productive activity. To the intuition, for example, the action of gravity takes place with perfect continuity; to the reflection, by fits and starts. Hence all the laws of mechanics, whereby that which is properly only the object of the productive intuition becomes an object of reflection, are really only laws for the reflection. Hence those fictitious notions of mechanics, the atoms of time in which gravitation acts, the law that the moment of solicitation is infinitely small, because otherwise an infinite rapidity would be produced in finite time, &c., &c. Hence, finally, the assertion that in mathematics no infinite series can really be represented as continuous, but only as advancing by fits and starts.

The whole of this inquiry into the opposition between reflection and the productivity of the intuition, serves only to enable us to deduce the general statement that in *all* productivity, and in productivity alone, there is absolute *continuity*—a statement of importance in the consideration of the whole of Nature; inasmuch, for example, as the law that in Nature there is no leap, that there is a continuity of forms in it, &c., is confined to the orig-

inal productivity of Nature, in which certainly there must be continuity, whereas from the stand-point of reflection all things must appear *disconnected* and *without* continuity—placed beside each other, as it were; we must therefore admit that both parties are right; those, namely, who assert continuity in Nature—for example, in organic Nature—no less than those who deny it, when we take into consideration the difference of their respective stand-points; and we thereby, at the same time, arrive at the distinction between dynamical and atomistic physics; for, as will soon become apparent, the two are distinguished only by the fact that the former occupies the stand-point of *intuition*, the latter that of *reflection*.

4.

These general principles being presupposed, we shall be able, with more certainty, to reach our aim, and make an exposition of the internal organism of our system.

(a) In the idea of becoming, we think the idea of gradualness. But an absolute productivity will exhibit itself empirically as a becoming with infinite rapidity, whereby there results nothing real for the intuition.

(Inasmuch as Nature must in reality be thought as engaged in infinite evolution, the permanence, the resting of the products of Nature—the organic ones, for instance—is not to be viewed as an absolute resting, but only as an evolution proceeding with infinitely small rapidity or with infinite tardiness. But hitherto evolution, with even finite rapidity, not to speak of infinitely small rapidity, has not been constructed.)

(b) That the evolution of Nature should take place with finite rapidity, and thus become an object of intuition, is not thinkable without an original limitation (a being limited) of the productivity.

(c) But if Nature be absolute productivity, then the ground of this limitation may lie *outside of it*. Nature is originally *only* productivity; there can, therefore, be nothing determined in this productivity

(all determination is negation) and so products can never be reached by it. If products are to be reached, the productivity must pass from being undetermined to being determined—that is, it must, as pure productivity, be cancelled. If now the ground of determination of productivity lay outside of Nature, Nature would not be originally absolutely productivity. Determination, that is, negation, must certainly come into Nature; but this negation, viewed from a higher stand-point, must again be positivity.

(d) But if the ground of this limitation lies *within Nature itself*, then Nature ceases to be *pure identity*. (Nature, in so far as it is only productivity, is pure identity, and there is in it absolutely nothing capable of being distinguished. In order that anything may be distinguished in it, its identity must be cancelled—Nature must not be identity, but duplicity.)

Nature must originally be an object to itself; this change of the pure subject into a self-object is unthinkable without an original sundering in Nature itself.

This duplicity cannot therefore be further deduced physically; for, as the condition of all Nature generally, it is the principle of all physical explanation, and all physical explanation can only have for its aim the reduction of all the antitheses which appear in Nature to that original antithesis in the heart of Nature, *which does not, however, itself appear*. Why is there no original phenomenon of Nature without this duplicity, if in Nature all things are not mutually subject and object to each other *ad infinitum*, and Nature even, in its origin, at once product and productive?

(e) If Nature is originally duplicity, there must be opposite tendencies even in the original productivity of Nature. (The positive tendency must be opposed by another, which is, as it were, anti-productive—retarding production; not as the contradictory, but as the negative—the really opposite of the former.) It is only then that, in spite of its being limited, there is no passivity in Nature, when even

that which limits it is again positive, and its original duplicity is a contest of really opposite tendencies.

(f) In order to arrive at a product, these opposite tendencies must concur. But as they are supposed equal, (for there is no ground for supposing them unequal,) wherever they meet they will annihilate each other; the product is therefore $= 0$, and once more no product is reached.

This inevitable, though hitherto not very closely remarked contradiction (namely, that a product can arise only through the concurrence of opposite tendencies, while at the same time these opposite tendencies mutually annihilate each other) is capable of being solved only in the following manner: There is absolutely no *subsistence* of a product thinkable, *without a continual process of being reproduced*. The product must be thought as *annihilated at every step*, and at *every step reproduced anew*. We do not really see the subsisting of a product, but only the continual process of being reproduced.

(It is of course very conceivable how the series $1-1+1-1\dots$ on to infinity is thought as equal neither to 1 nor to 0. The reason however why this series is thought as $=\frac{1}{2}$ lies deeper. There is one absolute magnitude ($=1$), which, though continually annihilated in this series, continually recurs, and by this recurrence produces, not itself, but the mean between itself and nothing.—Nature, as object, is that which comes to pass in such an infinite series, and is $=$ a fraction of the original unit, to which the never cancelled duplicity supplies the numerator.)

(g) If the subsistence of the product is a continual process of being reproduced, then all *persistence* also is only in nature as *object*; in nature as *subject* there is only infinite *activity*.

The product is originally nothing but a mere point, a mere limit, and it is only from Nature's combatting against this point that it is, so to speak, raised to a full sphere—to a product. (Suppose, for illustration, a stream; it is *pure identity*; where it meets resistance, there is formed a whirlpool; this whirlpool is not anything

abiding, but something that every moment vanishes, and every moment springs up anew.—In Nature there is originally nothing distinguishable; all products are, so to speak, still in solution, and invisible in the universal productivity. It is only when retarding points are given, that they are thrown off and advance out of the universal identity.—At every such point the stream breaks (the productivity is annihilated), but at every step there comes a new wave which fills up the sphere).

The philosophy of nature has not to explain the productive (side) of nature; for if it does not posit this as in nature originally, it will never bring it into nature. It has to explain the permanent. But the fact that anything should become permanent in nature, can itself receive its explanation only from that contest of nature *against all permanence*. The products would appear as mere points, if nature did not give them extension and depth by its own pressure, and the products themselves would last only an instant, if nature did not at every instant crowd up against them.

(h) This seeming product, which is reproduced at every step, cannot be a really infinite product; for otherwise productivity would actually exhaust itself in it; in like manner it cannot be a finite product; for it is the force of the whole of nature that pours itself into it. It must therefore be at once infinite and finite; it must be only seemingly finite, but in infinite development.

The point at which this product originally comes in, is the universal point of retardation in nature, the point from which all evolution in nature begins. But in nature, as it is evolved, this point lies not here or there, but everywhere where there is a product.

This product is a finite one, but as the infinite productivity of nature concentrates itself in it, it must have a tendency to infinite development.—And thus gradually, and through all the foregoing intermediate links, we have arrived at the construction of that infinite becoming—the empirical exhibition of an ideal infinity.

We behold in what is called nature (i. e. in this assemblage of individual objects), not the primal product itself, but its evolution, (hence the point of retardation cannot remain *one*.)—By what means *this* evolution is again absolutely retarded, which must happen, if we are to arrive at a fixed product, has not yet been explained.

But through this product an original infinity evolves itself; this infinity can never decrease. The magnitude which evolves itself in an infinite series, is still infinite at every point of the line; and thus nature will be still infinite at every point of the evolution.

There is only one original point of retardation to productivity; but any number of points of retardation to evolution may be thought. Every such point is marked for us by a product: but at every point of the evolution nature is still infinite; therefore nature is still infinite in every product, and in every one lies the germ of a universe.*

(The question, by what means the infiniteness tendency is retarded in the product, is still unanswered. The original retardation in the productivity of nature, explains only why the evolution takes place with finite rapidity, but not why it takes place with infinitely small rapidity.)

(i) The product evolves itself *ad infinitum*. In this evolution, therefore, nothing can happen, which is not already a product (synthesis), and which might not divide up into new factors, each of these again having its factors.

Thus even by an analysis pursued *ad infinitum*, we could never arrive at anything in nature which should be absolutely simple.

(k) If however we *suppose* the evolution as completed, (although it *never* can be

completed,) still the evolution could not stop at anything which was a product, but only at the purely productive.

The question arises, whether a final, such that it is no longer a substrate, but the cause of all substrate, no longer a product, but absolutely productive—we will not say *occurs*, for that is unthinkable, but—can at least be proved in experience.

(l) Inasmuch as it bears the character of the unconditioned, it would have to exhibit itself as something, which, although itself not in space, is still the principle of all occupation of space.

What occupies space is not matter, for matter is the occupied space itself. That, therefore, which occupies space cannot be matter. Only that which is, is in space, *not being itself*.

It is self-evident that no positive external intuition is possible of that which is not in space. It would therefore have to be capable of being exhibited negatively. This happens in the following manner:

That which is in space, is, as such, mechanically and chemically destructible. That which is not destructible either mechanically or chemically must therefore lie outside of space. But it is only the final ground of all quality that has anything of this nature; for although one quality may be extinguished by another, this can nevertheless only happen in a third product, C, for the formation and maintenance of which A and B, (the opposite factors of C,) must continue to act.

But this indestructible (somewhat), which is thinkable only as pure intensity, is, as the cause of all substrate, at the same time the principle of divisibility *ad infinitum*. (A body, divided *ad infinitum* still occupies space in the same degree with its smallest part.)

That, therefore, which is purely productive without being a product, is but the final ground of quality. But every quality is a determinate one, whereas productivity is originally indeterminate. In the qualities, therefore, productivity appears as already retarded, and as it appears most original in them generally, it appears in them most originally retarded.

* A traveller in Italy makes the remark that the whole history of the world may be demonstrated on the great obelisk at Rome; so, likewise, in every product of Nature. Every mineral body is a fragment of the annals of the earth. But what is the earth? Its history is interwoven with the history of the whole of Nature, and so passes from the fossil through the whole of inorganic and organic Nature, till it culminates in the history of the universe—one chain.—*Remark of the Original.*

This is the point at which our mode of conception diverges from those of the currently so-called dynamical physics.

Our assertion, briefly stated, is this:—If the infinite evolution of nature were completed (which is impossible) it would separate up into original and simple actions, or, if we may so express ourselves, into simple productivities. Our assertion therefore is not: There are in nature such simple actions; but only, they are the ideal grounds of the explanation of quality. These *entelechies* cannot actually be shown, they do not *exist*; we have not therefore to explain here anything more than is asserted, namely, that such original productivities must be *thought* as the grounds of the explanation of all quality. This proof is as follows:

The affirmation that nothing which *is* in space, that is, that nothing at all is mechanically simple, requires no demonstration. That, therefore, which is in reality simple, cannot be thought as in space, but must be thought as outside of space. But outside of space only pure intensity is thought. This idea of pure intensity is expressed by the idea of action. It is not the product of this action that is simple, but the action itself abstracted from the product, and it must be simple in order that the product may be divisible *ad infinitum*. For although the parts are near vanishing, the intensity must still remain. And this pure intensity is what, even in infinite divisibility, sustains the substrate.

If, therefore, the assertion that affirms something simple as the basis of the explanation of quality is atomistic, then our philosophy is atomistic. But, inasmuch as it places the simple in something that is only productive without being a product, it is *dynamical atomistics*.

This much is clear, that if we admit an absolute division of nature into its factors, the last (thing) that remains over, must be something, which absolutely defies all division, that is, the simple. But the simple can be thought only as dynamical, and as such it is not in space at all (it designates only what is thought as altogether outside of space-occupation); there is therefore no intuition of it possible, ex-

cept through its product. In like manner there is no measure for it given but its product. For to pure thought it is the mere *origin* of the product (as the point is only the origin of the line), in one word pure *entelechy*. But that which is known, not in itself, but only in its product, is known altogether empirically. If, therefore, every original quality, as quality (not as substrate, in which quality merely inheres), must be thought as pure intensity, pure action, then qualities generally are only the absolutely empirical in our knowledge of nature, of which no construction is possible, and in respect to which there remains nothing of the philosophy of nature, save the proof that they are the absolute limit of its construction.

The question in reference to the ground of quality posits the evolution of nature as completed, that is, it posits something merely thought, and therefore can be answered only by an ideal ground of explanation. This question adopts the stand-point of reflection (on the product), whereas genuine dynamics always remain on the stand-point of intuition.

(It must here, however, be at once remarked that if the ground of the explanation of quality is conceived as an ideal one, the question only regards the explanations of quality, in so far as it is thought as absolute. There is no question, for instance, of quality, in so far as it shows itself in the dynamical process. For quality, so far as it is relative, there is certainly a [not merely ideal, but actually real] ground of explanation and determination; quality in that case is determined by its opposite, with which it is placed in conflict, and this antithesis is itself again determined by a higher antithesis, and so on back into infinity; so that, if this universal organization could dissolve itself, all matter likewise would sink back into dynamical inactivity, that is, into absolute defect of quality. (Quality is a higher power of matter, to which the latter elevates itself by reciprocity.) It is demonstrated in the sequel that the dynamical process is a limited one for each individual sphere; because it is only thereby that definite points of relation for the deter-

ination of quality arise. This limitation of the dynamical process, that is, the proper determination of quality, takes place by means of no force other than that by which the evolution is universally and absolutely limited, and this negative element is the only one in things that is indivisible, and mastered by nothing.—The absolute relativity of all quality may be shown from the electric relation of bodies, inasmuch as the same body that is positive with one is negative with another, and conversely. But we might now henceforth abide by the statement (which is also laid down in the Outlines): *All quality is electricity*, and conversely, *the electricity of a body is also its quality*, (for all difference of quality is equal to difference of electricity, and all [chemical] quality is reducible to electricity).—Everything that is sensible for us (sensible in the narrower acceptation of the term, as colors, taste, &c.), is doubtless sensible to us only *through* electricity, and the only *immediately* sensible (element) would then be electricity,* a conclusion to which the universal duality of every sense leads us independently, inasmuch as in Nature there is properly only one duality. In galvanism, sensibility, as a reagent, reduces all quality of bodies, for which it is a reagent to an original difference. All bodies which, in a chain, at all affect the sense of taste or that of sight, be their differences ever so great, are either alkaline or acid, excite a negative or positive shock, and here they always appear as active in a higher than the merely chemical power.

Quality considered as absolute is inconstructible, because quality generally is not anything absolute, and there is no other quality at all, save that which bodies show mutually in relation to each other, and all quantity is something in virtue of which the body is, so to speak, raised above itself.

All hitherto attempted construction of

* Volta already asks, with reference to the affection of the senses by galvanism—"Might not the electric fluid be the immediate cause of all flavors? Might it not be the cause of sensation in all the other senses?"—*Remark of the Original.*

quality reduces itself to the two attempts; to express qualities by figures, and so, for each original quality, to assume a particular figure in Nature; or else, to express quality by analytical formulæ (in which the forces of attraction and repulsion supply the negative and positive magnitudes.) To convince oneself of the futility of this attempt, the shortest method is to appeal to the emptiness of the explanations to which it gives rise. Hence we limit ourselves here to the single remark, that through the construction of all matter out of the two fundamental forces, different degrees of density may indeed be constructed, but certainly never different qualities as qualities; for although all dynamical (qualitative) changes appear, in their lowest stage, as changes of the fundamental forces, yet we see at that stage only the product of the process—not the *process itself*—and those changes are *what require explanation*, and the ground of explanation must therefore certainly be sought in something higher.

The only possible ground of explanation for quality is an ideal one; because this ground itself presupposes something purely ideal. If any one inquire into the final ground of quality, he transports himself back to the starting point of Nature. But where is this starting point? and does not all quality consist in this, that matter is prevented by the general concatenation from reverting into its originality?

From the point at which reflection and intuition separate, a separation, be it remarked, which is possible only on the hypothesis of the evolutions being complete, physics divide into the two opposite directions, into which the two systems, the atomistic and the dynamical, have been divided.

The *dynamical* system *denies* the absolute evolution of Nature, and passes from Nature as synthesis (i. e. Nature as subject) to Nature as evolution (i. e. Nature as object); the atomistic system passes from the evolution, as the original, to Nature as synthesis; the former passes from the stand-point of intuition to that of reflection; the latter from the stand-point of reflection to that of intuition.

Both directions are equally possible. If the analysis only is right, then the synthesis must be capable of being found again through analysis, just as the analysis in its turn can be found through the synthesis. But whether the analysis is correct can be tested only by the fact that we can pass from it again to the synthesis. The synthesis therefore is, and continues, the absolutely presupposed.

The problems of the one system turn exactly round into those of the other; that which, in atomical physics, is the cause of the *composition* of Nature is, in dynamical physics, *that which checks evolution*. The former explains the composition of Nature by the force of cohesion, whereby, however, no continuity is ever introduced into it; the latter, on the contrary, explains cohesion by the continuity of evolution. (All cohesion is originally only in the productivity.)

Both systems set out from something purely ideal. Absolute synthesis is as much purely ideal as absolute analysis. The Real occurs only in Nature as *product*; but Nature is not product, either when thought as absolute involution or as absolute evolution; product is what is contained between the two extremes.

The first problem for both systems is to construct the product—i. e. that wherein those opposites become real. Both reckon with purely ideal magnitudes so long as the product is not constructed: it is only in the *directions* in which they accomplish this that they are opposed. Both systems, as far as they have to deal with merely ideal factors, have the same value, and the one forms the test of the other.—That which is concealed in the depths of productive Nature must be reflected as product in Nature as Nature, and thus the atomistic system must be the continual reflex of the dynamical. In the Outlines, of the two directions, that of atomistic physics has been chosen intentionally. It will contribute not a little to the understanding of our science, if we here demonstrate in the *productivity* what was there shown in the *product*.

(m) *In the pure productivity of Nature there is absolutely nothing distinguishable*

except duality; it is only productivity dualized in itself that gives the product.

Inasmuch as the absolute productivity arrives only at producing *per se*, not at the producing of a determinate [somewhat], the tendency of Nature, in virtue of which product is arrived at, must be the *negative* of productivity.

In Nature, in so far as it is real, there can no more be productivity without a product, than a product without productivity. Nature can only approximate to the two extremes, and it must be demonstrated that it approximates to both.

(a) *Pure 'productivity passes originally into formlessness.*

Wherever Nature loses itself in formlessness, productivity exhausts itself in it. (This is what we express when we talk of a becoming latent.)—Conversely, wherever the form predominates—i. e. wherever the productivity is *limited*—the productivity manifests itself; it appears, not as a (representable) product, but as productivity, although passing over into one product, as in the phenomena of heat. (The idea of imponderables is only a symbolic one.)

(b) *If productivity passes into formlessness, then, objectively considered, it is the absolutely formless.*

(The boldness of the atomical system has been very imperfectly comprehended. The idea which prevails in it, of an absolutely formless [somewhat] everywhere incapable of manifestation as determinate matter, is nothing other than the symbol of nature approximating to productivity.—The nearer to productivity the nearer to formlessness.

(γ) *Productivity appears as productivity only when limits are set to it.*

That which is everywhere and in everything, is, for that very reason, nowhere.—Productivity is fixed only by limitation.—*Electricity exists* only at that point at which limits are given, and it is only a poverty of conception that would look for anything else in its phenomena beyond the phenomena of (limited) productivity.—The condition of *light* is an antithesis in the electric and galvanic, as well as in the chemical, process, and even light which comes to us without our coöpera-

tion (the phenomenon of productivity exerted all round by the sun) presupposes that antithesis.*

(δ) *It is only limited productivity that gives the start to product.* (The explanation of product must begin at the origination of the fixed point at which the start is made.) *The condition of all formation is duality.* (This is the more profound signification that lies in Kant's construction of matter from opposite forces.)

Electrical phenomena are the general scheme for the construction of matter universally.

(ε) *In Nature, neither pure productivity nor pure product can ever be arrived at.*

The former is the negation of all product, the latter the negation of all productivity.

(Approximation to the former is the absolutely decomposable, to the latter the absolutely indecomposable, of the atomistics. The former cannot be thought without, at the same time, being the absolutely impossible, the latter without, at the same time, being the absolutely compossible.)

Nature will therefore originally be the middle [somewhat] arising out of the two, and thus we arrive at the idea of a *productivity engaged in a transition into product, or of a product that is productive ad infinitum*. We hold to the latter definition.

The idea of the product (the fixed) and that of the productive (the free) are mutually opposed.

Seeing that what we have postulated is already product, it can, if it is productive at all, be productive only in a *determinate way*. But determined productivity is (active) *formation*. That third [somewhat] must therefore be *in the state of formation*.

* According to the foregoing experiments, it is at least not impossible to regard the phenomena of light and those of electricity as one, since in the prismatic spectrum the colors may at least be considered as opposites, and the white light, which regularly falls in the middle, be regarded as the indifference-point; and for reasons of analogy one is tempted to consider this construction of the phenomena of light as the real one.—*Remark of the Original.*

But the product is supposed to be productive *ad infinitum* (that transition is never absolutely to take place); it will therefore at every stage be productive in a determinate way; the productivity will remain, but not the product.

(The question might arise how a transition from form to form is possible at all here, when *no* form is fixed. Still, that *momentary* forms should be reached, has already been rendered possible by the fact that the evolution cannot take place with infinite rapidity, in which case, therefore, for every step at least, the form is certainly a determinate one.)

The product will appear as in *infinite metamorphosis*.

(From the stand-point of reflection, as continually on the leap from fluid to solid, without ever reaching, however, the required form.—Organizations that do not live in the grosser element, at least live on the deep ground of the aerial sea—many pass over, by metamorphoses, from one element into another; and what does the animal, whose vital functions almost all consist in contractions, appear to be, other than such a leap?)

The metamorphosis will not possibly take place *without rule*. For it must remain within the original antithesis, and is thereby confined within limits.†

(This accordance with rule will express itself solely by an internal relationship of forms—a relationship which again is not thinkable without an archetype which lies at the basis of all, and which, with however manifold divergences, they nevertheless all express.)

But even with such a product, we have not that which we were in quest of—a product which, while productive *ad infinitum*, remains the same. That this product should remain the same seems unthinkable, because it is not thinkable without an absolute checking or suppression of the productivity.—The product would have to be checked, as the productivity was checked, for it is still productive—checked

† Hence wherever the antithesis is cancelled or deranged, the metamorphosis becomes irregular. For what is disease even but metamorphosis?—*Remark of the Original.*

by dualization and limitation resulting therefrom. But it must at the same time be explained how the productive product can be checked at each individual stage of its formation, without its ceasing to be productive, or how, *by dualization itself, the permanence of the productivity is secured.*

In this way we have brought the reader as far as the problem of the fourth section of the Outlines, and we leave him to find in it for himself the solution along with the corollaries which it brings up.—Meanwhile, we shall endeavor to indicate how the deduced product would necessarily appear from the stand-point of *reflection.*

The product is the synthesis wherein the opposite extremes meet, which on the one side are designated by the absolutely decomposable—on the other as indecomposable.—How continuity comes into the absolute discontinuity with which he sets out, the atomic philosopher endeavors to explain by means of cohesive, plastic power, &c., &c. In vain, for continuity is only *productivity* itself.

The manifoldness of the forms which such product assumes in its metamorphosis was explained by the difference in the stages of development, so that, parallel with every step of development, goes a particular form. The atomic philosopher posits in nature certain fundamental forms, and as in it everything strives after form, and every thing which does form itself has also its *particular* form, so the fundamental forms must be conceded, but certainly only as indicated in nature, not as actually existent.

From the standpoint of reflection, the becoming of this product must appear as a continual striving of the original actions toward the production of a determinate form, and a continual recancelling of those forms.

Thus, the product would not be product of a simple tendency; it would be only the visible expression of an internal proportion, of an internal equipoise of the original actions, which neither reduce themselves mutually to absolute formlessness, nor yet, by reason of the universal

conflict, allow the production of a determinate and fixed form.

Hitherto (so long as we have had to deal merely with ideal factors), there have been opposite directions of investigation possible; from this point, inasmuch as we have to pursue a real product in its developments, there is only one direction.

(n) By the unavoidable separation of productivity into opposite directions at every single step of development the product itself is separated into *individual products*, by which, however, for that very reason, only different stages of development are marked.

That this is so may be shown *either* in the products themselves, as is done when we compare them with each other with regard to their form, and search out a continuity of formation—an idea which, from the fact that continuity is never in the *products* (for the reflection), but always only in the *productivity*, can never be perfectly realized.

In order to find continuity in productivity, the successive steps of the *transition of productivity into product* must be more clearly exhibited than they have hitherto been. From the fact that the productivity gets *limited*, (*v. supra*,) we have in the first instance only the start for a product, only the fixed point for the productivity generally. It must be shown *how* the productivity gradually materializes itself, and changes itself into products ever more and more fixed, so as to produce a *dynamical scale in nature*, and this is the real subject of the fundamental problem of the whole system.

In advance, the following may serve to throw light on the subject. In the first place, a dualization of the productivity is demanded; the cause through which this dualization is effected remains in the first instance altogether outside of the investigation. By dualization a change of contraction and expansion is perhaps conditioned. This change is not something in matter, but is *matter itself*; and the first stage of productivity passing over into product. *Product* cannot be reached except through a stoppage of this change, that is, through a third [somewhat] which

fixes that change itself, and thus matter in its lowest stage—in the *first* power—would be an object of intuition; that change would be seen in rest, or in equipoise, just as, conversely again, by the suppression of the third [somewhat] matter might be raised to a higher power. Now it might be possible that those products just deduced stood upon *quite different degrees* of materiality, or of *that transition*, or that those different degrees were more or less *distinguishable* in the one than in the other; that is, a dynamical scale of those products would thereby have to be demonstrated.

(o) In the *solution* of the problem itself, we shall continue, in the first instance, in the direction hitherto taken, without knowing where it may lead us.

There are individual products brought into nature; but in these products productivity, *as* productivity, is held to be still always distinguishable. Productivity has not yet absolutely passed over into product. The subsistence of the product is supposed to be a continual self-reproduction.

The problem arises: By what is this absolute transition—exhaustion of the productivity in the product—prevented? or by what does its subsistence become a continual self-reproduction?

It is absolutely unthinkable how the activity that everywhere tends towards a product is prevented from going over into it *entirely*, unless that transition is prevented *by external influences*, and the product, if it is to subsist, is compelled at every step to reproduce itself *anew*.

Up to this point, however, no trace has been discovered of a cause opposed to the product (to organic nature). Such a cause can, therefore, at present, only be postulated. (We thought we saw the whole of nature exhaust itself in that product, and it is only here that we remark, that in order to comprehend such product, *something else* must be presupposed, and a new antithesis must come into nature.)

Nature has hitherto been for us absolute *identity* in duplicity; here we come upon an antithesis that must again take place *within* the other. This antithesis must be

capable of being shown in the deduced product itself, if it is capable of being deduced at all.)

The deduced product is an activity *directed outwards*; this cannot be distinguished as such without an activity *directed inwards from without*, (i. e. directed upon itself,) and this activity, on the other hand, cannot be thought, unless it is *pressed back* (reflected) from without.

In the opposite directions, which arise through this antithesis lies the principle for the construction of all the phenomena of life—on the suppression of those opposite directions, life remains over, either as *absolute activity* or *absolute receptivity*, since it is possible only as the perfect *inter-determination* of receptivity and activity.

We therefore refer the reader to the Outlines themselves, and merely call his attention to the higher stage of construction which we have here reached.

We have above (*g*) explained the origin of a *product generally* by a struggle of nature against the original point of check, whereby this point is raised to a full sphere, and thus receives permanence. Here, since we are deducing a struggle of *external* nature, not against a mere point, but against a *product*, the first construction rises for us to a *second* power, as it were,—we have a double product, (and thus it might well be shown in the sequel that organic nature generally is only the higher power of the inorganic, and that it rises above the latter for the very reason that in it even that which was already product *again* becomes product.)

Since the product, which we have deduced as the most primary, drives us to a side of nature that is opposed to it, it is clear that our construction of the origin of a product generally is *incomplete*, and that we have not yet, by a long way, satisfied our problem; (the problem of all science is to construct the origin of a fixed product.)

A productive product, as such, can subsist only under the influence of external forces, because it is only thereby that productivity is interrupted—prevented from being extinguished in the product. For these external forces there must now again

be a particular sphere; those forces must lie in a world which is *not productive*. But that world, for this very reason, would be a world fixed and undetermined in every respect. The problem—how a product in nature is arrived at—has therefore received a one-sided solution by all that has preceded. “The product is checked by dualization of the productivity at every single step of development.” But this is true only for the *productive* product, whereas we are here treating of a *non-productive* product.

The contradiction which meets us here can be solved only by the finding of a *general* expression for the construction of a *product generally*, (regardless of whether it is productive or has ceased to be so).

Since the existence of a world, that is *not productive* (inorganic) is in the first instance merely postulated, in order to explain the productive one, so its conditions can be laid down only hypothetically, and as we do not in the first instance know it at all except from its opposition to the productive, those conditions likewise must be deduced only from this opposition. From this it is of course clear, —what is also referred to in the Outlines— that this second section, as well as the first, contains throughout merely hypothetical truth, since neither organic nor inorganic nature is explained without our having reduced the construction of the two to a common expression, which, however, is possible only through the synthetic part.—This must lead to the highest and most general principles for the construction of a *nature generally*; hence we must refer the reader who is concerned about a knowledge of our system altogether to that part. The hypothetical deduction of an inorganic world and its conditions we may pass over here all the more readily, that they are sufficiently detailed in the Outlines, and hasten to the most general and the highest problem of our science.

The most general problem of speculative physics may now be expressed thus: *To reduce the construction of organic and inorganic products to a common expression.*

We can state only the main principles of such a solution, and of these, for the most part, only such as have not been completely deduced in the Outlines themselves—(3d principal section.)

A.

Here at the very beginning we lay down the principle that *as the organic product is the product in the second power, the organic construction of the product must be, at least, the sensuous image of the original construction of all product.*

(a) In order that the productivity may be at all fixed at a point, *limits must be given*. Since *limits* are the condition of the first phenomenon, the cause whereby limits are produced *cannot be a phenomenon*, it goes back into the interior of nature, or of each respective product.

In organic nature, this limitation of productivity is shown by what we call sensibility, which must be thought as the first condition of the construction of the organic product.

(b) The immediate effect of confined productivity is a *change of contraction and expansion* in the matter already given, and as we now know, constructed, as it were, for the second time.

(c) Where this change stops, productivity passes over into product, and where it is again restored, product passes over into productivity. For since the product must remain productive *ad infinitum*, those three stages of productivity must be *capable of being distinguished* in the product; the absolute transition of the latter into product is the cancelling of product itself.

(d) As these three stages are distinguishable in the *individual*, so they must be distinguishable in *organic nature throughout*, and the scale of organizations is nothing more than a scale of *productivity itself*. (Productivity exhausts itself to degree *c* in the product *A*, and can begin with the product *B* only at the point where it left off with *A*, that is, with degree *d*, and so on downwards to the *vanishing* of all productivity. If we knew the absolute *degree* of productivity of the *earth* for example—a degree which is determined by the earth's

relation to the sun—the limit of organization upon it might be thereby more accurately determined than by incomplete experience—which must be incomplete for this reason, if for no other, that the catastrophes of nature have, beyond doubt, swallowed the last links of the chain. A true system of Natural History, which has for its object not the *products* [of nature] but *nature itself*, follows up the one productivity that battles, so to speak, against freedom, through all its windings and turnings, to the point at which it is at last compelled to perish in the product.)

It is upon this dynamical scale, in the individual, as well as in the whole of organic nature, that the construction of all organic phenomena rests.

B.*

These principles, stated universally, lead to the following fundamental principles of a universal theory of nature.

(a) Productivity must be *primarily* limited. Since *outside* of limited productivity there is [only] *pure identity* the limitation cannot be established by a difference already existing, and therefore must be so by an *opposition* arising in *productivity itself*—an opposition to which we here revert as a first postulate.†

(b) This difference thought *purely* is the first condition of all [natural] activity, the productivity is attracted and repelled‡ between opposites (the primary limits); in this change of expansion and contraction there arises necessarily a common element, but one which exists only *in change*. If

* From this point onwards, there are, as in the Outlines, additions in notes (similar to the few that have already been admitted into the text in brackets []). They are excerpted from a MS. copy of the author's.

† The first postulate of natural science is an antithesis in the pure identity of Nature. This antithesis must be thought quite purely, and not with any other substrate besides that of activity; for it is the condition of all substrate. The person who cannot think activity or opposition without a substrate, cannot philosophize at all. For all philosophizing goes only to the deduction of a substrate.

‡ The phenomena of electricity show the scheme of nature oscillating between productivity and product. This condition of oscillation or change, attractive and repulsive force, is the real condition of formation.

it is to exist *outside* of change, then the *change itself* must become fixed. The *active* in change is the productivity sundered within itself.

(c) It is asked :

(a) By what means such change can be fixed at all; it cannot be fixed by anything that is contained as a link in change itself, and must therefore be fixed by a *tertium quid*.

(β) But this *tertium quid* must be able to *invade* that original antithesis; but *outside* of that antithesis nothing *is**; it (that *tertium quid*) must therefore be primarily contained in it, as something which is mediated by the antithesis, and by which in turn the antithesis is mediated; for otherwise there is no ground why it should be primarily contained in that antithesis.

The antithesis is dissolution of identity. But nature is *primarily* identity. In that antithesis, therefore, there must again be a struggle after identity. This struggle is immediately conditioned *through* the antithesis; for if there was no antithesis, there would be identity, absolute rest, and therefore no *struggle* toward identity. If, on the other hand, there were not identity in the antithesis, the antithesis itself could not endure.

Identity produced out of difference is indifference; that *tertium quid* is therefore a *struggle towards indifference*—a struggle which is conditioned by the difference itself, and by which it, on the other hand, is conditioned.—(The difference must not be looked upon as a difference at all, and is nothing for the intuition, except through a third, which sustains it—to which change itself adheres.)

This *tertium quid*, therefore, is all that is substrate in that primal change. But substrate posits change as much as change posits substrate; and there is here no first and no second; but difference and struggle towards indifference, are, as far time is concerned, one and contemporary.

Axiom. No identity in Nature is absolute, but all is only indifference.

Since that *tertium quid* itself *presupposes* the primary antithesis, the antithesis

* For it is the only thing that is given us to derive all other things from.

itself cannot be *absolutely* removed by it; *the condition of the continuance of that tertium quid* [of that third activity, or of Nature] *is the perpetual continuance of the antithesis*, just as, conversely, *the continuance of the antithesis is conditioned by the continuance of the tertium quid*.

But how, then, shall the antithesis be thought as continuing?

We have one primary antithesis, between the limits of which all Nature must lie; if we assume that the factors of this antithesis can really pass over into each other, or go together absolutely in some *tertium quid* (some individual product), then the antithesis is removed, and along with it the *struggle*, and so all the activity of nature. But that the antithesis should endure, is thinkable only by its being *infinite*—by the extreme limits being held asunder *in infinitum*—so that *always only the mediating links of the synthesis, never the last and absolute synthesis itself, can be produced*, in which case it is only *relative points of indifference* that are always attained, never absolute ones, and every successively originated difference leaves behind a new and still unremoved antithesis, and this again goes over into indifference, which, in its turn, *partially* removes the primary antithesis. Through the original antithesis and the struggle towards indifference, there arises a product, but the product partially does away with the antithesis; through the doing away of that part—that is, through the origination of the product itself—there arises a new antithesis, different from the one that has been done away with, and through it, a product different from the first; but even this leaves the absolute antithesis unremoved, duality therefore, and through it a product, will arise anew, and so on to infinity.

Let us say, for example, that by the product *A*, the antitheses *c* and *d* are united, the antitheses *b* and *e* still lie outside of that union. This latter is done away with in *B*, but this product also leaves the antithesis *a* and *f* unremoved; if we say that *a* and *f* mark the extreme limits, then the union of these will be that product which can never be arrived at.

Between the extremes *a* and *f*, lie the antitheses *c* and *d*, *b* and *e*; but the series of these intermediate antitheses is infinite; all these intermediate antitheses are included in the one absolute antithesis.—In the product *A*, of *a* only *c*, and of *f* only *d* is removed; let what remains of *a* be called *b*, and of *f*, *e*; these will indeed, by virtue of the absolute struggle towards indifference, become again united, but they leave a new antithesis uncanceled, and so there remains between *a* and *f* an infinite series of intermediate antitheses, and the product in which those absolutely cancel themselves *never is*, but only *becomes*.

This infinitely progressive formation must be thus represented. The original antithesis would necessarily be cancelled in the primal product *A*. The product would necessarily fall at the indifference-point of *a* and *f*, but inasmuch as the antithesis is an absolute one, which can be cancelled only in an infinitely continued, never actual, synthesis, *A* must be thought as the centre of an infinite periphery, (whose diameter is the infinite line *a f*.) Since in the product of *a* and *f*, only *c* and *d* are united, there arises in it the new division *b* and *e*, the product will therefore divide up into opposite directions; at the point where the struggle towards indifference attains the preponderance, *b* and *e* will combine and form a new product different from the first—but between *a* and *f*, there still lie an infinite number of antitheses; the indifference-point *B* is therefore the centre of a periphery which is comprehended in the first, but is itself again infinite, and so on.

The antithesis of *b* and *e* in *B* is *maintained* through *A*, because it (*A*) leaves the antithesis *un-united*; in like manner the antithesis in *C* is *maintained* through *B*, because *B*, in its turn, cancels only a part of *a* and *f*. But the antithesis in *C* is maintained through *B*, only in so far as *A* maintains the antithesis in *B*.* What

* The whole of the uncanceled antithesis of *A* is carried over to *B*. But again, it cannot entirely cancel itself in *B*, and is therefore carried over to *C*. The antithesis in *C* is therefore maintained by *B*, but only in so far as *A* maintains the antithesis which is the condition of *B*.

what is this mass but an abstraction of the specific gravity which you have hypostatized?); but, conversely, the mass of a body is only the expression of the momentum, with which the antithesis in it cancels itself.

(d) By the foregoing, the construction of matter in general is completed, but not the construction of specific difference in matter.

That which all the matter of *B*, *C*, &c., in relation to *A* has *common* under it, is the difference which is not cancelled by *A*, and which again cancels itself *in part* in *B* and *C*—hence, therefore, the gravity mediated by that difference.

What *distinguishes* *B* and *C* from *A* therefore, is the difference which is not cancelled by *A*, and which becomes the condition of gravity in the case of *B* and *C*.—Similarly, what distinguishes *C* from *B* (if *C* is a product subordinate to *B*), is the difference which is not cancelled by *B*, and which is again carried over to *C*. Gravity, therefore, is not the same thing for the higher and for the subaltern world-bodies, and there is as much variety in the central forces as in the conditions of attraction.

The means whereby, in the products *A*, *B*, *C*, which, in so far as they are opposed to *each other*, represent products absolutely *homogeneous* [because the antithesis is the same for the *whole product*,] another difference of individual products is possible, is the possibility of a difference of relation between the factors in the cancelling, so that, for example, in *X*, the positive factor, and in *Y*, the negative factor, has the preponderance, (thus rendering the one body positively, and the other negatively, electric).—All difference is difference of electricity.*

(e) That the identity of matter is not *absolute* identity, but only *indifference*, can be proved from the possibility of again cancelling the identity, and from the accompanying phenomena.† We may be al-

lowed, for brevity's sake, to include this recancelling, and its resultant phenomena under the expression *dynamical process*, without, of course, affirming decisively whether anything of the sort is everywhere actual.

Now there will be exactly as many stages in the *dynamical process* as there are stages of transition from difference to indifference.

(a) The first stage will be marked by objects in which the reproduction and recancelling of the antithesis at every step is still itself an object of perception.

The whole product is reproduced anew at every step.‡ that is, the antithesis which cancels itself in it, springs up afresh every moment; but this reproduction of difference loses itself immediately in *universal* gravity;§ this reproduction, therefore, can be perceived only in *individual* objects, which seem to gravitate *towards each other*; since, if to the one factor of an antithesis is offered its opposite (in another) *both factors* become *heavy with reference to each other*, in which case, therefore, the general gravity is not cancelled, but a special one occurs *within* the general.—An instance of such a mutual relation between two products, is that of the earth and the magnetic needle, in which is distinguished the continual recancelling of indifference in gravitation towards the poles||—the continual sinking back into identity** in gravitation towards the universal indifference-point. Here, therefore, it is not the *object*, but the *being-reproduced of the object* that becomes object.††

quality ought necessarily to be capable of experimental proof, by the recancelling the identity, and of the phenomena which accompany it.

‡ Every body must be thought as reproduced at every step—and therefore also every total product.

§ The *universal*, however, is never perceived, for the simple reason that it is universal.

|| Whereby what was said above is confirmed,—that falling toward the centre is a compound motion.

** The reciprocal cancelling of opposite motions.

†† Or the object is seen in the first stage of becoming, or of transition from difference to indifference. The phenomena of magnetism even serve, so to speak, as an impulse, to transport us to the standpoint beyond the product, which is necessary in order to the construction of the product.

* It is here taken for granted that what we call the quality of bodies, and what we are wont to regard as something homogeneous, and the ground of all homogeneity is really only an expression for a cancelled difference.

† In the M.S. copy the last part of this sentence reads as follows: The construction of

(β) At the first stage, in the identity of the product, its duplicity again appears; at the second, the antithesis will divide up and distribute itself among different objects (A and B). From the fact that the one factor of the antithesis attained a *relative* preponderance in A , the other in B , there will arise, according to the same law as in a , a *gravitation* of the factors toward each other, and so a new difference, which, when the relative equiponderance is restored in each, results in repulsion*—(change of attraction and repulsion, *second* stage in which matter is seen)—*electricity*.

(γ) At the second stage the one factor of the product had only a *relative* preponderance;† at the *third* it will attain an *absolute* one—by the two bodies A and B , the original antithesis is again completely represented—matter will revert to the *first* stage of becoming.

At the *first* stage there is still *PURE difference*, without substrate [for it was only out of it that a substrate arose]; at the second stage it is the *simple* factors of two *products* that are opposed to each other; at the third it is the *PRODUCTS THEMSELVES* that are opposed; here is difference in the *third* power.

If two products are absolutely opposed to each other,‡ then in each of them singly indifference of gravity (by which alone each is) must be *cancelled*, and they must gravitate to *each other*.§ (In the second stage, there was only a mutual gravitating

* There will result the opposite effect—a *negative* attraction, that is, repulsion. Repulsion and attraction stand to each other as positive and negative magnitudes. Repulsion is only negative attraction—attraction only negative repulsion; as soon, therefore, as the maximum of attraction is reached, it passes over into its opposite—into repulsion.

† If we designate the factors as $+$ and $-$ electricity, then, in the second stage, $+$ electricity had a relative preponderance over $-$ electricity.

‡ If no longer the individual factors of the two products, but the whole products themselves are absolutely opposed to each other.

§ For product is something wherein antithesis cancels itself, but it cancels itself only through indifference of gravity. When, therefore, two products are opposed to each other, the indifference in each *individually* must be absolutely cancelled, and the whole products must gravitate towards each other.

of the factors to each other—here there is a gravitating of the products.)||—This process, therefore, first assails the *indifferent (element) of the product*—that is, the products themselves dissolve.

Where there is equal difference there is equal indifference; difference of *products*, therefore, can end only with *indifference of products*.—(All hitherto deduced indifference has been only indifference of substrateless, or at least simple factors.—Now we come to speak of an indifference of products.) This struggle will not cease till there exists a common product. The product, in forming itself, passes, from both sides, through all the intermediate links that lie between the two products [for example, through all the intermediate stages of specific gravity], till it finds the point at which it succumbs to indifference, and the product is fixed.

GENERAL REMARK.

By virtue of the first construction, the product is posited as identity; this identity, it is true, again resolves itself into an antithesis, which, however, is no longer an antithesis cleaving to *products*, but an antithesis in the *productivity* itself.—The product, therefore, as product, is identity.—But even in the sphere of products, there again arises a duplicity in the second stage, and it is only in the third that even the duplicity of the *products* again becomes *identity* of the products.**—There is therefore here also a progress from thesis to antithesis, and thence to synthesis.—The last synthesis of matter closes in the chemical process; if composition is to proceed yet further in it, then this circle must open again.

|| In the electric process, the whole product is not active, but only the one factor of the product, which has the relative preponderance over the other. In the chemical process in which the *whole product* is active, it follows that the indifference of the whole product must be cancelled.

** We have therefore the following scheme of the dynamical process:

First stage: Unity of the product—magnetism.

Second stage: Duplicity of the products—electricity.

Third stage: Unity of the products—chemical process.

We must leave it to our readers themselves to make out the conclusions to which the principles here stated lead; and the universal interdependence which is introduced by them into the phenomena of Nature.—Nevertheless, to give one instance: when in the chemical process the bond of gravity is loosed, the phenomenon of *light* which accompanies the chemical process in its greatest perfection (in the process of combustion), is a remarkable phenomenon, which, when followed out further, confirms what is stated in the Outlines, page 146:—“The action of light must stand in secret interdependence with the action of gravity which the central bodies exercise.”—For, is not the indifference dissolved at every step, since gravity, as ever active, presupposes a continual cancelling of indifference?—It is thus, therefore, that the sun, by the distribution exercised on the earth, causes a universal separation of matter into the primary antithesis (and hence gravity). This universal cancelling of indifference is what appears to us (who are endowed with life) as *light*; wherever, therefore, that indifference is dissolved (in the chemical process), there light *must* appear to us. According to the foregoing, it is *one* antithesis which, beginning at magnetism, and proceeding through electricity, at last loses itself in the chemical phenomena.* In the chemical process, namely, the

* The conclusions which may be deduced from this construction of dynamical phenomena are partly anticipated in what goes before. The following may serve for further explanation:

The chemical process, for example, in its highest perfection is a process of combustion. Now I have already shown on another occasion, that the condition of light in the body undergoing combustion is nothing else but the maximum of its positive electrical condition. For it is always the positively electrical condition that is also the combustible. Might not, then, this coexistence of the phenomenon of light with the chemical process in its highest perfection give us information about the ground of every phenomenon of light in Nature?

What happens, then, in the chemical process? Two whole products gravitate towards each other. The *indifference* of the *individual* is therefore *absolutely* cancelled. This absolute cancelling of indifference puts the whole body into the condition of light, just as the partial in the electric process puts it into a partial condition of light. Therefore, also the light—what

whole product + *E* or — *E* (the *positively* electric body, in the case of absolutely *unburnt* bodies, is always the *more combustible*;† whereas the *absolutely incombustible* is the cause of all *negatively* electric condition;) and if we may be allowed to invert the case, what then are bodies themselves but condensed (confined) electricity? In the chemical process the whole body dissolves into + *E* or — *E*. Light is everywhere the appearing of the *positive* factor in the primary antithesis; hence, wherever the antithesis is restored, there is *light* for us, because generally only the positive factor is beheld, and the negative one is only felt.—Is the connection of the diurnal and annual deviations of the magnetic needle with light now conceivable—and, if in every chemical process the antithesis is dissolved, is it conceivable that Light is the cause and beginning of all chemical process?‡

seems to stream to us from the sun—is nothing else but the phenomenon of indifference cancelled at every step. For as gravity never ceases to act, its condition—antithesis—must be regarded as springing up again at every step. We should thus have in light a continual, visible appearing of gravitation, and it would be explained why, in the system of worlds, it is exactly those bodies which are the principal seat of gravity that are also the principal source of light. We should then, also, have an explanation of the connection in which the action of light stands to that of gravitation.

The manifold effects of light on the deviations of the magnetic needle, on atmospheric electricity, and on organic nature, would be explained by the very fact that light is the phenomenon of indifference continually cancelled—therefore, the phenomenon of the dynamical process continually rekindled. It is, therefore, one antithesis that prevails in all dynamical phenomena—in those of magnetism, electricity and light; for example, the antithesis, which is the condition of the electrical phenomena must already enter into the first construction of matter. For all bodies are certainly electrical.

† Or rather, conversely, the more combustible is always also the positively electric; whence it is manifest that the body which burns has merely reached the maximum of + electricity.

‡ And indeed it is so. What then is the absolute incombustible? Doubtless, simply that wherewith everything else burns—oxygen. But it is precisely this absolutely incombustible oxygen that is the principle of negative electricity, and thus we have a confirmation of what I have already stated in the Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, viz. that oxygen is a

(f) The dynamical process is nothing but the second construction of matter, and however many stages there are in the dynamical process, there are the same number in the original construction of matter.

This axiom is the converse of axiom *e*.*

principle of a negative kind, and therefore the representative, as it were, of the power of attraction; whereas phlogiston, or, what is the same thing, positive electricity, is the representative of the positive, or of the force of repulsion. There has long been a theory that the magnetic, electric, chemical, and, finally, even the organic phenomena, are interwoven into one great interdependent whole. This must be established. It is certain that the connection of electricity with the process of combustion may be shown by numerous experiments. One of the most recent of these that has come to my knowledge I will cite. It occurs in Scherer's *Journal of Chemistry*. If a Leyden jar is filled with iron filings, and repeatedly charged and discharged, and if, after the lapse of some time, this iron is taken out and placed upon an isolator—paper, for example—it begins to get hot, becomes incandescent, and changes into an oxide of iron. This experiment deserves to be frequently repeated and more closely examined—it might readily lead to something new.

This great interdependence, which a scientific system of physics must establish, extends over the whole of Nature. It must, therefore, once established, spread a new light over the History of the whole of Nature. Thus, for example, it is certain that all geology must start from terrestrial magnetism. But terrestrial electricity must again be determined by magnetism. The connection of North and South with magnetism is shown even by the irregular movements of the magnetic needle. But again, with universal electricity, which, no less than gravity and magnetism, has its indifference point—the universal process of combustion and all volcanic phenomena stand connected.

Therefore, it is certain that there is one chain going from universal magnetism down to the volcanic phenomena. Still these are all only scattered experiments.

In order to make this interdependence fully evident, we need the central phenomenon, or central experiment, of which Bacon speaks oracularly—(I mean the experiment wherein all those functions of matter, magnetism, electricity, &c., so run together in one phenomenon that the individual function is distinguishable)—proving that the one does not lose itself immediately in the other, but that each can be exhibited separately—an experiment which, when it is discovered, will stand in the same relation to the whole of Nature, as galvanism does to organic nature. [Compare this with the discourse on Faraday's latest discovery, (1832,) p. 15. Complete Works, 1st Div., last vol.]

* Proof—All dynamical phenomena are phenomena of transition from difference to indifference. But it is in this very transition that matter is primarily constructed.

That which, in the dynamical process is perceived in the product, takes place *outside* of the product with the simple factors of all duality.

The first start to original production is the limitation of productivity through the primitive antithesis, which, as antithesis (and as the condition of all construction), is distinguished only in *magnetism*; the second stage of production is the *change* of contraction and expansion, and as such becomes visible only in *electricity*; finally, the third stage is the transition of this change into indifference—a change which is recognized as such only in *chemical* phenomena.

MAGNETISM, ELECTRICITY AND CHEMICAL PROCESS are the *categories* of the original construction of nature [matter]—the latter escapes us and lies outside of intuition, the former are what of it remains behind, what stands firm, what is fixed—the general schemes for the construction of matter.†

And—in order to close the circle at the point where it began—just as in organic nature, in the scale of sensibility, irritability, and formative instinct, the secret of the production of the *whole of organic nature* lies in each individual, so in the scale of magnetism, electricity, and chemical process, so far as it (the scale) can be distinguished in the individual body, is to be found the secret of the production of *Nature from itself* [of the whole of Nature‡].

† In the already mentioned discourse on Faraday's latest discovery, the author cites the passage (p. 75, original edition,) as well as § 56 sq. of the *General View of the Dynamical Process* (likewise written before the invention of the voltaic pile,) as a proof of his having anticipated the discoveries which proved the *unity* of the electrical and the chemical antithesis, and of the similar connection subsisting between magnetic and chemical phenomena. (See also Remark 2, p. 216.)

‡ Every individual is an expression of the whole of Nature. As the existence of the single organic individual rests on that scale, so does the whole of Nature. Organic nature maintains the whole wealth and variety of her products only by continually changing the relation of those three functions.—In like manner inorganic Nature brings forth the whole wealth of her product, only by changing the relation of those three functions of matter *ad infinitum*; for magnetism, electricity, and chemical process are the functions of

C.

We have now approached nearer the solution of our problem, which was: To reduce the construction of organic and inorganic nature to a common expression.

Inorganic nature is the product of the *first* power, organic nature of the *second** —(this was demonstrated above; it will soon appear that the latter is the product of a still higher power)—hence the latter, in view of the former, appears contingent; the former, in view of the latter, necessary. Inorganic nature can take its origin from *simple* factors, organic nature only from products, which again become factors. Hence an inorganic nature generally will appear as having been from all eternity, the organic nature as *originated*.

In the organic nature, indifference can never be arrived at in the same way in which it is arrived at in inorganic nature, because life consists in nothing more than a continual *prevention of the attainment of indifference* [a prevention of the absolute transition of productivity into product] whereby manifestly there comes about only a condition which is, so to speak, extorted from Nature.

By organization, matter—which has already been composed for the second time by the chemical process—is once more thrown back to the initial point of formation (the circle above described is again opened); it is no wonder that matter always thrown back again into formation at last returns as a perfect product.

The same stages, through which the production of Nature originally passes, are also passed through by the production of the organic product; only that the latter, even in the *first stage*, at least begins with products of the *simple* power.—Organic production also begins with limitation, not of the *primary* productivity, but of

matter generally, and on that ground alone are they categories for the construction of all matter. This fact, that those three factors are not phenomena of special kinds of matter, but *functions of all matter* universally, gives its real, and its innermost sense to dynamical physics, which, by this circumstance alone, rises far above all other kinds of physics.

* That is, the organic product can be thought only as subsisting under the hostile pressure of an external nature.

the *productivity of a product*; organic formation also takes place through the change of expansion and contraction, just as primary formation does; but in this case it is a change taking place, not in the simple productivity, but in the compound.

But there is all this, too, in the chemical process,† and yet in the chemical process indifference is attained. The vital process, therefore, must again be a higher power of the chemical; and if the scheme that lies at the base of the latter is duplicity, the scheme of the former will of necessity be *triplicity* [the former will be a process of the third power]. But the scheme of triplicity is [in reality] that [the fundamental scheme] of the galvanic process (Ritter's *Demonstration, &c.*, p. 172); therefore the galvanic process (or the process of irritation) stands a power higher than the chemical, and the third element, which the latter lacks and the former has, prevents indifference from being arrived at in the organic product.‡

As irritation does not allow indifference to be arrived at in the individual product, and as the antithesis is still there (for the primary antithesis still pursues us),§ there remains for nature no alternative but separation of the factors in *different* products.|| The formation of the individual product,

† The chemical process, too, has not substrateless or simple factors; it has products for factors.

‡ The same deduction is already given in the Outlines, p. 163.—What the dynamical action is, which according to the Outlines is also the cause of irritability, is now surely clear enough. It is the *universal action* which is everywhere conditioned by the cancelment of indifference, and which at last tends towards intussusception (indifference of products) when it is not continually prevented, as it is in the process of irritation. (*Remark of the original.*)

§ The abyss of forces, into which we here look down, opens with the one question: In the first construction of our earth, what can have been the ground of the fact that no genesis of new individuals is possible upon it, otherwise than under the condition of opposite powers? Compare an utterance of Kant on this subject, in his Anthropology. (*Remark of the original.*)

|| The two factors can never be *one*, but must be separated into different products—in order that thus the difference may be permanent.

for that very reason, cannot be a completed formation, and the product can never cease to be productive.* The contradiction in Nature is this, that the product must be *productive* [i. e. a product of the third power], and that, notwithstanding, the product, as a product of the third power, must pass over into indifference.†

This contradiction Nature tries to solve by mediating *indifference* itself through *productivity*, but even this does not succeed—for the act of productivity is only the kindling spark of a new process of irritation; the product of productivity is a *new productivity*. Into this as its product the productivity of the *individual* now indeed passes over; the individual, therefore, ceases more rapidly or slowly to be productive, and Nature reaches the indifference-point with it only after the latter has got down to a product of the second power.‡

* In the product, indifference of the first and second powers is arrived at (for example, by irritation itself an origin of *mass* [i. e. indifference of the first order] and even *chemical products* [i. e. indifference of the second order] are reached), but indifference of the third power can never be reached, because it is a contradictory idea. (*Remark of the original.*)

† The product is productive only from the fact of its being a product of the third power. But the idea of a productive product is itself a contradiction. What is productivity is not product, and what is product is not productivity. Therefore a product of the third power is itself a contradictory idea. From this even is manifest what an extremely artificial condition life is—wrenched, as it were, from Nature—subsisting against her will.

‡ Nothing shows more clearly the contradictions out of which life arises, and the fact that it is altogether only a heightened condition of *ordinary* natural forces, than the contradiction of Nature in what she tries, but tries in vain, to reach through the *sexes*.—Nature *hates* sex, and where it does arise, it arises against her will. The diremption into sexes is an inevitable fate, with which, after she is once organic, she must put up, and which she can never overcome.—By this very hatred of diremption she finds herself involved in a contradiction, inasmuch as what is odious to her she is compelled to develop in the most careful manner, and to lead to the summit of existence, as if she did it on purpose; whereas she is always striving only for a return into the identity of the genus, which, however, is chained to the (never to be cancelled) duplicity of the sexes, as to an inevitable condition. That she develops the individual only from compulsion, and for the

And now the result of all this?—The condition of the inorganic (as well as of the organic) product, is duality. In any case, however, organic *productive product* is so only from the fact that the *difference* NEVER becomes *indifference*.

It is [in so far] therefore impossible to reduce the construction of organic and of inorganic product to a *common* expression, and the problem is incorrect, and therefore the solution 'impossible. The problem presupposes that organic product and inorganic product are mutually *opposed*, whereas the latter is only the *higher power* of the former, and is produced only by the higher power of the forces through which the latter also is produced. Sensibility is only the higher power of magnetism; irritability only the higher power of electricity; formative instinct only the higher power of the chemical process.—But sensibility, and irritability, and formative instinct are all only included in that *one* process of irritation. (Galvanism affects them all).§ But if they are only the higher functions of magnetism, electricity, &c., there must again be a higher synthesis for these in Nature||—and this, however, it is certain, can be sought for

sake of the genus, is manifest from this, that wherever in a genus she *seems* desirous of maintaining the individual longer (though this is never really the case), she finds the genus becoming more uncertain, because she must hold the sexes farther asunder, and, as it were, make them flee from each other. In this region of Nature, the decay of the individual is not so visibly rapid as it is where the sexes are nearer to each other, as in the case of the rapidly withering flower, in which, from its very birth, they are enclosed in a calix as in a bride-bed, but in which, for that very cause, the *genus* is better *secured*.

Nature is the *laziest* of animals, and curses diremption, because it imposes upon her the necessity of activity; she is active only in order to rid herself of this necessity. The opposites must for ever shun, in order for ever to seek, each other; and for ever seek, in order never to find, each other; it is only in this contradiction that the ground of all the activity of Nature lies. (*Remark of the original.*)

§ Its effect upon the power of reproduction (as well as the reaction of particular conditions of the latter power upon galvanic phenomena) is less studied still than might be needful and useful.—Vide Outlines, p. 177.—(*Remark of the original.*)

|| Compare above Remark, p. 197. (*Remark of the original.*)

only in Nature, in so far as, viewed as a whole, it is *absolutely* organic.

And this, moreover, is also the result to which the genuine Science of Nature must lead, viz : that the difference between organic and inorganic nature is only in Nature as object, and that Nature as originally-productive soars above both.*

There remains only one remark, which we may make, not so much on account of its intrinsic interest, as in order to justify what we said above in regard to the relation of our system to the hitherto so-called dynamical system. If it were asked, for instance, in what form our original antithesis, cancelled, or rather fixed, in the product, would appear from the stand-point of reflection, we cannot better designate what is found in the product by analysis,

*That it is therefore the same nature, which, by the same forces, produces organic phenomena, and the universal phenomena of Nature, and that these forces are in a heightened conditioned in organic nature.

than as *expansive* and *attractive* (retarding) *force*, to which then however, gravitation must always be added as the *tertium quid*, whereby those opposites become what they are.

Nevertheless, the designation is valid only for the stand-point of reflection or of *analysis*, and cannot be applied for *synthesis* at all; and thus our system leaves off exactly at the point where the Dynamical Physics of Kant and his successors begins, namely, at the antithesis as it presents itself in the product.

And with this the author delivers over these Elements of a System of Speculative Physics to the thinking heads of the age, begging them to make common cause with him in this science, which opens up views of no mean order, and to make up by their own powers, acquirements and external relations, for what, in these respects, he lacks.

[The notes not marked as "Remarks of the original" are by the German Editor.—*Note of the Translator.*]

ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S *ÆSTHETICS*.

[Translated from the French of M. CH. BENARD, by J. A. MARTLING.]

II. SCULPTURE.—Architecture fashions and disposes of the masses of inert nature according to geometric laws, and it thus succeeds in presenting only a vague and incomplete symbol of the thought. Its [thought's] progress consists in detaching itself from physical existence, and in expressing spirit in a manner more in conformity with its nature. The first step which art takes in this career does not yet indicate the return of spirit upon itself, which would render necessary a wholly spiritual mode of expression, and signs as immaterial as thought; but spirit appears under a corporeal, organized living form. What art represents is the animate, living body, and above all the human body, with which the soul is completely identified. Such is the *rôle* and the place which belong to Sculpture.

It still resembles *architecture* in this, that it fashions extended and solid mate-

rial; but it is distinguished from it in this, that this material, in its hands, ceases to be foreign to spirit. The corporeal form blends with it, and becomes its living image. Compared to poetry, it seems at first to have the advantage over it of representing objects under their natural and visible form, while speech expresses ideas only by sounds; but this plastic clearness is more than compensated by the superiority of language as a means of expression. Speech reveals the innermost thoughts with a clearness altogether different from the lines of the figure, the countenance, and the attitudes of the body; further, it shows man in action—active in virtue of his ideas and his passions; it retraces the various phases of a complete event. Sculpture represents neither the inmost sentiments of the soul, nor its definite passions. It presents the individual character only in general, and

to such an extent as the body can express in a given moment, without movement, without living action, without development. It yields also, in this respect, to painting, which, by the employment of color and the effects of light, acquires more of naturalness and truth, and, above all, a great superiority of expression. Thus, one might think at first that Sculpture would do well to add to its own proper means those of painting. This is a grave error; for that abstract form, deprived of color, which the statuary employs is not an imperfection in it—it is the limit which this art places upon itself.

Each art represents a degree, a particular form of the beautiful, a moment of the development of spirit, and expresses it excellently. To Sculpture it belongs to represent the perfection of the bodily form, plastic beauty, life, soul, spirit animating a body. If it should desire to transcend this limit, it would fail entirely; the use of foreign means would alter the purity of its works.

It is with art here as with science; each science has its object, peculiar, limited, abstract; its circle, in which it moves, and where it is free. Geometry studies extension, and extension only; arithmetic, number; jurisprudence, the right; &c. Allow any one to encroach upon the others, and to aim at universality; you introduce into its domain confusion, obscurity, real imperfection. They develop differently different objects; clearness, perfection, and even liberty, are to be purchased only at this price.

Art, too, has many phases; to each a distinct art corresponds. Sculpture stops at form, which it fashions according to its peculiar laws; to add color thereto is to alter, to disfigure its object. Thereby it preserves its character, its functions, its independence; it represents the material, corporeal side, of which architecture gives only a vague and imperfect symbol. It is given to painting, to substitute for this real form, a simple visible appearance, which then admits color, by joining to it the effects of perspective, of light and shade. But Sculpture

ought to respect its proper limits, to confine itself to representing the corporeal form as an expression of the individual spirit, of the soul, divested of passion and definite sentiment. In so doing, it can so much the better content itself with the human form in itself, in which the soul is, as it were, spread over all points.

Such is also the reason why Sculpture does not represent spirit in action, in a succession of movements, having a determined end, nor engaged in those enterprises and actions which manifest a character. It prefers to present it in a calm attitude, or when the movement and the grouping indicate only the commencement of action. Through this very thing, that it presents to our eyes spirit absorbed in the corporeal form, designed to manifest it in its entirety, there is lacking the essential point where the expression of the soul centres itself, the glance of the eye. Neither has it any need of the magic of colors, which, by the fineness and variety of their shadings, are fitted to express all the richness of particular traits of character, and to manifest the soul, with all the emotions which agitate it. Sculpture ought not to admit materials of which it has no need at the step where it stops. The image fashioned by it, is of a single color; it employs primitive matter, the most simple, uniform, unicolored: marble, ivory, gold, brass, the metals. It is this which the Greeks had the ability perfectly to seize and hold.

After these considerations upon the general character of Sculpture, and its connections with other arts. Hegel approaches the more special study and the theory of this art. He considers it—1st, in its principle; 2d, in its ideal; 3d, in the materials which it employs, as well as in its various modes of representation and the principal epochs of its historic development.

We are compelled to discard a crowd of interesting details upon each of these points, and to limit ourselves to general ideas.

1. To seize fully the principle of Sculpture and the essence of this art, it is nec-

essary to examine, in the first place, what constitutes the *content* of its representations, then the corporeal *form* which should express it; last, to see how, from the perfect accord of the idea and the form, results the *ideal* of Sculpture as it has been realized in Greek art.

The essential content of the representations of Sculpture is, as has been said, spirit incarnate in a corporeal form. Now, not every situation of the soul is fitted to be thus manifested. Action, movement, determined passion, cannot be represented under a material form; that ought to show to us the soul diffused through the entire body, through all its members. Thus, what Sculpture represents is the individual spirit, or, according to the formula of the author, the spiritual individuality in its essence, with its general, universal, eternal character; spirit elevated above the inclinations, the caprices, the transient impressions which flow in upon the soul, without profoundly penetrating it. This entire phase of the personal principle ought to be excluded from the representations of Sculpture. The content of its works is the essence, the substantial, true, invariable part of character, in opposition to what is accidental and transient.

Now, this state of spirit, not yet particularized, unalterable, self-centered, calm, is the divine in opposition to finite existence, which is developed in the midst of accidents and contingencies, the exhibition of which this world of change and diversity presents us.

According to this, Sculpture should represent the divine in itself, in its infinite calm, and its eternal, immovable sublimity, without the discord of action and situation. If, afterward, affecting a more determinate mode, it represents something human in form and character, it ought still to thrust back all which is accidental and transient; to admit only the fixed, invariable side, the ground of character. This fixed element is what Sculpture should express as alone constituting the true individuality; it represents its personages as beings complete and perfect in themselves, in an absolute repose freed from all foreign influ-

ence. The eternal in gods and men is what it is called upon to offer to our contemplation in perfect and unalterable clearness.

Such is the idea which constitutes the essential content of the works of Sculpture. What is the *form* under which this idea should appear? We have seen, it is the body, the corporeal form. But the only form worthy to represent the spirit, is the *human form*. This form, in its turn, ought to be represented, not in that wherein it approximates the animal form, but in its ideal beauty; that is to say, free, harmonious, reflecting the spirit in the features which characterize it, in all its proportions, its purity, the regularity of its lines, by its mien, its postures, etc. It should express spirit in its calmness, its serenity—both soul and life, but above all, spirit.

These principles serve to determine the ideal of beauty under the physical form.

We must take care, in the works of Sculpture, not to confound this manner of looking at the perfect correspondence of the soul and bodily forms, with the study of the lineaments of the countenance, etc. The science of Gall, or of Lavater, which studies the correspondence of characters with certain lineaments of face or forms of head, has nothing in common with the artistic studies of the works of the statuary. These seem, it is true, to invite us to this study; but its point of view is wholly different; it is that of the harmonious and necessary accord of forms, from which beauty results. The ground of Sculpture excludes, moreover, precisely all the peculiarities of individual character to which the physiognomist attaches himself. The ideal form manifests only the fixed, regular, invariable, although living and individual type. It is then forbidden to the artist, as far as regards the physiognomy, to represent the most expressive and determinate lineaments of the countenance; for, beside looks, properly so-called, the expression of the physiognomy includes many things which are reflected transiently upon the face, in the countenance or the carriage, the smile and the glance. Sculpture should interdict to itself things so

transient, and confine itself to the permanent traits of the expression of the spirit; in a word, it should incarnate in the human form the spiritual principle in its nature, at once general and individual, but not yet particularized. To maintain these two terms in just harmony, is the problem which falls to statuary, and which the Greeks have resolved.

The consequences to be deduced from these principles are the following :

In the first place, Sculpture is, more than the other arts, suited to the ideal, and this because of the perfect adaptation of the form to the idea; in the second place, it constitutes the centre of classic art, which represents this perfect accord of the idea and the sensuous form. It alone, in fact, offers to us those ideal figures, pure from all admixture—the perfect expression of physical beauty. It realizes, before our eyes, the union of the human and divine, under the corporeal form. The sense of plastic beauty was given above all to the Greeks, and this trait appears everywhere, not only in Greek art and Greek mythology, but in the real world, in historic personages : Pericles, Phidias, Soerates, Plato, Xenophon, Sophocles, Thucydides, those artistic natures, artists of themselves—characters grand and free, supported upon the basis of a strong individuality, worthy of being placed beside the immortal gods which Greek Sculpture represents.

2. After having determined the principle of Sculpture, Hegel applies it to the study of the *beau ideal*, as the master-pieces of Greek art have realized it. He examines successively and in detail the character and conditions of the *ideal form* in the different parts of the human body, *the face, the looks, the bearing, the dress*. Upon all these points he faithfully follows Winckelmann, recapitulates him, and constantly cites him. The philosopher meanwhile preserves his originality; it consists in the manner in which he systematizes that which is simply described in the History of Art, and in giving throughout, the reason of that which the great critic, with his exquisite and profound sense, has so admirably seized and undeniably proved, but

without being able to unfold the theory of it. The subject gathers, henceforth, new interest from this explication. We may cite, in particular, the description of the Greek profile, which, in the hands of the philosopher, takes the character of a geometric theorem. It is at the same time an example which demonstrates unanswerably the absolute character of physical beauty. The beauty of these lines has nothing arbitrary; they indicate the superiority of spirit, and the pre-eminence of the forms which express it above those which are suited to the functions of the animal nature. What he afterwards says of the looks, of the bearing, of the postures, of the antique dress compared with the modern dress, and of its ideal character, presents no less interest. But all these details, where the author shows much of discrimination, of genius even, and spirit, escape in the analysis. The article where he describes the particular attributes and the accessories which distinguish the personages of Greek Sculpture, although in great part borrowed also from Winckelmann, shows a spirit familiarized with the knowledge of the works of antiquity.

3. The chapter devoted to the different *modes* of representation of the materials of Sculpture, and of its historic development, is equally full of just and delicate observations. All this is not alone from a theorist, but from a connoisseur and an enlightened judge. The appreciation of the *materials of Sculpture*, and the comparison of their æsthetic value, furnish also to the author some very ingenious remarks upon a subject which seems scarcely susceptible of interest. Finally, in a rapid sketch, Hegel retraces the *historic development* of Sculpture, Egyptian Statuary, Etruscan art, the school of Ægina, are characterized in strokes remarkable for precision.

Arrived at *Christian Sculpture*, without disputing the richness and the ability which it has displayed in its works in wood, in stone, etc., and its excellence in respect to expression, Hegel maintains with reason, that the Christian principle is little favorable to Sculpture; and that in wishing

to express the Christian sentiment in its profundity and its vivacity, it passes its proper limits. "The self-inspection of the soul, the moral suffering, the torments of body and of spirit, martyrdom and penitence, death and resurrection, the mystic depth, the love and out-gushing of the heart, are wholly unsuited to be represented by Sculpture, which requires calmness, serenity of spirit, and in expression, harmony of forms." Thus, Sculpture here remains rather an ornament of architect-

ure; it sculptures saints, bas reliefs upon the niches and porches of churches, turrets, etc. From another side, through arabesques and bas reliefs, it approximates the principle of painting, by giving too much expression to its figures, or by making portraits in marble and in stone. Sculpture comes back to its true principle, at the epoch of the *renaissance*, by taking for models the beautiful forms of Greek art.

A DIALOGUE ON MUSIC.

By EDWARD SOBOLEWSKI.

Q. Tell me what is good music?

A. Concerning tastes—all fine natures—not the "fair sex" only, possess, as Bossuet says, an instinct for harmony of forms, colors, style and tones, especially for the latter, because the nerves of the ear being more exposed, are consequently more sensitive.

Discords massed together without system, produce a more disagreeable effect than ill-assorted colors; and on the other hand, the ethereal beauty of tone-poetry excites the soul more powerfully than the splendor of a Titian or Correggio.

Q. This "instinct" and "taste," are they one and the same?

A. To a certain degree only—though many amateurs, critics, musicians, and even composers, have had no other guide than a fine instinct.

Q. You speak as Pistocchi to the celebrated Farinelli: "A singer needs a hundred things, but a good voice is ninety-nine of them—the hundredth is the cultivation of the voice."

A. The instinct of a delicate, sensitive organization, may go far, but I think the hundredth thing is also necessary; therefore, one possessed of the finest voice, but uncultivated, will sing sometimes badly, sometimes pretty well, but never quite perfectly for a real judge.

So it is with taste. Depending on nat-

ural gifts alone, without cultivation—you will be sometimes right—as often wrong. In short, your taste is good, if you find pleasure in those works only which are composed according to the principles of art; on the contrary, your taste is bad, false, corrupt, if you find pleasure in music full of faults and defects.

Q. Therefore, to be correct in taste, I must know the principles of the art; I must know the rules of "Harmony, Rhythm and Form," and perhaps much more. Why, G. Weber has written three large volumes on "Harmony" alone. No, it is too difficult and takes too much time.

A. Yet it is not so difficult as it seems. To understand music rightly, nothing is necessary but the knowledge of two keys—major and minor; two kinds of time—common and triple—one simple chord and two cadences.

Q. But Rhythm, Form?

A. Form is Rhythm, and Rhythm is time.

Q. Let us begin then with the keys, you speak of two only—major and minor—but I have heard something of Ambrosian, Gregorian, Glarean and Greek keys, wherein are composed the beautiful and sublime compositions of Palestrina, Allegri, Lotti, that are performed annually during Passion-week in the church of St. Peter, at Rome.

A. Well, if you like to go so far back,

we will speak about Ambrose, Gregory, Glareanus, but there are no such things as "Greek" keys.

The knowledge we have of the music of the Greeks, is too slight and imperfect to enable us to assert positively anything concerning it; and as nothing important or necessary to modern art is involved, we may be content to let the music of the ancients rest in the obscurity which surrounds it.

With the first Christians, who hated everything which came from the temples of the heathens, arose our music.

Their religious songs were a production of the new soul which came into them with Jesus Christ, and are the foundation of our great edifice of art, as it now exists. In the year 385, Saint Ambrose introduced four keys, D, E, F, G; Pope Gregory, in 597, added four others to these, and named the four of Ambrose, "authentic moods," and his four, which began on every fifth of the first four, "plagalic." In these eight keys, without sharps or flats, are composed the liturgic songs of the Roman church, called "Gregorian chants." They are written in notes of equal value, without Rhythm or Metre, and are sung in unison with loud voice. Glareanus added to those eight keys, two more, A and C, with their plagal moods. To distinguish more clearly, some one called the key beginning with "D," Doric, "E," Phrygic, "F," Lydic, "G," Mixolydic, "A," Æolic, and "B," Tonic. These names are all we have borrowed from Greece.

Palestrina, the preserver of our art, wrote his compositions in these keys, and for the highest purity of harmony, rhythmical beauty, sublime simplicity, and deep religious feeling, his works are still unrivalled.

Q. Why don't you compose in the old keys and in Palestrina's style?

A. They are used sometimes by Handel in his Oratorios, by Sebastian Bach in his fugues for organ and piano. Later, Beethoven has written an Andante in the Lydic mood in his string-quartette (A minor). I myself have composed the first chorus of *Vinvela*, in the Mixolydic mood, and in *Comala*, the song to the moon, in the Doric

mood; but Handel, Bach, Beethoven, and myself, have written in our own style, and never imitated Palestrina's. Men in similar situations, only, have similar ideas. All older works of music utter a language which we yet understand, but cannot speak. We feel its deep innermost accents, but we cannot tune the chords of our soul to that pitch which harmonizes in every respect with that feeling. Palestrina's music sounds like that of another world; it is all quite simple; mostly common chords, here and there only a chord of the sixth; and always an irresistible charm.

This riddle is partially explained, if we observe how Palestrina selected the tones for the different parts in his choruses. Let us take the third, c—e; e. g. let the soprano and the alto sing this third, and you will have the same harmonic sound that the piano or organ gives. But let the tenor sing one of these tones, and soprano or alto the other, and the effect will be very different, although the tones are the same. Palestrina knew not only the particular sound of every tone in every voice, but also the effect which such or such combinations would produce.

This mystery is taught neither by a singing school, nor by a theory of composition, and few composers of to-day know it. How great and beautiful is Beethoven's solemn mass in D! What an effect would it make, had Beethoven possessed the same knowledge of voices that he had of instruments? Now, unfortunately, one often overpowers the others, and the enjoyment of this composition will be always greater for the eye than the ear.

We will now go back to the old keys. These are taken from the music produced at that time, as our two keys, major and minor, are taken from the melodies of later times.

This seems very simple to us, but not to our great theorists. Gottfried Weber takes two keys, major c, d, e, f, g, a, b, c, and minor a, b, c, d, e, f, g *sharp*, the same rising and falling equally.

Hauptmann, the first teacher of harmony in the Conservatory of Music at Leipsic, says in his book, *The Nature of Harmony and Metre*, page 30—"The key is form-

ed, when the common chord (c, e, g), after having gone through the subdominant-chord (f, a, c), and dominant-chord (g, b, d), has come in opposition with itself; this opposition coupled together, becomes *unity* and the *key*." He finds in our music three keys, and names them, the major, the minor, and the minor major.

R. Wagner recognizes no key at all; for him exists a chromatic scale only. He says: "The scale is the most closely united, the most intimately related family among tones." He does not like to stay long in one key, and takes the continuous change of keys for a quality of the music of the future; therefore, he finds in Beethoven's last symphony, in the melody to Schiller's poem, a going *back*, because it has scarcely any modulation.

We will not be so lavish with keys as Hauptmann, nor so economical as R. Wagner, neither are we of Weber's opinion. We find in C major the old Glarean key, called also "Ionic;" in our A minor of this day, a "*mixtum compositum*" of several old keys; it begins as the "Æolie" a, b, c, d, e, f, takes then its seventh tone, g *sharp*, from the Lydic, transposed a third higher; uses sometimes also the sixth of the last, accepts lastly the character of the Phrygie, transposed a fourth higher, and brings thus the tone b *flat* into its scale, which has been already the subject of much discussion, although that has never succeeded in throwing this tone out of many melodies in A minor. We have melodies which are the pure A minor from the beginning to the end, wherein we find f *sharp* and f *natural*, g and g *sharp*, b and b *flat*, and the last oftener than f *sharp*; therefore, we must build the scale of A minor, and its harmony, according to those different tones; it will be a, { b, c, d, e, { f, { g *sharp*, a, { b *flat*, { f *sharp*, { g *natural*.

Let us proceed. The two kinds of time are common and triple. The rhythm of the first is — ◡, that of the second — ◡ ◡. The accentuation of subdivisions is governed by the same law. It makes no difference whether a piece of music is written in $\frac{2}{2}$ or $\frac{3}{4}$, or even $\frac{3}{8}$ time; but good composers of music, writing in $\frac{3}{4}$ time, intend the

same to be of lighter rendition than those composed in $\frac{3}{4}$ time, etc.

Concerning harmony, there is one chord only—all other harmonies are passing notes, inversions, prolongations, suspensions or retardations of chord-tones, or from sharpened and diminished intervals. Harmony is a connection of different melodies. Before chords were known, they descanted, that is, they tried to sing to a melody, commonly a sacred hymn, called *cantus firmus*, different harmonical tones, and named this part, *Descant*; Italian, *soprano*; French, *Le dessus*. Later there was added to the tenor (which performed the *cantus firmus*) a higher part, named *alto*, and lastly, a lower part was added called *bass*. These four parts, though each melodious and independent in itself, harmonized closely with each other, all striving for the same aim.

Even to-day we must necessarily call such music good, wherein every voice acts independently of all others, and still in harmony with the same, in order to express the reigning feeling, and sustain the various shades in contrast to non-acting and lifeless trabants, which may be strikingly seen in many compositions, particularly in four-part songs for male voices, by Abt, Gumbert, Kücken, etc., wherein three voices (*Brumstimmen*) accompany the fourth with a growling sound escaping their closed lips.

The two cadences or musical phrases are the cadence on the tonic and the cadence on the dominant. The cadence on the tonic, consisting of the chord in the dominant, followed by that of the tonic, concludes the sense of the musical phrase, and is called "perfect" when the tonic is in the highest and lowest part. It corresponds to a period in language. The cadence on the dominant consists of the tonic, or the chord of the second or fourth going to the dominant. The cadence of the dominant suspends the sense of the musical phrase without concluding it. This is likewise the case with the cadence on the tonic, if the tonic is not in the highest and lowest part.

Q. You say nothing of the great mistake wherein two fifths or octaves follow each other?

A. Of course, the true nature of the proper arrangement of parts excludes all direct fifths.

It is considered by the new school "an exploded idea." Mozart himself made use of fifths in the first finale of Don Giovanni.

Q. I have heard something of these fifths, but was told it was "irony," being contained in the minuet which Mozart composed for "country musicians"?

A. You also find octaves in S. Bach's "Matthew Passion," p. 25, "On the cross," where surely no ironical meaning was intended.

Q. Do you not say anything in regard to form?

A. Form is an "exploded idea" also. The composers of the new school construct their vocal music so as to let the poem govern the music in relation to metre and form; in their instrumental compositions, the form is governed by phantasy.

Q. But what do you understand by a symphony, sonata or overture?

A. I must again go back, in order to explain this properly.

Revolutions often beat the path for new ideas. Palestrina towers great and unattainable in his compositions of sacred music, which breathe and express the purest catholicism.

But a Luther, Zwingli, and others came, followed soon by Handel and Bach, who, about the middle of the eighteenth century, created a music full of freshness, primitiveness and transporting power, which lived and died with the reformers.

The three grand-masters, Palestrina, Handel and Bach, equal, but do not rival each other. We cannot judge them for the different sentiments they indulged in. The philosophers may settle which is the best religion, for to the necessity of one they all agree, but music cannot be chained by dogmas. Heaven is an orb, whose centre is everywhere. Palestrina's music is the language of the south, Handel's and Bach's that of the north. Though one sun illumines both lands—though one ether spans both, yet in the south the sun is milder, the ether purer. Flowers which there grow in wild abundance, the north must obtain by culture.

We must think at our work.

This necessity of thought is apparent in religion, language and art, and can be seen most clearly in the greatest works of the German grand-masters, in Bach's "Matthew Passion," and Handel's "Israel."

Sebastian Bach's astonishing dexterity in thematical works is the reason that even unto this day we do not find a symphony or overture appropriate for a concert, of which the single motive forming the principal thought of the movement is not worked up on the basis which he constructed with such deep knowledge and skill.

To him we must retrace our steps, in order to perceive the true nature of our instrumental music, for we are as little masters of the course of our ideas, as of the circulation of the blood in our veins. Centuries have passed, and although the first great instrumental-piece—the overture—was a French production, (Lulli was the first master in this *genre* of art,) yet Bach and Handel impressed the first decided stamp upon it.

Later, the overture was supplanted by the symphony, for the reason that it was of easier composition and execution than the former. The overture consisted of a *grave*, followed by a *fugue*. The symphony was composed somewhat in the style of a *fugue* and that of the lively dances of that time.

Shortly after this period, the dance-music was thought no longer fashionable, and was succeeded by two *Allegros*, with an *Andante* or *Largo* placed between them.

Father Hayden felt hurt at the complete abandonment of dance-music, and again adopted the minuet. Mozart also preferred the grave and majestic dancing-step of his ancestors, the minuet. But Beethoven's impetuous and passionate nature scoffed at the slow and gracious movements of the minuet, and revelled instead in the wild Scherzo, or in the capricious demonical leaps of the old *Passepied*. Dark and mighty forms rose before the gloomy vision of his inner-man, acting powerfully upon the phantasy, and wherever they met this volcanic fire, always leaving a deep impression.

Two comets ushered in the existence of our century; the one revolutionized the exterior—the other, the interior world. Especially were the young generation touched by the electric sparks of their rays.

Napoleon's battles were repeated a thousand times in the nurseries with lead and paper soldiers. Beethoven's melodies agitated the souls of the young generation in their working and dreaming hours. When the shoes of the child became too small they were thrown aside; the lead and paper soldiers shared the same fate; but the melodious tones grew with the soul to more and more powerful chords. Beethoven's star shone brighter, while Napoleon's was already fading. Then we heard that Beethoven intended to destroy his great symphony called "Eroica." Napoleon, the consul, to whom Beethoven designed to dedicate this great work, had sunk to Napoleon the Emperor, and Beethoven felt ashamed.

Majesty of rank is often devoid of the grace and majesty of the soul. The chord *e*, *g*, *b^b* wherewith the bass solemnly introduced the third symphony (*Eroica*), and his inversions in the Scherzo *b^b*, *e^b*, *g* *b^b*, and in the last movement *e*, *b*, *b*, *e*, this echo of the Marseillaise suited no longer and should perish with it. Only then, when fate, in the icy deserts of Russia, clasped the grand General in its iron grip, and never loosened its hold until it had crushed him, did the composer of the *Eroica* comprehend that in the *marcia funebre* contained in this symphony, he had spoken in prophetic voice. The prophecy contained in the last movement was destined to be fulfilled in the latter half of this century.

As Beethoven poured out his soul in a prophetic epopee, so did Mozart embody his genius in his *Don Giovanni*. But as the sublime always acts more powerfully upon youth than knowledge and beauty, so likewise was the success of Beethoven greater than that of Mozart in this century. Altogether Mozart is generally appreciated better in riper years. "*La délicatesse du gout est une première nuance de a satiété.*"

Mendelssohn, whose compositions ever flowed smoothly and quietly, understood well how to tune his harmonica to Mozart's tuning-fork.

Q. You represent Beethoven as grave and solemn, and yet it appears he was not a great despiser of dances. Take, for instance, his *A major* symphony. Lively to overflowing, almost mad with frantic joy, is the first movement. Equal to a double quick-step, the last, about as the peasants of Saxony perform their dances, the Scherzo gay; and in the *Andante*, he even calls upon a lot of old bachelors and maidens, with their hoop accompaniment, to fall in and execute their *tours*?

A. What opposite views are often taken of the same thing by different minds! In the *andante*, in which you find so much humor, Marx observes the sober view of life, at first the peaceful and untroubled step, but growing ever more and more painful, and suffering, fighting the battle of life; yet, be this as it may, such music is ever successful, even in spite of the biting criticism of Maria v. Weber, and the ferocious attacks of Oulibischeff.

Q. A good dance is always successful, I believe?

A. Mendelssohn knew this, as he also understood Beethoven and the public, when he wrote his dance overture, "*A Summer-night's Dream.*" Auber, Herold and others wrote dance overtures *en masse*, and we often find more piquant themes in them than Beethoven's *A major* symphony, or Mendelssohn's *Summer-night's Dream* can boast of, yet we do not prefer them for the concert.

All compositions for an orchestra, be they overture or symphony, must first contain a theme, which expresses the character of the principal composition. Second, the expansions of compositions in the style of a symphony, must, according to my opinion, originate from *one theme*, germinate from *one seed*, growing larger and stronger all the time, until the swelling bud bursts into a beautiful blossom; yet there must not be orange-blossoms on an oak-tree; all must fit harmoniously.

The theme, *sujet*, or *motive*, must be a fixed idea, such as "love;" it must be ever

present—the first at day-break, the last at night—no other impression must be strong enough to erase it.

If, by the blossom, you understand the creation of a second thought, often called the second theme, even this second theme ought to be governed by the first, even this blossom ought to glow in the same colors. It must be so twined around the heart of the composer, that nothing foreign could possibly enter it. Merely thematical productions are exercises for the pupil; compositions which merely contain parts composed by rule, are merely a musical exercise. Lobe certainly is wrong, if he thus teaches the art of composing.

True, it is easy to point out how one part belongs here, the other there, yet the composition must be a free expression of the soul.

Third—The finishing of the same. This must also be governed in its main parts by the predominating feeling, and only minor thoughts and impressions must be used by the composer to fill up or cast away.

Let us now turn, for illustration, to the theme of Wagner's overture to *Faustus*. In the introduction we first see it in the eighth measure, very moderate, in the dominant d minor, commencing with the notes $a \bar{a} | b^b b^b$. $a | g$ sharp, and headed "very expressive," concerning which Von Bulow observes, that it truly expresses the feeling and character of the last lines of the motto which Wagner chose at the heading:

"Thus life to me a dire burden is;
Existence I despise, for death I wish."

If we designate the above-mentioned theme by figure I. we must name the figure which already makes its appearance in the second measure, and which is of the utmost importance, to wit, d sharp, e, f, f, e, e, b, b, figure II., the first theme having been expressed by the violin, the second figure reappears again in the tenth measure, executed by the viola, growling like a furiously racked demon, while the wind instruments, flute, oboe and clarinet, "very expressive," and yet full of sympathizing sorrow, intervene at the last quarter of the tenth measure with the motive, which

we will call figure III. Figure II. continues rumbling in the quartette, relieved by another figure (IV.) descending from above, which is introduced by the second violin in the fourteenth measure. Figure IV. now extends itself further above a chromatic bass, until in the nineteenth measure, in d major, a clear and distinct new motive, gentle and forgiving in character (V.) makes its appearance.

These five motives which the composer so exquisitely leads before us, in his very moderate introduction, now receive the finishing-touch in the allegro. Thus speaks Von Bulow.

Truly, as Goethe says: "If you perform a piece, be sure to perform the same in pieces."

I will pass over the introduction, though I have as little taste for such "theme pieces" succeeding each other, as for Opera-overtures, such as that of *Tannhäuser*, where pilgrim-songs, the love-sick murmurings of the voluptuous Venus, and the tedious Count's drawling sorrow for his only daughter and heir, form a hash, which in the details, and in the heterogeneous compilation of the same, is unpalatable enough, but which is made unbearable by the soul-killing figures—no! not figures, but by the up and down strokes of monotonous bases, which continue for about sixty measures. Setting aside even all this, we may justly expect in the allegro the expansion of the principle theme I., yet we have no such thing; in place of the "idea" he produces after the first five measures a worthless figure, fit for accompaniment only, which is supported on its tottering basis by the twenty-seven times repeated downstroke of the conductor only.

Q. Excuse me; but the tone-picture, which Von Bulow, R. Wagner's friend and admirer, calls the forgiving voice (III), reappears twice in wind-instrument music?

A. According to Lobe's system. Borrow a measure or two from a theme, then a motive, which you may construct from this or that or a third figure, and you have, besides the required unity, the grandest variation.

Do you know, my young friend, what a composer understands by an exploded

idea? The technical! All who study the art of composing, as Lobe teaches it, may learn to become *compilers* but *not composers*; or they must drink elder-tea, till their visions appear black and blue to them, in order to evaporate the schooling they enjoyed. After twenty-seven measures of earthly smoke, there appears a solitary star, theme I., continuing for four whole measures, followed by a little more mist.

Q. No; I think Bulow says the mist is parted by a firm and punctuated motive.

A. If it is not firm, it is at least *fortissimo*. Enough, we again hear thirteen measures of unimportant music, concluded by d minor, followed by a new melody for a hautboy, which, as it repeats the two first notes of the first theme, may claim to be considered as belonging there, leading to a third in f major, in company with a tremulando, *à la Samiel*, crescendo and diminuendo. We have now arrived at the point where we may look for the second theme, "the blossom," as we before said, but alas, in vain your tortured soul waits, no blossoms! The thermometer sinks again! With the cadence we again hear theme I., after four measures we find ourselves once more in d *flat* major—no, in a minor, b *flat* major or b *flat* minor, or g minor, it is difficult to say which, for this part may be said to belong in the "most inseparably combined, the closest related family of all keys." Enough, we find ourselves after twenty-six measures exactly at the very place we started from, before the performance of twenty-six measures, namely, in f major.

This movement of twenty-six measures might be wholly thrown out, without one being any wiser—a possibility which, in every good composition, must be looked upon as a great fault, as all parts must be so closely united as to enforce the presence and support of each other.

We will now look at the second theme. In it no critic can find a fault. It unravels itself smoothly, and, after forty-nine measures, conducts us again to motive V. in the introduction, as likewise to figure II., which here does not frown quite so much.

Figure V. first appears in f, after twenty-two measures in g *flat* major, after fourteen more in A minor, after thirty-four in d minor, and after another thirty-nine measures we at last hear theme I. again, in the dominant of the bass, a Faustus with lantern jaws, sunken temples, sparse hair, but with a very, very magnificent bread-basket.

The blossom is larger than the whole tree. If it is not a miracle, it is a wonderful abortion. Are you now curious as to the second part? Oh! it almost appears like a fugue, the bass dies away, a fifth higher the cello commences, another fifth higher the viola in unison with the second violin; but as the composer has strayed already from d minor to b minor, he does not think it safe to stray further; the wind instruments continue by themselves in figure II.

Q. Bulow says the cello and viola united, once more introduce the principal theme.

A. Just so. After the bassoon has tried twice to begin the same, after about thirty measures of worldly ether, more devoid of stars than the South Pole, it is headed "wild!" The leading theme once more begins in the principal tonic (d minor), etc., afterwards enlarged, the first two notes converted, caught up by the cello and the trumpet, wherein the bass-trombone is expected to perform the high A, and after twenty-eight measures of "hated existence" the second theme in d major, together with the finale, appears like a short bright ray of the glorious sun on a misty winter day.

"He, who reigns above my powers,
Cannot shake the outer towers"—

is Wagner's motto, which he has justly chosen for the heading of his overture, and I attempt no alteration only at the conclusion, and close with—

"In such music existence a burden is,
The future I hate, for the End I wish."

Q. Bulow would also answer as Goethe:

"To understand and write of living things,
Try first to drive away the soul,
The *parts* will then remain within your hand!"

A. I have never found fault with these

parts, excepting, perhaps, that I said the working out of the second theme is, in proportion to the first theme, too extensive; in fact, there is nothing of the future contained in the overture.

Q. No future?

A. I mean to say, no music of the future—not even a chromatic scale for the fundamental key—it moves entirely in the common form:

Principal theme—d minor;
Second theme—f major;
Return to fundamental key;
Second theme—d major, and conclusion in this key.

The finish and working up is neat and careful, and many pretty and uncommon effects occur therein; still I do not think the same in its proper place for a concert.

It inherits nothing of the Bach; the *piece* is well constructed, yet the *small pieces* cannot escape criticism. Even Beethoven, in the first movements of his *Eroica* makes us acquainted with all the parts he intends to work up, and in his c minor symphony he says plainly: Now observe; the notes g g g e *flat* compose the whole, nothing more. But after that it is a rushing flow, an unbroken ring and song, pressing breathlessly onward, which captivates and carries us along with its force. To express myself plainly, I may say that we can perceive the work *was done* before it began.

It is true, and I will not deny that even he applied the file to heighten its polish, yet the whole structure stood finished to his vision before even these first four notes were penned.

No doubt R. Wagner also imagined a picture before he painted it, but surely no musical one; the poetry was there—the music had to be manufactured. It is full of genius, and not untrue; but he does not allow sufficient freedom to the differ-

ent instruments, and is, consequently, not sufficiently “obligato.”

The parts succeed, instead of going in company or against each other.

Although now one, then another instrument catches up a thought, yet the whole appears more like a Quartette of Pleyel than one of Beethoven’s—the overture is not thought out polyphonically. Many, however, do not know what Polyphonism is; it has been written about in many curious ways. The pupil will best learn to write music in a polyphonic manner, if, at the commencement, he invents at once a double-voiced movement, but in such a manner that one voice is not the subordinate of the other; both are equally necessary to represent the meaning of the thought he wishes to express.

In this manner he may or must continue in regard to the three or four-voiced movements likewise.

The addition of voices to a melody satisfactory in itself, be they ever so well flourished, cannot properly be called polyphonism.

Polyphonism, however, should be the ruling principle in all orchestral concert compositions, although in some points, for instance, in the second theme, homophony may take its place.

A well composed symphony or overture must not entertain the audience only, but every performing musician must feel that he is not an instrument or a machine, but a living and intelligent being.

The overture to Faustus so entirely ignores Polyphony, that it seems a virtual denial of its effectiveness and importance in orchestral composition.

Richard Wagner will never become a composer of instrumental music, but in his operas he has opened a new avenue, and his creations therein are something grand and sublime.

SCHOPENHAUER'S DOCTRINE OF THE WILL.

Translated from the German, by C. L. BERNAYS.

[We print below a condensed statement of the central doctrine of Arthur Schopenhauer. It is translated from his work entitled "*Über den Willen in der Natur*," 2d ed., 1854, Frankfurt—pp. 19—23, and 63. To those familiar with the kernel of speculative truth, it is unnecessary to remark that the basis of the system herewith presented is thoroughly speculative, and resembles in some respects that of Leibnitz in the *Monadology*, printed in our last number. (It is only an attempt to solve all problems through self-determination, and this in its immediate form as the will. Of course the immediateness (i. e. lack of development or realization) of the principle employed here, leads into difficulty, and renders it impossible for him to see the close relation he stands in to other great thinkers. Hence he uses very severe language when speaking of other philosophers. If the Will is taken for the "Radical of the Soul," then other forms of self-determination, e. g. the grades of knowing, will not be recognized as possessing substantiality, and hence the theoretical mind will be subordinated to the practical;—a result, again, which is the outcome of the Philosophy of Fichte.) But Leibnitz seizes a more general *aperçu*, and identifies self-determination with cognition in its various stages; and hence he rises to the great principle of Recognition as the form under which all finitude is cancelled—all multiplicity preserved in the unity of the Absolute.—EDITOR.]

The idea of a soul as a metaphysical being, in whose absolute simplicity will and intellect were an indissoluble unity, was a great and permanent impediment to all deeper insight into natural phenomena. The cardinal merit of my doctrine, and that which puts it in opposition to all the former philosophies, is the perfect separation of the will from the intellect. All former philosophers thought will to be inseparable from the intellect; the will was declared to be conditioned upon the intellect, or even to be a mere function of it, whilst the intellect was regarded as the fundamental principle of our spiritual existence. I am well aware that to the future alone belongs the recognition of this doctrine, but to the future philosophy the separation, or rather the decomposition of the soul into two heterogeneous elements, will have the same significance as the decomposition of water had to chemistry. Not the soul is the eternal and indestructible or the very principle of life in men, but what I might call the Radical of the soul, and that is the *Will*. The so-called soul is already a compound; it is the combination of will and the *voûc*, intellect. The intellect is the secondary, the *posterius* in any organism, and, as a mere function of the brain, dependent upon the organism. The will, on the contrary, is primary, the *prius* of the organism, and the organism consequently is conditioned by it. For the will is the very "thing in itself," which in conception (that is, in the peculiar func-

tion of the brain) exhibits itself as an organic body. Only by virtue of the forms of cognition, that is, by virtue of that function of the brain—hence only in conception—one's body is something extended and organic, not outside of it, or immediately in self-consciousness. Just as the various single acts of the body are nothing but the various acts of the will portrayed in the represented world, just so is the shape of this body as a totality the image of its will as a whole. In all organic functions of the body, therefore, just as in its external actions, the will is the "*agens*." True physiology, on its height, shows the intellect to be the product of the physical organization, but true metaphysics show, that physical existence itself is the product, or rather the appearance, of a spiritual *agens*, to-wit, the will; nay, that matter itself is conditioned through conception, in which alone it exists. Perception and thought may well be explained by the nature of the organism; the will never can be; the contrary is true, namely, that every organism originates by and from the will. This I show as follows:

I therefore posit the will as the "thing in itself"—as something absolutely primitive; secondly, the simple visibility of the will, its objectivation as our body; and thirdly, the intellect as a mere function of a certain part of that body. That part (the brain) is the objectivated desire (or will) to know, which became represented; for the will, to reach its ends,

needs the intellect. This function again pre-supposes the whole world as representation ; it therefore pre-supposes also the body as an object, and even matter itself, so far as existing only in representation, for an objective world without a subject in whose intellect it stands, is, well considered, something altogether unthinkable. Hence intellect and matter (subject and object) only relatively exist for each other, and in that way constitute the apparent world.

Whenever the will acts on external matter, or whenever it is directed towards a known object, thus passing through the medium of knowledge, then all recognize that the *agens*, which here is in action, is the will, and they call it by that name. Yet, that is will not less which acts in the inner process that precedes those external actions as their condition, which create and preserve the organic life and its substrate ; and secretion, digestion, and the circulation of the blood, are its work also. But just because the will was recognized only while leaving the individual from which it started, and directing itself to the external world, which precisely for that purpose now appears as perception, the intellect was regarded as its essential condition, as its sole element, and as the very substance out of which it was made, and thereby the very worst *hysteron proteron* was committed that ever happened.

Before all, one should know how to discriminate between will and arbitrariness (*Wille und Willkür*), and one should understand that the first can exist without the second. Will is called arbitrariness where it is lighted by intellect, and whenever motives or conceptions are its moving causes ; or, objectively speaking, whenever external causes which produce an act are mediated by a brain. The motive may be defined as an external irritation, by whose influence an image is formed in the brain, and under the mediation of which the will accomplishes its effect, that is, an external act of the body. With the human species the place of that image may be occupied by a concept, which being formed from images of a similar kind, by omitting the differences, is no longer intuitive, but only

marked and fixed by words. Hence as the action of motives is altogether independent of any contact, they therefore can measure their respective forces upon the will, on each other, and thereby permit a certain choice. With the animals, that choice is confined to the narrow horizon of what is visibly projected before them ; among men it has the wide range of the *thinkable*, or of its concepts, as its sphere. Those movements, therefore, which result from motives, and not from causes, as in the inorganic world, nor from mere irritation, as with the plants, are called arbitrary movements. These motives pre-suppose knowledge, the medium of the motives, through which in this case causality is effected, irrespective of their absolute necessity in any other respect. Physiologically, the difference between irritation and motive may be described thus : Irritation excites a reaction *immediately*, the reaction issuing from the same part upon which the irritation had acted ; whilst a motive is an irritation, which must make a circuit through the brain, where first an image is formed, and that image then originates the ensuing reaction, which now is called an act of the free will. Hence the difference between free and unfree movements does not concern the essential and primary, which in both is the will, but only the secondary, that is, the way in which the will is aroused ; to-wit, whether it shows itself in consequence of some real cause, or of an irritation, or of a motive, that is, of a cause that had to pass through the organ of the intellect.

Free will or arbitrariness is only possible in the consciousness of men. It differs from the consciousness of animals in this, that it contains not only present and tangible representations, but abstract concepts, which, independent of the differences of time, act simultaneously and side by side, permitting thereby conviction or a conflict of motives ; this, in the strictest sense of the word, is called free will. Yet this very free will or choice consists only in the victory of the stronger motive over a weaker in a given individual character, by which the ensuing action was determined, just as one impulse is overpowered by

a stronger counter impulse, whereby the effect nevertheless appears with the same necessity as the movement of a stone that has received an impulse. The great thinkers of all times agree in this decidedly; while, on the contrary, the vulgar will little understand the great truth, that the mark of our liberty is not to be found in our single acts, but in our existence itself, and in its very essence. Whenever one has succeeded to discriminate will from free will, or the arbitrary, and to consider the latter as a peculiar species of the former, then there is no more room for any difficulty in discovering the will also in occurrences wherein intelligence cannot be traced.

* * * *

The will is the original. It has created the world, but not through the medium of an intellect either outside or inside of the world, for we know of the intellect only through the mediation of the animal world, the very last in creation. The will itself, the unintentional will which is discovered in everything, is the creator of the world. The animals, therefore, are organized in accordance with their mode of living, and their mode of living is not shaped in conformity with their organs; the structure of any animal is the result of its will to be what it is. Nature, which never lies, tells us the same in its *naïve* way; it lets any being just kindle the first spark of its life on one of his equals, and then lets it finish itself before our eyes. The form and the movement it takes from its own self, the substance from outside. This is called growth and development. Thus even empirically do all beings stand before us as their own work; but the language of nature is too simple, and therefore but few understand it.

Cognition, since all motives are dependent on it, is the essential characteristic of the animal kingdom. When animal life ceases, cognition ceases also; and arrived at that point, we can comprehend the medium by which the influences from the external world on the movements of other beings are effected only by analogy, whilst the will, which we have recognized as the basis and as the very kernel of all beings, always and everywhere remains the same.

On the low stage of the vegetable world, and of the vegetative life in the animal organizations, it is *irritation*, and in the inorganic world it is the mechanical relation in general which appears as the substitute or as the analogue of the intellect. We cannot say that the plants perceive the light and the sun, but we see that they are differently affected by the presence or absence of the sun, and that they turn themselves towards it; and though in fact that movement mostly coincides with their growth, like the rotation of the moon with its revolution, that movement nevertheless exists, and the direction of the growth of a plant is just in the same way determined and systematically modified as an action is by a motive. Inasmuch, therefore, as a plant has its wants, though not of the kind which require a sensorium or an intellect, something analogous must take their place to enable the will to seize at least a supply offered to it, if not to go in quest of it. This is the susceptibility for irritation, which differs from the intellect, in that the motive and subsequent act of volition are clearly separated from each other, and the clearer, the more perfect the intellect is; whilst at the mere susceptibility for an irritation, the feeling of the irritation and the resulting volition can no longer be discriminated. In the inorganic world, finally, even the susceptibility for irritation, whose analogy with the intellect cannot be mistaken, ceases, and there remains nothing but the varied reaction of the bodies against the various influences. This reaction is the substitute for the intellect. Whenever the reaction of a body differs from another, the influence also must be different, creating a different affection, which even in its dullness yet shows a remote analogy with the intellect. If, for instance, the water in an embankment finds an issue and eagerly precipitates itself through it, it certainly does not perceive the break, just as the acid does not perceive the alkali, for which it leaves the metal; yet we must confess that what in all these bodies has effected such sudden changes, has a certain resemblance with that which moves ourselves whenever we act in consequence of

an unexpected motive. We therefore see that the intellect appears as the medium of our motives, that is, as the medium of causality in regard to intellectual beings, as that which receives the change from the external world, and which must be followed by a change in ourselves, as the mediator between both. On this narrow line, balances the whole world as representation, i. e. that whole extensive world in space and time, which as such cannot be anywhere else but in our brain, just as dreams; for the periods of their duration stand on the very same basis. Whatever to the animals and to man is given by his intellect as a medium of the motives, the same is given to the plants by their susceptibility for irritation, and to inorganic bodies by their reaction on the various causes, which in fact only differ in respect to the degree of volition; for, just in consequence of the fact, that in proportion to their wants the susceptibility for external impressions was raised to such a degree in the animals that a brain and a system of nerves had to develop itself, did consciousness, moreover, originate as a function of this brain, and in this consciousness the whole objective world, whose forms (time, space and causality) are the rules for the exercise of this function. We therefore discover that the intellect is calculated only for the subjective, merely to be a servant of the will, appearing only "*per accidens*" as a condition of animal life, where motives take the place of irritation. The picture of the external world, which at this stage enters into the forms of time and space, is but the background on which motives represent themselves as ends; it is also the condition of the connection of the external objects in regard to space and causality, but yet is nothing else but the mediation and the tie between the motive and the will. What a leap would it be to take this picture to be the true, ultimate essence of things,—this image of the world, which originates accidentally in the intellect as a function of animal brains, whereby the means to their ends are shown them, and their ways on this planet cleared up! What a temerity to take this image and the connection of its parts to be the

absolute rule of the world, the relations of the things in themselves—and to suppose that all that could just as well exist independently of our brain! And yet this supposition is the very ground on which all the dogmatical systems previous to Kant were based, for it is the implicit pre-supposition of their Ontology, Cosmology, Theology, and of all their Eternal Verities.

By this realistic examination we have gained very unexpectedly the *objective* point of view of Kant's immortal discovery, arriving by our empirical, physiological way to the same point whence Kant started with his transcendental criticism. Kant made the subjective his basis, positing consciousness; but from its *a priori* nature he comes to the result, that all that happens in it can be nothing else but representation. We, on the contrary, starting from the objective, have discovered what are the ends and the origin of the intellect, and to what class of phenomena it belongs. We discover in *our* way, that the intellect is limited to mere representations, and that what is exhibited in it is conditioned by the subject, that is, a *mundane phenomenon*, and that just in the same way the order and the connection of all external things is conditioned by the subject, and is never a knowledge of what they are in themselves, and how they may be connected with each other. We, in our way, like Kant in his, have discovered that the world as representation, balances on that narrow line between the external cause (motive) and the produced effect (act of will) of intelligent (animal) beings, where the clear discrimination of the two commences. *Ita res accident lumina rebus.*

Our objective stand-point is realistic, and therefore conditioned, inasmuch as starting from natural beings as posited, we have abstracted from the circumstance that their objective existence pre-supposes an intellect, in which they find themselves as representations; but Kant's subjective and idealistic stand-point is equally conditioned, inasmuch as it starts from the intellect, which itself is conditioned by nature, in consequence of whose development up to the animal world it only comes into existence. Holding fast to this, our

realistic-objective stand-point, Kant's doctrine may be characterized thus: after Locke had abstracted the rôle of the senses, under the name of "secondary properties," for the purpose of distinguishing things in themselves from things as they appear, Kant, with far greater profundity, abstracted the rôle of the brain functions [conceptions of the understanding]—a less considerable rôle than that of the senses—and thus abstracted as belonging to the sub-

jective all that Locke had included under the head of primary properties. I, on the other hand, have merely shown why all stands thus in relation, by exhibiting the position which the intellect assumes in the System of Nature when we start realistically from the objective as a datum, and take the WILL, of which alone we are immediately conscious, as the true *πov στῶ* of all metaphysics—as the essence of which all else is only the phenomenon.

INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER VII.

COMPREHENSION AND IDEA.

I.

Everything, to be known, must be thought as belonging to a system. This result was the conclusion of Chapter VI. To illustrate: acid is that which hungers for a base; its sharp taste is the hunger itself; it exists only in a tension. Hence to think an acid we must think a base; the base is ideally in the acid, and is the cause of its sharpness. The union of the acid and base gives us a salt, and in the salt we cannot taste the acid nor the base distinctly, for each is thoroughly modified by the other, each is *cancelled*. We separate the acid and base again and there exist two contradictions—acid and base—each calling for the other, each asserting its complement to be itself. For the properties of a somewhat are its *wants*, i. e. what it lacks of the total.

Such elements of a total as we are here considering, have been called "*moments*" by Hegel. The total is the "*negative unity*." (See Chap. IV.)

In the illustration we have salt as the negative unity of the moments, acid and base. The unity is called *negative* because its existence destroys each of the moments by adding the other to it. After the negative unity exists, each of the moments is no longer in a tension, but has become thoroughly modified by the other. The negative unity is *ideal* when the mo-

ments are held asunder—it is then potential, and through it each moment has its own peculiar properties.

More generally: every somewhat is *determined* by another; its characteristic, therefore, is the manifestation of its other or of the complement which makes with it the total or negative unity.

The complete thought of any somewhat includes the phases or moments, as such, and their negative unity. This may properly be called the *comprehension*. To comprehend [*Begreifen*] we must seize the object in its totality; comprehend = to seize together, just as conceive = to take together; but conception is generally used in English to signify a picture of the object more or less general. Not the totality, but only some of its characteristics, are grasped together in a conception. Hence conceptions are *subjective*, i. e. they do not correspond to the true object in its entirety; but comprehension is *objective* in the sense that everything in its true existence is a comprehension. With this distinction between conception and comprehension most people would deny, at once, the possibility of the latter as an act of human intelligence. Sensuous knowing—for the reason that it attributes validity to isolated objects—does not comprehend. Reflective knowing seizes the reciprocal relations, but not in the negative unity. Comprehension—whether one ever can arrive at it or not—should be the thought in its totality, wherein nega-

tive unity and moments are thought together. Thus a true comprehension is the thought of the self-determined, and we have not thoroughly comprehended any thing till we have traced it back through its various presuppositions to self-determination which must always be the form of the total. (See chapters IV. & V.)

II.

The name "Idea" is reserved for the deepest thought of Philosophy.* In *comprehension* we think a system of dependent moments in a negative unity. Thus in the comprehension the multiplicity of elements, thought in the moments, is destroyed in its negative unity, and there is, consequently, only one independent being or totality. Let, once, each of these moments develop to a totality, so that we have in each a repetition of the whole, and we shall have a comprehension of comprehensions—a system of totalities—and this is what Hegel means by "*Idee*," or Idea. Plato arrives at this, but does not consistently develop it. He deals chiefly with the standpoint of comprehension, and hence has much that is *dialectical*. (The Dialectic is the process which arises when the abstract and incomplete is put under the form of the true, or the apodeictic. To refute a category of limited application, make it universal and it will contradict itself. Thus the "Irony" of Socrates consists in generously (!) assuming of any category all that his interlocutor wishes,

* The word "Idea" does not have the sense here given it, except in Hegel, and in a very few translations of him. For the most part the word is used, (e. g. in Schelling's Philosophy of Nature in this number,) as a translation for the German "*Begriff*," which we call "*comprehension*," adopting the term in this sense from the author of the "Letters on Faust." It will do no harm to use so expressive a word as comprehension in an objective sense as well as in a subjective one. The thought itself is *bizarre*, and not merely the word; it is useless to expect to find words that are used commonly in a speculative sense. One must seek a word that has several meanings, and grasp these meanings all together in one, to have the speculative use of a word. Spirit has formed words for speculative ideas by the deepest of instincts, and these words have been unavoidably split up into different meanings by the sensuous thinking, which always loses the connecting links.

and then letting it refute itself while it applies it in this and that particular instance with the air of one who sincerely believes in it. Humor is of this nature; the author assumes the validity of the character he is portraying in regard to his weak points, and then places him in positions wherein these weaknesses prove their true nature.) Aristotle, on the other hand, writes from the standpoint of the *Idea* constantly, and therefore treats his subjects as systematic totalities independent of each other; this gives the appearance of empiricism to his writings. The following illustration of the relation of comprehension to idea may be of assistance here:

Let any totality= T be composed of elements, phases or moments= $a + b + c + d$, &c. Each of these moments, a , b , c , &c., differs from the others and from the total; they are in a negative unity just as acid and base are, in a salt. The assertion of the negative unity cancels each of the moments. The negative unity adds to a the b , c , and d , which it lacks of the total; for $a = T - b - c - \&c.$; and so too $b = T - a - c - d - \&c.$, and $c = T - a - b - \&c.$ Each demands all the rest to make its existence possible, just as the acid cannot exist if its tension is not balanced by a base. So far we have the Comprehension. If, now, we consider these moments as being able to develop, like the Monads of Leibnitz, we shall have the following result: a will absorb $b + c + d + \&c.$, and thus become a totality and a negative unity for itself; b may do likewise, and thus the others. Under this supposition we have, instead of the first series of moments ($a + b + c + d + \&c.$) a new series wherein each moment has developed to a total by supplying its deficiencies thus: $a b c d \&c.$, $+ b a c d \&c.$, $+ c a b d \&c.$, $+ d a b c \&c.$ In the new series, each term is a negative unity and a totality, and hence no longer exists in a tension, and no longer can be cancelled by the negative unity. Such a system of terms would offer us a manifold of individuals, and yet a profound unity. This is the unity of the Idea, and it affords a concrete multiplicity. Leibnitz gives to his Monads

the power of reflection, so that each is the mirror of the universe; hence, in each is found the whole, and the Totality is endlessly repeated; "everywhere the one and the all?"—and this is the "preestablished harmony," no doubt. This is the highest point of view in philosophy—true multiplicity and true unity coexisting. Plato reaches it in his statement in the *Timaeus*, that "God has made the world most like himself, since he *in nowise possesses envy*." The ultimate purpose of the universe is the reflection of God to himself. In this reflection, the existence of independent self-determining totalities is presupposed; to all else he is a negative unity, and therefore destructive. To the righteous, i. e. to those who perfect themselves by performing for themselves the function of negative unity, He says: "In you I am well pleased; I am reflected in you." But to the wicked he is a consuming fire, for they do not assume the function of negative unity, but leave it to be used toward them from outside. Thus, too, the lower orders of existence perish through this, that their negative unity is not within but without. If God is conceived merely as the negative unity, and the creature not as self-determining, we have the standpoint of Pantheism. It is the Brahm which becomes all, and all returns into him again. If we had such a God we should only *seem* to be, for when he looked at us and "placed us under the form of Eternity" we should vanish. But in culture each of us absorbs his "not me," just as "a," in the illustration given above, became a b c d &c. Its a-ness was destroyed by its modifying ("rounding off") its own peculiarity by the peculiarities of the rest, and thus becoming "cosmopolitan." This is justly esteemed the profoundest and most sacred dogma of the Christian Religion when stated as the doctrine of the Trinity. The completest unity there obtains of independent individualities. All higher forms of spirit repeat the same thought. Government, e. g. is the Legislative, the Judiciary, and the Executive. Resist the Judiciary and it can, in the exercise of its function, assume executive powers. Each power is the entire organism viewed from

the standpoint of one of its phases, just as *abc, bac, cab*, are the same totality, but with different starting points assumed.

The self-determining being is the being which is its own other, and hence is its own negative unity. Thus it can never be a simple moment of a higher being, but is essentially a *reflection* of it. Recognition is the highest deed; it belongs to the standpoint of the Idea. Upon the plane of comprehension, the unity and multiplicity are mutually destructive; upon the plane of Idea they are mutually affirmative. The more creatures in whom he can be reflected, the more affirmations of God there are. The human spirit grows solely through recognition.

Remark. This is the only standpoint that is absolutely affirmative—all others being more or less negative, and, as a consequence, self-opposed. The stage of *human culture* is the most concrete illustration of it. Three human beings—A, B, and C—meet and form a community. As physical beings they exclude, each the others. The more one eats, the less the others have to eat. But spiritually it is the reverse: each has a different experience, and their giving and taking, instead of diminishing any one's share, *increases* it. The experience of A is imparted to B, and conversely; and so also both share with C. By this, C grows through the culture of A and B, and becomes C B A; B develops to B C A, and A to A C B; all is gain: no loss, except of *poverty*. Limitation by another makes a finite being. But self-determination is the process of being one's own "other" or limit, and hence all self-determined beings are totalities or microcosms, which, though independent, reflect each other, i. e. they make themselves in the same image. Hence the "Preestablished Harmony" exists among such beings. Each is its own negative. Cognition or mind is the form of being which embodies this.

In culture we have an absolutely affirmative process, for the reason that the *negative*, involved in the cancelling of one's own idiosyncracies, is a negative of what

CHAPTER VIII.

WHAT IS THE TRUE ACTUAL?

1. — *Reality and Potentiality.*

is already negative. Hence the unity of God is not in anywise impaired by the existence of a continually increasing number of perfected beings. In proportion to their perfection they reflect Him, and their complete self-determination is just that complete realization of Him which completes his self-consciousness. This has been called Pantheism by those who confound this standpoint with that of the Comprehension. Pantheism is impossible with a proper insight into the nature of self-consciousness. A blind force fulfilling its destiny, and giving rise to various orders of beings which are to be re-absorbed by it,—if one fancies this to be God, call him a Pantheist, for God is then merely a negative unity, and creation is only a series of *moments*. But if one considers God to be the Absolute Person, and deduces all Theology from His self-consciousness, as Hegel does, he cannot be called a Pantheist consistently by any one who believes in the Gospel of St. John. It is easy to see why Hegel has been and still is regarded as a Pantheist. When he asserts the self-consciousness of the creature to be the completion of the Divine self-consciousness, Hegel merely states the logical constituents of the Christian idea of the Trinity. The “creature” is the *Son*, which is “in the beginning.” All time must have presented and still presents the development of creatures into self-conscious beings. Our planet began a short time since to do this. “The fullness of time had come,” and the final stage of reflection (which must always have existed in the Universe) began on the earth, or, to state it theologically, “The Son was sent to redeem this world.” To think that Hegel could regard God as becoming conscious in time—as passing from an unconscious state to a conscious one—is to suppose him the weakest of philosophers. *Self-consciousness* cannot be “in time,” for it is the “form of eternity,” and thus time is not relative to it. The “fleeting show” of History does not touch the self-consciousness of God, nor does it touch any self-conscious being “whose soul is builded far from accident.”

The immediate object before the senses undergoes change; the real becomes potential, and that which was potential becomes real. Without the potentiality we could have had no change. At first we are apt to consider the real as the entire existence and to ignore the potential; but the potential will not be treated thus. Whatever a thing *can* become is as valid as what it is already. The properties of a thing by which it exists for us, are its relations to other beings, and hence are rather its *deficiencies* than its being *per se*. Thus the sharpness in the acid was pronounced to be the hunger of the same for alkali; the sharper it was, the louder was its call for alkali. Thus the very concreteness of a thing is rather the process of its potentialities. To illustrate this: we have a circle of possibilities belonging to a thing—only one of them is real at a time; it is, for instance, water, whose potentialities are vapor, liquid, and solid. Its reality is only a part of its total being, as in the case of water it was only one-third of itself at any given temperature. Yet the real is throughout qualified by the potential. In change, the real is being acted upon by the potential under the form of “outside influences.” The pyramid is not air, but the air continually acts upon it, and the pyramid is in a continual process of decomposition; its potentiality is continually exhibiting its nature. We know by seeing a thing undergo change what its potentialities are. In the process of change is manifested the activity of the potentialities which are thus negative to it. If a thing had no negative it would not change. The real is nothing but the surface upon which the potential writes its nature; it is the field of strife between the potentialities. The real persists in existence through the potential which is in continual process with it. Thus we are led to regard the product of the two as the constant. This we call *Actuality*.

II.—*Actuality.*

The actual is a process, and is ever the same; its two sides, are the real and the potential, and the real is manifested no more and no less than the potentialities, in the process which constantly goes on. The real is annulled by the potential, and the latter becomes the real, only to be again replaced. If in the circle of possibilities which make up the entire being of a thing, that which is real bears a small proportion to the rest, the real is very unstable, for the potentialities are to that extent actively negative to it. But let the sphere of the real be relatively large, and we have a more stable being—there is less to destroy it and more to sustain it—it is a higher order of being. If the whole circle of its being were real it would coincide with its actuality, it would be self-related, exist for itself, and this would be the existence of the *Idea*.

III.—*The Actual is the Rational.*

The highest aim is toward perfection; and this is pursued in the cancelling of the finite, partial or incomplete, by adding to it its other or complement—that which it lacks of the Total or Perfect. Since this complement is the *potential*, and since this potential is and can be the only agent that acts upon and modifies the real, it follows that all process is pursuant of the highest aim; and since the actual is the process itself, it follows that the actual is the realization of the Best or of the Rational.

A somewhat has a low order of existence if the sphere of its reality is small compared to that of its potentiality. But the lower its order the more swift and sure are the potentialities in their work. Hence no matter how bad anything is, the very best thing is being wrought upon it. Seize the moments of the world-history, and state precisely what they lacked of the complete realization of spirit, and one will see clearly that each phase perished by having just that added to it which it most of all needed.

IV.—*“The Form of Eternity.”*

To think according to Reason is to think things under the form of Eternity, says Spinoza (*Res sub quadam specie aeternitatis percipere*). The Form of Eternity is what we have found as the true actual. The Phenomenal world is the constant spectacle wherein each and all is placed under the form of Eternity. When this is done, all *immediate* (or mechanical) being appears in a state of transition; all *mediated* being appears as a merely relative, i. e. as existing in what lies beyond it; all *absolutely mediated* (i. e. self-determined) being appears in a state of development. In the first and second stages the individual loses its identity. In the third stage the process is one of unfolding, and hence the continual realizing of a more vivid personal identity. Thus the Form of Eternity is to the conscious being the realization of his Immortality.

A THOUGHT ON SHAKESPEARE.

BY ANNA C. BRACKETT.

To say that Shakespeare excels others by virtue of the genius which enables him to throw himself for the time completely into each of the characters he represents, is to say a very common-place thing, and yet it will bear repeating.

His spirit was so many-sided, so universal, that it was able to take all forms and perfectly to fit itself to each, so that he al-

ways gives us a consistent character. His personages are individuals whose every word agrees with every other they have spoken, and while the spirit which moves in them is Shakespeare, he is all, yet no one of them.

“The water unchanged in every case,
Doth take on the figure of the vase.”

He does not consciously go to work to

fashion a character, nor does he ask himself what that character shall say under the given circumstances, but his soul, being capable of all, takes on for the time the form of the character, and then speaks the things which are most natural to itself in that form. So entirely is this the case, that a comparison of the way in which one of his personages conducts himself under different circumstances, is sure to amaze us as we discover the fine touches by which the unity of the character is preserved. Goethe's characters grow—are in a state of becoming. Shakespeare's are grown: they are crystallized. The problem with Goethe is, the development of a character through growth; Shakespeare's: given a certain character and a certain collision, how will the given character demean itself? The common man with an effort could tell what *he himself* would have done under such and such circumstances, but Shakespeare could have done *all things*, and grasping one side of himself he holds it, and shows it for one person, and another for another. He never confuses—never changes. The divine inspiration sways him. The power to do this, the Universal which can take on all and be all, is genius.

This is not claimed as new in any sense. I simply wish to illustrate its truth with regard to the suitors of Portia, by noticing how perfectly the feelings which each expresses after the result of his choice is apparent, are the outcome of the feelings which decided the choice.

The three sets of comments on the caskets and their mottoes, betray three entirely different men. Their minds move differently; they are actuated habitually by different motives, and the results of the same failure in Morocco and Arragon are noticeably different. They are placed in precisely the same circumstances. They are both disappointed, but observe how differently they demean themselves. Morocco wastes no words. His mood changes instantly from a doubting hope to despondency and heartfelt grief, so powerful that it deprives him of all speech. He goes at once. But Arragon speaks as if he had been deceived. First—"How much unlike art thou to Portia!" That is, I was

led to suppose one thing; I have been misled. Then—"How much unlike my hopes!" but, indignation and wounded pride gaining the ascendancy—"and my *deservings!*" He re-reads the motto, and grows more angry still. He has not been treated fairly, and at last, forgetting himself, he turns round to Portia with the fierce, direct question, "Are my deserts no better?" Portia shows her appreciation of his state of mind by her evasion, plainly intimating that he had gone too far in his manner of addressing her. His very words are rough and uncourteous in their abruptness. His question was rude because so personal. In his haste he has not even noticed the writing, which now surprises him, as, feeling her quiet rebuke, he turns back to the casket to hide his embarrassment, and he reads. During the reading he begins to be conscious that he has been angry without reason, and that he has not had control enough of himself to conceal the fact. That he is not a fool is shown by his consciousness that he has behaved like one in giving away to his temper, and as this consciousness begins to dawn on him, he is ashamed of himself for having been provoked, and desires to be gone as soon as possible. He has had a revelation of himself which is not agreeable, and he turns to depart, no longer angry with Portia, but so angry with himself that he almost forgets to bid the lady adieu. But suddenly reminded that she is there, he assumes again his usual, courtly, outside self, and half in apology for his anger and rudeness, which might have led her to suppose that he would forget his promise, half to recall himself to himself, he awkwardly ends the scene by assuring her that he means to keep his word.

Now, why should Morocco never for one instant lose his gentlemanly bearing, while Arragon so wholly forgets himself? Turn back to the comments before the choice, and we have the key at once.

In their remarks on the leaden chest we see at first how much more quickly than Morocco, Arragon rushes at conclusions. The former becomes at once thoughtful, and does not pass by even that unattractive metal without careful pausing. After

reading all three mottoes once, he reads slowly the inscription on the leaden casket again, and begins to repeat it a second time. He feels thoroughly how much depends on the choice, and is self-distrustful. Finding that he can gain no suggestion from the lady, he commends himself for help to the gods before he proceeds. He is not the man to be daunted by a threat, and thinks he detects in that very threat a false ring. He is conscious of high motives, but not in vanity, and he decides adversely, giving a reason. But Arragon, before surveying the whole ground, decides at once about the first he sees, and the summary way in which he dismisses all consideration of the leaden casket, savors strongly of self-esteem. There is a sort of bravado in the sudden words without a moment's pause: "You shall look fairer ere I give or hazard!" The very use of "shall" with the second person, forces into view the will of the speaker. He does not turn to Portia. He is quite capable of directing his own actions without help from any god.

As Morocco considers the silver, the principal thing that attracts his attention is its "virgin hue." (Remark that Arragon under the same circumstances calls it a "treasure house.") He again begins thoughtfully to repeat; and again mark the self-distrust. There is an exquisitely delicate touch of this in—

"If thou be'st rated by thy *estimation*,
Thou dost deserve enough."

Relying on the judgment of others, rather than on his own, but conscious too that there is good ground for the estimation in which he knows himself held, the chivalrous admiration with which he looks up to the woman he desires, comes in here suddenly with a doubt whether if all that is thought of him is deserved, it is enough to win a pearl of so great price. His conscious manhood refuses, however, to weaken itself by doubting, and he again repeats the clause on which he stopped before. He goes back to the thought of the estimation in which he is held; he thinks of his noble birth, of his princely fortune, of his graces, and qualities of breeding, and enumerating all these, he proves his title to a better nobility by the sudden thought that the love he bears her is enough to

make him deserve her were she never so precious, and on that, and that alone, he rests his claim. But before deciding he will read again from the gold casket, and his exclamations on it are only a continuation of his previous thought. It seems perfectly plain to him that this must be the fortunate casket. In his generous love he forgets himself entirely, and as it were to show her how wholly he believes in her, he makes his selection here. Why should he be angry at the failure? He had no self-assertion to be wounded. If he deserved her, it was only because he loved her; and if he did not deserve her, it was only because she was more than any one could deserve.

As Arragon, after passing by the lead, turns to the gold, he begins to be a little more cautious, and repeats like Morocco. But his mind, instead of turning at once to Portia as the only prize in the world wholly desirable, begins from a lofty eminence of superiority to criticise others whom he calls the "fool multitude." He will not choose what many men desire, because he prefers to keep out of the ranks. No democrat, but a proud aristocrat is he, and so the gold casket is set aside. After reading from the next, he begins to criticise again. It seems as if he stood outside of all the world and coolly reviewed it. On consideration he is quite sure that there is no danger of his losing his place even if "true honor were purchased by the merit of the wearer," and basing his choice on his belief that he deserves success, he orders peremptorily the opening of the "treasure house."

Is it not most natural that with such feelings, such self-complacency, he should be angry when he finds he has made a mistake? Nothing can be more galling to a proud spirit than to discover that the estimation set upon him by others is lower than that he sets upon himself.

It was not our purpose to compare Basanio's comments with the others. Let us say only that he evidently prizes sincerity above all other virtues, and prefers a leaden casket that is lead all through, to a golden one that is gold only on the outside, and so he wins the woman, who, as she shows us a moment afterwards, is sincere enough to deserve to be won.

LEONARDO DA VINCI'S "LAST SUPPER,"

AS TREATED BY GOETHE.

[The following extracts from Goethe's treatment of the master-piece of Leonardo da Vinci were read at a meeting of the St. Louis Art Society, pending the discussion of a fine engraving of this celebrated picture. The MS. kindly presented to us by the translator we print, in order to give to those unacquainted with the original an exhibition of Goethe's thorough manner of penetrating the spirit of a work of art.—EDITOR.]

The Last Supper * * * was painted upon the wall of the monastery *alle Grazie*, at Milan. The place where the picture is painted must first be considered, for here the skill of the artist appears in its most brilliant light. What could be fitter and nobler for a refectory than a parting meal, which should be an object of reverence to the whole world for all future time. Several years ago, when travelling, we beheld this dining-room still undestroyed. Opposite the entrance on the narrow side, stood the table of the prior, on both sides of him the tables of the monks, all of which were raised a step from the floor—and when the visitor turned round, he saw painted on the fourth, above the doors, which are of but moderate height, a fourth table, and Christ and his disciples seated at it, as if they belonged to the society. At meal times it must have been a telling sight, when the tables of the prior and Christ looked upon each other as two opposite pictures, and the monks at their places found themselves enclosed between them. And just on this account the skill of the artist was compelled to take the existing tables of the monks as a pattern. Also, the table-cloth, with its folds still visible with its worked stripes and tied corners, was taken from the wash-room of the monastery. The plates, dishes, cups, and other vessels, are like those which the monks used.

Here was no attempt at imitating an uncertain antiquated costume; it would have been highly improper to stretch out the holy company upon cushions in this place. No, the picture must be brought near to the present; Christ must take his last supper with the Dominicans at Milan. Also, in many other respects, the painting must have produced a great effect; the thirteen figures about ten feet above the floor, one-

half larger than life-size, take up the space of twenty-eight feet in length. Only two whole figures can be seen at the opposite ends of the table, the rest are half-figures; and here, too, the artist found his advantage in the necessity of the circumstances. Every moral expression belongs to the upper part of the body, and the feet in such cases are everywhere in the way. The artist has created here twelve half-figures, whose laps and knees are covered by the table and table-cloth, but whose feet are scarcely visible in the modest twilight beneath. Let us now imagine ourselves in the place; let us consider the moral repose which prevails in such a monastic dining-hall, and let us admire the artist who has infused into his picture, powerful emotion, passionate movement, and at the same time has kept his work within the bounds of Nature, and thus brings it in close contrast with the nearest reality.

The means of excitement by which the artist arouses the quiet holy group, are the words of the Master: "There is one among you who shall betray me!" They are spoken—the whole company falls into disquiet; but he inclines his head, with looks cast down; the whole attitude, the motion of the arms, of the hands, everything repeats with heavenly submission the unhappy words: Yes, it is not otherwise, there is one among you who shall betray me!

Before we go farther, we must point out a happy device whereby Leonardo principally enlivened his picture; it is the motion of the hands; this device, however, only an Italian could discover. With his nation, the whole body is full of animation; every limb participates in the expression of feeling, of passion, even of thought. By various motions and forms of the hand, he expresses: "What do I

care!—Come hither!—This is a rogue! beware of him!—He shall not live long!—This is a main point!—Observe this well, my hearers!" To such a national peculiarity Leonardo, who observed every characteristic point with the closest attention, must have turned his careful eye. In this respect, the present picture is unique, and one can scarcely observe it enough. Every look and movement perfectly correspond, and at the same time there is a combined and contrasted position of the limbs, comprehensible at a glance, and wrought out in the most praiseworthy manner.

The figures on both sides of the Saviour may be considered by threes, and each of these again must be thought into a unity, placed in relation, and still held in connection with its neighbors. First, on the right side of Christ, are John, Judas, and Peter. Peter the most distant, in consonance with his violent character, when he hears the word of the Lord, hastens up behind Judas, who, looking up affrighted, bends forward over the table, and holds with his right hand firmly closed, the purse, but with the left makes an involuntary nervous movement, as if he would say: What's that? What does that mean? In the meanwhile Peter has with his left hand seized the right shoulder of John, who is inclined towards him, and points to Christ, and at the same time urges the beloved disciple to ask who the traitor is. He strikes a knife-handle, which he holds in his right hand, inadvertently into the ribs of Judas, whereby the affrighted forward movement, which upsets the salt-cellar, is happily brought out. This group may be considered as the one which was first thought out by the artist; it is the most perfect.

If now upon the right hand of the Lord immediate vengeance is threatened, with a moderate degree of motion, there arises upon his left the liveliest horror and detestation of the treachery. James, the elder, bends back from fear, extends his arms, stares with his head bowed down as one who sees before him the monster which he has just heard of. Thomas peers from behind his shoulder, and approaching the Saviour, raises the index of his right

hand to his forehead. Philip, the third of this group, rounds it off in the loveliest manner; he has risen, bends toward the Master, lays his hands upon his breast, and declares with the greatest clearness: Lord, it is not I! Thou knowest it! Thou seest my pure heart. It is not I!

And now, the last three figures of this group give us new material for thought; they talk with one another about the terrible thing which they have just heard. Matthew, with a zealous motion, turns his face to the left toward his two companions; his hands, on the contrary, he stretches with rapidity towards his master, and thus, by the most ingenious artifice, unites his own group with the previous one. Thaddeus shows the most violent surprise, doubt and suspicion; he has laid his left hand open upon the table, and has raised the right in a manner as if he intended to strike his left hand with the back of the right—a movement which one still sees in men of nature when they wish to express at an unexpected occurrence: Have I not said so? Have I not always supposed it? Simon sits at the end of the table, full of dignity—we therefore see his whole figure; he, the eldest of all, is clothed with rich folds; his countenance and movements show that he is astonished and reflecting, not excited, scarcely moved.

If we now turn our eyes to the opposite end of the table, we see Bartholomew, who stands upon his right foot, with the left crossed over it; he is supporting his inclined body by resting both hands firmly upon the table. He listens, probably to hear what John will find out from the Lord; for, in general, the incitement of the favorite disciple seems to proceed from this entire side. James, the younger, beside and behind Bartholomew, lays his left hand upon Peter's shoulder, just as Peter lays his upon the shoulder of John, but James does so mildly, seeking explanation only, whereas Peter already threatens vengeance.

And thus, as Peter reaches behind Judas, so James the younger reaches behind Andrew, who, as one of the most important figures, shows with his half-raised arms, his expanded hands in front, a decided ex-

pression of horror, which appears only once in this picture, while in other works of less genius, and of less profound thought, it recurs unfortunately only too often.

COPIES GENERALLY.

Before we now come to imitations of our painting, of which the number amounts to about thirty, we must make some reference to the subject of copies generally. Such did not come into use until everybody confessed that art had reached its culminating point, whereupon, inferior talents, looking at the works of the greater masters, despaired of producing by their own skill anything similar, either in imitation of nature, or from the idea; and art, which now dwindled into mere handiwork, began to repeat its own creations. This inability on the part of most of the artists did not remain a secret to the lovers of art, who, not being able always to turn to the first masters, called upon and paid inferior talents, inasmuch as they preferred, in order not to receive something altogether destitute of skill, to order imitations of recognized works, with a view to being well served in some degree. This new procedure was favored, from reasons of illiberality and overhaste by owners no less than by artists, and art lowered itself advisedly by setting out with the purpose to copy.

In the fifteenth century, as well as in the previous one, artists entertained a high idea of themselves and their art, and did not readily content themselves with repeating the inventions of others; hence we find no real copies dating from that period—a circumstance to which every friend of the history of art will do well to give heed. Inferior arts no doubt made use of higher patterns for smaller works, as in the case of *Niello* and other enamelled work, and, of course, when from religious or other motives, a repetition was desired, people contented themselves with an accurate imitation, which only approximately expressed the movement and action of the original, without paying any close regard to form and color. Hence in the richest galleries we find no copy previous to the sixteenth century.

But now came the time, when, through the agency of a few extraordinary men—among whom our Leonardo must be reckoned and considered as the first—art in every one of its parts attained to perfection; people learned to see and to judge better, and now the desire for imitations of first-class work was not difficult to satisfy, particularly in those schools to which large numbers of scholars crowded, and in which the works of the master were greatly in request. And yet, at that time, this desire was confined to smaller works which could be easily compared with the originals and judged. As regards larger works, the case was quite different at that time from what it was at a later period, because the original cannot be compared with the copies, and also because such orders are rare. Thus, then, art, as well as its lovers, contented itself with copies on a small scale, and a great deal of liberty was allowed to the copyist, and the results of this arbitrary procedure showed themselves, in an overpowering degree, in the few cases in which copies on a large scale were desired. These indeed were generally copies of copies, and, what is more, generally executed from copies on a smaller scale, worked out far away from the original, often from mere drawings, or even perhaps from memory. Job-painters now increased by the dozen, and worked for lower prices; people made household ornaments of painting; taste died out; copies increased and darkened the walls of ante-chambers and staircases; hungry beginners lived on poor pay, by repeating the most important works on every scale; yea, many painters passed the whole of their lives in simply copying; but even then an amount of deviation appeared in every copy, either a notion of the person for whom it was painted, or a whim of the painter, or perhaps a presumptuous wish to be original.

In addition to this came the demand for worked tapestry, in which painting was not content to look dignified, except when tricked out with gold; and the most magnificent pictures were considered meagre and wretched, because they were grave and simple; therefore the copyist introduced buildings and landscapes in the back-

ground, ornaments on the dresses, aureoles or crowns around the heads, and further, strangely formed children, animals, chimeras, grotesques, and other fooleries. It often happened, also, that an artist, who believed in his own powers of invention, received by the will of a client who could not appreciate his capabilities, a commission to copy another person's work, and since he did so with reluctance, he wished to appear original here and there, and therefore made changes or additions as knowledge, or perhaps vanity, suggested. Such occurrences took place of course according to the demands of place and time. Many figures were used for purposes quite different from those for which they had been intended by their first producers. Secular subjects were, by means of a few additions, changed into religious ones; heathen gods and heroes had to submit to be martyrs and evangelists. Often also, the artist, for instruction or exercise to himself, had copied some figure from a celebrated work, and now he added to it something of his own invention in order to turn it into a saleable picture. Finally, we may certainly ascribe a part of the corruption of art to the discovery and abuse of copper-plate engravings, which supplied job-painters with crowds of foreign inventions, so that no one any longer studied, and painting at last reached such a low ebb that it got mixed up with mechanical works. In the first place, the copper-plate engravings themselves were different from the originals, and whoever copied them multiplied the changes according to his own or other peoples' conviction or whim. The same thing happened precisely in the case of drawings; artists took sketches of the most remarkable subjects in Rome and Florence, in order to produce arbitrary repetitions of them when they returned home.

COPIES OF THE SUPPER.

In view of the above, we shall be able to judge what is to be expected, more or less, of copies of the Supper, although the earliest were executed contemporaneously; for the work made a great sensation, and other monasteries desired similar works.

Of the numerous copies consulted by the author [Vossi] we shall occupy ourselves here with only three, since the copies at Weimar are taken from them; nevertheless, at the basis of these lies a fourth, of which, therefore, we must first speak. *Marco d'Oggiono*, a pupil of Leonardo da Vinci's, though without any extensive talent, gained the praise of his school chiefly by his heads, although in them he is not always equal to himself. About the year 1510, he executed a copy on a small scale, intending to use it afterwards for a copy on a larger scale. It was, according to tradition, not quite accurate; he made it, however, the basis of a larger copy which is in the now suppressed monastery at Castellazzo, likewise in the dining-hall of the monks of those days. Everything about it shows careful work; nevertheless the usual arbitrariness prevails in the details. And although Vossi has not been able to say much in its praise, he does not deny that it is a remarkable monument, and that the character of several of the heads, in which the expression is not exaggerated, is deserving of praise. Vossi has copied it, and on comparison of the three copies we shall be able to pronounce judgment upon it from our own observation.

A second copy, of which we likewise have the heads copied before us, is found in fresco on the wall at Ponte Capriasca; it is referred to the year 1565, and ascribed to Pierro Lovino. Its merits we shall learn in the sequel; it has the peculiarity that the names of the figures are written underneath, a piece of foresight which aids us in arriving at a correct characterization of the different physiognomies.

The gradual destruction of the original we have described in sufficient detail, and it was already in a very wretched condition when, in 1612, Cardinal Frederico Borromeo, a zealous friend of art, endeavored to prevent the entire loss of the work, and commissioned a Milanese, Andrea Bianchi, surnamed Vespino, to execute a full-sized copy. This artist first tried his skill on a few of the heads; being successful in these, he proceeded and copied the whole of the figures, separately however, and afterwards put them together with the

greatest possible care; the picture is at present to be found in the Ambrosiana library at Milan, and lies mainly at the basis of the most recent copy, executed by Vossi. This was executed on the following occasion.

LATEST COPY.

The Kingdom of Italy was decreed, and Prince Eugène, following the example of Luigi Sforza, wished to glorify the beginning of his reign by patronizing the fine arts. Luigi had ordered a representation of the Last Supper of Leonardo; Eugène resolved to restore, as far as possible, the painting that had been going to wreck for three hundred years in a new picture, which, in order that it might be indestructible, was to be done in mosaic, for which preparation had been made in an already existing institution.

Vossi immediately receives the commission, and commences in the beginning of May, 1807. He finds it advisable to execute a full-sized cartoon, takes up anew the studies of his youth, and applies himself entirely to Leonardo, studies his art-remains and his writings, particularly the latter, because he is persuaded that a man who has produced such splendid works must have worked on the most decided and advantageous principles. He had made drawings of the heads in the copy at Ponte Capriasca, as well as of some other parts of it, likewise of the heads and hands of the Castellazzo copy, and of that of Bianchi. Then he makes drawings of everything coming from Da Vinci himself, and even of what comes from some of his contemporaries. Moreover he looks about for all the extant copies, and succeeds in making more or less acquaintance with twenty-seven; drawings and manuscripts of Da Vinci's are kindly sent to him from all quarters. In the working out of his cartoon, he adheres principally to the Ambrosiana copy; it alone is as large as the original. Bianchi, by means of thread-nets and transparent paper, had endeavored to give a most accurate copy of the original, which, although already very much injured, was not yet painted over.

In the end of October, 1807, the cartoon

is ready; canvass grounded uniformly in one piece, and the whole immediately sketched out. Hereupon, in order in some measure to regulate his tints, Vossi painted the small portion of sky and landscape, which, on account of the depth and purity of the colors in the original, had still remained fresh and brilliant. Hereupon he paints the head of Christ and those of the three apostles at his left, and as for the dresses, he first paints those about whose colors he had first arrived at certainly, with a view to selecting the rest according to the principles of the master and his own taste. Thus he covered the whole of the canvass, guided by careful reflection, and kept his colors of uniform height and strength.

Unfortunately, in this damp, deserted place, he was seized with an illness which compelled him to put a stop to his exertions; nevertheless, he employed this interval in arranging drawings, copper-plate engravings, partly with a view to the Supper itself, partly to other works of the master; at the same time he was favored by fortune, which brought him a collection of drawings, purporting to come from Cardinal Cæsar Monti, and containing, among other treasures, remarkable productions of Leonardo himself. He studied even the authors contemporaneous with Leonardo, in order to make use of their opinions and wishes, and looked about him for everything that could further his design. Thus he took advantage of his sickness, and at last attained strength to set about his work anew.

No artist or friend of art will leave unread the account of how he managed the details, how he thought out the characters of the faces and their expression, and even the motions of the hands, and how he represented them. In the same manner he thinks out the dishes, the room, the background, and shows that he has not decided upon any part without the strongest reasons. What care he takes about representing the feet under the table in correct attitudes, because this portion of the original had long been destroyed, and in the copies had been carelessly treated!

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Of the relation of the two copies—the

merits of the third can be shown only to the eye, not to the mind in words—we shall state in a few words the most essential and most decided points, until we shall be fortunate enough, as we shall perhaps one day be, to be able to lay copies of these interesting sheets before the friends of art.

COMPARISON.

St. Bartholomew, manly youth, sharp profile, compressed, clear face, eyelid and brow pressed down, mouth closed, as if listening with suspicion, a character completely circumscribed within itself. In Vespino's copy no trace of individual characteristic features, a general kind of drawing-book face, listening with open mouth. Vossi has approved of this opening of the lips, and retained it, a procedure to which we should be unable to lend our assent.

St. James the younger, likewise profile, relationship to Christ unmistakable, receives from the protruded, slightly opened lips, something individual, which again cancels this similarity. According to Vespino, almost an ordinary, academical Christ, the mouth opened rather in astonishment than in inquiry. Our assertion that Bartholomew must have his mouth close, receives support from the fact that his neighbor has his mouth open. Such a repetition Leonardo would never have endured; on the contrary, the next figure,

St. Andrew has his mouth shut. Like persons advanced in life, he presses the lower lip rather against the upper. In the copy of Marco, this head has something peculiar, not to be expressed in words; the eyes are introverted; the mouth, though shut, is still *naïve*. The outline of the left side against the back ground forms a beautiful silhouette; enough of the other side of the forehead (eye, nose and beard) is seen to give the head a roundness and a peculiar life; on the contrary, Vespino suppresses the left eye altogether, but shows so much of the left temple and of the side of the beard as to produce in the uplifted face a full bold expression, which is indeed striking, but which would seem more suitable to clenched fists than to open hands stretched forward.

Judas locked up within himself, fright-

ened, looking anxiously up and back, profile strongly dented, not exaggerated, by no means an ugly formation; for good taste would not tolerate any real monster in the proximity of pure and upright men. Vespino, on the other hand, has actually represented such a monster, and it cannot be denied that, regarded by itself, this head has much merit; it expresses vividly a mischievously bold malignity, and would make itself eminently conspicuous in a mob triumphing over an *Ecce Homo*, and crying out "Crucify! crucify!" It might be made to pass for Mephistopheles in his most devilish moment. But of affright or dread, combined with dissimulation, indifference and contempt, there is not a trace; the bristly hair fits in with the *tout ensemble* admirably; its exaggeration, however, is matched only by the force and violence of the rest of Vespino's heads.

St. Peter.—Very problematical features. Even in Marco, it is merely an expression of pain; of wrath or menace there is no sign; there is also a certain anxiety expressed, and here Leonardo may not have been at one even with himself; for cordial sympathy with a beloved master, and threatening against a traitor, are with difficulty united in one countenance. Nevertheless, Cardinal Borromeo asserts that he saw such a miracle in his time. However pleasant it might be to believe this, we have reason to suppose that the art-loving cardinal expressed his own feeling rather than what was in the picture; for otherwise we should be unable to defend our friend Vespino, whose Peter has an unpleasant expression. He looks like a stern Capuchin monk, whose Lent sermon is intended to rouse sinners. It is strange that Vespino has given him bushy hair, since the Peter of Marco shows a beautiful head of short, curled tresses.

St. John is represented by Marco in the spirit of Da Vinci; the beautiful roundish face, somewhat inclined to oval, the hair smooth towards the top of the head, but curling gently downwards, particularly where it bends round Peter's inserted hand, are most lovely; what we see of the dark of the eye is turned away from Peter—a marvellously fine piece of observation,

in that while he is listening with the intensest feeling to the secret speech of his neighbor, he turns away his eyes from him. According to Vespino, he is a comfortable-looking, quiet, almost sleepy youth, without any trace of sympathy.

We turn now to the left side of Christ, in order that the figure of the Saviour may come last in our description.

St. Thomas' head and right hand, whose upraised fore-finger is bent slightly toward his brow to imply reflection. This movement, which is so much in keeping with a person who is suspicious or in doubt, has been hitherto misunderstood, and a hesitating disciple looked upon as threatening. In Vespino's copy, likewise, he is reflective enough, but as the artist has again left out the retreating right eye, the result is a perpendicular, monotonous profile, without any remnant of the protruding, searching elements of the older copies.

St. James the Elder.—The most violent agitation of the features, the most gaping mouth, horror in his eye; an original venture of Leonardo's; yet we have reason to believe that this head, likewise, has been remarkably successful with Marco. The working out is magnificent, whereas in the copy of Vespino all is lost; attitude, manner, mien, everything has vanished, and dwindles down into a sort of indifferent generality.

St. Philip, amiable and invaluable, resembles Raffaele's youths, collected on the left side of *The School of Athens* about Bramante. Vespino has, unfortunately, again suppressed the right eye, and as he could not deny that there was something more than profile in the thing, he has produced an ambiguous, strangely inclined head.

St. Matthew, young, of undesigning nature, with curly hair, an anxious expression in the slightly opened mouth, in which the teeth, which are visible, express a sort of slight ferocity in keeping with the violent movement of the figure. Of all this nothing remains in Vespino; he gazes before him, stiff and expressionless: one does not receive the remotest notion of the violent movement of the body.

St. Thaddeus, according to Marco, is

likewise quite an invaluable head; anxiety, suspicion, vexation, are expressed in every feature. The unity of this agitation of the countenance is extremely fine, and is entirely in keeping with the movement of the hands which we have already explained. In Vespino, everything is again reduced to a general level; he has also made the head still more unmeaning by turning it too much towards the spectator, whereas, according to Marco, hardly a quarter of the left side is seen, whereby the suspicious, askance-looking element is admirably portrayed.

St. Simon the Elder, wholly in profile, placed opposite the likewise pure profile of young Matthew. In him the protruding under lip which Leonardo had such a partiality for in old faces, is most exaggerated; but, along with the grave, overhanging brow, produces the most wonderful effect of vexation and reflection, in sharp contrast with the passionate movement of young Matthew. In Vespino he is a good-natured old man in his dotage, incapable of taking any interest in even the most important occurrence that might take place in his presence.

Having thus now thrown light upon the apostles, we turn to the form of *Christ* himself. And here again we are met by the legend, that Leonardo was unable to finish either Christ or Judas, which we readily believe, since, from his method, it was impossible for him to put the last touch to those two extremes of portraiture. Wretched enough, in the original, after all the darkening processes it had to undergo, may have been the appearance presented by the features of Christ, which were only sketched. How little Vespino found remaining, may be gleaned from the fact that he brought out a colossal head of Christ, quite at variance with the purpose of Da Vinci, without paying the least attention to the inclination of the head, which ought of necessity to have been made parallel with the inclination of John's. Of the expression we shall say nothing; the features are regular, good-natured, intelligent, like those we are accustomed to see in Christ, but without the very smallest particle of sensibility, so that we should

almost be unable to tell what New Testament story this head would be welcome to.

We are here met and aided by the circumstance that connoisseurs assert, that Leonardo himself painted the head of the Saviour at Castellazzo, and ventured to do in another's work what he had not been willing to undertake in his own principal figure. As we have not the original before us, we must say of the copy that it agrees entirely with the conception which we form of a noble man whose breast is weighed down by poignant suffering of soul, which he has endeavored to alleviate by a familiar word, but has thereby only made matters worse instead of better.

By these processes of comparison, then, we have come sufficiently near the method of this extraordinary artist, such as he has clearly explained and demonstrated it in writings and pictures, and fortunately it is in our power to take a step still further in advance. There is, namely, preserved in

the Ambrosiana library a drawing incontestably executed by Leonardo, upon bluish paper, with a little white and colored chalk. Of this the chevalier Vossi has executed the most accurate *fac-simile*, which is also before us. A noble youthful face, drawn from nature, evidently with a view to the head of Christ at the Supper. Pure, regular features, smooth hair, the head bent to the left side, the eyes cast down, the mouth half opened, the *tout ensemble* brought into the most marvellous harmony by a slight touch of sorrow. Here indeed we have only the man who does not conceal a suffering of soul, but the problem, how, without extinguishing this promise, at the same time to express sublimity, independence, power, the might of godhead, is one which even the most gifted earthly pencil might well find hard to solve. In this youthful physiognomy which hovers between Christ and John, we see the highest attempt to hold fast by nature when the supermundane is in question.

PAUL JANET AND HEGEL.*

[In the following article the passages quoted are turned into English, and the original French is omitted for the sake of brevity and lucid arrangement. As the work reviewed is accessible to most readers, a reference to the pages from which we quote will answer all purposes.—EDITOR.]

Since the death of Hegel in 1831, his philosophy has been making a slow but regular progress into the world at large. At home in Germany it is spoken of as having a right wing, a left wing, and a centre; its disciples are very numerous when one counts such widely different philosophers as Rosenkrantz, Michelet, Kuno Fischer, Erdmann, J. H. Fichte, Strauss, Feuerbach, and their numerous followers. Sometimes when one hears who constitute a "wing" of the Hegelian school, he is reminded of the "*lucus a non*" principle of naming, or rather of misnaming things. But Hegelianism has, as we said, made its way into other countries. In France we have the *Æsthetics* "partly translated and partly analyzed," by Professor Bénard;

* "Essai sur la dialectique dans Platon et dans Hegel," par Paul Janet, Membre de l'Institut, professeur à la Faculté des lettres de Paris.—Paris, (Ladrange,) 1860.

the logic of the small Encyclopædia, translated with copious notes, by Professor Vera, who has gone bravely on, with what seems with him to be a work of love, and given us the "Philosophy of Nature" and the "Philosophy of Spirit," and promises us the "Philosophy of Religion"—all accompanied with abundant introduction and commentary. We hear of others very much influenced by Hegel: M. Taine, for example, who writes brilliant essays. In English, too, we have a translation of the "Philosophy of History," (in Bohn's Library;) a kind of translation and analysis of the first part of the third volume of the *Logic*, (Sloman & Wallon, London, 1855); and an extensive and elaborate work on "The Secret of Hegel," by James Hutchison Stirling. We must not forget to mention a translation of Schwegler's *History of Philosophy*—a work drawn princi-

pally from Hegel's labors—by our American Professor Seelye; and also (just published) a translation of the same book by the author of the "Secret of Hegel." Articles treating of Hegel are to be found by the score—seek them in every text-book on philosophy, in every general Cyclopædia, and in numerous works written for or against German Philosophy. Some of these writers tell us in one breath that Hegel was a man of prodigious genius, and in the next they convict him of confounding the plainest of all common sense distinctions. Some of them find him the profoundest of all thinkers, while others cannot "make a word of sense out of him." There seems to be a general understanding in this country and England on one point: all agree that he was a Pantheist. Theodore Parker, Sir William Hamilton, Mansell, Morell, and even some of the English defenders of Hegelianism admit this. Hegel holds, say some, that God is a *becoming*; others say that he holds God to be *pure being*. These men are careful men apparently—but only *apparently*, for it must be confessed that if Hegel has written any books at all, they are, every one of them, devoted to the task of showing the inadequacy of such abstractions when made the highest principle of things.

The ripest product of the great German movement in philosophy, which took place at the beginning of this century, Hegel's philosophy is likewise the concretest system of thought the world has seen. This is coming to be the conviction of thinkers more and more every day as they get glimpses into particular provinces of his labor. Bénard thinks the Philosophy of Art the most wonderful product of modern thinking, and speaks of the Logic—which he does not understand—as a futile and perishable production. Another thinks that his Philosophy of History is immortal, and a third values extravagantly his Philosophy of Religion. But the one who values his Logic knows how to value all his labors. The History of Philosophy is the work that impresses us most with the unparalleled wealth of his thought; he is able to descend through all history, and give to each philosopher a splendid thought

as the centre of his system, and yet never is obliged to confound different systems, or fail in showing the superior depth of modern thought. While we are admiring the depth and clearness of Pythagoras, we are surprised and delighted to find the great thought of Heraclitus, but Anaxagoras is a new surprise; the Sophists come before us bearing a world-historical significance, and Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle lead us successively to heights such as we had not dreamed attainable by any thinking.

But thought is no *immediate* function, like the process of breathing or sleeping, or fancy-making: it is the profoundest mediation of spirit, and he who would get an insight into the speculative thinkers of whatever time, must labor as no mere flesh and blood can labor, but only as spirit can labor: with agony and sweat of blood. A philosophy which should explain the great complex of the universe, could hardly be expected to be transparent to uncultured minds at the first glance. Thus it happens that many critics give us such discouraging reports upon their return from a short excursion into the true wonder-land of philosophy. The Eternal Verities are miraculous only to those eyes which have gazed long upon them after shutting out the glaring sunlight of the senses.

Those who criticise a philosophy must imply a philosophical method of their own, and thus measure themselves while they measure others. A literary man who criticises Goethe, or Shakespeare, or Homer, is very apt to lay himself bare to the shaft of the adversary. There are, however, in our time, a legion of writers who pass judgment as flippantly upon a system of the most comprehensive scope—and which they confess openly their inability to understand—as upon a mere opinion uttered in a "table-talk." Even some men of great reputation give currency to great errors. Sir William Hamilton, in his notes to Reid's Philosophy of "Touch," once quoted the passage from the second part of Fichte's *Bestimmung des Menschen*, (wherein onesided idealism is pushed to its downfall,) in order to show that

Fichte's Philosophy ended in Nihilism. The *Bestimmung des Menschen* was a mere popular writing in which Fichte adopted the Kantian style of exhibiting the self-refutation of sense and reflection, in order to rest all ultimate truth in the postulates of the Practical Reason. Accordingly he shows the practical results of his own system in the third part of the work in question, and enforces the soundest ethical views of life. He never thought of presenting his theoretical philosophy in that work. Thus, too, in Hamilton's refutation of Cousin and Schelling: he polemicalises against all "Doctrines of the Absolute," saying that *to think is to limit; hence to think God would be to determine or limit Him*; and hence is inferred the impossibility of thinking God as he truly is. This, of course, is not pushed to its results by his followers, for then its skeptical tendency would become obvious. Religion demands that we shall do the Will of God; this Will must, therefore, be known. But, again, Will is the realization or self-determination of one's nature—from it the character proceeds. Thus in knowing God's will we know his character or nature. If we cannot do this at all, no religion is possible; and in proportion as Religion is possible, the Knowledge of God is possible.

If it be said that the Absolute is unthinkable, in this assertion it is affirmed that all predicates or categories of thought are inapplicable to the Absolute, for to think is to predicate of some object, the categories of thought; and in so far as these categories apply, to that extent is the Absolute thinkable. Since *Existence* is a category of thought, it follows from this position that to predicate existence of the Absolute is impossible; "a questionable predicament" truly for the Absolute. According to this doctrine—that all thought is limitation—God is made Pure Being, or Pure Thought. This is also the result of Indian Pantheism, and of all Pantheism; this doctrine concerning the mere negative character of thought, in fact, underlies the Oriental tenet that consciousness is finitude. To be consistent, all Hamiltonians should become Brahmins, or, at least, join some sect of modern Spiritualists, and

thus embrace a religion that corresponds to their dogma. However, let us not be so unreasonable as to insist upon the removal of inconsistency—it is all the good they have.

After all this preliminary let us proceed at once to examine the work of Professor Paul Janet, which we have named at the head of our article: "*Essai sur la dialectique dans Platon et dans Hegel.*"

After considering the Dialectic of Plato in its various aspects, and finding that it rests on the principle of contradiction, M. Janet grapples Hegel, and makes, in order, the following points:

I. TERMINOLOGY.—He tells us that the great difficulty that lies in the way of comprehending German Philosophy is the abstract terminology employed, which is, in fact, mere scholasticism preserved and applied to modern problems. No nation of modern times, except the Germans, have preserved the scholastic form. He traces the obscurity of modern German philosophy to "Aristotle subtilized by the schools." This he contrasts with the "simple and natural philosophy of the Scotch." [This "simplicity" arises from the fact that the Scotch system holds that immediate sensuous knowing is valid. Of course this implies that they hold that the immediate existence of objects is a true existence—that whatever is, exists thus and so without any further grounds. This is the denial of all philosophy, for it utterly ignores any occasion whatever for it. But it is no less antagonistic to the "natural science" of the physicist: he, the physicist, finds the immediate object of the senses to be no permanent or true phase, but only a transitory one; the object is involved with other beings—even the remotest star—and changes when they change. It is force and matter (two very abstract categories) that are to him the permanent and true existence. But force and matter cannot be seen by the senses; they can only be thought.] Our author proceeds to trace the resemblance between Hegel and Wolff: both consider and analyze the pure concepts, beginning with Being. To M. Janet this resemblance goes for much, but he admits that "Hegel

has modified this order (that of Wolff) and rendered it more systematic." If one asks "*How* more systematic?" he will not find the answer. "The scholastic *form* is retained, but not the *thought*," we are told. That such statements are put forward, even in a book designed for mere surface-readers may well surprise us. That the mathematical method of Wolff or Spinoza—a method which proceeds by definitions and external comparison, holding meanwhile to the principle of contradiction—that such a method should be confounded with that of Hegel which proceeds dialectically, i. e. through the internal movement of the categories to their contradiction or limit, shows the student of philosophy at once that we are dealing with a *litterateur*, and not with a philosopher. So far from retaining the form of Wolff it is the great object of Hegel (see his long prefaces to the "*Logik*" and the "*Phänomenologie des Geistes*") to supplant that form by what he considers the true method—that of the *objective* itself. The objective method is to be distinguished from the arbitrary method of external reflection which selects its point of view somewhere outside of the object considered, and proceeds to draw relations and comparisons which, however edifying, do not give us any exhaustive knowledge. It is also to be distinguished from the method of mere empirical observation which collects without discrimination a mass of characteristics, accidental and necessary, and never arrives at a vivifying soul that unites and subordinates the multiplicity. The objective method seizes somewhat in its definition and traces it through all the phases which necessarily unfold when the object is placed in the form of *relation to itself*. An object which cannot survive the process of self-relation, perishes, i. e. it leads to a more concrete object which is better able to endure. This method, as we shall presently see, is attributed to Plato by M. Janet.

The only resemblance that remains to be noted between the scholastics and Hegel is this: they both treat of subtle distinctions in thought, while our modern "common

sense" system goes only so far as to distinguish very general and obvious differences. This is a questionable merit, and the less ado made about it by such as take pride in it, the better for them.

Our author continues: "The principal difficulty of the system of Kant is our ignorance of the ancient systems of logic. The Critique of Pure Reason is modelled on the scholastic system." Could we have a more conclusive refutation of this than the fact that the great professors of the ancient systems grossly misunderstand Kant, and even our essayist himself mistakes the whole purport of the same! Hear him contrast Kant with Hegel: "Kant sees in Being only the form of Thought, while Hegel sees in Thought only the form of Being." This he says is the great difference between the Germans and French, interpreting it to mean: "that the former pursues the route of deduction, and the latter that of experience!"

He wishes to consider Hegel under three heads: 1st, The Beginning; 2d, the dialectical deduction of the Becoming, and 3d, the term Dialectic.

II. THE BEGINNING.—According to M. Janet, Hegel must have used this syllogism in order to find the proper category with which to commence the Logic.

(a) The Beginning should presuppose nothing;

(b) Pure Being presupposes nothing;

(c) Hence Pure Being is the Beginning.

This syllogism he shows to be inconclusive: for there are two beginnings, (a) in the order of knowledge, (b) in the order of existence. Are they the same? He answers: "No, the thinking being—because it thinks—knows itself before it knows the being which it thinks." Subject and object being identical in that act, M. Janet in effect says, "it thinks itself before it thinks itself"—an argument that the scholastics would hardly have been guilty of! The beginning is really made, he says, with internal or external *experience*. He quotes (page 316) from Hegel a passage asserting that *mediation* is essential to knowing. This he construes to mean that "the determined or concrete (the world of experience) is the essential condition of know-

ing!" Through his misapprehension of the term "mediation," we are prepared for all the errors that follow, for "mediation in knowing" means with Hegel that it involves a *process*, and hence can be true only in the form of a system. The "internal and external experience" appertains to what Hegel calls immediate knowing. It is therefore not to be wondered at that M. Janet thinks Hegel contradicts himself by holding Pure Being to be the Beginning, and afterwards affirming mediation to be necessary. He says (page 317), "In the order of knowing it is the mediate which is necessarily first, while in the order of existence the immediate is the commencement." Such a remark shows him to be still laboring on the first problem of Philosophy, and without any light, for no *Speculative* Philosopher (like Plato, Aristotle, Leibnitz, or Hegel) ever held that Pure Being—or the immediate—is the first in the order of existence, but rather that God or Spirit (self-thinking, "pure act," *Noûs*, "Logos," &c.) is the first in the order of existence. In fact, M. Janet praises Plato and Aristotle for this very thing at the end of his volume, and thereby exhibits the unconsciousness of his procedure. Again, "The pure thought is the end of philosophy, and not its beginning." If he means by this that the culture of consciousness ends in arriving at pure thought or philosophy, we have no objection to offer, except to the limiting of the application of the term Philosophy to its preliminary stage, which is called the Phenomenology of Spirit. The arrival at pure thought marks the beginning of the use of terms in a universal sense, and hence is the beginning of philosophy proper. But M. Janet criticises the distinction made by Hegel between Phenomenology and Psychology, and instances Maine de Biran as one who writes Psychology in the sense Hegel would write Phenomenology. But M. Biran merely manipulates certain unexplained phenomena,—like the Will, for example—in order to derive categories like force, cause, &c. But Hegel shows in his Phenomenology the dialectical unfolding of consciousness through all its phases, starting from the

immediate certitude of the senses. He shows how certitude becomes knowledge of truth, and wherein it differs from it. But M. Janet (p. 324) thinks that Hegel's system, beginning in empirical Psychology, climbs to pure thought, "and then draws up the ladder after it."

III. THE BECOMING.—We are told by the author that consciousness determining itself as Being, determines itself as *a* being, and not as *the* being. If this be so we cannot think *pure being* at all. Such an assertion amounts to denying the universal character of the Ego. If the position stated were true, we could think neither being nor any other object.

On page 332, he says, "This contradiction (of Being and non-being) which in the ordinary logic would be the negative of the *posited notion*, is, in the logic of Hegel, only an excitant or stimulus, which somehow determines spirit to find a third somewhat in which it finds the other conciliated." He is not able to see any procedure at all. He sees the two opposites, and thinks that Hegel empirically hunts out a concept which implies both, and substitutes it for them. M. Janet thinks (pp. 336-7) that Hegel has exaggerated the difficulties of conceiving the identity of Being and nought. (p. 338) "If the difference of Being and nought can be neither expressed nor defined, if they are as identical as different—if, in short, the idea of Being is only the idea of the pure void, I will say, not merely that Being transforms itself into Nothing, or passes into its contrary; I will say that there are not two contraries, but only one term which I have falsely called Being in the thesis, but which is in reality only Non-being without restriction—the pure zero." He quotes from Kuno Fischer (p. 340) the following remarks applicable here:

"If Being were in reality the pure void as it is ordinarily taken, Non-being would not express the same void a second time; but it would then be the non-void, i. e. the abhorrence of the void, or the immanent contradiction of the void."—(and again from his "Logik und Metaphysik" II. § 29): "The logical Being contradicts itself; for thought vanishes in the immovable repose of Being. But as Being comes only from thought (for it is the act of thought), it contradicts thus itself in destroying thought. Consequently thought manifests

itself as the negation of Being—that is to say, as *Non-being*. The Non-being (logical) is not the total suppression of Being—the pure zero—it is not the mathematical opposition of Being to itself as a negative opposed to a positive, but it is the dialectical negative of itself, the immanent contradiction of Being. Being contradicts itself, hence is Non-being, and in the concept of Non-being, thought discovers the immanent contradiction of Being—thought manifests itself at first as Being, and in turn the logical Being manifests itself as Non-being; thought can hence say, “I am the Being which is not.”

“Such,” continues our author, “is the deduction of M. Fischer. It seems to me very much inferior in clearness to that of Hegel.” How he could say this is very mysterious when we find him denying all validity to Hegel’s demonstration. Although Fischer’s explanation is mixed—partly dialectical and partly psychological—yet, as an explanation, it is correct. But as psychology should not be dragged into Logic, which is the evolution of the forms of pure thinking, we must hold strictly to the dialectic if we would see the “Becoming.” The psychological explanation gets no further than the relation of Being and nought as concepts. The Hegelian thought on this point is not widely different from that of Gorgias, as given us by Sextus Empiricus, nor from that of Plato in the Sophist. Let us attempt it here:

Being is the pure simple; as such it is considered under the form of self-relation. But as it is wholly undetermined, and has no content, it is pure nought or absolute negation. As such it is the negation by itself or the negation of itself, and hence its own opposite or Being. Thus the simple falls through self-opposition into duality, and this again becomes simple if we attempt to hold it asunder, or give it any validity by itself. Thus if Being is posited as having validity in and by itself without determination, (*omnis determinatio est negatio*), it becomes a pure void in nowise different from nought, for difference is determination, and neither Being nor nought possess it. What is the validity of the nought? A negative is a relative, and a negative by itself is a negative related to itself, which is a self-cancelling. Thus Being and nought, posited objectively as having validity, prove dissolving forms and

pass over into each other. Being is a *ceasing* and nought is a *beginning*, and these are the two forms of *Becoming*. The Becoming, dialectically considered, proves itself inadequate likewise.

IV. THE DIALECTIC.—To consider an object dialectically we have merely to give it universal validity; if it contradicts itself then, we are not in anywise concerned for the result; we will simply stand by and accept the result, without fear that the true will not appear in the end. The negative turned against itself makes short work of itself; it is only when the subjective reflection tries to save it by hypotheses and reservations that a merely negative result is obtained.

(Page 369): “In Spinozism the development of Being is Geometric; in the System of Hegel it is organic.” What could have tempted him to use these words, it is impossible to say, unless it was the deep-seated national proclivity for epigrammatic statements. This distinction means nothing less (in the mouth of its original author) than what we have already given as the true difference between Wolff’s and Hegel’s methods; but M. Janet has long since forgotten his earlier statements. (Page 369) He says, “Hegel’s method is a faithful expression of the movement of nature,” from which he thinks Hegel derived it empirically!

On page 372 he asks: “Who proves to us that the dialectic stops at *Spirit* as its last term? Why can I not conceive a spirit absolutely superior to mine, in whom the identity between subject and object, the intelligible and intelligence would be more perfect than it is with this great Philosopher [Hegel]? * * * * In fact, every philosopher is a man, and so far forth is full of obscurity and feebleness.” Spirit is the last term in philosophy for the reason that it stands in complete self-relation, and hence contains its antithesis within itself; if it could stand in opposition to anything else, then it would contain a contradiction, and be capable of transition into a higher. M. Janet asks in effect: “Who proves that the dialectic stops at God as the highest, and why cannot I conceive a higher?” Judging from his attempt

at understanding Hegel, however, he is not in a fair way to conceive "a spirit in whom the identity between subject and object" is more perfect than in Hegel. "What hinders" is his own culture, his own self; "*Du gleichst dem Geist den du begreifst, nicht mir,*" said the World-spirit to Faust.

He asks, (p. 374): "When did the 'pure act' commence?" From Eternity; it always commences, and is always complete, says Hegel. "According to Hegel, God is made from nought, by means of the World." Instead of this, Hegel holds that God is self-created, and the world eternally created by him (the Eternally-begotten Son). "What need has God of Nature?" God is Spirit; hence conscious; hence he makes himself an object to himself; in this act he creates nature; hence Nature is His reflection. (P. 386): "The Absolute in Hegel is spirit only on condition that it thinks, and *thinks itself*; hence it is not *essentially* Spirit, but only *accidentally*." To "*think itself*" is to be conscious, and, without this, God would have no personality; and hence if Hegel were to hold any other doctrine than the one attributed to him, he would be a Pantheist. But these things are not mere dogmas with Hegel; they appear as the logical results of the most logical of systems. "But in Plato, God is a Reason *in activity*, a living thought." M. Janet mentions this to show Plato's superiority; he thinks that it is absurd for Hegel to attri-

bute *thinking* to God, but thinks the same thing to be a great merit in Plato. (P. 392): "Behold the Platonic deduction [or dialectic]: being given a pure idea, he shows that this idea, if it were *all alone*, [i. e. made universal, or placed in self-relation, or posited as valid for itself,] would be contradictory of itself, and consequently could not be. Hence, if it exists, it is on condition that it mingles with another idea. Take, for example, the multiple: by itself, it loses itself in the indiscernible, for it would be impossible without unity." This would do very well for a description of the Dialectic in Hegel if he would lay more stress on the positive side of the result. Not merely does the "pure idea mingle with another"—i. e. pass over to its opposite—but it *returns* into itself by the continuation of its own movement, and thereby reaches a concrete stage. Plato sometimes uses this complete dialectical movement, and ends affirmatively; sometimes he uses only the partial movement and draws negative conclusions.

How much better M. Janet's book might have been—we may be allowed to remark in conclusion—had he possessed the earnest spirit of such men as Vera and Hutchison Stirling! Stimulated by its title, we had hoped to find a book that would kindle a zeal for the study of the profoundest philosophical subject, as treated by the profoundest of thinkers.

THE JOURNAL
OF
SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

VOL. II.

EDITED BY WM. T. HARRIS.

ST. LOUIS, MO.:
GEORGE KNAPP & CO., PRINTERS AND BINDERS.
1868.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1869, by Wm. T. Harris, in the Clerk's Office
of the U. S. District Court of the Eastern District of Missouri.

P R E F A C E.

The completion of this volume furnishes the appropriate occasion for a rapid review of the contents of the Journal from its first number to the eighth, which closes the second volume. By such review the compass and relation of the articles presented may best be seen.

The ancients divided Philosophy into three departments,

- (a) DIALECTICS,
- (b) PHYSICS,
- (c) ETHICS,

these departments corresponding to what we in modern times call (a) Pure Philosophy or Logic, (b) Philosophy of Nature, (c) Philosophy of Spirit. We propose to arrange the articles of this volume so as to show clearly what has been given in each of these departments:

Pure Philosophy.

1. Mr. Kroeger has contributed two introductions to the "Science of Knowledge" by Fichte, and the "Sun-clear Statement concerning the True Nature of the Science of Knowledge" by that philosopher; these contributions occupying in all some eighty-seven pages of the Journal, and running through six numbers. In these, one will find the clearest and most forcible exposition of the Kantian and Fichtean standpoint. Taken in connection with the translation of the Science of Knowledge itself, published by Mr. Kroeger last year, and Fichte's second exposition of that science which will appear in the third

volume of this Journal, we trust that nothing is wanting to the complete equipment of the student who desires to understand Fichte, unless it be a vigorous commentary by some American student who has already mastered the system.

2. Leibnitz's Monadology has been given for the first time in English. This famous compend of the system of that great man gives in its pure outlines the science of the IDEA, in the highest sense of that term. It stands as the representation of a system of thought which "thinks by wholes"—as the Neo-Platonists term it—a system of thought which ascends above all mere abstractions, and thinks true individuality under the form of the Monad. Not the *Atom*, but the *MONAD*; for the "atom" denotes the simple element of matter—a figment of materialistic abstract theorizing—while the "monad" is the self-contained, independent, simple existence which by its own activity *re-presents* the universe in itself. It is the *Microcosm*.

3. In the Introduction to Philosophy the editor has endeavored to present various important *aperçus* that belong to the department of Pure Philosophy. In other articles he has followed out the same purpose to some extent: "The Speculative," the critique of "Paul Janet and Hegel," and of "Herbert Spencer." Then some discussions resulting from these, as "Nominalism *vs.* Realism," &c., belong to the treatment of the same subject. In all, about sixty-four pages of the two volumes are occupied in this way.

4. Schelling's "Introduction to Idealism" gives, in a lucid exposition, his view of the problems of pure thought. If read in connection with his "Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature," translated, like the former, by Mr. Davidson, a tolerably clear conception of the system of Schelling may be reached.

5. Many passages in the treatment of the Phenomenology of Spirit bear on this subject: as pure science is not only *presupposed* in all applied science, but is actually introduced into all thorough expositions.

In all, about one-third of the pages of the Journal have been devoted to Pure Philosophy or Dialectics.

Philosophy of Nature.

A few articles treat of this in whole or in part. They are

1. "Goethe's Theory of Colors."
2. "Metaphysics of Materialism."
3. Schelling's "Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature."
4. Leibnitz "On the Nature of the Soul in Brutes, &c."
5. "Herbert Spencer."
6. Alcott's "Genesis."

In all, perhaps one-eighth of the work has had this bearing.

Philosophy of Spirit.

This general head includes, besides others, Psychological and Æsthetic articles, and for convenience will be divided.

A. Psychology.

1. The contributions of Mr. Peirce on the "Faculties claimed for Man," "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," "Validity of the Laws of Logic," starting from a Psychological basis, have an important bearing on the problems of Pure Science.

2. Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit," with the Analysis of the same, traces the phases of experience through which the mind passes in its endeavor to complete its comprehension of truth. Strictly considered, Phenomenology and Psychology should be distinguished one from the other, Psychology referring to the faculties of mind as coördinated, while Phenomenology treats of the phases of the culture of mind as successive.

3. Schopenhauer's "Dialogue on Immortality" and "Doctrine of the Will" give sufficient clue to the discerning reader to show the drift of the entire system of that distinguished man.

4. "Sāṅkhya Kārikā" of Kapila: The entire Philosophy of Spirit as treated thousands of years ago by a Brahmin. The freeing of man from external constraint through the activity of thought is opposed to other solutions—such as that which is prescribed by the Vedas.

5. "Cousin's Doctrine of the Absolute" develops the relations of Cousin to Kant and gives the psychological grounds of his system.

In all, about eighty pages are occupied with this subject.

B. Æsthetics.

The departments of Art are five in number: Architecture, Sculpture, Painting, Music, and Poetry, including art-works of Literature under the latter subdivision.

I. The Analysis of Hegel's Æsthetics by Bénard, which has been continued through six numbers of the Journal, has given a general view of Art, and its different styles and phases. It constitutes a complete outline of the Philosophy of Art.

The portions relating to Architecture, Sculpture, Painting and Music have been given, and the more elaborate analysis of the treatment of Poetry will be printed in the third volume.

II. Besides the general treatment contained in Bénard's Analysis, different departments have been illustrated by special articles.

1. *Sculpture*: Winckelmann's Remarks on the Torso and the Laökoön; Goethe's Essay on the Laökoön; these genial interpretations are examples of the best that has been written in the whole domain of art-criticism.

2. *Painting*: Goethe's Essay on Leonardo da Vinci's "Last Supper," and "Raphael's Transfiguration."

3. *Music*: "Dialogue on Music;" "New School of Music;" "Beethoven's Seventh Symphony;" "Music as a form of Art;" Beethoven's Sinfonia Eroica;" these articles show by example what contents musical works of art may have, and, more or less, they develop the theoretic limitations of the art.

4. *Poetry*: "Notes on Milton's Lycidas;" two series of "Letters on Faust;" "A Thought on Shakespeare;" Rosenkranz on "Goethe's Social Romances," treating Wilhelm Meister, the Elective Affinities, &c., and besides this his famous critique on the second part of Faust.

So large a portion has been devoted to the

exposition of Art for the reason that its sensuous content acts most readily upon the incipient phases of culture, and its higher forms work with a genial effect in developing the spiritual faculties.

Art is moreover a subject for free reflection, while Religion has not as yet become such among us. The constraint prevailing in the latter province seriously hinders the pure thinking that is requisite to see the speculative depth of the great ideas that underlie the religion of the day, while those who break away from the popular forms fall into an abyss of nullification such as unfits them for sound positive insight. They wander away from all the landmarks that Spirit has been setting up for two thousand years, and soon find themselves in an attitude of hostility to all the forms and institutions of the age in which they live—all except the most superficial. And yet they find themselves obliged to live a contradiction, for they cannot renounce these institutions practically without committing suicide. Intellectual "clearing-up"—insight—alone can work out for the individual the emancipation which our time demands. To preach renunciation of the convictions arrived at by the activity of reflection is to recommend a suicide worse than that into which those plunge who reject all guidance except their own caprice. The doctrine of Herbert Spencer, that the cardinal point in religion is the confession that the Absolute is unknowable, leads directly to the conclusion: let us have done, then, with all talk about what we can know nothing of—let us leave religion to the past—to the mythologizing age of humanity, and give our whole attention to the sphere of natural science, the *POSITIVE*. Hamilton and Mansell cannot with consistency say nay to this conclusion.

It is evident that any form of activity of mind which involves a union of feeling and intellect must owe to the latter factor all the content it may have. Parental love, for example, cannot be exerted toward a definite object unless the intellect recognizes in that object its relation to the subject of that love. A brute deprived of the senses whereby it can distinguish its own from other off-spring would cherish all alike, and if it could not distinguish the young of its own kind from those of different species, its love would extend to the latter. So of religious feeling, and with far more force, may

this be said, for the intelligence of the subject is here so important that without its ascendancy the form of its action contradicts all that religion should attain. Fetichism, wherein the subject has not distinguished as yet the limits of his own personality, nor obtained any clearness regarding the difference between things and self-determining beings—and whose consciousness, therefore, is a dreamy haze, a life of instinct, a mesmeric intoxication half *en rapport* with the pulses of nature and half a fitful waking to consciousness of self—fetichism is the nadir of Religion, and shows what Religion must be with the minimum of intellect. It does not matter what form of religion one teaches to a people buried in this stage—*provided the intellectual side be ignored*—for such a people will receive any form as no more than a fetichism and are powerless to make it otherwise. So of Religions which though Pagan are far higher in the scale than mere fetichism;—take Buddhism, for example: were the Christian missionary to convert a Buddhistic people to Christianity, and at the same time leave the intellectual mode of viewing things as it was before, he would find that the Christian doctrines had only been substituted in name for those renounced. The story of the missionary, who, in conveying to the savages an idea of immortality, was obliged, on account of the utter want of words containing spiritual import in the language, to teach them that each individual had within him an entrail that never decayed, illustrates this point.

All spiritual culture rises step by step through a cancelling of sensuous facts or of the limits which bound sensuous perception. Thus the first abstract or general idea is a contradiction of the sensuous certitude and involves this absurdity (to the senses), that somewhat should be what it is not—i. e. that a somewhat should have its essence in what exists as other (or alien) to it—a point well shown in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (chapter on "This and the Meaning.") So all higher concepts are reached through downright contradiction of the lower "common sense view." Thus the idea of immortality above spoken of had to be taught simply as a physical absurdity at first. Out of that contradiction arises the abstracted and freer thought of the doctrine. So religion throughout moves in a cycle of super-sensuous-sensuousness—a series of types

that shadow forth with more or less clearness the eternal verity of the universe and at the same time use material types to do it with. The material facts which answer the purpose of typifying spiritual truths are used in a contradictory sense. The phantasy of the believer who appropriates these is thereby loosened from the enthrallment of the merely natural, and this enthrallment being broken, all spiritual possibilities at once open for the soul.

That this first enfranchisement of the soul begins through the Phantasy is to be remembered in order rightly to understand the function of art in a civilization. Then to trace this back into the Mythology and thenceforward into the forms and observances of the system of worship is the next step. Sometimes these mythological types ascend and at others they descend. The myth of Thor's Journey to Utgard and victory over the Giants (untamed natural forces) lifted the Scandinavian consciousness out of its every-day prose reality to such a height that deeds of almost miraculous valor were performed. The same myth subordinated by degrees finally becomes the story of Jack the Giant Killer, and still acts most powerfully upon the phantasy of the child in the nursery, and no one can tell to what mechanical inventions it has contributed the first impulse, or what more spiritual achievements it has prompted.

"Truth embodied in a tale,
Shall enter in at lowly doors,"

and after the Phantasy has seized the intellectual content the clear conception follows, and therewith the complete elevation of the mind out of the previous stage of Consciousness. Thus the religious process commences in the natural and instinctive—the element of feeling—and proceeds toward the clear thought, passing through the stage of Phantasy. Thus Religion is the great Nursery of human spirit, and no culture, no ascendancy above the immediateness of animal life has ever taken, or can take, place except through religion. Those who grow up in modern society and call themselves atheists or infidels, owe, all the same, whatever insight they may possess, to religious training—the only difficulty being for them to recognize the same. For when one lives and breathes an element, it is not easy to separate himself from it so far as to distinguish clearly its outlines, and hence he is apt to

mistake some special form of its manifestation for it. As, for example, one may mistake the men filling the offices of the state for the state itself, and hold likely enough that the state is a very unimportant affair; forgetting meanwhile that in our modern state very little of its essence is embodied in the officers who have the name of administering it, but that its essence is all the more embodied in the individuals who constitute society, so that little is left for the external visible government to do. But were the organism of the state removed—whose essential function is to secure to each man the fruition of his deed, good or bad—the individual deprived thus of the organism which elevated him to such importance as individual, would shrivel up into an atom so insignificant that life would not be worth the having. Thus in the common attitude of the individual toward the state there is quite as much unconscious as conscious relation. No doubt so long as this unconsciousness remains there will arise collisions, and that too of a bloody character. So in Religion the unconscious element, that which the mere sentiment enshrouds, must be productive of collisions, while it impels ever onward toward the self-clearness of pure thought. It is for those who hold by the form as well as the substance of religion to penetrate by careful study the causes of these collisions, and thus get into a position to administer the remedy. And that remedy is LIGHT. No truly religious man would admit that his religion contained aught but the absolute truth. This absolute truth, embodied in such a form as to be *lived and felt* as religion, should also be *thought* as pure truth. The Piety of the Heart leads its possessor to renounce whatever comes between him and the divine mission of his life; the Piety of the Intellect leads to the renunciation of mere opinions, the delusions of the senses—to a seeking, through a speculative insight, the Truth which burns with a consuming fire the shreds of abstraction and stands before the soul in wholeness and holiness.

To attempt to solve the problem of scepticism through an exhortation addressed to the sceptic to give up searching for comprehension, is to preach a one-sided Christianity which ignores the highest attribute of man and seeks to elevate the emotional nature over the rational—a procedure that would end in fetichism if persisted in. That which

proceeds from error of the intellect should be corrected intellectually and not emotionally. Indeed since the intellect furnishes the content for the emotions the latter procedure is impossible, and an attempt to carry it out results only in making a wide breach between the scientific and the religious consciousness.

But it must be confessed that the hostility of Religion to Philosophy does not make much headway except as it is reinforced by weapons from the armory of Philosophy itself. It is to negative, sceptical philosophers, like Kant, Hamilton, and Mansell, that theologians go for arguments to prove the impotency of the human intellect in the pursuit of truth. The great Christian fathers and the theologians that have ap-

peared from time to time in the history of the Church have vindicated the claims of Reason in Religion by showing the speculative depth of the dogmas that form the system of faith.

Scepticism in Philosophy turns for the most part on one of three points. The transition from the sensuous grade of thinking to the freer reflection and the absolutely free movement of speculative thought, encounters—1st, the problem of the Infinite Progress; 2d, that of Essence and Phenomenon; 3d, that of Subjective and Objective, i. e. form of thought and "thing-in-itself."

The discussion of these problems has formed the theme of much that has been in the Journal, and will be made the subject of a special article in the next volume.

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THE JOURNAL

OF

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

Vol. II.

1868.

No. 1.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.

In entering upon a new volume it is proper that we should review our position and endeavor to state the central question more clearly. Not much good can be expected from reading what purports to be an answer to a question that no one has asked. The reader must have the question continually before him, if he would read the ~~an-~~ answer intelligently. It is very easy to illustrate this remark: let one read the commentators of Plato and he will find many of the dialogues pronounced incomplete, because they end negatively. The modern commentator asks questions that Plato did not entertain. In one sense they are incomplete, but so are all of the dialogues if judged by the same standard. The full treatment of a subject should have three stages:—(a) Inmediateness, (b) mediation, (c) absolute mediation. More explicitly, it should be treated first in its most obvious phases, such, for example, as occur in the sensuous knowing. Then follows the treatment of the same object in its complication with other objects; its *relations, pre-suppositions, consequences*, &c. This is called the *reflective* stage, and our formal logic has carefully gathered up the “laws” that govern it. The final stage of an exhaustive scientific treatment traces the object back to itself, having grasped it as a totality. “Absolute Mediation” means *self-mediation*. Plato has not given us a single example of a systematic

combination of these three forms of treatment. The reason for this is found in the fact that the Grecian national culture had not advanced far into the reflective stage. A child of eight years in our time is more conscious of the abstract nature of the words he uses than the average adult Greek of Plato’s time. Therefore Plato does not unfold the second stage so fully as a modern would do. Sometimes, too, his dialogue has for object the production in the minds of his countrymen of just that consciousness of the distinctions of reflection which we possess from childhood. His questions therefore proceeded from his time; all speculation should be directed to the solution of the world before us. Plato solved the problem of his time, and we must take his questions with their limitations or else mistake the purport of his answers. He arrives at the highest goal, but his details are not full enough to satisfy us; he solves by his dialectic only such forms as had begun to appear in that time. The two thousand years that intervene have brought out a host of others which demand solution likewise. Other speculative writers—especially those of modern times—do not often attempt exhaustiveness. They aim to express their *aperçu* in the clearest mode; hence they state their starting point, (which is some conviction resting on a distinction of reflection,) and then proceed to elevate them-

selves above and beyond it to the speculative point of view. Mystics form an exception to this statement in that they do not always start from any standpoint of the ordinary consciousness.

The question must be seized precisely, and this is indispensable in proportion to the systematic exhaustiveness of the treatment.

In Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* the first question is not "what is the absolutely true?" but it is the specific one, "is the object of my certitude true (permanent, abiding) without my subjective activity?" This question being settled in the negative the new question arises: "Is the object perfectly identified through my subjective testimony to its existence?" This question next becomes, "Is it possible at all for an object to exist as absolutely particular?" This gets answered in an exhaustive way. But how many have been misled to suppose that the first answer was intended to settle the general question. Even the acute Feuerbach stumbles over this and refutes Hegel by showing in a number of instances that the first stage of the method which Hegel so uniformly pursues, does not answer the question which should be answered by the *third* stage of treatment. Of course his labor is not remunerative; it does not pay the reviewer to refute a position of his author, which has been stated by the author himself merely for refutation. It is certainly not a discredit to an author, that he has treated a subject in all its phases—shallow as well as deep.

We invite the reader to note our fundamental position.

Truth can be known by the thinking reason. It has been known by speculative thinkers scattered through the ages. Their systems exist and may be mastered. Their differences are not radical, but lie rather in the mode of exposition—the point of departure, the various obstacles overcome, and the character of the *technique* used. Their agreement is central and pervading. The method of speculative cognition is to be distinguished from that of sensuous certitude, and from the reflection of the understanding by the exhaustive nature of its procedure. It considers its

subject in a universal manner and its steps are void of all arbitrariness.

In order to detect a speculative system ask the following questions of it: (1.) "Is the highest principle regarded as a fixed, abstract, and rigid one, or as a concrete and self-moving one?" (2.) "Is the starting point of the system regarded as the highest principle, and the onward movement of the same merely a result deduced analytically; or is the beginning treated as the most abstract and deficient, while the final result is the basis of all?" In other words, "Is the system a descent from a first principle or an ascent to one?" This will detect a defect of the method, while the former question, (1,) will detect defects in the content or subject matter of the system.

Attention should also be called to some special theses which we hope to establish clearly in the course of this volume.

I. In the present attitude of natural science the grade of thought is almost speculative. It has before it all the elements and only needs grasp them together. With the doctrine of the correlation of forces it has arrived at a self moving principle, although it does not yet comprehend (*com-prehendere*) it. If the force No. 1 creates force No. 2, and the latter, force No. 3—if these forces are one and the same force under different phases—and this result goes on to the force No. x which creates force No. 1 again, we certainly have a circular movement and a self-created force. Force No. 1 creates itself by means of a long chain of *media*—No. 2, No. 3, &c. When this is grasped by the "positivist" intellect it will enter the domain of biology and give us a complete science thereof.

II. In the domain of formal logic and metaphysics likewise a stage has been reached that approximates the speculative. The negative and dialectical stage is reached by the advanced thinkers of this domain. The labors of Hamilton have done as much for the English mind as those of Kant for the German. The ability to evolve antitheses ("antinomies" of Kant,) from any metaphysical principles is everywhere displayed. The dialectic is used to exhibit the impotency of the "human intellect"

which is hurled resistlessly from one side to the other. But antithesis is the soul of movement, and when grasped affirmatively gives us the self-determined or the true first principle. The cultivators of formal logic in their extreme care to detect the source of this negative element in the dialectic are at present engaged in seizing and measuring the comprehension and extension of the subject and predicate. Their labors up to present date have served only to narrow the function of the judgment more and more; it is evident, upon consideration, that the abstract identity of subject and predicate—in other words, a meaningless tautology—is all that can remain if formal logic will be *thoroughly* consistent and exclude all trace of contradiction (or, what is the same thing, *distinction*) from the judgment. This we shall endeavor to elaborate in Chapter IX. of the Introduction to Philosophy, printed in this number.

III. The adequacy of scientific forms to contain the contents of mystical systems.

We are fortunate in being able to present in this number another and more elaborate article from Mr. Alcott, the most eminent mystic of our time. We hope to present in a future number an exhibition of his system in its relation to Method. In this connection, also, the article of Dr. Tafel on Swedenborg will be studied with great interest.

IV. That Art and Religion have the same content as Speculative Philosophy. We shall print the remainder of the Essay of Bérard on Hegel's *Æsthetics*, and hope that readers who have the leisure will re-read the whole from the beginning. The "Letters on Faust" we are happy to hear have been found a most comprehensive and clear exposition of that poem.

In conclusion, we hope that the "Phenomenology" will not be neglected, and that the "Sun-clear Statement" of Fichte will be taken up by those who have been completely baffled by the former articles translated from him.

SUN-CLEAR STATEMENT

To the Public at large concerning the true nature of the NEWEST PHILOSOPHY. An attempt to force the reader to an understanding.

Translated from the German of J. G. FICHTE, by A. E. KROEGER.

PREFACE.

Certain friends of transcendental idealism, or of the System of the Science of Knowledge, have attached to this system the name of the newest philosophy. Although this looks somewhat like a satire, and seems to presuppose in those who originated it a search after a *very newest* philosophy, and although the author of that system is clearly convinced that there is only one science of philosophy as there is only one science of mathematics; and that as soon as this only possible philosophy has been discovered and recognized no newer philosophy can arise, and all previous so-called philosophies will be regarded as only preliminary attempts to establish that science: he nevertheless has preferred the use of that expression in the title of a popular work like the present to the risk of using

such unpopular names as "Transcendental Idealism," or "The Science of Knowledge."

Many reasons make it necessary and proper to render an account to the public at large, which has not made the study of philosophy its particular business, concerning the latest attempts to raise philosophy to the dignity of a science. True, not all men are to devote their life to a study of the sciences, and hence not either to a study of the science of all other sciences—a scientific philosophy; and to cultivate this science successfully requires, moreover, a freedom of mind, an industry and a talent which can be found only in a few. Nevertheless it is equally true that every one who claims but an ordinary intellectual culture should know *what* this science of philosophy is; should know—though himself not joining in its investigations—what it proposes to investigate

should know the *limit* which separates its field from the field which he himself occupies, although he himself does not enter the field, lest he might apprehend danger threatening from that world so utterly foreign and unknown to him, to the world wherein he dwells. He should know this, moreover, in order that he may not wrong scientific men, with whom he has, after all, to associate; or that he may not give bad advice to his friends, and dissuade them from a study the neglect whereof may be fraught with terrible consequences for them. All these reasons tend to show that men of culture should at least know what philosophy is *not*, what it does *not* propose to do, and what it *cannot* effect.

To produce this insight is not only possible, but even an easy matter. Scientific philosophy, although rising above the natural view of things, and above common sense, nevertheless stands with its foot upon the field of common sense, and starts from it—in the course of its progress, however, leaving it far behind. To perceive this foot of philosophy resting upon the field of the natural way of thinking, or to watch this its start from ordinary consciousness, is possible for every one who has but common sense, and possesses the attention which may be properly presupposed in every man of culture.

Such a report is moreover indispensable for a system which was preceded in time by an *eclectic* system (still in existence), that had abandoned all claim to a scientific method and to scientific preparatory studies, and invited every one to participate in its investigations who was able to add two and two; and indispensable at a time when the unscientific public is but too ready to take advantage of this invitation, and cannot be dissuaded from the opinion that philosophizing is done in the same manner as eating and drinking, and that each one has a vote on philosophical subjects who has the faculty of speech—at a time when this opinion has resulted in great disaster, dragging philosophical propositions and expressions, which can be understood only in a scientific philosophical system, before the juris-

diction of unscientific common sense and nonsense, thereby bringing philosophy not inconsiderably into bad repute; and when it will be found difficult to pick out, even from amongst real philosophical writers, half a dozen who know what philosophy really is, while others, who seem to know it, whine piteously because philosophy is only philosophy and nothing else; and at a time when even the most thorough of book critics imagine that they have inflicted no little disgrace upon the newest philosophy, by assuring the people that it is after all far too abstract ever to become the ordinary mode of thinking.

The author of this has not hesitated, at various times and in the most varied forms, to make such statements to these pretended art-colleagues. It seems he did not succeed, for he is still compelled to listen to that same old song. He now intends to try whether he can succeed with that public which is not philosophical, as the writer of this understands that term; he intends to show again, in the most comprehensible manner that he finds possible, what he has already shown at various times, and, as he believes, very comprehensibly, in some of his articles. Perhaps he may thus also succeed—at least mediately—in making himself understood to his colleagues of the faculty. Perhaps the honest and unprejudiced reader will become aware, having no philosophical professor's or author's celebrity to maintain, that philosophy needs certain abstractions, speculations and contemplations which he has never before made, and which, when he now tries to make them, do not turn out very satisfactorily; perhaps he will get the insight that this science of philosophy does not at all think or speak about what he ordinarily thinks or speaks; that it cannot contradict him, because it does not at all speak with, of, or concerning him; that all the words which he and that science use in common receive quite a different and, to him, utterly incomprehensible signification as soon as they enter the magic sphere of that science. Perhaps this honest and unprejudiced man will henceforth abstain quietly from speaking of philosophical matters, pre-

cisely as he abstains from discussing trigonometry, or algebra, unless he has studied those sciences; perhaps he will now, whenever the discussion turns upon philosophy, say quietly, "Let the philosophers settle that among themselves, it is none of my business; I shall attend to my vocation." When lay people shall have set an example of this fair abstinence, it may even be possible that men of learning will also cease to get indignant when they are told repeatedly not to talk about matters which they have *not even read of*.

In short, common opinion is that philosophy is inborn in man; and hence every one considers himself justified in discussing philosophical matters. How it may be with this inborn philosophy I shall not now investigate; suffice it to say, that my philosophy, which I surely ought to know better than any one, is not *inborn*, but must be *acquired*, learned; and can be judged only by those who have learned it. The former I shall proceed to show; the latter is its evident result.

It seems hard, it is true, and it is a thing which has always been received with ungracious mien, to deny to common sense the right to judge about matters which are also considered the ultimate end of philosophy—God, Freedom, and Immortality. Hence, also, the quoted example of mathematical (or any other positive) science, has always been rejected and denounced as improper. The argument is: these conceptions are after all grounded in the natural way of thinking of mankind, and hence they are surely in a certain respect inborn.

Now it is to be remembered that, so far as the newest philosophy is concerned, it by no means denies to common sense the right to talk about those subjects, but rather vindicates to common sense that right more emphatically, it appears to me, than any previous philosophy has done; solely requiring of common sense to limit those discussions to *its own sphere*, and for *its own mode of arguing*; but on no account to assert them to be *philosophically scientific*, since the philosophical sphere does not exist at all for common sense. Common sense has the perfect right to

argue about those subjects, and perhaps may argue very correctly; but common sense cannot *philosophize* about them, for this is possible only to those who have learned to philosophize.

If, nevertheless, people are so anxious to retain that favorite expression, "philosophy," and to continue to glory in the celebrity of a "philosophical mind," "philosophical lawyer," "philosophical historian," "philosophical newspaper-writer," &c., let them adopt my repeated proposition, that scientific philosophy should abandon the name "philosophy," and assume the name "science of knowledge." Once assured of this name, our science will gladly assign that other name, "philosophy," to *all sorts of arguing*. Let the public at large, in that case, and all who have not thoroughly studied that science, consider it as some newly-discovered, unknown science, and have faith in our assurance that this science has nothing in common with what they call philosophy, and hence can never enter into conflict with it. Their philosophy shall retain all possible dignity and honor; we ask them only to allow us our claim to the natural freedom of all men, not to take any notice of their philosophy, and beg them likewise not to take any notice of our science in their so-called philosophy.

The following is therefore the real purpose of this work: not to secure any new sphere for the newest philosophy, but merely to secure a just place for it within its own limits. This work itself is not *philosophy*, in the true sense of the word, but merely *argument*. Whoever has read and understood it from beginning to end has not thereby acquired a single *philosophical conception*, but solely a *conception of philosophy*; he has never stepped from the field of common sense, or into that of philosophy, but he has arrived at the limit which separates the two. If thereupon he desires to study this philosophy, he will at least know what he has to direct his attention upon, and what he has to look away from. If he does not desire to do so, he has at least gained the clear consciousness that he does not desire it, and never did desire it; and that hence he

ought to disclaim all judgment regarding philosophical matters. He will also have become convinced that true philosophy can never interfere with or disturb his own peculiar sphere.

INTRODUCTION.

My reader, before you proceed to the reading of this work, let us come to a preliminary agreement.

That which you are going to read in this book has, it is true, been thought by me; but it matters not, either to you or to me, that you should know what I have thought. However much it may have been your habit to read works merely in order to know what their authors have thought and said, I still wish that you should proceed differently in respect to this book. I appeal not to your memory, but to your understanding. My object is not that you should remark what I have said, but that you should yourself think, and, if it pleases heaven, think precisely what I have thought. Hence, if in the reading of this work it should happen to you—as so often happens to readers now-a-days—that you should continue to read, without continuing to think—that you should still be taking hold of the words, without, however, continuing to seize their meaning—desist, redouble your attention, and read over again from the sentence where your attention slipped off, or put the book aside for the day, and commence to-morrow with fresh vigor. Only on this condition on your part can I fulfil the proud promise on the title-page—to force you to an understanding. You must really come out with your mind and oppose it to mine for battle, and to this I cannot force you. If you hold back, I have lost the wager; you will understand nothing, just as you can see nothing if you close your eyes.

But if it should happen to you that from a certain point in this work you cannot in any manner, and by any exertion, convince yourself of the correctness of my assertions, put the book aside, and leave it unread for a considerable time. Continue to use your understanding in the accustomed manner, without thinking about the book; and, perhaps, all of a sudden, with-

out your intending it in any way, the condition of understanding it will come of itself, and you will after a while comprehend quite readily and well what at present you cannot comprehend by any exertion. Such things have also occurred to us, who at present claim some power of thinking. But let me entreat you to give God the praise for it, and to keep utterly silent on this subject until the condition of understanding this work, and its comprehension, have arisen in you.

My argument is one uninterrupted chain of conclusions; each subsequent point is true only on condition of its preceding point having been found to be true by you. If it has not been so found by you, you cannot continue to think as I have thought, and hence your persisting to read would have no other result than to make you acquainted with what I have thought. But this result has always been considered by me as very insignificant; and I have often marvelled at the modesty of most men in placing such a high value upon the thoughts of others, and so little value upon their own, that they will rather spend their whole lives in making themselves acquainted with those, than generate any of their own—a modesty which I desire should be utterly waived in the case of my thoughts.

I.

By observing the external world, and his own internal self, each man of healthy senses receives a collection of cognitions, experiences, and facts. These, the given of immediate perception, he can also renew in himself without that actual perception; he can reflect upon and can hold the manifold of the perception together; can hunt up that wherein the separates of the manifold agree, and that wherein they do not agree. In this manner, if a man has but an ordinary, healthy understanding, his knowledge will become *clearer, more definite, and useful*—will become a possession, which he can administer with complete freedom and agility—but on no account will his knowledge be *increased* by thus reflecting upon it. He can reflect only upon what he has *perceived or observed*, and can *compare* it

only with itself, but on no account can he produce new objects by mere thinking.

This collection of knowledge, and a certain more or less superficial or thorough control over it by freely reflecting upon it, you and I and all men possess in common; and this is doubtless what is meant when people speak of a system or of propositions of common sense.

II.

There did exist a philosophy which claimed that it could increase the above described collection by a mere drawing of *conclusions*, and which held that thinking was not only what we have just described it to be—a mere *analyzing* and *recomposing* of the *given*—but, at the same time, a *producing* and *creating* of *something altogether new*. According to this system, the philosopher was exclusively possessed of certain cognitions which common sense could not attain. According to it, the philosopher could produce through argument, a God, and an immortality for himself, and could argue himself wise and good. If such philosophers are logical, they must declare common sense to be insufficient for the purposes of daily life—since, otherwise, their expanding system would become superfluous—and must invite all who bear a human face to become as great philosophers as they are themselves, so that all may likewise become as good and virtuous as these philosophers.

III.

My reader, does a philosophical system, such as I have just now described, appear to you to be honorable to common sense and its interests—a system which insists of common sense that it should be cured of its inborn blindness in the school of the philosopher, and should there get an artificial light to replace its own natural light?

Now, if to this system there should oppose itself another system, claiming utterly to refute this pretension of a knowledge obtainable only through argument, but inaccessible to common sense, and to show in the most convincing manner that we have no Truth and Reality except the experience which is accessible to all; that there is nothing for life except the above

described system of common sense; that life can be learned only through life itself, but on no account through speculation; and that men do not argue themselves wise or good, but live themselves wise and good—would you, as the representative of common sense, consider this latter system your enemy or your friend, and would you believe its tendency to be to wrap new chains around you, or rather to liberate you from those wherein you have been enwrapped?

Again: If this latter system were attacked, and charged with being hostile to you and threatening your ruin, and if this charge emanated from persons who had all the appearance of belonging to the party of the philosophers of the class first described, what opinion would you hold of the honesty of such persons, or, to use the mildest expression, of their acquaintance with the true position of things?

IV.

You are astonished, my reader. You ask whether these are really the facts of the case in the charges raised against the newest philosophy?

I am forced here to throw aside my character as author, and to assume my individual personality. Whatever people may think and say of me, I am at least known to be not a mere copyist; and, so far as I know, the public is unanimous on this point—nay, many confer upon me the oft repudiated honor of holding me up as the originator of an utterly new system, unknown before me; and the man who would seem to be the most competent judge in this matter—Kant—has publicly renounced all participation in my system. Let this be as it may, at any rate I have not *learned* from any one else what I teach; have not *found* it in any book before I taught it; and hence it is, at least in its form, altogether my property. I ought, therefore, to *know* best my own teachings. Doubtless I also *desire* to state them; for of what use could it be to me here publicly to declare something whereof any one might prove the contrary from my other writings?

I therefore publicly declare it to be the innermost spirit and soul of my philosophy,

that man has nothing but experience, and that he arrives at everything at which he does arrive, only through experience, only through life itself. All his thinking, be it loose or systematic, ordinary or transcendental, proceeds from experience, and has again experience for its object. Nothing except life has unconditioned value and significance; all other thinking, imagining, and knowing, has value only in so far as it relates itself in some manner to life, proceeds from life, and tends to return back into life.

Such is the tendency of my philosophy. Such, also, is the tendency of Kant's philosophy, which will not separate from me, at least on this point; and such, also, is the tendency of the philosophy of a contemporary of Kant—Jacobi—who would have little to complain of about my system if he would understand me on this one point. Hence, it is the tendency of all *newer* philosophy which understands itself and knows what it wants.

I have not to defend any of the others here; I speak only of my own, of the so-called *newest*. The standpoint, the method, the whole form of this philosophy, involves statements which may induce the belief that it does not tend towards the result just described, but towards its very opposite, namely: if its peculiar standpoint is lost sight of, and if that which is valid for it is held as valid for everyday life and common sense. Hence, I need only to describe this standpoint accurately, and to distinguish it carefully from the standpoint of common sense, in order to make it appear clearly that my philosophy has no other tendency than the one just announced. If you, therefore, dear reader, should resolve to remain upon the standpoint of common sense, this work will give you full security on that standpoint against my own and all other philosophy; or should you desire to rise to the standpoint of philosophy, it will furnish you with the most comprehensible introduction to it.

I am desirous to be, for once, clearly understood in regard to the points which I have to treat of here, for I am tired of continually repeating what I have stated so often.

Nevertheless, I must ask the patience of the reader for a continuous argument, wherein I can assist his memory only by repeating propositions before proven, whenever new consequences are to be drawn from them.

FIRST CONVERSATION.

Don't be alarmed, my reader, if I seem to take a somewhat long route. I am anxious to make very clear to you certain conceptions which will be of importance in future, not for the sake of these conceptions themselves, which are but common and trivial, but for the sake of the results I propose to derive from them. Nor shall I analyze these conceptions further than is absolutely necessary for my purpose, as you may tell the book critic, who will perhaps expect here an analytical art work.

To begin, you surely know how to distinguish the really actual, that which is the true fact of your present experience and life, or that which you actually *live* and *experience*, from the non-actual, the merely imagined. For instance, you at this moment sit in your room, hold this book in your hand, see its letters, and read its words. This is doubtless the actual event and determinedness of your present life-moment. In thus sitting and continuing to hold this book, you doubtless can remember yesterday's conversation with a friend, can represent this friend to yourself as if he actually stood before you, can hear him speak, can make him repeat what he said yesterday, &c., &c. Tell me, is this latter, this appearance of your friend, equally the actual and true event of your present life-moment, with your sitting in your room and holding this book?

The Reader. By no means.

The Author. But I should think something at least, even in this latter state, is an actual and real event of your life; for tell me, do you not in the meanwhile continue to live—does not your life pass away in the meanwhile—is it not filled up with something?

R. I see; you are right. The true event of my life in the latter state is precisely my *placing* my friend *before me*, my making him *speak*, not his actual *being with me*.

This placing him before me is that where-with I fill up the time which I live in the meanwhile.

A. Hence, there must be a *common* somewhat in your *sitting there and holding the book* and in your *placing your friend before you, recalling his conversation, &c.*, by means of which common character you judge of both cases, that they are *actually real events of your life*. On the other hand, that *yesterday's actual conversation* and presence of your friend must also not have this common character—which would warrant you to consider it as actually occurring—in the connection of time wherein you place it to-day by recalling it. Nay, it has, probably, an opposite to this common character, which causes you to-day to declare it to be not actually occurring.

R. It certainly must be so. My judgment must have a ground; a similar judgment must have a similar ground; an opposite judgment an opposite ground, or the absence of the former ground.

A. What may this ground be?

R. I do not know.

A. But you judge every moment of your life concerning actuality and non-actuality, and judge correctly, in conformity with other rational beings. Hence, the ground of those judgments must be always present to you; you only do not become clearly conscious of it in your judgment. As for the rest, your answer, "I do not know," signifies only: "Nobody has yet told me." But even if it were told you, it would avail you nothing; you must find it yourself.

R. However much I revolve the matter in my mind, I cannot get at it.

A. Nor is it the right way to be guessing at it and looking around for it. It is in this way that those systems arise which are purely imaginary. Neither can you get at it by drawing conclusions. But try to become thoroughly conscious of your procedure in this judgment concerning actuality and non actuality; look into yourself, and you will at once become conscious of the ground of your procedure, and will internally contemplate it. All that can be done to assist you is to guide you in the right direction, and this guidance is indeed all that can be obtained from philosophical

teaching. The presupposition must always be that you have within yourself, and contemplate and observe, that towards which the teacher guides you. Otherwise, you will only be listening to the narrative of another's observation, and not of your own; and, moreover, to an *incomprehensible* narrative, for that upon which all depends cannot be described in words as composed of things already known to you, but is an absolutely unknown, which can become known to you only through your own internal contemplation, and can be characterized by anything sensuously known only in the way of analogy, which characteristic, therefore, receives its full significance only through contemplation.

Remember this, once for all, when similar cases arise in the future, and try to spread it amongst our celebrated writers who do not know it, and who speak very awkwardly concerning the relation of philosophy to language. But to the point:

When you are engaged in the reading of this book, in the observation of this object, or in the conversation with your friend, do you reflect upon your reading, observing, hearing, seeing, or feeling of the object, or your speaking to your friend?

R. By no means. I think not at all upon myself. I forget myself utterly in the book, in the object, in the conversation. Hence, people use the expressions: "I am engaged in it," "immersed in it," "lost in it."

A. And this, by the bye, all the more, the more intense, full, and lively your consciousness of the object is. That half dreamy and listless consciousness, that inattention and thoughtlessness, which is a characteristic of our age, and the most unconquerable obstacle to a thorough philosophy, is precisely the condition wherein men do not utterly *abandon* themselves to the object, do not bury and forget themselves in it, but always flutter and waver between the object and their own consciousness.

But how is it in the case when you place before you an object not held by you as actual in the present connection of time; for instance, yesterday's conversation with your friend? Is there also something in

this case to which you abandon yourself, wherein you forget yourself?

R. Certainly. Precisely this *placing* the absent object *before me* is that wherein I forget myself.

A. You stated a short while ago, that in the former condition it is the *presence* of the object, and in the latter condition the *re-presenting* of the object to your mind, which constitutes the true reality of your life, and at present you state that you forget yourself in both. Here, then, we have found the looked for ground of your judgment concerning actuality and non-actuality. The self-forgetting is the characteristic of actuality; and in each condition of life, the focus wherein you throw and forget yourself, and the focus of actuality, are one and the same. That which tears you from yourself is the actually occurring, which fills up your life-moment.

R. I do not quite understand you.

A. I was forced to establish this conception so much in advance, and have in the meanwhile characterized it as clearly as possible. But if you will only keep up attentive conversation with me, I hope it will become very clear to you in a short while. Can you also represent again the representation just now made by you of yesterday's conversation with your friend?

R. Doubtless. Nay, this is the very thing I have done during our reflection on that representation. I did not so much represent that conversation as rather the representing of that conversation.

A. Now, tell me what in this representation of the representing do you hold to be the real *factual*, or that which fills up the fleeting moments of your life?

R. Precisely this representing of the representing.

A. Now let us retrace our steps. In the representation of yesterday's conversation—please become thoroughly conscious of it, and look into your consciousness—how was that conversation related to your consciousness, and to the real factual which filled your consciousness?

R. The conversation, as I have already stated, was not the actual event, but merely the *reconstructing of the conversation*.

Nevertheless, the event was not a mere *reconstructing in general*, but the reconstructing of a *conversation*, and, moreover, of this *particular conversation*. The reconstructing, as the chief point, was accompanied by the conversation; and the latter was not the actual, but the modification, the *general determination* of the latter.

A. And in the representing of this representation?

R. In the representing of the representation, that representing was the actual event; the representation the further determination of it, since it was not a representing in general, but the representing of a representation; and the conversation, finally, was the further determination of the (represented) representation, since the representing had for its object not a representation in general, but a determined representation, namely, that of a determined conversation.

A. Hence, each reality, each true and actually occurring event in life is that wherein you forget yourself. This is the beginning and real focus of life, whatever further subordinated determinations this focus may involve, because it happens to be such a particular focus. I wish and hope that I have made myself quite clear to you, and am sure I have been successful, if during this investigation you have only been always within yourself, looking into yourself, and attending to yourself. Tell me, whilst you represented yesterday's conversation, or—since I prefer not to assume a mere fiction, but to place you right into your present condition of mind—whilst you just now argued with me, thereby filling up your life and throwing into it yourself, you doubtless hold that many other things have moved and happened *outside of your own self and mind*?

R. Doubtless. The hand of the clock, for instance, has moved, so has the sun, &c.

A. Have you seen or *experienced* this moving of the hand of the clock?

R. How could I, since I was arguing with you, throwing my whole self into it, and filling up my life with it?

A. How, then, do you know concerning

the movement of the clock—to stop at this example?

R. I looked at it before, and noticed the place pointed out by the hand. I now look at it again, and find that the hand has moved to another place. I *draw the conclusion* from the arrangement of the clock, which was previously known to me, likewise through perception, that the hand has gradually moved whilst I was arguing.

A. Do you assume that, if instead of arguing with me, you had occupied the same time in looking at the clock, you would have actually perceived the movement of the hand?

R. Most certainly do I assume it.

A. Hence, both your arguing and the movement of the clock are, according to what you say, true and actual events of the same moment of time; the latter, to be sure, is not an event of *your life*, since you lived something else during the time, but it might have become an event of your life, and would have become so necessarily, if you had paid attention to the clock?

R. Yes.

A. And the hand of the clock has actually and in fact moved without your knowledge and activity?

R. That is the assumption, certainly.

A. Do you believe that if you had not argued—just as you did not look at the clock—your argument would also have moved on without your knowledge or activity, like the hand of the clock?

R. On no account. My arguing does not move of itself; I must carry it on, if it is to be carried on.

A. How does this apply to the representing of yesterday's conversation? Does that also come to you without any activity of your own, like the movement of the clock, or must you produce it yourself, like the argument?

R. If I consider it carefully, I do not know. True, just at present I am convinced that I actively produced it, because you asked me to do so; but since it often happens that images crowd through my brain, and come and go without any co-operation of my own, just as the hand of the clock moves, I cannot decidedly say whether that representation might not have

come into my head without any activity of my own, and without your request.

A. With all the respect which an author owes his reader, and which I really entertain towards you, let me tell you that this confusion of yours is of bad augury for the continuation of our conversation. I hold that men should dream only in their sleep, but should not when waking allow images to crowd of themselves into their brain. The absolute freedom arbitrarily to give a determined direction to your mind, and keep it in that direction, is an essential condition, not only of philosophical, but even of healthy common thinking. But in the hope that you will, at least during our present investigation, keep these foreign images away from your mind, and resist that blind operation of an association of ideas, I will drop this doubtful point of sensuous representation, and solely make use of your confession concerning the freedom of argument.

It seems, then, that there are two kinds of actuality, which are both equally actual, but of which the one makes itself, while the other must be made by him for whom it is to be, and is not unless he so makes it?

R. So it appears.

A. Let us consider the matter a little. You say the hand of the clock has actually moved during your argumentation. Would you be able to say this, would you know this, unless you had *looked again* at the hand after your argument, and had now drawn your conclusion from the *actual perception* that it occupied another place?

R. Certainly not.

A. Do not forget this; it is very important to me. All reality of the first kind—however much it may proceed in its course without your knowledge and co-operation, or may exist *in itself*, i. e. unrelated to any possible consciousness, a point which we shall not discuss here—all such reality is at least *for you*, and as an event of *your* life, only in so far as you at some time direct your attention to it, throw yourself into it, and take hold of that reality with your consciousness. When we consider this well, your assertion that the hand of the clock has moved from one place to an-

other, from the time of one of your perceptions to that of a second perception—with-
out which latter perception the hand would
never have come into your consciousness
again—and during this intermediate time
while you did not observe it, can only
signify : *you would have perceived the hand
moving if you had directed your attention
to it.*

Hence, by this assertion of an event out-
side of your life, you only assert a *possible*
event within your life, a possible continu-
ous flow of this life from the first percep-
tion of the hand to the second perception.
You supply and add a series of possible
observations between the end points of
your two actual observations. Now, if
I pledge you my word that I shall always
speak only of a reality *for you*, and never
replace it by a reality *unrelated to you*,
nor speak or assert anything of this latter
sort of reality, will you then allow me to
consider the continuation of an external
reality, without any act of your own, as
merely the continuation of your own *pos-
sible* consciousness and life, since you
have seen that it becomes reality for you,
after all, only in this manner?

A Reader (who, perhaps, may even
be a celebrated philosopher). I will
hear nothing more of such stuff. Have I
not sufficiently hinted to you that this is
pure insanity? I always proceed from a
reality in and for itself, from an *absolute
being*. I cannot go higher, and will not.
The distinction which you make between a
reality in itself and a reality for us, and
the abstraction in the former which you
undertake, and which, as I now apprehend,
is the corner-stone of your system, you
must first demonstrate to me!

A. Indeed? You are able to *speak* of a
reality without *knowing* of it, without
seizing it, at least dimly, in your conscious-
ness, and relating it to your conscious-
ness? You can do more than I can. Put
down the book; it is not written for you.

A second and fairer Reader. I will ac-
cept your limitation to speak only of a
reality for us, on condition that you remain
true to it, and speak of reality in itself
neither good nor evil. But as soon as you
transcend your limits and draw a conclu-

sion to the disadvantage of the latter, I
also shall leave you.

A. Not more than fair. If we then pre-
suppose this view, that only our relation
to reality and actuality is to be considered,
our consciousness would appear about as
follows : *All reality*, whatever name it may
have, becomes reality for us only through
our immersing and forgetting ourself in
certain determinations of our life, and
this forgetting of ourself is precisely that
which gives to these determinations where-
in we forget ourselves the character of
reality, and which gives us *life* at all.

Thus there result certain *fundamental*
and *primary* determinations (the next fol-
lowing opposite will make clear these ex-
pressions, which I entreat you to consider
maturely,) of our life, as its true roots,
which make and continue themselves, and
to which we only need to *surrender* our-
selves and allow them to take hold of our
being, in order to appropriate them and
make them our actual life; and the con-
tinuous chain whereof, no matter if they
are dropped at certain links, can always
be arbitrarily taken hold of again, and be
supplied backward or forward from every
point.

I say we only need to *surrender* ourselves
to them, for even these fundamental de-
terminations cannot *pull* us irresistibly
towards them; we having, moreover, the
faculty to pull ourselves (a fact which was
forgotten in those determinations) loose
again from them, and to create freely out
of ourselves a higher series of life and ac-
tuality for ourselves. We can, for instance,
think and seize ourselves as the *knowing*
in that fundamental consciousness, or as
the living in that fundamental life; or
we can rise to the *second* degree of life, if
we call the remaining within the funda-
mental determinations the *first* degree of
life; or we may again seize ourselves as
the thinking in that thinking of original
knowledge, as the *contemplating* of our
own life in that positing of it, which would
result in a third degree of life; and so on
ad infinitum.

The whole distinction between that first
degree and the higher degrees, between
the previously given life—which was pre-

sented to us, and which we need only to accept in order to make it our actual life—and that life which is not given to us, but which must be produced by our self-activity, is probably this: that from each of the higher degrees you can look down and descend into a lower one; whereas from the lowest one you cannot look down, because it is itself the deepest, and cannot go lower except into the realm of nothingness; that hence we are conditioned in regard to the *descent* by the lowest one, but not in regard to the *ascent* through reflection; and that this lowest one is, therefore, the real foot and root of all other life. Hence, I called it the primary and fundamental determination of all life.

For us, let it be here sufficient, conformably to our agreement, to consider this sphere of the first degree as the sphere of such fundamental determinations of our life, but on no account as the sphere of things in and for themselves, a view which we here discard. Be they ever so much the latter, in and for themselves, for us they exist only as determinations of our life, or by our living and experiencing them, and we are content here to speak of them only in relation to us. The content of this sphere is often more specially called *reality, fact of consciousness, or experience*.

Know, reader, that hereafter we shall reflect solely upon this system of the first degree. Do not forget this for a single moment, but separate whatsoever belongs to the higher degrees from it.

I include in this system of the first degree all that which we perceive through our external senses in space, or through our internal sense in our soul. In regard to the latter, this sphere includes also what I have termed higher degrees, not as regards their *content*, but as regards their *form*, namely: the laws which it observes, for these laws belong to the facts of the internal sense, and are perceived when we carefully observe ourselves in those proceedings of the soul.

The chief object of the present conversation, my reader, was this: that you should (but quite arbitrarily, and only to suit my future purpose,) separate all the occurrences of your consciousness into two

classes, and should clearly comprehend the distinction of what belongs to the one and what to the other class; that you should separate that which is product of freedom, and which therefore belongs to the higher classes, and should look to that only which I have called the first degree. Only in so far as you have clearly seen this distinction, and hold to it, can you correctly seize that which will be the subject of our other conversations.

SECOND CONVERSATION.

A. Do not forget, my reader, the distinction we have drawn between two fundamental determinations of all possible consciousness, but keep in mind that I shall speak only of the former of the two which I have called the fundamental and primary determination of all life. Let us now renew our conversation, without any fear on your part as to how we can return to our argument.

Let us consider the interior of a mechanical work of art; for instance, of a watch. You observe many wheels of various kinds joined together in it, likewise springs, chains, &c. Your observation goes from one object to another in its perception of the manifold of the machinery. Tell me, does it make any difference to you in this, your observation, whether you commence with the upper or lower part of the machinery, with the right or left side of it?

R. Certainly not. I can complete my observation of the parts in all these directions.

A. But perhaps, instead of guiding your observation by the sequence of the parts, you direct it by other characteristics, as, for instance, their external similarity and equality?

R. This also is a matter of indifference to my observation.

A. Nevertheless, just as sure as you have observed the separate parts, you have observed them in a certain order of sequence, let us say from the upper part downward. Why, since there were many sequences possible for your observation, did you then choose this particular sequence and none other?

R. I cannot even say that I did choose

it. I did not even consider that many sequences were possible. I immediately hit upon the one I followed. It was by *chance*, as we say when we can assign no ground.

A. The manifold of the above described fundamental determinations of consciousness in general doubtless observe also an order of sequence in your consciousness?

R. Assuredly. I observe in the world before me at present this, next that, next that, &c., &c.

A. Does it strike you at the first glance, that this sequence of your observation is necessary, or do you hold that the sequence might have been otherwise?

R. I hold that other sequences might have been possible, and, moreover, that I did not choose those observations which did occur in my consciousness with freedom, but that they came into me by chance, like the sequence of my observation of the manifold elements in the watch.

A. At present, let us return to this watch and your observation of its separate parts.

In examining each separate part, this wheel and this spring, each by itself, and finding it altogether determined in a certain manner, of a certain size and a certain form, &c., does it seem impossible to you that it might be otherwise, or can you conceive that it might be otherwise, larger or smaller, in the most manifold manner?

R. I hold that each separate piece, considered in and for itself, might well be infinitely otherwise as such separate piece. But all these pieces are to work together, and to produce a single result in their union; and if I take this view of the subject, all the pieces must, in my judgment, fit together and reciprocally work upon each other. If I take this view, it is certainly possible to make another whole, e. g. another and larger watch, or to make the machinery of the watch serve other purposes besides its proper own; and in this case, the separate wheel which I observed not only could be otherwise, but would necessarily have to be otherwise. But if you ask me to speak only of *this* particular watch before us, then I must say it is absolutely necessary that this wheel should be precisely as it is, and not a hairsbreadth different, for the very reason that the whole

is as it is, or rather because all other pieces in the watch are as they are. Again: If I commence my observation with this single piece, I must say: If this piece is once given as a piece of such a mechanism, then it is necessary that all other pieces be precisely as they are, if they are to form a whole with it.

A. Hence, if you only properly understand the mechanism of this work of art, you will not need at all, as we assumed at first, to observe one part of the machinery after the other in actual perception, but after you have seen and correctly comprehended the one part, you can by its means supply all the others without actually perceiving them; you can replace them by mere conclusions from the construction of the one part, and these mere conclusions will show you all the other parts needed for the completion of the machinery.

R. Undoubtedly.

A. Is it all the same for this purpose what particular piece of machinery I give to you for examination?

R. All the same, for all the others must fit each possible piece; hence from each possible part it is possible to conclude how all the others must be constructed, in so far as they are to be determined through the mere mechanism of the work.

A. Now assume the possible case, that—in respect to a certain sphere, and to a certain extent, which this is not the place to define more closely—there is, in the manifold parts of the above-described fundamental determinations of all consciousness, such a connection, similar to the mechanical one just pointed out, and that hence each separate part of that manifold object must fit to and be determined by all other parts, and *vice versa*. In that case, would it not be possible to discover, by means of mere conclusions drawn from each separate part of actual consciousness, how all other consciousness must be—although that other consciousness do not become actual—precisely as you held yourself able to state from your observation of one wheel the construction of all others, although not actually observing them?

Assume, moreover, that philosophy, or, if you prefer, the science of knowledge,

consists in this very hunting up of the manifold elements of consciousness, by means of conclusions drawn from the given to the construction of the not-given, and you have already a very clear conception of that science. That science is the demonstration, or the deduction, of all consciousness, of course in its primary and fundamental determinations, from some given determination of actual consciousness; precisely as you undertook a demonstration or deduction of the whole watch from one of its given wheels. That science is a demonstration of this consciousness utterly independent of actual perception in consciousness; precisely as you need not actually perceive all the other parts of the watch in order to know how they are, and necessarily must be, in actuality, if the watch is properly constructed.

R. Very true, if I reflect only in a superficial manner on what you say, and accept the comparison without objecting. But if I reflect closer, your conception appears to me to be self-contradictory. The science of knowledge, you say, furnishes me with a consciousness of the fundamental determination of my consciousness, without these determinations actually occurring in consciousness. How is that possible? Do I not become conscious of what the science of knowledge teaches?

A. Undoubtedly; precisely as you become conscious of the wheels, the existence whereof in the machine you assert from a mere conclusion, but not conscious, as if you saw or felt them. It ought to have become clear to you ere this, that there is a distinction in the modes of becoming conscious. I shall define them more clearly after a while, for the purpose of our investigation. At present, let not this deter you from accepting our assumption.

R. Truly, I have no great desire to go on and investigate what might result if the merely possible should become actual, or the impossible possible; and your presupposition of a systematic connection amongst the fundamental determinations of our consciousness seems, indeed, to belong to these impossibilities.

A. I trust I shall be able to remove your objections to the impossibility of my presupposition. For the present, please draw only one conclusion with me from that assumption—a conclusion which I cannot too speedily draw for the sake of annihilating misunderstandings of another description, and of removing their secret effects upon your mind.

If you examine a separate piece of the watch, and proceed to draw your conclusions according to the well-known laws of mechanics as to the construction of the other necessary parts, in order to give to that one part, which you actually perceive, the whole determinateness which you perceive belongs to it, do you, in this your function of drawing conclusions, actually see and feel, or perceive with your external senses, those other parts?

R. By no means. To use the illustration used by you in the first conversation: these other parts are not related to my consciousness like this book which I hold in my hand, but like the representation of yesterday's conversation with a friend. The real factical in this operation, that wherein I immerse and lose myself, is not the existence of wheels, but my representing of them, my—not so much *re-constructing*, as *pre-constructing* them.

A. Do you, or does any rational man, claim such a representation, such an internal tracing out of a piece of machinery to be the actual working machinery of real life? And does any one say, after having, for instance, described and demonstrated to you such a watch, "Now put this watch into your pocket; it will go right; you can pull it out whenever you choose, and see by it what time it is"?

R. Not that I know, unless he be a complete fool.

A. Take care and do not say so. For this was precisely what that philosophical system says, of which I spoke in the introduction, and against which the so-called *newest* is chiefly directed. That system pretended its demonstration of a watch, and moreover an incorrect demonstration, to be a real, and even a most excellent watch.

But if any one, to whom you have

demonstrated a watch, should finally say: "How can this help me? I do not see that I shall thus get possession of a watch, or that your demonstration will be able to show me what time it is;" or if he should moreover accuse you of having spoiled his actual watch by your demonstration, or of having demonstrated it out of his pocket, what would you say of such a one?

R. That he was as much of a fool as the first one.

A. Take care and do not say so. For precisely this—this insisting on a real watch, when you have only promised them a demonstration of one—is the most weighty objection that has yet been raised against the newest philosophy—and has been raised, moreover, by the most respectable professors and most thorough thinkers of our time. Upon this mistaking of the actual thing for its mere demonstration are grounded, indeed, all misapprehensions to which that philosophy has been exposed. I say emphatically, are grounded all objections and misapprehensions. For why should I not, instead of continuing to presuppose what that science may be, historically state what that science really is to its originators, who undoubtedly know something about it.

1. Philosophy, therefore, dear reader—or, since this word might lead to disputes,—the science of knowledge first of all utterly abstracts from all that we have above characterized as *higher degrees of consciousness*, and limits itself with its assertion, which we shall directly state, to the *primary and fundamental determinations of consciousness*, altogether in the sense stated above.

2. In these fundamental determinations the science of knowledge makes a further distinction between that whereof each rational being asserts, that it is the same for each other rational being, or valid for all reason; and that whereof each confesses that it exists only for our race, for *man-kind*, or perhaps only for this *particular individual*. The science of knowledge abstracts also altogether from this second class of determinations of consciousness, and hence only the former class constitutes the substance of its investigations.

If any reader should remain in doubt concerning the ground and the laws of this latter distinction, or if he should not be able to make it as clear to himself as the primary distinction between determinations of consciousness in general, this would not interfere with any of the results we intend to establish in this work; nor would it interfere with the obtaining of a correct conception concerning the science of knowledge. In that science itself, to which we do not propose to introduce the reader here, the distinction between those two classes arises of itself.

For those who are acquainted with philosophical terminology, we add the following: That class of fundamental determinations of consciousness, which is valid for all reason, and which alone is the object of philosophy, is what Kant calls the *a priori*, or primary; and the other class of determinations, valid only for the race, or for the individual, is what the same author terms the *a posteriori*. The science of knowledge does not need to make this distinction in advance of its system, since it is made and grounded in the system itself; in the science of knowledge those expressions, *a priori* and *a posteriori*, have quite a different meaning.

3. The science of knowledge presupposes, for the purpose of gaining an entrance for itself and a definite problem for itself, that there may be a systematic connection in the manifold elements of those fundamental determinations, by means of which connection, if one is, then all the rest must also be, and be precisely as it is; and hence that those fundamental determinations within the described sphere constitute a system complete in itself.

I say, that science presupposes for itself this in advance. For, first, it is not yet a science, but only becomes such through that presupposition; and, secondly, it only presupposes, but does not prove it at first. Those fundamental determinations are known, let us say, to the teacher of the science of knowledge; whence? it does not matter here; he hits upon the thought—how? it does also not matter here—that there may be a systematic connection

between them. He does not as yet maintain this connection, nor does he claim to furnish immediate proof of it, and still less does he claim to prove anything else by his presupposition. His thought may be merely an assumption, an accidental notion, which is therefore to signify nothing more as yet than any other notion.

4. By virtue of this presupposition, the teacher of the science of knowledge now proceeds to the attempt to see whether, from some one fundamental determination of consciousness—this is not the place to say from which—he can deduce all others as necessarily connected with it and determined through it. If the attempt fails, it does not prove that it may not succeed another time, or that the presupposition of a systematic connection is false. It retains its validity as a problem. If the attempt succeeds—if really all the fundamental determinations of consciousness, except the presupposed one, can be completely and exhaustively deduced from it, then the presupposition has been proved by the fact. But even this presupposition, thus proved, is foreign to us in a description of the science of knowledge. The business of that deduction is the science of knowledge itself; where it begins the science begins, and where it ends the science ends.

This, then, my reader, consider settled and fixed between you and me: The science of knowledge is the systematic deduction of an actual, of the first degree of consciousness; and that science is related to this consciousness as the above demonstration of a watch is related to the real watch. Being mere science of knowledge, it has no pretensions to be anything else, or anything besides; and would rather not be than be anything else than what it is. Every one who claims anything more or else for it does not know that science.

The objects of the science of knowledge are the fundamental determinations of a consciousness, as such—i. e. as the determinations of a consciousness—and on no account as things actually existing outside of consciousness. We shall see after a while that both may be one and the same in and for that science, but we

shall also see why the science can take only the former view. At present it suffices to state it as a fact.

Now these fundamental determinations of consciousness, which the science of knowledge has for its object, also occur in actual perception—or rather those determinations themselves are perceptions; but the science of knowledge has them for its object in quite a different manner from that in which perception has them. Precisely as the consciousness of the real presence of your friend was related to the representation of that presence, or as the actual watch was related to the demonstration of a watch, so actual consciousness is related to the science of knowledge. When we philosophize we immerse ourselves not into these fundamental determinations themselves, but into the reproducing and reconstructing of them.

Hence the science of knowledge, without paying any attention to actual perception, deduces *a priori* what it asserts ought to occur in perception, and hence *a posteriori*.

This sphere the science of knowledge has adopted ever since its first existence—nay, has clearly indicated it by its very name. It is scarcely to be comprehended why people will not believe that science to be what it states itself to be.

Limiting itself to this sphere, the science of knowledge can allow every other philosophy to be what it pleases: love of wisdom, wisdom, world-wisdom, life-wisdom, or whatever other kind of wisdom there may be. But that science makes the fair request that itself should not be taken for the equal of those other sciences, and should not be judged and refuted from their standpoint; and the authors and professors of that science only ask that they shall not be compelled to become co-laborers in those other philosophies, or to take notice of them. As for the dispute, what this one or that one may consider philosophy to be, the science of knowledge takes no cognizance of it. It appeals to its right to select its own problem; and if anything but the solution of this problem is to be called philosophy, then it does not choose to be called philosophy.

I hope, my reader, that this description of the science of knowledge, as a mere historical description, is altogether clear and comprehensible, and admits of no ambiguity whatever. I merely wish to request you to remember this description,

and not to forget it at the first opportunity; and to believe me that I am serious in this description, and that it is to last forever, I repudiating whatsoever may contradict it.

SWEDENBORG AND SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

By R. L. TAFEL.

The object of the following pages is to explain Swedenborg's relation to Speculative Philosophy. This has been set forth at large by the late Prof. Dr. Immanuel Tafel, of the University of Tübingen, in his various philosophical writings.* In these he starts with the positions laid down by Swedenborg, and proves them by the methods of the philosophers.

My course in this article will be, first, to declare Swedenborg's positions with regard to rational or speculative philosophy, from his own writings, and afterwards to let Prof. Tafel prove these positions by the methods of the philosophers. For the sake of convenient reference I shall number the extracts from Swedenborg's writings, and in the article translated from Prof. Tafel I shall subjoin additional quotations from Swedenborg, in order to show that the philosophy of the former is essentially a philosophical demonstration of the principles of the latter.

The quotations from Swedenborg will be

* The Religious System of the New Church (Religions-system der Nenen Kirche), first part: treating of Religion and Revelation, and their relation to reason. Tübingen, 1832.

History and Criticism of Scepticism and Irrationalism (Geschichte und Kritik des Scepticismus und Irrationalismus), in their relation to Modern Philosophy, with special reference to Hegel. Tübingen, 1834.

Fundamental Philosophy (Fundamental Philosophie), in its genetic development, with special reference to the history of each single problem. Vol. i. Tübingen, 1848. Vol. ii., which was left in manuscript by the author, is in process of publication.

The Principal Truths of Religion (Die Hauptwahrheiten der Religion), or Hours of Meditation concerning the final grounds of the Truths of Religion. Part i. Tübingen, 1852.

Open Letter to Prof. Dr. M. J. Schleiden of Jena, (Offenes Sendschreiben,) Tübingen, 1856.

made both from his philosophical writings, which were written before his illumination, and from his theological writings, which were written after his illumination—for the two classes of writings are supplementary to one another, and the latter are really based upon the former. Moreover, Swedenborg has never abrogated his scientific and philosophical writings, but uses the principles contained in them constantly in illustrating and confirming his religious doctrines. Among the theological works quoted are his "Arcana Coelestia," "Divine Love and Wisdom," and "Divine Providence," which were published by himself, and the "Spiritual Diary," and "Adversaria," which he left in manuscript. Among the philosophical works which will be quoted are his "Principia," "Outlines of the Infinite," and his "Animal Kingdom," and "Economy of the Animal Kingdom."

1. "It is commonly believed, that a man from the light of nature, thus without revelation, may know several things which relate to religion; as, that there is a God, that he is to be worshipped and to be loved, likewise that man is to live after death, with several other truths dependent on these; and that man may infer these things by his own intelligence; but I have learnt from much experience, that a man of himself, *without revelation*, knows nothing at all concerning divine things, nor concerning those which relate to celestial and spiritual life." (*Arcana Coelestia*, 8944.)

2. "The power of divining true principles by the mind alone and of descending therefrom, in the path of certainty, through their consequences, to posterior things, belongs exclusively to higher beings and

powers; to spirits, angels, and the Omniscent Himself, who indeed inhabit the brightest light, and dwell in essential truth and wisdom. They see all things, in one complex, as at once beneath them and within them; they view the last things from the first, the lowest from the highest, the outermost from the innermost; in a word, all the circumferences from the centre; consequently the very effects of the world from their causes. Not so human minds, which derive from the senses, or absorb through the senses, all the materials which they have to reason upon. For we are born in dense ignorance; in process of time organs are opened for us, and ways prepared, and images themselves are sublimated, until they become ideas, and at length reasons; which, when connected into series, are brought under the inspection of the reasoning power. Thus, by slow degrees only, judgment is developed and reason displayed. This, then, is man's only way of attaining truths, so long as his soul lives in the body. Can you tell me by synthesis or *a priori*, before seeing the viscera or examining the interior parts, what is contained within the animal body? Can you predict that it contains the liver, the mesentery, the kidneys, the heart, the arteries, and an infinity of other things; still less that they are connected together in one way, and in no other? Must you not rather, like a blind man, afflicted with cataract and suffusion, present to yourself ludicrous imaginations, and dream dreams, at which you yourself, when you shall have looked into them, must ultimately either blush or laugh? But alas! we are so puffed up with self-conceit, that we seem to ourselves to be not in the outmost, but in the inmost; to be standing, not on the earth, but in the sky; and in no faint or uncertain light, but in the brightest radiance; nay, in heaven itself, whence we descend before we ascend, and where we even build our airy palaces; not knowing that our very height must aggravate the peril of our fall. This, as we before said, is the cause and the source of the insanities of the human mind." (*Animal Kingdom*, vol. i. Eng. ed. pp. 6 & 7.)

And again he says in the same work, p.

4: "Synthesis, which begins its thread of reasons from causes and principles, and evolves and unwinds it until it reaches the effects of the causes, and the phenomena resulting from the principles, assumes some particular principle familiar and favorable to the intellect, as formed by previous ideas; and however susceptible this principle may be of doubt or controversy, synthesis seizes it as a truth, and lays it down; and thus presumed, defines and disengages it, and confirms it, first rationally, then empirically. Should anything adverse appear, synthesis polishes away, represses and removes it, until at length the truth can come upon the stage, naked at first, but afterwards bedecked and ornamented; exactly in imitation of the inverse method of analysis, which is called, also, the *regula falsi*, or, rule of false position. And synthesis, in reality, is nothing but a poor, precocious and vague analysis; it gives out nothing more than what has crept into the intellect; and among the intellectual ideas, by way of the senses, from a few phenomena of experience, without any general bond to connect them; and for the most part in the first impetuosity of the judgment. The hasty conceptions thus formed at the mind's first glance, are termed opinions, conjectures, hypotheses; whence come systems.

"This has been the received and established method for ages past, from the very infancy of philosophy, through its later and maturer development; and now, also, it endures and flourishes by the favor of our contemporaries, being adopted exclusively even at the present day in reasonings on the causes of things which are naturally abstruse and profound. It is, also, pleasing and wonderfully accommodated, and in a manner akin to human minds; it enables each mind to indulge its own tastes, to favor its own state, and to assent to an order, whose laws are proclaimed as truths. And we are very easily impelled and carried away into ideal games of this kind, inasmuch as they are races of our thoughts from assumed starting places to the very goals we desire to reach. This, also, pimps to self-love and self-glory, for, as nothing properly belongs to us but the produce of

our own minds, when these have conceived anything, and are supported by plausibilities, we suppose we have divined the pure reality, opened the true Delphos, or Heaven itself, unlocked oracles which the genius of our predecessors never penetrated, and, in a word, earned an indisputable palm of victory. But those who commence with this species of scholastic exercitation, that is, who set out relying on mere reasoning, not fortified by the sure patronage of experience, will never, as I think, attain the goal; for they begin from the goal and hurry to the starting place; thus they bend their course outwards instead of inwards, contrary to the order which the nature of the human mind prescribes for the discovery of the occult and unknown.

"But granting, for argument's sake, that any of the chiefs or rulers of the learned world, commencing from synthesis, may have perhaps taken the false for the true, but with the intention of afterwards eliciting from it purer truths, by means of analysis, or the rule of false position, and of correcting, perfecting, and polishing it, like the sculptor working the rude marble:—Tell me then, I pray, which of them has thus followed the rules of analysis? Which of them afterwards has wrought and corrected the visions and appearances he imbibed and pre-determined, perhaps in the very dawn of thought, and which were adverse to the truth? Instead of this have not they all, as experience shows, sought the confirmation of the false, and not of the true? For while the will is directed to the false, it is constantly detained in those things, also, that confirm it, or are conformable to it. Hence the presumption becomes more and more confirmed by plausible arguments, until at last it has the same power of persuasion as the truth itself. For whenever affirmative reasoning is applied to a pre-conception, an infinity of particulars, all voting the same way, fly to its assistance,—both the decrees of ratiocinative philosophy, and the phenomena of the world, laid hold of in the fallacious light of the senses. Indeed, there is nothing but may form a constituent part in different series of reasonings, if not directly, at least obliquely; as a single particle

of salt may form an ingredient in an infinity of savors, and a single color in an infinity of pictures; and one thing may be engrafted on another, as branch upon branch; thus, the legitimate upon the spurious; so that falsehood assumes the form of truth, and the measure of the fiction increases by meditation. At length, when the phantom is led forth upon the theatre of what is called the learned world, multitudes run to it, passionately admire it, favor and applaud it; nay, numerous connoisseurs embellish it with paint and new decorations, so that it looks like a phantom no longer, but like a beautiful Venus, or a Delphian virgin. Whatever is now poured from its mouth, you are to regard as the voice of destiny, or the response of an oracle. But all things have their day; among the rest, the produce of the human faculties,—particularly those misshapen offspring, the monsters of hypothesis. They are conceived, they are born, they grow to maturity, they grow old, at last they die. But from the ashes of each, new ones arise; and every hydra head that is lopped off by the youthful Hercules, produces hundreds of others: whence spectres of similar brood prevail for ages, and, like enchantresses, distract the human mind perennially. Hence errors, mental obscurity, fallacies, and strife; civil wars between the soul and the body; scholastic contentions about straws and trifles; the flight and exile of truths; and stupor and thick darkness in those very things where the light is most brilliant: and this to such an extent, that the very altars and their sacred fire are contaminated; which is the reason why the philosophy of the human mind is solemnly proscribed in the divine records.

"All this—Swedenborg adds—is owing to the habit and the propensity of reasoning synthetically."

Such are the utterances of Swedenborg concerning synthetical philosophy, before his illumination; after his illumination, he speaks as follows:

3. "Philosophical studies, from their very first origin, thus for some thousands of years, have rested merely in terms and syllogisms; and since it is only terms that they care about, as what form is, what ac-

cidents are, what modes are, and the like, it cannot be otherwise but that the mind should remain in ideas only, without any life, because without light. For they do not apply their philosophy to things rational; or what they do apply are mere terms; from which, if they dispute, they are like those who learn the words of a language, and that not for the sake of expressing any meaning thereby, but only for the sake of talking; and since they concentrate and contract all the powers of the mind upon that in which there is no life, thus upon material things only, they consequently form in their minds a callous substance, through which no light can pass. Such, also, is the case with *sylogistic or logical philosophy*, which so confines the ideas of the mind, that there is scarcely any aperture for the light to come in. Wherefore, such wise men as these are much more stupid in spiritual and heavenly matters than the most insignificant among the crowd, or than any rustic." (*Spiritual Diary*, 866.)

4. "There are some studies by which man's faculty of thinking, and his rational mind is entirely destroyed. Among these are philosophical studies, when through a series of conclusions a result is drawn from the definitions of terms and the conclusions thence. As these series, when strung together, represent such things as cannot be understood by anybody, and among which no connection can be seen, they take away all reason; while, nevertheless, they involve nothing but what may be explained in a very simple manner, so as to be understood by everybody. To these studies also belongs *logic*, which limits truths, and renders them doubtful; especially when from several things one thing is evolved, which thereby becomes involved; and frequently the conclusion is of such a nature that it may be understood without any syllogism. Logic is, in this respect, like geometry and algebra, when they are employed in demonstrating simple truths; and when through angular, circular, and curved figures something intricate is expressed, which, when set forth according to the rules laid down in these sciences, becomes quite unintelligi-

ble. Through these sciences and such practices man loses his common sense and becomes insane." (*Diarium Mixus*, 4578.)

5. "As concerns philosophy, every one of its parts has had thus far no other effect than to darken the mind, and thus to close the way to the intuition of interior, and at the same time, also, of universal things; for it stops short in mere terms, and in disputes concerning them. * * * By these practices it not only obstructs the ways to interior things, but, also, blinds the mind, and utterly banishes faith; so that in the other life, a philosopher who has dwelled much on, or indulged in like things, becomes stupid and, beyond all others, ignorant." (*Spiritual Diary*, 767.)

Such is, according to Swedenborg, the state of the philosophers, who do not derive the principles of their philosophy from revelation, but imagine that they are independent of revelation, and able to generate truth from their own consciousness. There is, however, a philosophy which, according to Swedenborg, agrees with revelation. He contrasts this with the former in the following passage:

6. "There are two principles, of which one leads to all folly and madness, and the other to all intelligence and wisdom. The former principle consists in denying everything, or in a man's saying in his heart that he cannot believe anything, unless he is convinced by such things as he can comprehend or be sensible of; this principle leads to all folly and madness, and may be called the negative principle. The other principle consists in affirming the things of doctrine drawn from the Word, or in thinking and believing in oneself that these things are true, because the Lord has spoken them; this principle leads to all intelligence and wisdom, and may be called the affirmative principle. They who think from a negative principle, the more they consult the things of reason, of science and of philosophy, do but the more plunge themselves into darkness, till at length they come to deny all things; the reason of which is, because no one from lower things can comprehend higher, nor, consequently, spiritual and

heavenly, and still less divine things, because they transcend all understanding; moreover, all things are in this case imbued with negative things from the ruling principle. But they, on the other hand, who think from an affirmative principle, may be confirmed by all things whatsoever of reason, of science, nay, by those of philosophy; for all these things serve them as corroborations, and afford them a fuller idea of the subject." (*Arcana Cælestia*, 2568.)

The distinction between affirmative and negative philosophy is further discussed in the following passages:

7. "Philosophy, such as it is at present in human minds, destroys all faith, but philosophy in itself, which is true philosophy, agrees with the things in the Divine Word; just as external things agree with internal things, or nature with heaven, for nature is so constituted that there is a complete concordance or harmony. The philosophy of the human mind ought to be of such nature that spiritual and heavenly things may be seen from it; and such a philosophy is possible, because such is the nature of philosophy in itself.

"When there is such a philosophy, then there is acquired by means of it an intellectual faith, to which the human mind may have recourse when there arise doubts about the things to be believed. But if the mind has recourse to it at the present time, then faith is at once destroyed, for the philosophy of the present day is of such a nature that it expels faith, and thus extinguishes the light of truth and induces darkness; the result of which is, that the mind can no longer be illustrated except by a miracle, viz.: when a different state is induced upon the mind, which can only be brought about by misfortunes, sickness, and thus by anxieties, and finally by what are called pangs of conscience; consequently, by an indefinite variety of modes adapted to the state of each one's mind. It is evident, however, that this is much more difficult with such as are imbued with the philosophy of the present day than with the more simple ones." (*Adversaria*, vol. i., n. 914.)

8. "It is very evident, indeed, that phil-

osophy, such as it is in itself, can never be opposed to the things in the Divine Word, for natural and heavenly things agree; as in man, his natural and his spiritual nature agree when he is a true man, for nature is formed by the Supreme Creator, so that it is perfectly obedient to spiritual things; the world itself, with its nature, being created for this very purpose, that it might yield obedience to the things ordered by heaven, just as the body of man, with its nature, is so constituted that it may obey the spiritual mind in everything it intends and embraces as an end; so that in nature there may be effects, but in heaven causes and beginnings, as is the case in the human body.

"Philosophy or human erudition judges and concludes spiritual from natural things; and as the natural man, since the fall, is of such a nature as to be entirely opposed to the spiritual man, and to fight continually against it, therefore the philosophy which is drawn from the rational mind of such a man is of such a nature that it destroys the things derived from the Divine Word. Wherefore it is not so much philosophy itself, regarded in itself, which is at fault, but the human mind which has become such since the fall, and from which mind philosophy is drawn." (*Adversaria*, vol. i., n. 911.)

Concerning the origin of philosophy from the human mind, Swedenborg makes the following statement in his *Animal Kingdom*, vol. ii., p. 356:

9. "It is beyond all doubt that the rational mind of man is in its very nature philosophical, and has the ability to arrange and distribute ideas in an analytic form, and to revolve and sum them up so as to form a certain conclusion; for all our philosophy and logic is derived from no other fountain or collected from no other streams than from the operations of the rational mind, which not only herald with their light, but even instruct us, their subjects, in the matter of philosophy and the manner of philosophizing, which shows that we cherish and possess in ourselves the very master of philosophy, to whose utterances the most learned among us must listen in humble dependence; and so much

is this the case, that the philosopher may derive innumerable materials deserving to be inserted in his code from the common herd of the unlearned. The boy and the youth in their simple speech sometimes run through more axioms of philosophy and logic, through more categories and series of consequences, than the prince of philosophers can distinctly set forth in his pages. Each copula or connection of words contains some philosophical principle, much more an entire oration, as every one may perceive if he will only bestow a little attention upon particular cases. The mind does not derive these predicates from its body, but from a higher essence, in which the above faculty is innate—in fact, from the soul, which lives immediately under the auspices of the Superior Mind. Philosophy is a kind of anatomy of the human mind; for as we are ignorant of what lies hidden in the body, and of how the organic fabrics act upon each other, until the viscera are opened and examined, so, also, without investigation we are ignorant of what lies hidden in the mind. The grand philosopher is he who scrutinizes these subjects with the greatest depth and distinctness."

Let us see what further conditions Swedenborg lays down to the philosopher in order to enable him to evolve a true system of philosophy:

10. "No man seems to have been capable of arriving at true philosophy since the age of that first of mortals, who is said to have been in a state of the most perfect integrity, that is to say, who was formed and made according to all the art, image and connection of the world before the existence of vice. All who are governed by a right mind aspire after, nay, are intensely desirous of arriving at, the same degree of wisdom, as at something which we have lost; but how far it is possible to succeed, none but the true philosopher can see. He who is only in part a philosopher, or who wishes to be reputed one, may suppose himself to have arrived at the goal, and even to have proceeded beyond it, while his fancied wisdom is after all a mere hallucination. The reason why a man in a state of integrity was made a

complete philosopher, was that he might better know how to venerate the Deity, the Origin of all things, that Being who is all in all; for without the utmost devotion to the Supreme Being, no one can be a complete and truly learned philosopher. True philosophy and contempt for the Deity are two opposites, Veneration for the Infinite Being can never be separated from philosophy, for he who fancies himself wise whilst his wisdom does not teach him to acknowledge a Divine and Infinite Being, that is, he who thinks he can possess any wisdom without a knowledge and veneration of the Deity, has not even a particle of wisdom. The philosopher sees, indeed, that God governs His creation by rules and mechanical laws, and that the soul governs the body in a similar manner. He may even know what those rules and mechanical laws are; but to know the nature of that Infinite Being from whom, as from their fountain, all things in the world derive their existence and subsistence—to know, I say, the nature of that Supreme Intelligence, with its infinite arcana—this is an attainment beyond the sphere of his limited capacity. When, therefore, the philosopher has arrived at the end of his studies, even supposing him to have acquired so complete a knowledge of all mundane things that nothing more remains for him to learn, he must there stop, for he can never know the nature of the Infinite Being, of His Supreme Intelligence, Supreme Providence, Supreme Love, Supreme Justice, and other infinite attributes. He will therefore acknowledge that in respect to this supremely intelligent and wise Being, his knowledge is nothing. He will hence most profoundly venerate Him with the utmost devotion of soul, so that at the mere thought of Him his whole frame, or membranous and sensitive system, will awfully yet sweetly tremble, from the inmost to the outermost principles of his being." (*Principia*, vol. i., Eng. edition, pp. 34, 35.)

The first requisite of a true philosopher, according to Swedenborg, is, therefore, to be a sincere worshiper of the Divine Being, and he must be deeply conscious that no man from his own power is able to fathom

His depths. This is expressed in even stronger terms in the following passage :

11. "If the soul, which is within nature and below the first substance of the world, is of infinite intuition, what must be the case with the Supreme Being, who is above nature, and whose essence is life and wisdom? It is impossible to think of Him as limited and within the universe, for necessity dictates that He is that to which no limits can be assigned—in other words, that He is infinite. But, since in this Divine Abyss there is nothing but what is eternal, infinite, holy, away and away! we exclaim, with reason and philosophy which, long before they arrive at the verge of this fathomless deep, fail and are forced into silence from the inability of language. They, then, who by the guidance of mental philosophy dare to attempt this abyss, become the devoted victims of their rashness. They return, as it were, paralyzed and faltering, like persons who have looked over sheer precipices into the vast profound, or else blinded, like those who have gazed upon the sun; and ever after, as I have often deplored, some spot or shadow flits before the eye of their reason, which at all times is dull enough of itself, so that they are blind in broad daylight, and live at the mercy of their own phantasies, a just punishment for their presumption. If an expression must be used to signify this Almighty Being, there is no other than the word 'Jehovah,' the I AM and the I CAN, yet understood in Himself and above all nature; but if expressed within nature, He is called God, and omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence, are attributed to Him, although the mind cannot define these attributes, except from the finite sphere and the all thereof, so that it gains no idea of the infinite. This very I AM, or *esse*, is life, the life is wisdom, the wisdom is all for the sake of the end, that the *esse* may be the first and last end, for the sake of which, or for which, every finite in the universe exists." (*Economy of the Animal Kingdom*, vol. i., p. 238, Eng. edition.)

According to Swedenborg, the faculty of becoming a philosopher is not possessed by every one, but philosophers are born, like poets and musicians. This he teaches in

the following passage, where he gives an additional picture of the true philosopher :

12. "To find out the causes of things from the study of given phenomena, certainly requires a talent of a peculiar kind. It is not every one that can confine his attention to one thing, and evolve with distinctness all that lies in it; it is not every one that can think profoundly, or, as Cicero says, 'that can cast up all his reasons, and state the sum of his thoughts,' or, as in another place, 'that can recall the mind from the senses, fix upon the real truth in everything, and see and combine with exactness the reasons that led to his conclusions.' This is a peculiar endowment, into which the brain must be initiated from its very rudiments, and which must afterwards, by a gradual process, be made to acquire permanence by means of habit and cultivation. It is a common remark, that poets, musicians, singers, painters, architects, and sculptors, are born such; and we know that every species of animal is born with that peculiar character which distinguishes it so completely from every other species. We see that some men come into the world as prodigies, endowed with superhuman powers of memory, others with an extraordinary activity of the whole faculty, amounting to a peculiar strength of imagination and intuitive perception, by virtue of which no sooner do they set the animal mind in motion on any subject, than they excite the rationality of the corresponding rational mind, they arrange their philosophical topics into a suitable form, and afterwards engage in thought till they see clearly whether their opinions are consonant with the decisions of a sound judgment, when, if any element of an obscure character embarrasses the subject, by a happy gift of nature, they separate the obscure from the clear, and in its place insert some other element more conformable to the general idea, so as to make all the parts aptly cohere. With a natural facility, they distribute their thoughts into classes, and separate mixed topics into appropriate divisions, and skilfully subordinate series thus perspicuously divided, one under the other; that is, the particular under the general, and the gen-

eral under the universal. Thus are they never overwhelmed by the multiplicity of things, but continually enlightened more and more, and, by the help of arrangement and general notions, recall to mind, whenever they please, such parts of the subject as had become effaced from their notice, and unfold such as are complicated or perplexed.

“Those who are born with this felicity of talent, and afterwards proceed in due order to its development, the more profoundly they penetrate into the depths of science, the less do they trust to their imagination, and the more cautious are they not to extend their reasoning beyond the strict limit justified by facts; or, if they indulge in conjecture at all, they treat it as mere surmise and hypothesis until experience bespeaks its correctness. They avoid as a hydra any premature attachment to, or implicit credence in, opinions, unless there are circumstances duly to support them. Even if they retain them in their memory, they do not admit them as links in any chain of reasoning, but, while conducting their argument, in a manner banish them from thought, and keep the attention fixed on data and facts alone. The fictitious depresses them, the obscure pains them, but they are exhilarated by the truth; and in the presence of everything that is clear, they too are clear or serene. When, after a long course of reasoning, they make a discovery of the truth, straightway there is a certain cheering light, and joyful confirmatory brightness, that plays around the sphere of their mind, and a kind of mysterious radiation—I know not whence it proceeds—that darts through some sacred temple in the brain. Thus, a sort of rational instinct displays itself, and in a manner gives notice that the soul is called into a state of more inward communion, and has returned at that moment into the golden age of its intellectual perfections. The mind that has known this pleasure—for no desire attaches to the unknown—is carried away wholly in pursuit of it, and in the kindling flame of its love despises, in comparison as external pastimes, all merely corporeal pleasures, and although it recognizes them as means

for exciting the animal mind and the purer blood, it on no account follows them as ends. Persons of this cast consider the arts and sciences only as aids to wisdom, and learn them as helps to its attainment, not that they may be reputed wise for possessing them. They modestly restrain all tendency to inflated ideas of themselves, knowing that the sciences are an ocean, of which they can catch but a few drops. They look on no one with a scornful brow or a supercilious air, nor arrogate any praise to themselves. They ascribe all to the Deity, and regard Him as the source from whom all true wisdom descends. In the promotion of His glory, they place the end and object of their own. * * *

13. “As the natural gift we have mentioned—or the faculty by which the understanding sees acutely and distinctly into the series of things—is to be perfected by the use of means, so, even where this faculty is by nature excellent, there are many things that retard its advancement, diminish its energy, and enfeeble its efforts. Such, for instance, are the desires of the animal mind and the pleasures of the body, which render the rational mind, when too compliant to them, unable any longer to pursue its high investigations, for then it is, as it were, in bonds, and forced to go wherever lust will have it. This faculty is impaired and destroyed also by the cares and anxieties arising from domestic circumstances and the consideration of worldly prospects, for these determine the mind to low and outward things, and never raise it to the high and inward. Nothing superinduces more darkness on the human mind than the interference of its own fancied providence in matters that properly belong to the Divine Providence.

“This faculty, however, is chiefly impaired by the thirst for glory and the love of self. I know not what darkness overspreads the rational faculties when the mind begins to swell with pride, or when our intuition of objects calls up in the objects themselves the image and glory of our own selfhood. It is like pouring a liquor upon some exquisite wine, which throws it into a froth, sullies its purity, and clouds its translucence. It is as if the

animal spirits were stirred into waves, and a tempest drove the grosser blood into insurgent motion, by which the organs of internal sensation or perception becoming swollen, the powers of thought are dulled, and the whole scene of action in their theatre changed. In those who experience these disorderly states, the rational faculty is crippled and brought to a standstill, or rather its movements become retrograde instead of progressive. A limit is put to its operations, which its possessor imagines to be the limit of all human capacity because he himself is unable to overstep it. He sees little or nothing in the most studied researches of others, but everything—oh! how vain-glorious—in his own; nor can he return to correct conceptions until his elated thoughts have subsided to their proper level. ‘There are many,’ says Seneca, ‘who might have attained to wisdom, had they not fancied they had attained it already.’ The Muses love a tranquil mind, and there is nothing but humility, a contempt of self, and a simple love of the truth, that can prevent or remedy the evils we have described.” (*Economy of the Animal Kingdom*, vol. i., pp. 8-12.)

In conclusion, I propose to give, as a specimen of the manner in which Swedenborg treats speculative subjects, a portion of his argument concerning the Infinite. This is taken from his work entitled, “*Outlines of a Philosophical Argument on the Infinite, and the Final Cause of Creation*”:

14. “The more deeply human wisdom commits itself to the investigation of the divine or infinite essence, the more deeply it is involved in a labyrinth. For example, let THE INFINITE be the difficulty that the philosopher is impatient to solve. As soon as he arrives at the point where he begins to enquire into the qualities of the infinite, he at once whets his mind, consults all the oracles of reason, and collects a thousand arguments from whatever particulars are fixed scientifically in his memory. These arguments, however, be it observed, are taken in the first instance from the finite sphere, for in consulting the oracle of reason, they can come from no other source.

Besides, the reasoning mind knows none other than the finite, consequently can produce none other, for it is informed and developed by finite things and through finite senses, and seeks the unknown by the analysis of the known; and, moreover, being finite itself, none but finite things can be known to it. In the first place, therefore, the philosopher institutes a comparison of a general kind between the finite and the infinite, or between a living, intelligent, and active finite, and a living, intelligent, and active infinite. But rational philosophy at last rejoins, that no comparison or relation can subsist between the finite and the infinite; that if the philosopher must enquire, by relation and proportion, into the essence of the infinite from the essence of the finite, the infinite will necessarily appear null in relation to the finite, or else the finite null in relation to the infinite; for the infinitely small becomes proportionately as nothing in relation to the greatest or least finite, if we may so express ourselves. On the other hand, the greatest or least finite becomes nothing relatively to the infinitely great. Whence, if we postulate either the infinite or the finite, the other perishes in the comparison. (p. 7.)

15. “The human mind, however, does not rest satisfied with even the above answer, but in the course of its enquiries into things descends to one detail after another, and distinctly proposes to solve the difficulty by scrutinizing, in the first place, every hole and corner of the subject. As yet, indeed, it does not thoroughly doubt, neither deny or reject, nor yet affirm, but cherishes the hope of still solving the question so long as anything whatever remains untried. It therefore now goes into details for the enquiry, to enable it the better to see whether what at first appears impenetrable and inexplicable, may not somewhere or somehow be explained; and for this purpose it directs its attention to magnitude, space, extension, form, or to quantity and quality, or other similar *geometrical conditions*. And as it knows that there is an infinite in the least sphere, and an infinite in the greatest, so it compares the substances, quantities or qualities of

the finite with the infinite, and in the first instance probably supposes—for the supposition is extremely natural—that God is the least or simple element of quantity and space, and likewise the greatest. Yet, as the reasoning goes deeper, the inference comes that if God be the least, then He cannot be infinite, for the least or minimum of quantity or quality still retains somewhat of the finite, according to which God is not infinite; and so the mind plunges deeper into the knotty labyrinth, and can hardly emerge from it again. For what is that minimum which is infinitely little? What is the infinitely little, or the infinitely least? Such an entity is impossible, and therefore there is no escape in this direction. There is no quantity infinitely small. All quantity must be either finitely least, or it must be a simple of some kind, or the subject must be infinite without predication of quantity, magnitude, space, extension, form, quality, or smallness. Furthermore, as there can be no proportion between the infinite and the finite, there is therefore the same between the least finite and the infinite as between the greatest finite and the infinite. The difference between the two finites, or between the greatest and the least of nature, is itself finite, and therefore makes nothing relatively to the infinite; so that no possible ratio exists. Here, then, the mind is again at fault, and this time is deeper plunged than ever in the formidable maze. (p. 8.)

16. "As, then, the infinite is not the least of substantials, the least of extension, the least of quantity, or the least of form—that is to say, is not the least of geometrical entities—the human mind goes onwards, turns over the subject in every way, and asks whether the infinite may not be the pure and least actuality; at once the least and the greatest in motion, in celerity, in motive force; in short, whether it may not be at once the least and the greatest of *mechanical entities*? The mind is aware that no finite can exist without a cause; that nothing can result or happen from causes without a mode; that modification can never take place without a change or variation of limits, either of those of the parts or the whole; that nothing can ex-

perience such variation of limits, or of the parts and the whole, without motion; that motion cannot exist without a substance that is moved; and that no substance can undergo motion without assuming reference to degrees and moments, which give birth to succession in celerity, or, what is the same thing, in time, and hence to motive powers in mechanics. As, then, motion or mode supposes the finite and substantial, or as the mechanical always immediately supposes the geometrical, and as the infinite cannot admit of modification, the mind concludes again that the infinite cannot be the greatest mechanical entity in the sphere of leasts, more especially as it is not the least geometrical entity, the former being a causate and effect, while the cause and efficient lies in the latter. (p. 9.)

17. "Still, however, the mind is dissatisfied and perplexed, and to enable it to investigate the essence of its infinite and its divinity, it passes analytically from geometrical and mechanical grounds to a something analogous to the geometrical or mechanical; to something conceived as pure; to an entity that is not finite, that is indivisible, not extended, not consisting of parts, and therefore neither formal nor modified—in a word, to the *pure simple*. And in this it recognizes a kind of primitive causant and agent preceding the state in which finites can exist from it, and finite existences subsist. For extended entities must originate and subsist ultimately from non-extended; entities possessing magnitude, dimension, space, and form, must come from entities destitute of these categories; limited beings from non-limited; geometrical entities from geometrical points—in a word, all compounds from relative simples, and these latter from positive or pure simples. But if the pure simple be the primitive, from which compounds could exist by succession, as the limited exists from the unlimited, the extended from the non-extended, the geometrical from geometrical points, or as numbers from simple units, still they could not have existed without a mode, or some analogue of a mode, nor without reference to some sort of limit in the simple, although it may be

only a single limit, the simple therefore being not finite; for the finite must consist at least of two terms, or of two ends, and therefore must originate out of the multiplication of simples in a simple mode or analogue of a mode. The result is, that still the mind does not see that it has approached the essence of the infinite, because the infinite is devoid of all parts, terms, and modes, and, moreover, involves nothing that can be said to resemble geometrical and mechanical entities. (p. 9.)

18. "Still finding himself here entangled in an inextricable difficulty, the philosopher turns to other sides of the question, and considers whether God be infinite or not, or, whether there be any infinity in respect of time, or, what amounts to the same thing, whether there be any eternity or not. Generally speaking, the conclusion is that there is nothing but has had an origin. When anything is presented as existing, there must be a commencement, time and source from which it began to exist. No entity or actuality can possibly be without having an origin, if not within myriads of years, at least within myriads of myriads; or if not within these, the mind only multiplies and multiplies again innumerable myriads by innumerable other myriads, until it supposes that it hits the origin by this process. Now, therefore, it occurs to the philosopher that there was a time when God took His rise, according to which He cannot be eternal. Yet He is styled eternal, and eternity is time without end, or is, in respect of time, the infinite we seek; and time itself is no more than a peculiar relation to modes proceeding from finite and substantial beings, like celerity in motion, namely, its successiveness, and denotes only the degrees and moments thereof, and thus is like to, and almost identical with, celerity, and consequently is mechanical, and therefore similar to the geometrical; for where there is no substance there is no celerity, and where there is no celerity there is no time. Pondering these considerations, the mind doubts and hesitates respecting the existence of eternity, and whether there is aught from eternity, aught that has never at any time had an origin, however far back such origin might

be in multiplied series of myriads of years. It falls then again into precisely the same difficulty, and stumbles over this identical and inexplicable first question, particularly as quantity, space, motion, time, and all things, conspire and consent naturally and rationally in declaring that there is no infinity in any of them. (p. 10.)

19. "If the philosopher be determined of purpose, he does not cut the knot or reject the difficulty until he has wandered over the whole of rational philosophy, both in general and in particular, and at one time diffused, at another concentrated, his attention, and divided and again divided, and multiplied by degrees and powers, and gone from one deep part of the question to another, and this repeatedly, and until he finds that although in his calculus he can apparently approach *the indefinite*, yet that nevertheless he is coming no nearer to the infinite, or to anything like it, or to anything without end. At last, when he sees all these impenetrable mazes, when he has had such repeated experience of their difficulties, and has found that they all combine to form one and the same unfathomable problem, viz., this: that by all the reasons of the case, no infinite can possibly exist, because it does not exist for any rational, natural, or geometrical analysis—after this result, he secretly concludes that the divine essence is probably not infinite, but indefinite, and the least and the greatest in all things; and as he sees in the greatest, too, a natural and geometrical condition, or an analogue of the least in quantity, space, and time, he guesses that the Divine is the prime being of nature, and consequently that nature and God are in a manner one and the same. And thus occasionally the philosopher may at length, by his own imperfect investigations and analysis, become a worshiper, not of God, but of nature. * * * (p. 11.)

20. "For the purpose of prosecuting our enquiry, let us accept the very conclusion with which reason presents us, viz.: that naturally, or in nature, the infinite is impossible; that that which is the first or least of things is a natural something, or similar to a natural, the infinite being as nothing in proportion. Granting, then, a

first or least natural something, or any analogue thereof, the question occurs: WHENCE, and BY VIRTUE OF WHAT CAUSE, could such an entity exist? This of itself incites our reason to endeavor to ascertain its cause. If we suppose that it existed from itself, or was its own cause, we at once have a consequence which is flatly repugnant to reason. If it be finite, if natural, or if similar to a finite or natural, that which is finite in it, or which is natural, or analogous to natural, must have a cause or origin. If it admits in it aught that is similar to the finite, whence comes this similar? How can it admit anything in it without a cause? Thus the philosopher straightway sees that his mind is toiled anew in the old difficulty, and he finds that he now doubts what he had before concluded on the ground of his own reason respecting the origin of nature; for he wishes, at all events, to give a competent answer to the question of the source and cause whereby this first natural could exist, and exist in the manner that it does. Reason dictates clearly that it could not originate itself, because it is finite, or similar to finite, and must in the first instance be finited, or made similar to the finite. The philosopher, therefore, now revolves in his mind whether it can exist from itself. He affirms, denies, doubts; he sees that it cannot be, but that there must have been a cause for it. If it did exist from itself, it could not even do this by accident, because one sees that where no cause is present, neither is any cause or accident; casualty itself demands not a simple or single, but a multiple causation. Furthermore, if the natural primitive arose by accident, and were such as accident could make it, how could all its derivatives and subsequent issues be of such distinguished harmony that not only the elements, worlds, and planets, but the vast and beautiful kingdoms founded upon them, should exist in an order and tenor at once so stupendous and so delightful. Nothing of the kind could come by accident; for if it did, then all the productions subsequent to it would be similar to the accident, and destitute of order—in short, the supposition of accident is unsuited to the occasion. If we

say that the above natural did not indeed proceed from accident, but from something remotely like it, the same *nodus*, the same inextricable difficulty, still remains. WHENCE this something? If again we say, from itself, pray then whence this precise finite with its distinctive *qualities*? And here the mind again suggests, that if finite it be, there must have been a time when it was finited; therefore, time must enter into the case, and origin also. If it came from itself, or by accident, why did it not come sooner, since it might as easily have arisen before as when I did? Therefore one does not see in this way either, how primitive nature could have existed from itself. The end is, that we conclude with reason, as nothing finite, or similar thereto, can arise without a cause, that primitive nature had a cause.

“If, then, primitive nature existed from a cause, the cause could not be finite, either in itself, or in its origin; for if it were, it also would desiderate a cause, to finite it. We conclude, therefore, with reason, that the infinite is the cause of the finite, albeit we do not know the nature or *quale* of the infinite. Thus, though we are so far ignorant, yet we are bound to acknowledge the infinite as a cause; and consequently to acknowledge the first and least natural entity as a causate. Thus, by the question of WHENCE, of cause, or of UNDE, we may be brought to a confession of the infinite, but not by the question of QUALITY, distinctive nature, or *quale*. * *

21. “The infinite is the cause of the finite, which it could not be if it did not exist. No cause can produce an effect, unless the power to produce lie in it: but that the infinite produced the primordial seeds of nature, and consequently the world, has been already stated. Actual NOTHING can furnish us with no cause: nothing comes of nothing. It follows that the infinite was the cause, and that whatever is in the cause is infinite. The circumstance of all contingencies in the finite sphere conspiring so marvellously to a single end, can proceed from no other ground than a cause involving an infinitely intelligent being; whence it follows that there is a

pre-eminent being in the cause, and an infinite intelligence in the being. * * * Thus, we may be certain that there are infinite things in the infinite, the nature and quality of which can never be conceived by the finite. The conclusion is, that beyond our finite sphere there are verily infinities, to the knowledge of which it is useless to aspire; and which in the infinite are infinitely many, and can be known to no one but the infinite. In order that these may in some measure be conceived by the soul introduced through faith into communion with the infinite, it has pleased God *to discover by revelation* much whereby the mind can finitely conceive and express him: not, however, that finite perceptions or expressions are similar or adequate to him, but only that those made use of are not repugnant." (p. 57.)

These are the grounds which Swedenborg himself takes with regard to rational or speculative philosophy. These grounds are taken up by Prof. Tafel in his philosophical works, and proved by him according to the methods of modern speculative philosophy. The following article is a translation of the introductory chapter of his "*Hauptwahrheiten*," in which are summed up his results; by additional quotations from Swedenborg I shall show that Prof. Tafel's philosophy is essentially a philosophical demonstration of the principles taught by Swedenborg.

WHERE CAN I FIND TRUTH AND CERTAINTY?

"What is truth? This old, ever recurring question, I must first of all propound to myself. What is the object, what the end I have in view, when I am seeking the truth? Do I not aspire to an *agreement* of my views and thoughts with one another* and with objects which are independent of them, and yet important, and worthy of being sought after; which are consequently not merely transitory and inane phenomena, but permanent and real goods?† These

* "Whatever is contradictory, is against the light of truth, which flows from Divine Wisdom." (*Divine Love and Wisdom*, n. 283.)

† "Truth in itself is good, because it is from good; truth is the form of good, i. e. when good is formed so as to be intellectually per-

goods I wish to perceive and to know, to touch and seize with my mind and understanding, and thus to unite them with myself, and to appropriate them. I wish, therefore, to view and to think what truly is.

"But by my doing so, this ceases to be Being independent of myself, and becomes a thing of thought; it assumes my nature, and has impressed upon it my mode of viewing and thinking; it thereby becomes my own product, and that which I grasp, or imagine to grasp, is no longer Being independent of myself, such as it is in itself, but a figment of my own imagination.

"It is, therefore, impossible for me to reach being itself, such as it is in itself; it remains a thing unknown and unknowable to me forever; and it thus seems as if the sophists and sceptics of old were right, who declared that Being in itself was unattainable, and the finding of truth, consequently, impossible. But, by their very act of denying that truth can be found and known, they evidently pre-suppose both; for they go through a process of argumentation, and thus pre-suppose a law of argumentation, or of conclusion, which they hold to be true and certain, and thereby they pre-suppose the existence of their own thought; so that it is impossible for any one, provided he think, i. e. he a human being, to divest himself utterly of all truth and certainty.

"The reasonings of the sceptics, there-

ceived, it is called truth. (*Arcana Cælestia*, n. 3049.)

"Truths in the intellect or rational mind are analogous to lights and rays in ocular vision; falsities that have the appearance of truth are analogous to unreal or phosphoric lights; doubts, to clouds and shadows; and ignorance itself is thick darkness, and the image of night. (*Animal Kingdom*, vol. i., p. 1.)

"A truth is never absolutely single or simple, although after its formation, and the coalescence of its parts, it may appear to be so: on the contrary, a truth is a fitting combination of an infinity of other truths, of an infinity of distinct ideas and notions." (*Id.* p. 3.)

"One truth does not confirm good, but several truths; for one truth, without connection with others, is not confirming; there must be several in connection, then one may appear from another. One does not produce any form, thus not any quality, but several connected in a series; for as one tone does not make a tune, still less a harmony, so neither does one single truth constitute a truth." (*Arcana Cælestia*, n. 4196.)

fore, need not make us despair of finding truth, and of arriving at certainty; but it may be questioned whether we have gained much thereby, and whether we can go beyond the fact of our own existence and that of the laws of thought. It is true, there have been some who have traced back all thought or all mediate knowing to an external seeing or an immediate knowing, and who have thus included at least the facts of external sight and of sensation—nay, who have principally included these in the sphere of the knowable and certain, by deriving man's entire mental activity from external sensation, and thus from the impressions of the senses and the things causing them. But, here again the doubt arises, whether external sight and sensation really furnish exact impressions of the things seen and felt; for what I immediately perceive is my own state, and an extraneous object, if it be at all capable of affecting me, can do so only in accordance with my individual organization, and the nature of my mind which receives these sensations. But suppose my sensation is actually an exact impression of the thing causing it, how can I ever become certain of this? for I cannot step out of myself, and place myself above myself and the object, and compare my idea of the object with the object itself. This act would pre-suppose, not only consciousness and reflection on my part, not only a state of separation of the ego in me, which knows, from the impressions of the senses, thus not only a discrimination of these impressions from the ego, but, also, a primitive and immediate knowledge of Being in itself, which I should have independently of all the impressions of the senses and of all experience.

"If, therefore, any one lays down the principle that everything must be derived from the impressions of the senses, and, if he would abide in facts, and thus remain in what he calls the positive, he, nevertheless, continually pre-supposes and applies ideas and principles which no impression of the senses can ever give him, and without which it is utterly impossible for him to acquire any knowledge at all.

He sees and feels only individual things pertaining to space and time; but these are determined only by virtue of their relations as parts to the whole of space and time: the idea of the whole of space and time must, therefore, previously exist with him. He sees the relations of things in juxtaposition to one another, and, also, of things following one another, but these relations do not yet furnish him with the ideas of the whereby and the wherefor, or of cause and end; nay, they do not even supply him with the idea of substance or of being, which remains constant amid all changes, and which lies at the bottom of everything. He, nevertheless, has these very ideas, and can by no means get along without them; nay, he absolutely fortifies himself with these ideas, and by means of them maintains his principle of empiricism and positivism against that of the idealists and egoists. For he says: It is not in my power, instead of a man whom I now see, to see an animal, a plant, or a mass of rock, or to see man differently from what I now see him: I, therefore, infer from this that the view which I have of this man, and the determinate image which remains in me of this man, is produced by a corresponding extraneous object, and for this reason is a true representation; even as the Epicureans declared such a representation as had really been produced by, and in accordance with, an extraneous object to be true; and the only test, on which they could rely, in order to distinguish the real from the merely imaginative, in this case, was the state of compulsion in which we are, while we are the subjects of a real or genuine sensation. In this procedure, however, there is pre-supposed the principle that every change must have a cause, and, indeed, a cause which is adequate to it, or which corresponds with it; and it was easy to show that this principle cannot be proved empirically: for the sceptic could insist that experience teaches only that one thing follows another, but not that it is caused by another, and, also, that this consequence *must* take place in *many*, but not in *all* cases. The principle itself, however, that every change must have a cause, has impressed upon it the

stamp of truth and certainty, and it forces itself upon us with the same necessity with which there is impressed upon our faculty of thinking the condition, according to which it is impossible for us to *think* together things which are contradictory. I can, indeed, comprise under a higher unity antitheses like being and thinking, and can even posit them as equal in certain respects, but it is impossible for me to think together things contradictory, because, thus, the thought which is in the process of formation would again be destroyed. For the same reason, because unthinkable, it is utterly impossible for me to admit that being is produced from non-being, the somewhat from the naught; * whence follows again the positive law, that every somewhat which has been produced, or which is in the process of production, must have a cause, and indeed a cause corresponding to it; because a production from a non-corresponding cause would again be a derivation of the determinate somewhat from naught, and would presuppose that an efficient cause could operate in a manner different from the nature of its determinations. As sure as the general, without its particulars and individuals is nothing,† so sure Being, which lies at the bottom of everything, must be universally determined, and the effect it produces must correspond with its determinations. But if the law of causality is inherent in my thought, and is given by the existence of my thought, and if all empirical knowledge is based upon it, it hence follows that the reason of the certainty of my knowledge is not contained in the impressions of the senses, but rather in ideas and principles which are independent of them; nay, the question may here arise again, whether each perception and representation received by me from without, is

not formed differently by my faculty of perception and representation, according to its general and particular organization, and this in addition to the contingency that the perception and representation may not be an entirely faithful image of its object. At all events we would have to examine, first, what share the extraneous object itself, and what my faculty of knowing have in this image, and, also, whether the whole image is not the effect of my own activity; in which latter case the state of compulsion in which I was while gazing upon an object, would have originated in the peculiar organization of my organs and faculties.

"But if the principle of empiricism—in case I should limit it to the knowledge derived from the senses—leads beyond itself to ideas and principles which must be added to the impressions of the senses, in order to derive thence knowledge, the question arises: Are these ideas and principles innate, and, if not, by what means did I get them?*" I have many items of knowledge of which I am not always conscious; they repose in my memory until they are called up by a certain opportunity. I can, therefore, easily explain to myself why Plato could be induced to place the origin of these general ideas and principles in a previous existence, and why he defined all learning as a mere recollection. But by this reasoning the question is only deferred, not answered; for, at some time or other, I must have first become conscious of them, and thereby have formed them in my mind; for it is entirely out of question

* "There are no innate ideas or imprinted laws in the human mind, but only in the soul; in which, unless ideas and laws were connate, there could be no memory of the things perceived by the senses, and no understanding." (*Economy of the Animal Kingdom*, vol. ii., p. 286.)

"The mind is a distinct faculty from the soul, namely, posterior and inferior to, and more imperfect than the latter; it is the first determination of the soul, and partakes at once of the soul and the body." (*Id.* p. 260.)

"That we possess a soul with more knowledge than we believe, is obvious from the very nature of the mind, in which a kind of highly rational philosophy and a peculiar logic appears, as it were, connate from the first beginning of our sensations, and which is perfected in proportion to the growth of the understanding." (*Id.* p. 256.)

* See "*Outlines of the Infinite*," p. 57, in n. 21.

† "An indefinite or undeterminate idea is no idea." (*Arcana Cælestia*, n. 8705.)

"The minutest individuals are what constitute the universal, and to talk of a universal, and to separate individuals from it, would be the same thing as talking of a whole in which there are no parts, and consequently like talking of something in which there is nothing." (*Id.* n. 1919.)

that I could have had ideas and principles, which were my property, in a state which anteceded that of my consciousness. But if I could be allowed to assume a previous existence, could I not be allowed to assume as well a state of consciousness without a beginning? No! for if my individual self is not to be destroyed, and if the identity of my self-consciousness is to be preserved at all hazards, then the finiteness and limitation of my being must likewise remain, and this finiteness and limitation would be contradicted by a self-consciousness without any beginning, because in this case my being would be posited as finite and non-finite at the same time. But if my self-consciousness had a beginning, because I am a finite being, then the consciousness of these ideas and principles must also have had a beginning, and indeed a beginning which was the result of free acts, for the very reason that these ideas and principles could not be communicated to me by the things of sense. I can, therefore, ascribe to myself only the *faculty* of these ideas and principles, which faculty does not of its own accord enter into a state of activity, but in its development is limited to influences and conditions which do not take place with all human beings, because not all human beings arrive at this state of consciousness, e. g. those children that had grown up in forests and in deserts, and among animals, did not become self-conscious human beings, but remained animals until they entered again into the society of men. [See "Fundamental Philosophie," pp. 44-150, where all instances of wild men and women on record are critically examined and sifted.] Whence it follows that man awakens into a state of self-consciousness, and becomes a man, only among men; that, therefore, he must be educated in order to become a man—i. e. that by self-conscious beings he must be incited to acts of freedom, and be called upon to follow a higher aim of life which is opposed to the selfish impulses of nature—even as self-consciousness, and the formation of these ideas and principles, pre-supposes a state of freedom, viz.: a state in which the interior eye, or the interior perception of man, is independent of the exterior object

and its allurements; and *vice versa*, a state of freedom, as such, pre-supposes a state of self-consciousness; and from this circle there is no escape, unless I admit that both self-consciousness and freedom are communicated to man by a corresponding external cause, which cause can proceed from none other than a rational being already developed, and which consists in the incitation proceeding from the *educator*, by which man is induced to perform free actions, which are opposed to the animal and selfish impulses of nature.*

"But if I, and every other finite being, must have had a beginning, then also, for the very same reason, we must assume a beginning for the whole of humanity, and the question arises: How was it possible for the first men to awaken into a state of consciousness and freedom, and thus to become men, inasmuch as they can arrive at such a state only by means of the educating influences of a human being already developed, and in the present case there were no such developed beings, for the very reason that they were the first human beings created? There is no alternative left me but to assume a primitive person, i. e. a rational being without any beginning, who lowered himself to them and educated them, by inciting them to follow a course of freedom independent of the selfish impulses of nature.† As this rational being was with-

* "Suppose a person destitute of education, left wholly to himself with wild beasts and apes, or advancing to manhood without the society of any animal—What kind of brute would he be? What intelligence would he enjoy from nature? What would be the operation of the organs of his body on his mind? Man is made and formed, and distinguished from the brutes, by *education alone*." (*Principia*, vol. i., p. 7.)

"In things which relate to the civil government and economy of a kingdom or state, what is useful and good cannot be seen unless several of the statutes and ordinances therein be known; or, in matters of a judicial nature, unless laws be known; or in natural things—as physics, chemistry, anatomy, mechanics, and the like—unless a man be instructed in the sciences; but in things purely of a rational, moral, and spiritual nature, truths appear from their own light, provided a man, by means of a good education, be made in some degree rational, moral, and spiritual." (*Divine Providence*, n. 317.)

† "The first man, and the first-born, were led by no one else than the Lord alone." (*Spiritual Diary*, 2591.)

out any beginning, He could not have been developed into a state of self-consciousness and freedom, but must have always been self-conscious and free from self-love, else He could not have been a rational being *without any beginning*, but would have been subject to the same conditions as myself, and I should not have advanced a single step forward, and the same old difficulty would still remain unsolved. As this being was without any beginning, He was also true being, else He could not have been without any beginning, but would have been subject to time, and be finite, and would have pre-supposed for his origin another being which was true being. True being, however, is also unchangeable, and cannot cease being; for as out of nothing nothing can be, so also what *is* cannot become nothing, but has to remain something; it can, therefore, neither be changed nor perish: its essence ever remains the same. In this rational being without any beginning, Who is from eternity, being and the knowledge of being are originally and eternally united; He is the One that can truly say of Himself: *I am*—which is also the meaning of the name *Jehovah* or *Jahve*—and who says of Himself: “I am that I am.” (Exod. iii., 14.) It was possible, therefore, for *Jehovah*, from His unity of being and knowing, to give to man, who could have originated only from Him, that revelation and instruction, without which he could never have awakened into a state of reason and freedom, and have elevated himself above the level of animals. All knowledge of truth is, therefore, very justly traced back to a primitive Divine revelation and tradition, as to its original source.*

* “In inference to the Ancients, who were acquainted with the existence of the Divine, and that it is to be worshipped, and also that man, as to his soul, is immortal, it must be observed that they did not know these things from the light of nature, but from revelation, which flowed from the Church down to them; for the Church of the Lord has been in the land of Canaan from the most ancient times; and hence the things relating to Divine worship were diffused from them to the nations round about, and likewise to the neighboring Greeks, and from these to the Italians or Romans; hence, they all had a knowledge of the Supreme Deity, and of the immortality of the soul, on which subjects their learned men have written.” (*Arcana Cælestia*, n. 8944.)

[The historical proofs that speculative philosophy is based upon revelation are given by Prof. Tafel in his “Fundamental Philosophy,” pp. 221-226.]

“But however true it may be that revelation and its tradition is an indispensable condition for the knowledge of truth, still it is equally clear that it cannot be the only condition; for revelation, in order to be received and understood, and to be acknowledged and held fast as a conviction, requires a peculiar organ created for its reception, and also a general light which existed before revelation, for the influence of which this organ would be adapted.† Suppose I was willing to admit that sufficient light emanated from revelation alone, still it would be perfectly useless to submit an animal to the influence of its light, which is a positive proof that an animal is entirely destitute of the organ created for the reception of revelation, and that this must be peculiar to man. But if an animal is thus utterly unsusceptible of the light of revelation, and if it is totally incapable of a higher destination, it can, nevertheless, not be denied that it enjoys a natural light, and this same natural light must also be enjoyed by man, only in a much higher degree, provided his interior eye, or his interior perception, which animals have not, is opened, and he has thereby awakened to a state of self-consciousness and reflection.

“If it should be objected that, since the obscuration consequent upon the fall of man, this light, which man enjoys independently of revelation, no longer agrees with the superior light of revelation, and that man, on account of his depraved condition, is utterly blind in spiritual things,

† “It is very plain that the understanding was given to man in order that he might see the truth, and from the truth what is good. * * * This understanding was given to man, but not to animals.” (*Adversaria*, vol. i., nos. 915, 916.)

“Truths themselves are not seen except in a certain light, which is called the intellectual light; just as the forms of the objects before our eyes do not appear except in daytime, when the sun shines, and then according to the intensity of the light. This light, in which truths appear, comes from the only source of truth, viz.: from *Jehovah* God, and by this light the human soul is illuminated.” (*Id.* n. 940.)

so that revelation would not only be needed in order to bring him new light, but also in order to open his eye for its reception; still, even in this case, this eye must still be in man, and it must have preserved the faculty of being opened by revelation, or its tradition, and of seeing what is true; it must be 'sun-like' in its nature, and there must exist a relation of correspondence between it and the true light.* Man, consequently, must have a criterion in himself, by which he is enabled to recognize every true revelation as such, and to distinguish it from spurious revelation. But this pre-supposes, independently of external revelation and tradition, ideas and principles, and a whole series of reasons connected therewith, which are inherent in the organization of man's inner eye, or at least which are connected with it, and which are awakened and stirred into consciousness by the light of revelation. There must be mind and memory in man, in order to receive the ideas and doctrines of revelation, and to retain them; there must be understanding, in order that man may be conscious of their determinateness and connection, and that he may distinguish them from the opposite errors; there must be reason, in order that he may know their relation to the supreme and absolutely certain grounds of all knowledge, and that he may thereby become conscious and be made certain of their truth and priceless value.† Unless this inner light existed, unless I was

bound originally to certain fundamental ideas and laws, I might accept, and follow as divine revelations, the most contradictory and perverse notions, with which I may have become imbued by the chances of my birth, of my education, and of my circumstances in life; and the belief in a divine revelation, and its reception by me, would thus be destroyed. Not that it would be really possible for me to receive and appropriate these perverse notions, because I could not receive and seize them with their determinateness, for I find that I am actually bound to such fundamental ideas and laws. It is impossible for any man to consider contradictory propositions as true; and he cannot entertain and follow perverse and ignoble sentiments, if he wishes to be elevated above the level of animals, and to advance towards the one source of truth and goodness. I can, indeed, receive contradictory propositions in my memory; but unless my understanding and reason decide either for the one or the other, neither of them is appropriated to me, and I remain in a state of indecision; or else mere chance or prejudice, or even blind passion and a depraved heart, decide between them; and if man progresses at all in truth, clearness, and certainty, such a decision must appear daily more one-sided and unsatisfactory to him, or else, if his circumstances and relations in life change, this persuasion may be given up to-morrow, and again day after to-morrow, and so on forever; but if in these circumstances doubts are cast against revelation, this remains without any defence whatsoever."

The light of the rational mind, which is received by man immediately by influx from the Lord, is, therefore, the condition of man's reception of revelation, and must therefore, in a certain sense, be placed above revelation, and be made the judge between two conflicting revelations. The question now arises: if there is a possibility of revealed truth being falsified and perverted, and if man by his very organization is bound to some general ideas and principles, of which he becomes conscious by education; if, therefore, by investigating the conditions of his consciousness

* "In spite of any difficulty in the case, we may nevertheless learn through reason what the principle in man receptive of the divinity consists in, in short, that it lies in the circumstance that man may acknowledge, and does acknowledge God; that he can believe, and does believe, that God is infinite; that though he is ignorant of the nature of the Deity, yet he can acknowledge, and does acknowledge, His existence; and this without the shadow of doubt. * * * But where he doubts, he does not acknowledge, and the divine is not in him." (*Outlines of the Infinite*, p. 71.)

† "As by the grace of God truth is revealed to us in the Holy Scripture, so where reason is perplexed in its apprehensions, we must at once have recourse to revelation; and where we cannot discover from revelation either what we should adopt, or in what sense we should understand its declarations, we must then fly to the oracle of reason." (*Outlines of the Infinite*, p. 85.)

he eliminates these general ideas and principles and forms them into a system, is not this system of rational truths more reliable and more useful to him than an unsatisfactory and dubious revelation? Prof. Tafel, after explaining the style of divine revelation in the Holy Scripture, and showing that by its appearances of truth, and its allegories, in which is contained absolute truth, it is adapted to the apprehension of child-like minds and spiritual minors, as well as to that of the highest intelligences, answers this question in the following manner :

“Revelation and tradition must, therefore, by no means be cast aside and excluded, but rather be most carefully sought after, and when found, be cherished with the greatest affection; for the generation of all rational and philosophical knowledge originally depends upon revelation, and is continually influenced by it, and the general truths of reason by themselves are not sufficient to keep us in the right path to the end, and to direct us ever toward it; for they move in the sphere of the general and merely negative, and by themselves are destitute of all life and fullness, and are unable to affect man; this power they receive only by having inseminated in them the particulars and facts with which we meet in revelation and in history. Mere rational knowledge, therefore, lacks completeness and positive determination; moreover, it is not fully developed in any man; nor is it protected in him against doubt; also, it is nowhere found entirely pure and unalloyed, but is always mixed up with foreign additions of prejudice, imagination, and passion. A knowledge of the general laws of reason includes by no means a knowledge of their application in concrete cases, and neither the understanding nor reason has the power of creating existences, but they must necessarily begin and start with the actual, as they find it, and as it exists, without their interposition. Reason and revelation, therefore, are two halves, of which the one is supplementary to the other, and of which one bears witness of the other; and to these two, experience is added as a

third. The greatest clearness and certainty, indeed, must result, when these three, faith, reason and experience, are joined in a harmonious whole, and when not only highways lead from one of these spheres into the other, but also every false way has been examined and exposed, according to the prophecy of Isaiah: ‘In that day shall there be a highway out of Egypt to Assyria, and the Assyrian shall come into Egypt, and the Egyptian into Assyria, and the Egyptians shall servewith the Assyrians. In that day shall Israel be the third with Egypt and with Assyria, a blessing in the midst of the land,’ xix. 23, 24; where Israel signifies the sphere of the faith, Assyria that of reason, and Egypt that of experimental knowledge.”

The relation of Swedenborg’s theology to speculative philosophy is, therefore, as follows: He acknowledges both reason and revelation, speculative philosophy and revealed religion, and asserts that in the beginning the two agreed most amicably together. In the process of time, however, when men plunged into sensualism, and would believe only what they could apprehend with their senses, both philosophy and revealed religion lost the light of truth, and a deep gulf became fixed between them. This gulf exists at the present day. Philosophy sees so many contradictions in the dogmas of Christianity and in the literal sense of the Sacred Scripture, that it regards both as antagonistic to the truth; and Christianity, on the other hand, points to the numberless systems of philosophy which have risen and have fallen like so many dazzling meteors, and regards this as a positive proof that philosophy is not in the possession of the light of truth.

In order to effect a reconciliation between philosophy and revelation, it is evident, therefore, that both require to be purged of abuses. As all revelation comes from God, and as He is the same now as He was in the beginning, when He gave to man his first revelation, it follows that He can even now make a new revelation, and indeed one which is adapted to the present scientific and philosophical state of man-

kind. As He revealed himself to the simple minded in miracles and parables, He can reveal himself to thinking and rational men by a rational revelation.

We claim for Swedenborg's theology that it is adapted to the rational state of mankind of the present time, and that each of its positions is capable of being proved and confirmed by the laws of thought. Nay, we hold that the fundamental points of Swedenborg's theology flow naturally and

irresistibly from the laws of thought, when they are consulted in their true form, and not in one that is perverted.

We invite all speculative philosophers who seek the truth, and nothing but the truth, to judge for themselves. They will derive great assistance in this work by a study of the works of Prof. Immanuel Tafel, which were quoted in the beginning of this article.

THE SEVENTH SYMPHONY.

"Beethoven of transcendent power."—R. W. Emerson.

By CHAS. W. CHAPMAN.

[In printing this article we have adopted the following plan for musical notation, and we hope by its means to be able to present some of the excellent critiques of Marx in our future numbers: Notes will be indicated by the letters of the scale, and the word *sharp* or *flat* will be written after the letter to indicate a sharp or flat. The length of the note or notes will be indicated by a fraction following in a parenthesis, thus, ($\frac{1}{4}$) = a quarter note; ($\frac{1}{8}$) a dotted eighth; (1) = a whole note. The clef will be written at the beginning.—EDITOR.]

It is unnecessary at this late day to enter into any comparative estimate of the place which the Beethoven Symphonies hold in classic musical literature. They have long since taken their stand at the head of orchestral compositions as models of human genius and skill, and time only increases the admiration—the feelings akin to worship—which they inspire.

The Seventh, Op. 92, thought by many to be the greatest of the series, consists of four grand movements, besides a shorter introductory movement, viz.:

- I. *Poco sostenuto*; *Vivace*.
- II. *Allegretto*.
- III. *Presto*, including the *meno assai*.
- IV. *Allegro con brio*.

These parts, though quite distinct in outline and separate from each other, yet have an inner relative proportion and sequence. They form together a complete unity and constitute a Tone-poem, a Joy-song of unsurpassed magnificence. The opening "*poco sostenuto*" in two-fold measure, stretches out like a newly awakened athlete, beginning preparation at once for the day's contest. Bright hints of good news, full of promise, excite the hopes and anticipate

the certain success. A beautiful figure* only partially worked out, shadows forth the great things coming, and gathering force leads gradually to a climax of expectation, and conducts the hearer directly to the most inspiring, *Vivace*, a 6-8 movement abounding in vigor and love of play. The motive or subject, although so free and spontaneous, is treated throughout with the thoroughness and strength of Beethoven. It is full of the activity of youth, the freedom and freshness of morning. The unshaped gladness of the Prelude has here become fully determined. Before the end of the part,† and after the Coda has begun, appears in the violas, violincellos and double basses, a new phrasing of the subject, an epitome of the first motive; it denotes an ecstatic summing up of the deepest delight; it is ten times repeated with increasing emphasis, and rolls up like the ground swell of a conquering storm gone by; it is an extraordinary effect, and in the last part of the work‡ occurs a

* 23d measure; oboes.

† 50 measures before the close, the Coda including 60 measures.

‡ *Allegro con brio*, 77 measures from the end. Note.—There is a subtle analogy in the phenomena of material forces which these

reminiscence of it in a broader setting. The theme is developed to a culminating point of astonishing force; by a simultaneous charge the mount of joy is scaled, and the movement finishes in a fortissimo of attainment and victory.*

ALLEGRETTO.

From the height of exhilaration to this next movement, what a fall! we are in another country from the last. The hearer is startled by a hollow and yet piercing cry of pain.† A marchlike musing theme begins from the foundations‡ a spectral harmony without melodic voice; a message of such momentous import that articulate utterance is denied it. At length arises a melody (violas) so simple, so grand, it seems to take hold of the very innermost of song. Is it a weary nation whose deliverer has not yet arisen—or the loneliness of a leader whose people will not follow? Balboa at the foot of the Isthmian rocks with a hardly suppressed mutiny about him? Or, a vast procession bowed in profoundest feeling, and signalled by that sharp cry to move on? Rather let us conclude, a song of love and compassion for erring mortals; a symphonic picture of performance, matched with the attempted ideal—(subpart in A major, the triple motion again). Once, twice, does the gloomy curtain lift amid strains from Elysium, seldom given to mortals to hear; still it is far off, and while it comforts, it is that “remembering hap-

Codas of Beethoven remind one of. It is to this effect: The greatest force moves largest masses through least space, e. g. compare the flight of the yellow bird and the eagle; or, better, see the sun make the hills lean for him in his daily round, to settle back under the cold of night. If the mountains could sing, would they not gently hum such a figure as this over and over and over: (Bass $\frac{6}{8}$) d ($\frac{1}{2}$), d, c sharp, b sharp, b sharp ($\frac{1}{2}$), c sharp ($\frac{1}{2}$), c sharp ($\frac{1}{2}$).

* *Note.*—Victory, undoubtedly. And yet, why does the cadence chord fall upon the third? Is something further to be looked for? Ah! it is the very nature of the triplet, the 6-8 motion to be incapable of reaching the final solution of life. Youth, with its inexperience, its high bent and its caprice, favors the triple motion; there is in it a little of the curvet and the magniloquent, which anguish or tragedy prunes away in good time. The romantic is insufficient for itself.

† Oboes, clarionets, fagottos and horns.

‡ Violas, violincellos and contra bassi.

pier things,” which is truly the “crown of sorrow.” We called this Seventh Symphony a joy-song! Yes! not the mere briskness and unthinking levity of youth or bodily spirits, but the soundness of a great and healthy nature. Woe—even the wretchedest §—to which such consolations are permitted to come, can never utterly lose courage. The sources of grief well up with increased power; though the Divine assistance does not fail, human endurance has a limit; a desperate effort against fate, only rends the striver, and calls forth again the same bitter cry, ending the movement as it began. This sad and most beautiful picture let into the body of the work, heightens in the greatest degree the contrast of feelings both before and after it; just the converse of the grave-digger scene in Hamlet, it answers a similar purpose. The dignity and nobleness of the sorrow here shown is perhaps without a parallel in the domain of musical expression. Totally unlike this movement is the third, or “*Presto*,” and “*meno assai*.” It has such an impetuosity of frolic as to run itself almost out of control. Flutes and oboes call to strings and fagottos back and forth like elves and nixies, and chase and hiding alternate in the imaginative sport. Hungry wild birds come upon a supply of food ridiculously overmuch for them, chuckle such assuring notes together. The combination of might and fairy fleetness is masterly. Upon the fire and vehemence of this “*Presto*,” fairly sails the *assai meno* (*Presto*) [the Trio to this Scherzo]. The acute notes held along by the violins, remind one of the sea of insect sound filling all the air, which rises from an August field. It is a colossal calm, fitly introduced after the three great movements preceding, telling of infinite content and the leisure of midsummer heats. The old is not forgotten, but surmounted; the herald cry at the beginning and end of the “*Allegretto*” comes up again, but stripped of the minor interval—it is the strong, unison breath of robust maturity.¶ Sooth-

§ 143d measure of Allegretto, or 5th measure after the first episode in A major.

¶ Coda to Scherzo, and also before the “*Assai meno*.”

ed to slumbrous quiet by these splendid tones, and loth to let them go, the part ends abruptly.

ALLEGRO CON BRIO.

This powerful composition rounds and completes the work. It overflows with millennial rejoicing. The undercurrent of bliss reached in the *Vivace* here finds room for development upon a broader basis. The pleasure is so intense and active that phrases from the *Allegretto*, expressing the deepest affliction, are here turned into proudest notes of exultation.* When the resources of art seem well nigh exhausted, we are carried to still higher flights in periods of excelling majesty. In joy like this we learn truths that sadness may help teach us, but itself could never reveal. We feel the brotherhood of man, and that suffering is but an incident in the life of the soul. Beethoven himself said, this is "one of my very best" works. (Letter to J. P. Salomon, 1815.) Over particular beauties of the work one could linger long. The crisis introduced at the 143d measure, *Allegretto*—what a vast sigh terminating in paroxysmal pain—it shudders like the

* Compare the 38th measure, *Allegretto* for instance, with the 16th measure of the *Allegro con brio*—(24th, reckoning the repeat.)

recoiling surf that has spent its utmost upon the unyielding breaker.

The flutes sing eloquently—each sufferer responding less fluently, with greater emphasis; the weight descends with ever added mass upon those terrible couplets, *fortissimo*—and the last hope of deliverance by active effort is exhausted. The very least note of this gigantic dissolution is indispensable. * * There is nothing in all experience adequate to such a composition, except the glory to the world of having for awhile detained such an author. Just as the breadth of treatment urges for more performers than it would be practicable to assemble, so does the greatness of ideas contained therein transcend the actual and look beyond to the dream of the poet, or to prophetic vision. An intellectual nature so energetic as to superintend inspirations of such magnitude, can stand for humanity to a distant future, as a symbol of Divine power. If it is the province of Art to develop the latent sense of Beauty in man, to bring into clearness the indistinct but ever-beckoning Possible, surely little should be needed to incite us to love and study works placed in our hands by the labor and genius that have gone before: they have made the habitable earth more habitable, and the gift of Life more welcome to us.

BENARD'S ESSAY ON HEGEL'S *ÆSTHETICS*.

Translated from the French by JAS. A. MARTLING.

III. PAINTING. With painting, commences a new series which the author describes under the name of *Romantic Arts*. We have already spoken of this division, which makes the chronological and historical order coincide with the logical order in the theory of the arts. Hegel sets out with this principle, that each art corresponds to a particular degree in the development of spirit. Thus architecture limits itself to fashioning the forms of inert matter, according to the laws of mathematics, thereby expressing the thought only vaguely and symbolically, and is especially suited to the infancy of society. It is the lan-

guage of nations whose religious thought is an enigma to themselves, and whose worship is directed toward the forces of nature. Sculpture, which represents spirit under the human form, and the perfect agreement of the soul and body, marks a more advanced epoch. To it, it is given to realize the type of classic beauty. But the spirit does not rest here. It turns back upon itself, and descends into its innermost depths. It distinguishes itself from external nature, and from whatever in the soul connects it with the body. It acquires a sense of its free personality, of its infinite nature, of its divine essence, and of

its immortal destiny. It also conceives God as pure spirit, as infinite spirit. Then a new world opens, the world of the soul, with all its depths.

In other words, the ideal of pagan sculpture represents the divine principle under an individual and corporeal form. Christian spiritualism abandons this form and withdraws itself into itself; it represents the essence of spirit as spirit. Thenceforth the bond which united the spirit to the corporeal form, is, if not altogether broken, at least much weakened. The two terms are rendered more independent. If, then, the spirit wishes to express itself by sensuous emblems, it needs more spiritual, more ideal, and less material forms. It must have, besides, a broader field of representation, richer and more varied materials, more vivacity and depth in expression. Nature will hold her place in these representations, but nature spiritualized, presenting everywhere a reflex of the thought, an echo of the sentiment, a frame for the development of spirit, which has become the principal object. If we consider the mode of expression, and the means which the arts have at their disposal, it follows that extension, with its three dimensions, or the plastic form, must give way to another mode of representation, better fitted to express the thoughts and feelings of the soul.

This new form, more spiritual, is the visible appearance created by the spirit itself, and which, combined with color, perspective, and the play of light and shade, acquires a higher expression, opens a vaster field for representation, permits objects to crowd themselves upon the same surface. Such is the aim of painting.

Music will go still further. It will suppress extension. Seizing the soul in its most internal phase, sentiment, it expresses this by an immaterial, invisible sign, by sound, which vibrates upon the ear and penetrates into the soul.

Finally, poetry will consummate this liberation of the soul. The art of speech replaces form, visible appearance, color, significant and harmonious sound, by a sign, in itself void of meaning, but capable of expressing all the conceptions of

spirit, all the shades of thought, the innermost sentiments of the soul, and of reproducing an action in the successive phases of its development. The art which expresses itself by speech, embraces and includes the means adapted to the other arts. Hence it is employed in all forms of art and in all epochs.

These principles established, Hegel enters upon the theory of painting, the general character and principle of which he devotes himself to determining, in the first place, in a more precise manner. For this purpose, he considers it in its content, its form, and its mode of execution.

1. The idea which constitutes the content of the representations of painting, is the inner life, the soul, whose sentiments, impressions, and acts manifest themselves in a multitude of situations and varying scenes,—the soul, which still reflects itself in the spectacle of nature and in the forms of the visible world. This is why its true centre is the Christian world. There is no need of instituting here a comparison between ancient and modern painting. Materials are lacking for this purpose. But it suffices to know what are the ideas, the sentiments, the content, in a word, which harmonize with the essence of this art, and its mode of representation. Now, *a priori*, we can maintain only that however excellent may have been the pictures of the ancients, and however unapproachable the beauty of their sculpture is, painting, among them, without speaking of the material means invented since, was not able to attain the same degree of development and perfection as among moderns. The reason is simple. It is that the content of the Greek thought, so eminently favorable to the principle of sculpture, precisely because of this advantage, is not favorable to painting. If, on the other hand, painting was carried to its perfection at the close of the middle ages, it is because the spiritual content of its works, the Christian sentiment, lends itself in a wonderful manner to its representations.

Such is the true reason why it was impossible for the Greeks to realize the ideal of painting. This ideal did not exist. If

sculpture is pagan art, painting is eminently Christian.

On the other hand, if we examine painting in its form or in its mode of representation, we may see that it demands likewise a higher degree of spirituality, which belongs only to Christian art. What is, in fact, the sensuous element in which this art moves? Surface, visible appearance, that is to say, something artificial substituted for the reality. Now, for this very reason, this means claims an animation, a vitality superior to plastic expression. The innermost of spirit must vivify these external forms, and be reflected therein. Color, which further specializes this appearance, requires in the objects represented, a more determinate, more vivid and more animated character than the ideal simplicity of the forms of statuary. Hence the necessity of a multiplicity of situations, of movement, of variety, in order to correspond to the materials of painting. Between the content and the form there is established a necessary reciprocity. If the idea seeks a form capable of expressing it, this in turn seeks a principle which penetrates and animates it.

From these principles the following results are derived.

In the first place, painting, in its personage, represents the spirit reflected upon itself, assuming more depth and individuality. It is no longer able, like sculpture, to present a purely general character. It demands a more personal treatment, more sensibility, passions more defined, more vitality in the situations; a place for the particular, the individual, the accidental, for even the indifferent. As to the extent of the field of painting, it embraces the totality of the objects of nature, all the spheres of human activity, all the particulars of existence. A crowd of objects inaccessible to sculpture enter into its representations. The religious world, the scenes of nature and of human life, the most fugitive accidents of situations and of characters, should be presented in conceptions of the artist.

But the true principle, the essential content, the centre of this art, is always the innermost life of the soul. In the repre-

sentation of external objects, in the pictures which represent nature, what constitutes the vital interest, the real sense, is the sentiment which beams through it, the reflex of the spirit, the soul of the artist which appears in his work, the image of his inmost thought, or a general echo of our impressions.

2. If from the content we pass to the *form*, that, in painting, consists in the two means which it employs, *surface* and *color*. Surface, in place of the three dimensions of body, presents only two. This is, as we have seen, a consequence of the nature of the content which it represents. To a spiritual content there ought to correspond a more immaterial and artificial form. Art can no longer retain plastic material.

Is that a proof of inferiority? Undoubtedly. Yet, more than sculpture, it places an abstract form under the eye. But this apparent imperfection is a real progress. Sculpture had already, in place of copying nature, fashioned a simple and colorless image. Here we have the contrary. Inner sentiment manifests itself fully only so far as it is freed from material form. Painting, like sculpture, labors for the eyes, but it no longer shows them natural objects, such as they are in themselves. It transforms them into images, such that they are a mirror of spirit. Art, then, destroys real existence, changes it into a simple appearance, created by spirit and addressed to spirit. If it renounce extension altogether, this would not imply weakness, defect, inferiority—it is to the end that this appearance, artificially fashioned, may reveal the spirit to itself, and that the work of art may enter into a more intimate relationship with the spectator. The latter is thus associated, from the commencement, with the faculty of conception. By reason of this purpose, which it is intended to fulfil as pure reflex of the spirit, the simple appearance of the reality meets and better fulfils the design. Real extension would perplex the spectator; for, in painting, the pleasure of the representation is not produced by the view of real objects; it is in the purely contemplative interest that the spirit takes in the manifestation of itself in the forms of the external world.

But the physical element proper to painting, and which is adapted to it through its ideal character, is light. The preceding arts employ ponderable matter; with them light would only serve to illumine them from without; it could not constitute an integral part of a work of art; it limits itself to rendering it visible. In painting, light, the clear and the obscure, the effects of shade, are not only the very materials of the art; they are produced by the art itself—its creation. A new reason why painting has no need of three dimensions is, that the artistic form is produced by light and shade; the real form is then useless, and would be a hindrance.

Light does not limit itself to the clear and the obscure, to the alternate play of light and shade; it becomes also the principle of color, which for painting is the means of excellence. Forms, distance, limits, outlines, are manifested by color, whose more ideal character is also capable of expressing a more ideal content. By deep contrasts, gradations infinitely varied, fineness of shades and tints, it embraces a vaster field, inasmuch as it reproduces a variety of objects with all the richness of their details—form, distance, the play of the features of the face, the expression of the most delicate sentiments, and whatever is at once most sensuous and most immaterial—ideas.

3. As to its *mode of execution*, it may be said that painting, by the manner in which it treats its subjects, is capable of reconciling the two extremes, of representing the most elevated, the most profound subjects, and also those of the most insignificant appearance. It seems to accord an equal value to the content and the form; frequently even to make of the latter, and the mode of execution, its essential object. Hence, we have two species of painting, two schools, two opposite schools, and also two modes of judging; it is the opposition of the ideal and the real, but of the real idealized through the execution. Painting admits these two extremes; it represents the substance of things, the most elevated objects of religious faith, the great events and the great persons of history, or it opens a free field in the details of nature

and of real life. It goes so far in this direction as to make appearance itself and illusion its principal object. But here the image is superior to the reality. The ideal character consists in this, that the fugitive and momentary accident is fixed upon the canvas forever, and represented in its vitality. It is this that gives rise to the fact that there are two modes of understanding the ideal in painting, both wholly true, but exclusive. Hence, also, that there can be here diversity of schools, of styles, of manner, and greater originality than in the other arts.

In the examination of the *particular characteristics* of painting, the author comes back to the preceding questions, exploring and developing them. Thus he devotes himself to characterizing, in a more especial manner, what constitutes the content of religious painting, or the Christian *ideal*, of which mention has been made above. He then studies the means of expression which are suitable to painting—*perspective, drawing, coloring*. Finally, under the head of artistic execution, he treats of the *conception of composition*, and of the manner of characterizing the works of the painter. We can devote only a few words to each of these points:

1. The true domain of painting is what it is capable of expressing better than the other arts, by the means which are peculiar to it. It embraces, consequently, subjects which to depth and richness of sentiment join strongly marked originality of character. Here the frigid grandeur of the antique ideal is no longer appropriate. The ideal will be furnished by a religion which has penetrated farther into the depths of the soul, which reveals rejoicings and sufferings unknown, joys, delights ineffable, a bliss which succeeds struggles and afflictions. The soul, in order to attain this, must have passed through a life of combats and sufferings, and have come out triumphant.

Such is the Christian ideal. It is the reconciliation of man with God, who in His terrestrial life has Himself trodden the path of suffering. In breaking His human heart, He rises above the pains and joys of the world, to a profound, unalterable peace,

which he draws from the divine love, and the hope of being reunited to God.

This particular feature of love is not wholly wanting in the antique ideal; but it is not true love for a living and personal God. The idea of destiny freezes sentiment. Hence that silent sadness in the expression of sorrow in most noble natures, in Laocoon, in Niobe, for example—that frigid resignation, which is only impassibility, the petrification of sorrow.

True love, on the other hand, true felicity in love, is the abandonment, the forgetfulness of self, but in order to find itself again in the object beloved.

Thus, in this sacrifice and this abandonment, the soul preserves the feeling of living with the object of its love, and it acquires thus the highest joy in itself. This apparent contradiction, this mysterious problem, love resolves. It alone renders one happy; it causes one to taste heaven; it exalts the soul above the temporal and the finite.

Now this depth of mystic love, unknown to the ancients, constitutes the centre of the Christian ideal and the principal content of the representations of religious painting. It is what makes the incomparable superiority in Christian painting. It is the content of all its subjects.

There is, in the first place, the love of Christ, the love of God for men, which reproduces itself in all the acts of his mortal life, in his infancy, his miracles, his passion, his cross, and his resurrection. Then come the personages of the holy family, the Virgin, Saint Joseph, the disciples. These are inexhaustible subjects of pictures where the highest ideal is found. Among them are distinguished, as the most favorable, the infancy of Christ and his passion. In another point of view, the happiest subject is maternal love, the love of the Virgin, which presents situations at once so exalted, so pure and so touching—the annunciation, the visitation, the birth, the flight into Egypt, etc.; but especially Mary at the foot of the cross. By the side of such a subject the antique Niobe no longer bears a comparison.

Of a less elevated sort, although also full of interest, are the pictures which

represent the disciples, the apostles, the saints, self-examination, adoration, prayer, penitence, conversion, glorification, and sanctity—these subjects have inspired the greatest painters. The same is true of the other phase of religious sentiment, of the suffering and the sorrow in the scenes which represent martyrdom, constancy in supplication, physical and moral suffering, the wounds of love, the sorrows of the soul, inward penitence, regret, and contrition; finally, glorification through sorrow, sanctity obtained through penitence.

Such are the principal elements of the Christian ideal which form the essential content of painting in the middle ages. They are the subject of its most admired and most celebrated works—works immortal through the depth of the thought which they express, as well as through the talent and genius of the artists who have represented it.

After having dwelt particularly upon religious painting, and upon the ideas which form the content of its works, Hegel passes immediately to landscape painting. If he limits himself thus to characterizing the two extremes, without pausing at the intermediate points, it is for the purpose of better bringing to light the general principle which he has laid down above. He wishes to demonstrate thereby that it is yet the soul and the inmost sentiment that painting represents in the pictures which present to us the vision of nature. He undertakes to justify this assertion in the following manner:

The interest that we take in the representation of the objects of nature, centres not in the objects themselves, but there is in them a content of vitality which excites our sympathy, and which is for us a source of pleasure. Between these objects and the human soul there exists a secret harmony, which maintains in us an inward joy, the charm of living existence. A sort of dialogue is established between nature and man, who lends to it his sentiments, his ideas, all the attributes of his soul.

Art, moreover, changes our ordinary point of view with regard to nature; the practical connection becomes purely contemplative. Art causes us to forget our

wants, gives us a sense of our inner, proper, independent life; in fine, it fixes and makes eternal that which is in itself mobile and instantaneous. This is the triumph of art over reality, the ideal in this domain. Besides, something new is added to the objects represented, or to their image, to-wit: the love, the feeling, the spirit, the soul of the artist who communicates to them thus his personal inspiration as a new life, and makes of it his creation.

Under the head of *materials* of painting, Hegel treats of *perspective*, of *drawing*, and of *color*. What he says of the first two furnishes nothing new, and need not occupy our attention. He enlarges more upon coloring. It is color, he says, which, to speak properly, constitutes painting. Drawing, no doubt, is the essential condition; but the painter ought, above everything, to paint. It is only by the employment of color that he can express the soul as really living. Hegel speaks next in detail of other means which the painter uses to produce his results—of the *clear* and the *obscure*, of the distribution of *light* and *shade*, of the *model*, of *color*, of *fundamental colors*, of the *harmony of colors*, of *aerial perspective*, of *carnation*, of the *magic of coloring*. All this part, where one meets with a multitude of delicate observations, original with the author, which mingle themselves with accepted ideas, furnishes a living interest. What he says of *carnation*, the tone of color of human flesh, is especially remarkable. In general, upon all these points, Hegel shows himself not only a philosopher and metaphysician; we recognize in him an enlightened judge, who joins to a delicate tact, and to a spirit always ingenious, the knowledge of works of art, whose procedure and results he explains.

This theory of painting is completed by certain general rules upon *conception*, *composition*, and the manner of characterizing personages. Each of these points furnishes to the author judicious reflections, by which artists might profit. We are obliged to confine ourselves to the most general and philosophic facts of these precepts.

The mode of *conception* in painting depends not only upon the nature of the sub-

ject, but upon the degree of development at which the art has arrived. The first mode is that whereby the painter still approaches sculpture and architecture, when it presents us isolated figures in absolute repose and independence, such as Christ, the apostles, isolated saints, without determinate situation, without surrounding objects, with a frame and ornaments which recall architecture. Those figures which, for example, decorate the pillars, the arcades of Gothic churches, have the rigid and immobile character of statuary.

The rule here is that these figures should form a perfect whole in themselves, as an object of veneration or interest. Without this they are insignificant.

But painting, still less than sculpture, is able to hold itself to the immobility, void of situation, of an independent person. It should present persons in a determinate situation, should offer a multiplicity of relations and characters, of figures environed with accessory objects. Such is, in fact, the progress of painting. More than the other arts of design, it needs to adopt dramatic vitality, to group figures, etc. Hence the ever increasing importance of individuality in conception and execution, the vivid coloring of objects, etc. It is not necessary, however, that this side predominate so far as to cause the content to be forgotten for the sensuous appearance. In seeking hazy tones, the magic of colors, and the harmony of combinations, painting encroaches upon music.

2. As to the mode of composition, only a few special rules can be given. The supreme condition is the choice of a *situation* which is suitable to a painting. It is here that it is important carefully to distinguish the limits of this art, not to confound situations which suit it with those which are proper for sculpture or poetry.

Hegel insists much upon this important point, which has been very imperfectly treated by the authors who have occupied themselves with it, and in particular by Lessing. That great critic has marked very well the limits of the arts of design and of poetry; but he constantly confounds sculpture and painting, and supposes them subject to the same laws, which is a grave

error. In this respect, the pages which Hegel devotes to this question, and what he adds upon poetry, are of the highest interest.

Sculpture is, especially, called to represent the calmness, the essential traits which form admits. Painting, on the contrary, should enter into the living movement of human situations, passions, conflicts, etc. It expresses character, soul, sentiment; but developed, and revealing themselves by their actions.

On the other hand, painting is distinguished from poetry in this: that it cannot give the development of a situation, of an event, of an action, in a successive manner, but in a single moment. Hence arise differences which have been perfectly apprehended and set forth by Lessing. The general rule is, that the whole of the situation of the action in painting must be visible in a single moment. It is essential to choose the decisive moment, where the action concentrates itself in a single point, where the past and the future blend and separate. As to the precept, *ut pictura poesis erit*, taken in the letter, it cannot be justified; for descriptive poetry itself cannot reproduce all the details which figure in a picture. On the other hand, a multitude of details escape the painter, that the poet can give precisely by presenting them successively. Poetry, moreover, is able to develop ideas and sentiments, not only as such, but in their fluctuation, their gradation, and their development. Painting having at its disposal only the expression of the countenance and the attitudes of the body, there are sentiments and situations which poetry may express, and with regard to which painting is powerless. Such are lyric situations, those where the sentiment remains concentrated in the bottom of the soul, and can appear only very vaguely in the countenance or in the attitude. The painter ought to know how to discern them, in order not to expose himself to passing beyond the limits of his art, and to missing its effect. Hegel mentions a few of these exclusively poetic situations, among others, the *Fisher* and the *Mignon* of Goethe. These subjects, he says, in spite of the talent of the painter, are conceived without

imagination, because they are sentiments which cannot be transferred to visible images. Now, the personages of painting must present to view the interior of their souls. To put poetry into painting, is to conceive without imagination. Poetry itself interprets passion by images, actions, events. But as for sentiments, concentrated, abstract, vague, to wish to express them by the mouth, the eye, the countenance, a glance lifted towards heaven, is to misunderstand the limits of painting and poetry. The soundness of these reflections, and the truth of these rules, cannot be denied, and it will be well for artists to recollect them.*

Hegel draws also from these principles a few rules for *composition*. The first concerns the *clearness* of subjects. Let the situation be easy to comprehend, and, as far as possible, explain itself; for painting lacks the language of words with which poetry can aid itself independently of its other means. Now, in order that the situation may be comprehensible, external circumstances do not suffice. The essential thing is the motives, which the artist should be able to place in relief, and to develop with tact. Every action presents striking signs, sensuous relations, which can be employed in the happiest manner, at once to cause the subject to be comprehended, and better to characterize the personages. Hegel cites as an example the "Transfiguration" of Raphael.

With what precedes, there is connected the manner of arranging the different parts of a picture, the ordering and grouping of figures, and the distribution of objects, so as to cause them to contribute to the total effect.

A last point, equally full of interest, and which the author develops with his usual sagacity, is what he calls *characterization*, or the manner in which the painter should characterize his personages. This subject has been treated already, at least by implication, above; but here it is illuminated with new light, by a comparison of the

* A remarkable article upon this question, in the book which M. Guizot has just published, entitled "Studies on the Fine Arts," will be read with interest.

characters of ancient sculpture with those of modern painting. Hegel deduces from it new rules upon the respective domains of statuary and painting. The manner of characterizing the figures leads to a very interesting digression upon *portrait* painting, to which he accords a very high rank.

A portrait, he remarks, is a work of art only so far as it is stamped with the type of individuality, as it represents perfectly the original character of the individual, as it brings out the essential traits of the moral physiognomy. Hence, a portrait may be very like and insignificant; while a simple sketch of a few lines, which represent the simple image, but the whole of the character, is far more truthful. The painter ought to place before us the spiritual sense of the figure, the permanent traits which interpret the character, the figure fashioned by the spirit. In this sense, the portrait ought to flatter, or individualize; the painter ought to neglect the simple accidents of nature, to reproduce what constitutes the proper character of the person in its inmost essence, and at the same time with its highest degree of vitality.

Next come some reflections upon the manner in which the painter ought to appropriate the characteristics of form, countenance, &c., to the particular situation of the personages, in order to establish that

perfect agreement between the external and the internal, that beautiful harmony of the physical and the moral, which the great masters, especially among the Italians, have realized.

Even in *genre* painting, in fact, the originality of the figures should be such that one would be unable to imagine that they could ever have other appearance, other traits, other expression. This is the true mode of *characterization*.

This theory ends with a general sketch of the *historic* development of painting since its commencements in the middle ages down to its highest degree of perfection in the sixteenth century. The principal schools which the author attempts to characterize are the Byzantine, the Italian, and the Dutch. The remarks upon the Italian school are full of elevation and brilliancy. The character of the Dutch school, a subject already twice treated, furnishes to him an occasion for joining high historic considerations to a remarkable artistic appreciation. It is wrong to say that Hegel here exalts Protestantism in art at the expense of Catholicism. Such a criticism is unjust, after the unreserved admiration which the author has just expressed for the Italian school, which holds the first rank, and seems to him to mark the culminating point in art.

PANTHEON.

By A. BRONSON ALCOTT.

"As everything which operates essentially produces an image of itself, the person who forms the world fashions forth an image of himself. And this being so, he contains in himself, by consequence, the archetypes or causes of the world, and these are Ideas. To which we may add: that as the perfect must necessarily antedate the imperfect, unity multitude, the indivisible the divisible, and that which abides perpetually one and the same, that which subsists in unceasing mutation, it follows that things are not born of baser natures, but that they end in these; and that they originate in the most perfect, the most beautiful, and the best. For it is not possible that our intellect should be able to apprehend things equal, similar, and the like, and that the Creator of the world should not contain in himself personally the essentially equal, just, beautiful and good, and, in short, everything which has a universal and perfect subsistence, and which, from its residence in His deity, forms a link of that luminous chain of Powers to which we may give properly the name of Ideas."—*Thomas Taylor*.

I.—IDEAS.

The Ancients had a happy conception of mind in their Pantheon of its Powers. They fabled these as Gods celestial, mundane, infernal, according to their several

prerogatives and uses. It appears their ideal metaphysic has not as yet been surpassed or superseded altogether, as the classic mythology still holds its high place in modern thought and the schools as a

discipline and culture. And for the reason that thought is an Olympian, and man a native of the cloudlands, whatever his metaphysical pretensions. It is only as we sit aloft that we oversee the world below and comprehend aright its drift and revolutions. Ixion falling out of the mist, which he illicitly embraced, is the visionary mistaking images for ideas, and thus paying the cost in his downfall. Plumage, wings or none, imagination or understanding, the fledged idea or the footed fact, the fleet reason or slow—these distribute mankind into thinkers or observers. Only Genius combines the double gifts in harmonious proportions and interplay, possessing the mind entire, and is a denizen of both hemispheres. The Idealist is the true Realist, grasping the substance and not its shadow. The man of sense is the visionary or illusionist, fancying things as permanencies and thoughts as fleeting phantoms. A Ptolemaist in theory, and earth-bound, he fears to venture above his terra firma into the real firmament whereinto mind is fashioned to spring and command the wide prospect around.

"Things divine are not attained by mortals
who understand body merely,
But only those who are lightly armed arrive
at the summit."

Thought is the Mercury; and things are caught on the wing, and by the flying spectator only. Nature is thought in solution. Like a river whose current is flowing steadily, drop displacing drop, particle following particle of the passing stream, nothing abides but the spectacle. So the flowing world is fashioned in the Idealist's vision, and is the reality which to slower wits seems fixed in space and apart from his thought, subsisting in itself. But thought works in the changing and becoming, not in the changed and become; all things sliding by imperceptible gradations into their contraries, the Cosmos rising out of the chaos by its agency. Nothing abides; all is image and expression out of our thought.

So Speech represents the flowing essence as sensitive, transitive; the word signifying what we make it at the moment of using, but needing life's rounded experiences to

unfold its manifold senses and shades of meaning. Definitions, however precise, fail to translate the sense. They confine in defining; good for the occasion, but leaps in the dark; at best, guesses at the meanings we seek; parapets built in the air, the lighter the safer; mere ladders of sound, whose rounds crumble as we tread. We write as we speak. The silence bears away the sense, closing shape and significance from us. Here is the mind facing its image the world, and wishing to see the reflection at a glance, a trope. No. The world is but the symbol of mind, and speech a mythology woven of both. Each thing suggests the thought imperfectly, and thought is translatable only by thought. Our standards are ideas, those things of the mind* and originals of words.

Thought's winged hand
Marshals in trope and tone
The ideal band.
Genius alone
Holds fast in eye
The fleeing God—
Brings Beauty nigh—
Senses desecry
Footsteps he trod,
Figures he drew,
Shapes old and new,
The fair, the true,
In soul and sod.

Nature is thought immersed in matter, and seen differently as viewed from the one or the other. To the laborer it is a thing of mere uses; to the scholar a symbol and a muse. The same landscape is not the same as seen by poet and plowman. It stands for material benefit to the one, immaterial to the other. The artist's point of view is one of uses seen as means of beauty, *that* being the complement of uses. His faculties handle his organs; the hands, like somnambulists, playing their under

* CATEGORIES OF GRAMMAR.

BEING :			
<i>Flowing,</i> Subjective.			<i>Fixed,</i> Objective.
I.	III.		II.
<i>Actions,</i>	<i>Participles,</i>		<i>Things,</i>
<i>Verbs.</i>			<i>Nouns.</i>
	IV.		
	<i>Qualities,</i>		
	<i>Adverbs, Adjectives.</i>		
	V.		
	<i>Relations,</i>		
	<i>Prepositions, Conjunctions, Pronouns.</i>		

parts to ideas; these, again, serving uses still higher. The poet, awakened from the sleep of things, beholds beauty in essence and form, being thus admitted to the secret of causes, the laws of pure Being.

The like of Persons. Every one's glass reflects his bias. If the thinker views men as troglodytes—like Plato's groundlings, unconscious of the sun shining overhead; men of the senses, and mere makeweights—they in turn pronounce him the dreamer, sitting aloof from human concerns, an unproductive citizen and waste power in the world. Still, thought makes the world and sustains it; atom and idea alike being its constituents. Nor can thought, from its nature, at once become popular. It is the property and delight of the few fitted by genius and culture for discriminating truth from adhering falsehood, and of setting it forth in its simplicity and truth to the understandings of the less favored. Apart by pursuit from the mass of mankind, or at most taking a separate and subordinate part in affairs that engage their sole attention, the thinker seems useless to all save those who can apprehend and avail themselves of his immediate labors; and the less is he known and appreciated as his studies are of lasting importance to his race. Yet time is just, and brings all men to the side of thought as they become familiar with its practical benefits, else the victory were not gained for philosophy, and wisdom justified in him of her chosen children.

Ideas alone supplement nature and complement mind. Our senses neither satisfy our sensibility nor intellect. The mind's objects are mind itself; imagination the mind's eye, memory the ear, ideas of the one imaging the other, and the mind thus rounding its history. And hence the pleasurable perspective experienced in surveying our Personality from obverse sides in the landscape of existence—culture, in its inclusive sense, making the tour of our gifts, and acquainting us with ourselves and the world we live in. All men gain a residence in the senses and the family of natural things; few come into possession of their better inheritance and home in the mind—the Palace of Power and Per-

sonality. Sons of earth rather by preference, and chiefly emulous for their little while of its occupancy, its honors, emoluments, they here pitch their tents, here plant fast their hopes, and roll through life they know not whither.

II.—MIND.

"But all the Gods we have are in The Mind, By whose proportions only we redeem Our thoughts from out confusion, and do find The measure of ourselves and of our powers, And that all happiness remains confined Within the kingdom of this Breast of ours, Without whose bounds all that we look on lies In others' jurisdiction, others' powers, Out of the circuit of our liberties."—*Daniel*.

Thought is the fountain of Personal power, and the seminary of the Gifts. With instinct there may be an embryo, but sense must be superinduced to constitute an animal—memory, moral sentiment, reason, imagination, the Will, to constitute the man. The mind is the man, not the outward shape: all is in the Will. The animal may mount to fancy in the grade of gifts; but reason, imagination, conscience, choice—the mediating, creative, ruling powers—belong to man alone. But not to all men, save in essence and possibility. Man properly traverses the hierarchy of Gifts—spiritual, intellectual, moral, natural, animal—but oftenest falls short of that full possession and interplay enabling him to hold free colloquy with all, giving the whole mind voice in the dialogue. Thus:

<i>Asking for</i>			
The Who?	Will	responds,	The Person.
The Ought?	Conscience	"	The Right.
The How?	Imagination	"	The Idea.
The Why?	Reason	"	The Truth.
The Thus?	Fancy	"	The Image.
The Where?	Understanding	"	The Fact.
The Once?	Memory	"	The Event.
The Which?	Sense	"	The Thing.
The What?	Instinct	"	The Life.*

*"One would think nothing were easier for us than to know our own mind, discern what was our main scope and drift, and what we proposed to ourselves as our end in the several occurrences of our lives. But our thoughts have such an obscure, implicit language, that it is the hardest thing in the world to make them speak out distinctly; and for this reason the right method is to give them voice and accent. And this, in our default, is what the philosophers endeavor to do to our hand, when, holding out a kind of vocal looking-glass, they draw sound out of our breast, and instruct us to personate ourselves in the plainest manner."—*Lord Shaftesbury*.

III.—BIRTH.

Nature does not contain the Personal man. He embodies nature. Nor shall the naturalist solve Life's riddle, though he quarry forth nature's bowels and open the springs of the material elements. This fire of fires, whose ashes are spent men and fuel of the flesh, only thought can snatch from the clouded essence of life itself. Man is the mind with the matter omitted, or, conversely, the animal transfigured into the human image by the unfolding of his Gifts. It is a slow process; long for the individual, longeval for the race. Centuries, milliennads elapse, mind meanwhile travelling with man, the birth arrested for the most part, or premature, the translation from germ into genius being transcendental, ideal, and the embryo hardly delivered from spine and occiput into face and forehead, the mind uplifted and impersonated in thought.

Pure mind alone is face,
Brute matter surface all;
As souls immersed in space,
Ideal rise, or idol fall.

IV.—PERSON.

The lapsed Personality, or deuce human and divine, has played the prime part in metaphysical theology of times past, as it does still. But rarely has thought freed itself from the notion of duplicity, triplicity, and grounded its faith in the Idea of the One Personal Spirit, as in Parmenides, Pythagoras, Plato, Plotinus—the Greek genius first mastering this problem of pure theism, and planting therein a faith and cultus. If we claim more for the Hebrew thought, as this rose to an intuition in the mind of its inspired thinker, it passed away with him. Since Christendom throughout is still mythologizing, rather than thinking about his mixed attributes; divided, subdivided into sects, schools of doctrine; orthodox Trinitarian, heterodox Arian, Socinian, Swedenborgian, are all so immersed in their special individualism as to be unable to rise to the comprehension of the Personal One. Nor, considering the demands mind makes upon the senses—these inclining always to idolatry—is it surprising that this spiritual theism, seek-

ing its symbols in pure thought, without image graven or conceived, should find any considerable number of followers. Yet a faith less supersensuous and ideal, any school of thought, code of doctrine, creed founded on substance, force, law, tradition, authority, miracle, is a covert superstition, ending logically in atheism, necessity, nihilism, disowning alike personality, free agency. This keystone of PERSON wanting to the radiant arch of human belief, its parts lack coherence, support, and we have but a ruin of ruins in place of the heaven-kissing dome of deity.

When thou approachest to the One,
Self from thyself thou first must free,
Thy cloak duplicity cast clean aside,
And in the Being's Being Be.

Communicable, but not divisible, the Person is the copula of Being, without which neither God were possible, nor universe. There were no God for the world, were there not the God immanent in every part to animate and uphold it. For only where Spirit is, is there a Personal will, reconciling opposites, extremes meeting and vanishing in The One and Same—God being God, because while passing into the Many He yet abides one and indivisible. And man is man as partaking of His oneness, this distinguishing him from the animal, which, being several, is incapable of attaining to Personality. If nature is sufficient for the animal, God alone is for man, by fellowship with whom he completes himself, becoming hereby united with himself and his kind.*

* "The first principle of all things is Living Goodness, armed with Wisdom and all-powerful Love. But if a man's soul be once sunk by evil fate or desert, from the sense of this high and heavenly truth into the cold conceit that the original of all lies either in shuffling chance or in the stark root of unknowing nature and brute necessity, all the subtle cords of reason, without the timely recovery of that divine torch within the hidden spirit of his heart, will never be able to draw him out of that abhorred pit of atheism and infidelity. So much better is innocence and piety than subtle argument, and sincere devotion than curious dispute. But contemplations concerning the dry essence of the Godhead have for the most part been most confusing and unsatisfactory. Far better is it to drink of the blood of the grape than to bite the root of the grape, to smell the rose than to chew the stalk. And blessed be God, the meanest of men are capa-

V.—CHOICE.

The Gods descend always in the likeness of men, and ascending transfigure the man into their Personal likeness. Man descending below himself, debases and disfigures this image, transforming it into the shape of demon and brute. As by choice he leaps upwards, so by choice he lapses downwards and divides himself. Yet, while free to choose, he cannot sink himself beneath himself absolutely, since his *beneath* subsists by his election only. His choices free or fetter: they elevate or debase, deify or demonize his humanity. Superior to all forces is a spirit within, doing or defying all determinations of his, and holding him fast to the consequences. Obeying its dictates or disobeying, frees or binds. It has golden chains for the good, for others iron. Love is its soft, yet mighty curb; freedom its easy yoke; fate its fetter.

Nor man in Evil willingly doth rest,
Nor God in Good unwillingly is blest.

VI.—CONSCIENCE.

There is no appeal from the decisions of this High Court of Duty in the Breast. The Ought is the Must and the Inevitable. One may misinterpret the voice, may deliberate, disobey the commandment, but cannot escape the consequences of his election. The

ble of the former, very few successful in the latter; and the less, because the reports of those that have busied themselves that way have not only seemed strange to most men, but even repugnant to one another. But we should in charity refer this to the nature of the *pigeon's neck* than to mistake and contradiction. One and the same object in nature affords many different aspects. And God is infinitely various and simple; like a circle, indifferent whether you suppose it of one uniform line, or an infinite number of angles. Wherefore it is more safe to admit all possible perfections of God than rashly to deny what appears not to us from our particular posture."—*Henry More*.

deed decides. Nor is the Conscience appeased till swifter or slower our deserts are pronounced—The welcome "well done," or the dread "depart."

"'Tis vain to flee till gentle Mercy show
Her better eye. The further off we go
The swing of Justice deals the mightier blow."

Only the repenting consciousness of freedom abused restores the lost holiness, redeems from the guilty lapse—the sin that separating from the One revealed the fearful Doubtfulness within, opening the yawning pit down which we stumbled, to become the prey of the undying worm.

"Meek love alone doth wash our ills away."

VII.—INSTINCT.

With love enough, knowledge were useless. It comes in defect of love. Exhaustless in its sources, love supersedes knowledge, being the proper intellect of Spirit and spring of intuition—God being Very God, because His love absorbs all knowledge and contains His Godhead. Knowing without loving is decease from love and lapse from pure Intellect into Sense. Knowledge is not enough. The more knowledge, the deeper the depths left unsounded, the more exacting our faith in the impossibility of knowing. Greater than our faith, our instinct feels after its objects, if haply by groping in the darkness of our ignorance we may fathom its sources. "Although no man knoweth the spirit of a man save the spirit within him, yet is there something in him that not even his spirit itself knoweth. Only as thou beest it, thou seest it." If the divine instinct stirred not within the spirit, how could we apprehend divinity or comprehend ourselves?

"WHO placed thee here, did something then
infuse
Which now can tell thee news."

INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER IX.

OF THE THEORIES ON THE SUBJECT OF DISTINCTION.

Many important themes have been touched upon in our previous eight chapters. Of the *aperçues* exhibited, I consider those of chapter iv., on *Self-Determination*; chapter vii., on *Comprehension and Idea*; chapter viii., on *The True Actuality*, to be of the most vital importance to speculative insight. Hoping that the reader who has had the patience to accompany me hitherto will now keep clearly in mind the results of those three chapters, I ask him in this chapter to take note of some important consequences which follow from those doctrines.

All philosophy, indeed, every form of knowing, is conversant with the seizing of *distinctions*. To find the permanent distinction, is to find the first principle. Let us therefore proceed to examine the general subject of *distinction* in the light of the principles already established.

I.—PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION.

There are three possible theories on the subject of distinction. The first of these is the Eleatic Theory, which says:

1. "Being alone is, and nothing is not"; there is only identity, and distinction does not truly exist. The One is, the Many are not.

But though Xenophanes saw "naught but the One and All," and Parmenides asserted that the Many only arose through erroneous thinking (through "*opinion*"), yet Zeno found it necessary to show up "*the many*" as self-contradictory, and hence impossible.

Yet through the concept of the totality which Heraclitus leads to by uniting the negative element to the positive, from which it had been dirempted by the Eleatics—who were the first *pure thinkers*, i. e. the first to free thought from all traces of a sensuous or empirical content—philosophy arrived at

Atomism, which is the basis of the "common sense" view of the present day. This holds that:

2. Each somewhat is distinct from all others, and identical with itself alone. "*Ex nihilo nihil fit.*" Identity remains identity, and is distinct from difference; the two never mingle; distinction cannot be cancelled. The "laws of thought," which state the conviction of this stage of consciousness, are developed in Formal Logic. Nothing can possibly have more plausibility at first sight than this view of distinction.

3. The third theory is the Speculative. It holds that self-determination is the ultimate principle of thought, as well as of Being, and hence it sees distinction arise in the process of self-identification, and, conversely, identity in the act of self-distinction. Both are involved in the same process. This is the concept of the *Universal*, and, historically, its first appearance is found with Anaxagoras, although it was not till after the unfolding of its negative phases by the Sophists, and the seizing of its affirmative side by Socrates, that its infinite significance as the solvent of all problems was exhibited by Plato.

The generic term *Distinction* includes three forms: (a) *Difference*, which is the most "indifferent" form, that of mere diversity or variety, and involving mere likeness and unlikeness; (b) *Opposition*, which is the distinction of *contraries*, *polarity*; (c) *Contradiction*, which is distinction in its absolute form, the form of *self-relation*.

The Pythagoreans mention, in their list of categories, the two first of these forms, but make no mention of the third. They did not reach that consciousness of the nature of the negative or dialectic element which is implied in a system that traces all distinction to its root, and finds that distinction becomes identity at its highest tension, which is that of *self-distinction* or contradiction. This demands at our hands a full exposition.

II.—SCIENTIFIC DEDUCTION OF THE FORMS OF DISTINCTION.

All distinction originates in *relation*. Hence, the form of thought which notes distinction is *reflection*. That this is a necessary form of knowing, and that relativity is a form pertaining to everything objective, is the result of the doctrine developed in chapter vi., on Mediation. For the present, however, we may rest the case on its own merits; and without considering the “whence” of the same, we shall take the concept of *Identity*, as currently held, and see what will come of it.

1. The immediate form of distinction is abstract identity and difference.

“A is A;” this is given as the form of the Principle of Identity. This does not mean that A is B, C, or D, or that everything is identical with everything else, but, on the contrary, everything is identical with itself alone. A is not *non-A*. Hence, the principle states likewise the difference of each thing from all else.

The comparison by which this difference is discovered is an arbitrary one made by *me*, and is not anything implied in the nature of the object, as it is when I speak of heat or cold, sweet or sour, light or dark, heavy or light, &c.—distinctions which imply their opposites. This first form of distinction is, therefore, not an essential one, but if we examine it attentively, we shall see that it will become such.

(a) A is not B, C, or D; it is different from or unlike them. How does it differ? It cannot differ *universally* unless it excludes every predicate of the others. If there is no likeness, no common ground, then A cannot be a *determined* being, for the others (B, C, D, &c.) must possess one or both of its elements, i. e. they must contain being, or determination, or both. Hence, if A is absolutely unlike B, both must be pure simples, one of which, as the *ultimatum* of abstraction, is called pure being, and the other pure nought. But as such, they are hopelessly indistinguishable, for they are the same abstraction. We may therefore safely affirm that difference can only subsist where there is an identity posited.

We shall say, then, that A is like B, C,

and D, in the higher genera, or at least in the *summun genus*.

(b) A is, therefore, like B in one respect, and unlike it in another respect.

The respect in which A is *like* B, is unlike the respect in which it is *unlike* B. Therefore the difference falls wholly in A; and

(c) In so far as A is like B, it is different from itself as unlike B.

Our object has become a self-opposed. We see by this that simple difference (*likeness* and *unlikeness*) rests upon *opposition*, i. e. upon *essential distinction*.

2. Essential distinction or opposition must underlie and render possible all differences of whatever character. This is our result. Is this form of distinction the ultimate? An examination will decide.

The two sides of opposition are called *positive* and *negative*. They are the “contraries.”

(a) The *positive* is such only through its relation to the *negative*. The same relative nature belongs to the *negative*. A, as the opposite of B, finds its limit in B; so, too, the limit of B is in A.

(b) If A is what it is through B, then B determines A in so far as A is A. So, likewise, A is the determiner of B in so far as B is. Grasp this thought together, and we have: 1. A determines B, i. e. it constitutes B what it is; but since B determines A again, we have the determination that proceeded from A turned back upon A through B. 2. Hence, A determines itself through determining B.

(c) Therefore, opposition rests upon self-determination. The determination which proceeds from either side returns to that side, and is the determination of that side. Thus we have simply a circular movement, one half of which is called positive, and the other half negative. Either of these forms (positive or negative) grasped in its entire compass includes the other.

3. Self-determination, seized in its immediateness, is contradiction. But it is the basis of all distinction. Simple difference reduces when examined to antithesis; antithesis can only abide where there is self-negativity or contradiction.

With this we see what the general condi-

tions of *relativity* are. Relativity is negativity, and when traced out comes back again to itself.

Contradiction, or self-negativity, has the following obvious characteristics:

(a) The relation of the negative to itself is one of identity;

(b) But since it is a *negative*, it produces distinction by the same relation.

(c) Hence, in its contradiction it preserves itself, and is its own ground.

[*Remark.* The reader will not fail to note that this form of distinction (self-determination or contradiction) shows us the nature of the previous forms. In mere *difference*, we seized only the extremes of the process. This is the most superficial intellectual process. In seizing contraries, we arrive at a much more profound apprehension of the total movement which is involved in all distinction. The *self-relation* of the negative to itself is seized as *the positive*; the negating—distinction-producing—phase of the same movement is seized as *the negative*. But when arrived at the comprehension (or grasping together) of the entire process, we see the whole as one individual in the form of self-determination or contradiction. Some will be disposed to consider the term *contradiction* inapplicable here; but it must be confessed that it is an appropriate name for the process, if viewed from one of its sides. “A,” seized as a somewhat identical with itself, is found to be a mere phase of a total which includes B, or the opposite of A. The total is the true being of A and B, and in it both are cancelled, for it is their negative unity. We may say, therefore, that the true being of A is its destruction (non-being, or being-cancelled by its negative unity—the total). Hence, setting out with any given existence=A, we may assert of it that A and not-A (not-A being its potentiality) are one being.]

III.—THE “LAWS OF THOUGHT.”

It is scarcely necessary to call special attention to the abstract nature of the principles set up by Formal Logic as the laws of thought. But their discussion properly falls in this chapter. I shall therefore

point out some of the most obvious defects in such principles.

1. They are abstract, and only state one phase of the totality of an object. They, moreover, are based upon the image-making kind of thought which looks upon all truths as dead results, and never as living processes. For this reason, all mysticism has the greatest abhorrence of them, and condemns systematic procedure *by means of such laws* in the strongest manner. (Swedenborg, in the quotations printed on pages 19–21 of this volume, refers to formal metaphysics built up on such abstract principles, as the opposite of the true speculative which he calls “divine knowledge” and “revelation.”) When the mind rises out of the sensuous habit of viewing things as true in their isolated independence, and comes to see that interdependence obtains among such things—then it is that a suspicion of the inadequacy of these forms gains strength, and formal logic falls into disrepute. Those who still cultivate it, endeavor to make it apply to propositions by distinctions of *quantification* in the subject and predicate. But such labors tend more and more to reduce all speech to a tautology. “The rose is red,” when corrected according to the principle of contradiction, so as to exclude all trace of contradiction, will read thus: “The rose, in so far as red, is a red rose.” For it is evident that the identity expressed by “is” between “rose” and “red” is not intended. There is no mending of a sensuous or reflective form of expression so as to make it capable of holding truth (or the universal). A single proposition is not adequate to contain a statement of the total; it therefore requires several propositions, mutually restrictive, combined into a system.

2. The principle of Identity asserts that every somewhat is identical with itself. This makes out every somewhat a total in itself. It is evident that this principle cannot apply to anything finite or dependent; to anything, in short, which comes under our observation in this world. Take this stone, for example; its being involves wide relations to the solar system; its being is complicated with earth, air, fire, and water.

Let these relations develope, and it crumbles to dirt, and is a stone no longer; hence, the assertion of its true or total being destroys its present individuality completely. So if we take the principle of contradiction: "the somewhat cannot be itself and not itself at the same time"; we have to deny its application to dependent beings. For that which has its limit in another is so involved that we may assert that *precisely in that respect* in which it is itself, it is not itself at the same time. For the limit which gives it its individuality is at the same time its negation or other-being.

Likewise, in all processes we have to set aside such abstract principles. All forms of motion embody contradiction, and hence are allowed to be inconceivable by metaphysicians or formal logicians.

Motion.

(a) A body cannot move where it is, for it is there already.

(b) Nor can it move where it is not;

(c) Therefore it cannot move at all.

Change.

(a) Any somewhat is either in one condition or another.

(b) If it is in any one condition, it is not changing—nor, likewise, if it is already in another.

(c) Therefore there can be no change.

Death.

(a) This being cannot die, for there is no middle ground between life and death.

(b) Therefore it is either alive or dead.

(c) Hence, there can be no transition from one state to the other.

[The reader will remember this argument in Plato.]

Take the most general form of process:

The Becoming.

(a) It (a somewhat) either is or is not.

(b) If it already is, there is no becoming; if it is not, there is likewise no becoming.

(c) *Ergo*, &c.

In the same way consciousness can be proved to have no existence; Herbert Spencer has, in fact, proved its impossibility.

What do these principles apply to? They

do not apply to any processes; they do not apply to any finite or dependent beings; they do not hold of any being that has an essential relation to anything else; in fine, they cannot apply to anything *phenomenal*. The *phenomenal* is that which exists outside of its true self (its noumenon).

Do they apply to the totality? The totality *does* remain self-identical, but it does so through self-distinction. Hence, the principle of contradiction is a fragment of the true concrete law, which should state: "That only is true which is self-identical in its non-being, or, in short, is self-determined." Such a being is the universal and abiding, for every limitation of it is a continuation, every negation an affirmation, every refutation a proof of it. It is Spinoza's "*Infinitum actu vel rationis*."

3. The Principle of Contradiction taken in a universal sense refutes itself:

(a) Being is not non-being.

(b) By this all determined being is distinguished into being + determination, for all determination is negation, and hence non-being.

(c) Hence, we are carried at once to the *ultimatum* of abstraction—pure being, which is the same as nought, or the pure void.

But the Principle of Excluded Middle, when taken universally, cancels the Principle of Contradiction, although it is at the same time founded on that principle.

It says in general terms: "A is either B or not B." But A is not B; hence, to assert B of A, at all, is to contradict the principle of identity.

(a) A is *either* B or not-B, i. e. B excludes not-B.

(b) But since A is not B, B excludes A, and consequently,

(c) A is excluded from itself by predicating B of it.

Practically considered, the principle of Excluded Middle is directed against all forms of change and synthesis. Could we, however, look at the universe as composed of unchangeable finite beings, still, so long as a multiplicity of determinations belonged to each, this principle could not apply. No one would ever think of

applying the principle of contradiction if he regarded things as phenomenal, i. e. as outside of their true being. It is only when we, for practical purposes, regard things as fixed—as having permanent being, just as they are—that we regard them as self-identical, and as not contradictory. Thus it is not in our rational consciousness, but in our first stages of reflection, that we apply these principles. We abstract from the concrete object before us, and apply the principle to the abstraction which we have made. Such a procedure is all well enough until we undertake to know the Concrete, in and for itself. Then we have to leave these abstract principles for principles as concrete as the truth itself. No abstraction holds when we apply to it the “Form of Eternity.” Truth does not need “different points of view” to save it from contradiction; its Negative Unity dissolves all distinction in its resistless menstruum,

and rays forth creatively through the same negative self-relation. Formal Logic and Formal Metaphysic can never seize anything in its *genesis*, but always goes behind one phase merely to posit the same identical distinction over and over again; it holds that “like produces like,” and that distinction comes from distinction and cannot be cancelled. On the other hand, the Speculative Insight *always* regards the process,—sees all things in their *genesis*, and thus can comprehend synthesis as well as analysis. It does not need to keep some distinction “on hand for seed,” fearing, lest it come to the assistance of the world with such principles as “*Ex nihilo nihil fit*,” and the “Eternity of Matter and Force,” that it can never comprehend the phenomena therein. It is aware that he who would seize the world rationally, and be present at its creation, must first ascend into the creative thought.

THE DIFFERENCE OF BAADER FROM HEGEL.

[We lay before our readers the following communication from Professor Karl Rosenkranz. Aside from the curiosity naturally awakened to hear the words of the philosopher who has occupied for nearly forty years the chair formerly occupied by Kant, the subject itself is one of special interest, particularly in the present connection, as it is discussed in several articles of this number. We are indebted to Mr. Davidson for the translation. —EDITOR.]

To the President of the Philosophical Society of St. Louis:

At the end of the third number of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, there appears a letter from Dr. Hoffmann, Professor at Würzburg, wherein he recommends the study of the philosophy of Franz von Baader. Dr. Hoffmann is now the most distinguished representative of this philosophy. With great personal sacrifices, with admirable perseverance, with genuine enthusiasm, he has made himself its apostle, and has brought out a complete edition of the works of his master, which deserves to be called a model. In the above mentioned communication to you, Mr. President, he has had the kindness to make reference to a work of mine—*The Science of the Logical Idea*—in terms of distinction, for which I cannot be otherwise than grateful to him. When, however, he places it in such a relation to Baader's philosophy as to give the

impression that I, a Hegelian, had come unusually close to it, I feel myself compelled to remark that I have, in part I., pp. 330 sqq. of my work, drawn a perfectly definite distinction between myself and Baader.

Permit me, Mr. President, in a few words to state as clearly as possible the grounds of this distinction.

1. I have endeavored, in my logic, to combat the confusion which has arisen in the school of Hegel between the concept of opposition and that of contradiction. Every opposition, *oppositio*, may become a contradiction, *repugnantia*, but in itself it is not necessarily one. It is not a contradiction when I say that the human species is opposed to itself in the difference between woman and man, or that the state is opposed to itself in the distinction between government and governed, and so on.

2. Opposition becomes contradiction

when things, in themselves opposed, manifest, instead of their proper unity, the diremption thereof. This possibility is necessary, but the actualization of it is accidental.

3. If this actualization takes place, the existence will either (a) be destroyed by the diremption, or (b) overcome the diremption, and reinstate itself in the harmonious unity of opposites: as, for example, the Union has just done in the reconstruction of its Constitution against the insurrection of the Southern States.

Hence, contradiction, as a phenomenon, may have (a) a merely negative, or (b) a positive result.

Therefore, in the concept of the negative, the destructive and the productive directions must be distinguished. It is plain that along with the concept of the true, the concept of the false is necessarily given (*verum index sui et falsi*, as Spinoza says) with that of life, that of disease, with that of the beautiful, that of ugliness, with that of good, that of evil; but it is also plain that the true, life, the beautiful, the good, are the absolute, the positive conditions of the false, disease, ugliness, the evil, respectively. They are the *prius* of the negative forms of their existence, which are, as existences, accidental.

Now, I have endeavored, in the doctrine of contradiction as well as in the doctrine of the negative, to deduce and to explain all the possible forms of the negative as a moment of the evolution of the idea. In connection with this, I have, in certain points, in the concepts of usurpation, of degradation, of monstrosity, approximated to Herr von Baader; but as regards the method in which he derives such forms originally from a "Fall" which he supposes to lie away beyond the origin of the world—from a hypothetical spirit-world—I have assumed a position of decided opposition. I have always combatted the main doctrine

of Baader, which holds to a twofold Nature: a Nature in God, which is supposed to be without matter, and a Nature which was produced in time and space, as matter, only through the Fall; for I have no idea of an immaterial Nature, nor can I, in the universality of law which the study of Nature discovers to us, find any ground for believing in a diabolic production of it. In a skeptical investigation, entitled *The Transfiguration of Nature*, (in the first volume of my Studies, 1839, pp. 155-204,) I have gone into some detail on this subject; in 1853, I published a work with the same tendency, viz.: *The Æsthetics of the Ugly*, &c., &c.

Mystical Logic says, for example, that life is a contradiction of the concept of death; I say, Death is the opposition immanent in, and necessary to, the concept of life. All living must die. On the other hand, disease is a contradiction of life to itself. I cannot say All living must become diseased. Herr von Baader had profound insights into the region of the diabolical; but when he comes to diabolize cold, heat, rage, hurricanes, volcanoes, poisons, savage beasts, &c., I reject such a doctrine as much as the doctrine of demons, devils, angels, &c., who are supposed to influence us:

I consider the world, notwithstanding its evils, as rational; and I see in the freedom which is conscious of itself, the origin of the good no less than of the evil, without making either angels or devils responsible for them.

You will, perhaps, much respected Mr. President, find a page for this brief explanation in the Journal of the Society of which I have the honor to be a member.

With much esteem,

Yours, very faithfully,

KARL ROSENKRANZ.

Königsberg, 7th Jan., 1868.

NOMINALISM *versus* REALISM.

[We print below some strictures upon the position assumed in our last number with reference to M. Janet's version of Hegel's doctrine of the "Becoming." We hope that these acute statements which have been written, for the most part, in the form of queries, will receive a careful reading, especially by those who have differed from our own views hitherto expressed. They seem to us the most profound and compendious statement of the anti-speculative standpoint as related to the Science of Pure Thought (*Prima Philosophia*), that we have seen. But for this very reason we are fain to believe that the defects of the formalism relied upon are all the more visible. We have endeavored to answer these queries with the same spirit of candor that animates their author.—*Editor*.]

Mr. Editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy:

I should like to make some inquiries in regard to your meaning in the paragraph beginning "Being is the pure Simple," vol. i., p. 255.

I will begin by stating how much of it I already understand, as I believe. I understand that 'Being' and 'Nothing' as used by you, are two abstract, and not two general terms. That Being is the abstraction belonging in common and exclusively to the objects of the concrete term, whose extension is unlimited or all-embracing, and whose comprehension is null. I understand that you use Nothing, also, as an abstract term=nothingness; for otherwise to say that Being is Nothing, is like saying that humanity is non-man, and does not imply at all that Being is in any opposition with itself, since it would only say 'Das Sein ist nicht Seiendes,' not 'Sein ist nicht Sein.' By Nothing, then, I understand the abstract term corresponding to a (possible) concrete term, which is the logical contradictory of the concrete term corresponding to 'Being.' And since the logical contradictory of any term has no extension in common with that term, the concrete nothing is the term which has no extension. I understand, that, when you say 'Being has no content,' and 'Being is wholly undetermined,' you mean, simply, that its corresponding concrete has no logical comprehension, or, at least, that what you mean follows from this, and this, conversely, from what you mean.

I come now to what I do not understand, and I have some questions to ask, which I have endeavored so to state that all can see that the Hegelian is bound to answer them, for they simply ask what you mean, whether this or that; they simply ask you to be explicit upon points upon which you have used ambiguous expressions. They are not put forward as arguments, however, but only as inquiries.

1. Abstract terms, according to the doctrine of modern times, are only a device for expressing in another way the meaning of concrete terms. To say that whiteness inheres in an object, is the same as to say

that an object is white. To say that whiteness is a color, is the same as to say that the white is colored, and that this is implied in the very meanings of the words.

But, you will undoubtedly admit that there is a difference between a hundred dollars in my pocket, *Being* or *not Being*, and so in any other particular case. You, therefore, admit that there is nothing which is, which is also not. Therefore, it follows that *what is*, and *what is not*, are mutually exclusive and not coextensive.

Since, then, you nevertheless say that the corresponding abstractions, Being and Nothingness, are absolutely the same, (although you at the same time hold that it is not so, at all), it is plain that you find some other meaning in abstract terms than that which other logicians find. I would, therefore, ask what you mean by an abstraction, and how you propose to find out what is true of abstractions.

[Here we have stated, 1st, what our interrogator thinks he understands, in brief, as follows: (a) That Being and Nothing are two abstract, and not two general terms; (b) that Being belongs to the concrete term, whose extension is unlimited, and whose comprehension is null; (c) that Nothing means *nothingness*, and belongs to the concrete term, whose extension is null.

At this point we will pause, in order to call attention to a vital misapprehension of the signification of Being, as we used the term. If Being were the abstraction corresponding to the concrete term, "whose extension is unlimited and whose comprehension is null," Being would then signify *existence*, (not the German "*Sein*," but "*Daseyn*," sometimes called *extant Being*,) i. e. it would signify *determined* Being, and not *pure* Being. If Being is taken in this sense, it is not equivalent to Nought, and there is no support given to such an absurdity in any system of Philosophy

with which we are acquainted. Therefore, whatever is based on this assumption falls to the ground. But the question may be asked, "If the abstraction corresponding to the most general predicate of individual things is *existence*, by what process of abstraction do you get beyond this most general of predicates to a category transcending it?" We answer, by the simple process of *analysis*; let us try: in the most general predicate, which is *determined Being*, or *existence*—for all things in the Universe are determined beings—we have an evident two-foldness, (a composite nature,) which allows of a further analysis into pure Being and determination. Now, pure Being, considered apart from all determination, does not correspond to any concrete term, for the reason that *determination*, which alone renders such correspondence possible, has been separated from it by the analysis.

As regards the point (c), it is sufficient to remark that we did not use the term "Nothing" for nothingness, in the place referred to, but used the term "*Nought*," so as to avoid the ambiguity in the term Nothing, to-wit: the confusion arising from its being taken in the sense of no thing, as well as in the sense of the pure void. In analyzing "determined Being," we have two factors: one reduces to pure being, which is the pure void, while the other reduces to pure negation, which is likewise the pure void. Determination is negation, and if determination is isolated it has no substrate; while on the other hand all substrates, or substrate in general when isolated from determination, becomes pure vacuity.

Hence it seems to us that the process of analysis which reflection initiates, does not stop until it comes to the pure simple, which is the turning point where analysis becomes synthesis. Let us see how this synthesis manifests itself: our ultimate abstraction, the pure simple, has two forms, pure Being and pure negation; they coincide, in that they are the pure void. Neither can be determined, and hence neither can possess a distinction from the other. Analytic thought, which sunders the concrete, and never takes note of the

link which binds, must always arrive at the abstract simple as the net result of its dualizing process. But arrived at this point it is obliged to consider the *tertium quid*, the *genetic universal*, which it has neglected. For it has arrived at that which is self-contradictory. To seize the pure simple in thought is to cancel it; for by seizing it in thought, we seize it as the negation of the determined, and by so doing we place it in opposition, and thereby determine it. Moreover, it would, objectively considered, involve the same contradiction, for its distinction from existing things determines it likewise. Therefore, *the simple*, which is the limit of analysis, is only a point at which synthesis begins, and hence is a *moment* of a process of self-repulsion, or self-related negation. So long as analysis persists in disregarding the mediation here involved, it can set up this pure immediate for the *ultimatum*. But so soon as it takes it in its truth it allows its mediation to appear, and we learn the synthetic result, which, in its most abstract form, is "the becoming." This we shall also find in another mode of consideration: differentiation and distinguishing are forms of mediation; the simple is the limit at which mediation begins; it (mediation) cancels this limit by beginning; but all mediated somewhats imply, likewise, the simple as the ultimate element upon which determination takes effect. Thus we cannot deny the simple utterly, nor can we posit it affirmatively by itself; it is no sooner reached by analysis than it passes into synthesis. Again we see the same doctrine verified by seizing the two factors of our analysis in their reflective form, i.e. in their mediation: Being, as the substrate, is the form of identity or self-relation, which, when isolated, becomes empty self-relation, or self-relation in which the negativity of the relation has been left out; this gives a form that collapses into a void. Determination, as the other factor, is the relation to a beyond, or what we call the *relative* proper; it is the self-transcending element, and when isolated so that its relation remains within itself, it falls into the form of the self-related, which is that of substrate, or the form of

Being, and this collapses still further into the void, when we continue our demand for the simple; this void (or "hunger," as Boehme called it) is the same relativity that we found determination to be, when isolated, and thus we may follow these abstractions round and round until we find that they are organic phases of one process. Then we have found our synthesis, and have left those abstractions behind us.

We do not pretend to speak for "Hegelians;" we do not know that they would endorse our position. We give this as our own view, merely.

The first query which our interrogator offers contains the following points:

(a) Abstract terms are devices for expressing the meaning of concrete terms.

(b) Difference between a hundred dollars in his pocket being and not being (i.e. that the existence of a hundred dollars in his pocket makes a difference to his wealth) granted, it follows that what is and what is not are mutually exclusive, and not coextensive.

(c) The assertion of the identity of Being and Nothing, [nought?] and the simultaneous denial of it indicates some other meaning given to abstract terms than the one he finds.

With regard to the first point, (a), we are ready to say at once, that we could not hold such a doctrine and lay any claim to be speculative philosophers. Nor, indeed, could we consistently hold it and join the class of thinkers which belong to the stage of Reflection—such as the Positivists, the Kantists, the Hamiltonians, &c., &c.,—who agree that we know only phenomena, and hence agree that the immediate world is untrue in itself, and exists only through mediation. For it is evident that the doctrine enunciated by our querist implies that general terms as well as abstract terms are only "*flatus vocis*"—in short, that individual things compose the universe, and that these are valid and true in themselves. On the contrary, we must hold that true actualities must be self-determining totalities, and not mere *things*, for these are always dependent somewhat, and are separated from their true selves. (See chapter VIII. of our Introduction to Philosophy,

and, also, chapter X. on *The Universal*.) That which abides in the process of origination and decay, which *things* are always undergoing, is the generic; the generic is the total comprehension, the true actuality, or the Universal, and its identity is always preserved, while the mere "thing," which is not self-contained, loses its identity perpetually. The loss of the identity of the *thing*, is the very process that manifests the identity of the total.

Hence, to pre-suppose such a doctrine as formal logic pre-supposes, is to set up the doctrine of immediateness as the only true.

The "hundred dollar" illustration does not relate to the discussion, for the reason, that the question is not that of the identity of *existence* and *non-existence*, but of *pure Being* and *Nought*, as before explained.]

2. You say, in effect,

Being has no determination;

Ergo, It is nothing.

Now, it certainly appears that the contrary conclusion follows from this premise, namely: that it is not nothingness. I suppose that you have suppressed one of your premises, and that you mean to argue thus:

Indetermination in respect to any character, is the negation of that character;

Being is indeterminate in respect to every character;

Ergo, Being is negative of every character.

In short, you seem to imply that to abstract from a character, is to deny it. Is this the manner in which your argument is to be completed, or how else?

3. This suggests another question. You say that nothing has no determination. It is plain that it would not follow from this that Being is nothing, but only that Nothing is being, or rather that Any non-being is a being, thus reducing non-being (*nicht-seiende*) to an absurdity. This would be nothing new, (for Albertus Magnus quotes Avicenna to this effect,) and in my opinion would be perfectly true. *Non-ens*, or "the not being," is a self-contradictory expression. Still, though I thus see no monstrous consequences of saying that nothing has no determination, I see no proof at all that it is so. It might be said, indeed, that the things which are not have no characters in common, and that therefore *what is not* has no logical comprehension and Being—not no determination. I would ask, then, have you proved that nothing has no determination? Do not suppose that I am endeavoring to drive you into contradiction; for I understand Hegelians profess to be self-

contradictory. I only wish to ascertain whether they have an equal disregard for those logical maxims which relate to ambiguities.

4. You say, in effect,

Difference is determination,

Being has no determination;

Ergo, Being has no difference from nothing;

Ergo, Being is nothing.

It is incontestable that difference from anything is determination in respect to being or not being that thing. A monkey, in differing from a man, is determined (negatively) in respect to humanity. Difference, then, in any respect, is determination in that respect. This, I take it, is what you mean. Now let us parallel the above argument:

Difference in any respect is determination in that respect;

Animality, in general, is not determined in respect to humanity;

Ergo, Animality, in general, has no difference from humanity;

Ergo, Animality, in general, is humanity.

This is plainly sophistical. For to say that an abstraction, in general, is undetermined, has two different senses; one resulting from a strict analysis of the language, and the other reposing upon the ordinary use of language. Strictly, to say that an abstraction is undetermined, would mean that it may be this or may be that abstraction; that is, that the abstract word by which it is expressed may have any one of a variety of meanings. What is ordinarily meant by the phrase, however, is that the object of the corresponding concrete term is undetermined, so that neither of a certain pair of mutually contradictory predicates are *universally* true of that concrete. Now, it is true to say that animality is undetermined in respect to humanity, or that being is not determined at all, only in the latter of these senses, to-wit: that not every animal is a man, and not every animal is not a man, and (in the other case) that there is no predicate which can be truly affirmed or denied of all beings. For in the other sense, we should imply that the abstractions themselves were vague, and that being, for example, has no precise meaning. In the only true sense, therefore, the premise is, in the one case, that "Animal, simply, is undetermined," and in the other, that "*Ens (seiende)* is undetermined;" and what follows is, in the one case, that "not every animal differs from a man," and in the other, that "not every being differs from any nothing." This latter amounts merely to saying that there is nothing from which every being differs, or that a nothing is an absurdity. These correct conclusions do not in the least imply that animality is hu-

manity, or that being is nothingness. To reach the latter conclusions, it would be necessary (in the first place) to use the premises in the other and false sense; but even then, all that would be legitimately inferable would be that "humanity, *in some sense*, is animality," and that "being, *in some sense*, is nothing." Only by a second fallacy could it be concluded that animality, in the sense intended, is humanity, or that being, in the sense intended, is nothing. Now, I would inquire whether you inadvertently fell into these ambiguities, or, if not, wherein the force of your argumentation lies?

[The second point we are requested to answer is involved in the third and fourth, which charges to our account the following syllogism:

Difference is determination; being has no determination; *ergo*, being has no difference from nothing; *ergo*, being is nothing.

This is then paralleled with one in which animality and humanity are confounded; the cause of which is the following oversight: In the article under criticism, (vol. i. of the present Journal, p. 255,) we said, "Thus, if Being is posited as having validity in and by itself, without determination, it becomes a pure void, in nowise different from nought, for difference is determination, and [N. B.] neither Being nor nought possess it." The ground of their identity is stated to be the lack of determinations in nought as well as in Being.

Again, determination may be quantitative as well as qualitative, and, in the former respect, animality is distinguished from humanity; for to have more extension and less comprehension, certainly distinguishes one concept from another. Two is distinct from three, although contained in the latter. Hence, it is not quite correct to say that "animality, in general, is not determined in respect to humanity." Moreover, if it were correct, its converse "humanity is not determined in respect to animality," would also have to be true to make a case parallel to the one in which Being is asserted to be identical with nothing for the reason that neither is determined in any respect. Were animality and humanity neither determined in respect to the other, they certainly must be identical.

For these reasons, we cannot acknowledge that we "inadvertently fell into these ambiguities," or that we fell into them at all.

And we cannot see the basis of the assertion that "Hegelians profess to be self-contradictory." For they hold that finite things contradict themselves, but that the total preserves itself in its negation. They therefore would consider every one who stakes his faith on the immediate to contradict himself, but that the philosopher who holds only to the absolute mediation, escapes self-contradiction by not attempting to set up non-contradiction as the first principle of things. Hegelians may understand this as they please—to us it seems that the principle of identity is abstract, and only one side of the true principle. If we would comprehend the true principle of the universe, we must be able to seize identity and contradiction in one, and hence to annul both of them. He who comprehends self-determination must be able to do this. The self negates itself, and yet, for the reason that it is the self that does this, the deed is *affirmative*, and hence identity is the result. "The self says to itself, 'thus far shalt thou go, and no farther'; its reply is, 'I am already there, limiting myself.'" "When me they fly, I am the wings," says Brahma, and every true Infinite involves this negation, which is at the same time negation of negation or affirmation.

Hence, it seems to us improper to charge self-contradiction upon those who merely assert it of finite things.]

5. Finally, I would inquire whether, in your opinion, the maxims of (ordinary) logic relating to contradictions lack even a *prima facie* presumption in their favor? Whether the burden of proof is or is not upon the Hegelians to show that the assumption of their falsity is a more tenable position than the assumption of their truth? For in the present state of the question, it

seems to me more probable that subtle fallacies lurk in the Hegelian reasoning than that such fallacies lurk in all other reasoning whatsoever.

[In answer to the fifth query, we will state that we think the maxims of formal logic are *prima facie* true, for the *prima facie* mode of viewing always gives validity to the immediate phase of things. But Reflection discovers the insufficiency of abstract identity and difference, and comes to their assistance with manifold saving clauses. The speculative insight holds, too, like reflection, that mediation belongs to things, but sees, further, that all mediation is circular, and hence, that self-mediation is the "constant" under all variables.

The whole question of the validity of formal logic and of common sense *vs.* speculative philosophy, can be reduced to this: Do you believe that there are any finite or dependent beings? In other words, Are you a nominalist or a realist?

This is the gist of all philosophizing: If one holds that things are not interdependent, but that each is for itself, he will hold that general terms correspond to no object, and may get along with formal logic; and if he holds that he knows things directly in their essence, he needs no philosophy—common sense is sufficient.

But if he holds that any particular thing is dependent upon what lies beyond its immediate limits, he holds, virtually, that its true being lies beyond it, or, more precisely, that its immediate being is not identical with its total being, and hence, that it is in contradiction with itself, and is therefore *changeable, transitory*, and evanescent, regarded from the *immediate* point of view. But regarding the entire or total being (The Generic), we cannot call it changeable or contradictory, for that perpetually abides. It is the "Form of Eternity."

LEIBNITZ ON THE NATURE OF THE SOUL.

Translated from the original Latin by TOM. DAVIDSON.

[The following article is the translation of a letter from Leibnitz to Wagner, "On the Active Force of the Body, the Soul, and the Souls of Brutes."—EDITOR.]

I. It is with pleasure that I reply to your inquiries concerning the nature of the soul, inasmuch as I observe, from the doubt which you express, that my meaning has not been rendered sufficiently clear to you, and that this has arisen from some pre-judgment or other which you have drawn from my sketch inserted in the *Acta Eruditorum*, wherein I engaged in a polemic against Cl. Sturm, on the active force of the body. You say that I have there claimed active force for matter, and that, by attributing resistance to matter, I have attributed to it reaction, and consequently action. You add, therefore, that since there is everywhere in nature an active principle, this alone seems sufficient to account for the actions of the brutes, without calling in the aid of a sort of undecayable soul.

II. I reply, in the first place, that the active principle is not attributed by me to naked or primary matter, which is purely passive, and consists merely of *stubbornness** and extension; but to body, to *clothed* or secondary matter, which contains, in addition, a primitive *entelecheia* or active principle. I reply, in the second place, that the resistance of naked matter is not an action, but only mere passiveness, inasmuch as it has *stubbornness* or impenetrability, whereby it resists anything that attempts to penetrate it, but exerts no repercussion, unless with addition of elastic force, which must be derived from motion, and consequently supposes the further addition of the active force of matter. I reply, in the third place, that this active principle, this primary *entelecheia*, is, in reality, the vital force, endowed also with the faculty of perception, and undecayable, for reasons formerly stated by me. And this it is that in brutes I hold to be their soul. While, therefore, I admit the superaddition everywhere of active principles in matter, I

posit, as likewise everywhere disseminated through it, vital or percipient principles, consequently monads and, so to speak, metaphysical atoms, destitute of parts, and incapable of being produced or destroyed naturally.

III. You next ask my definition of soul. I reply, that soul may be understood in a broad or in a narrow sense. In the broad sense, it will be the same as life, or the vital principle, that is, the principle of internal action existing in a simple thing or monad, to which external action corresponds. And this correspondence of internal and external, or the representation of the external in the internal, of the compound in the simple, of multiplicity in unity, is, in reality, perception. But in this sense, soul may be attributed not only to animals, but to all other percipient things likewise. In its narrow acceptation, soul is taken to mean a nobler sort of life, or sentient life, wherein there is not merely the faculty of perceiving, but also that of feeling, inasmuch, namely, as attention and memory are added to perception. Moreover, in a similar manner, mind is a nobler species of soul—that is, mind is rational soul, wherein reason, or the power of generalization from universality, is added to feeling. As, therefore, mind is rational soul, so soul is sentient life, and life is perceptive principle. Now, I have shown, both by examples and by arguments, that every perception is not feeling, but that there is perception of things that cannot be felt. For example, I should not be able to perceive green, unless I perceived blue and yellow, from which it results. At the same time, I do not feel blue and yellow, unless, perhaps, by the use of a microscope.

IV. You will remember, moreover, that according to my view, not only are all lives, all souls, all minds, all primitive *entelecheias*, enduring, but also that every prim-

* Ἀντιπνικία.

itive *entelecheia*, or every vital principle, is perpetually furnished with a sort of nature-machine, which to us comes in the form of an organic body, and which, notwithstanding that it preserves its general appearance, is perpetually getting repaired, like the ship of Theseus. Nor can we be so much as certain that even the smallest particle received by us at our birth still remains in our body, even although it is the same machine that is by degrees completely transformed, increased, diminished, involved, or evolved. Hence, not only is the mind enduring, but there also always survives some animal, although any particular animal cannot be said to be enduring, inasmuch as the animal species is not permanent; as for example, the caterpillar and the butterfly are not the same animal, although there is the same soul in both. Every nature-machine, therefore, has this property, that it is never entirely destructible, since, however thick may be the integument that is dissolved, there is always a tiny machine that is not destroyed, like the garb of Harlequin in the pantomimes, who, after the removal of a large number of coats, used always to have still a fresh one underneath. And this circumstance need not cause us so much astonishment, when we reflect that nature everywhere is organic, and ordered by a most wise Author for certain ends, and that nothing in nature ought to be looked upon as unwrought, though it may sometimes appear nothing but a rude mass to our senses. We thus, therefore, remove all the difficulties which arise from the nature of a soul separated entirely from all matter; so that, in fact, a soul or an animal before birth, or after death, differs from a soul or an animal living the present life only in material condition and degree of perfection, but not by entire generic essence. In like manner, my notion of Genii is that they are minds endowed with bodies remarkably penetrative and adapted for action—bodies which they can, perhaps, change at will, and hence they do not deserve even to be called animals. Thus all things in nature are analagous, and subtle elements may be readily understood by the study of coarse ones, inasmuch as both exist in the same

manner. God alone is substance really separate from matter, since He is pure act, without any addition of passive power, which, wherever it is, constitutes matter. And, indeed, all created substances have impenetrability, the natural consequence of which is that one is outside of another, and thus penetration is excluded.

V. Now, although my principles are very general, and find their verification no less in man than in the brutes, yet man rises in an extraordinary degree above the brutes, and approaches the Genii, because, from having the use of reason, he is capable of communion with God, and hence is a subject for reward or punishment in the divine government. He therefore preserves not only his life and his soul, like the brute, but also self-consciousness and the remembrance of a previous state, and, in a word, personality. And he is immortal, not only physically, but also morally; whence, in the strict sense, immortality is attributed to the human soul alone. For if a man did not know that in the other life penalties or rewards awaited him for (his conduct in) this, there would really be no punishment and no reward; and as far as morals were concerned, it would be precisely the same thing as if I were extinguished, and another being, happier or unhappier, succeeded me. Therefore I hold that the souls which doubtless are latent in seminal animalculæ from the beginning, are not rational until, by conception, they are destined for human life; but when they are once made rational, and rendered capable of consciousness and communion with God, I aver that they can never lay aside the person of a citizen in the Commonwealth of God; and since it is governed with the utmost justice and beauty, it is consistent that even by the laws of nature, on account of the parallelism between the Kingdom of Grace and that of nature, souls be rendered fitter for rewards and punishments by the force of their own actions. And in this sense, it may be said that virtue brings its own reward, and vice its own punishment, since, by a sort of natural consequence, before the last state of the soul, according as it departs atoned for or unatoned for, there arises a certain natural divergence, pro-

ordained in nature by God, with divine promises and threats, and consistent with grace and justice; and this takes place by the additional intervention of Genii, good or bad, according to which we have associated with, whose operations are perfectly natural, although their nature is sublimer than ours. We see, for example, that a man on awaking from a profound sleep, or even on recovering from apoplexy, usually recovers the recollection of his former state. The same thing must be said of death, which may render our perceptions disturbed and confused, but cannot altogether blot them out of memory, on the recovery of the use of which rewards and punishments take place.

VI. There is, therefore, no reason to fear that dangerous consequences will arise from this doctrine; but, on the contrary, a true natural theology, not only not at variance with revealed truth, but even wonderfully in its favor, will be deduced by the most beautiful arguments from my principles. Those, however, who deny all perception

and organism to the brutes, and to other parts of nature, do not sufficiently recognize the Divine Majesty, but introduce something that is unworthy of God, something uncouth, that is, a void of perfections and forms, which you may call metaphysical, but which is no less deserving of rejection than a material or physical void. Those, on the other hand, who grant real souls and perception to the brutes, and yet admit that their souls may perish naturally, thereby deprive us of the demonstration that proves that our souls cannot perish naturally, and fall into the dogma of the Socinians, who think that the soul cannot be preserved except by a miracle or by grace, but maintain that by nature it ought to perish, which is depriving natural theology of its most important part. Besides, the contrary can be completely demonstrated, inasmuch as a substance that has no parts cannot be naturally destroyed.

With respect and good wishes.

Wolfenbüttel, 4th June, 1710.

BOOK NOTICES.

THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE; by J. G. Fichte. Translated from the German by A. E. Kroeger. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1868.

This book, which has been announced for some time past in this Journal, has at length made its appearance. We hope at an early day to devote space to a thorough consideration of it; at present we confine ourselves to announcing its appearance. All those who wish to see the first great work of Philosophy which undertook to satisfy the demand for a strictly scientific form, should obtain this book and study it thoroughly, in connection with Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason." Whatever one may ultimately conclude as to the validity of Fichte's labors as final statements of the problem, he must always acknowledge a great debt to those labors, for upon their basis all that is great in later systems of Speculative Philosophy rests. Mr. Kroeger has shown, in a remarkable degree, that rare command of style which is able to array the

members of a long sentence so as to make the meaning perspicuous. We are informed that he is about to publish a translation of Fichte's "Science of Rights."

NOTES ON THE VITA NUOVA, AND MINOR POEMS OF DANTE, together with "The New Life," and many other poems of Dante; by the author of "Remarks on the Sonnets of Shakespeare," &c. New York: James Miller, 1868.

This work is full of interest to the one who can detect the inner sense of mystic writings. We give the titles of some of the chapters at the beginning: Chap. i., *Notes on Pythagoras*; chap. ii., *Notes on Boëthius*; chap. iii., *Notes on the Veil over the Face of Moses*; chap. iv., *Notes on Personification*; chap. v., *Notes on Philosophy—as a Lady*; chap. vi., *Notes on the Meaning of Number Nine*.

Since the days of Goethe, we do not remember a writer who possesses a more luminous style, or one so calm and genial while full of persuasion.

THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

Vol. II.

1868.

No. 2.

SUN-CLEAR STATEMENT

To the Public at large concerning the true nature of the NEWEST PHILOSOPHY. An attempt to force the reader to an understanding.

Translated from the German of J. G. FICHTE, by A. E. KROGER.

THIRD CONVERSATION.

R. I believe that I have now fully grasped your opinion concerning the Science of Knowledge, and that, historically, I know quite well what you mean. Moreover, when I accept the mere similarity of your science with the demonstration of a mechanical work of art, I can think the possibility of it quite well, and in a general way. But as soon as I reflect on the necessary distinction of both, and the characteristic differences of their several objects, a science like the one you describe appears to me to be utterly impossible.

The conception of the systematic connection of the manifold in a work of art with the view to produce a prearranged result has been in the mind of the artist long before the work of art existed; which work has indeed been produced only after this conception and according to it. We others do nothing but reconstruct that conception of the artist, or *reinvent* his work of art. Hence, it is here very significant to say, that there is a systematic connection in the manifold. This systematic connection is in the *conception of the artist*, and of all those who think as artists.

But tell me, does your assertion of a systematic connection in the manifold of consciousness signify likewise, that this con-

sciousness has been prepared by some artist according to the conception of such a connection, and that the teacher of the Science of Knowledge only reinvents this conception? Where is this artist? And how and in what manner has he produced consciousness?

A. Supposing it is not to signify this, and that the comparison is not to be extended so far? Supposing that ambiguous proposition is to signify no more than the following: we *may* view—amongst other manners of viewing—the manifold of consciousness as systematically connected; or: there are two ways of viewing the determinations of consciousness: one immediate way, by immediately surrendering ourselves to them, and thus finding them as they present themselves; and another way, through mediation, or by systematically deducing them as they must necessarily present themselves in consequence of this systematic connection? In which case the latter view could be realized only after actual consciousness had already existence, and on no account in advance of the existence of consciousness. Nor could the latter view exist for any but such as with arbitrary freedom might take hold of it. Hence, the teacher of the Science of Knowledge, and he alone, would be the artist of

consciousness, if there were any artist in this case. He would be, as it were, the *reinventor* of consciousness without there being any first and original inventor and any prior conception of consciousness, according to which he could have produced his invention.

R. If I understand you correctly, I am to seize it in the following manner: there is a consciousness as the fundamental determination of my life, as sure as I am myself. This consciousness appears to be a connecting manifold. What sort of a consciousness it may be, I know only by entertaining it, and on this stand-point I cannot properly ask any further questions. At the same time, however, it is likewise possible that this manifold can be systematically deduced as necessarily precisely as it is, if consciousness is to be at all. This view, this deduction, and the systematic connection which results in the deduction, exist only for him who grasps this view, and, absolutely for no one else; and other questions are not asked at all on this stand-point.

A. You express it correctly.

R. Well, let it be; although here again I rather seize your opinion historically than comprehend it, and although I have still many questions to ask.

But to proceed; the artist, who traces out this conception of a mechanical work of art, reduces, in this conception, the manifold to the unity of a result. The work of art is to serve this or that purpose; and the manifold and the way in which it works together involve, in the conception of the artist, the conditions under which alone the work of art can serve this purpose; and this unity exists in advance of the work of art and even prior to the conception of the manifold. The latter conception arises only through that of the unity, and exists only for its sake, being determined through it. Precisely such a manifold is needed, because precisely such a purpose is to be achieved.

Such a conception of the unity appears, therefore, to me as inseparable from that of a systematic connection. Hence, the teacher of the Science of Knowledge probably possesses the conception of such a

unity, of such a purpose and result of all consciousness, to which he reduces the manifold as conditions of the same.

A. Undoubtedly.

R. This unity he cannot first discover in the system, but must possess it before he commences his systematic deduction, precisely as the artist must first know what purpose his work of art is to serve before he can hunt up the means wherewith to attain it.

A. Unquestionably; the teacher of the Science of Knowledge must possess the conception of the unity in advance of the system.

R. The artist arbitrarily thinks this purpose, and produces it through his thinking, since the existence of the work of art, as well as its form, depends altogether upon the artist. But since the teacher of the Science of Knowledge does on no account produce consciousness, (it existing independently of him and existing thus precisely as it is, even by your own confession,) it is not well possible, that the artist can produce this *unity* through *free thinking*, since the manifold, which exists actually, and without the co-operation of the philosopher, must likewise relate itself to that unity, independently of the philosopher. Neither can he, as has already been said, find that unity in his systematic deduction, for the unity is presupposed as condition of the possibility of the deduction. Nor can he find the unity through perceptions in actual consciousness, for only the manifold, and not the unity, occurs in actual consciousness. How, then, and in what manner is he to arrive at this unity?

A. It suffices, if you assume that he arrived at it through some happy chance. He *guesses* this unity. This, of course, gives him only an assumption, and he must take the risk of building his system upon it entirely on the assumption that he has guessed correctly.

If the investigation shows, finally, that all the manifold of consciousness can really be reduced to that assumption, as to its unity, but only then, has he proved by this very reduction that his presupposition was correct. The presupposition has been proved by the fact, by the establishment of the system.

Fichte's Purpose?

R. Well, grant even this. But again: The artist knows in advance of his conception the necessary and unchangeable laws of his mechanism, those laws, upon which he calculated in his combination of the manifold for the achievement of a certain result. He knows, likewise, the materials and their qualities, out of which he proposes to form the manifold, and upon the unchangeableness whereof he also bases his calculation in his conception. Now, if the comparison is to hold good, the philosopher must also have, in advance of his deduction, a knowledge of unchangeable laws, according to which the manifold of consciousness produces the presupposed unit-result, and moreover—unless I am very much deceived—also, a knowledge of a material component of consciousness, which is already determined by these laws.

Let me, for the present, assume merely the first. But how does the philosopher obtain the knowledge of these laws? Does he, perchance, hit upon them by a lucky guess, until they prove themselves correct by the fact that the manifold of consciousness can be explained according to them, from the presupposed chief result; similarly as the fact, that precisely this result is the ultimate result of these laws, proves the result to be correct?

A. You make fun of the Science of Knowledge, but with rather more profundity than is usual. No; the Science of Knowledge does not proceed in this manner, for that were to proceed in a most vicious and self-evident circle.

I am very content to keep to the comparison once adopted. Let the teacher of the Science of Knowledge be the artist, who builds up the art-work of consciousness, which however exists already, as he cheerfully admits; which he, therefore, only *re-invents*, and yet invents altogether, since he never looks at the existing art-work during the operation.

But the great distinction is this: the artist who produces a mechanical work operates upon dead matter, which he puts in motion, while the philosopher operates upon a living something, which moves itself. He does not so much generate consciousness as that he rather causes consciousness

to generate itself under his observation. Now, if consciousness operates according to laws, it doubtless will generate itself according to these laws, and the observing philosopher will thus discover these laws at the same time; although his final object was not to obtain a knowledge of these laws, but of their total result, consciousness.

R. What! A consciousness, which generates itself, and which yet is not the actual consciousness of which we all have possession?

A. Of course; for actual consciousness does not systematically generate itself, its manifold being connected by mere chance. That consciousness which generates itself under the observation of the philosopher is merely an image of actual consciousness.

R. An image which generates itself? I utterly cease to understand you, and I am sure I shall not understand you until you have given me a short sketch of your procedure.

A. Very well. The presupposition, from which we start, is this: that the final and highest result of consciousness, or that to which all its manifold is related as the condition to the conditioned, or as the wheels, springs, and chains in the watch are related to the hand, is nothing else than *clear and complete self-consciousness*, as you and I and all of us are conscious of ourselves. I say, you and I and all of us, and thereby exclude, in conformity with a previous remark, all that is purely individual, which cannot enter our system at all according to our presupposition. That, which you ascribe to your self alone, and not to me, or I only to me and not to you, remains excluded; except that you do so ascribe something exclusively to your self and I to my self and each one to his Self.

Now, this result—that complete self-consciousness is the highest and final result of all consciousness—is, as we have said, a mere presupposition, which awaits its confirmation from the system. From this self-consciousness, in its fundamental determination, the deduction begins.

R. In its fundamental determination? What does that mean?

A. In regard to that, which in it is not at all determined by any other consciousness, and which can, therefore, not be found in the deduction, but from which, on the contrary, the deduction must proceed. The presupposition is, that the manifold of consciousness contains the conditions of complete self-consciousness. Nevertheless, there may be somewhat in this self-consciousness which is not conditioned by anything else. This somewhat is to be established, and from it the deduction proceeds.

R. But how do you find it?

A. Likewise, only by a happy hit, but as somewhat, which when once found, needs and requires no further proof, but is immediately self-evident.

R. Abstaining for the present from all inquiry as to this immediate self-evidence itself, tell me, what is it in this somewhat which is thus immediately self-evident?

A. That it is the absolutely unconditioned and the characteristic of self-consciousness.

R. I shall not be able to understand you, until you tell me what this unconditioned and characteristic of self-consciousness is, which is thus self-evident.

A. It is the Ego-hood, the subject-objectivity, and nothing else whatsoever, the positing of the subjective and of its objective, of consciousness and of the object of consciousness as one and the same, and as absolutely nothing but this its identity.

R. I know from various sources, that people generally consider you very incomprehensible, and, moreover, very ridiculous in your views on this first point, which you must, nevertheless, hold to be altogether clear and comprehensible, since all your reasoning starts from it. Be good enough, therefore, to furnish me some means by which I can make it clearer to those others, in case they should ask me about it; unless, indeed, such an explanation belongs rather to the Science of Knowledge proper, and not to a mere statement of its nature.

A. It certainly belongs to this statement, for it is the previously mentioned common point of the Science of Knowledge and of actual consciousness, from which the former rises above the latter. Who-

soever is to receive a perfectly clear conception of this science must know the point from which it starts, and this conception is the very thing which our statement proposes to create.

But what people say about not having understood us on that point belongs to the absolutely incomprehensible; for every child, that has but ceased to speak of itself in the third person and calls itself "I," has already realized that point, and can, therefore, understand us.

I shall have to repeat what I have said already several times. Think something: for instance, the book you hold in your hand. You can doubtless become conscious of the book as the object of your thought, and of yourself as the thinking. Do you appear to yourself as being one and the same with the book, or as another?

R. Doubtless, as another, I shall never mistake myself for the book.

A. Is it necessary, in order that you do not mistake yourself—the thinking, for the thought—that the thought should be a book, and this particular book?

R. By no means. I distinguish my self from every object.

A. Hence, in the thinking of this book you can abstract from all that which makes the present object of your thinking a book, and this particular book; and you can reflect solely upon the fact, that in this thinking you distinguish yourself—the thinking—from the thought.

R. Undoubtedly; and in replying to your question, whether I distinguish my self from the book, I reflected only on that fact.

A. Hence, you distinguish every object from yourself as the thinking, and no object exists for you except through and by means of this distinction.

R. Precisely.

A. Now, think your self. You doubtless can become conscious in this case, also, of a thinking and a thought. Do both continue separate in this thinking of your self, and form a duality?

R. No; for in thinking *myself*, I am the thinking, for otherwise I should not think; and at that same time, I am the thought, for, otherwise, I should not think *myself*,

but some other object, as for instance, this book.

A. Well, you have now certainly thought yourself, i. e., you, this particular individual, Caius, Sempronius, or whatever may be your name. But you, doubtless, can abstract also from these particular determinations of your personality, precisely as you were able to abstract from the particular determinations of this book; and can reflect only upon the uniting of the thinking and the *thought*, as, in the other case, you reflected upon the *dirempting* of both. Nay, you actually did so when you told me that in the thinking of your self, the thinking and the thought unite for you. It is, therefore, in this uniting of the thinking and the thought, which in the thinking of an object always *dirempts*, that you discover the Ego, and hence, the essential characteristic of the Ego,—of that much abused, *pure Ego*, concerning which our modern philosophers have for years puzzled their brains, and do still assert that it is a psychological—write *psychological*—deception, and an infinitely laughable affair altogether.

R. Perhaps they thought that such a pure Ego, such a reuniting, and, in itself returning thing was concealed somewhere in their souls, like a blade in a knife, and kept looking for it, but could not find the blade; whereupon they concluded that those who pretended to have seen it had deceived themselves.

A. Very probably. But how did you discover this uniting?

R. In thinking myself.

A. Do other people also think themselves?

R. Doubtless, unless they speak without thinking, for they all speak of themselves.

A. In thus thinking themselves, do they proceed in the same manner in which you proceed?

R. I believe so.

A. Can they observe this their procedure, just as you have observed yours?

R. I do not doubt it.

A. Hence, if they do it in thus thinking themselves, they will doubtless also find that uniting of the thinking and the

thought; but unless they do it, they will not find it. Such is our statement. We do not speak of the finding of something which lies ready made before them; but of the finding of a somewhat which is first to be produced by free thinking. The Science of Knowledge is not psychology; and psychology itself is nothing. But at present I wish you to give me a decided answer as to whether you seriously hold, that I and all other rational beings, in thinking our Self, do proceed precisely as you do, i. e. that in this thinking of our Self we hold the thinking and the thought to be one?

R. I not only assume this, but I assert it to be absolutely certain, and I hold an exception to be utterly impossible. The thought of an I (Ego) does not occur except through such proceeding, and this proceeding is itself the thought I. Hence everyone who thinks himself must proceed in that same manner.

A. But I beseech you, dear reader, do you then think into my soul and into the soul of all rational beings; or, assuming that you can do so, have you then actually surveyed and thought into the soul of all rational beings, and been thus authorized to assert something of their souls?

R. By no means; and yet I cannot withdraw what I have asserted. Nay, in becoming thoroughly conscious of my self I find that I can assert still more; that I can assert further, that each of all other rational beings must assert the same out of his own consciousness in relation to all the others.

A. How do you get at these assertions?

R. If I become very conscious of my self, I discover that my procedure in thus thinking my self is immediately accompanied by the irresistible and inflexible conviction, that neither I nor any other rational being can ever proceed otherwise.

A. Hence, through this procedure you prescribe a law for yourself, and for all rational beings; and thus you have at the same time an illustration of the immediate evidence which I mentioned before. But now let us get back to our argument. This fundamental and characteristic determination of self-consciousness, the philosopher

discovers outside and independent of his science. It cannot be proved in the science itself, nor, indeed, can it be proved as a proposition in any manner. It is immediately self-evident. Nor can it be proved as fundamental proposition of the Science of Knowledge in any other way than by the fact itself, i. e. by showing that the required deduction is actually possible from it. The manner of proceeding in this deduction is as follows: In the thinking of my self, says the teacher of the Science of Knowledge, I proceed as has just now been stated. Now let us see whether another procedure may not connect with that first one, thus giving us a new fundamental characteristic of consciousness, and a third procedure, perhaps, with that second, &c., &c., and let us continue this until we have arrived at the completely determined self-consciousness, and have thus obtained a systematic deduction of the whole?

R. I again do not understand you. You ask me whether another procedure—doubtless another determination of consciousness—may not connect with the first one? But how can it connect, and with what? I, at least, in that thinking of my self am conscious of nothing else but the identity of the thinking and the thought.

A. Nevertheless you abstracted, at my request, and according to your own observation, from many other things, which you thought at the same time you were thinking your self. This was very proper; and to take this Other up again in the same confusion in which it occurred in your consciousness, would not advance the Science of Knowledge. However that may be; even in that very observation in which you seized the thinking of your self, there occurs something else, and you will find it as soon as you look a little closer at it. For instance: does not this thinking of your self appear to you as a transition from another condition to this particular condition?

R. It really does so appear to me.

A. Do you believe that it must appear so to every other person who looks at it closely?

R. I certainly do believe it when I make

myself clearly conscious of it; and I even assert that it must so appear to *all* others. There is the same immediate evidence here which we discovered before.

A. In precisely the same manner does this second appearance, if you but examine it closely, connect with another one, and that one, under the same condition, with a third one, and in this manner the Science of Knowledge advances step by step, until all the manifold of consciousness has been exhausted, and terminated in the completely deduced determined self-consciousness.

Hence, in a certain respect, it is the teacher of the Science of Knowledge himself who generates his system of consciousness, which system, nevertheless, in another respect, generates itself. The teacher merely furnishes the occasion and condition of that self-generation. But while he is thinking and construing what he intended to think and construe, something else, which he did not intend to produce, joins it with absolute necessity, and accompanied by the evident conviction, that it must appear in the same manner to all rational beings.

It is only the origin and first starting point of his system which the teacher of the Science of Knowledge generates with absolute freedom. From this starting point he is *led*, but not *driven*, onward. Each new link, which arises in his construction of the previous link, he must again construe with full freedom, whereupon a new link will again arise to connect with it, and with this new link he proceeds in the same manner. Thus his system is gradually built up. Here, therefore, in this connecting of one manifold with another, those laws of consciousness which you were inquiring about, manifest themselves. His final object is the apprehending, not of these manifolds, but merely of their result.

R. I remember having heard that people say: Your system is correct and logical enough if your fundamental principle is once admitted. How is this?

A. Unless the significance of the whole system, as well as of its fundamental principle, is utterly misapprehended and taken in a sense in which it is incorrect, and can there-

fore never be proved; in other words, unless that system and its fundamental principle are viewed psychologically, the demand for the proof of the fundamental principle can mean only the following:

Firstly, opponents may demand a proof of our right not to philosophize in the manner in which they do, and to philosophize in the manner in which we philosophize. This demand is very properly rejected, from the natural reason, that every one has the undisputed right to carry on whatever science he chooses. Let them consider, if they so please, our Science of Knowledge as some new, particular, to them unknown, science, just as we are very willing to consider their philosophies to be whatsoever they assert them to be. It is only when we say that their philosophies are nothing at all, as we really hold, and shall tell them at the proper place, that they may properly require proof from us. But this proof is completely and decisively established only in our whole Science of Knowledge, and hence they will have to study that science after all.

Secondly, they may demand that the fundamental principle of that Science shall be proved as such fundamental principle of the system in advance of the system itself, which demand is absurd.

Finally, they may require us to demonstrate the truth of the content of that proposition through an analysis of the conceptions which it involves. But this would show that they have no conception of, or capacity for, the Science of Knowledge, which is never based upon conceptions, but always upon the contemplation of immediate evidence. Hence, in this case, we could only turn our back on them, unwilling to waste time upon them any further.

R. But I fear very much that the latter is the very point which is obnoxious to them. If every one can appeal to his contemplations and require others to entertain them, without properly establishing his proof by conceptions, why he may assert whatever he chooses. Every stupidity will remain unpunished, and a door will be opened to all sorts of imaginary theories. This is what they will say, I fear.

A. Nobody can prevent them from say-

ing it; let all, moreover, who are like them believe them. But you, my readers, who are unprejudiced, and to whom—although you are resolved not to enter upon the study of philosophy itself, and not to elevate yourself to the contemplation peculiar to this science—I am to furnish a conception of philosophy: to you I can describe the nature and possibility of contemplation from other easier examples.

You assume, I suppose, that a rectilinear triangle is completely determined by two sides and the included angle, or by one side and the two adjoining angles; i. e. that if these are given, precisely such lines must be added as will constitute a triangle?

R. I do assume it.

A. Do you not fear that a case may occur when such will not be the case?

R. I have no such fear.

A. Do you not fear, then, that some other rational being, understanding your words, may, nevertheless, deny this assertion?

R. I do not fear that either.

A. Have you then tested that proposition in all possible cases of triangles, or have you asked all possible rational beings whether they assent to it?

R. How could I?

A. Then tell me: how do you get at that conviction which you assume to be valid for you in all possible cases without any exception, and, moreover, for all possible rational beings without any exception?

R. I will take the first instance, wherein we presupposed two sides and the included angle. If I am clearly conscious of myself, I get at it in this manner: I draw in my imagination some particular angle with two sides, and close the opening between the lines by a straight line. I discover that absolutely only one straight line can close this opening; that this line rests on either side in a certain inclination towards the two given sides, thus forming two angles; and that it can touch them absolutely in no other inclination.

A. But your arbitrarily drawn angle was surely a determined angle, of so and so many degrees. Or did you draw a general angle?

R. How could I? I can only describe determined angles, though I may neither know nor intend their size. The mere description makes the angle determined for me.

A. In like manner the presupposed sides were determined, were of a certain length. Hence, granting you a number of other objections, you might certainly say in this particular case: "under the presupposition of *this* determined angle and of *these* determined sides, the triangle can be closed only by the one straight line which I draw, and only by the one possible pair of angles which arise in my construction." For you must confess that no more than this is contained in your internal *perception*, which evidently proceeds from determined presuppositions. You may certainly try the same experiment with other triangles, and may be able to make the same assertions concerning them wherever actual perception shall warrant you in doing so; but you never can cover with your present assertion all these cases which you have not yet tested; least of all can you extend it so boldly and recklessly to the infinity of cases which you cannot possibly exhaust by actual experiment.

Had you not better, therefore, correct your expression, and restrict your assertion to those cases which you have experimented upon?

R. If I observe myself correctly, and look clearly into my consciousness, I shall not do so on any account. I cannot consent to limit the universal validity of my assertion.

A: Perhaps you take the many cases in which you have found your assertion to be correct, and extend them to universality, judging by analogy, habit, association of ideas, or whatever you choose to call it, that it will always prove valid?

R. I do not believe it. A single experiment is sufficient, and is as efficient as a thousand to impel my universal assertion.

A. Seriously, I also do not believe it; and that talking of arbitrarily raising the occurrence of a great number of cases to universality appears to me to be the utterance of absolute unreason.

But now, dear reader, permit me to be

somewhat intrusive, for I shall not allow you to escape until you have given me a clear account of the manner in which your procedure in the construction of a triangle can account for the universal validity of your assertion, which you are not willing to abandon.

R. I evidently abstract in the universality of my assertion from the determinateness of the angle and of the two sides which I presupposed and closed by the third side. That I did so abstract is simply factual, and appears from the mere analysis of my assertion.

Hence, I also must have abstracted in my construction of the triangle, and in my observation of that construction, upon which observation my assertion based itself, from that its determinateness; only I did not become very clearly conscious of having done so, for, if I had become so conscious, the conclusion would surely have indicated what was contained in the premise. But when I abstract from all determinateness of the angles and of their sides, no angles and sides of any kind remain as given objects, and hence nothing remains as object of my observation, or—if you denominate the observation of a given and actual exclusively *perception*, as I believe you do—no perception of any kind remains. But since there must remain an observation, and something for that observation, as otherwise I could not make any assertion at all, this remainder can be nothing else than my mere *drawing* of lines and angles. Hence it must be this which I really observed; and this presupposition agrees very well with what I am actually and clearly conscious of in that proceeding. When I began to describe my angle I did not at all intend to describe an angle of so and so many degrees, but merely to describe an angle in general, and sides in general. It was not through my intention that the angle and the sides became determined, but through necessity. When I came to the actual description, they certainly became determined in precisely that manner; but God only knows why they happened to become determined precisely as they did.

Now, this consciousness of my drawing

of lines, which lies beyond all perception, is doubtless what you call *contemplation*.

A. Precisely.

R. Then, in order to discover the ground of my universal assertion, it is necessary that this contemplation of my construction of a triangle should be immediately connected with the absolute conviction, that I can never construe a triangle differently. If this were so, then I should in that contemplation take hold of and embrace, at the same time, and with one glance, *my whole faculty of construction*, and this by means of an immediate consciousness, not of this determined constructing, but absolutely of all my constructing in general, as such. Hence the proposition: these "three parts of the triangle determine its other three parts," would signify simply, my constructing of the former three parts determines my construction of the other three parts; and hence the universality, which I posited, would not arise from a gathering up of the manifold into a unity but rather from the deduction of the infinite manifold out of the unity, which I seize at one glance.

A. But you assert this proposition in its universality to be, moreover, universal for all rational beings?

R. Certainly; and I can just as little abandon this claim to universal validity for all, as I could abandon the universal validity of all. In order to ground it, I must assume that in this immediate contemplation of my procedure, I contemplated this my procedure not only as that of this particular person (myself) but as the procedure of a rational being in general, with the immediate conviction of its absolute certainty. That contemplation would thus be the immediate self-comprehension on the part of reason of its manner of acting, comprehended thus at one glance; and again this universal validity for all persons would not be the result of a gathering up the many into a unity, but rather of the deduction of the infinitely many persons from the unity of one and the same reason. It is to be comprehended how this contemplation, and it alone, grounds immediate evidence, necessity and

universal validity of all and for all, and hence grounds all science.

A. You have excellently comprehended yourself, and I only wish that you could make all those readers, of whom you are the representative, comprehend the matter with equal clearness.

You can now judge for yourself what significance belongs to the objection, that we base our science upon contemplation, and how far those who do raise such an objection can have any claim to scientific culture.

Now, if I tell you that the Science of Knowledge is based upon that very contemplation, which you have just proved and described as the condition of geometry, but based upon it in its highest abstraction, and that the Science of Knowledge has for its object to establish the whole series of this contemplation; nay, that in its highest abstraction it even proceeds from this contemplation; if I tell you that this contemplation for itself,—and hence, universal reason itself, grasping itself in its only central point, and forever determining itself therein,—is the very first link in the chain of the Science of Knowledge, and is that very reason which grasps and comprehends itself therein as reason, and hence is that very pure Ego, described previously, but in the highest significance of the word Ego: then, you will find it very natural, if you have any knowledge of the literature of our age, why our learned men of the latter half of the eighteenth century found it impossible to discover that pure Ego in themselves. It will also be immediately clear to you, what sort of people those persons must be, who want to go even beyond the fundamental principle of the Science of Knowledge, i. e. beyond the absolute self-contemplation of reason, and who really believe that it is possible to go beyond it.

R. The Science of Knowledge, therefore, starts from that pure Ego, or from contemplation in its highest purity, and with every further step of that science a new link connects with the previous links, the necessary connecting whereof is proved in that very contemplation.

A. Precisely in the same manner in which geometry proceeds, where each new proposition adds something new to the proposition previously established, the necessity of which something new, is proved also, only in contemplation. In fact, such must be the method of every real progressive science which does not turn around in a circle.

R. I have been told that you develop your whole science out of the presupposed conception of the Ego, as out of an onion; that all you do is to analyze that conception, and to show that all other conceptions which you establish are contained in it beforehand, however dimly, and that such a conception is called fundamental conception, and the proposition, which announces it, fundamental proposition.

A. I suppose you were very good natured to allow people to tell you such nonsense.

R. I believe I see clearly now, how you proceed to establish your science; and I also see upon what you ground your claim to the universal validity of your science, namely, upon contemplation, which, being the contemplation of the manner of acting of all reason, is therefore valid for all reason, i. e. for all, who, like you, will cause reason to *generate that science in them*. In short, the product of your science is to be attained, from your assumed presupposition, only in the manner in which you attain it, precisely as the triangle, when those three parts thereof had been presupposed, could also be closed by only one straight line and two determined angles. If you really can prove in contemplation, what you assert you can prove, I have no further objection to your statement; provided, you will content yourself with stating the product of your science to be merely a product of your imagination, and nothing else, just as the oft-mentioned triangle is also nothing but such a product. But it appears to me from what you have said before, that you do not content yourself with this. You are not satisfied to establish your product, as in itself existing and agreeing with itself; you go beyond it. You assert it to be, moreover, a picture

of true actual consciousness, as it exists without the co-operation of philosophy, or of that consciousness which we all possess. This consciousness, you now assert, has the same manifold which the result of your system contains and in the same relation. But I confess that I do not well understand what you do assert on this subject, nor how you will ground such further claims.

A. Nevertheless, you admit that geometry has an application to actual consciousness in life, and consider it, like the Science of Knowledge, to be a picture of a part of your consciousness. Explain and give me your reasons for this claim. Perhaps it will also explain our claim.

In scientific geometry, you draw the line, wherewith you close your arbitrarily imagined angle with its two sides. Now, you find in your field a triangle with an angle determined in itself and two sides determined in themselves. You measure them. Do you need to measure the third one likewise?

R. On no account; for by making use of the unchangeable relation of this third side to the other two, which relation is well known to me, I can discover its actual length through mere calculation.

A. Its actual length! What do you mean by that?

R. If I took my measure and measured it as I have measured the other two sides, I should find its length to be precisely what my calculation states it to be.

A. You are firmly convinced of this?

R. That I am.

A. And you are ready to apply the same procedure to all possible triangles, which you may find in the field, without fear of meeting with some triangle which will form an exception to the rule?

R. I have no such fear, and it is impossible that I should have it.

A. What, then, may be the ground of this, your firm conviction, of the correctness of your calculation in ascertaining the length of the third side independently and in advance of its actual measurement?

R. If I observe myself closely, I must proceed about in this manner:

If two lines and their included angle are presupposed, this angle can be closed by only one possible determined side, i. e. a side which has a determined relation to the other two sides. This is valid for the imaginary construction of the triangle, and becomes immediately clear and certain through contemplation.

Now, I treat the actual triangle according to the laws of the merely imagined one, and with the same certainty, *precisely as if it were likewise involved in that contemplation*. Hence, I *factually* presuppose, that the right to make this application is, indeed, contained in that contemplation. I consider the actual line as one, which has, as it were—I say as it were—arisen through my free construction. How the actual line may have originated, I do not ask at all, for at least its measuring is a reconstructing of the existing line, and hence, I am compelled to assume, that it is altogether the same as if it were an original constructing of it through my free imagination.

A. You have described very accurately the nature of the claims of the Science of Knowledge to validity in actual consciousness. Precisely, as in the original construction of the triangle, the third side was found to be determined by the other two and their angle, so, according to the Science of Knowledge, is the original construction of consciousness a certain somewhat, determined through another. But these determinations are pure creations of imagination, and, by no means, actual determinations of consciousness; just as the lines of the triangle are also purely imaginary.

But now, an actual determination of consciousness enters, precisely as you found an angle and two sides in the field, and you may be just as firmly convinced, that this actual determination contains all the others, which in the Science you have discovered to be inseparable from it, as you were convinced in the case of the actual triangle. The determinations of actual consciousness, to which you are compelled to apply the laws of that consciousness, which you constructed with freedom, ap-

pear to you now also, *as it were*, like results of an original construction, and are judged by you as such. Whether such an original construction of consciousness did really precede consciousness, is not asked at all; indeed, such a question is senseless.

At least, the *judging* is a reconstructing, precisely as measuring is a reconstructing for the geometrician. This judging must agree with an original constructing, which is to be presupposed, as it were, of the object of the judgment, and will assuredly agree with it, if the judgment is correct, just as the measuring of the line must agree with the calculation, if made correctly. This, and nothing more than this, is what the claim of the Science of Knowledge to a validity outside of itself and for actual consciousness in life, is to signify, and in this manner, the claim to such validity is based, like the whole science, upon the same immediate contemplation.

Thus, I believe, that I have given you a sufficiently clear conception not only of the object of the Science of Knowledge in general, but also of its procedure and the grounds of this procedure. This science constructs the entire common consciousness of all rational beings absolutely *a priori*, in its fundamental characteristics, precisely as geometry constructs absolutely *a priori* the universal modes of limiting space on the part of all rational beings.

That science begins with the simplest and most characteristic determination of self-consciousness, namely, its self-contemplation or Egohood, and proceeds, on the presupposition that the completely determined self-consciousness will be the final result of all other determinations of consciousness, until this result has been reached; each link of its chain connecting with a new link, and accompanied by the immediate contemplation, that this new link must connect with the previous one in the same manner in the cases of all rational beings whatsoever.

If you posit $Ego=A$, you will find in the constructing of this A, that inseparable therefrom, a B connects with it, and in the contemplation of the constructing of this

B, you will likewise find that a C connects with it, and so on, until you have arrived at the last link of A, namely, at completely determined self-consciousness.

FOURTH CONVERSATION.

A. It is held that a certain system of consciousness exists for each rational being as soon as this being itself exists. Can that, which this consciousness contains, be presupposed in every human being?

R. Undoubtedly; your very description of that consciousness involves that it is common to all men.

A. Is it also to be presupposed that every person is able to form a correct judgment of objects by means of that consciousness, and to draw conclusions from the one as to the other without falling into error?

R. Clearly enough, provided he has but practised to some extent the faculty of judging which belongs to that system, and which is inborn in all men. Nay, it is no more than fair to assume, until the contrary is proved, that each one has thus moderately developed that faculty.

A. But that which is not included in this universal system, common to all men, and given to them as their heritage, as it were; that which must first be produced by an arbitrary and free abstraction and reflection: is that also to be presupposed in every rational being?

R. Clearly not. Each one attains it only by freely realizing within himself that abstraction and reflection; and otherwise he does not attain it.

A. If, therefore, some person should venture to give his judgment upon the sufficiently described Ego, from which the Science of Knowledge takes its start, and should look for this Ego as a Given in common consciousness, could his judgment be received in the matter?

R. Decidedly not; for that of which you speak is not found in common consciousness, but first must be produced by free abstraction.

A. Again: the teacher of the Science

of Knowledge, whose manner of proceeding we have become acquainted with, describes from this first link a continuous series of determinations of consciousness, wherein each preceding link connects with another, &c., &c. It is these links of his series, whereof he speaks and asserts. Now tell me, how can any one get from the first link to the second, from the second to the third, &c.?

R. According to your description only by actually constructing the first link internally within himself, and observing himself in this constructing to see whether or not a second link arises and what that second link may be; and then again constructing the second and observing whether a third link appears, &c. It is only in this contemplation of his constructing, that he receives the object, which is spoken of; and unless he so constructs, the object, which is spoken of, does not exist for him at all. So at least the matter would be according to your description, and this was undoubtedly the answer you intended me to give you.

But the following doubt occurs to me. This series, which the teacher describes, consists only of separate, particular determinations of consciousness. But the actual common consciousness, which belongs to each one without any Science of Knowledge, also contains a separate manifold. Hence if the former are *the same* as the latter and are separated and divided in the same manner, then the manifold of the Science of Knowledge is known from actual consciousness, and we do not need contemplation in order to get at it.

A. It suffices here, to tell you concisely and historically, that the separates of the Science of Knowledge and of actual consciousness are not at all the same, but utterly different. True, the separates of consciousness also occur in the Science of Knowledge, but only as its final deductions. But in the way of their deduction through our philosophical construction and contemplation there lie elements altogether different, and through the uniting whereof alone there first arises a separate totality of actual consciousness at all.

Let me give you an illustration. The Ego (I) of actual consciousness is certainly, also, a particular and separate Ego; it is a person amongst many persons, all of whom, each for himself, call themselves I, and our Science of Knowledge proceeds with its deduction to the consciousness of this very personality. But the Ego, from which the Science of Knowledge starts, is something quite different, is nothing but the identity of the subject and object of consciousness; and this abstraction can be reached only by removing whatsoever else the conception of personality involves. Those who assure us, that they cannot abstract from their individuality in the conception of the Ego are quite correct if they speak of their Ego as they find it in common consciousness; for in ordinary consciousness, in perception, the identity, which they do not cast their eye upon, and the individuality, which they exclusively attend to, are inseparably united. But if they have not even the general faculty to abstract from actual consciousness and its facts, then the Science of Knowledge has no claims upon them. In previous philosophical systems, all of which had a description of the same series of determinations of consciousness dimly in view, which the Science of Knowledge undertakes, and some of which systems did even hit them in part happily enough,—we meet some of these separates and names for them, as for instance: Substance, accident, &c., &c. But, firstly, these words are not understood by any one, unless he has the contemplation of what they signify; for otherwise he gets merely empty words instead of what they stand for,—as indeed some senseless philosophers have actually considered these words to be things existing for themselves;—and secondly, the Science of Knowledge in rising to a higher abstraction than all those systems did, composes these separates from far simpler elements, and hence in a quite different manner; but finally those artificial conceptions which occur in previous systems are even partly incorrect.

Hence whatsoever the Science of Knowledge speaks of, exists absolutely in contemplation and for that science only, i. e.

only for him who actually constructs that series; and without this condition it does not exist at all, as indeed without this constructing all the propositions of the Science of Knowledge are utterly without sense or significance.

R. Is this your serious opinion, and shall I take it strictly, without deducting for any exaggeration?

A. Certainly; I desire you to take it in full seriousness. I wish people would believe me, at least on this point.

R. But in that case only one of two things is possible in regard to the Science of Knowledge; it must be understood, or altogether not understood; must be correctly apprehended, or not at all apprehended. But by far the fewest are willing to confess that they do not understand you at all; they believe, that they understand you well enough, but see clearly, that you are in the wrong; whereupon you say, that they misunderstand you. Hence they certainly must make some sort of sense out of your words and expressions, and only not the sense which you intended. But how is this possible according to what you have just now said?

A. Because the Science of Knowledge had to begin with a collection of existing words in a language. If it had been possible for that science to begin, as no doubt it will end,* by creating an altogether peculiar system of signs, *representative only of its contemplations and the relations of those contemplations to each other*, and signifying absolutely nothing but this, then it certainly could not have been misunderstood, but neither would it have been understood and passed from out of the mind of its originator into the minds of others. At present, however, it has to solve the difficult problem of leading others to contemplation by the use of confused words, which thoughts people have even recently attempted to elevate as judges over reason. Every one has hitherto thought something when hearing or reading a word, and now when he hears it again

* Such was also the assertion of Leibnitz, who indeed had begun to create a system of philosophical signs.—*Translator.*

he quickly tries to recall what he did think when he heard this word before. Well, this is very proper. But unless he can rise above the words, which are merely as so many lines in geometry, and above their whole previous significance, to the subject-matter itself, or the contemplation, he will necessarily misunderstand even where he understands best; for that which is the all-important here, *has hitherto neither been said, nor has it been characterized through words, nor can it be said; it can be only contemplated.* The highest whereof word-explanation is capable, is a determined *conception*; and for that very reason the utterly false in the Science of Knowledge.

This science describes a continuous series of contemplation. Each successive link connects with and is *determined* through the preceding link; i. e. this very connection explains it and belongs to its characteristic; and only when contemplated in this connection is it contemplated correctly. The third link again is determined through the second, and since the second is determined through the first, the third is likewise mediately determined through the first, and so on until the end. All the previous explains the succeeding, and again all the succeeding further determines that which preceded. In an organic system, the links whereof connect not merely through sequence but through reciprocal determination, it cannot well be otherwise.

Now, I ask you, can any link of the Science of Knowledge be correctly comprehended, unless all the previous links have been correctly comprehended and are present in the comprehension of it?

R. No.

A. Can any part of it be completely and thoroughly understood, unless the whole system has first been completely understood?

R. Not according to what you have said. Each point of the system can be understood only in its connection, and since each is connected with the whole, it can be completely understood only when the whole has been understood.

A. Of course, I mean each point *in the*

actual science. For, the mere conception of that science, its nature, object and manner of proceeding, may be made known to others, although they are not in possession of the science itself, simply because the conception of that science is taken and deduced from the sphere of common consciousness. To learn to know this conception and to form a judgment of it, I have invited you, as a popular reader; whereas I should take good care not to invite you to a discussion of the system itself.

In the same manner, the final result of the system falls also within the sphere of common consciousness, and in regard to its deduction, likewise, each person can judge, not whether it has been correctly deduced, for about that he has no judgment, but whether it does occur in common consciousness.

Hence, the propositions and component parts of the Science of Knowledge do not lie within the sphere of common consciousness and within the judgment of ordinary common sense. They are produced only through freedom and abstraction, and are determined through their connection, and no one who has not undertaken this abstraction and construction, and who has not followed it to its final result, and cannot keep the whole constantly and firmly in mind, has the least judgment in matters of this description.

R. I clearly see that it is so. Each one who wants to have a judgment on this subject, must first invent for himself the whole system.

A. Assuredly. But since it appears that mankind has philosophized for thousands of years, and has, at various times, as can be clearly proved, been but one hair's breadth removed from the real point at issue, without hitting it, and thereby discovering the Science of Knowledge, and since it may thus be assumed, that the Science of Knowledge, if it should get lost now, would not be found very soon again, it may be advisable enough to make use of its present accidental discovery, by accepting for the present a description of its invention, and using this as an aid in reinventing it, precisely as is done in the sci-

ence of Geometry, which it also, in all probability, took time enough to discover. People would thus study the Science of Knowledge, and study it until they had made it their own invention. ~

It is clear, therefore, is it not, that no one who does not prove by the fact, that he has himself invented the Science of Knowledge, or who is not conscious of having studied it long enough to have made it his own discovery, or—for this is the only possible alternative—who cannot establish by proof another system of intellectual contemplation, opposed to that of the Science of Knowledge—can have any judgment upon any proposition of this science, and if it should turn out to be the only possible philosophy, as it asserts itself to be, upon any philosophical proposition whatsoever?

R. Turn whichever way I please, I cannot deny that it is so. But, on the other hand, I cannot condemn the other philosophers for making a very unfriendly face at your proposition, to take them all again to school. They are all conscious of having studied their science as well as you have studied it; some of them, moreover, having passed for masters in it at a time when you were still studying its first rudiments. They presuppose and you yourself confess that you were first shaken out of the dreams of your mind partly by their writings, and at present, when the beards of some of them have grown gray, you tell them either to go to school under you, or to stop talking.

A. True, if they love anything in the world more than truth and science, their fate is a hard one. But there is no help for it. Being very conscious, as they are, that they have never even believed that they possess what we claim to, namely, an evident science, they cannot well help, however distasteful it may be to them, to examine once what there really is in our unheard of pretension. Do you know any other alternative for them, unless they choose to study the Science of Knowledge, than to keep silent, without waiting to be told so, and to take their exit from the scene?

R. Ah, but in that case—and I have al-

ready heard such a birdlet sing,—they will say that you are so extremely conceited as to ask others to despise themselves in comparison with you.

A. This is an invidious manner of getting out of it; but it does not better their case. I do not ask them to think little of the general talent and the knowledge which they have hitherto claimed actually to possess; on the contrary, I compliment the former, by inviting them to an explanation and examination of my science. That it is I who made the discovery, and not they, I ascribe to a happy chance and to the time in which I was born, but I do not in any manner consider it to be a personal merit of my own. But neither is the request that they should consider me and not themselves in possession of this invention, which they have never claimed to possess, and that they ought to listen to what I say about it, any more a presumption that they ought to hold themselves in contempt, than that I would think of despising myself, when I read their books on the presupposition that they may, after all, have thought something which I have not thought.

Each one who goes to be taught some science, presupposes that the teacher knows more about it than he does, for, otherwise, he would not go to be taught, and the teacher presupposes the same, or he would not assume to teach. But the former does not, on that account, hold himself in contempt, for he hopes to be able to comprehend the science quite as well as his teacher, and thus to comprehend it, is indeed his object.

R. But it cannot be known beforehand whether there really is something in your science or not, and whether it is really worth the difficult and persistent study which you require of them. They have been so often deceived by the promises of great wisdom!

A. Of course they cannot know it beforehand, for to ask them to believe our assurance would be ridiculous. But neither did they know this in the case of any other science, which they nevertheless learned at the risk of losing their time. Or did they do so only while they were under the rod of their teacher, and have

they not done it again since they became their own masters?

They must risk our science as they risked the other sciences. Or, if they have been frightened away for their whole lifetime from every venture, the escape is still open to them to keep silent and enter some other profession, to which the presumption of the teachers of the Science of Knowledge may not extend so very soon.

R. If there were only a prospect for them that you and your science would become the fashion. But this you have yourself obstinately prevented in defiance of all the warnings of those who were well disposed towards you. You have inspired your colleagues with too little confidence and love towards your person, for them to be inclined to make you fashionable. You are not old enough. You have neglected the old praiseworthy customs of your profession; you have not allowed yourself to be first introduced in a preface by one of your teachers as a diligent student; nor have you sought to make conversions, and to gain praise and approval in an honest and decent way by letters, by asking for advice and information, by quoting and praising others, and by joining some society of reviewers; thus rising gradually and imperceptibly. No, you have jumped up all of a sudden, as if out of the ground, with all your presumptions and perhaps quite as arrogant as you are now. You have quoted and praised scarcely any one but yourself. But how have you condemned and made war upon others? In violation of all literary usage and public law, you have offered no peace and compromise; you have immediately refuted your opponents, and have not allowed them to be in the right unless they really were so; you have not mentioned with one syllable all their other talents and their profundity, and have had no other end in view than to annihilate. You are capable of denying the most well known truth which has been received as valid ever since the beginning of the world, and turning it into dust under the hands of some poor opponent, so that an honest man knows no longer from what premises he is to dispute with you. Hence many have resolved and pub-

licly protested, that they will not learn anything from you, as you are certainly not worthy to receive learning from; whereas others have even doubted whether your name could be mentioned in honorable company.*

A. Well, we must bear the affliction that these people will not learn anything.

But to return. Do you hold that every person is possessed of that fundamental contemplation which we have described above?

R. According to your description, necessarily, as sure as he has ever in all his lifetime uttered one solitary universal proposition, as such; and not merely repeated it, but repeated it with firm conviction; or as sure as he has absolutely required some one else to think something precisely as he thinks it; for we have seen that this necessity and universality proceeds from and bases itself solely upon that contemplation.

A. But does every one rise also to the clear consciousness of that contemplation?

R. This, at least, does not follow, like the contemplation itself, from the fact of an absolute assertion; for such an assertion is uttered as absolutely grounded in itself, without further asking for its higher ground, and without consciousness of such higher ground. It seems that in order to rise to this consciousness, it is first necessary to reflect upon that absolute asserting and account for it to one's self. But this does not seem to be by any means so universally and necessarily grounded in the nature of rational beings, as that absolute asserting, without which, indeed, all communication and common understanding amongst mankind would almost cease.

Nevertheless every one certainly can make that reflection—as we, for instance, did in our previous conversation,—and can thus rise to a consciousness of that contemplation.

A. Undoubtedly every one can do it; precisely as every one can through freedom elevate himself to pure morality, or by means of another contemplation, closely

*The reviewer of the *Erlanger Literary Journal* doubts whether my name may be mentioned in honorable company.

related to the philosophical scientific contemplation,—to poetry. Concerning this matter our opinion is as follows, and it will suffice to tell you this historically: It is not proper to deny to any one the faculty of rising to a consciousness of scientific contemplation, as it is not proper to deny to any one the faculty of being morally regenerated, or of being a poet. But just as little can it be explained—precisely because these faculties and abilities are absolutely primary and are not conditioned by any previous grounds—why they should appear in this person and not in that one. Experience, however—which, as we have said, cannot be explained from grounds—teaches us, that some men do not rise to it, no matter what you may do to assist them. In youth, when man is most open to culture, he rises easiest to science or to poetry. But if he has allowed this youth to pass away, and has ruined half a lifetime by committing to memory, studying a little of everything and reviewing,—it is pretty safe, with little risk of being refuted by success, to deny to such a one a faculty for science or for poetry, although you certainly cannot demonstrate that he has not got that faculty.

At any rate, no one should get angry if this faculty of rising to a contemplation of contemplation is denied to him; as no one gets angry if poetical talents are denied to him.

In regard to the latter, people have long since comforted themselves by the proverb, that “Poets are born and not made;” why, then, do they not extend this consolatory proverb to philosophy? Unfortunately, it has become a habit to consider philosophy as a matter of ordinary judgment, and hence, to consider the denial of philosophical talent equivalent to a denial of ordinary judgment. This certainly would be an insult, but coming from the lips of the Science of Knowledge, that denial has indeed, quite another meaning.

But it is not enough to possess that faculty in general; *one must also have the talent of strictly controlling it; of being able to exercise it at any moment when it may be needed, and hence, of entering at will that altogether peculiar world which it*

opens to us, and of dwelling with full consciousness in that world, wherever one may be. It is not unusual, especially amongst young people, that a light penetrates them all at once and scatters the old darkness like a flash of lightning; but, before they are aware of it, the eye has closed again, and the old night set in; whereupon they await the moment of a new enlightenment. This condition is worth nothing for a permanent and systematic study. Contemplation must become perfectly free and must be completely in our power. But this power over it we attain only through continual practice.

But systematic thinking requires, even as such, freedom of the mind to give direction to its thinking, with absolute arbitrariness, to fix it upon this or that object, and keep it so fixed until it has been sufficiently digested for our purpose, and to keep everything else removed from it. This freedom is not inborn in men, but must be acquired through diligence and through constant exercise of our mind, which is naturally much inclined to wander from one object to another. Now, transcendental thinking is distinguished, moreover, from ordinary thinking in this: that whereas ordinary thinking is fixed, and, as it were, carried by something, which is separated and determined already in itself, transcendental thinking, on the contrary, has nothing for its object but itself, and hence, is fixed, separated, divided and determined only through itself. The mathematician has, at least, his lines and figures on the black-board, and thus concentrates his attention; but the teacher of the Science of Knowledge has nothing whatsoever except himself and his free reflection. Now, this reflection he is to keep constantly fixed throughout a long series, and at each new link he must have all the previous links in their fixed determination before his mind, while, at the same time, he must also keep the whole series of links not completely determined, since each successive link will again further determine all the previous ones. It is clear, that he must not only have the ordinary faculty of concentrated attentiveness and self-activity of the mind, but also an habitual ability of reviewing his

whole mind, fixing it, analyzing it in the finest or coarsest manner, recomposing it, and again analyzing it, and always with a firm unshaken hand, and with the assurance that it will always remain as he has arranged it. It is, therefore, also clear, that this is not only a higher degree of labor, but an entirely new *kind* of mental labor, the like of which has never before been known, and that the faculty of working in this manner can be practised and exercised only upon the one object, which exists for it. Hence, all other thinkers, however accomplished and practised, will need time and diligence to gain a firm foothold in this science, and can by no means give a competent judgment upon it after the first or second reading. Is it then, to be supposed, that unpractised and unscientific persons, who have no other culture than that of memory, and who are not even capable of carrying on an objective-scientific argument, should be able to pass a judgment upon any detached proposition of that science, which they may have found in some newspaper or another, at the very first reading, just as if they had merely to say whether they

had already heard the same thing somewhere else or not?

At the same time, no study is so easy as the study of this science, as soon as but the very first ray of light concerning its true nature has risen upon students. This science presupposes no elementary knowledge of any kind, but merely ordinary mental culture. It does not weaken the mind, but strengthens and enlivens it. Its progress is altogether connected, and its method very simple and easily comprehended. Each single point of this science, which has been understood, throws a flood of light upon all the others.

The Science of Knowledge, therefore, is not inborn in man, as his five senses are, but can be acquired only through study. It was this I wished to convince you of, my reader, so that, if you have not studied it yet, and have no inclination to study it now, you may at least be careful not to make yourself ridiculous by talking about it; and secondly, so that you may know what to think, when other persons, however highly cultivated otherwise, talk about the Science of Knowledge, without having studied it any more than you have.

COUSIN UPON KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE ABSOLUTE.

[By FRANCIS A. HENRY.]

The ultimate question of all philosophy is the question of the Absolute. Is there an Universal, a Necessary, an Unconditioned on which the Finite and Particular depend? Though doubtless every truth is this or that truth, has it not in it a something which constitutes it truth independently of its particular elements? Is there a substance, so to speak, in which the relative inheres, a foundation on which it rests, and of which all particulars are the partial representation? In analysing the Related do we not come at last to an Unrelated, the ground on which all the former reposes—itself groundless; and will not every process of explanation lead sooner or later to an inexplicable?

All else in philosophy leads up to this culmination which crowns the synthesis of

thought, and according to its holding on this point a philosophic system may be judged. For the fundamental principle of all science is the Platonic axiom:—There can be no science of that which fluctuates or passes away. The Absolute, then, is the true scientific element. The scientific spirit consists in constantly bringing the Absolute into the Relative, and constantly leading up the Relative to the Absolute. Thus all philosophy may be summed up under these three heads:—Rational Psychology, or science of the Absolute as idea, in its relation to reason; Ontology, or science of the Absolute outside of reason, in its relation to existence; and Logic, or the passage from the first to the last, from idea to being.

It is evident to a superficial observation

that the current of modern thought sets strongly against a belief in the Absolute, or at least against a belief in the possibility of a science of Ontology. The modern German Idealism founded by Fichte and developed by Schelling has ceased to exert much influence on the mind of the age, while outside of Germany Hamilton and Comte, Spencer and Mill agree in representing the notion of the Absolute as a mere negative, the opposite of the Relative and the Conditioned which alone is conceivable and cognizable by the mind. This doctrine has obtained its present prevalence mainly through the influence of one book, the "Critique of Pure Reason."

After the great edifice of Cartesianism had fallen into decay, weakened by unsound speculations and ill-supported hypotheses, a reactionary spirit of positivism arose from its ruins which refused to put faith in anything beyond the demonstrable. To the despotic government of dogmatism succeeded the anarchy and the rebellious spirit of skepticism. From this impulse sprang the philosophy of Locke which seemed for a time to restore order in the world of thought by bringing all knowledge under the authority of Experience, and bounding it within the sphere of sensation. It soon became dominant in England and France; but a system founded on such partial principles was not slow to wander into wild extravagances and fall into a labyrinth of inconsistencies, till finally Hume swept away the entire fabric by demonstrating that the only logical result from Locke's principles was universal skepticism or nescience. And now all authorities seemed to have been listened to in vain, all methods tried unsuccessfully. The last and most hopeless stage was reached, that of apathy. It was not the apathy of indifference however but of discouragement, and meant merely that the old philosophy was dead and that there needed another. The dawn of the new day was at hand. Startled at the work Hume had effected, Reid set himself to reëxamine Locke's analysis of the mind, and his profounder observation disclosed many elements before unrecognized. It proved that the Intelligence supposes

principles which as the conditions of its activity cannot be the results of its operation; that the mind contains cognitions which, as primitive, universal, necessary, cannot be explained as generalizations from the Contingent and Particular, about which alone Experience is conversant. Some enumeration of these primary principles of the intellect was attempted, and thus a Rational Psychology, or doctrine of the Absolute in the mind of man established.

But what was merely a sketch in Scotland became a finished drawing in the hands of the philosopher of Königsberg. With a mental grasp and keenness of insight that have gained for him the name of the modern Aristotle, Kant shed the light of his profound analysis on the deep recesses of the human mind in order to reconstruct philosophy upon the basis of a complete and accurate psychology. His enterprise was nothing less than to create a new philosophy which could be placed between the old dogmatism and the Sensism of Locke and Condillac in security against the attacks of Hume. At first little read and almost unnoticed, the "Critique of Pure Reason" gradually made its way among thinkers, at the end of eight or ten years had produced a marked effect on Germany, and ended by effecting a renovation of philosophy as complete as Klopstock had wrought in the national literature.

Kant's philosophy is the highest development of spiritualism that the eighteenth century produced, but with all our admiration for his genius and for the great results he has achieved, his work must on the whole be pronounced a failure, since its ultimate result is to declare that pure reason, as purely subjective, and conscious of nothing but itself, is unable to evince the reality of anything beyond its own personal modifications; that Ontology, or a knowledge of the Absolute in itself, is beyond the compass of our faculties.

The following citations from Cousin's criticism upon Kant, and others of his writings, it is hoped will lead some to reopen the question of the Absolute, and to test for themselves the strength of the

grounds on which rests the refined skepticism which has so powerfully affected the course of thought since his day :

* "If it is true that since Descartes the question of the veracity of consciousness has been the chief question in philosophy, this is especially the case in the system of Kant. To solve this question Kant undertook an analysis of consciousness, and the profound and original way in which he solved it has impressed a peculiar character upon all his philosophy, and has decided that of the philosophy of Germany. Kant was right in placing first among philosophic questions that of the objective validity of our cognitions, and he clearly saw that the scientific solution of the problem must be sought in a profound analysis of the mechanism of the human intelligence. But if his method was the right one, did he always follow it exactly? Before entering upon a general discussion of the Kantian doctrine, let us remark in the first place that his opinion is in contradiction with that of mankind—with common sense. Kant denies the objective reality of space and time; mankind, on the contrary, believe in this reality, and manifest their belief every moment by their words and actions. When I speak of the situation of this room in relation to the surrounding rooms, and when in this room I distinguish the place where I am from the one where you are by saying *here* and *there*, I never take it into my head to think that when I speak thus it is merely for the sake of making a distinction of my own, and of putting my sensible impressions in a kind of order.

"I believe that I really occupy a certain portion of a space which exists independently of me, and which would not cease to exist even if I should cease to have the idea of it; and if I rise to go towards you, or to pass into another room, I believe that every one of my steps measures a portion of this space, and that in going towards you, or into the other room, I actually change my place, that is, pass through different points of space. Should one dispute with me on the soundness of this be-

lief, and tell me that these places I distinguish, these different points of space I pass through, that this space itself, have no existence in reality; that there only appears in all this a manner of representing phenomena to oneself,—in vain would he speak to me in the name of philosophy, he would not shake my conviction.

"Kant's doctrine opposes itself to common sense, no less on the notion of time than on that of space. When a man says that it has taken him an hour to go from one place to another, just as he believes that he has actually passed over a certain portion of space, so he believes he has employed in passing over it a certain portion of time; and if you tell him that all this exists only in his mind, and that in reality there is no such thing as time or parts of time, he will laugh at you, or he will not understand what you mean. Granted that the divisions we establish in time, like those we establish in space, are more or less arbitrary, and that in dividing time into minutes, hours, days, and years, our only object is to understand each other; yet should one maintain that such divisions are not divisions of a real time at all, that what we call time is a pure form of our minds by means of which we represent phenomena to ourselves,—his opinion would only vainly conflict with that of mankind, it could not prevail against it.

"Let us turn to another part of Kant's theory and choose among the categories of the understanding that, for instance, of causality. Is the principle of causality in the eyes of mankind merely a form, a purely subjective condition of the application of our mind to phenomena—to sensible objects; or do they not rather believe that just as there is a real something, a phenomena that begins to be, so this something, this phenomenon, has its real and objective cause? To answer this question it only needs to look at the way men are every instant applying the principle of causality. A cruel murder is committed; the public is at once indignant at the perpetrator of the deed, although it may not know who he is, and justice follows in his pursuit, not resting till it has discovered him; and even if it cannot discover him,

*Course of the History of Modern Philosophy, 1st Series, Vol. V., Lect. viii.

it does not the less persist in assuming that the murder had a real cause. When the criminal is seized, he is tried; and if there is sufficient proof against him, he is put to death.

"This is what takes place, and surely all this does not come to pass merely because we apply the principle of causality to events in order to connect them together in our mind, but because when we apply this principle we accord to it implicitly or explicitly that objective validity which Kant's system refuses to it. According to his system, in the case we have supposed, the public would be aroused; justice would institute a search, a man would be put to death only to satisfy a law of our mind which would have us conceive a cause, indeed, but a cause purely ideal wherever we see an event produced! Let us not be reproached for combatting Kant's theory by ridicule, for ridicule, it might be answered, is only the expression, and, so to speak, the loudest cry of common sense, and consequently may be properly employed against philosophy whenever it goes astray as it does here.

"Consider the opinion of Kant on the *Me* and compare it with the opinion of mankind. To Kant the idea of the being which we are, presents nothing else than a logical bond which serves to collect the psychological phenomena into one whole. Is this the opinion of common sense? When a man speaks of himself, does he believe that that which constitutes his personality, that which makes him an individual, one and the same, is this logical connection which he establishes among his own modifications in order to bring them into a certain unity? And when he speaks of individuals, whom he distinguishes from himself, and from each other, does he believe that in this he is only grouping certain phenomena around certain unities which he calls for convenience's sake James or John, but to which he accords no objective reality? In a word, is the idea of the *Me* nothing for us but a regulative principle, and the distinction of individuals a mere affair of classification? It is very clear that the *Me* of Kant's system is not the *Me* of consciousness. We may

add that his God, or at least the God of his metaphysic, is equally far from being the God of humanity. It is in fact a pure ideal which crowns human consciousness and enables the mind to reach the highest possible unity, but which can have only an abstract existence in the mind. Is it this ideal without reality, this doubtful object of a regulative idea, that mankind salutes as the first substance and cause of all things, the being of beings and the father of the human race?

"It appears from the foregoing how remote are the results at which Kant arrives from the common notions of men; but since, however strange they may be, they are, according to Kant, the fruit of philosophy, let us examine them philosophically and see whether a sound criticism of human knowledge can admit them, or whether on the contrary it will not sanction the opinion of mankind.

"Why does Kant deny the objective reality of space and time? This is the answer: even if we could not cease to affirm the real existence of time and space, we should always be unable to establish such affirmations by reason of the subjective character with which they are impressed. He denies the objective validity of the principle of causality, and in general of all the categories of the understanding, for the same reason: to conclude from the subjective to the objective cannot be a valid conclusion according to the Critical Philosophy. For the same reason, though he does not deny the objective validity of the idea of God, he dares not affirm it. Thus the foundation on which all Kant's skepticism rests, is in the last analysis, nothing but the character of subjectivity with which all the developments of our faculty of Knowing are necessarily stamped. This then is his trouble.

"But is this subjectivity the only form of reason? How do I know that my reason is subjective? Because when I have tried to affirm the contrary of what the principles of reason naturally teach me I have found my efforts useless, that is, I have seen the necessity of its principles. It is in the feeling of this necessity, in this observation, namely, that I cannot but admit such

or such a truth, that the subjective character of my reason reveals itself. But does the mind set out with this observation? We have just seen that it supposes reflection, for it supposes that the mind *bends back upon itself* to try to call in question the certainty of its principles. Now Kant's theory implies that the mind sets out by reflection, by these attempts at doubt in which it discovers the necessity of the principles of reason, and thus the subjectivity of reason itself. But in order that the mind should seek to affirm anything contrary to the principles of reason, it must have first affirmed something in accordance with those principles, without any return upon itself; consequently it must be admitted that human reason has primitively nothing of the subjective character which Kant has made a weapon against it, and that it must begin to act by a pure affirmation, absolute, without any suspicion of error. After this it returns upon itself; it tries to affirm the contrary of what it had at first affirmed spontaneously; and as it cannot succeed in this, it persists in believing what it believed before, but its mode of believing is changed; from being spontaneous it has become reflective. In the first mode reason contains nothing personal or subjective but what the relation of every apperception to consciousness must unavoidably bring into consciousness; in the second mode it contracts that decided character of subjectivity which is imposed upon it by the intervention of reflection, that is to say, of the will, the faculty on which the human personality especially displays itself.

"Unfortunately Kant has not seen that this form of reason is in some sort foreign to it, and inferior; he has not seized reason at that pure and lofty degree where reflection, will, and personality are as yet absent. If he had known this intuition, this spontaneous revelation which is the primitive mode of reason, perhaps he might have renounced his skepticism. For this skepticism rests as we have said on the assumption that the laws of reason are subjective, personal to man; but here is a mode of reason where these same laws are, so to speak, freed from all subjectivity,

where reason shows itself almost entirely impersonal. Is not this sufficient for Kant? Does he wish in order to believe in the objectivity and validity of reason that it should cease to make its appearance in a particular subject; in man, for instance? But if reason is outside of the subject which I am, it is nothing for me. For me to have consciousness of it, it must descend into me, it must make itself mine, and in this sense become subjective. A reason which is not mine, which entirely universal as it is in itself, does not incarnate itself, as it were, in my consciousness, is for me as though it did not exist. Consequently to wish that reason in order to be trustworthy should cease entirely to be subjective, is to demand an impossibility. It is to demand what God himself could not do. Suppose that God wishes to give me a knowledge of the external world. If the *Me* is to remain *Me*, and if the *Not-Me* is to remain *Not-Me*, the *Me* can only know the *Not-Me* by means of the faculties which belong to it, and in this sense it will be true that it can only attain the objective subjectively. Attempt to conceive of its being otherwise, and you find the contrary an absurdity.

"Further, God himself cannot know what is not himself otherwise than thus, because he cannot know otherwise than by his own intelligence. In the terms of Kant's philosophy the divine reason also would be tainted with subjectivity because this reason resides in a determined subject which is God. If then this subjectivity necessarily involves skepticism, here is God himself condemned to a skepticism from which he can no more free himself than we men can. This is what Kant must have admitted if he was consistent; or else, if the knowledge which God has by the action of his intelligence does not involve skepticism for him, no more does the subjectivity of human reason entail it upon us.

"Now it will be easy to show that Kant made a mistake when he was willing to take the part of such a skepticism, and that the principles of the Kantian critique once admitted, logic destroys all that he thought he had been able to preserve.

"If he denies the objective reality of space and time, Kant does not deny the existence of the material world; he has even given a demonstration of it. But this demonstration rests on the authority of our faculty of knowing. Now by what privilege does our faculty of knowing, which has a character eminently subjective when it furnishes us the ideas of space and time, acquire an objective validity with regard to the natural world—to those phenomena, that is, which we can only represent to ourselves by means of the ideas of space and time, ideas destitute of all objectivity according to Kant? It matters little that Kant tells us he admits nothing but phenomenal existence in the material world; however he admits it, it is as something really external, and this something really external, phenomenon or being—he can admit only through the principle of causality, or through some other principle which he declares purely subjective. If this is indeed the fact, why not acknowledge that when we represent to ourselves anything in space and time we only transport to the object what belongs solely to the subject. We cannot allow him a right to admit the external world, whose existence he would attempt to demonstrate, while he does not recognize that of space and time. With his subjective reason he is condemned to remain locked up within the limits of the subject.

"But within these limits what remains for him? The idea of the *Me*, of the one and identical substance which we are, has for him a purely ideal validity, and all that he can admit in the mind are the phenomena of consciousness, nothing more. But what are these surviving phenomena? If the *Me* has no reality, can the phenomenal determinations by which its existence is manifested be anything? If the *Me* is obliterated, if it is made an unknown quantity, or an abstraction, must not the same be done to phenomena? The internal phenomena, and the subject of these phenomena, are given us, we have seen, in one and the same psychological fact; we are free to consider them separately, that is, in a state of abstraction; but if after separating them we reject the reality of the

subject, while we hold to that of phenomena, we fall into an evident contradiction. In fine, Kant has no more right to admit psychological phenomena than he has to admit any external phenomenon. What remains for him then? Nihilism. A total skepticism is the legitimate result of the Critique of Pure Reason. It stops short, we know, of its true limit, but this is not Kant's only inconsistency.

"While in theory he denies all objective reality to *a priori* ideas, in his practical work he readily accords this objectivity to the idea of duty; while in the one he thinks himself incompetent to affirm the existence of free will or that of God, in the other he believes himself able to assert both with entire certainty. But is there at bottom a real distinction between moral and metaphysical principles? What are the characteristics of the moral law? Its necessity and universality. But does not Kant admit that these are the characteristics of every principle that he recognizes in metaphysic, of the principle of causality, for example? Why then does he take metaphysical principles to be purely subjective, and simple forms of our mind, when the law of duty is in his eyes an objective law, independent of the subject who conceives it, and possessing an absolute validity? Moral principles and metaphysical principles both derive from the same faculty, the reason; Kant himself admits this, since he talks of speculative reason and practical reason. He distinguishes here not two different faculties, but two applications, or, as he says, two different employments of reason. If then he denies the trustworthiness of the speculative reason, he must that of the practical reason too; he must admit that the moral law depends upon our individual nature, and that outside of us it has no bearing. Now what becomes of the new basis of Kant's moral dogmatism? What becomes of all the objective existence he reestablishes on this basis? Skepticism sweeps away the faculty of reason entire, in all its applications. All the consequences at which we arrive on setting out from the law of duty can only have, like that law itself, an ideal and subjective

character. This is what Kant would be obliged to assert himself, if, in his desire to save morality from the wreck of his metaphysic, he did not sue logic to relax its rigor. But logic is inexorable: Kant must either renounce his moral dogmatism and accept all the consequences of his metaphysical skepticism; or, if he is not willing to renounce certainty in morality, he must accept dogmatism in metaphysic also, and recognize the validity of the speculative reason as well as that of the practical, for there is no essential difference between them.

"It follows from what we have said that absolute skepticism must be the final conclusion of Kant's philosophy as well in its moral part as in its speculative. Such indeed is the necessary conclusion of every system that calls in question the authority of our faculty of knowing, instead of directing it, and keeping it from going astray by constantly recalling it to the circumspection which is required of it: for caution is not skepticism. If Skepticism were consistent it would be the negation of all science and all philosophy, while a severe examination of the processes which dogmatism employs is of great advantage to philosophy. As is almost always the case Kant has exceeded his intention, and though his wish was only to confine human knowledge within its actual limits, his system, pushed to its consequences, destroys knowledge completely. Let us take warning by this example; and if it is useful and salutary to give place to doubt in philosophy, let us be careful to give it only the place that belongs to it. Let us not pretend that there rests no cloud upon the questions that philosophy raises, but neither let us believe that the human mind can affirm nothing with certainty, and that upon the points where its destiny is especially interested it should be condemned to error or to ignorance."

In the year 1818, in his *Course on the Absolute*, Cousin had entered upon the same discussion.

* "Let us understand the new aspect the ontological question has taken in the hands

* Lecture iii. On the Validity of *a priori* Principles.

of Kant. He has established, like Reid and ourself, the existence of universal and necessary principles; but he has made the immense concession to the empirical school that these principles are nothing more than regulative laws of thought, that their function is only to put our impressions in order, and that beyond these impressions, beyond experience, they are powerless. This position started German philosophy on a road at whose end was an abyss. In vain did this great man open a learned and subtle controversy with Hume: it is he that has been overcome in this contest; it is Hume that remains master of the field. Kant's theory brings us back to that Conceptualism of the middle age which, concentrating truth in the human intelligence, makes of the nature of things a phantasm of the mind which everywhere throws itself outside of itself, at once triumphant and powerless, since it produces everything, yet its productions are only shadows. The function of philosophy is to explain facts; but if in its explanation it destroy what it pretends to explain, it no longer explains, it imagines. Here the great fact to be explained is the belief of the human race, and the system of Kant annihilates it. We all believe *a priori* principles to be true in themselves, and true even if our minds were not here to conceive of them; we consider them as independent of ourselves, and as imposing upon our intelligence by the force of the truth which is in them. Thus to express correctly what passes within us we must reverse Kant's proposition, and instead of saying with him: these principles are the necessary laws of our mind, therefore they can have no absolute validity outside of our mind; we ought rather to say: these principles have an absolute validity in themselves, this is why we cannot but believe in them.

"Let us return here to that spontaneous intuition of truth which Kant had no knowledge of, held captive as he was in the circle of reflection by his scholastic habits of mind.

"Is it true that there is no judgment even affirmative in form but what is mingled with negation? It seems indeed that every af-

firmative judgment is at the same time negative, since to affirm that a thing exists is to deny its non-existence. If this is the case, every judgment whether its form be affirmative or negative, for these two forms return one to the other, supposes a previous doubt as to the existence of the thing in question, some exercise of reflection that is, at the conclusion of which the mind feels itself obliged to pass such or such a judgment; so that from this point of view the ground of the judgment seems to be its necessity; and then comes the well known objection: If you judge thus only because it is impossible for you not to, you have only yourself and your own modes of conceiving for guaranty of the truth; it is the human mind carrying its laws out of itself; it is the subject making the object in its own image without ever getting out of the circle of subjectivity.

"We reply by going right to the root of the difficulty; it is not true that all our judgments are negative. We grant that in the reflective state every affirmative judgment supposes a negative judgment and reciprocally. But does reason act only under the condition of reflection? Is there not a primitive affirmation which implies no negation? Just as we often act without deliberating, without premeditating the action, and, as in this case we manifest a free activity, though free with an unreflecting freedom, so reason often perceives truth without passing through doubt. Reflection is a return upon consciousness, or upon some other operation different from itself. It is impossible therefore that it should be found in any primitive act; every judgment that contains it presupposes another where it is not. We arrive thus at a judgment pure from all reflection, an affirmation without admixture of negation, an immediate intuition, legitimate daughter of the natural energy of thought, like the inspiration of the poet and the instinct of the hero. Such is the first act of the faculty of knowing. If we contradict this primitive affirmation, the faculty of knowing turns back upon itself, it examines itself, it tries to call in question the truth it has perceived: it cannot; it affirms again what it had affirmed at first,

but with the new sentiment that it is not in its power to escape from the evidence of this truth. Then, and then only, appears this character of necessity and subjectivity which has been turned against the truth, as if the truth lost its own validity by penetrating further into the mind and triumphing over doubt; as if reflective evidence were any the less evidence from being reflective; as if the necessary conception were the only form or the first form of the apperception of truth! The skepticism of Kant, which common sense gets rid of so easily, is pushed to extremity, and forced into its entrenchments by the distinction between spontaneous and reflective reason. Reflection is the field of the combats which reason sustains with itself, with doubt, sophistry, and error; but above reflection is a region of light and peace, where reason perceives truth without return upon itself, for the simple reason that truth is truth, and that God has given reason power to perceive it, as he has made the eye to see and the ear to hear. Analyze with impartiality the fact of spontaneous apperception, and you will satisfy yourself that there is nothing subjective about it, but what it is impossible it should not have, that is, the *Me*, which appears in the fact without constituting it. The *Me* enters inevitably into every cognition, for it is the subject of it. Reason perceives truth directly, but it doubles itself, as it were, in consciousness, and this produces knowing. Consciousness is here as witness, not as judge; the only judge is reason, the faculty both subjective and objective together, according to the language of Germany, which attains absolute truth immediately, almost without any personal intervention on our part, although it cannot enter into exercise unless the person precede it, or is added to it.

"Spontaneous apperception constitutes natural logic; reflective conception is the foundation of logic proper. The one rests on itself, *verum index sui*; the other on the impossibility that reason should not yield to the truth and believe it. The form of the first is affirmation accompanied with absolute security, and without even the suspicion of a possible negation; the

form of the second is reflective affirmation ; that is, the impossibility of denying, and so the necessity of affirming. The idea of negation governs ordinary logic, whose affirmations are only the laborious product of two negations. Natural logic proceeds by affirmations — expressions of a simple faith which instinct alone produces and sustains.

"In truth, when we see the father of German philosophy losing himself in the labyrinth of the problem of the subjectivity and the objectivity of primary principles, we are almost ready to pardon Reid for having disregarded this problem, and contenting himself with repeating that the absolute truth of these principles rests on the veracity of our faculties, and that as to their veracity we can have no other testimony than their own.

"To explain," he says, "why we are persuaded by our senses, by consciousness, by all our faculties, is an impossibility. We say this is so, this cannot be otherwise, and we reach the end. Is it not the expression of an irresistible belief, of a belief that is the voice of nature, and against which we struggle in vain? Do we wish to penetrate further, to demand of each of our faculties what are its titles to our confidence, and refuse it until it shall have produced them? Then I fear that this extreme wisdom will only lead us to folly, and that for not having been willing to submit to the common lot of humanity, we shall be altogether deprived of the light of common sense."

"To state the conclusion of our argument:—I. Kant's doctrine, which is based on the necessary character of rational principles as weakening their objective authority, only applies to the form imposed on these principles by reflection, and does not reach to their spontaneous application where the character of necessity has not yet appeared.

"II. After all, to conclude with the human race from the necessity of believing to the truth of what is believed is not a bad conclusion; for it is reasoning from the effect to the cause, from the sign to the thing signified.

"III. Besides, the validity of principles

is above all demonstration. Psychological analysis discovers in the fact of intellectual intuition an absolute affirmation, free from a touch of doubt; it proclaims it, and this is equivalent to a demonstration. To demand any other demonstration is to demand an impossibility of the reason, since absolute principles being indispensable to every demonstration can be demonstrated only by themselves."

In the lectures of 1828, after his triumphant return from exile, Cousin recurs again to the distinction between the spontaneous and reflective activity of reason. From the same premises he arrives at an opposite conclusion to that of Kant, whereas the latter argued from the necessity of rational principles, or the inability of the subject to free himself from their control, to the subjectivity of these principles, or the restriction of their legitimate application to the personality of man, as laws of human thought; Cousin argues from this same necessity to the objectivity of principles, that is, to the impersonality of reason.

* "Is reason purely human, to speak strictly, or is it only human because it makes its appearance in man? Does reason belong to you—is it yours? What is it to be yours and mine? I wish to move my arm, and I move it; I take such a resolution; this resolution is exclusively mine, I can impute it to no one else; it belongs to me; and this is so true that, if I please, at the very instant I can take a contrary resolution—I can produce another movement because it is the essence of my will to be free, to do or not to do as it pleases. Is it the same with the perception of reason? Reason conceives a mathematical truth; can it change this conception, as my will just now changed my resolution? In vain you attempt to conceive that two and two are not four, or that right is not obligatory. Reason does not modify itself as it pleases; you do not think as you wish to. All that is free is yours; what is not free is not yours; freedom constitutes personality. It provokes a smile to hear the declamations of the upholders of authority against the individual reason. In truth

there is nothing less individual than reason. If it were individual we should master it as we master our resolutions and our volitions; we should be continually changing its acts, that is, our conceptions. If these conceptions were only individual, we should not dream of imposing them on any other individual, for to impose one's individual notions on another person would be an extravagant tyranny. But things are not so; the fact is that we call those crazy who do not admit the mathematical relations of numbers, or the difference between the beautiful and the ugly, and the just and unjust. Why? Because we know it is not the individual who constitutes these conceptions, or, in other terms, that reason has in itself something universal and absolute; that it is obligatory upon every individual, and that while one individual knows himself to be obliged by it, he knows that all others are so likewise. The reason in us is not purely individual then, since it appears to us to be the law of all individuals. Hence that sublime conjecture of Fenelon: 'O! Reason, art not thou the God whom I seek?' Reason in itself is universal and absolute, and consequently would be infallible, but that fallen as it is in man, and brought into relation with the senses, the passions, and the imagination, from being infallible as it is in itself, it has now become fallible. It does not mistake, but that in which it is leads it astray: hence its aberrations; they are numerous, and since they derive from a relation, which in the present state of things is our inevitable condition, they themselves are inevitable. But truth misunderstood is not on that account changed or destroyed; it subsists independently of the reason, which in its present state perceives it imperfectly. Truth is independent of our reason because its true subject is the substance of the absolute, that incorruptible intelligence of which ours is a fragment. * * * * *

"I will to think, and I think; but do I never think without willing to? Carry yourself back to the first act of the intelligence, for the intelligence must have had

its first act, before which you were ignorant that you were an intelligence—the intelligence only acquiring knowledge of itself by its acts, or by one act at least; before this act which declares it it was not in your power to suspect its existence, and you were entirely ignorant of it. Now when for the first time the intelligence manifested itself, it is clear that it did not do so voluntarily. It did manifest itself, however, and you had a more or less vivid consciousness of it. What must have taken place at this starting point of the intelligence, in this phase of it, which no longer subsists and which can never return? To think is to affirm; the first affirmation was neither voluntary nor reflective, neither can it have been an affirmation blended with negation, it was then a pure affirmation, an instinctive apperception of truth. Now what is there in this primitive affirmation? All that there will be afterwards in reflection. But while all is here, it is here under another form. We do not begin by searching for ourselves, for that would suppose our knowing already that we are; but there comes a day, an instant, when, without having sought, we find ourselves; we affirm our existence with a security with which no doubt is blended, because it is pure from all reflection; we perceive ourselves with certainty, but without the clear discernment of reflection; in the same way we perceive the world, (the *Not-Me*, finite) we feel the limitations and imperfections of these, and we perceive vaguely something other and better to which we refer ourselves and the world. The intelligence naturally perceives all this, but while it perceives it with perfect certainty, it cannot but do so in a somewhat confused manner at first.

"Such is the primitive affirmation: it is a judgment, but a self-evident judgment; resting on that evidence which is called intuitive, to distinguish it from that which is obtained by the laborious processes of induction and deduction. The intuition of truth is a true inspiration. Inspiration, in every language, means an apperception of truth, without intervention of the will or mingling of the personality; it does not belong to us; it comes at its own

time, and we can neither retain it nor drive it away. It is an activity unquestionably, and a high activity, but it is not the reflective, the personal activity. In certain cases enthusiasm enters into inspiration, that powerful emotion which snatches the soul from its habitually subordinate condition, and sets free in it the lofty and divine part of its nature. Man not being able to attribute inspiration and enthusiasm to himself, ascribes them to God, with the truths which they reveal to him. Is he wrong in this? Surely not, for what is God? He is the eternal reason, the first substance and the first cause of truth that man perceives. When man, then, pays homage to God for truth which he cannot attribute to his own personality, nor to the impressions the world makes upon his senses, he refers them to their true source. The intuition of truth without reflection,—inspiration,—is a sort of revelation, that natural revelation made to all men, which is the light within us that lighteth every man that cometh into the world.

“So in the infancy of civilization, he who possesses the gift of inspiration in a higher degree than his fellows, passes for the confidant and interpreter of God. He is so for others, for he is so in his own eyes, and he is so in fact in a profoundly philosophic sense.

“Remark, too, this particular effect of inspiration. When man, hurried away by the rapid and vivid apperception of truth, tries to express in words what passes within him, he can do so only in words as wonderful as the ideas they attempt to convey. The first form, the natural language of inspiration, is poetry. Mankind does not begin with prose, but with poetry, because it does not begin with reflection, but with intuition. Hence again it follows that we do not begin with science, but with faith. In the strictest sense faith is an unlimited belief, which we have not made, but which governs us, and is for us a sacred authority, which we invoke at once against others and against ourselves. Now this characteristic of faith, which, by and by, in the deplorable conflicts of religion and philosophy, will be opposed to reason,—this characteristic is precisely that

of the reason itself; for it is reason that speaks to us as a sovereign, and that first reveals to us all truths necessary to the human race; so that reason and faith blend in the primitive intuition of truth.

“Spontaneous thought enters into exercise by its own power, and gives us ourselves, the world, and God; ourselves and the world with limitations vaguely perceived, and God without limitation; the whole in a synthesis, where the clear and obscure are blended together. By degrees reflection applies itself to this phenomenon; then everything clears up and determines itself; the *Me* separates itself from the *Not-Me*, these in their opposition and their connection give us a clear idea of the finite; and as the finite cannot be sufficient for itself, it supposes and implies the infinite, and here you have the categories of the *Me* and the *Not-Me*, the finite and the infinite, etc. But what is the source of these categories? The spontaneous apperception; and since there is nothing more in reflection than in spontaneity, in analysis than in the original synthesis, the categories in their developed and scientific form contain nothing more than the intuition. And how have you obtained these categories! Once more, you have obtained them by analysis, that is, by reflection. Now the necessary element of reflection is the will, and the will is the person, it is yourself. The categories obtained by reflection have then the appearance, from their relation to reflection and will, of being personal; they have so much the appearance of personality that they have been considered laws of our nature, by those who have not explained themselves very fully, as to what ‘our nature’ is, and the greatest analytic mind of modern times, after separating the categories from sensation, and every empirical element, after enumerating and classifying them, and attributing to them an irresistible power, finding them in the depths of consciousness, where personality resides, concludes that they are only laws of our person, and modes of our thinking. Kant, after having conquered the categories from Sensualism, has left them powerless in that subjective condition, which is only their reflective

form. As if, far from our constituting the truths which reason reveals to us, it were not our honor to attain to, and participate in them! For who has ever said: My truth, or your truth. The spontaneous character of reason guaranties the independence of the truths perceived by reason; nor is it surprising that reason should bring us to know being, since itself is the true substance, and the absolute essence; reason alone is self-determined.

"Reflection, doubt, skepticism, belong to a few; pure apperception, spontaneous faith, to all; spontaneity is the genius of humanity, as philosophy is the genius of individual men. Doubtless inspiration manifests itself in some highly endowed natures more strikingly than in others, but with more or less energy, thought develops itself in all thinking beings, and it is the identity of spontaneity in the human race, with the absolute faith it engenders that constitutes the identity of humanity. Where is the man who in the spontaneous action of his intelligence, does not believe in his own existence and in that of the world? This is evident as to these: it is not less so as to God. Leibnitz has said: There is being in every proposition. But a proposition is only a thought expressed, and if there is being in every proposition, it is because there is being in every thought. Now the most imperfect idea of being, implies an idea,—more or less clear, but a real idea,—of perfect being, that is, of God. Again, to think is to believe and to know that we think, it is to trust in our thought, it is to trust in the principle of thought; therefore it is to believe in the existence of this principle, which being neither the Me, nor the world, but God Himself, it follows that every thought implies an instinctive faith in God, and that there is no such thing as natural atheism.

"I do not say merely that there is no language where the name of God may not be found, for if you could show me dictionaries where this name does not occur, I should not be disturbed. I should only ask you, is there a man that speaks this language who thinks, and puts faith in his thought? Does he believe he exists, for

instance? If he believes this, he believes that his thought, the idea of his existing is worthy of faith; he has faith then in the principle of thought, and this principle, whether he know it or not, is God. Every serious conviction rests on a concealed faith in thought, in reason, in God. Every utterance is an act of faith; thus in the infancy of society the first expression in language is a hymn. Search the history of language, of society at their remotest periods, and you will find nothing anterior to lyric poetry, to hymns and litanies. So true it is that every primitive conception is a spontaneous apperception, stamped with faith, an inspiration accompanied by enthusiasm, that is to say, a religious movement of the soul. Here, I repeat, is the identity of the human race. Everywhere, in all generations of humanity, and in all the individuals of a generation, reason, in its instinctive form, is the same. Whoever is heir to thought, is heir also to the ideas which every thought contains, and which science afterwards presents with all its own apparatus, under the appalling title of laws, principles and categories. In their simple and primitive form these ideas are everywhere the same, and this primitive state is in a manner the state of innocence, the golden age of thought."

The foregoing extracts may serve to give an outline of Cousin's own system with regard to the question of the Absolute. His philosophy, as he himself describes it, is simply that enlightened Spiritualism "which began with Socrates and Plato, which the Gospel spread abroad in the world, and which Descartes placed under the severe form of modern thought."

The reader will not need to be told that Cousin's spontaneous apperception is the same simple and solid basis on which Descartes established the Absolute. The famous *Cogito ergo sum*, and the proof of the existence of God, have no other foundation. Descartes passes directly from Idea to Being by the pure fact of the Idea. There is in me the idea of God; assuredly it is not here through any agency of my own, nor can it come from the natural world, for the idea of the infinite and per-

fect is opposed to that, consequently it comes from God; that is, it reveals its object; God exists. The father of modern philosophy too often indeed abandons his own method, as new to himself as to his age, and turns from the natural logic of the immediate intuition to fortify his positions by the logic of the schools; he had not sounded to a sufficient depth the nature of reason, by distinguishing it from the personality, and showing that it is in man, but is not man; and so he was not always able to show convincing grounds for his firm belief in the truth of the intuitions of reason, as revelations of objective existence. But skepticism had not then intrenched itself so strongly, and the same forces were not called for to overthrow Gassendi as were afterwards needed to encounter Kant.

The powerful effect of the Kantian philosophy on the German mind may be appreciated in the writer who, more fully than any other, was the expression of the spirit of his age.

It perhaps has not been considered that Goethe's Faust was in some degree the product of this latest phase of thought. And what a commentary upon it it is! Faust is introduced to us sinking into a dreary skepticism, in the bitterness of disappointment at his fruitless efforts to attain to knowledge. Truth is a phantasm, or if it exist, how can the mind ever know it, how can we anywhere reach certainty? His active intellect tosses about in a feverish restlessness. His faith in his own reason gone, all faith is gone; Theology, the piety of the Intellect, Religion, the piety of the Sentiments, desert him. He falls back on the finite and negative for ground to stand upon. Here at least he can find demonstration. He yields himself to the guidance of his Sense-Understanding—the "wisdom of this world, earthly, sensual, devilish,"—for the real Mephistopheles is within Faust, and within every human soul; hence follows the catastrophe, and his ruin.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT.

Translated from the German of G. W. F. HEGEL.

[The preface and introduction to this remarkable work are omitted for the present, although they belong to the most valuable of Hegel's writings. We commence with the scientific exposition at once. All marks of subdivision, included in brackets, [], are not in the original, but are employed here in order to facilitate reference to the portions taken up in the commentary, which follows.—EDITOR.]

A. CONSCIOUSNESS.

The Sensuous Certitude, or the This and the Meaning.

[P. 71 orig.] [a.] The knowing which is, at first or immediately, our object, can be no other than that which is itself immediate knowing—a knowing of the immediate or the existent [*seyenden* = that which is]. We have, likewise, to conduct ourselves toward it, in an immediate manner, i. e. *apprehending* it, and taking care to change nothing that is presented in it,—in short, we must simply *apprehend* and hold back all tendency to *comprehend* [i. e. all activity of reflection and Reason].

[b.] The concrete content of the sensuous

certitude appears immediately as the *richest* knowing, even as a knowing of infinite wealth, for which no limit is to be found, whether we go out into space and time in which it expands itself, or whether, selecting a specimen out of this fullness we go through analysis into the same. Besides this, it appears as the most true; for it has omitted nothing from the object, but has the same before it in its entire completeness. This certitude, however, turns out in point of fact to be the most abstract and poorest truth. It says, of what it knows, only this: It is; and its truth contains merely the *being* of the subject-matter [*sache*]; the consciousness for its part, in this certitude, is merely as pure *Ego*; or

the Ego is therein merely as a pure This [one] and the object, likewise, as a pure This [thing]. I—This one—am certain of this subject-matter, not for the reason that I, as consciousness, have unfolded myself in this, and my thought has been active; nor for the reason that the [p. 72 orig.] subject-matter of which I am certain, is, in a variety of respects, rich in relations to itself or a state of manifold relation to other things; neither of these circumstances has anything to do with the truth of sensuous certitude. Neither the Ego nor the subject-matter contains a manifold mediation; the Ego has not the signification of a manifold representing or thinking, nor has the subject-matter the signification of manifold properties. The subject-matter *is*; and *it is merely because it is*. "It is,"—this is the essential point for sensuous knowing, this pure being, or this simple immediateness, constitutes its truth. Moreover, the certitude as relation, is immediate, pure relation; consciousness is the Ego, and nothing more, a pure This; the individual knows purely this, or the individual.

[c.] But to the pure being which constitutes the essence of this certitude, and which it asserts as truth, much else is attached, if we examine closely. A given, real, sensuous certitude, is not merely this pure immediateness, but an *example* of the same. Among countless distinctions which occur on every hand in this, we find everywhere the main distinction, viz: that in it the two already named This's at once separate from the pure being—one This as Ego, the other This as object. If we reflect upon this distinction, it becomes obvious that neither the one nor the other is merely immediate in the sensuous certitude, but both are at the same time mediate; the Ego possesses its certitude through another, namely, the subject-matter, and the latter is likewise in the certitude through another, namely, the Ego.

[d.] This distinction of essence and example, of immediateness and mediation, is not one that is made merely by us, but we find it in the sensuous certitude itself, and we must proceed to take it up in the form which it has there, and not in the [re-

flective] mode which we have just now been using. One "This" is posited in the certitude [p. 73, orig.] as the simple, immediately existent, or as the essence, *the Object*; the other "This," however, is posited as the unessential and mediated which is therein not in itself [essentially] but through another—the ego, a knowing which knows the object only because the object *is*, and which may or may not be. The object, however, is the true and the essence; it *is*, indifferent whether it is known or not; it remains even if it is not known; but the knowing is not if the object is not. [e.] The object, therefore, is to be considered in order to ascertain whether it, in point of fact, is, in the sensuous certitude, such an essence as that for which it is given out by it [the certitude]; whether this, which is defined to be essence, proves to be so in reality. For this purpose we have not to reflect and think, concerning it, inquiring what it is in truth, but only to consider it as found in the sensuous certitude.

[f.] It, therefore, is itself to be interrogated: What is the This [object]? If we take it in the two-fold form of its being, as the Now and the Here, its dialectic will obtain as intelligible a form as the subject possesses. To the question: What is the Now? We answer, for example: The Now is night. In order to test the truth of this sensuous certitude, a simple experiment is sufficient. We write this truth down; a truth can lose nothing by being written down, for that is the way to preserve it. If we look now, this noon, at this truth that was written down, we shall have to say that it is become false [*scha*=stale].

[g.] The Now which is night is preserved, i. e. it is treated as that which it professes to be—as an existent; but it proves itself to be a non-existent, rather. Although the Now preserves itself, yet it is as a somewhat which is not night; the same thing happens to the day which it is now, namely, the Now proves itself to be not the day, but a negative somewhat in general. This Now which [p. 74] preserves itself, therefore, is not an immediate, but a mediate somewhat; for it is determined as an abiding and self-preserving somewhat, through

this, that while others, namely, the day and night are not, nevertheless, it is just as simply a Now as before, and in this simplicity it is indifferent to whatever else plays around it; as little as day and night are its being, just as much is it also both day and night; it is not affected, at all, through this—its other being. Such a simple, which is through negation neither This nor That—a Not-this, and likewise indifferent whether it is This or that—we call a Universal; the Universal, therefore, is in point of fact the True of sensuous certitude.

[h.] We also *express* the sensuous fact as a universal; what we say is: "This," i. e. the universal This; or: "It is," i. e. Being in general. Of course, we do not, on this occasion, *represent* to ourselves the universal This, or Being in general, but we *express* the universal; in other words, we do not *speak* what we *mean* in this sensuous certitude. But language is, we see, the more true; in it we refute immediately our meaning,—and since the Universal is the True of sensuous certitude and language expresses only *this* True, it is entirely impossible that we should ever be able to express a sensuous being which we *mean*.

[i.] The same will be the case with the other form of the This, with the Here. The Here is, e. g. the tree. I turn around and this truth has vanished and has converted itself into its opposite: the Here is not a tree but rather a house. The Here itself vanishes not, but it abides in the vanishing of the house, the tree, &c., [something must abide or else no vanishing could take place,] and is indifferent whether it is house or tree. The This (somewhat) therefore shows itself again to be a mediated simplicity, or Universality. [p. 75.] [j.] For this sensuous certitude, therefore, while it shows the Universal to be the truth of its object, pure Being remains as its essence, not as an immediate, however, but as a somewhat to which negation and mediation are essential; hence, not what we *mean* by Being, but *Being with the determination that it is the abstraction or the pure Universal*; and our *meaning* for which the true of the sensuous

certitude is not the Universal is left alone, standing opposite to this empty or indifferent Now and Here.

[k.] If we compare the relation in which the knowing and the object stood to each other when they first entered upon the scene, with the relation in which they stand now in this result, we shall discover that it has become inverted. The object which was taken for the Essential, is now the Unessential of sensuous certitude; for the Universal into which it has been changed, is no longer such a somewhat as it was supposed to be essentially by itself, but it is now in the contrary somewhat, namely, in the Knowing, which previously was taken for the Unessential. Its truth is in the object as *mine*, or in the *meaning*—it is, because *I* know it. The sensuous certitude is therefore driven out of the object; but through that, it is not yet cancelled [done away with] but only driven back into the Ego; it remains to be seen what experience teaches us with reference to this its reality.

[l.] The force of its truth lies, therefore, in the Ego—in the immediateness of my *seeing, hearing, &c.*; the vanishing of the particular Now and Here, which we mean, is prevented through the fact that the Ego holds them fast. The Now is day, because the Ego sees it; the Here is a tree, for the same reason. But the sensuous certitude experiences, in this relation, the same dialectic as in the former case. I, *this* Ego, see the tree and assert the tree to be the Here; but another Ego sees the house and asserts that the Here is [p. 76] not a tree but a house. Both truths have the same evidence, namely, the immediateness of seeing, and the certainty and testimony of each concerning its knowing; but the one vanishes in [is refuted by] the other.

[m.] That which does not vanish is the Ego as universal, whose seeing is neither a seeing of the tree nor of this house, but a simple seeing which is mediated through the negation of this house, &c., and is simple and indifferent in respect to that which still plays around it—i. e. the house and the tree. The Ego is merely universal, as Now, Here, or This, in general; although I *mean* a particular Ego, yet just

as little as I can say what I mean by Now and Here, just so little can I say what I mean by Ego. When I say this Here, Now, or a particular, I say all This's, all Here's all Now's, all particulars; likewise when I say Ego, *this particular* Ego, I say in general all Ego's; for each is what I say—Ego, this particular Ego. If the demand is made upon science, as a test by which it must prove its adequacy, that it deduce a so-called *this thing* or a *this man*—or to *construct it à priori*, if one wishes to express it so—it is surely not more than fair that the demand express *which* “this thing,” or *which* “this Ego” it means; but to say this is impossible.

[n.] The sensuous certitude discovers, therefore, that its essence is neither in the object nor in the Ego, and that the immediateness is neither an immediateness of the one nor of the other; for to either that which I *mean* is rather an Unessential, and the object and Ego are Universals in which that particular Now and Here and Ego which I *mean* do not remain or be. Through this we are forced to posit the whole of the sensuous certitude as its essence, and no longer to do this of a mere moment thereof—as we did in the two instances already considered, wherein, first, the object opposed to the Ego was taken for the reality, and second, [p. 77] by the Ego itself for such. It is therefore only the entire sensuous certitude which holds fast to it as immediateness, and thereby excludes all opposition which was present in the former cases.

[o.] With this pure immediateness, the other-being of the Here, as a tree, which passes over into a Here, which is not a tree; the other-being of the Now, as day, which passes over into a Now, that is Night, or another Ego to whom something else is object, has therefore nothing to do. Its truth preserves itself as a relation which remains equal to itself, and which causes no distinction between the Ego and the object, of essentiality and unessentiality, and into which, therefore, no distinction in general can possibly penetrate. I, this Ego, assert, therefore, the Here as a tree, and do not turn around so that the Here would become a not-tree; neither do

I take any notice of the fact that another Ego sees the Here as a not-tree, or that I myself, at some other time, took the Here as a not-tree, the now as not-day—but I am pure intuition; I, for myself, insist that the Now is day, or in like manner that the Here is a tree, and moreover I do not compare the Here and Now themselves with each other, but I cling to one immediate relation: the Now is day.

[p.] Since this certitude refuses to notice when we call its attention to a Now which is night, or to an Ego for which it is night, we must go to it and permit it to show to us the Now which it asserts. We must allow it to be shown to us, for the truth of this immediate relation is the truth of this Ego which limits itself to a Now or a Here. If we were to hear of this truth subsequently, or to stand at a distance from it, it would have no significance at all; for we should then cancel the immediateness which is essential to it. We are bound, therefore, to enter into the same moment of time, or of space, and let it be shown to us, i. e. [p. 78] we must let ourselves be transformed into the same Ego which is subject of the certitude in question. Let us, then, see what is the nature of this Immediate which is shown to us.

[q.] The Now is shown; *this* Now. Now; while it is being shown, it has already ceased to be; the Now which is, is another from the one shown, and we see that the Now is precisely this; to be no more, while it is. The Now which is shown to us is a Been [a Then]; and this is its truth; it has not the truth of Being. This, then, is surely true, that it *has been*. But what has been, is, in point of fact, no essence; it is not, and Being was the very thing in question.

[r.] Hence we see in this exhibition merely a movement and the following course thereof: (1) I exhibit the Now; it is asserted as the true; but I show it as a Been [a Then] or as a cancelled, I cancel the first truth and (2) now I assert as the second truth that it *has been*, that it is cancelled. (3) But that which has been is not; I cancel the Been (or cancelled Being,) the second truth, and thus negate the negation of the Now, and return to the

first assertion: the Now is. The Now and the exhibition of the Now possess, therefore, this nature, that neither the Now nor the showing of the Now is an immediate Simple, but an activity which consists of different moments; the This is posited, but instead of it another is posited rather, or the This is cancelled; and this other being or the cancelling of the first is itself again cancelled and thus there is a return to the first. But this first, reflected into itself, is not quite the same that it was in the beginning, namely, an immediate; but it is precisely a somewhat which is reflected into itself, or a Simple which remains in the other being what it is; a Now which is absolutely many Nows; and this is the true Now; the Now as simple day, which has many Nows within it, hours; such a Now, an hour, is likewise [p. 79] many minutes, and this Now also many Nows and so on. The showing is, therefore, the activity which expresses what the Now in truth is, namely, a result, or a manifold of Nows taken together; and the showing is the experiencing that the Now is universal. [s.] The exhibited Here, which I hold fast, is likewise a this Here, which, in fact, is not *this* Here, but a Before and Behind, an Above and Below, a Right and Left. The Above is itself likewise this manifold other-being, an Above and Below, &c. The Here which was to be shown vanishes in other Heres, but the latter vanish no less; the "Shown," the Retained and Remaining [Here] is a negative This, which is only so while the Here is taken for what it offers itself, but therein cancels itself; it is a simple complex of many Heres. The Here which is *meant* would be the point; but it does not exist, but while it is shown as being, the process of such "showing" shows itself to be not an immediate knowing but a movement proceeding from the "meant" Here through many Heres into the universal Here, which, just as the day is a simple multiplicity of Nows, is a simple multiplicity of Heres.

[t.] It is obvious that the dialectic of the sensuous certitude is nothing else than the simple history of its activity or its experience, and the sensuous certitude itself is nothing else than merely this history. The

natural consciousness, therefore, for this reason also always goes forward to this result, and makes this experience concerning it; but it likewise always forgets it again, and begins the movement from the beginning. It is therefore surprising that in the face of this experience we hear it asserted as a matter of universal experience (and even as a philosophical conclusion or a result of skepticism) that the reality or Being of external things as This's or sensuous particulars has absolute truth for the consciousness. Such an assertion does not [p. 80] know at the same time what it says; it knows not that it says the opposite of what it meant to say. The truth of the sensuous This's is asserted to be universal experience for the consciousness; but the converse rather is universal experience; every consciousness cancels such a truth as e. g.: "the Here is a tree," or "the Now is noon," of itself, and expresses the converse: "The Here is not a tree but a house," or whatever else takes its place is again cancelled in the same manner; and in all sensuous certitude it only experiences in truth what we have seen, namely, the This as a universal, the converse of that which the mentioned assertion assures us to be the universal experience.

[u.] On the occasion of this appeal to universal experience it may be permitted to anticipate the practical result. In this respect it may be said to those who assert the truth and certitude of the reality of sensuous objects that they ought to be sent back to the lowest school of Wisdom, viz.: into the ancient Eleusinian Mysteries of Ceres and Bacchus in order to learn the secret of the eating of the bread and the drinking of the wine; for he who is initiated into these mysteries does not arrive merely at a *doubt* of the Being of sensuous things, but to despair of the same, and partly accomplishes in them their nugatoriness and partly sees it accomplished. Even the animals are not shut out from this wisdom, but rather show that they are deeply initiated; for they do not stand before the sensuous things as in themselves existent ones, but they despair of this reality and in the full certitude of their nuga-

toriness, they "help themselves" to them and eat them up; and all nature celebrates, like them, these open mysteries, which demonstrate what the truth of sensuous things is.

[v.] But those who make such assertions, [p. 81] say, as above remarked, immediately the converse of what they mean; a phenomenon which is perhaps the best calculated to arouse reflection concerning the nature of sensuous certitude. They speak of the extant being of *external* objects, which, more closely, may be determined as *real* ones, as absolutely particular, wholly personal, individual things, each one of which has no longer its absolute equivalent; that this extant Being has absolute certitude and truth. They mean *this* piece of paper upon which I write (or rather have written); but they do not say what they mean. If they really wanted to say this piece of paper which they mean, (and they do,) this is impossible, since the sensuous This which is meant, is unapproachable by language; for that belongs to consciousness—the in-itself Universal. During the actual attempt to express it, it would rot; those who had commenced its description could not complete it but would have to leave it to others who would finally themselves acknowledge that they were engaged in describing what no longer existed. Hence although they mean

this piece of paper which is entirely a different one from that above, yet they speak of "actual things," "external or sensuous objects," "absolute individual essence," &c., i. e. they say of them only the Universal; for this reason that which is called the unspeakable is nothing else than the untrue, the unreasonable, that which is merely "meant."—If nothing more is said of something than that it is an actual thing, an external object, then one has said only the most general thing of it, and with this has been expressed rather its likeness with everything, than its difference. If I say a *particular thing*, I say it rather as a universal, for each is a particular thing; and moreover, a *This thing* is anything which one pleases. More closely designated as *this piece of paper*,—so is every piece of paper a *this piece of paper*, and I have still merely said the general. But [p. 82] if I will not allow language which possesses the divine nature, immediately to invert the meaning and thus not permit it to put in a word, but hasten to its assistance by *exhibiting* this piece of paper, then I learn by experience what the truth of sensuous certitude is in fact; I point it out as a Here which is a Here of other Here's; or in itself a simple complex of many Here's, i. e. a Universal, and thus I apprehend it as it in truth is, and instead of *knowing* an Immediate, I *PERCEIVE* it.

ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY.

"The special object of the Phenomenology was, by a development of consciousness in its essential principle, to establish what was to Hegel the absolute cognition,—to demonstrate this cognition to be but the highest step and stage of consciousness. Hegel gives, in this work, a history of consciousness as it appears in time (hence the title), an evolution of the epochs of the growth of consciousness, on its way to philosophical knowledge."

[Schwegler's Hist. Phil.—Stirling's Translation.]

The work under consideration, usually called the first original work of Hegel, appeared in 1807. Some think it "the most obscure of Hegel's works," but by himself it is called his "Voyage of Discovery." The true student of philosophy must regard it as the greatest work in the whole history of thought. In it are unfolded in their natural order all the *aperçus* of pure science (*prima philosophia*) and these are,

at the same time, recognized in the various concrete forms that they have assumed in the world; thus exhibiting in a sort of dramatic spectacle the development of the *motives* of human history. Institutions of civilization, phases of psychological culture, historical revolutions, the genesis of so-called "faculties of the mind"—all these are shown to have their necessity in the final cause, the realization of spirit.

That which is potentially self-conscious—the individual soul, which, as Leibnitz teaches, is a monad and even in its lowest stage of development reflects the whole universe—must become actually so, must dissolve all objective forms by aid of its alchemy and see in the universe only its own infinitude.

Such a conception is embodied in a popular form in the religious doctrine of creation. God creates man in his own image for his honor and glory. He creates man in order that there may be a being that can recognize him. Thus, the end of man is stated to be the recognition of God. But God, too, is the infinite person, the Ego or eternal subject who makes possible all self-consciousness whatever. Hence, the individual in recognizing God or Eternal Reason, recognizes his own true being. The Creator is the essence of the creature, and the latter must recognize the former if it would recognize its own essence.

In the preface to this work, Hegel takes occasion to advance the claims of what he considers the true method of philosophy, against views then prevalent. Thus, according to him, philosophy should be a scientific exposition of truth and have a strictly systematic form; it should not be a mere series of genial philosophemes. First principles are only beginnings. They are seeds; their truth is their development into organic systems. The acorn is an oak in its abstract and hence untrue form. But while advocating system he is careful to discriminate the true method from inadequate methods, such, for example, as that of Spinoza and Wolff (the mathematical method) and that of the disciples of Schelling (a schematizing formalism). The mathematical method is defective in that its procedure is arbitrary; the demonstrator has in view the final "*quod erat*," etc., and makes this and that construction, postulates these and demonstrates those preliminaries, refers now to an axiom and then to a definition—all without showing the necessity of the procedure. In the end, one perceives why the demonstrator pursued the course he did, but he sees too that it was subjective choice that

guided. The mathematical method is not a method for discovering truth, but only of *communicating truth after it is seen*. Again, the method of "schematizing formalism," in which one merely classifies data obtained from experience according to a ready-made scheme, does not arrive at a true system any more than the labelled bottles of the apothecary constitutes such. It is the disease prevalent among philosophical diletanti, to use a few abstract categories on all occasions and subsume everything under them.

The true method seizes the subject-matter and holds it fast; first taking it according to its most obvious phase, it allows it to show up its presuppositions one after the other until we have the elements constituting quite a different object, before us.* The three stages of an exhaustive systematic treatment are those of *immediateness*, *mediation*, and *absolute mediation*. (See Vol. i. of this journal, pp. 3-4; Vol. ii., p. 1.)

The difficulty of Hegel to new beginners lies in their inability to mark the transitions from one of these stages to the other. And not only do they fail to separate these stages, but they fail to distinguish even the discursive remarks ("external reflections,") with which he opens the subject, from the rigid scientific treatment that follows.

In the chapter of the translation before us, the paragraphs from [a.] to [e.], inclusive, contain only external reflections; from [f.] to [i.], inclusive, we have the immediate stage; from [k.] to [m.] the stage of mediation; from [n.] to [s.], inclusive,

* We quote from an admirable article on Hegel, by J. E. Cabot, North American Review, No. ccxix., p. 456:

"The essence of Hegel's method consists in taking any statement, any fact that offers, at its own valuation, and treating it as if it were truth. In this way its inherent limitations are sure to show themselves, and not simply as error, but as an advance towards a more complete statement." "It is a favorite device of Hegel's to show how the paradoxes and self-contradictions which the understanding perpetually encounters, but which it usually dodges and derides as metaphysical subtleties when called to notice them, are in reality the coming to light of what is wanting in its own statements, and needed to make them true."

the absolute mediation. Then follow—[t.] to [v.]—some more reflections to show where we are with our result. Let us examine the content more minutely:

[a.] Since it is evident that we cannot comprehend a result without first considering the premises, we are obliged to neglect all forms of knowing that are obviously inferential, and apply ourselves first to what seems to be immediate or intuitional knowing. Of course, we do not know, until it has been demonstrated to us, that such intuitional knowing is not entirely sufficient.

[b.] It offers itself as the truest and most satisfactory mode of knowing. It seems to give us the very concrete reality itself. But, in fact, such certitude merely says "it is" and does not say aught of the definite distinctions and limits which belong to the object and give it individuality. An object is through its relations to other objects, and a relation cannot be cognized *immediately*. To cognize a relation implies that the sensuous intuition be made a tool in the hands of a higher—a synthetic mode of cognition. The senses cannot draw inferences; they merely give premises. But premises such as they furnish are not things, but mere elements of things—mere abstractions or determinations.

[c.] Moreover, it is evident upon reflection that every immediate certitude involves the distinction and determination of subject and object, and that such distinction and determination is a mediation, and hence we have a relation and not a simple immediate. When I say, "This object is," a ground is implied: "because I see it." But this implied ground will render it untrue the moment I look somewhere else. If I assert it on the ground that I saw it, or that *some one else saw it*, then I am asserting the truth upon other grounds than immediate sensuous certitude, and involve a complicated series of grounds such as memory, language, definitions, credibility of testimony, etc., etc.

[d.] We need not, however, continue these reflections; let us rather summon this certitude before us and note its procedure.

[e.] Its first attitude must be that of the mere assertion of the simple existence of the object without conditioning its assertion by introducing the Ego as in any way essential to the truth of the assertion.

[f.] The senses can testify only of what is *present* to them in time and space—the Now and the Here. Any assertion on their part, will be a predication of some content or other to the Here or the Now, for example: "The Now is night." "The Here is a tree." But experience shows at once that the individual contents of the Now and Here, which the senses testify of, do not abide.

[g.] The subject and predicate of the sensuous assertion do not coincide. The Now and Here are universals, and of any particular content that is attributed to them, we can with equal propriety deny the truth or affirm it. The universal is both affirmative and negative at the same time. Therefore, each particular act of sensuous certitude refutes all others and is refuted in turn by them.

[h.] Language seizes the abiding, and hence, the universal. No particular content of sensuous certitude can be communicated.

[i.] "The Here is a tree" is not true, for the reason that the Here is anything else that happens to be present to the senses, and the mentioned assertion does not tell which senses are meant. The senses themselves must be taken into consideration, for it is their presence that makes the Now night or day. The *meaning* is the essential condition which gives truth to the assertion. I must add to the assertion this condition and always be particular to state the subject who knows.

[k.] Therefore, the first attitude of the sensuous certitude toward its object must be changed. It has found that the object cannot be asserted purely, but that the assertion must bring with it at the same time a voucher for the truth by adding the essential condition, namely, the Ego who *means* the particular content asserted. It is this "*meaning*" that prevents our certitude from inverting itself.

[l.] Let us examine this new attitude

and see what will come of it: "The Now which I see is day;" "the Here which I see is a tree." But it is obvious at once that we are still in difficulty, for we cannot tell what we mean by "I." Every observer is a subject or "I," and his object is in a Here and Now.

[m.] The Ego is as universal as the Here and Now. In fact, we cannot say what we mean. The particular, for itself, that we wish to seize by a sensuous intuition seems to escape us.

[n.] It is evident that we have failed in our attempts thus far. But there is still one way left. We posited the objective as essence at first, and then we posited the subjective as essence; now we can posit their union as essence, and beyond this we cannot go, but shall be obliged to give up the cause and refuse all truth to sensuous certitude if here it fails.

[o.] The truth is seized in the relation of the Ego to the object, and both are alike essential in it.

[p.] Let us now finally see whether the immediateness of the relation can be preserved, considered in and for itself.

[q. r. s.] The point of time (the Now) and the point of space (the Here), or the This in general, can be seized only through other points or This's which fix and define the former. From this, it is evident that every sensuous knowing must involve an activity having three stages: (1) I seize the object as This, but I cannot do it (2) except by separating it from the Not-this which of course must also be my object while I am engaged in the process. (3) Therefore, in seizing an object, I necessarily transcend it (and cancel it) and seize it in identity with another or higher totality which includes its other-being or limits. And hence, my act of seizing it (in a cognition) is a three-fold act which negates as well as posits or affirms the object.

The Universal is the unity of the partic-

ular and its other-being (*alterum*); it is the Finite and that on which it depends. The Me and Not-Me together make the totality, and the Universal is this totality. No object can be completely known until all its complications with other things are unravelled. The shallowest Knowing must accomplish this to some degree. The sensuous certitude (it must be allowed) can know only what occupies Space or Time; but whatever is extended in Space or Time must be a compound having parts, and the sensuous Knowing is a seizing of such parts in their synthesis, and hence a mediation.

We find in this third attitude of the certitude an answer to the question: Can we know immediately? This answer is: No, for objects themselves are mediated and hence require mediated knowing, if they are to be known in their truth.

A knowing of an object sensuously, involves a distinguishing and uniting of the above and below, right and left, before and after, &c., and such a knowing is not an immediate but a mediate, and we call it PERCEPTION,* a taking *through* [something else].

[t. u. v.] Hegel concludes this chapter by alluding to the Mysteries which were remnants of religious rites of Western Asia, wherein was celebrated the consciousness that the essence of man is supersensual and immortal; i. e. abides through mediation, and does not perish like the food of the body. Even animals act as though they knew that sensuous things are not permanent or true, but destructible (or digestible even). But one who should undertake a complete description of a sensuous object would find the task interminable, for the reason that new peculiarities would arise in it, through its changeable nature, faster than he could describe them.

The next chapter is a consideration of Perception.

* German = *Wahrnehmung*.

QUESTIONS CONCERNING CERTAIN FACULTIES CLAIMED FOR MAN.

[By C. S. PEIRCE.]

QUESTION 1. *Whether by the simple contemplation of a cognition, independently of any previous knowledge and without reasoning from signs, we are enabled rightly to judge whether that cognition has been determined by a previous cognition or whether it refers immediately to its object.*

Throughout this paper, the term *intuition* will be taken as signifying a cognition not determined by a previous cognition of the same object, and therefore so determined by something out of the consciousness.* Let me request the reader to note this. *Intuition* here will be nearly the same as "premise not itself a conclusion;" the only difference being that premises and conclusions are judgments, whereas an intuition may, as far as its definition states, be any kind of cognition whatever. But just as a conclusion (good or bad) is determined in the mind of the reasoner by its premise, so cognitions not judgments may be determined by previous cognitions; and a cognition not so determined, and therefore determined directly by the trans-

cendental object, is to be termed an *intuition*.

Now, it is plainly one thing to have an intuition and another to know intuitively that it is an intuition, and the question is whether these two things, distinguishable in thought, are, in fact, invariably connected, so that we can always intuitively distinguish between an intuition and a cognition determined by another. Every cognition, as something present, is, of course, an intuition of itself. But the determination of a cognition by another cognition or by a transcendental object is not, at least so far as appears obviously at first, a part of the immediate content of that cognition, although it would appear to be an element of the action or passion of the transcendental *ego*, which is not, perhaps, in consciousness immediately; and yet this transcendental action or passion may invariably determine a cognition of itself, so that, in fact, the determination or non-determination of the cognition by another may be a part of the cognition. In this case, I should say that we had an intuitive power of distinguishing an intuition from another cognition.

There is no evidence that we have this faculty, except that we seem to *feel* that we have it. But the weight of that testimony depends entirely on our being supposed to have the power of distinguishing in this feeling whether the feeling be the result of education, old associations, etc., or whether it is an intuitive cognition; or, in other words, it depends on presupposing the very matter testified to. Is this feeling infallible? And is this judgment concerning it infallible, and so on, *ad infinitum*? Supposing that a man really could shut himself up in such a faith, he would be, of course, impervious to the truth, "evidence-proof."

But let us compare the theory with the historic facts. The power of intuitively distinguishing intuitions from other cog-

* The word *intuitus* first occurs as a technical term in St. Anselm's *Monologium*. He wished to distinguish between our knowledge of God and our knowledge of finite things (and, in the next world, of God, also); and thinking of the saying of St. Paul, *Videmus nunc per speculum in ænigmate: tunc autem facie ad faciem*, he called the former *speculation* and the latter *intuition*. This use of "speculation" did not take root, because that word already had another exact and widely different meaning. In the middle ages, the term "intuitive cognition" had two principal senses, 1st, as opposed to abstractive cognition, it meant the knowledge of the present as present, and this is its meaning in Anselm; but 2d, as no intuitive cognition was allowed to be determined by a previous cognition, it came to be used as the opposite of discursive cognition (see Scotus, In sentent. lib. 2, dist. 3, qu. 9), and this is nearly the sense in which I employ it. This is also nearly the sense in which Kant uses it, the former distinction being expressed by his *sensuous* and *non-sensuous*. (See Werke, herausg. Rosenkrantz, Thl. 2, S. 713, 31, 41, 100, u. s. w.) An enumeration of six meanings of intuition may be found in Hamilton's Reid, p. 759.

nitions has not prevented men from disputing very warmly as to which cognitions are intuitive. In the middle ages, reason and external authority were regarded as two coördinate sources of knowledge, just as reason and the authority of intuition are now; only the happy device of considering the enunciations of authority to be essentially indemonstrable had not yet been hit upon. All authorities were not considered as infallible, any more than all reasons; but when Berengarius said that the authoritativeness of any particular authority must rest upon reason, the proposition was scouted as opinionated, impious, and absurd. Thus, the credibility of authority was regarded by men of that time simply as an ultimate premise, as a cognition not determined by a previous cognition of the same object, or, in our terms, as an intuition. It is strange that they should have thought so, if, as the theory now under discussion supposes, by merely contemplating the credibility of the authority, as a Fakir does his God, they could have seen that it was not an ultimate premise! Now, what if our *internal* authority should meet the same fate, in the history of opinions, as that external authority has met? Can that be said to be absolutely certain which many sane, well-informed, and thoughtful men already doubt?*

Every lawyer knows how difficult it is

* The proposition of Berengarius is contained in the following quotation from his *De Sacra Cena*: "*Maximi plane cordis est, per omnia ad dialecticam confugere, quia confugere ad eam ad rationem est confugere, quo qui non confugit, cum secundum rationem sit factus ad imaginem dei, suum honorem reliquit, nec potest renovari de die in diem ad imaginem dei.*" The most striking characteristic of medieval reasoning, in general, is the perpetual resort to authority. When Fredigisus and others wish to prove that darkness is a thing, although they have evidently derived the opinion from nominalistic-Platonic meditations, they argue the matter thus: "God called the darkness, night;" then, certainly, it is a thing, for otherwise before it had a name, there would have been nothing, not even a fiction to name. Abelard thinks it worth while to cite Boëthius, when he says that space has three dimensions, and when he says that an individual cannot be in two places at once. The author of *De Generibus et Speciebus*, a work of a superior order, in arguing against a Platonic doctrine, says that if whatever is universal is eternal, the *form* and matter of Socrates, being severally uni-

versal, are both eternal, and that, therefore, Socrates was not created by God, but only put together, "*quod quantum a vero deviet, palam est.*" The authority is the final court of appeal. The same author, where in one place he doubts a statement of Boëthius, finds it necessary to assign a special reason why in this case it is not absurd to do so. *Exceptio probat regulam in casibus non exceptis.* Recognized authorities were certainly sometimes disputed in the twelfth century; their mutual contradictions insured that; and the authority of philosophers was regarded as inferior to that of theologians. Still, it would be impossible to find a passage where the authority of Aristotle is directly denied upon any logical question. "*Sunt et multi errores eius,*" says John of Salisbury, "*qui in scripturis tam Ethnicis, quam fidelibus poterunt inveniri: verum in logica parem habuisse non legitur.*" "*Sed nihil adversus Aristotelem,*" says Abelard, and in another place, "*Sed si Aristotelem Peripateticorum principem culpae possumus, quam amplius in hac arte recepimus?*" The idea of going without an authority, or of subordinating authority to reason, does not occur to him.

from which we can infer that a given fact must have been seen or must have been inferred. In trying to give an account of a dream, every accurate person must often have felt that it was a hopeless undertaking to attempt to disentangle waking interpretations and fillings out from the fragmentary images of the dream itself.

The mention of dreams suggests another argument. A dream, as far as its own content goes, is exactly like an actual experience. It is mistaken for one. And yet all the world believes that dreams are determined, according to the laws of the association of ideas, &c., by previous cognitions. If it be said that the faculty of intuitively recognizing intuitions is asleep, I reply that this is a mere supposition, without other support. Besides, even when we wake up, we do not find that the dream differed from reality, except by certain *marks*, darkness and fragmentariness. Not unfrequently a dream is so vivid that the memory of it is mistaken for the memory of an actual occurrence.

A child has, as far as we know, all the perceptive powers of a man. Yet question him a little as to *how* he knows what he does. In many cases, he will tell you that he never learned his mother-tongue; he always knew it, or he knew it as soon as he came to have sense. It appears, then, that *he* does not possess the faculty of distinguishing, by simple contemplation, between an intuition and a cognition determined by others.

There can be no doubt that before the publication of Berkeley's book on Vision, it had generally been believed that the third dimension of space was immediately intuited, although, at present, nearly all admit that it is known by inference. We had been *contemplating* the object since the very creation of man, but this discovery was not made until we began to *reason* about it.

Does the reader know of the blind spot on the retina? Take a number of this journal, turn over the cover so as to expose the white paper, lay it sideways upon the table before which you must sit, and put two cents upon it, one near the left hand edge, and the other to the right. Put your left

hand over your left eye, and with the right eye look *steadily* at the left hand cent. Then, with your right hand, move the right hand cent (which is now plainly seen) *towards* the left hand. When it comes to a place near the middle of the page it will disappear—you cannot see it without turning your eye. Bring it nearer to the other cent, or carry it further away, and it will reappear; but at that particular spot it cannot be seen. Thus it appears that there is a blind spot nearly in the middle of the retina; and this is confirmed by anatomy. It follows that the space we immediately see (when one eye is closed) is not, as we had imagined, a continuous oval, but is a ring, the filling up of which must be the work of the intellect. What more striking example could be desired of the impossibility of distinguishing intellectual results from intuitional data, by mere contemplation?

A man can distinguish different textures of cloth by feeling; but not immediately, for he requires to move his fingers over the cloth, which shows that he is obliged to compare the sensations of one instant with those of another.

The pitch of a tone depends upon the rapidity of the succession of the vibrations which reach the ear. Each of those vibrations produces an impulse upon the ear. Let a single such impulse be made upon the ear, and we know, experimentally, that it is perceived. There is, therefore, good reason to believe that each of the impulses forming a tone is perceived. Nor is there any reason to the contrary. So that this is the only admissible supposition. Therefore, the pitch of a tone depends upon the rapidity with which certain impressions are successively conveyed to the mind. These impressions must exist previously to any tone; hence, the sensation of pitch is determined by previous cognitions. Nevertheless, this would never have been discovered by the mere contemplation of that feeling.

A similar argument may be urged in reference to the perception of two dimensions of space. This appears to be an immediate intuition. But if we were to *see* immediately an extended surface, our retinas must be spread out in an extended

surface. Instead of that, the retina consists of innumerable needles pointing towards the light, and whose distances from one another are decidedly greater than the *minimum visibile*. Suppose each of those nerve-points conveys the sensation of a little colored surface. Still, what we immediately see must even then be, not a continuous surface, but a collection of spots. Who could discover this by mere intuition? But all the analogies of the nervous system are against the supposition that the excitation of a single nerve can produce an idea as complicated as that of a space, however small. If the excitation of no one of these nerve points can immediately convey the impression of space, the excitation of all cannot do so. For, the excitation of each produces some impression, (according to the analogies of the nervous system,) hence, the sum of these impressions is a necessary condition of any perception produced by the excitation of all; or, in other terms, a perception produced by the excitation of all is determined by the mental impressions produced by the excitation of every one. This argument is confirmed by the fact that the existence of the perception of space can be fully accounted for by the action of faculties known to exist, without supposing it to be an immediate impression. For this purpose, we must bear in mind the following facts of physio-psychology: 1. The excitation of a nerve does not of itself inform us where the extremity of it is situated. If, by a surgical operation, certain nerves are displaced, our sensations from those nerves do not inform us of the displacement. 2. A single sensation does not inform us how many nerves or nerve-points are excited. 3. We can distinguish between the impressions produced by the excitations of different nerve-points. 4. The differences of impressions produced by different excitations of similar nerve-points are similar. Let a momentary image be made upon the retina. By No. 2, the impression thereby produced will be indistinguishable from what might be produced by the excitation of some conceivable single nerve. It is not conceivable that the momentary excitation of a single nerve

should give the sensation of space. Therefore, the momentary excitation of all the nerve-points of the retina cannot, immediately or mediately, produce the sensation of space. The same argument would apply to any unchanging image on the retina. Suppose, however, that the image moves over the retina. Then the peculiar excitation which at one instant affects one nerve-point, at a later instant will affect another. These will convey impressions which are very similar by 4, and yet which are distinguishable by 3. Hence, the conditions for the recognition of a relation between these impressions are present. There being, however, a very great number of nerve-points affected by a very great number of successive excitations, the relations of the resulting impressions will be almost inconceivably complicated. Now, it is a known law of mind, that when phenomena of an extreme complexity are presented, which yet would be reduced to *order* or mediate simplicity by the application of a certain conception, that conception sooner or later arises in application to those phenomena. In the case under consideration, the conception of extension would reduce the phenomena to unity, and, therefore, its genesis is fully accounted for. It remains only to explain why the previous cognitions which determine it are not more clearly apprehended. For this explanation, I shall refer to a paper upon a new list of categories, § 5,* merely adding that just as we are able to recognize our friends by certain appearances, although we cannot possibly say what those appearances are and are quite unconscious of any process of reasoning, so in any case when the reasoning is easy and natural to us, however complex may be the premises, they sink into insignificance and oblivion proportionately to the satisfactoriness of the theory based upon them. This theory of space is confirmed by the circumstance that an exactly similar theory is imperatively demanded by the facts in reference to time. That the course of time should be immediately felt is obviously impossi-

* Proceedings of the American Academy, May 14, 1867.

ble. For, in that case, there must be an element of this feeling at each instant. But in an instant there is no duration and hence no immediate feeling of duration. Hence, no one of these elementary feelings is an immediate feeling of duration; and, hence the sum of all is not. On the other hand, the impressions of any moment are very complicated,—containing all the images (or the elements of the images) of sense and memory, which complexity is reducible to mediate simplicity by means of the conception of time.*

We have, therefore, a variety of facts, all of which are most readily explained on the supposition that we have no intuitive faculty of distinguishing intuitive from mediate cognitions. Some arbitrary hypothesis may otherwise explain any one of these facts; this is the only theory which brings them to support one another. More-

over, no facts require the supposition of the faculty in question. Whoever has studied the nature of proof will see, then, that there are here very strong reasons for disbelieving the existence of this faculty. These will become still stronger when the consequences of rejecting it have, in this paper and in a following one, been more fully traced out.

QUESTION 2. *Whether we have an intuitive self-consciousness.*

Self-consciousness, as the term is here used, is to be distinguished both from consciousness generally, from the internal sense, and from pure apperception. Any cognition is a consciousness of the object as represented; by self-consciousness is meant a knowledge of ourselves. Not a mere feeling of subjective conditions of consciousness, but of our personal selves.

* The above theory of space and time does not conflict with that of Kant so much as it appears to do. They are in fact the solutions of different questions. Kant, it is true, makes space and time intuitions, or rather forms of intuition, but it is not essential to his theory that intuition should mean more than "individual representation." The apprehension of space and time results, according to him, from a mental process,—the "Synthesis der Apprehension in der Anschauung." (See Kritik d. reinen Vernunft. Ed. 1781, pp. 98 *et seq.*) My theory is merely an account of this synthesis.

The gist of Kant's Transcendental Æsthetic is contained in two principles. First, that universal and necessary propositions are not given in experience. Second, that universal and necessary facts are determined by the conditions of experience in general. By a universal proposition is meant merely, one which asserts something of *all* of a sphere,—not necessarily one which all men believe. By a necessary proposition, is meant one which asserts what it does, not merely of the actual condition of things, but of every possible state of things; it is not meant that the proposition is one which we cannot help believing. Experience, in Kant's first principle, cannot be used for a product of the objective understanding, but must be taken for the first impressions of sense with consciousness conjoined and worked up by the imagination into images, together with all which is logically deducible therefrom. In this sense, it may be admitted that universal and necessary propositions are not given in experience. But, in that case, neither are any inductive conclusions which might be drawn from experience, given in it. In fact, it is the peculiar function of induction to produce universal and necessary propositions. Kant points out, indeed, that the universality and

necessity of scientific inductions are but the analogues of philosophic universality and necessity; and this is true, in so far as it is never allowable to accept a scientific conclusion without a certain indefinite drawback. But this is owing to the insufficiency in the number of the instances; and whenever instances may be had in as large numbers as we please, *ad infinitum*, a truly universal and necessary proposition is inferable. As for Kant's second principle, that the truth of universal and necessary propositions is dependent upon the conditions of the general experience, it is no more nor less than the principle of Induction. I go to a fair and draw from the "grab-bag" twelve packages. Upon opening them, I find that every one contains a red ball. Here is a universal fact. It depends, then, on the condition of the experience. What is the condition of the experience? It is solely that the balls are the contents of packages drawn from that bag, that is, the only thing which determined the experience, was the drawing from the bag. I infer, then, according to the principle of Kant, that what is drawn from the bag will contain a red ball. This is induction. Apply induction not to any limited experience but to all human experience and you have the Kantian philosophy, so far as it is correctly developed.

Kant's successors, however, have not been content with his doctrine. Nor ought they to have been. For, there is this third principle: "Absolutely universal propositions must be analytic." For whatever is absolutely universal is devoid of all content or determination, for all determination is by negation. The problem, therefore, is not how universal propositions can be synthetical, but how universal propositions appearing to be synthetical can be evolved by thought alone from the purely indeterminate.

Pure apperception is the self-assertion of the *ego*; the self-consciousness here meant is the recognition of my *private* self. I know that *I* (not merely *the I*) exist. The question is, how do I know it; by a special intuitive faculty, or is it determined by previous cognitions?

Now, it is not self-evident that we have such an intuitive faculty, for it has just been shown that we have no intuitive power of distinguishing an intuition from a cognition determined by others. Therefore, the existence or non-existence of this power is to be determined upon evidence, and the question is whether self-consciousness can be explained by the action of known faculties under conditions known to exist, or whether it is necessary to suppose an unknown cause for this cognition, and, in the latter case, whether an intuitive faculty of self-consciousness is the most probable cause which can be supposed.

It is first to be observed that there is no known self-consciousness to be accounted for in extremely young children. It has already been pointed out by Kant* that the late use of the very common word "*I*" with children indicates an imperfect self-consciousness in them, and that, therefore, so far as it is admissible for us to draw any conclusion in regard to the mental state of those who are still younger, it must be against the existence of any self-consciousness in them.

On the other hand, children manifest powers of thought much earlier. Indeed, it is almost impossible to assign a period at which children do not already exhibit decided intellectual activity in directions in which thought is indispensable to their well-being. The complicated trigonometry of vision, and the delicate adjustments of coördinated movement, are plainly mastered very early. There is no reason to question a similar degree of thought in reference to themselves.

A very young child may always be observed to watch its own body with great attention. There is every reason why this should be so, for from the child's point of view this body is the most important thing

in the universe. Only what it touches has any actual and present feeling; only what it faces has any actual color; only what is on its tongue has any actual taste.

No one questions that, when a sound is heard by a child, he thinks, not of himself as hearing, but of the bell or other object as sounding. How when he wills to move a table? Does he then think of himself as desiring, or only of the table as fit to be moved? That he has the latter thought, is beyond question; that he has the former, must, until the existence of an intuitive self-consciousness is proved, remain an arbitrary and baseless supposition. There is no good reason for thinking that he is less ignorant of his own peculiar condition than the angry adult who denies that he is in a passion.

The child, however, must soon discover by observation that things which are thus fit to be changed are apt actually to undergo this change, after a contact with that peculiarly important body called Willy or Johnny. This consideration makes this body still more important and central, since it establishes a connection between the fitness of a thing to be changed and a tendency in this body to touch it before it is changed.

The child learns to understand the language; that is to say, a connection between certain sounds and certain facts becomes established in his mind. He has previously noticed the connection between these sounds and the motions of the lips of bodies somewhat similar to the central one, and has tried the experiment of putting his hand on those lips and has found the sound in that case to be smothered. He thus connects that language with bodies somewhat similar to the central one. By efforts, so unenergetic that they should be called rather instinctive, perhaps, than tentative, he learns to produce those sounds. So he begins to converse.

It must be about this time that he begins to find that what these people about him say is the very best evidence of fact. So much so, that testimony is even a stronger mark of fact than *the facts themselves*, or rather than what must now be thought of as the *appearances* themselves.

* Werke, vii. (2), 11.

(I may remark, by the way, that this remains so through life; testimony will convince a man that he himself is mad.) A child hears it said that the stove is hot. But it is not, he says; and, indeed, that central body is not touching it, and only what that touches is hot or cold. But he touches it, and finds the testimony confirmed in a striking way. Thus, he becomes aware of ignorance, and it is necessary to suppose a *self* in which this ignorance can inhere. So testimony gives the first dawning of self-consciousness.

But, further, although usually appearances are either only confirmed or merely supplemented by testimony, yet there is a certain remarkable class of appearances which are continually contradicted by testimony. These are those predicates which *we* know to be emotional, but which *he* distinguishes by their connection with the movements of that central person, himself, (that the table wants moving, etc.) These judgments are generally denied by others. Moreover, he has reason to think that others, also, have such judgments which are quite denied by all the rest. Thus, he adds to the conception of appearance as the actualization of fact, the conception of it as something *private* and valid only for one body. In short, *error* appears, and it can be explained only by supposing a *self* which is fallible.

Ignorance and error are all that distinguish our private selves from the absolute *ego* of pure apperception.

Now, the theory which, for the sake of perspicuity, has thus been stated in a specific form, may be summed up as follows: At the age at which we know children to be self-conscious, we know that they have been made aware of ignorance and error; and we know them to possess at that age powers of understanding sufficient to enable them then to infer from ignorance and error their own existence. Thus we find that known faculties, acting under conditions known to exist, would rise to self-consciousness. The only essential defect in this account of the matter is, that while we know that children exercise *as much* understanding as is here supposed, we do not know that they exercise it in precisely

this way. Still the supposition that they do so is infinitely more supported by facts, than the supposition of a wholly peculiar faculty of the mind.

The only argument worth noticing for the existence of an intuitive self-consciousness is this. We are more certain of our own existence than of any other fact; a premise cannot determine a conclusion to be more certain than it is itself; hence, our own existence cannot have been inferred from any other fact. The first premise must be admitted, but the second premise is founded on an exploded theory of logic. A conclusion cannot be more certain than that some one of the facts which support it is true, but it may easily be more certain than any one of those facts. Let us suppose, for example, that a dozen witnesses testify to an occurrence. Then my belief in that occurrence rests on the belief that each of those men is generally to be believed upon oath. Yet the fact testified to is made more certain than that any one of those men is generally to be believed. In the same way, to the developed mind of man, his own existence is supported by *every other fact*, and is, therefore, incomparably more certain than any one of these facts. But it cannot be said to be more certain than that there is another fact, since there is no doubt perceptible in either case.

It is to be concluded, then, that there is no necessity of supposing an intuitive self-consciousness, since self-consciousness may easily be the result of inference.

QUESTION 3. *Whether we have an intuitive power of distinguishing between the subjective elements of different kinds of cognitions.*

Every cognition involves something represented, or that of which we are conscious, and some action or passion of the self whereby it becomes represented. The former shall be termed the objective, the latter the subjective, element of the cognition. The cognition itself is an intuition of its objective element, which may therefore be called, also, the immediate object. The subjective element is not necessarily immediately known, but it is possible that such an

intuition of the subjective element of a cognition of its character, whether that of dreaming, imagining, conceiving, believing, etc., should accompany every cognition. The question is whether this is so.

It would appear, at first sight, that there is an overwhelming array of evidence in favor of the existence of such a power. The difference between seeing a color and imagining it is immense. There is a vast difference between the most vivid dream and reality. And if we had no intuitive power of distinguishing between what we believe and what we merely conceive, we never, it would seem, could in any way distinguish them; since if we did so by reasoning, the question would arise whether the argument itself was believed or conceived, and this must be answered before the conclusion could have any force. And thus there would be a *regressus ad infinitum*. Besides, if we do not know that we believe, then, from the nature of the case, we do not believe.

But be it noted that we do not intuitively know the existence of this faculty. For it is an intuitive one, and we cannot intuitively know that a cognition is intuitive. The question is, therefore, whether it is necessary to suppose the existence of this faculty, or whether then the facts can be explained without this supposition.

In the first place, then, the difference between what is imagined or dreamed and what is actually experienced, is no argument in favor of the existence of such a faculty. For it is not questioned that there are distinctions in what is present to the mind, but the question is, whether independently of any such distinctions in the immediate *objects* of consciousness, we have any immediate power of distinguishing different modes of consciousness. Now, the very fact of the immense difference in the immediate objects of sense and imagination, sufficiently accounts for our distinguishing those faculties; and instead of being an argument in favor of the existence of an intuitive power of distinguishing the subjective elements of consciousness, it is a powerful reply to any such argument, so far as the distinction of sense and imagination is concerned.

Passing to the distinction of belief and conception, we meet the statement that the knowledge of belief is essential to its existence. Now, we can unquestionably distinguish a belief from a conception, in most cases, by means of a peculiar feeling of conviction; and it is a mere question of words whether we define belief as that judgment which is accompanied by this feeling, or as that judgment from which a man will act. We may conveniently call the former *sensational*, the latter *active* belief. That neither of these necessarily involves the other, will surely be admitted without any recital of facts. Taking belief in the sensational sense, the intuitive power of reorganizing it will amount simply to the capacity for the sensation which accompanies the judgment. This sensation, like any other, is an object of consciousness; and therefore the capacity for it implies no intuitive recognition of subjective elements of consciousness. If belief is taken in the active sense, it may be discovered by the observation of external facts and by inference from the sensation of conviction which usually accompanies it.

Thus, the arguments in favor of this peculiar power of consciousness disappear, and the presumption is again against such a hypothesis. Moreover, as the immediate objects of any two faculties must be admitted to be different, the facts do not render such a supposition in any degree necessary.

QUESTION 4. *Whether we have any power of introspection, or whether our whole knowledge of the internal world is derived from the observation of external facts?*

It is not intended here to assume the reality of the external world. Only, there is a certain set of facts which are ordinarily regarded as external, while others are regarded as internal. The question is whether the latter are known otherwise than by inference from the former. By introspection, I mean a direct perception of the internal world, but not necessarily a perception of it *as* internal. Nor do I mean to limit the signification of the word to intuition, but would extend it to any knowl-

edge of the internal world not derived from external observation.

There is one sense in which any perception has an internal object, namely, that every sensation is partly determined by internal conditions. Thus, the sensation of redness is as it is, owing to the constitution of the mind; and in this sense it is a sensation of something internal. Hence, we may derive a knowledge of the mind from a consideration of this sensation, but that knowledge would, in fact, be an inference from redness as a predicate of something external. On the other hand, there are certain other feelings—the emotions, for example—which appear to arise in the first place, not as predicates at all, and to be referable to the mind alone. It would seem, then, that by means of these, a knowledge of the mind may be obtained, which is not inferred from any character of outward things. The question is whether this is really so.

Although introspection is not necessarily intuitive, it is not self-evident that we possess this capacity; for we have no intuitive faculty of distinguishing different subjective modes of consciousness. The power, if it exists, must be known by the circumstance that the facts cannot be explained without it.

In reference to the above argument from the emotions, it must be admitted that if a man is angry, his anger implies, in general, no determinate and constant character in its object. But, on the other hand, it can hardly be questioned that there is some relative character in the outward thing which makes him angry, and a little reflection will serve to show that his anger consists in his saying to himself, “this thing is vile, abominable, etc.,” and that it is rather a mark of returning reason to say, “I am angry.” In the same way any emotion is a predication concerning some object, and the chief difference between this and an objective intellectual judgment is that while the latter is relative to human nature or to mind in general, the former is relative to the particular circumstances and disposition of a particular man at a particular time. What is here said of emotions in general, is true in particular of the sense

of beauty and of the moral sense. Good and bad are feelings which first arise as predicates, and therefore are either predicates of the not-I, or are determined by previous cognitions (there being no intuitive power of distinguishing subjective elements of consciousness).

It remains, then, only to inquire whether it is necessary to suppose a particular power of introspection for the sake of accounting for the sense of willing. Now, volition, as distinguished from desire, is nothing but the power of concentrating the attention, of abstracting. Hence, the knowledge of the power of abstracting may be inferred from abstract objects, just as the knowledge of the power of seeing is inferred from colored objects.

It appears, therefore, that there is no reason for supposing a power of introspection; and, consequently, the only way of investigating a psychological question is by inference from external facts.

QUESTION 5. *Whether we can think without signs.*

This is a familiar question, but there is, to this day, no better argument in the affirmative than that thought must precede every sign. This assumes the impossibility of an infinite series. But Achilles, as a fact, will overtake the tortoise. How this happens, is a question not necessary to be answered at present, as long as it certainly does happen.

If we seek the light of external facts, the only cases of thought which we can find are of thought in signs. Plainly, no other thought can be evidenced by external facts. But we have seen that only by external facts can thought be known at all. The only thought, then, which can possibly be cognized is thought in signs. But thought which cannot be cognized does not exist. All thought, therefore, must necessarily be in signs.

A man says to himself, “Aristotle is a man; therefore, he is fallible.” Has he not, then, thought what he has not said to himself, that all men are fallible? The answer is, that he has done so, so far as this is said in his *therefore*. According to this, our question does not relate to *fact*,

but is a mere asking for distinctness of thought.

From the proposition that every thought is a sign, it follows that every thought must address itself to some other, must determine some other, since that is the essence of a sign. This, after all, is but another form of the familiar axiom, that in intuition, i. e. in the immediate present, there is no thought, or, that all which is reflected upon has past. *Hinc loquor inde est.* That, since any thought, there must have been a thought, has its analogue in the fact that, since any past time, there must have been an infinite series of times. To say, therefore, that thought cannot happen in an instant, but requires a time, is but another way of saying that every thought must be interpreted in another, or that all thought is in signs.

QUESTION 6. *Whether a sign can have any meaning, if by its definition it is the sign of something absolutely incognizable.*

It would seem that it can, and that universal and hypothetical propositions are instances of it. Thus, the universal proposition, "all ruminants are cloven-hoofed," speaks of a possible infinity of animals, and no matter how many ruminants may have been examined, the possibility must remain that there are others which have not been examined. In the case of a hypothetical proposition, the same thing is still more manifest; for such a proposition speaks not merely of the actual state of things, but of every possible state of things, all of which are not knowable, inasmuch as only one can so much as exist.

On the other hand, all our conceptions are obtained by abstractions and combinations of cognitions first occurring in judgments of experience. Accordingly, there can be no conception of the absolutely incognizable, since nothing of that sort occurs in experience. But the meaning of a term is the conception which it conveys. Hence, a term can have no such meaning.

If it be said that the incognizable is a concept compounded of the concept *not* and *cognizable*, it may be replied that *not* is a mere syncategorematic term and not a concept by itself.

If I think "white," I will not go so far as Berkeley and say that I think of a person seeing, but I will say that what I think is of the nature of a cognition, and so of anything else which can be experienced. Consequently, the highest concept which can be reached by abstractions from judgments of experience—and therefore, the highest concept which can be reached at all—is the concept of something of the nature of a cognition. *Not*, then, or *what is other than*, if a concept, is a concept of the cognizable. Hence, not-cognizable, if a concept, is a concept of the form "A, not-A," and is, at least, self-contradictory. Thus, ignorance and error can only be conceived as correlative to a real knowledge and truth, which latter are of the nature of cognitions. Over against any cognition, there is an unknown but knowable reality; but over against all possible cognition, there is only the self-contradictory. In short, *cognizability* (in its widest sense) and *being* are not merely metaphysically the same, but are synonymous terms.

To the argument from universal and hypothetical propositions, the reply is, that though their truth cannot be cognized with absolute certainty, it may be probably known by induction.

QUESTION 7. *Whether there is any cognition not determined by a previous cognition.*

It would seem that there is or has been; for since we are in possession of cognitions, which are all determined by previous ones, and these by cognitions earlier still, there must have been a *first* in this series or else our state of cognition at any time is completely determined, according to logical laws, by our state at any previous time. But there are many facts against the last supposition, and therefore in favor of intuitive cognitions.

On the other hand, since it is impossible to know intuitively that a given cognition is not determined by a previous one, the only way in which this can be known is by hypothetic inference from observed facts. But to adduce the cognition by which a given cognition has been determined is to explain the determinations of that cogni-

tion. And it is the only way of explaining them. For something entirely out of consciousness which may be supposed to determine it, can, as such, only be known and only adduced in the determinate cognition in question. So, that to suppose that a cognition is determined solely by something absolutely external, is to suppose its determinations incapable of explanation. Now, this is a hypothesis which is warranted under no circumstances, inasmuch as the only possible justification for a hypothesis is that it explains the facts, and to say that they are explained and at the same time to suppose them inexplicable is self-contradictory.

If it be objected that the peculiar character of *red* is not determined by any previous cognition, I reply that that character is not a character of red as a cognition; for if there be a man to whom red things look as blue ones do to me and *vice versa*, that man's eyes teach him the same facts that they would if he were like me.

Moreover, we know of no power by which an intuition could be known. For, as the cognition is beginning, and therefore in a state of change, at only the first instant would it be intuition. And, therefore, the apprehension of it must take place in no time and be an event occupying no time.* Besides, all the cognitive faculties we know of are relative, and consequently their products are relations. But the cognition of a relation is determined by previous cognitions. No cognition not determined by a previous cognition, then, can be known. It does not exist, then, first, because it is absolutely incognizable, and second, because a cognition only exists so far as it is known.

The reply to the argument that there must be a first is as follows: In retracing our way from conclusions to premises, or from determined cognitions to those which determine them, we finally reach, in all cases, a point beyond which the consciousness in the determined cognition is more lively than in the cognition which determines it.

We have a less lively consciousness in the cognition which determines our cognition of the third dimension than in the latter cognition itself; a less lively consciousness in the cognition which determines our cognition of a continuous surface (without a blind spot) than in this latter cognition itself; and a less lively consciousness of the impressions which determine the sensation of tone than of that sensation itself. Indeed, when we get near enough to the external this is the universal rule. Now let any horizontal line represent a cognition, and let the length of the line serve to measure (so to speak) the liveliness of consciousness in that cognition. A point, having no length, will, on this principle, represent an object quite out of consciousness. Let one horizontal line below another represent a cognition which determines the cognition represented by that other and which has the same object as the latter. Let the finite distance between two such lines represent that they are two different cognitions. With this aid to thinking, let us see whether "there must be a first." Suppose an inverted triangle ∇ to be gradually dipped into water. At any date or instant, the surface of the water makes a horizontal line across that triangle. This line represents a cognition. At a subsequent date, there is a sectional line so made, higher upon the triangle. This represents another cognition of the same object determined by the former, and having a livelier consciousness. The apex of the triangle represents the object external to the mind which determines both these cognitions. The state of the triangle before it reaches the water, represents a state of cognition which contains nothing which determines these subsequent cognitions. To say, then, that if there be a state of cognition by which all subsequent cognitions of a certain object are not determined, there must subsequently be some cognition of that object not determined by previous cognitions of the same object, is to say that when that triangle is dipped into the water there must be a sectional line made by the surface of the water lower than which no surface line had been made in that way. But draw the horizon-

* This argument, however, only covers a part of the question. It does not go to show that there is no cognition undetermined except by another like it.

tal line where you will, as many horizontal lines as you please can be assigned at finite distances below it and below one another. For any such section is at some distance above the apex, otherwise it is not a line. Let this distance be a . Then there have been similar sections at the distances $\frac{1}{2}a$, $\frac{1}{4}a$, $\frac{1}{8}a$, $\frac{1}{16}a$, above the apex, and so on as far as you please. So that it is not true that there must be a first. Explicate the logical difficulties of this paradox (they are identical with those of the Achilles) in whatever way you may. I am content with the result, as long as your principles are fully applied to the particular case of cognitions determining one another. Deny

motion, if it seems proper to do so; only then deny the process of determination of one cognition by another. Say that instants and lines are fictions; only say, also, that states of cognition and judgments are fictions. The point here insisted on is not this or that logical solution of the difficulty, but merely that cognition arises by a process of beginning, as any other change comes to pass.

In a subsequent paper, I shall trace the consequences of these principles, in reference to the questions of reality, of individuality, and of the validity of the laws of logic.

LETTERS ON FAUST.

[By H. C. BROCKMEYER.]

VI.

DEAR H.—In following our theme through the sphere of manifestation, we arrived at the conclusion: "Although man cannot know truth—has no Reason—he does possess a stomach, a capacity for sensual enjoyment and an Understanding to minister to the same—to be its servant." With this conclusion, we have arrived at the world of Reality,—for we have attributed objective validity to the Understanding. It also determines our position in that world. The Understanding—Mephisto—is our guide and servant; the world of Reality a mere means for individual ends—for private gratification. Whatever higher pretensions this world might make, such pretensions are based upon the presupposition that man can know Truth, and are therefore without foundation. Hence, this world of Reality—the Family, Society, and the State—have no right and no authority as against the individual inclinations and desires of man. The latter are supreme and find their limitation not in Reason but in the power of the Understanding to supply them with means of gratification. It is true that these means are derived from without, and hence, that the individual under this view is limited and

determined from without, and that external determination is collision and conflict. Besides, whatever our conviction with reference to the world of Reality may be, that world, once for all, is extant with the bold claim of being on the one side the pledge and on the other the very embodiment of the rational existence of the race; and it wields moreover, in that existence, the power of the race. But this is *our* reflection, dear friend, which it may be well enough to keep in view, as a species of logical heat-lightning along the horizon, but which has no significance under the conclusion arrived at by Faust. Under it our individual desires and inclinations, however capricious, are the *end*, and whatever presents itself has value and validity in so far and only in so far as it is a means for this end.

These are the principles of the man before us, who,

"For idle dalliance too old,
Too young to be without desire,"

is still professor in a German University. His life falls in the historic period when a knowledge of the natural sciences is not as yet diffused, and many of the results remain *arcana* for individual profit. Pos-

sessed of such, and whatever may enrich the Understanding of man—convinced, circumstanced, and occupied as he is—what should be his future career? Shall he spend the remainder of his life in the same fruitless endeavor as hitherto, even after he is convinced of its futility and thus deprived of the poor solace of hope? Or shall he not rather “learn some sense” and look around for enjoyment before it is entirely too late?

“Away with this striving after the impossible! What though your body is your own, is that which I enjoy less mine? If I can pay for six brave steeds, are they not mine with all their power? I run as if on four and twenty legs, and am held to be of some consequence! Away, therefore; leave off your cogitating—away into the world! I tell you, a man who speculates is like a brute led by evil *genii* in circles round and round upon a withered heath, while close at hand smile beauteous pastures green. Just look at this place! Call you this living—to plague yourself and the poor boys to death with *ennui*? Leave that to your good neighbor, the worthy Mr. Book-worm. Why should you worry yourself threshing such straw?”

This, dear friend, is “common sense,” and hence the speech of Mephisto upon the situation, literally translated by the poet no less than by ourselves from the poet. Its extraordinary good sense is so apparent that it cannot be without immediate effect, which we perceive in the scene where the different studies are reviewed by the aid of its radiance concentrated into,

“All theory, my friend, is gray,
But green the golden tree of Life!”

as the focal point. With this final adieu to the past, we congratulate ourselves upon the “New career”!—

“What about the immediate start—conveyance, etc.?” Well, I suppose Faust is not the only one that has travelled on the quality of his cloth! “To fly through the air on Mephisto’s cloak” sounds very poetic, but to pass in society upon the strength of appearance is such an every-day occurrence, that it is quite prosaic.

VII.

In our last, we saw our hero off, that is, we saw him enter upon a “New career,” apparently furnished with all the requisites for his journey. Not equipped like him, it will be necessary for you and me to cast about for some mode of progression, lest we be left behind. Let us, therefore, proceed in our own way to examine the *locale*, the world of Reality into which we saw him enter with our own eyes, in order that we may duly appreciate the situation, entertaining no doubt in the meantime but that we shall meet him again in the course of our ramblings.

Setting aside, therefore, the conviction of Faust, which may be regarded as his vehicle, we have before us the world of Reality, characterized in our analysis [see letters ii. & iii., p. 181, of vol. i., of this journal.—*Editor*.] as deriving the *end* but not the *means* of its existence from self-conscious intelligence, and, as comprehending the three institutions, the Family, Society, and the State. The disparity between the end and the means indicated in the characterization manifests itself in the family in the two factors or moments:

First, the natural moment: the affections of the parties;

Second, the rational moment: the social requirements upon which the family is to be founded.

The first is called *natural*, because it is unconscious, in the sense that it is not based upon any specific reasons, and hence, Cupid is represented as blind by the truthful ancients.

The second is called *rational*, because self-conscious intelligence assigns the reasons for or against the contemplated union.

The fact of this duality renders a collision between the two elements possible, and, in consequence of the peculiar conditions of modern society which favor such collisions, this content has occupied modern art to a greater extent than any other.

“Ah, me! for aught that ever I could read,
Could ever hear by tale or history,
The course of true love never did run smooth:
But either it was different in blood,
Or else misgraffed, in respect of years;

Or else it stood upon the choice of friends ;
Or, if there were a sympathy of choice,
War, death, or sickness did lay siege to it.”—

says Shakespeare, when he epitomizes the content of what is now called light literature.

This collision, however, is a proper subject for Art only when both elements have validity in the public consciousness. Hence, only in modern times, and then only in certain localities.*

Again, it is a proper subject for Art only when both parties attach this validity to both elements. For if this is not the case, then the collision admits of no solution except an external one, i. e. through a *deus ex machina* as to the party denying this validity, and this is in violation of the great principle that Art is the Manifestation of self-conscious intelligence to man.†

Perhaps the extreme modification of this collision presents itself under the following form : Society promulgates its edict, based upon the necessity of its own existence, that man shall not be a father until he can protect, maintain and educate his offspring, i. e. guarantee to it a rational

* I apprehend that a true American, born in the free West—free in the sense that every man is master over his physical necessities, and not their slave—finds Art of this kind a foreign affair. Not because he is illiterate—the usual solution assigned for his want of appreciation—but simply because the content is *untrue* to him. What is a social inequality to him that he should snivel with Arthur or Harry because they could not marry the girls they loved? He has no personal experience in common with Arthur or Harry. If his parents oppose his marriage because Sally is too poor, he takes her and sings:

“For Uncle Sam is rich enough to give us all a farm,”

and therewith ends the matter. Again, if he is poor and Sally is the daughter of a United States Senator, and her mother in consequence deadly opposed to the match, he quietly works his way into the legislature of his State, defeats the old man for the Senate and asks the old lady how she would like to be his mother-in-law, now. For he is a free American citizen, containing, by virtue of his birth, all the social possibilities between the gallows and the presidential chair. Social requirements can have no validity in his presence, in the sense that he should regard them as insurmountable obstacles to the accomplishment of any rational purpose.

† This is the principle of free art as recognized in all of its significance by Shakespeare. It is based upon the final assumption of abso-

existence. But *Nature* declares that he shall be a father when he can propagate his species. Now, the period when the individual may comply with both of these behests does not coincide with the period when he can comply with either; for the command of Nature may be fulfilled on his part several years earlier than that of Society, and during all this time we have Nature urging and Society dissuading and prohibiting the individual from fulfilling the peculiar destiny of his individuality—its annihilation in the generic act. This eventuates in what might be called the “Negative Family”—a generic relation of the sexes utterly devoid of all positive or rational elements.

As a concomitant, and sharing with it a common origin, is that peculiar social phenomenon which we witness in “Auerbach’s cellar,” where it appears we have arrived in happy time—to find our hero joining in the chorus,

“We are as happy as cannibals,
Nay, as five hundred hogs;”

or, if not our hero, Mephisto for him (for you will notice that Faust says only, “Good evening, gentlemen,” and “I should like to leave now,” during this whole scene), the very leader of the crowd in wit, song, and wine. Nay, as to the latter, he cannot refrain from giving them a little touch of his chemical science, which can dispense with the old grape-wine process, and still give perfect satisfaction to his customers—a fact of some importance, one would suppose, to the landlord. And thus it would

lute self-determination for the individual. Macbeth spurns and demands loyalty at the same time. What wonder, then, that it comes home on the sword of Mac Iuff?

Hamlet arms Doubt; and Accident, the proper person of Doubt, slays Polonius and thus arms Laertes against Hamlet, who returns Laertes his own by Accident.

Romeo loves, he knows not whom, and dies, he knows not why; while Juliet—

“Go ask his name :—if he be married,
My grave is like to be my wedding bed.”

The Moor of Venice violates the generic conditions of race through physical courage: “She loved me for the dangers I had passed,” and moral cowardice destroys both him and Desdemona.

Compare with these the works of Calderon and the contrast will render apparent what logic has but indicated.

appear that our hero is not left to trust entirely to the quality of his cloth for the practical wherewithal. But the little "Fener-luft," which one would at first have been inclined to interpret *Fame*, resolves itself into "fire-water," or rather the art to make this—to work the miracle of the Wedding-feast at Galilee on the principles of natural science.

VIII.

There is one thing, dear friend, in the character of Faust, to which I have not called your attention heretofore, and that is, the age of the man and the practical inconvenience he may experience therefrom in his new career.

"For idle dalliance too old,
Too young to be without desire,"

he would find it, no doubt, convenient to decrease the one and increase the other. For in this new career, the strength and number of his desires are an essential element, especially when there is every prospect of ample means for their gratification. As regards external appearance, that can be readily managed by a judicious use of cosmetics, the tailor's art and kindred appliances. But the physical desires, the sexual passions, for example, require youth to yield full fruition. Proper culture, however, not to mention aphrodisiacs, will do much, even in this direction. The modes for this are two, but for practical purposes only one; and although not exactly to our taste at first, still, since there is no other alternative presented, we must to the "Witches' Kitchen," named the "Negative Family," if I remember correctly, in a former letter. The popular name for this is somewhat different, but since I have given the genesis of the thing in the letter referred to, I may be permitted to omit the more definite designation, for

"Who dares to modest ears announce
What modest hearts will not renounce?"

If, however, you should find any difficulty in discovering what is meant by the Witches' Kitchen, and where to find it, all that is necessary is to disregard the name and pay attention to what transpires.

First, the servants, employed, as the poet

assures us, in stirring a very strange dish, Beggar's Broth—a kind of broth, perhaps, not so well calculated to feed as to make beggars. You will also perceive the strong propensity to gambling which possesses these creatures. Next, observe the ecstacy of Faust over the image of a woman which he sees in a mirror—with this strange peculiarity:

"Alas! if I do not remain upon this spot, if I dare to approach nearer, then I can only see her as in a mist!" No doubt this beauty will not bear close inspection! Still it is very beautiful! "Is it possible? Is woman so beautiful? Must I see in this moulded form the very comprehension of all that is in heaven? And such an object is found upon this earth?"

Of course it is, and quite attainable, too, says Mephisto. But above all, pay attention to the scene between Mephisto and the witch herself, not omitting the mode in which he identifies himself as belonging to the nobility. This latter is based upon a satirical saying quite current in Germany, but which will not bear translation.

By paying attention to these things, instead of to the name by which the poet calls the place, you will readily detect the original.

I cannot dismiss this scene without calling your attention to the manner in which a poet treats his theme. The scene just examined may, at first glance, appear to flow less freely or necessarily from the content, the idea of the work, even for those who can recognize the negativity of the conclusions of Faust, and trace that negativity through the various forms in which it presents itself in society. And yet, aside from this logical necessity, there is another, a physico-psychological necessity for this scene, contained in the theme, thus:

"So, then, I have studied Philosophy,
Jurisprudence and Medicine,
And, what is worse, Theology,
Thoroughly, but, alas, in vain."

Who says this—a young man of twenty or twenty-five? If so, what significance can there be attached to his words? What could he be expected to know of such subjects at that age? But mark:

"And here I stand, with study hoar,
A fool—and know what I knew before."

Ay, more—

"Am called Magister, nay, LL.D.,
And for ten years am busily
Engaged to lead through fen and close
My trusting pupils by the nose."

You will see, my friend, what an essential element the age of Faust is, to give weight to his conclusions. Without this, the whole would sink into utter absurdity. But now comes the question: how is this LL.D., hoary with study, professor in the university for the last ten years, to enter into a conflict with the family, so necessarily contained in his conviction? The lessons taught and appliances furnished in the Witches' Kitchen are the poet's answer to this question. Of these, advantage has been taken, and such benefits reaped, that at the end of the scene we are assured, upon the very best authority, that he is now in a condition to "see a Helen in every woman." The means used, it is sufficient to know, were produced under the special directions of the devil, although the devil himself could not make them, and were therefore quite natural.

IX.

We are now prepared, my friend, to witness the results of the elements and powers so carefully elaborated by the poet. In order to do so, however, with satisfaction, it may be necessary to recall, in their simplest logical forms, the agents involved. On the one side, therefore, we have the family relation, with its natural and rational moments, and, on the other, the conviction that this relation has no validity as against the individual desires and conclusions of man. Imbued with and swayed by the latter, we have Faust, a man prepared "to see a Helen in every woman;" as the simple bearer of the former in its potential perfection, a young woman—"not so poor but that she enjoys the respect of her neighbors, nor yet so rich that she may defy their opinion." For under these social conditions, if anywhere, that which the Germans call "*Sitte*," and the ancients called "*Ethica*," and what we, with our usual obliquity of expression, call "public morals," must be sought. This young woman, clad in purity

and faith, is met at the temple of the living God—at once the primary source and the still existing refuge of the sacredness of the family-relation. The severely realistic character of Gretchen, therefore, is determined by the theme; and the scene where she relates her daily occupation of cooking, washing, sweeping, &c., besides the exquisite motive which the poet employs to transfigure its prosaic commonplace, ought not to be wanting. While this gives the potential, the real side of the family-relation must be presented. This is supplied by the family of which Gretchen is a member. If we desire to determine further the elements of the latter, it is necessary only to reflect upon the peculiar mediation involved in the relation.* From

* The individual is born. His existence depends upon the constant victory of his individuality over every *opposing* individuality, particularity, or process. To this he owes his existence, both prior and subsequent to his birth. And yet the existence of that individual is dependent in its origin upon the cancelling of individuality in the generic act. The affirmative solution of this contradiction rests with the Family.

Let us watch the process for a moment. Take a young man of twenty or twenty-five—one who pays his way, i. e. makes himself valid in the material, social, and political relations of life. He depends upon himself, has no wife or child, pays what he owes, and earns what he eats. His success depends upon "looking out for number one"—his own individuality is the beginning and the end of his exertion. But see, he has looked into that woman's eyes, and now, lo! with a peculiar gratification, he pays for her subsistence also! She *was* nothing to him—he owed her nothing—and yet the delight of his life seems to be to labor early and late to provide for her. Her garb is his delight, her food his enjoyment; for he is no longer a mere man, but a husband; no longer a mere individual, but a rational somewhat, whose individuality reaches beyond himself, and finds itself in another. Nor does it stop here; the two become three, five, ten. And this individuality, which was centered in and upon itself, had itself for its sole end and aim, has lost itself, and stands the husband of a wife and the father of a family. It enjoys itself no longer, save through this assemblage of individualities; it exists for them. Again, if we look upon this assemblage, we find a kindred process: the individuality of each member is modified by the relation which it sustains to all the rest. The brother is the lover of the sister, her champion and protector, if the father fail. This prepares them for the kindly glance of strangers, &c., and the process begins anew. Thus an affirmative solution is wrought out, or, what is the same thing, the contradiction has an affirmative result—the perpetuation of the Family and, through it, of the Race.

this it would appear that the essential elements of that mediation are presented in the mother, the son, and the daughter, uniting at once the highest possible degree of potentiality with the reality of fact. For the son is brother and father, the daughter is sister and mother, and the mother becomes grandmother.

From these elements, thus determined as to number, character, and social position, the scenes flow with logical necessity to the final solution—the destruction of the Family.

These evolutions are so simple, and their logical import is so generally understood, that it is not necessary to dwell upon them in detail. The only point which might, perhaps, require attention is the artistic side—the true nature of the collision presented and the mode of its solution. That the family relation is impossible under the conviction of Faust, or that an existing family should be destroyed (the mother poisoned, the child drowned, the brother slain and the sister stand before the judgment-seat of God as the self-acknowledged author, cause, or whatever name you may give to the connection which she had with these effects), by a man's giving practical effect to the convictions of Faust, is acknowledged and realized by the general consciousness of the age, as is abundantly proved by the effect which the part of the work under consideration has produced. But the nature of the collision presented, and the artistic character of the solution, have given rise to some doubt. It may, therefore, be well, at the conclusion of this letter, to recall to your mind some of the facts and principles formerly alluded to, which, in my opinion, are well calculated to remove whatever difficulty may have arisen on this point.

If my memory serves me, I called your attention, in a former letter, to the collisions inherent in the family relation and also to the conditions under which they might be used for artistic purposes, namely, that both parties should give full validity to both elements of the collision. Now, if from great familiarity with the themes derived from this source we regard the part of the work under consideration as presenting

one of these collisions, then we meet with difficulty as regards the solution or rather want of solution. For the destruction of the family and the preservation of the destroyer will hardly pass for a satisfactory solution either logical or artistic. To regard the poem, however, in this light, would be our own act and the consequent difficulty one of our own creation. For this would be an attempt to make rather than to read the poem. And whatever merit or demerit might attend the undertaking, it would hardly be fair to attribute either the one or the other to the author of Faust. For, in this poem we have for our theme “The self-conscious intelligence in conflict with itself—with its entire content.” Not the content with itself, but the self-conscious intelligence on the one side and its content on the other. Included within this content we have the institution of the family. Hence, the collision presented is one not inherent in this institution, (for that involves as its presupposition the valid existence thereof,) but between the family and its negation. It is, therefore, not an independent but a subordinate collision. The Family is a part of the content of self-conscious intelligence [see Analysis, in letter ii., p. 181, vol. i., *Jour. Spec. Phil.—Ed.*] and as such a part, it is drawn into the conflict posited between that intelligence and its content in the proposition: “Man cannot know Truth.” But since it is only a part of this content, the conflict is not exhausted by the destruction of the Family, any more than it was exhausted at the end of the subjective collision which resulted in the destruction of the rational avocation of Faust and delivered him over to the guidance of the Understanding and its finite aims—sensual indulgence. Hence, no solution is presented or as yet possible, and those who regard the destruction of the Family as the solution of the collision presented, and thus substitute one of the moments [factors] for the totality, ought not to wonder if they find in the end, that after all the poem has no further unity than what it derives from the art of the bookbinder, and that its solution is very inartistic and immoral. Nothing is more natural than such

a conclusion.* As the result of the subjective collision we had the conclusion: that if man cannot know truth he can enjoy sensual pleasure. Taking this for the principle of our action, we entered the world of reality, and lo! it crumbles under

* The only point to be remembered in this connection by you and me is this: that in all critical labors—this humble attempt not excepted—there may be observed to exist some slight analogy to the works of the taxidermist. Not merely because the operation in either case fills the external form of the given subject with such substance as he may have at hand, stubble, chaff, or bran, but especially because the object and purpose of their respective labors is nearly the same, namely, to assist the appreciation of the beautiful, in Art or Nature. And that as the one would not be permitted to present you with a specimen of a bird of Paradise with neck, wings, and tail

our feet. We clasp the beautiful, pure, and confiding girl, but as all rational end is ignored, our embrace is death. Not life, not perpetuity of the race, but *death*—blank nothingness; the conclusion reads: “If man cannot know truth, then he cannot exist?”

removed, simply, perhaps, because he found it inconvenient to fill them with his stubble, so you should refuse to accept as a fair specimen the result of the labors of the other if the subject treated bears traces of mutilation. But above all, as any serious attempt to make you believe that the headless and wingless specimen was complete as Nature produced it, would only excite your derision, still more should the dogmatic assertions of the critic, though ever so persistent, fail to mar your appreciation of a great work of art, but simply serve as “ear marks” by which you discern his own quality.

GOETHE'S SOCIAL ROMANCES.

[Translated from the German of Carl Rosenkrantz, by TOM DAVIDSON.]

The character of Wilhelm Meister formed in Goethe's mind the reaction to Faust. Faust is the revolutionary spirit, breaking absolutely with the actual world, and withdrawing ever more and more into himself, in order to subject the world to himself from the rallying-point of his idea. From the beginning, he carries within him, in the infinitude of his spirit, the tragic certainty that no salvation can come to him from without; that he can find nothing outside of himself, capable of affording him any absolute satisfaction. With such persistence does he ever pass from conception to reality, that he will not even accept the ground and basis for his activity as already existing for him, but is resolved on creating them for himself. He will wrest the land from the sea, in order that it may be entirely the product of spirit, and upon this soil defiantly extorted from Nature by the power of will, he desires to stand with a free people.

Altogether different is Wilhelm Meister. His is a pliant nature, susceptible, and therefore also covetous of culture in all directions. Everything charms him, and everything satisfies him for the moment. He has no clear idea of himself at all, as

Faust has, and, therefore, does not act, but tries to assimilate every element with which he comes in contact. This infusion of new circumstances, new accomplishments, new insights, this self-culture is his action. Every new love, whose passion seizes him, seems to him the most real of all. Every new circle of men into which he enters, appears to him the society best adapted for him. Thus he passes from error to the detection of it, and thence, enriched by his new experience, to fresh error. By giving himself up, however, to everything external, he gains by appropriating it, more and more of harmony and power.

In Werther, at all events, there is a social Faust of the romance style, on the shoulders of the figure of Wilhelm. Werther, with his enthusiastic love of Nature, and of purity and strength of feeling, was crushed to death by the contradiction in which his heart stood to a cold, culture-fevered, unnatural society, and the contradiction between his passion and the sacredness of the law. He had not reached the elasticity and pliability of Wilhelm; neither had he the Titanic force of Faust, which, in its lyric fire, consciously saw worlds after worlds sink into ashes, and

yet maintained itself. His act was but the passive one of destruction.

We have designated the three romances—*Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship*, *The Elective Affinities*, and *Wilhelm Meister's Journeyman-ship*—as social romances, and we must justify ourselves in the use of this term. We designate them so on account of their tendency. The ordinary novel-reader occupies himself with the historical matter. The contrasts of the characters, the interweaving of the adventures, monopolize his attention. This is the way in which the thousands read who form the public of the circulating libraries, and it is very characteristic that we Germans have invented the extraordinary pleonasm, which we find in no other language whatever, of calling the romance plainly a reading-book (*Lesebuch*). When any one asks us to lend him something to read, he means of course only a reading book, that is, a romance. A higher class of readers gets beyond the material occupation of the imagination with the external multiplicity of occurrences, and throws itself upon the consideration of the form. They admire in Goethe's romances the simplicity of the representations, the art displayed in the grouping, the clearness of the outlines, the perspicuity and pleasantness of the language, the creation of a new prose. But one step further must be taken. Readers must penetrate down to a conception of the subject, and try to grasp the idea, which, working from within, governs the characters and fortunes in these romances. This idea we call social. This foreign word, which has become naturalized among us, comprehends the meaning of two German words, *Geselligkeit* (sociality) and *Gesellschaftlichkeit* (sociability). The social is the tendency of man to hold communion with his fellows; the sociable is the mode and method of the social connection. At the present day, a great deal of mischief is done by the use of the word *social*. A large number of half-educated writers and unfledged talkers think they have said something full of import and intelligence, when they succeed in introducing this word social. It is just now the fashionable term in newspaper-offices and drawing-rooms.

On closer inspection, the social element is nothing more than what used formerly to be called civil society, having the family for its subordinate condition, and the state proper for its superior one, and making its main element consist in the production of divers forms of economy, of class differences, of scholastic and educational institutions, and of police. The police has no doubt fallen into great disrepute among our journalists, because as censorship it often comes into conflict with the free activity of the spirit; notwithstanding, if we look at its intrinsic value, the police, as the systematizing of all those institutions which have in view the well-being of society, is by no means so despicable. Its disagreeable traits appear only, when it comes as an obstacle in the way to prevent civil society from passing over into the higher form of a rational state, which acknowledges freedom itself as its essential condition. Goethe's social world takes no account whatever of church or state; it forswears the lawyers even, and retains only the police, with which it cannot dispense. He shows the same consistency that we find in our social theories of that day, which also develop, on the one hand, a system of wants and of economy, on the other, a system of police regulations, but no system of laws as its medium. In 1838, when in an essay upon Ludwig Tieck and the Romantic School, I expressed myself for the first time with considerable freedom upon the importance of the *Journeyman-ship* for the question of socialism, this was explained by Laube in the third volume of his *German Literature* as philosophical white-washing and extravagant admiration of the poet. Laube considered the *Journeyman-ship* an icy product of senile weakness, lacking that pathological interest and that passion which are essential to the very constitution of a romance. Goethe, he thought, had simply packed together in it a number of short stories, pretty sentences, and wise remarks. I do not think that at present any one pronounces such perversions of judgment upon it; and when one has before him such *aperçus* as that of Karl Grün, when one hears that George Sand and Bettina are preparing to write precisely on the social

element of this romance, he surely cannot doubt that the appreciation of the ideal content holds its way uninterruptedly in spite of all æsthetic prejudices.

The practical problem of Goethe's romances we can state in general terms only thus far, that they attempt to exhibit the Emancipation of Individuality. This they do in three different ways. First, with relation to the natural capabilities in which our Vocation has its source; second, with relation to love, which results in Marriage; third, with relation to Property, upon which depend our position in the world, our means of culture, our objective interaction with others, our substantial means of ingrooving with the general machinery of the world.

This educational problem is one which could not possibly have been proposed except through the principle which governs the modern world—the principle of free subjectivity which began in the German Reformation to metamorphose the church, and in the French Revolution to metamorphose the state. The French have the reformation of their religious consciousness still in the future; that of ours is, in all essential points, behind us. In the external outlines of political formalism the French are farther advanced. But since the religious element is the deeper and more comprehensive, the course of history with us must be very different from what it is in France. Nothing, in fact, is farther from the truth than the notion that we Germans, in order to be able to progress politically, must necessarily repeat all the phases of the French Revolution from 1789 downwards. Many of us have become so engrossed with the writings of Thiers and Mignet, that we are unable to get beyond those conceptions which in them have become rooted. It will become apparent, however, that we Germans will finally produce not merely a new edition of the French forms, but also another form of constitution from other materials. The principle of subjective freedom is to be taken not merely in its formal infinitude, as so many do at present; rather is it necessary that in order to verify itself, it should realize itself objectively. It was this concrete realization to which Goethe

particularly directed his attention, and which formed in him what may be called his political stand-point. Ordinary military and diplomatic politics were an object of indifference, perhaps of hatred to him, whereas he cultivated social politics with enthusiasm. He conceived the distinction of classes, in the sense understood by our century, as meaning the distinction of the different functions which arise from the division of labor, and as no longer implying exclusive privileges of caste.

The principle of free subjectivity has completely transformed family life with us. Internally, family life has received a higher internality. The dependence of the children upon their parents, of the wife upon the husband, as her lord, has remained only in form; it has vanished in reality. The confidential *Thou* of all the members of the family has become generally prevalent. Externally, however, the family has surrendered its exclusiveness. It is drawn into the development of art, of the church, of the state, and has been obliged to yield more and more to sympathy with public sociality, a circumstance which, to family life, has momentarily been fraught with even much detriment, the clamorous confusion whereof we must look upon merely as a phase of transition. The free choice of calling and culture has done away with the oppressiveness of guilds. The competition of individuals, however, has given rise to another evil, the dependence of workmen who have no means upon the great capitalists as contractors. The subjective principle aims, with good reason, at having all merely mechanical work performed by machinery. Machines are continually allowing more and more spirit to become free. Even women can now, by their aid, secure themselves a position of material independence, a thing which formerly was impossible. Machines, in the modern world, are what slaves were in the ancient. It is only relatively and momentarily that they can become a curse; intrinsically they are a blessing. Agriculture can never make a man one-sided in the same manner in which the manufacturing system is capable of blunting to callousness the individual workman; in like manner, it can never deprive the masses of

their entire means of subsistence so suddenly as the competition of manufacturers renders such vicissitudes possible. These experiences impel us to what, using an expression which has become technical, we call Organization of Labor. This will justify the reasonableness of machines, and continually allow more and more spirit to live to spirit. It is precisely by the universal application of machinery that it will annihilate the *proletariat*, notwithstanding that at present it often arises from the invention and introduction of new machines. Goethe has given attention to all these relations, and I am persuaded, now that we have become acquainted with the distress in Berlin, and among the Silesian weavers, that his picture of Susanna's weaving-establishment in the mountains will no longer be looked upon as altogether that monstrosity transgressing the limits of all poetry, which it was formerly held to be.

Modern life, moreover, has become a wandering life, and this circumstance has resulted in giving much greater determinateness to our view of the world, and in bringing about a more peaceful attitude of nations toward each other. The distant and dim produces, by its very indeterminateness, prejudices. Formerly, travelling was the privilege of individuals. Since the introduction of railways and steamships, this privilege of landed nobility, wealthy merchants and artists, well-to-do students, and of artisans who make their work a golden path, has vanished. Everybody travels now. Whole families become families of tourists. Contemplation gluts itself with pure realities, and the fabulous imagination of distance vanishes more and more in presence of definite distinctness.

The frequently childish wonder with which former generations drew their conceptions of many things from hearsay, from books and from pictures, is dying out. In particular, however, nations must find it daily more inconceivable why they should go to war with each other, inasmuch as by mere personal contact every people will come to form a juster judgment of the peculiar condition of its neighbors, and be able to find more points of contact for a peaceful

settlement of difficulties that may occur. No doubt, the circumstances of the present time seem to be at variance with this view, for it still looks as if our whole peace were only a provisional interval for the preparation of war. Characteristically enough, too, we call our peace an armed peace, and at this moment we are still building fortresses in the East against Russia, and in the West against France. Yet, it may be possible that these master-pieces of architecture, like the monasteries which Bavaria restored, shall remain only as monuments of the views entertained by an earlier, and, in this respect, still barbarous period, as the ruins of the knightly castles upon our mountains, or as the pyramids of the Egyptian Pharaohs. So powerful is the tendency of our time towards uniting all nations in a common bond of true humanity, that we are bold enough to stop the conflict of continents even. In ten years, the Isthmus of Suez will have ceased to be. Then, ships from Europe to the East Indies will no longer have to sail round the Cape of Good Hope, but will take the route by the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. The Isthmus of Panama too, will fall. North and South America will become islands altogether. Ships will sail direct from Europe to China, and from China to Europe.

But the most difficult question of all is that of property. In the *Apprenticeship* and in the *Journeymanship*, Goethe repeatedly lays stress on the fact, that all Europe is already taken possession of. He has, as we were formerly convinced, in his revolutionary pieces, always directed his chief attention to this problem, and the *Story of the Necklace*, in which he saw the first symptom of the most violent turning upside down of all relations, excited him to such a degree, that his friends almost thought he was out of his mind. The Germanic Conquerors divided among them the lands which they had won sword in hand. Landed property was the condition of all power. Gradually, however, in opposition to it, floating property has been rising in estimation, and now fights for recognition with it, in the form of money, as the universal means of obtaining prop-

erty. Among us Prussians, the qualification for taking any share in the political concerns of our country still depends essentially upon landed property. In France money has already become a condition. There, in order to confer the right of electing or of being elected, a certain fixed income is necessary. The person who has no property is excluded from all direct share in political activity. Inasmuch, however, as he may still take a conscious interest in it, and may possess patriotism, intellect, culture, insight, it is very natural that in France the mind should already be rising above money, and seeking to advance a claim to active politics under the title of capacity. In his social romances, Goethe has given the most varied directions to the movements of property, according validity to property simply as a means toward the development of individuality, but bestowing upon it, in this significance, emphatic prominence. And by this circumstance, among others, it can be shown, that when he sketched the *Apprenticeship*, he already had the composition of the *Journeyman-ship* in his mind. That secret society of shrewd men in the *Apprenticeship* comes upon the idea of buying up estates, and laying out capital in different countries, so that, in view of the uncertainty of all possessions, it may still secure an honorable and sufficient livelihood to its members. (*Lehrjahre*, Bk. viii. c. 7, beg.) This idea of a society distributed over all parts of the world, and securing the means of subsistence to all its members, was afterwards set forth by Sealsfield in his *Morton* to the commercial world. Goethe endeavored to paint an industrial association, and hence his anxiety to introduce the artisans, and to impart to them, by means of vocal music, a higher social culture. When Goethe drew his workmen's association, he had not before him any of those experiences which we have since arrived at, and which show that vocal music exercises a powerful ethical influence in workmen's associations. The inspiring themes of song raise the soul to nobler feelings, and the unison of song expands the bosom, and makes the heart of each individual feel at one with the hearts of others. Pity

it is that diseased political tendencies have so often abused the charm of song, or rather that the police, under the influence of pitiable prejudice, have spied danger in the loftier subjects of song. Under the Bourbons, not long before the revolution of July, the workmen were forbidden to sing at their meetings songs which they had composed themselves, full of moral impulse. The police was better pleased to see them occupying themselves with drinking at the bar-rooms outside the barriers, and singing equivocal and obscene songs.

But let us return to literature. Goethe began Wilhelm Meister in 1778, and had finished the sixth book in 1785, that is, before his visit to Italy. In conjunction with Schiller, he finished the romance, and subjected the whole to a careful revision, as is shown by the correspondence of the two poets. In 1794 the printing began. He intended, at first, to work out the *Journeyman-ship* in 1807; but the *Elective Affinities* pushed itself between. He did not continue it till 1810, and in 1821 he completed it. He brought it out a second time, corrected and enlarged, in 1829.

WILHELM MEISTER'S APPRENTICESHIP. THE ELECTIVE AFFINITIES, AND MEISTER'S JOURNEYMANSHIP IN THEIR GENERAL CONNECTION.

It is usual to consider the *Elective Affinities* as a romance having no further connection with *Meister's Apprenticeship* and *Journeyman-ship* than that it is the work of the same author. It is one of the merits of Hothe, that he first, in 1829, indicated a deeper connection between these compositions, in the December number of the *Berlin Annals of Scientific Criticism*. In bringing about a higher appreciation of the *Journeyman-ship* itself, Varnhagen has been particularly instrumental, — first, in 1833, by his collection of Critiques for History and Literature, and in 1843, in the third volume of his miscellaneous writings, by an essay entitled: *In the Spirit of the Journeymen*. [A delightfully detailed investigation of the *Journeyman-ship* has, since that time, been undertaken by Dr. A. Jung, in a separate work, Mayence, 1854.]

Let us, in the first place, sum up the rich life of these romances in the abstract formula, that *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship* is intended to depict Formation of Individuality, the *Elective Affinities*, the Development of Individuality into Fate, and the *Journeyman'ship*, the Victory over Fate by resignation and activity.

Wilhelm Meister is originally a merchant, thinks himself intended for an actor, for an artist, and at last finds his special calling in the chiburgical art. He wavers about for a long time, and spends his life in making continual up-clearings with regard to himself. And this not only in his judgment concerning his natural powers, and his vocation as determined by them, but even in love. From the warm-hearted Mariana he passes to the coquettish Philina, to the pretty countess, to the hospitable Theresa, before he finds his ideal in Natalia. The idea of this romance is that we should educate ourselves, in accordance with the all sidedness of human nature generally, to the beautiful, and, in accordance with the one-sidedness of our individuality, also to the useful. In the former relation, it is through humanity generally; in the latter, it is through a particular accomplishment, that we can become helpful to others. Naturally every one is destined by his particular capabilities for a particular activity, but in this he is liable to manifold mistakes. The opinion of others, a ready adaptability, the presence of an example alluring us to imitation, material advantages offering themselves to us, all these are motives which may deceive us in regard to our vocation. The happiness or unhappiness of our life depends upon this. If we deceive ourselves concerning our natural capacity, or do not cultivate ourselves sufficiently, we may experience the torment of living a life which is a failure. What we are really capable of, however, we learn only through our activity. Culture, not merely in the sense of social polish, affability of manner, possession of the small arts of conversation, non-confusion of *I* and *me*,—but in the sense of the conception of our history, consists mainly in this, that we become conscious what capacities we have received

from nature, and how far we have proceeded in our cultivation of them; what stages of knowledge and of volition we have behind us, and what before us. Wilhelm, as a man, continually becoming, but still imperfect, stands opposed to a group of men who have come to a clear understanding with themselves, and who, with shrewd vital pleasure, endeavor to guide not only their own fates, but also those of other people, in so far as they consider those deserving of their society. The educational lodge, the society composed of Jarno, the Abbé, Lothario, and others, which has its archives in the mysterious tower, is no longer according to our taste. Our love for publicity, which is ever more and more becoming a habit with us, makes us dislike such petty cautions. They seem to us to savor of the craft of old age. Last century, however, up to the time of the revolution, things were otherwise. Let us remember what we were obliged to say of the Rosierucians and Illuminists in order to arrive at an understanding of the poem *The Mysteries*. Tieck, also, in his *Lovell*, has a similar secret society; and George Sand, in her *Consuelo*, cannot avoid having one. The Venetian *Cantatrice*, also, goes through an apprenticeship, and must pay her tribute to the social machinery of the eighteenth century, by being incorporated into a secret society of mystics.

We ought now to pass from the *Apprenticeship* to the *Journeyman'ship*. Such seems the natural way. In the mind of the author, however, there was developed, as an antithesis, the *Elective Affinities*, which, at the same time, formed a further development. As far as style is concerned, we of course admit the similarity of the three romances, with which we are at present occupied. As regards subject, the *Elective Affinities*, keeping out of view its extent, might unquestionably form one of the novels in the *Journeyman'ship*, which deal with cases of moral collision, demanding abnegation or travel. That the persons who appear in it are quite different from those whose acquaintance we have made in *Meister*, would, in the epic width and extent of the *Journeyman'ship*, form no obstacle to prevent us from incor-

porating it in the picture of the whole. However, we must proceed to a still deeper comprehension. In the *Apprenticeship*, there is, to be sure, a great deal of talk about fate; yet it appears little. It is only in the last third of the romance, when the solemnity of death begins to prevail, only with the ruin of Mariana, the attempted suicide of Aurelia, the death of Mignon, and the account of her ominous birth, that we trace something of the necessary character of that higher working, which often seems to us so strange, in the union of the many seemingly distinct and individual occurrences, which we call Fate. The strength of the *Elective Affinities* lies precisely in this: We meet perfectly finished men, who have completed their education, and hence turn their activity outwards, to the laying out of parks, the schooling of the youth of the villages, and the like. So very complete are they, that Edward and Charlotte have already been once married. He has buried a wife, she a husband. Life seems to prosper them in richest abundance, for they have possessions which afford them competent means of living. The conditions of existence here are therefore on the whole those whose attainment has been aimed at in the *Apprenticeship*, in which we find not only Wilhelm, but others also, engaged in the process of searching and striving, in which no one has arrived at marriage, not even the mature, much-experienced Lothario, in which, finally, property seems still insecure, and the commercial house of Werner enters into negotiations with the secret society about a complex system of estates. But in the world of Edward and Charlotte, which seems so firmly established, so saturated with peace, in which everything looks so smooth outwardly, fate displays its iron power, and we learn from the tragic struggles of these amiable persons how little outward rest and regularity of existence suffice to preserve us from tumbling headlong into the destroying abysses of passion. It is a situation similar to that depicted in the *Tasso* as occurring in the pleasure-gardens and marble halls of Belriguardo, whose delightful retirement and beauty are not able to check the stream of

emotions which rolls suddenly with devastating flood over the noblest men. The first marriage of Edward, as well as that of Charlotte, was a mistake; it was a marriage of convenience. But their own marriage is likewise a mistake. In their youth they had been friendly with each other, had been accustomed to regard themselves as belonging to each other, and have, now that all obstacles to their union have been removed, at last reached the accomplishment of their wishes. But inwardly they are afflicted with *ennui*. In order to have more life about them, they send for Otilie from her boarding-school. And lo! With this harmless child, fate enters their circle. In one's vocation, individuality reaches its natural purpose. In marriage, individuality again lies at the basis, but in this case it stands in relation to another individuality, which supplements it. The man who misses his vocation has his unhappiness confined to himself. The man who makes a mistake in marriage is doubly unfortunate. In regard to the capacity that one has for anything, since one must cultivate it, and since in his performances he has an objective test, there is, after all, less room for deception, than there is with regard to the tie which, from among so many individuals worthy of our love, binds us forever irrevocably with this particular one. Through our freedom, we stand, in both relations, in opposition to the necessity of Nature, with the possibility of choice. We may adopt this or that profession, we may enter into this or that marriage. But if the direct determination of Nature does not harmonize with our wills, we remain in the former case novices and bunglers; in the latter, we become miserable men, strangling ourselves throughout the whole of a life with an insoluble contradiction. Edward is unquestionably destined for Otilie, Charlotte for the Captain. They belong to each other as natures having an elective affinity, *without any reflection*, without any regard to external relations. They are intrinsically one, and their life would be only the uniformly accelerated progress of a union in itself infinite. Now one might say that Edward and Otilie, Char-

lotte and the Captain might marry each other, and Edward give up his union with Charlotte. But it is exactly here that the moral earnestness of these natures develops itself. They stake every thing—they stake their very lives upon maintaining in its integrity so holy a relation as marriage, the beginning and the summit of all culture. Hence the movement of the events in the *Elective Affinities* is continually describing concentric circles. In the *Apprenticeship* there is a spiral going round and round, *ad infinitum*; here, on the contrary, every thing comes back to the same point, however far it may have intended to depart from it when it started. Arbitrary freedom cannot alter that which is fixed by Nature as a fathomless power. Edward goes to the war, comes back laden with honors, thinks he has become master of himself, and finds himself subject to the same law. The continual returning to the same point, even to the same locality in the *Elective Affinities*, produces an awfully profound, and genuinely fatalistic impression. In Ottilie's death, or rather in her dying, the almost mystic-seeming invincibility of the spirit of Nature makes itself manifest. One can hardly say of this delicate gentle creature, who unintentionally commits so much mischief, that she voluntarily puts an end to her life by starvation. She is unable any longer to take food. Body and soul divide asunder in Ottilie, and Edward, who lives only in her, dies after her.

The important thing therefore is not only, as was shown in the *Apprenticeship*, a correct estimate of our own capacities, but also the correct choice of a wife, inasmuch as it also requires the sympathy of the genius of Nature, unless marriage is to be destitute of warmth and thorough intimacy. The individual man, however, and also the individual family, are interwoven with universal fate—with the development of the world. And herein they can again cancel those limits which arise for the individual. What the individual calls fate in a particular sense is not absolutely, but only relatively and momentarily a limit to his freedom. The infinity of freedom is able to transcend it. The *Journeyman*

shows us the positive and negative sides of social education teaching us to overcome fate. Positive, inasmuch as we can never attain it. In reference to the choice of a profession, this is effected mainly by a proper cultivation of individuality—by education. The province of education is based entirely upon the principle of individual freedom. On the other hand, to enable the individual to make a proper choice in marriage, the most favorable education is to be obtained through a pure and rich family life, because in this the fine sensitiveness of feeling, and the habit of confidence are most thoroughly developed, while inconsiderateness and unconcern in contracting a marriage are provided against from the very outset. A beautiful family life of this sort which thrills him who is native to it, from his earliest years, with the breath of freedom, with morality, and respect for fate, is presented to us on the Uncle's estates. What then is to happen if the sacred order of things is after all destroyed? For we men must always be prepared to find, that it is possible for us, either through the impliability of our nature, or through the arbitrariness of our freedom, to go astray into the immoderate. Nothing undermines us more, nothing with greater certainty prepares us for a sudden fall, than the so-called fleshly security—when we think that we have gained complete victory, and have become unassailable. It is from the very point, whence with our calculating understanding we least expect it, that the blow falls upon us. There are always unguarded spots in our hearts, and it is usually only for want of opportunity that we do not allow our weakness and perverse tendencies to pass into actions. When this does happen, we are naturally astounded that such things should have been possible for us, who thought we had long ago got beyond them. The *Elective Affinities* shows us this self-generation of fate. This idea is transferred to the *Journeyman*. Lothario, with all his maturity cannot yet shake himself free from errors of passion. So long as errors which occur in the path of culture, and so long as the moral conflicts of individuals are of a subordinate character, they endeavor to

provide against them in secret, and to cure them by the application of mild remedies. If, however, the development is of a more serious nature, it is only renunciation that can restore the unity of the mind with itself and its harmony with others. If the painful injury takes a still deeper hold, and the freely imposed limitations of resignation are not sufficient, then the transgressor must travel. Or, if the word *transgressor* does not seem quite applicable, let us say, *the victim of fate*. He must alienate himself for a time from the circle in which his presence produces a polarizing tension. He must endeavor to rise above himself, to get outside of himself, by the reception of new objects into his consciousness and by coming in contact with other persons. We arrive at self-knowledge of a genuine kind not by brooding in seclusion over ourselves, but by mutual communication with the world. It is only the totality of human beings that is humanity, as Wilhelm comes to learn. Moreover, we do not attain self-oblivion by mere subjective abstraction, but only by an objective change in our conscious-

ness—by filling it with other materials. The person who is travelling must not tarry more than three days in the same place, in order that he may not run the risk afresh of getting engrossed in a one-sided manner and entangled.

If now, however, the individual has made himself fit for any sphere of activity, and has maintained himself sociably and socially at peace with the world, what can the individual accomplish? However far our power may extend, whatever flow of activity we may develop; in view of the immeasurableness of the world and the necessity which works with immanent power in all relations, we are nevertheless, in our individuality, only vanishing moments. If we would produce greater effects, we must unite ourselves with others. Goethe makes individuality unite and form associations with homogeneous natures. In the chain of this brotherhood, the power of the individual, which, in isolation, would split itself up, is increased to the extent of the power of all. The necessity of free association is the social result of the *Journey-manship*.

COMPREHENSION.

By A. C. B.

Foot surer than his, crossing o'er
The rapid river shore to shore,
While down the stream the ice-floes roar,—

Hold, closer than the bird's that sings
Unmindful how the storm-wind swings
The slender twig to which he clings,—

Touch, finer far than that so fine
Upon the spider's silvery line
He crosses sure through sun and shine.

O surer, closer, finer yet,
Must be the thought that strives to get
And hold the Truth inviolate.

For narrow as the bridge did rise
Before the prophet's wondering eyes,
Runs still the path to Paradise.

On either side we seize despair;
We prison fast the sun-lit air,
And lo! 'tis darkness that is there!

And so we miss, and grasp, and lose,
While Thought its shadow still pursues,
Nor knows its work is not to choose;

For only where the one is twain,
And where the two are one again,
Will Truth no more be sought in vain.

THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

VOL. II.

1868.

NO. 3.

SUN-CLEAR STATEMENT

To the Public at large concerning the true nature of the NEWEST PHILOSOPHY. An attempt to force the reader to an understanding.

(Translated from the German of J. G. FICHTE, by A. E. KROEGER.)

FIFTH CONVERSATION.

A. That which the Science of Knowledge deduces is to be a faithful and complete picture of fundamental consciousness. Can its deductions then contain more or less or anything else than what occurs in actual consciousness?

R. By no means. Every deviation from actual consciousness would be a sure proof of the incorrectness of the deduction of that science.

A. Hence, according to all our previous results, the total consciousness of a finite rational being can involve only the following:

FIRSTLY—The primary and fundamental determinations of consciousness, or common consciousness, or immediate experience, or whatever else you choose to call it.

These determinations form in themselves a complete system, which is altogether the same—apart from its exclusively individual determinations—for all rational beings. We have called this system common consciousness, or the first degree of consciousness.

SECONDLY—The reflection and representation of this common consciousness, the free separating, composing, and infinite judging of it; which, being dependent upon freedom, varies according to the different use made of that freedom. This we have called the higher degrees of consciousness—the middle region of our mind, as it were. It is to be remembered that nothing can occur in these

higher degrees which has not occurred previously in common consciousness, at least in its elements. The freedom of the mind has the power infinitely to separate and compose that which is given in fundamental consciousness, but it cannot create anything anew.

THIRDLY AND FINALLY—A complete deduction of all that which occurs in common consciousness—without any relation to actual experience—from the mere necessary manner of acting of the Intelligence in general; precisely as if that common consciousness were the result of this manner of acting. This is the Science of Knowledge, as the absolute highest degree, which no consciousness can transcend. In this science, also, nothing can occur which has not occurred in actual consciousness, or in experience, in the highest significance of that word.

According to our principles, therefore, nothing can enter the consciousness of a rational being, in any manner, which does not in its elements occur in experience, and in the experience of all rational beings, without exception. All have received the same gifts, and the same freedom further to develop these gifts; and no one can create something of his own. Our philosophy is, therefore, most decidedly favorably disposed towards common sense, and secures its rights, as we asserted at the beginning; and

all other philosophy which opposes it in this respect is in opposition to common sense.

We have said that the Science of Knowledge is a faithful image of fundamental consciousness. Can this image be that consciousness itself, and does it pretend to be it?

R. According to what you have said, and as I now see clearly enough myself, on no account. The determinations of life, which it establishes, must necessarily lack that penetrating something, whereby they tear our self away from us and immerse it in themselves. In the Science of Knowledge we immerse our self altogether in the *constructing* of these determinations, but not in the *determinations themselves*, as such; precisely as I immersed my self in the representing of my friend's presence, but not in that presence itself.

A. Very true. The Science of Knowledge pretends to be nothing but a picture of life, not life itself. Whosoever mistakes that science for the latter, utterly misapprehends it. Not a single one of its propositions, thoughts, or results, is one of actual life, or fits into actual life. Those thoughts are, in truth, only thoughts of thoughts, which we have, or ought to have; propositions of propositions which we ought to make our own; statements of statements which we ought to state. The reason why it is so difficult to consider that the Science of Knowledge is nothing more than this, is because other philosophies have claimed to be more, and it seems hard to believe that the new one should be so very different from the former. These previous philosophies claimed to be not only science, but, moreover, wisdom—world-wisdom, or life-wisdom, as they called it;—and hence they were neither. Ours is content to be science, and has from the very beginning disclaimed being anything else by its very name. It cannot make men good, wise, or religious, by demonstration, any more than the previous philosophies could do so; but it knows that it cannot do it, and does not desire to do what it knows it cannot do. It only desires to make those who cultivate it, scientific. Whatsoever it says concerning wisdom, virtue, or religion, must be actually *lived* and *experienced* in order to become actual wisdom, virtue, or religion.

R. Hence it probably does not make its study or comprehension the condition of wisdom or of a virtuous life.

A. On the contrary, it is a decided opponent of those who assert all the culture and

education of man to consist in his *intellectual* development, and who believe that they have gained everything when they have made men able arguers. Our science knows very well, and never forgets, that life can be developed only through life.

R. You, therefore, do not, I suppose, invite every one to a study of your science.

A. On the contrary, we rather deplore that half-true philosophical propositions of other systems have already been scattered amongst the people at large. But this we do demand—I may as well make already known all the pretensions of our science, though a century should elapse until they are fulfilled—that every one who studies a science, and moreover every one who is connected with the education of mankind in general or with the administration of government, ought to be in possession of our science.

R. But in spite of the harmony between your science and common sense, which you assert to exist, you cannot well deny that you say: Whatsoever is for us, we produce ourselves. Now this is doubtless an assertion which directly contradicts common consciousness. We are not conscious of producing that which exists, but are conscious only that it exists as we find it, or that we find it *given*.

A. I do not even clearly understand the assertion which you ascribe to us; hence do not know whether I ought to recognize it as our own, or deny it. But let us examine it. The very description of the Science of Knowledge involves that every one who produces it within himself, produces himself a picture of actual consciousness, and hence a series of pictures of all that is found as actually occurring in consciousness, and contemplates himself in thus producing it. Every one who studies and comprehends that science must find this as an immediate fact in himself. To say that this same series is produced in the same manner in ordinary consciousness would not only be a contradiction of this immediate consciousness itself, but also of the express assertion of the Science of Knowledge, and would annul its whole system; for this Science holds that common consciousness is a complete system, and that no separate part thereof can be without all others, nor all others without each separate part. This Science cannot, therefore, hold that common consciousness produces gradually, and in a

series, first a separate A, and then a separate B, &c., &c.; since the one is not possible without the other, and since, therefore, the whole, with all its separate parts, would have to be produced at once, if we could speak at all of production in this connection.

But why should we speak of production in connection with actual consciousness? Actual consciousness *is*; is wholly and altogether complete the moment we ourselves are complete and have self-consciousness, with which self-consciousness, as its ultimate link, the Science of Knowledge concludes. Our existing world is complete, as undoubtedly all will confess, when we *are*. Our actual life can do nothing more than become conscious of this world, piece by piece, as inexplicable chance may have connected these pieces, and to comprehend, analyze and form a judgment of these pieces. To assert generating in actual life is, therefore, senseless. Life is not a generating, but a finding. This very pretended generating is what our philosophy contradicts and refutes.

But this absolutely existing world can, according to our philosophy, be *treated* and *judged* in actual life, *as if* it had arisen through an original construction similar to the constructions of the Science of Knowledge. Actual life can be complemented and regarded according to the laws of such a construction, and we can, moreover, be sure that actual observation will confirm such a complementing. It is not necessary to live and experience everything, or all the intermediate links; exactly as we need not, supported by a scientific geometry, actually measure all the lines which we require to use, but can discover some through mere calculation.

But to consider this *as if* in the light of a categorical *it is so*, this fiction, in the light of a narrative of a true event which happened at a certain time, is an evident misunderstanding. Does any one believe that we intended to furnish, in our construction of fundamental consciousness in the Science of Knowledge, a history of the acts of consciousness before consciousness was—the history of a man before his birth? How could we, when we expressly declare that consciousness exists only together with all its determinations, and that we do not desire any consciousness in advance of all consciousness and without consciousness? These are misapprehensions which no one

guards himself against, because they are not expected until they actually occur.

Thus all cosmogonies are attempts to narrate an original construction of the universe from its fundamental components. But does any originator of a cosmogony pretend to say that things really did happen in the way in which he describes them to have happened in his cosmogony? Certainly not, if he but understands himself and knows whereof he speaks. For he doubtless holds the universe to be an organic whole, whereof no separate part can exist unless all others exist, and which therefore could not rise into existence gradually at all, but must necessarily have been complete at any time when it was. It is true that unscientific understanding—which ought to be kept within the sphere of the Given, and ought not to be invited to investigate matters of this kind—believes itself listening to a narrative, because it can understand only narratives. May we not conclude from the present assumption of so many people, that our gnosogony is intended to be a narrative, that they would not be indisposed to accept it as such if it were but stamped with the seal and authority of age?

R. Nevertheless I hear you speak only of determinations of a consciousness which exists, or of a system of consciousness which exists, &c. But with this the others are not content: they require, first, a system of things, and from this system a consciousness to be generated.

A. You now speak no longer as common sense and actual consciousness speak, but as one of those professional philosophers would speak whom I thought I had silenced long ago. Tell me, and reflect well before you answer: does, then, a thing enter you, and exist for you, except through and together with your consciousness of it? Can the thing, then, in and for your self, be ever separated from your consciousness thereof; or can the consciousness—provided it is the actual or completely determined consciousness of the first degree—be ever separated from the thing? Can you think the thing without the consciousness of it, or an altogether determined consciousness without its thing? Does reality arise for you in any other manner than through your immersing your consciousness into its lowest degree? nay, does not your thinking utterly vanish when you attempt to think differently?

R. If I reflect maturely, I must admit it.

A. It certainly is always you who speak, out of your soul and into your soul. Do not, then, desire to plunge out of yourself, and to grasp something in a different manner than is possible for you; namely, as thing and consciousness, or as consciousness and thing; or rather as neither of both, but as that which is separated into both only after having been grasped: the absolute subject-objective and objective-subjective.

Common sense never judges otherwise; it always holds both consciousness and the thing together, and always speaks of both in their union. It is only the philosophical system of Dualism which holds differently, when it separates the absolutely inseparable, and when it believes to be thinking very profoundly after its thinking has utterly vanished into smoke.

Now this mature consideration and attentiveness of each one to what passes in his own consciousness appears to us to be so easy and natural, that it ought to require no study to find it, but should be known to every one. For everyone who but awakes to clear consciousness, and tears himself loose from the condition midway between plant and man, finds it thus; and should it be impossible for him to find it thus, there is no help for him.

Some have considered this self-attentiveness to be itself the Science of Knowledge. If it were, the possession of that science would be the easiest thing achievable: that attentiveness to one's self is not the science itself, but merely the first and simplest, but also an exclusive condition of its comprehension.

What ought we to think of the minds of those who even here still scent the escape of a critical and transcendental skepticism, and who believe that they can doubt whether they really must *know* whereof they speak, and who hold this doubt to be the true philosophical enlightenment.

I beg you, dear reader, do shake these men out of their dreams, and ask them: Do you ever know without having a consciousness? Can you ever, therefore, with your knowledge—and since this knowledge, unless you change yourselves into logs and stones, is inseparable from your nature—can you ever with your whole nature go beyond determinations of consciousness? If you have once obtained a clear insight into

this, do, for heaven's sake retain that conviction; keep it always in mind, and let nothing induce you to forget it for a single moment!

Of course, it is well known to us, that if you again pass judgment upon these determinations of consciousness, you generate a consciousness of the *second degree*, and that this second consciousness now appears to you in this connection as more particularly consciousness, and as mere consciousness, without any relation to the thing; whereas the determination of the first consciousness appears to you now, when related to this *mere* consciousness, as a mere thing, precisely as the *measure* of your line appears to you a something else than *the line itself*.

But you will surely not allow yourself to be deceived by this appearance, since you have now convinced yourself that nothing can exist for you except determinations of consciousness. You will, therefore, understand that that seeming thing is nothing but such a determination of your consciousness, as you have named thing merely in its relation to a higher consciousness; precisely as you can at every moment become conscious that your measure of the line is altogether nothing but the line itself, and is this line only as thought is another relation, and more definitely.

Neither is it unknown to us, that if you think a permanent system of fundamental determinations of consciousness—which you certainly must think in order properly to seize the conception of the Science of Knowledge—it is not well possible for you to fix and place before you as permanent and steady that ever living and constantly becoming somewhat, as which your consciousness appears to you; and that this system, therefore, in its relation to your consciousness changes into a system of the universe, as, indeed, your whole world, even as thought on the standpoint of ordinary consciousness is nothing but this tacitly presupposed system of the fundamental determinations of consciousness in general. But you ought to know from your previous reflection, and keep in mind always, that, nevertheless, as sure as you think, know and speak of it, and not—not think, not know, and not speak of it, in reality can be only a system of determinations of your consciousness.

SIXTH CONVERSATION.

I see, dear reader, you look surprised. Is it nothing more than this? you seem to say: "What! I merely get a picture of actual life which is of no service to me in any manner, a mere sketch in shadowy colors, and of diminished size, of what I have every day clear before me in nature without labor or study on my part. Why should I undergo a tedious course of study and weary exercises for such a purpose? Your art seems to me not much more important than that of the well-known man who threw grains of corn through the eye of a needle, which surely cost him, also, considerable trouble. I have no need of your science and prefer to cling to life."

Very well; follow your resolution without hesitation, and cling right closely to life. Stand firmly and fixedly upon this your resolution; allow no philosophy to shake you in it, or to make it appear suspicious to you. Even thus shall I have attained the greatest part of the end I had in view.

But lest you might fall into the danger of dissuading others from the study of a system which we do not advise you, and which nothing urges you, to undertake, or of lowering and speaking ill of it to others, let me now tell you what influence and use this study may, nevertheless, exercise.

The science of mathematics, and particularly that branch of this science which excites contemplation* in the most immediate

* CONTEMPLATION AND INTUITION.—The use of the word Contemplation, instead of Intuition, for the German word *Anschauung*, in these translations, has been objected to. This objection would be valid, if the words Contemplation and Intuition were equivalent and exchangeable terms in the English language, and if the word Intuition were the scientific philosophical term for the (vulgar) word Contemplation. But if there is a distinction between those two words in the English language, and a translator chooses the one in preference to the other, the presumption should justly be, that he made his choice for a reason, and for the sake of that distinction; and, instead of objecting to the term chosen, critics should rather endeavor to ascertain the distinctive act of the mind which it is to designate.

My reason for translating the word *Anschauung*, whenever it occurs in the writings of Fichte—and I have no hesitation to extend the same remark to Kant's writings—by Contemplation instead of Intuition, is in short this: the word Intuition stands as designation for an act of the mind altogether different from that which is designated by *Anschauung*; and the word Contemplation, of all other words in

manner—namely, geometry—has always been recommended as a means to exercise the mind, and has often been studied with this end alone in view, and with no intention of making practical use of it. That science is, moreover, well worthy of this recommendation; although the authority which it enjoys, and which is based upon its age and its peculiar standpoint midway between contemplation and perception, has made it possible to get a knowledge of it historically, instead of getting it, as should be done, by reinventing it; or to accept it on trust, instead of convincing one's self of its evidence. Hence, the scientific culture which it was intended to effect is no longer produced, and the conclusion that a much-knowing mathematician is also a scientific mind, has become very unsafe in these present days; for in the actual use of that science in daily life, or even in the progression in that science, it is immaterial whether its propositions have been really comprehended, or whether they have been accepted merely upon trust.

Even in this respect the Science of Knowledge has more to recommend it. For this science cannot be apprehended, at least as it is taught now, in any manner except through actually rising into the region of contemplation, and thus of that science; and centuries may elapse before it will be taught in any manner which will make it possible to learn it by committing to memory; and, unless I am much mistaken, it

the English language, best designates that act of the mind which Fichte calls *Anschauung*. It is true that mystics have used the word Contemplation, as expressive of their wrapt ecstasy. But this is also, to some extent, true of the German word; and, moreover, Fichte often enough points out that in the term Intellectual Contemplation, the latter word is to describe precisely the same act of mind which occurs in sensuous contemplation. The act is, in short, one of *looking on*, exclusive of all conception or effort to comprehend. It is elaborately described by Fichte in his Second Introduction, published in this *Journal* under the head of Criticisms of Philosophical Systems. (See particularly IV. of that article.) It is completely deduced as a distinctive act of the Ego in the Science of Knowledge. (See pages 197—200.) Had I translated it by Intuition, I should have caused readers to entertain an utterly wrong conception; and I venture to affirm, that one of the many reasons why Kant has been so abominably misunderstood by the English is precisely because to such words in his writings as *Anschauung* his translators have given a quite different meaning.—A. E. Krueger.

can never be applied or used as a means to produce another knowledge, unless itself has been scientifically grasped. Moreover, from the facts already stated, that the Science of Knowledge has no aid, no substrate of its contemplation, except that contemplation itself, it can elevate the human mind to a higher degree than any geometry can do. It gives to the mind not only attentiveness, ability and firmness, but at the same time absolute self-reliance, by forcing it to be alone with itself, and to live and rule within itself. All other mental labor is comparatively an infinitely easy task; and he who has practice in that science, finds no task difficult. Add to this, that by penetrating all objects of human knowledge into their very centre, it accustoms the eye to seize the true central point in everything which may occur to it, and steadily to pursue this point. Hence, for a practised teacher of the Science of Knowledge, there is nothing difficult, confused or dark, provided he knows the object under consideration. It is always an easy task for him to build up everything anew and from the very beginning, carrying as he does within him the outlines for every scientific structure, and an easy task to get a clear view of the most intricate science. Add to this the confidence and trust in his judgment which he has acquired in possessing the Science of Knowledge, as a guide of all reasoning, and the unshaken calmness with which he regards all deviations from the well known path, and all paradoxes. Human affairs would be in quite a different stage of progress if men could only resolve to believe their eyes. But as matters stand, men go to their neighbors or to their remote ancestors to inquire what they actually do see; and this distrust in themselves perpetuates their errors. The teacher of the Science of Knowledge is protected against this distrust for ever. In one word, through the Science of Knowledge the mind of man comes back to itself, and henceforth reposes upon itself, without foreign assistance, getting itself thoroughly under control as the dancer has his feet, or the fencer his hands under control.

Unless the friends of the Science of Knowledge are mistaken, having had too little chance as yet to try its effects, this self-reliance of the mind also leads to self-reliance of character, a disposition for which is inversely a necessary condition of the comprehending of this science. True, the Science

of Knowledge is just as impotent as any other knowledge to make man honest and virtuous; but it at least removes, unless we are much mistaken, the chief obstacle to honesty. Whosoever has in his thinking torn himself loose from all foreign influence, and has built up himself out of himself in this respect, will, doubtless, not go to get the principles of his actions from where he refused to get the principles of his knowing. His views respecting fortune and misfortune, honor and disgrace, will undoubtedly not be formed any more through the invisible influence of the universe and its secret power; but he will influence himself, and will look for and generate the fundamental motives of this influence in himself.

Such will be the influence of this study, if we look merely at its scientific form, and when its content is supposed to have no significance or purpose at all.

But let us now look at this content! The system of the Science of Knowledge exhausts all possible knowledge of the finite mind in its fundamental elements, and fixes these elements for all eternity. These elements can be divided again and recomposed in infinitely different ways, and in this infinite recomposition thereof the finite enters and has its playroom, but nothing new can be added to them. That which is not in its elements involved in their description, is most surely irrational. This the Science of Knowledge shows in supreme clearness to all whose eyes it has opened. Hence, from the moment when this science shall begin to rule—i. e. when all those shall possess it who lead the great masses of the people that cannot possess it—absolutely no transcending of reason, no imaginations, no superstition will any longer be possible. All this will have been attacked and rooted out in its fundamental grounds.

Every one who has assisted in that general survey of finite reason, can at every moment state the point where the irrational transcends the limits of reason and contradicts it. He knows also how to make clear this contradiction at once to every one who has a sound mind, and who has the desire to be rational. It is thus with the judgments of common life; it is so likewise in regard to that kind of philosophy which has been current amongst us, exciting attention and creating innumerable confusions. All these confusions are at an end as soon as the Science of Knowledge is recognized. Hitherto philos-

ophy has desired to *be*, and desired to be something, only not knowing *what*; nay, this was even one of the chief points concerning which it disputed. But a complete survey of the whole field of finite thinking and knowing, establishes what part of this field belongs to philosophy, and what to all other sciences. Nor is any dispute possible concerning particular points and propositions, since all that is thinkable has been proved and determined in a scientific series of contemplation. Error is impossible; for contemplation never errs. The Science which liberates all the other sciences from their dreams, is not itself enveloped in dreams.

The Science of Knowledge exhausts all human knowledge in its fundamental principles, as I said; divides it, and distinguishes these fundamental characteristics. Hence the object of every possible science is involved in it. The manner in which such object must be treated appears likewise in the Science of Knowledge from its connection with the whole system of the human mind and from the laws which are valid in this region. The Science of Knowledge tells each co-operator in science what he can know, and what he cannot know; tells him the inquiries he may and should raise; furnishes him with the series of investigations to be explored, and teaches him how he has to undertake them and how to establish their proof. Hence the Science of Knowledge also puts a stop to the blind groping about, which now pervades all sciences. Each investigation which is undertaken decides for ever, since it can be certainly known whether the investigation has been undertaken correctly. Through all this the Science of Knowledge secures culture by removing it from the rule of blind chance, and bringing it under the control of rules and self-consciousness.

This is the result which the Science of Knowledge has in relation to those sciences which influence actual life; and hence mediately also in relation to actual life.

But the Science of Knowledge has, moreover, an immediate influence upon life. Although not in and for itself the correct practical mode of thinking, since it lacks the vitality of experience, it yet furnishes a complete picture of it. Whoever really possesses the Science of Knowledge, but otherwise has not and does not act in actual life according to the mode of thinking which it establishes as the only rational one, is at

least not in error concerning himself whenever he compares his actual with his philosophical thinking. He knows that he is a fool, and cannot but call himself one. He likewise has also at all times the power to discover the true principles of his badness, and the true means to reform himself. The least reflection concerning himself will show him what habits he must abolish, and what practices he ought, on the other hand, to undertake. If he does not at once become a wise man as well as a philosopher, the fault lies altogether in his will and his laziness; for no philosophy has the power to give strength to the will.

This is the relation of the Science of Knowledge to those who are personally in possession of it. Those who cannot so possess it, it influences through their governments and teachers.

Whenever the Science of Knowledge shall have been understood and accepted, the science of state government and all other sciences will cease to be a blind groping about and experimentalizing. That Science will become a science of fixed rules and principles; for these principles the Science of Knowledge establishes. True, it cannot infuse those who govern with the good will or the courage to carry out its principles; but it can at least take away from them the excuse that it is not their fault if human affairs are in a wretched condition. Every one who possesses that science will be able to tell them what they must do in order to improve human affairs; and if they still persist in not doing it, they will stand publicly convicted of lacking good intentions. It will therefore be possible from that moment to bring human affairs into such a condition, that it shall not only be easily possible, but almost necessary, for men to be orderly and honest citizens.

Not until this problem shall have been solved can teachers and educators hope to work successfully. The external condition of the end they have in view, and which condition does not depend upon them, will have been furnished. The ability to attain it lies in themselves; for their profession also will have been relieved by the Science of Knowledge from all superstitions and traditional rules, and will have been reduced to fixed principles. They will know clearly from what point they must start, and how they must proceed.

In one word, through the adoption and

general spreading of the Science of Knowledge amongst those for whom it is written, the whole human race will have been rid of the rule of blind chance, and fate will have been annihilated. Mankind will henceforth control itself under the rule of its own conception, and will henceforth make out of itself with absolute freedom all that can be made out of it.

All this which I have just asserted is strictly provable, and is involved in the mere conception of the Science of Knowledge as established in this work. The only possible question is, therefore, whether this conception can be realized; and this question can be decided, and decided only by those who actually do realize it, and who construe for themselves and re-invent that Science of Knowledge whereof we claim that it has already existence. But the success of what we have prophesied of it depends upon the fact whether the Science of Knowledge will come into the possession of the men who stand above the people either as men of science, or as teachers of the people. Whether this will be so, future ages must decide. In the present age, the Science of Knowledge has no other hopes and pretensions than that it may not be thrown aside and forgotten altogether, but may pass into at least a few, who can transmit it to a better age. If it attains this end, then the object of this work, and of the former and future works of the author, will have been accomplished.

A FEW WORDS, IN CONCLUSION, FOR THOSE PROFESSIONAL PHILOSOPHERS WHO HAVE HITHERTO BEEN OPPONENTS OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

It is true, this work is not written for you; nevertheless it will come into your hands, and, according to your previous practice, you will doubtless neither understand, nor indeed really read, but will at any rate review it. Unless the business is very urgent, I would ask you, before you proceed to this reviewing, to read at least these final words, written expressly for you, and which will have been written in vain unless you read them.

"The difference between conflicting opinions is not so very great; let, then, the parties in dispute each cede something to the other and make a compromise!" This is one of the favorite expressions of our humane age, and has been used also with ref-

erence to the dispute between you and me when people were yet somewhat calm. Now even if you have merely turned over the leaves of this work (as is sufficient for a review), you cannot have failed to perceive that the difference between you and me is indeed very great, and that it may be very true, what I have often enough told you and what you never wanted to accept seriously, namely, that there is absolutely not one common point between you and me concerning which or from which we might arrive at an understanding. In turning over these leaves, the reason why this should be so, or the real ground which separates our minds, may have become apparent to you.

But since it is equally possible that it may not have become apparent to you, I will state this point once more for your benefit—historically, of course, as such things can only be stated for you.

I propose to seize Science—not only the external systematic form, but the Interior of a *knowing*, that which is the sole ground that there is such a thing as knowledge, as conviction, or as certitude of consciousness—in its original source. You, on the contrary, however clever arguers you may be according to logical form—a glory which I will cheerfully grant to each of you in whatever degree he may be able to maintain it—have not even the slightest suspicion of this Interior of knowing. The whole depth of your being does not reach so far, and reaches no farther than historical acceptance, your business being to further analyze the traditions of this historical faith by means of argument. You have never in your life *known*, and hence do not know at all, how a man feels who knows. You remember how you used to laugh when *intellectual contemplation* was spoken of. If you had ever known, or known of knowing, you would not have laughed at this contemplation.

But not only have you no suspicion of that Interior of a knowing; you have, moreover, received in some dark tradition a shadow of that Unknown, which has led you to consider it as the worst of all stray paths, and as the most enormous aberration to which the human mind can become subject. You call it "Imaginary nonsense, word-quibbles, scholastic smoke, miserable sophistries!" etc. You skip this, wherever you find it, so that you may speedily get hold of the — *results* (i. e. propositions which may be historically seized and committed to

memory), or, as some of your representatives say, that you may get at things which interest the mind and heart. The puffed-up, enlightened culture and humanity of the present philosophical age consists precisely in what you have got rid of—those antiquated pedantries of former ages.

Now I esteem, and with all my energies strive precisely after that which you hold in contempt and fly away from. Our views as to what is proper, decent, and praiseworthy, are utter opposites; and if this opposition has not broken out before, it is simply because you had the benevolent opinion that my scholasticism was but a temporary aberration, and that my final object was, after all, the same as yours—namely, a popular and edifying everyday philosophy. You have spoken, it is true, of the signs of the times, and have said that some persons are endeavoring to restore that old barbarism—which I, to be sure, call the old thoroughness;—and you have complained that the enlightenment and fine literature of the Germans—which I call the emptiness and frivolity of the Germans—which had been so nicely set a-going, are now in danger of coming to an untimely end; which complaint you probably made with a view to avert this untimely end. There is no question that it will appear more and more how wretched the tendency of the Science of Knowledge is in this respect, and that, if it had full sway, that old barbarism would certainly be restored, and our beautiful enlightenment would certainly be completely destroyed.

Your nature, therefore, extends to historical faith, and no further. First of all, you have belonging to it your own life, in the existence whereof you believe firmly, merely because others believe in it; for if you were only so far advanced as to *know* that you live, things would stand quite differently in regard to you. Next, there floats in the current of time a lot of broken up fragments of previous sciences. You have heard it said that these pieces are valuable, and hence you try to catch as many of them as you can, and to exhibit them to the curious. You are very careful in handling these old pieces, lest they might get broken or crushed, or might otherwise lose their form in some manner; in which case you could not bequeath them to your heirs and assignees, nor they exhibit them again to the curious

of posterity. At the very utmost, you once in a while varnish or dust them a little.

I have come among you, and you have done me the honor to consider me one of your own. You have sought to render me collegial services, to take me into your councils, to warn me and to advise me. In this you have had the following luck, and you will always have the same luck unless you give up the business altogether:

Firstly, you have taken that which I taught, to be history. At first you took it to be crumbs from the Kantian table, and then you hastened to compare them with your own collection; and when you did not succeed in this, you took them to be at least crumbs from empirical life. Whatever I may say, assure, and protest, you cannot cease to turn my scientific propositions into propositions of empirical life, my contemplations into perceptions, my philosophy into psychology. This has happened to one of your own set even in regard to my second book on the *Destination of Man*, wherein I surely thought I had spoken clearly enough. That gentleman, in a review in the *Erlanger Literatur Zeitung*, reproves the *spirit of speculation* which I introduce in that book as speaking, because it asks after the *consciousness* of our hearing, seeing, &c. In that mere question the reviewer discovers already the deception. He, for his own person, knows through hearing, seeing, &c., without knowing of hearing, seeing, &c.; and the man is very correct from his standpoint.

I know very well that this must happen so to you people, and I also know the reason of it. You have not contemplation and cannot rise to it; hence only perception remains to you; and if that is denied to you, nothing remains in your hands. But this is precisely what I wish—namely, that nothing shall remain to you—as I shall immediately still further explain to you.

Secondly, you have taken every bite of those crumbs to be a complete for-itself-existing bite, such as your other collections contain; and have believed that all you had to do was to carry away such bite; that these bites could be singly taken away and stored up in memory. You have tried the experiment. But the single pieces, as you picked them up, would not fit together, and now you cried: Contradiction! This happened to you because you have no conception of a synthetical, systematic science, but know on-

ly collations of the sayings of wise men. Each science is to you a sand-pile, whereof each grain is existing and complete in itself, and comprehensible even as a grain of sand. But you know nothing of a science as an organic and self-organizing body. You tear a piece out of the organic body, show the pieces which hang flapping all around, and cry out: Is this smooth and complete?

This is precisely what happened to that reviewer with my books. Know, then—or, rather, know not you, but the popular reader, who perchance may read also these final pages—that my science proceeds, as all scientific work should proceed, from the most Undetermined; and that it further determines this before the eyes of the reader. Hence, in the progress of that science, the objects of that science have quite other predicates attached to them than at first; hence also this science often establishes and develops propositions which it finally refutes, proceeding as it does from antithesis to synthesis. The completely determined, final result, which is the ultimate and that which is to remain, is shown only at the end. You, of course, seek only this result, and the way of finding it does not exist for you. To write for you, we ought to state in the concisest possible manner what one means, so that you might quickly reflect and see whether you mean so likewise. If Enklid were an author of our day, how you would have shown up to him the contradictions, which are innumerable, in his book.—“Each triangle has three angles.” Very good; we will keep that in mind. “The content of the three angles in a triangle is equal to two right angles.” What a contradiction! you would cry out. On this page he says, “three angles in general, the content whereof can surely result in various sums”; and on the other, “only three such angles, the sum whereof is equal to two right angles.

You have improved my expressions and have taught me how to speak; for, being my judges, it is a matter of course that you should know better than I how to speak. The only theory you have forgotten is this: that we cannot properly advise another person *how* he shall speak until we know *what* he intends to speak. You have shown yourself anxious for the welfare of my readers; you have complained that I do not write plainly, and have often prophesied that the public, for whom I had written a work, would not be able to understand it; and if

you follow your usual practice, you will assert the same thing of the present book. But this you have believed only because you did not understand those books yourselves, and you assumed that the public at large had much less sense than you, who are learned men and philosophers; but in this presupposition you have made a great mistake. I have had much conversation respecting philosophy these many years, not only with young students, but also with grown-up persons, of various occupations in life, and belonging to the more cultured classes, and I have never in my life heard such nonsense in these conversations as you write down every day to be printed.

From this radical difference of our minds arise all the diverse phenomena which are witnessed every day. Thus when I say something which to me appears very easy, natural and self-evident, you consider it to be a terrible paradox which you cannot possibly make clear to yourselves; and in like manner, that which you presuppose as uncommonly plain and well known, against which no one could possibly object, often appears to me so full of confusion that it would require days to point it all out. These plain propositions of yours have floated down to you in the current of tradition, and you believe that you understand and know them because you have so often heard and uttered them yourselves without being contradicted.

The present work again is undoubtedly, in your estimation, full of such paradoxes, which you can quench with a single one of your plain propositions. Let me cite, as an example, only one, the very first one I lay hold of. “That which is attained through a mere word-explanation, is in the Science of Knowledge never the correct, but quite surely the incorrect,”—I have stated above. If you follow your usual practice, you will quote this proposition as a clear proof how far nonsense can possibly go. “For how in all the world can we arrive at any understanding except through a correct explanation of the words used?” Then you will commence to be witty in your manner—to congratulate the enlightened persons who desire to rise to this sense beyond the words by means of the Fichtean contemplation; to assure the public that you have no such desire; and whatever else your wit may suggest. At the same time, if you would attend to yourselves when merely reading a

political newspaper, you would discover that you do not understand even it, if you merely seize and analyze the words, but that you must cause your imagination to produce before you a picture of the event narrated, and let this picture pass before your mind; in other words, that you must *construct* the whole event if you wish to understand it; nay, still more, that you have done and do this all your lifetime, as sure as you ever understood or understand at present your newspaper. Only you did not observe it before, and I very much fear that you will fail to remark it now, although I call your attention to it; for the very blindness of this internal eye of your imagination is what I have always charged you with. But even if you had observed or did now observe it, it would not seem to you to be applicable at all to science. You always have believed that science need only be committed to memory, and it has never occurred to you, that, like the event narrated in the newspaper, it ought to be constructed in the mind. From this ground, now sufficiently exposed, you have hitherto so little understood the Science of Knowledge, that not a single one of you has perceived even the basis whereupon it is built. Now, when I tell you this, you get angry. But why should you get angry? Must I not say it? For if the public were to believe that the Science of Knowledge had been comprehended by you, and that it ought to be comprehended as you have comprehended it, it is just as if the Science of Knowledge had never had existence, for it would be the same as to kill it off in the quietest manner possible. Now, you cannot fairly presume that I should allow this to occur merely in order to prevent suspicions getting afloat concerning your powers of comprehension.

But neither will you understand the Science of Knowledge in the future. Apart from the fact, that some of you have rendered themselves very suspicious by the curious means employed to bring our science into bad repute, being inspired by other passions than a zeal for philosophy: apart from this, and abandoning that suspicion as unfounded, there might be perhaps some hope yet of you had you not already declared your standpoint and your heart's opinion so very loudly and publicly. But this, alas! you have done; and now you are asked all at once to change your whole nature, and to enter a light

wherein things, of which you have hitherto spoken in your off-hand way, and your whole spiritual condition, will appear to you I cannot express how pitiful! Perhaps all men who have risen to higher culture through quiet self-education have discovered that while at one time they stood firmly rooted in their convictions, they at some later time looked back with a melancholy smile upon their past errors. But it happens very rarely that men who have made the whole public witnesses of their errors, and who every day write, review, and lecture, without stopping, recognize and retract them.

Since this is all so, as you cannot but confess—if not publicly, at least in some secret nook of your souls when you are calm—the only thing you can do is henceforth to keep utterly silent in regard to every thing which concerns the Science of Knowledge and philosophy in general.

You *can* choose this course; for you can never persuade me that your organs of speech form the words which you utter, of themselves, or that your pens put themselves in motion and write down upon the paper those things which are afterwards printed with or without your name. I always shall believe that you move tongue and pen through your will alone.

Since you can do it, therefore, why should you not will it? I have reflected upon and considered the subject maturely, and I can absolutely discover no ground why you should not follow this advice, or why you should get angry at me for giving it to you.

You cannot plead your zeal for truth; for since you do not know at all—as your own conscience will tell you, if you ask it properly—what the Science of Knowledge really does teach, and since the whole region wherein it moves does not really exist for you at all, you cannot possibly know whether that which this science reports of those regions is truth or error. Leave this business, therefore, quietly to the persons whose proper business it is, upon their own responsibility; just as we allow the kings to rule their states and to conclude war and peace on their own responsibility, without offering our advice. Hitherto you have only stood in the way of an impartial investigation, have confused that which was simple, darkened that which was clear, and turned every thing topsy turvy. Why do you absolutely persist in being in the way?

Or do you believe that your honor will be

damaged if you, who have hitherto been the great leaders, suddenly become silent? You surely do not care for the opinion of the stupid! But sensible people will only think all the more of you.

Thus it is stated that Professor Jacob at Halle has utterly abandoned speculative philosophy, and devoted himself altogether to political economy, a branch of science wherein many excellent attainments may be expected from his praiseworthy accuracy and industry. He has shown himself a wise man by ceasing to be a philosopher; and I herewith publicly express my esteem for him on that account, and hope that every sensible man who knows what speculation is will share this esteem. Would that all the others would also abandon a science which they have abundantly tortured themselves to grasp, and for which they have discovered that they are not made. Let them turn to some other useful occupation—grinding glasses, making verses, writing novels, and studying agriculture or game-keeping; let them take service in the detective police, study medicine, raise cattle, or write devotional reflections on death for every day in the year,—and no one will refuse them his esteem.

But since, nevertheless, I cannot be sure that they and the like of them will follow good advice, I add the following in order that they can not plead that I did not tell them what would happen:

This is the third time that I make a report concerning the nature of the Science of Knowledge. I should not like to be compelled to do so a fourth time, and I am tired of seeing my words passing from mouth to mouth disfigured in such a terrible manner that I scarcely recognize them. Hence I shall presuppose that many of our modern literary men and philosophers will not even understand this third report. I also presuppose, because I *know* it, that absolutely every man can know whether he does or does not understand something, and that no one is forced to speak of a matter he is conscious of not understanding. Hence I shall no more leave this work to its fate than all my future scientific works, but shall strictly watch over the expressions it may excite, and comment upon them in a periodical. If it does not reform these gossips, it may at least teach the public what sort of people have undertaken, and still undertake, to direct its opinion.

Berlin, 1801.

SOME CONSEQUENCES OF FOUR INCAPACITIES.

[By C. S. PEIRCE.]

Descartes is the father of modern philosophy, and the spirit of Cartesianism—that which principally distinguishes it from the scholasticism which it displaced—may be compendiously stated as follows:

1. It teaches that philosophy must begin with universal doubt; whereas scholasticism had never questioned fundamentals.

2. It teaches that the ultimate test of certainty is to be found in the individual consciousness; whereas scholasticism had rested on the testimony of sages and of the Catholic Church.

3. The multifarious argumentation of the middle ages is replaced by a single thread of inference depending often upon inconspicuous premises.

4. Scholasticism had its mysteries of faith, but undertook to explain all created things. But there are many facts which Cartesianism

not only does not explain, but renders absolutely inexplicable, unless to say that "God makes them so" is to be regarded as an explanation.

In some, or all of these respects, most modern philosophers have been, in effect, Cartesians. Now without wishing to return to scholasticism, it seems to me that modern science and modern logic require us to stand upon a very different platform from this.

1. We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us *can* be questioned. Hence this initial scepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not real doubt; and no one who follows the Carte-

sian method will ever be satisfied until he has formally recovered all those beliefs which in form he has given up. It is, therefore, as useless a preliminary as going to the North Pole would be in order to get to Constantinople by coming down regularly upon a meridian. A person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian maxim. Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts.

2. The same formalism appears in the Cartesian criterion, which amounts to this: "Whatever I am clearly convinced of, is true." If I were really convinced, I should have done with reasoning, and should require no test of certainty. But thus to make single individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious. The result is that metaphysicians will all agree that metaphysics has reached a pitch of certainty far beyond that of the physical sciences;—only they can agree upon nothing else. In sciences in which men come to agreement, when a theory has been broached, it is considered to be on probation until this agreement is reached. After it is reached, the question of certainty becomes an idle one, because there is no one left who doubts it. We individually cannot reasonably hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we pursue; we can only seek it, therefore, for the *community* of philosophers. Hence, if disciplined and candid minds carefully examine a theory and refuse to accept it, this ought to create doubts in the mind of the author of the theory himself.

3. Philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in its methods, so far as to proceed only from tangible premises which can be subjected to careful scrutiny, and to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibres may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected.

4. Every unidealistic philosophy supposes some absolutely inexplicable, unanalyzable ultimate; in short, something resulting from mediation itself not susceptible of mediation. Now that anything is thus inexplicable can only be known by reasoning from signs. But the only justification of an inference

from signs is that the conclusion explains the fact. To suppose the fact absolutely inexplicable, is not to explain it, and hence this supposition is never allowable.

In the last number of this journal will be found a piece entitled "Questions concerning certain Faculties claimed for Man," which has been written in this spirit of opposition to Cartesianism. That criticism of certain faculties resulted in four denials, which for convenience may here be repeated:

1. We have no power of Introspection, but all knowledge of the internal world is derived by hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of external facts.

2. We have no power of Intuition, but every cognition is determined logically by previous cognitions.

3. We have no power of thinking without signs.

4. We have no conception of the absolutely incognizable.

These propositions cannot be regarded as certain: and, in order to bring them to a further test, it is now proposed to trace them out to their consequences. We may first consider the first alone; then trace the consequences of the first and second; then see what else will result from assuming the third also; and, finally, add the fourth to our hypothetical premises.

In accepting the first proposition, we must put aside all prejudices derived from a philosophy which bases our knowledge of the external world on our self-consciousness. We can admit no statement concerning what passes within us except as a hypothesis necessary to explain what takes place in what we commonly call the external world. Moreover when we have upon such grounds assumed one faculty or mode of action of the mind, we cannot, of course, adopt any other hypothesis for the purpose of explaining any fact which can be explained by our first supposition, but must carry the latter as far as it will go. In other words, we must, as far as we can do so without additional hypotheses, reduce all kinds of mental action to one general type.

The class of modifications of consciousness with which we must commence our inquiry must be one whose existence is indubitable, and whose laws are best known, and, therefore (since this knowledge comes

from the outside), which most closely follows external facts; that is, it must be some kind of cognition. Here we may hypothetically admit the second proposition of the former paper, according to which there is no absolutely first cognition of any object, but cognition arises by a continuous process. We must begin, then, with a *process* of cognition, and with that process whose laws are best understood and most closely follow external facts. This is no other than the process of valid inference, which proceeds from its premise, A, to its conclusion, B, only if, as a matter of fact, such a proposition as B is always or usually true when such a proposition as A is true. It is a consequence, then, of the first two principles whose results we are to trace out, that we must, as far as we can, without any other supposition than that the mind reasons, reduce all mental action to the formula of valid reasoning.

But does the mind in fact go through the syllogistic process? It is certainly very doubtful whether a conclusion—as something existing in the mind independently, like an image—suddenly displaces two premises existing in the mind in a similar way. But it is a matter of constant experience, that if a man is made to believe in the premises, in the sense that he will act from them and will say that they are true, under favorable conditions he will also be ready to act from the conclusion and to say that that is true. Something, therefore, takes place within the organism which is equivalent to the syllogistic process.

A valid inference is either *complete* or *incomplete*. An incomplete inference is one whose validity depends upon some matter of fact not contained in the premises. This implied fact might have been stated as a premise, and its relation to the conclusion is the same whether it is explicitly posited or not, since it is at least virtually taken for granted; so that every valid incomplete argument is virtually complete. Complete arguments are divided into *simple* and *complex*. A complex argument is one which from three or more premises concludes what might have been concluded by successive steps in reasonings each of which is simple. Thus, a complex inference comes to the same thing in the end as a succession of simple inferences.

A complete, simple, and valid argument,

or syllogism, is either *apodictic* or *probable*. An apodictic or deductive syllogism is one whose validity depends unconditionally upon the relation of the fact inferred to the facts posited in the premises. A syllogism whose validity should depend not merely upon its premises, but upon the existence of some other knowledge, would be impossible; for either this other knowledge would be posited, in which case it would be a part of the premises, or it would be implicitly assumed, in which case the inference would be incomplete. But a syllogism whose validity depends partly upon the *non-existence* of some other knowledge, is a *probable* syllogism.

A few examples will render this plain. The two following arguments are apodictic or deductive:

1. No series of days of which the first and last are different days of the week exceeds by one a multiple of seven days; now the first and last days of any leap-year are different days of the week, and therefore no leap-year consists of a number of days one greater than a multiple of seven.

2. Among the vowels there are no double letters; but one of the double letters (*w*) is compounded of two vowels: hence, a letter compounded of two vowels is not necessarily itself a vowel.

In both these cases, it is plain that as long as the premises are true, however other facts may be, the conclusions will be true. On the other hand, suppose that we reason as follows:—"A certain man had the Asiatic cholera. He was in a state of collapse, livid, quite cold, and without perceptible pulse. He was bled copiously. During the process he came out of collapse, and the next morning was well enough to be about. Therefore, bleeding tends to cure the cholera." This is a fair probable inference, provided that the premises represent our whole knowledge of the matter. But if we knew, for example, that recoveries from cholera were apt to be sudden, and that the physician who had reported this case had known of a hundred other trials of the remedy without communicating the result, then the inference would lose all its validity.

The absence of knowledge which is essential to the validity of any probable argument relates to some question which is determined by the argument itself. This question, like every other, is whether certain objects have certain characters. Hence, the absence

of knowledge is either whether besides the objects which, according to the premises, possess certain characters, any other objects possess them; or, whether besides the characters which, according to the premises, belong to certain objects, any other characters not necessarily involved in these belong to the same objects. In the former case, the reasoning proceeds as though all the objects which have certain characters were known, and this is *induction*; in the latter case, the inference proceeds as though all the characters requisite to the determination of a certain object or class were known, and this is *hypothesis*. This distinction, also, may be made more plain by examples.

Suppose we count the number of occurrences of the different letters in a certain English book, which we may call A. Of course, every new letter which we add to our count will alter the relative number of occurrences of the different letters; but as we proceed with our counting, this change will be less and less. Suppose that we find that as we increase the number of letters counted, the relative number of *e*'s approaches nearly $11\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. of the whole, that of the *t*'s $8\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., that of the *a*'s 8 per cent., that of the *s*'s $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., &c. Suppose we repeat the same observations with half a dozen other English writings (which we may designate as B, C, D, E, F, G) with the like result. Then we may infer that in every English writing of some length, the different letters occur with nearly those relative frequencies.

Now this argument depends for its validity upon our *not* knowing the proportion of letters in any English writing besides A, B, C, D, E, F and G. For if we know it in respect to H, and it is not nearly the same as in the others, our conclusion is destroyed at once; if it is the same, then the legitimate inference is from A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H, and not from the first seven alone. This, therefore, is an *induction*.

Suppose, next, that a piece of writing in cypher is presented to us, without the key. Suppose we find that it contains something less than 26 characters, one of which occurs about 11 per cent. of all the times, another $8\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., another 8 per cent., and another $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Suppose that when we substitute for these *e*, *t*, *a* and *s*, respectively, we are able to see how single letters may be substituted for each of the other characters so as to make sense in English, provided,

however, that we allow the spelling to be wrong in some cases. If the writing is of any considerable length, we may infer with great probability that this is the meaning of the cipher.

The validity of this argument depends upon there being no other known characters of the writing in cipher which would have any weight in the matter; for if there are—if we know, for example, whether or not there is any other solution of it—this must be allowed its effect in supporting or weakening the conclusion. This, then, is *hypothesis*.

All valid reasoning is either deductive, inductive, or hypothetic; or else it combines two or more of these characters. Deduction is pretty well treated in most logical textbooks; but it will be necessary to say a few words about induction and hypothesis in order to render what follows more intelligible.

Induction may be defined as an argument which proceeds upon the assumption that all the members of a class or aggregate have all the characters which are common to all those members of this class concerning which it is known, whether they have these characters or not; or, in other words, which assumes that that is true of a whole collection which is true of a number of instances taken from it at random. This might be called statistical argument. In the long run, it must generally afford pretty correct conclusions from true premises. If we have a bag of beans partly black and partly white, by counting the relative proportions of the two colors in several different handfuls, we can approximate more or less to the relative proportions in the whole bag, since a sufficient number of handfuls would constitute all the beans in the bag. The central characteristic and key to induction is, that by taking the conclusion so reached as major premise of a syllogism, and the proposition stating that such and such objects are taken from the class in question as the minor premise, the other premise of the induction will follow from them deductively. Thus, in the above example we concluded that all books in English have about $11\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. of their letters *e*'s. From that as major premise, together with the proposition that A, B, C, D, E, F and G are books in English, it follows deductively that A, B, C, D, E, F and G have about $11\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. of their letters *e*'s. Accordingly, induction has been defined by Aristotle as the inference of the major premise of a syllogism from its minor premise and conclu-

sion. The function of an induction is to substitute for a series of many subjects, a single one which embraces them and an indefinite number of others. Thus it is a species of "reduction of the manifold to unity."

Hypothesis may be defined as an argument which proceeds upon the assumption that a character which is known necessarily to involve a certain number of others, may be probably predicated of any object which has all the characters which this character is known to involve. Just as induction may be regarded as the inference of the major premise of a syllogism, so hypothesis may be regarded as the inference of the minor premise, from the other two propositions. Thus, the example taken above consists of two such inferences of the minor premises of the following syllogisms:

1. Every English writing of some length in which such and such characters denote *c*, *t*, *a*, and *s*, has about $11\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. of the first sort of marks, $8\frac{1}{2}$ of the second, 8 of the third, and $7\frac{1}{2}$ of the fourth;

This secret writing is an English writing of some length, in which such and such characters denote *c*, *t*, *a*, and *s*, respectively:

- ∴ This secret writing has about $11\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. of its characters of the first kind, $8\frac{1}{2}$ of the second, 8 of the third, and $7\frac{1}{2}$ of the fourth.

2. A passage written with such an alphabet makes sense when such and such letters are severally substituted for such and such characters.

This secret writing is written with such an alphabet.

- ∴ This secret writing makes sense when such and such substitutions are made.

The function of hypothesis is to substitute for a great series of predicates forming no unity in themselves, a single one (or small number) which involves them all, together (perhaps) with an indefinite number of others. It is, therefore, also a reduction of a manifold to unity.* Every deductive syllogism may be put into the form

If *A*, then *B*;

But *A*;

∴ *B*.

* Several persons versed in logic have objected that I have here quite misapplied the term *hypothesis*, and that what I so designate is an argument from *analogy*. It is a sufficient reply to say that the example of the cipher has been given as an apt il-

And as the minor premise in this form appears as antecedent or reason of a hypothetical proposition, hypothetic inference may be called reasoning from consequent to antecedent.

The argument from analogy, which a popular writer upon logic calls reasoning from particulars to particulars, derives its validity from its combining the characters of induction and hypothesis, being analyzable either into a deduction or an induction, or a deduction and a hypothesis.

But though inference is thus of three essentially different species, it also belongs to one genus. We have seen that no conclusion can be legitimately derived which could not have been reached by successions of arguments having two premises each, and implying no fact not asserted.

Either of these premises is a proposition asserting that certain objects have certain characters. Every term of such a proposition stands either for certain objects or for certain characters. The conclusion may be regarded as a proposition substituted in place of either premise, the substitution being justified by the fact stated in the other premise. The conclusion is accordingly derived from either premise by substituting either a new subject for the subject of the premise, or a new predicate for the predicate of the premise, or by both substitutions. Now the substitution of one term for another can be justified only so far as the term substituted represents only what is represented in the term replaced. If, therefore, the conclusion be denoted by the formula,

S is *P*;

and this conclusion be derived, by a change of subject, from a premise which may on this account be expressed by the formula,

M is *P*,

then the other premise must assert that whatever thing is represented by *S* is represented by *M*, or that

Every *S* is an *M*;

while, if the conclusion, *S* is *P*, is derived from either premise by a change of predicate, that premise may be written

S is *M*;

illustration of hypothesis by Descartes (Rule 10 *Œuvres choisies*: Paris, 1865, page 334), by Leibniz (*Nouv. Ess.*, lib. 4, ch. 12, § 13, Ed. Erdmann, p. 383 *b*), and (as I learn from D. Stewart; *Works*, vol. 3, pp. 305 et seq.) by Gravesande, Boscovich, Hartley, and G

and the other premise must assert that whatever characters are implied in *P* are implied in *M*, or that

Whatever is *M* is *P*.

In either case, therefore, the syllogism must be capable of expression in the form,

S is *M*; *M* is *P*;
∴ *S* is *P*.

Finally, if the conclusion differs from either of its premises, both in subject and

L. Le Sage. The term Hypothesis has been used in the following senses:—1. For the theme or proposition forming the subject of discourse. 2. For an assumption. Aristotle divides *theses* or propositions adopted without any reason into definitions and hypotheses. The latter are propositions stating the existence of something. Thus the geometer says, "Let there be a triangle." 3. For a condition in a general sense. We are said to seek other things than happiness *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*, conditionally. The best republic is the ideally perfect, the best the best on earth, the third the best *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*, under the circumstances. Freedom is the *ὑπόθεσις* or condition of democracy. 4. For the antecedent of a hypothetical proposition. 5. For an oratorical question which assumes facts. 6. In the Synopsis of Pællus, for the reference of a subject to the things it denotes. 7. Most commonly in modern times, for the conclusion of an argument from consequence and consequent to antecedent. This is my use of the term. 8. For such a conclusion when too weak to be a theory accepted into the body of a science.

I give a few authorities to support the seventh use:

Chauvin.—Lexicon Rationale. 1st Ed.—"Hypothesis est propositio, quæ assumitur ad probandum aliam veritatem incognitam. Requiritur multi, ut hæc hypothesis vera esse cognoscatur, etiam antequam appareat, an alia ex ea deduci possint. Verum aliud alii, hoc unum desiderari, ut hypothesis pro vera admittatur, quod nempe ex hac talia deducitur, quæ respondent phenomenis, et satisfaciunt omnibus difficultatibus, quæ hac parte in re, et in iis quæ de ea apparent, occurrant."

Newton.—"Hactenus phenomena cælorum et maris nostri per vim gravitatis exposui, sed causam gravitatis nondum assignavi..... Rationem vero harum gravitatis proprietatum ex phenomenis nondum potui deducere, et hypotheses non fingo. Quicquid enim ex phenomenis non deducitur, *hypothesis* vocanda est..... In hæc Philosophiæ Propositiones deducuntur ex phenomenis, et redduntur generales per inductionem." Principia. *Ad fin.*

Sir Wm. Hamilton.—"Hypotheses, that is, propositions which are assumed with probability, in order to explain or prove something else which cannot otherwise be explained or proved."—Lectures on Logic (Am. Ed.), p. 188.

"The name of *hypothesis* is more emphati-

predicate, the form of statement of conclusion and premise may be so altered that they shall have a common term. This can always be done, for if *P* is the premise and *C* the conclusion, they may be stated thus:

The state of things represented in *P* is real,
and
The state of things represented in *C* is real.

In this case the other premise must in some form virtually assert that every state

cally given to provisory suppositions, which serve to explain the phenomena in so far as observed, but which are only asserted to be true, if ultimately confirmed by a complete induction."—*Ibid.*, p. 364.

"When a phenomenon is presented which can be explained by no principle afforded through experience, we feel discontented and uneasy; and there arises an effort to discover some cause which may, at least provisionally, account for the outstanding phenomenon; and this cause is finally recognized as valid and true, if, through it, the given phenomenon is found to obtain a full and perfect explanation. The judgment in which a phenomenon is referred to such a problematic cause, is called a *Hypothesis*."—*Ibid.*, pp. 449, 450. See also Lectures on Metaphysics, p. 117.

J. S. Mill.—"An hypothesis is any supposition which we make (either without actual evidence, or on evidence avowedly insufficient), in order to endeavor to deduce from it conclusions in accordance with facts which are known to be real; under the idea that if the conclusions to which the hypothesis leads are known truths, the hypothesis itself either must be, or at least is likely to be true."—Logic (6th Ed.), vol. 2, p. 8.

Kant.—"If all the consequences of a cognition are true, the cognition itself is true..... It is allowable, therefore, to conclude from consequent to a reason, but without being able to determine this reason. From the complexus of all consequents alone can we conclude the truth of a determinate reason..... The difficulty with this *positive* and *direct* mode of inference (*modus ponens*) is that the totality of the consequents cannot be apodictically recognized, and that we are therefore led by this mode of inference only to a probable and *hypothetically* true cognition (*Hypotheses*)."—Logik by Jäsche Werke; Ed. Roseuk. and Sch., vol. 3, p. 221.

"A hypothesis is the judgment of the truth of a reason on account of the sufficiency of the consequents."—*Ibid.*, p. 262.

Herbart.—"We can make hypotheses, thence deduce consequents, and afterwards see whether the latter accord with experience. Such suppositions are termed hypotheses."—Einleitung; Werke, vol. 1, p. 53.

Beneke.—"Affirmative inferences from consequent to antecedent, or hypotheses."—System der Logik, vol. 2, p. 103.

There would be no difficulty in greatly multiplying these citations.

of things such as is represented by *C* is the state of things represented in *P*.

All valid reasoning, therefore, is of one general form; and in seeking to reduce all mental action to the formulae of valid inference, we seek to reduce it to one single type.

An apparent obstacle to the reduction of all mental action to the type of valid inferences is the existence of fallacious reasoning. Every argument implies the truth of a general principle of inferential procedure (whether involving some matter of fact concerning the subject of argument, or merely a maxim relating to a system of signs), according to which it is a valid argument. If this principle is false, the argument is a fallacy; but neither a valid argument from false premises, nor an exceedingly weak, but not altogether illegitimate, induction or hypothesis, however its force may be overestimated, however false its conclusion, is a fallacy.

Now words, taken just as they stand, if in the form of an argument, thereby do imply whatever fact may be necessary to make the argument conclusive; so that to the formal logician, who has to do only with the meaning of the words according to the proper principles of interpretation, and not with the intention of the speaker as guessed at from other indications, the only fallacies should be such as are simply absurd and contradictory, either because their conclusions are absolutely inconsistent with their premises, or because they connect propositions by a species of illative conjunction, by which they cannot under any circumstances be validly connected.

But to the psychologist an argument is valid only if the premises from which the mental conclusion is derived would be sufficient, if true, to justify it, either by themselves, or by the aid of other propositions which had previously been held for true. But it is easy to show that all inferences made by man, which are not valid in this sense, belong to four classes, viz.: 1. Those whose premises are false; 2. Those which have some little force, though only a little; 3. Those which result from confusion of one proposition with another; 4. Those which result from the indistinct apprehension, wrong application, or falsity, of a rule of inference. For, if a man were to commit a fallacy not of either of these classes, he would, from true premises conceived with

perfect distinctness, without being led astray by any prejudice or other judgment serving as a rule of inference, draw a conclusion which had really not the least relevancy. If this could happen, calm consideration and care could be of little use in thinking, for caution only serves to insure our taking all the facts into account, and to make those which we do take account of, distinct; nor can coolness do anything more than to enable us to be cautious, and also to prevent our being affected by a passion in inferring that to be true which we wish were true, or which we fear may be true, or in following some other wrong rule of inference. But experience shows that the calm and careful consideration of the same distinctly conceived premises (including prejudices) will insure the pronouncement of the same judgment by all men. Now if a fallacy belongs to the first of these four classes and its premises are false, it is to be presumed that the procedure of the mind from these premises to the conclusion is either correct, or errs in one of the other three ways; for it cannot be supposed that the mere falsity of the premises should affect the procedure of reason when that falsity is not known to reason. If the fallacy belongs to the second class and has some force, however little, it is a legitimate probable argument, and belongs to the type of valid inference. If it is of the third class and results from the confusion of one proposition with another, this confusion must be owing to a resemblance between the two propositions; that is to say, the person reasoning, seeing that one proposition has some of the characters which belong to the other, concludes that it has all the essential characters of the other, and is equivalent to it. Now this is a hypothetic inference, which though it may be weak, and though its conclusion happens to be false, belongs to the type of valid inferences; and, therefore, as the *modus* of the fallacy lies in this confusion, the procedure of the mind in these fallacies of the third class conforms to the formula of valid inference. If the fallacy belongs to the fourth class, it either results from wrongly applying or misapprehending a rule of inference, and so is a fallacy of confusion, or it results from adopting a wrong rule of inference. In this latter case, this rule is in fact taken as a premise, and therefore the false conclusion is owing merely to the falsity of a premise. In every fallacy, therefore, possible to the mind of man, the

procedure of the mind conforms to the formula of valid inference.

The third principle whose consequences we have to deduce is, that, whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some feeling, image, conception, or other representation, which serves as a sign. But it follows from our own existence (which is proved by the occurrence of ignorance and error) that everything which is present to us is a phenomenal manifestation of ourselves. This does not prevent its being a phenomenon of something without us, just as a rainbow is at once a manifestation both of the sun and of the rain. When we think, then, we ourselves, as we are at that moment, appear as a sign. Now a sign has, as such, three references: 1st, it is a sign to some thought which interprets it; 2d, it is a sign for some object to which in that thought it is equivalent; 3d, it is a sign, in some respect or quality, which brings it into connection with its object. Let us ask what the three correlates are to which a thought-sign refers.

1. When we think, to what thought does that thought-sign which is ourself address itself? It may, through the medium of outward expression, which it reaches perhaps only after considerable internal development, come to address itself to thought of another person. But whether this happens or not, it is always interpreted by a subsequent thought of our own. If, after any thought, the current of ideas flows on freely, it follows the law of mental association. In that case, each former thought suggests something to the thought which follows it, i. e. is the sign of something to this latter. Our train of thought may, it is true, be interrupted. But we must remember that, in addition to the principal element of thought at any moment, there are a hundred things in our mind to which but a small fraction of attention or consciousness is conceded. It does not, therefore, follow, because a new constituent of thought gets the uppermost, that the train of thought which it displaces is broken off altogether. On the contrary, from our second principle, that there is no intuition or cognition not determined by previous cognitions, it follows that the striking in of a new experience is never an instantaneous affair, but is an *event* occupying time, and coming to pass by a continuous process. Its prominence in consciousness, therefore, must probably be the con-

summation of a growing process; and if so, there is no sufficient cause for the thought which had been the leading one just before, to cease abruptly and instantaneously. But if a train of thought ceases by gradually dying out, it freely follows its own law of association as long as it lasts, and there is no moment at which there is a thought belonging to this series, subsequently to which there is not a thought which interprets or repeats it. There is no exception, therefore, to the law that every thought-sign is translated or interpreted in a subsequent one, unless it be that all thought comes to an abrupt and final end in death.

2. The next question is: For what does the thought-sign stand—what does it name—what is its *suppositum*? The outward thing, undoubtedly, when a real outward thing is thought of. But still, as the thought is determined by a previous thought of the same object, it only refers to the thing through denoting this previous thought. Let us suppose, for example, that Toussaint is thought of, and first thought of as a *negro*, but not distinctly as a man. If this distinctness is afterwards added, it is through the thought that a *negro* is a *man*; that is to say, the subsequent thought, *man*, refers to the outward thing by being predicated of that previous thought, *negro*, which has been had of that thing. If we afterwards think of Toussaint as a general, then we think that this negro, this man, was a general. And so in every case the subsequent thought denotes what was thought in the previous thought.

3. The thought-sign stands for its object in the respect which is thought; that is to say, this respect is the immediate object of consciousness in the thought, or, in other words, it is the thought itself, or at least what the thought is thought to be in the subsequent thought to which it is a sign.

We must now consider two other properties of signs which are of great importance in the theory of cognition. Since a sign is not identical with the thing signified, but differs from the latter in some respects, it must plainly have some characters which belong to it in itself, and have nothing to do with its representative function. These I call the *material* qualities of the sign. As examples of such qualities, take in the word "man" its consisting of three letters—in a picture, its being flat and without relief. In the second place, a sign must be capable of

being connected (not in the reason but really) with another sign of the same object, or with the object itself. Thus, words would be of no value at all unless they could be connected into sentences by means of a real copula which joins signs of the same thing. The usefulness of some signs—as a weather-cock, a tally, &c.—consists wholly in their being really connected with the very things they signify. In the case of a picture such a connection is not evident, but it exists in the power of association which connects the picture with the brain-sign which labels it. This real, physical connection of a sign with its object, either immediately or by its connection with another sign, I call the *pure demonstrative application* of the sign. Now the representative function of a sign lies neither in its material quality nor in its pure demonstrative application; because it is something which the sign is, not in itself or in a real relation to its object, but which it is *to a thought*, while both of the characters just defined belong to the sign independently of its addressing any thought. And yet if I take all the things which have certain qualities and physically connect them with another series of things, each to each, they become fit to be signs. If they are not regarded as such they are not actually signs, but they are so in the same sense, for example, in which an unseen flower can be said to be *red*, this being also a term relative to a mental affection.

Consider a state of mind which is a conception. It is a conception by virtue of having a *meaning*, a logical comprehension; and if it is applicable to any object, it is because that object has the characters contained in the comprehension of this conception. Now the logical comprehension of a thought is usually said to consist of the thoughts contained in it; but thoughts are events, acts of the mind. Two thoughts are two events separated in time, and one cannot literally be contained in the other. It may be said that all thoughts exactly similar are regarded as one; and that to say that one thought contains another, means that it contains one exactly similar to that other. But how can two thoughts be similar? Two objects can only be *regarded* as similar if they are compared and brought together in the mind. Thoughts have no existence except in the mind; only as they are regarded do they exist. Hence, two thoughts cannot *be* similar unless they are brought together

in the mind. But, as to their existence, two thoughts are separated by an interval of time. We are too apt to imagine that we can frame a thought similar to a past thought, by matching it with the latter, as though this past thought were still present to us. But it is plain that the knowledge that one thought is similar to or in any way truly representative of another, cannot be derived from immediate perception, but must be an hypothesis (unquestionably fully justifiable by facts), and that therefore the formation of such a representing thought must be dependent upon a real effective force behind consciousness, and not merely upon a mental comparison. What we must mean, therefore, by saying that one concept is contained in another, is that we normally represent one to be in the other; that is, that we form a particular kind of judgment,* of which the subject signifies one concept and the predicate the other.

No thought in itself, then, no feeling in itself, contains any others, but is absolutely simple and unanalyzable; and to say that it is composed of other thoughts and feelings, is like saying that a movement upon a straight line is composed of the two movements of which it is the resultant; that is to say, it is a metaphor, or fiction, parallel to the truth. Every thought, however artificial and complex, is, so far as it is immediately present, a mere sensation without parts, and therefore, in itself, without similarity to any other, but incomparable with any other and absolutely *sui generis*.† Whatever is wholly incomparable with anything else is wholly inexplicable, because explanation consists in bringing things under general laws or under natural classes. Hence every thought, in so far as it is a feeling of a peculiar sort, is simply an ultimate, inexplicable fact. Yet this does not conflict with my postulate that that fact should be allowed to stand as inexplicable; for, on the one hand, we never can think, "This is present to me," since, before

* A judgment concerning a minimum of information, for the theory of which see my paper on Comprehension and Extension, in the Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, vol. 7, p. 426.

† Observe that I say *in itself*. I am not so wild as to deny that my sensation of red to-day is like my sensation of red yesterday. I only say that the similarity can *consist* only in the physiological force behind consciousness,—which leads me to say, I recognize this feeling the same as the former one, and so does not consist in a community of sensation.

we have time to make the reflection, the sensation is past, and, on the other hand, when once past, we can never bring back the quality of the feeling as it was *in and for itself*, or know what it was like *in itself*, or even discover the existence of this quality except by a corollary from our general theory of ourselves, and then not in its idiosyncrasy, but only as something present. But, as something present, feelings are all alike and require no explanation, since they contain only what is universal. So that nothing which we can truly predicate of feelings is left inexplicable, but only something which we cannot reflectively know. So that we do not fall into the contradiction of making the Mediate immediate. Finally, no present actual thought (which is a mere feeling) has any meaning, any intellectual value; for this lies not in what is actually thought, but in what this thought may be connected with in representation by subsequent thoughts; so that the meaning of a thought is altogether something virtual. It may be objected, that if no thought has any meaning, all thought is without meaning. But this is a fallacy similar to saying, that, if in no one of the successive spaces which a body fills there is room for motion, there is no room for motion throughout the whole. At no one instant in my state of mind is there cognition or representation, but in the relation of my states of mind at different instants there is.* In short, the Immediate (and therefore in itself unsusceptible of mediation—the Unanalyzable, the Inexplicable, the Unintellectual) runs in a continuous stream through our lives; it is the sum total of consciousness, whose mediation, which is the continuity of it, is brought about by a real effective force behind consciousness.

Thus, we have in thought three elements: 1st, the representative function which makes it a *representation*; 2d, the pure denotative application, or real connection, which brings one thought into *relation* with another; and 3d, the material quality, or how it feels, which gives thought its *quality*.†

That a sensation is not necessarily an intuition, or first impression of sense, is very

* Accordingly, just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a body we ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts are in us.

† On quality, relation, and representation, see *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, vol. 7, p. 293.

evident in the case of the sense of beauty; and has been shown, upon page 105 of this volume, in the case of sound. When the sensation beautiful is determined by previous cognitions, it always arises as a predicate; that is, we think that something is beautiful. Whenever a sensation thus arises in consequence of others, induction shows that those others are more or less complicated. Thus, the sensation of a particular kind of sound arises in consequence of impressions upon the various nerves of the ear being combined in a particular way, and following one another with a certain rapidity. A sensation of color depends upon impressions upon the eye following one another in a regular manner, and with a certain rapidity. The sensation of beauty arises upon a manifold of other impressions. And this will be found to hold good in all cases. Secondly, all these sensations are in themselves simple, or more so than the sensations which give rise to them. Accordingly, a sensation is a simple predicate taken in place of a complex predicate; in other words, it fulfils the function of an hypothesis. But the general principle that every thing to which such and such a sensation belongs, has such and such a complicated series of predicates, is not one determined by reason (as we have seen), but is of an arbitrary nature. Hence, the class of hypothetic inferences which the arising of a sensation resembles, is that of reasoning from definition to definitum, in which the major premise is of an arbitrary nature. Only in this mode of reasoning, this premise is determined by the conventions of language, and expresses the occasion upon which a word is to be used; and in the formation of a sensation, it is determined by the constitution of our nature, and expresses the occasions upon which sensation, or a natural mental sign, arises. Thus, the sensation, so far as it represents something, is determined, according to a logical law, by previous cognitions; that is to say, these cognitions determine that there shall be a sensation. But so far as the sensation is a mere feeling of a particular sort, it is determined only by an inexplicable, occult power; and so far, it is not a representation, but only the material quality of a representation. For just as in reasoning from definition to definitum, it is indifferent to the logician how the defined word shall sound, or how many letters it shall contain, so in the case of this constitu-

tional word, it is not determined by an inward law how it shall feel in itself. A feeling, therefore, as a feeling, is merely the *material quality* of a mental sign.

But there is no feeling which is not also a representation, a predicate of something determined logically by the feelings which precede it. For if there are any such feelings not predicates, they are the emotions. Now every emotion has a subject. If a man is angry, he is saying to himself that this or that is vile and outrageous. If he is in joy, he is saying "this is delicious." If he is wondering, he is saying "this is strange." In short, whenever a man feels, he is thinking of *something*. Even those passions which have no definite object—as melancholy—only come to consciousness through tingling the *objects of thought*. That which makes us look upon the emotions more as affections of self than other cognitions, is that we have found them more dependent upon our accidental situation at the moment than other cognitions; but that is only to say that they are cognitions too narrow to be useful. The emotions, as a little observation will show, arise when our attention is strongly drawn to complex and inconceivable circumstances. Fear arises when we cannot predict our fate; joy, in the case of certain indescribable and peculiarly complex sensations. If there are some indications that something greatly for my interest, and which I have anticipated would happen, may not happen; and if, after weighing probabilities, and inventing safeguards, and straining for further information, I find myself unable to come to any fixed conclusion in reference to the future, in the place of that intellectual hypothetic inference which I seek, the feeling of *anxiety* arises. When something happens for which I cannot account, I *wonder*. When I endeavor to realize to myself what I never can do, a pleasure in the future, I *hope*. "I do not understand you," is the phrase of an angry man. The indescribable, the ineffable, the incomprehensible, commonly excite emotion; but nothing is so chilling as a scientific explanation. Thus an emotion is always a simple predicate substituted by an operation of the mind for a highly complicated predicate. Now if we consider that a very complex predicate demands explanation by means of an hypothesis, that that hypothesis must be a simpler predicate substituted for that complex one; and that when we have an emotion, an hypothesis, strictly

speaking, is hardly possible—the analogy of the parts played by emotion and hypothesis is very striking. There is, it is true, this difference between an emotion and an intellectual hypothesis, that we have reason to say in the case of the latter, that to whatever the simple hypothetic predicate can be applied, of that the complex predicate is true; whereas, in the case of an emotion this is a proposition for which no reason can be given, but which is determined merely by our emotional constitution. But this corresponds precisely to the difference between hypothesis and reasoning from definition to definition, and thus it would appear that emotion is nothing but sensation. There appears to be a difference, however, between emotion and sensation, and I would state it as follows:

There is some reason to think that, corresponding to every feeling within us, some motion takes place in our bodies. This property of the thought-sign, since it has no rational dependence upon the meaning of the sign, may be compared with what I have called the material quality of the sign; but it differs from the latter inasmuch as it is not essentially necessary that it should be felt in order that there should be any thought-sign. In the case of a sensation, the manifold of impressions which precede and determine it are not of a kind, the bodily motion corresponding to which comes from any large ganglion or from the brain, and probably for this reason the sensation produces no great commotion in the bodily organism; and the sensation itself is not a thought which has a very strong influence upon the current of thought except by virtue of the information it may serve to afford. An emotion, on the other hand, comes much later in the development of thought—I mean, further from the first beginning of the cognition of its object—and the thoughts which determine it already have motions corresponding to them in the brain, or the chief ganglion; consequently, it produces large movements in the body, and, independently of its representative value, strongly affects the current of thought. The animal motions to which I allude, are, in the first place and obviously, blushing, blenching, staring, smiling, scowling, pouting, laughing, weeping, sobbing, wriggling, flinching, trembling, being petrified, sighing, sniffling, shrugging, groaning, heartsinking, trepidation, swelling of the heart, etc. etc. To

these may, perhaps, be added, in the second place, other more complicated actions, which nevertheless spring from a direct impulse and not from deliberation.

That which distinguishes both sensations proper and emotions from the feeling of a thought, is that in the case of the two former the material quality is made prominent, because the thought has no relation of reason to the thoughts which determine it, which exists in the last case and detracts from the attention given to the mere feeling. By there being no relation of reason to the determining thoughts, I mean that there is nothing in the content of the thought which explains why it should arise only on occasion of these determining thoughts. If there is such a relation of reason, if the thought is essentially limited in its application to these objects, then the thought comprehends a thought other than itself; in other words, it is then a complex thought. An incomplex thought can, therefore, be nothing but a sensation or emotion, having no rational character. This is very different from the ordinary doctrine, according to which the very highest and most metaphysical conceptions are absolutely simple. I shall be asked how such a conception of a *being* is to be analyzed, or whether I can ever define *one*, *two*, and *three*, without a diallele. Now I shall admit at once that neither of these conceptions can be separated into two others higher than itself; and in that sense, therefore, I fully admit that certain very metaphysical and eminently intellectual notions are absolutely simple. But though these concepts cannot be defined by genus and difference, there is another way in which they can be defined. All determination is by negation; we can first recognize any character only by putting an object which possesses it into comparison with an object which possesses it not. A conception, therefore, which was quite universal in every respect would be unrecognizable and impossible. We do not obtain the conception of Being, in the sense implied in the copula, by observing that all the things which we can think of have something in common, for there is no such thing to be observed. We get it by reflecting upon signs—words or thoughts;—we observe that different predicates may be attached to the same subject, and that each makes some conception applicable to the subject; then we imagine that a

subject has something true of it merely because a predicate (no matter what) is attached to it,—and that we call Being. The conception of being is, therefore, a conception about a sign—a thought, or word;—and since it is not applicable to every sign, it is not primarily universal, although it is so in its mediate application to things. Being, therefore, may be defined; it may be defined, for example, as that which is common to the objects included in any class, and to the objects not included in the same class. But it is nothing new to say that metaphysical conceptions are primarily and at bottom thoughts about words, or thoughts about thoughts; it is the doctrine both of Aristotle (whose categories are parts of speech) and of Kant (whose categories are the characters of different kinds of propositions).

Sensation and the power of abstraction or attention may be regarded as, in one sense, the sole constituents of all thought. Having considered the former, let us now attempt some analysis of the latter. By the force of attention, an emphasis is put upon one of the objective elements of consciousness. This emphasis is, therefore, not itself an object of immediate consciousness; and in this respect it differs entirely from a feeling. Therefore, since the emphasis, nevertheless, consists in some effect upon consciousness, and so can exist only so far as it affects our knowledge; and since an act cannot be supposed to determine that which precedes it in time, this act can consist only in the capacity which the cognition emphasized has for producing an effect upon memory, or otherwise influencing subsequent thought. This is confirmed by the fact that attention is a matter of continuous quantity; for continuous quantity, so far as we know it, reduces itself in the last analysis to time. Accordingly, we find that attention does, in fact, produce a very great effect upon subsequent thought. In the first place, it strongly affects memory, a thought being remembered for a longer time the greater the attention originally paid to it. In the second place, the greater the attention, the closer the connection and the more accurate the logical sequence of thought. In the third place, by attention a thought may be recovered which has been forgotten. From these facts, we gather that attention is the power by which thought at one time is connected with and made to relate to thought at another time;

or, to apply the conception of thought as a sign, that it is the *pure demonstrative application* of a thought-sign.

Attention is roused when the same phenomenon presents itself repeatedly on different occasions, or the same predicate in different subjects. We see that *A* has a certain character, that *B* has the same, *C* has the same; and this excites our attention, so that we say, "*These* have this character." Thus attention is an act of induction; but it is an induction which does not increase our knowledge, because our "*these*" covers nothing but the instances experienced. It is, in short, an argument from enumeration.

Attention produces effects upon the nervous system. These effects are habits, or nervous associations. A habit arises, when, having had the sensation of performing a certain act, *m*, on several occasions *a*, *b*, *c*, we come to do it upon every occurrence of the general event, *l*, of which *a*, *b* and *c* are special cases. That is to say, by the cognition that

Every case of *a*, *b*, or *c*, is a case of *m*,
is determined the cognition that

Every case of *l* is a case of *m*.

Thus the formation of a habit is an induction, and is therefore necessarily connected with attention or abstraction. Voluntary actions result from the sensations produced by habits, as instinctive actions result from our original nature.

We have thus seen that every sort of modification of consciousness—Attention, Sensation, and Understanding—is an inference. But the objection may be made that inference deals only with general terms, and that an image, or absolutely singular representation, cannot therefore be inferred.

"Singular" and "individual" are equivocal terms. A singular may mean that which can be but in one place at one time. In this sense it is not opposed to general. *The sun* is a singular in this sense, but, as is explained in every good treatise on logic, it is a general term. I may have a very general conception of *Hermolaus Barbarus*, but still I conceive him only as able to be in one place at one time. When an image is said to be singular, it is meant that it is absolutely determinate in all respects. Every possible character, or the negative thereof, must be true of such an image. In the words of the most eminent expounder of the doctrine, the image of a man "must be either

of a white, or a black, or a tawny; a straight, or a crooked; a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man." It must be of a man with his mouth open or his mouth shut, whose hair is precisely of such and such a shade, and whose figure has precisely such and such proportions. No statement of Locke has been so scouted by all friends of images as his denial that the "idea" of a triangle must be either of an obtuse-angled, right-angled, or acute-angled triangle. In fact, the image of a triangle must be of one, each of whose angles is of a certain number of degrees, minutes, and seconds.

This being so, it is apparent that no man has a *true* image of the road to his office, or of any other real thing. Indeed he has no image of it at all unless he can not only recognize it, but imagines it (truly or falsely) in all its infinite details. This being the case, it becomes very doubtful whether we ever have any such thing as an image in our imagination. Please, reader, to look at a bright red book, or other brightly colored object, and then to shut your eyes and say whether you *see* that color, whether brightly or faintly—whether, indeed, there is anything like sight there. Hume and the other followers of Berkeley maintain that there is no difference, between the sight and the memory of the red book except in "their different degrees of force and vivacity." "The colors which the memory employs," says Hume, "are faint and dull compared with those in which our original perceptions are clothed." If this were a correct statement of the difference, we should remember the book as being less red than it is; whereas, in fact, we remember the color with very great precision for a few moments [please to test this point, reader], although we do not see any thing like it. We carry away absolutely nothing of the color except the *consciousness that we could recognize it*. As a further proof of this, I will request the reader to try a little experiment. Let him call up, if he can, the image of a horse—not of one which he has ever seen, but of an imaginary one,—and before reading further let him by contemplation* fix the image in his memory. . . .

* No person whose native tongue is English will need to be informed that contemplation is essentially (1) protracted (2) voluntary, and (3) an action, and that it is never used for that which is set forth to the mind in this act. A foreigner can convince himself of this by the proper study of English writers. Thus, Locke (Essay concerning Human Understanding,

Has the reader done as requested? for I protest that it is not fair play to read further without doing so. — Now, the reader can say in general of what color that horse was, whether grey, bay, or black. But he probably cannot say *precisely* of what shade it was. He cannot state this as exactly as he could just after having *seen* such a horse. But why, if he had an image in his mind which no more had the general color than it had the particular shade, has the latter vanished so instantaneously from his memory while the former still remains? It may be replied, that we always forget the details before we do the more general characters; but that this answer is insufficient is, I think, shown by the extreme disproportion between the length of time that the exact shade of something looked at is remembered as compared with that instantaneous oblivion to the exact shade of the thing imagined, and the but slightly superior vividness of the memory of the thing seen as compared with the memory of the thing imagined.

The nominalists, I suspect, confound together thinking a triangle without thinking that it is either equilateral, isosceles, or scalene, and thinking a triangle without thinking whether it is equilateral, isosceles, or scalene.

It is important to remember that we have no intuitive power of distinguishing between one subjective mode of cognition and another; and hence often think that something is presented to us as a picture, while it is really constructed from slight data by the understanding. This is the case with dreams, as is shown by the frequent impossibility of giving an intelligible account of one without adding something which we feel was not in the dream itself. Many dreams, of which the waking memory

makes elaborate and consistent stories, must probably have been in fact mere jumbles of these feelings of the ability to recognize this and that which I have just alluded to.

I will now go so far as to say that we have no images even in actual perception. It will be sufficient to prove this in the case of vision; for if no picture is seen when we look at an object, it will not be claimed that hearing, touch, and the other senses, are superior to sight in this respect. That the picture is not painted on the nerves of the retina is absolutely certain, if, as physiologists inform us, these nerves are needle-points pointing to the light and at distances considerably greater than the *minimum visibile*. The same thing is shown by our not being able to perceive that there is a large blind spot near the middle of the retina. If, then, we have a picture before us when we see, it is one constructed by the mind at the suggestion of previous sensations. Supposing these sensations to be signs, the understanding by reasoning from them could attain all the knowledge of outward things which we derive from sight, while the sensations are quite inadequate to forming an image or representation absolutely determinate. If we have such an image or picture, we must have in our minds a representation of a surface which is only a part of every surface we see, and we must see that each part, however small, has such and such a color. If we look from some distance at a speckled surface, it seems as if we did not see whether it were speckled or not; but if we have an image before us, it must appear to us either as speckled, or as not speckled. Again, the eye by education comes to distinguish minute differences of color; but if we see only absolutely determinate images, we must, no less before our eyes are trained than after-

Book II., chap. 19, § 1) says, "If it [an idea] be held there [in view] long under attentive consideration, 'tis *Contemplation*"; and again, (*Ibid.*, Book II., chap. 10, § 1) "Keeping the *Idea*, which is brought into it [the mind] for some time actually in view, which is called *Contemplation*." This term is therefore unfitted to translate *Anschauung*; for this latter does not imply an act which is necessarily protracted or voluntary, and denotes most usually a mental presentation, sometimes a faculty, less often the reception of an impression in the mind, and seldom, if ever, an action. To the translation of *Anschauung* by intuition, there is, at least, no such insufferable objection. Etymologically the two words precisely correspond. The original philosophical meaning of intuition

was a cognition of the present manifold in that character; and it is now commonly used, as a modern writer says, "to include all the products of the perceptive (external or internal) and imaginative faculties; every act of consciousness, in short, of which the immediate object is an *individual*, thing, act, or state of mind, presented under the condition of distinct existence in space and time." Finally, we have the authority of Kant's own example for translating his *Anschauung* by *Intuitus*; and, indeed, this is the common usage of Germans writing Latin. Moreover, *intuitus* frequently replaces *anschauend* or *anschaulich*. If this constitutes a misunderstanding of Kant, it is one which is shared by himself and nearly all his countrymen.

wards, see each color as particularly such and such a shade. Thus to suppose that we have an image before us when we see, is not only a hypothesis which explains nothing whatever, but is one which actually creates difficulties which require new hypotheses in order to explain them away.

One of these difficulties arises from the fact that the details are less easily distinguished than, and forgotten before, the general circumstances. Upon this theory, the general features exist in the details: the details are, in fact, the whole picture. It seems, then, very strange that that which exists only secondarily in the picture should make more impression than the picture itself. It is true that in an old painting the details are not easily made out; but this is because we know that the blackness is the result of time, and is no part of the picture itself. There is no difficulty in making out the details of the picture as it looks at present; the only difficulty is in guessing what it used to be. But if we have a picture on the retina, the minutest details are there as much as, nay, more than, the general outline and significancy of it. Yet that which must actually be seen, it is extremely difficult to recognize; while that which is only abstracted from what is seen is very obvious.

But the conclusive argument against our having any images, or absolutely determinate representations in perception, is that in that case we have the materials in each such representation for an infinite amount of conscious cognition, which we yet never become aware of. Now there is no meaning in saying that we have something in our minds which never has the least effect on what we are conscious of knowing. The most that can be said is, that when we see we are put in a condition in which we are able to get a very large and perhaps indefinitely great amount of knowledge of the visible qualities of objects.

Moreover, that perceptions are not absolutely determinate and singular is obvious from the fact that each sense is an abstracting mechanism. Sight by itself informs us only of colors and forms. No one can pretend that the images of sight are determinate in reference to taste. They are, therefore, so far general that they are neither sweet nor non-sweet, bitter nor non-bitter, having savor or insipid.

The next question is whether we have

any general conceptions except in judgments. In perception, where we know a thing as existing, it is plain that there is a judgment that the thing exists, since a mere general concept of a thing is in no case a cognition of it as existing. It has usually been said, however, that we can call up any concept without making any judgment; but it seems that in this case we only arbitrarily suppose ourselves to have an experience. In order to conceive the number 7, I suppose, that is, I arbitrarily make the hypothesis or judgment, that there are certain points before my eyes, and I judge that these are seven. This seems to be the most simple and rational view of the matter, and I may add that it is the one which has been adopted by the best logicians. If this be the case, what goes by the name of the association of images is in reality an association of judgments. The association of ideas is said to proceed according to three principles—those of resemblance, of contiguity, and of causality. But it would be equally true to say that signs denote what they do on the three principles of resemblance, contiguity, and causality. There can be no question that anything is a sign of whatever is associated with it by resemblance, by contiguity, or by causality: nor can there be any doubt that any sign recalls the thing signified. So, then, the association of ideas consists in this, that a judgment occasions another judgment, of which it is the sign. Now this is nothing less nor more than inference.

Everything in which we take the least interest creates in us its own particular emotion, however slight this may be. This emotion is a sign and a predicate of the thing. Now, when a thing resembling this thing is presented to us, a similar emotion arises; hence, we immediately infer that the latter is like the former. A formal logician of the old school may say, that in logic no term can enter into the conclusion which had not been contained in the premises, and that therefore the suggestion of something new must be essentially different from inference. But I reply that that rule of logic applies only to those arguments which are technically called completed. We can and do reason—

Elias was a man;
∴ He was mortal.

And this argument is just as valid as the full syllogism, although it is so only because the

major premise of the latter happens to be true. If to pass from the judgment "Elias was a man" to the judgment "Elias was mortal," without actually saying to one's self that "All men are mortal," is not inference, then the term "inference" is used in so restricted a sense that inferences hardly occur outside of a logic-book.

What is here said of association by resemblance is true of all association. All association is by signs. Everything has its subjective or emotional qualities, which are attributed either absolutely or relatively, or by conventional imputation to anything which is a sign of it. And so we reason,

The sign is such and such;
 ∴ The sign is that thing.

This conclusion receiving, however, a modification, owing to other considerations, so as to become—

The sign is almost (is representative of) that thing.

We come now to the consideration of the last of the four principles whose consequences we were to trace; namely, that the absolutely incognizable is absolutely inconceivable. That upon Cartesian principles the very realities of things can never be known in the least, most competent persons must long ago have been convinced. Hence the breaking forth of idealism, which is essentially anti-Cartesian, in every direction, whether among empiricists (Berkeley, Hume), or among no-ologists (Hegel, Fichte). The principle now brought under discussion is directly idealistic; for, since the meaning of a word is the conception it conveys, the absolutely incognizable has no meaning because no conception attaches to it. It is, therefore, a meaningless word; and, consequently, whatever is meant by any term as "the real" is cognizable in some degree, and so is of the nature of a cognition, in the objective sense of that term.

At any moment we are in possession of certain information, that is, of cognitions which have been logically derived by induction and hypothesis from previous cognitions which are less general, less distinct, and of which we have a less lively consciousness. These in their turn have been derived from others still less general, less distinct, and less vivid; and so on back to the

ideal* first, which is quite singular, and quite out of consciousness. This ideal first is the particular thing-in-itself. It does not exist *as such*. That is, there is no thing which is in-itself in the sense of not being relative to the mind, though things which are relative to the mind doubtless are, apart from that relation. The cognitions which thus reach us by this infinite series of inductions and hypotheses (which though infinite *a parte ante logice*, is yet as one continuous process not without a beginning *in time*) are of two kinds, the true and the untrue, or cognitions whose objects are *real* and those whose objects are *unreal*. And what do we mean by the real? It is a conception which we must first have had when we discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; that is, when we first corrected ourselves. Now the distinction for which alone this fact logically called, was between an *ens* relative to private inward determinations, to the negations belonging to idiosyncrasy, and an *ens* such as would stand in the long run. The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of knowledge. And so those two series of cognitions—the real and the unreal—consist of those which, at a time sufficiently future, the community will always continue to re-affirm; and of those which, under the same conditions, will ever after be denied. Now, a proposition whose falsity can never be discovered, and the error of which therefore is absolutely incognizable, contains, upon our principle, absolutely no error. Consequently, that which is thought in these cognitions is the real, as it really is. There is nothing, then, to prevent our knowing outward things as they really are, and it is most likely that we do thus know them in numberless cases, although we can never be absolutely certain of doing so in any special case.

But it follows that since no cognition of ours is absolutely determinate, generals must have a real existence. Now this scholastic realism is usually set down as a belief in met-

* By an ideal, I mean the limit which the possible cannot attain.

apophysical fictions. But, in fact, a realist is simply one who knows no more recondite reality than that which is represented in a true representation. Since, therefore, the word "man" is true of something, that which "man" means is real. The nominalist must admit that man is truly applicable to something; but he believes that there is beneath this a thing in itself, an incognizable reality. His is the metaphysical figment. Modern nominalists are mostly superficial men, who do not know, as the more thorough Roscellinus and Occam did, that a reality which has no representation is one which has no relation and no quality. The great argument for nominalism is that there is no man unless there is some particular man. That, however, does not affect the realism of Scotus; for although there is no man of whom all further determination can be denied, yet there is a man, abstraction being made of all further determination. There is a real difference between man irrespective of what the other determinations may be, and man with this or that particular series of determinations, although undoubtedly this difference is only relative to the mind and not *in re*. Such is the position of Scotus.* Occam's great objection is, there can be no real distinction which is not *in re*, in the thing-in-itself; but this begs the question, for it is itself based only on the notion that reality is something independent of representative relation.†

Such being the nature of reality in general, in what does the reality of the mind consist? We have seen that the content of consciousness, the entire phenomenal manifestation of mind, is a sign resulting from inference. Upon our principle, therefore, that the absolutely incognizable does not exist, so that the phenomenal manifestation of a substance is the substance, we must conclude that the mind is a sign developing according to the laws of inference. What distinguishes a man from a word? There is a distinction doubtless. The material qualities, the forces which constitute the pure denotative application, and the meaning of

the human sign, are all exceedingly complicated in comparison with those of the word. But these differences are only relative. What other is there? It may be said that man is conscious, while a word is not. But consciousness is a very vague term. It may mean that emotion which accompanies the reflection that we have animal life. This is a consciousness which is dimmed when animal life is at its ebb in old age, or sleep, but which is not dimmed when the spiritual life is at its ebb; which is the more lively the better *animal* a man is, but which is not so, the better *man* he is. We do not attribute this sensation to words, because we have reason to believe that it is dependent upon the possession of an animal body. But this consciousness, being a mere sensation, is only a part of the *material quality* of the man-sign. Again, consciousness is sometimes used to signify the *I think*, or unity in thought; but the unity is nothing but consistency, or the recognition of it. Consistency belongs to every sign, so far as it is a sign; and therefore every sign, since it signifies primarily that it is a sign, signifies its own consistency. The man-sign acquires information, and comes to mean more than he did before. But so do words. Does not electricity mean more now than it did in the days of Franklin? Man makes the word, and the word means nothing which the man has not made it mean, and that only to some man. But since man can think only by means of words or other external symbols, these might turn round and say: "You mean nothing which we have not taught you, and then only so far as you address some word as the interpretant of your thought." In fact, therefore, men and words reciprocally educate each other; each increase of a man's information involves and is involved by, a corresponding increase of a word's information.

Without fatiguing the reader by stretching this parallelism too far, it is sufficient to say that there is no element whatever of man's consciousness which has not something corresponding to it in the word; and the reason is obvious. It is that the word or sign which man uses *is* the man himself. For, as the fact that every thought is a sign, taken in conjunction with the fact that life is a train of thought, proves that man is a sign; so, that every thought is an *external* sign, proves that man is an external sign. That is to say, the man and the external

* "Eadem natura est, quæ in existentia per gradum singularitatis est determinata, et in intellectu, hoc est ut habet relationem ad intellectum ut cognitum ad cognoscens, est indeterminata." — Quæst. Subtilissimæ, lib. 7, qu. 18.

† See his argument *Summa logices*, part. 1, cap. 16.

sign are identical, in the same sense in which the words *homo* and *man* are identical. Thus my language is the sum total of myself; for the man is the thought.

It is hard for man to understand this, because he persists in identifying himself with his will, his power over the animal organism, with brute force. Now the organism is only an instrument of thought. But the identity of a man consists in the *consistency* of what he does and thinks, and consistency is the intellectual character of a thing; that is, is its expressing something.

Finally, as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to be known to be in the ideal state of complete information, so that reality depends on the ultimate decis-

ion of the community; so thought is what it is, only by virtue of its addressing a future thought which is in its value as thought identical with it, though more developed. In this way, the existence of thought now, depends on what is to be hereafter; so that it has only a potential existence, dependent on the future thought of the community.

The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and from what he and they are to be, is only a negation. This is man,

* * * "proud man,
Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
His glassy essence."

ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S *ÆSTHETICS*.

[Translated from the French of Charles Bénard by JAS. A. MARTLING.]

IV. *MUSIC*.—Art represents, under different forms, the development of spirit. It is, accordingly, the degree of spirituality in the mode of expression which assigns to each of the arts its rank, its pre-eminence, and which serves to fix its relations.

Architecture is the most imperfect art, expressing thought in a vague manner only, through forms borrowed from inorganic matter. Next, *Sculpture* represents spirit, but still as identified with the body, and only so far as corporeal form allows. *Painting* expresses the innermost and profoundest side of the soul, passion, and moral sentiment. Hence it rejects matter, in order that it may confine itself to surface. It employs visible appearance and color as a richer, more varied and more spiritual mode of expression. Nevertheless this appearance is always borrowed from the visible, extended, and permanent form.

There is in the soul a necessity for signs, for materials, more in conformity with its nature, presenting nothing fixed and extended, and where the material side wholly disappears.

This need is supplied in *Music*. Its end is to express the soul in itself, the inner sentiment, by a sign which no longer offers anything extended or material, by a sign invisible, rapid and fleeting as the movements of

soul itself. This sign, which is, however, still produced by means of matter, no more recalls extension and its forms, but is sound, the result of the undulatory vibration of bodies.

As music abandons visible forms, it addresses itself to a new organ, to the hearing, a sense more spiritual, though less contemplative, than vision. The ear perceives this unextended sign, the resultant of that vibration which leaves no trace after it, and vanishes in its expression.

By thus divesting itself of external and material form, sound is eminently fitted to be the echo of the soul and of sentiment. Accordingly, the problem of music will be to awake the inmost chords of the soul, and to reproduce all its movements and emotions.

Thereby, also, its effects are explained. Its aim is to reach the utmost limit of sentiment; it is the art of *sentiment*. Between art and sentiment there exists so intimate a union that they seemingly fuse together. Sound, that immaterial phenomenon, without proper duration, instantaneous, borrowing all its value from the sentiment which it veils, penetrates into the soul and echoes through its depths.

If we compare music with the other arts, we find, in the first place, that it exhibits certain real analogies with *Architecture*. If

this, indeed, expresses ideas only symbolically and vaguely, music also limits itself to the accompanying of conceptions of spirit, of which language alone is the clear and truthful expression.

In the next place, architecture does not borrow from nature forms already complete; it invents them, or fashions them, according to geometric rules and proportions. Now music also, independently of the expression of sentiment, follows the law of numbers, which determines the measure, the length, the accord of sounds. It introduces among sounds, as architecture among forms, regularity, symmetry, and harmony. This is what has caused architecture to be styled *nude music*.

Meanwhile, by the side of these resemblances, still greater differences are manifested between these two arts; for, if the laws of number and quantity form their common base, their materials are of a nature directly opposite. Architecture appropriates to itself ponderable matter and external forms; music employs sound, an invisible, mobile, fugitive element, borrowed not from space but from time—sound, a sign full of soul and life.

These two arts appertain, then, to two entirely different spheres of the spirit. While architecture lifts up its colossal images which the eye contemplates in their symbolic form and their eternal immobility, the rapid world of sound penetrates immediately by the ear into the interior of the soul and fills it with emotions of sympathy.

Sculpture is the art farthest removed from music. Painting, however, exhibits a great affinity with it: it approaches it, in fact, in vivacity of expression. Nevertheless painting represents external and visible forms which already exist in nature. The artist does not invent these forms; he is limited to generalizing and spiritualizing them; while the musician, receiving indeed a text, invents the most proper combinations to express the sentiments of the soul which connect themselves with it. Its proper field is sentiment in its abstract simplicity. To form it, he has only to return into himself, to go down into the depths of his soul. He may, indeed, sometimes go to the extent of forgetting his subject in order to express his own emotions. It also belongs to this art to effect an enfranchisement of the soul, to free it from the wants and miseries of actual existence, to cause it to forget its sorrows.

Music secures this freedom in the highest degree.

Sculpture and painting have only to bring out the idea already contained in the subject, to gather about it its accessories and details. Though a musical work ought not to miss this interior connection and this unity, its mode of development is wholly different. The musical theme is quickly exhausted; the principal thought remains the centre; but this succession necessitates, with a flight, a return, oppositions, conflicts, transitions, sudden turns, unexpected conclusions. Accordingly, the unity is far from resembling that of the members and their proportions in a statue, or in the arrangement of a picture.

Music is distinguished from the other arts in this respect: it is too near the free world of the soul not to have the right of placing itself above the given subject, and even the thought which it makes its content. The artist here is free to abandon himself to his genius and his fancies. Its laws are those of sounds; and they as such do not bind themselves strictly to the thought and to the sense of words, as visible forms are united to the idea which they represent.

If, in fine, one compares music to poetry, it exhibits a great affinity with it, but also profound differences.

In poetry, the sound is not modulated by instruments. The articulate sound of the voice is only an oral sign, in itself void of sense, and more or less independent of the idea which it expresses; hence a striking difference between musical and poetical employment of sound. Music does not reduce sound to the condition of a mere means, a sign of the thought; it makes of it its end; it fashions it in itself and for itself.

But what poetry thus loses as to the immediate expression of visible objects, it regains in presenting them to the imagination. In a word, it forms pictures for the spirit. Music should waive this prerogative; it is confined to expressing a certain harmony, a sympathetic relation between sounds and ideas or objects. It thus gives a vague idea of the moral situation; it succeeds even in communicating a certain excitement to the imagination, but without giving rise to the actual image of the objects and of their determinate form.

Music and poetry, moreover, readily intermarry; but the two arts remain no less distinct, and preserve their independence.

If the poetic work is perfect, it must expect little aid from music; and if the music is the principal aim, the poetic text should be subordinate and superficial; it merely furnishes a simple canvas. The interest cannot divide itself equally, as is exemplified by the Italian opera.

The nature and the proper sphere of music being understood, it is easy to determine the special manner in which it must conceive its subject. Although it can free itself from it to a certain extent, nevertheless it should, in order to produce its true effect, express a thought. But how? Not as thought, as idea clear or abstract, as general notion: it is as *sentiment*. It ought not to undertake to labor in the service of the imagination; that care concerns the other arts: it should confine itself to rendering comprehensible the sentiments of the soul—the inner and emotional part of man—this is its proper object. “To express in sounds that inner life, those mysterious movements of the soul, or to combine that harmonious echo with the language of words which express thoughts, to baptize in some way this frigid language in the living fountain of sympathetic sentiment,—such is the difficult task which falls to the lot of music.”

Although thus restrained, its domain is not the less an extensive one; for the sphere of sentiment is infinitely vast and varied. On the other hand, it ought not to express sentiment, as it escapes naturally from the soul, in a spontaneous cry; but to sweeten, to temper that expression by its measures and cadences, fashioned according to the laws of harmony and rhythm. It is by this only that it is an art, and that among all the arts it is the best adapted to calm the violence of natural emotions, to work out the enfranchisement of the soul, to transport it into a serener and purer sphere.

The power with which music acts upon the soul, and chiefly upon the sensibility, is explained by these principles. “It does not go so far as to awaken the conceptions of the intellect, nor so far as to evoke in the spirit, images which divide and captivate its attention; it centres itself in the profound region of sentiment. Placed in the seat of the inner changes of the soul, at the central point of the whole man, it agitates and moves the whole.”

If, in this connection, we compare anew music with the other arts, we shall understand the different manner in which they

act upon us, and the peculiar effects of music. In the arts of design, the spectacle and the spectator are distinct, set over against one another. In music, the sounds are distinct from us, but the opposition does not go so far as the fixedness of a permanent spectacle. Sounds are instantaneous. Music thus penetrates immediately to the inner focus of the movements of the soul: that loses its contemplative liberty; the musical expression excites and transports us. Sound acts as an element, as a force of nature. The *me* is not seized by some point of its spiritual existence; it is lifted up and placed wholly in movement. Add to this the power of measure and rhythm, which act mechanically upon us, and we shall have the explanations of the effects of music.

By measure, indeed, sound penetrates into the *me* from another side; it seizes our very being, and draws us into its cadenced movement.

We ought not, however, to exaggerate this power of music, and, especially, not to isolate it too much from thought itself—from religious, moral, scientific thought, etc. Music produces its most extraordinary effects only on barbarous or half civilized people. The prodigies which are related about this subject belong to fable. The lyre of Amphion only moved stones, that of Orpheus tamed tigers; but to civilized man other more serious means are necessary: the power of religious and moral ideas, laws, institutions. Man is not an animal, nor a purely sensual being. It is reason that it is necessary to be able to address; she it is that it is necessary to persuade. To-day Music retains its charms, and produces a part of its effects; but it is an art, and its sphere of action is more restricted and subordinate. It has power to accompany the transports of religious thought, inflame patriotic sentiment, sustain the march of soldiers and preserve their courage; but it is not to it that are due the prodigies of faith. Nevermore does it cause the walls of cities to fall.

Hegel does not confine himself to these generalities upon music; he enters into an examination of the different parts which constitute the theory of this art. Under the head of *musical means of expression*, he seeks to give a philosophic explication of *time*, *measure*, *rhythm*; then of *harmony* and *melody*.

We must follow him in this part, which, although abstract, does not lack interest from the point of view of the metaphysics of art.

1. In order to observe the gradation of ideas, to go from the simple to the complex among the means of expression which music employs, we commence with those which are connected with the duration of sounds, to wit: *time, measure, and rhythm*.

The preponderance of time in music is explained by the very nature of *sound*. Sound, that invisible and unextended phenomenon which is produced in space only under the form of oscillatory movement, is successive. It falls, accordingly, under the law of time. This succession of points of duration needs to be fixed and regulated. Music ought, then, not only to admit time as a necessary element, but to impose upon it a determined measure by a mathematical rule.

But a more profound reason for the importance of measure is the close analogy which exists between it and the soul itself, which in the continuous succession of sound perceives its proper identity, and acquires the feeling of its inner life and its permanent activity. Whatever brings it back to a sense of itself and its nature agreeably entertains it.

Now, in order that duration may not lose itself in the vague and indeterminate, it is necessary that it should have a commencement, an end, and marked divisions. The *ego* finds itself, and is satisfied in this variety and this diversity only so far as the intervals of time are brought back to unity. This fixed, regular, and mathematically determined unity is measure. It fills, in music, the same office as regularity in architecture.

Then, in this uniformity of measure, the *ego* finds the image of its proper unity; it recognizes in the return and equality of measure its proper identity; it sees that it is itself which introduces this measure into the succession of time: the pleasure which it receives is by so much the more vivid as the measure there, is its work, and as it is its proper unity which serves it in measuring sounds. Measure, here, far more truly than in the movements of the heavenly bodies, proceeds from the spirit; it is even more truly the work of the spirit than in architecture, which imitates the movements of nature, and follows the analogies which it finds there.

But, in order that the measure may be the more striking, it is necessary that diversity and inequality break the uniformity; that irregularity be combined with regularity, and be itself led back to unity. Hence the different species of *measures*.

Finally, in order to give to measure more richness, animation, and liberty, it is necessary that the essential divisions of measure be marked in a more precise manner. This engenders rhythm with its varied forms, which combine themselves with the corresponding forms of rhythm in poetry, without however being wholly confounded with them.

2. What precedes concerns the duration of sound and quantity. The second side, which furnishes more of richness and variety, has regard to the very nature of sound and its *quality*. The nature of sounds is determined, in the first place, by that of the instruments which produce them; then by the manner in which they are co-ordinated; finally, by the forms which they adopt by their apposition, their reconciliation, their various modulations, and their reciprocal fusion. The laws which regulate them are those of harmony.

As to the *instruments*, they consist sometimes of a confined and vibrating column of air (wind instruments), sometimes of a stretched cord (stringed instruments), sometimes of a plain or curved surface, etc., of glass or metal. The linear direction predominates in true musical instruments, for there exists a secret analogy between linear sounds and the deepest feelings of the soul. A plane or rounded surface furnishes instruments of an inferior character, which do not respond to energy of sentiment. But the instrument *par excellence* is the *human voice*, which unites the characters of wind instruments and string instruments. The human voice is the echo of the soul itself; the sound emanates directly from it; it is its natural and immediate expression, which itself fashions as it controls the body, its instrument. Music ought to combine these instruments, and to harmonize them. In this respect, the progress of modern music is remarkable. The science of instrumentation has received developments unknown to the ancients.

But the harmonic element properly so called, and which approaches nearer to the physical quality of sound, consists in the determined character of each sound, and in its co-ordinate connection with other sounds.

It rests, in the first place, upon the specific quality of sound (its physical side), then upon numerical proportions and difference, varying with the body placed in vibration, the degree of tension, the number and mode of the vibrations—relations which are mathematically determined. This is what forms the harmonic system. Hence, 1st, the theory of *intervals*; 2d, the combined series of sounds in their most simple succession, the *diatonic scale* or *gamut*; 3d, the diversity of tones as proceeding some from others, and from a fundamental sound, the various kinds of tones, etc.

Thus far we have only simple series of sounds, a succession where each preserves its proper value. Now, it is their mutual connection which gives them a concrete existence and a real value. Through that they combine to form one and the same sound. It is this combination which forms the *chord*. Regularity should be also introduced into the chords, in conformity with the design of music. It is in the knowledge of these chords that the science of harmony properly so called, consists. It is sufficient to indicate the principal species of chords, and their gradation.

The first species is formed by sounds which accord immediately, of which nothing can alter the perfect consonance. Then there is manifested a more profound opposition where the immediate consonance is destroyed, which constitutes a depth of sound, and furnishes a suitable means for expressing the grand sentiments, the profound emotions of the soul, the joys, the sufferings, and the abysses of sorrow. This means is found in the *dissonant* chords. But it is necessary that in this opposition a real unity be revealed, a secret harmony, that the opposition be reconciled by a return to a perfect chord. This superior unity can only manifest itself in the completeness and the successive development of musical composition.

3. Harmony includes only the essential relations, the necessary laws of sounds; but it is not any more than measure and rhythm music properly so called. They are only its essential bases. The poetic element of music, the language of the soul, which causes its inmost joys and sorrows to circulate in sounds, frees it and lifts it up to higher spheres, is melody. It is only given to the composer of genius to speak worthily of it, if he join the philosophic spirit to the know-

ledge of his art; yet he cannot reveal its secrets. It is necessary, besides, to have made a profound study of the master-pieces of music. Hegel contents himself with making some general reflections.

In the first place, melody, although distinct from harmony, should not be separated from it. It should preserve a strict connection with it. In this, it does not sacrifice its liberty; it renounces only arbitrariness and fancy; for true liberty here, as everywhere, is conformity to law. It ought, then, to move itself upon the base of harmony and rhythm. Rhythm and harmony, on their side, have life and animation only through melody. It is in this union of harmony and melody that the secret of great musical composition resides.

We ought meanwhile to establish an important distinction which bears upon the predominance of the one or the other of these two means of expression. Sometimes melody simply takes for base the most simple harmonic chords; this is to escape dryness, and for fear of being superficial. Sometimes each tone of the melody forms for itself an accord, and the melody is wholly blended in the harmony; harmony and melody form a whole, compact and identical. Or it is a harmonious combination of melodies which forms harmonies; or, reciprocally, the movements of the melody penetrate into the harmonic relations. Thus, in bold compositions, are evoked oppositions and dissonances. But in the midst of all this outburst of the powers of the harmony appears the peaceful triumph of melody. Great artists alone are able to conquer these difficulties; otherwise, the music is labored or purely erudite.

But in all melody, in spite of this intimate accord, the *song*, properly so called, should be revealed, with its richness of expression, as the predominant element. At the same time, in spite of this richness and this variety, the whole should be firmly conceived and executed to form a complete and individual unit. By this alone, music expresses sentiment in its profundity; it imprints on the work the character of ideality and freedom; it enfranchises the soul and transports it to a higher sphere.

After having determined the general characteristics of music, and the nature of the means of expression which it has at its disposal, it remains to study it in its relations with the subject of which it treats.

Now, making abstraction of the various classes of music, music has sometimes as end the treating of a subject already expressed by word, or the *accompanying* of a text; sometimes it expresses the subject simply by harmonic and melodic combinations. In the first case, it is the *music of accompaniment*; in the second, the music is *independent*.

In that which concerns, in the first place, this distinction in itself, it is to be remarked, contrary to the vulgar opinion (which considers instrumental music as accompaniment and vocal music as the more independent), that it is rather the human voice, the song which accompanies the words. But this apparent contradiction effaces itself when we consider that the text ought to remain in the service of the music; to be made for that, and not that for it. What it ought to express, is the inmost sentiment of the subject, whether the composer is absorbed and identified with it, or whether he expresses rather the personal impression which the subject awakens in his soul.

We must always understand by musical accompaniment, what a subject already formulated expresses in a text; this is then, above all, vocal music, the song which accompanies the words. Instruments, in their turn, may accompany the voice; but it is rather the instrumental music which is independent, since it can dispense with all text, and then music restricts itself to its own means of expression.

As to the *music of accompaniment*, let us observe, in the first place, that if, in allying itself with a text already expressed by words, it is less independent, it ought not, meanwhile, to subordinate itself too much thereto, and to lose its liberty. Every obstacle to free musical production would destroy the impression; without wishing to emancipate himself from the text, the composer will then simply penetrate the general sense of words, of situations, to inspire himself with it, and to render it freely.

In this circle, we may distinguish three modes of expression. The first is what may be called the melodic style of expression. The music then devotes itself only to rendering the fundamental feature of a subject as it seizes it in the harmony of its inner being; it is the pure echo of sentiment, the harmonious sounding of the soul. For melody is the soul of music. There is, then, a

living and pathetic sentiment which vibrates in it. Nor does music leave this sentiment in its natural and gross existence. More than the other arts, it idealizes expression. It is especially given to moderate and sweeten the affections of the soul. It ought to be free in the outpourings of melody, to preserve its calmness and serenity in the midst of tears and suffering. This characteristic, which we have already had to notice in Italian painting, appears essentially in melodic expression. Music ought to exalt the soul above the particular sentiment which it feels, to cause it to hover in a serener region. It is this which, properly speaking, constitutes the *singing* principle of music. It is thus that it gives truly the idea of divine felicity and harmony.

But music cannot long remain at this height; it would risk losing itself in the vague and indeterminate; this necessitates it the more frequently to approach nearer the text, to take a more precise character—above all, if the subject itself is very determinate. Hence a difference of expression, according to the subjects, and the sentiments of the soul which it attempts to express. The character of the subject is given by the text itself. Here the opposite of melodic expression is the *recitative*, which makes of the song no more the principal thing, but the accompaniment. The particular sense of the words imprints itself then, with all its precision, in the sounds. This is the sung declamation, which connects itself rigorously with the movement of the words, in their sense and in their order. This recitative or declamatory expression is particularly adapted to the theatre, and to the peaceful recital of events; to the dramatic song, to the oratorio, to the dialogue, etc. It awakens sympathetic emotions; but one would seek vainly in it the expression of that inner life of the soul which characterizes melodic expression, song properly so called.

Hence, the necessity of an intermediate variety between recitative and melodic music, and one which unites their characteristics. The problem consists in so managing that melody, in determining itself further, may cause that which seems to be foreign to it in the recitative to enter its domain; music becomes thus recitative and melodic.

In order to make this whole question better comprehended, Hegel thinks himself obliged to enter into certain details—1st, upon the nature of the *text* which is adapted

to musical composition; 2d, upon the *composition* itself; 3d, upon the different *styles* of music where the mode of expression is different.

In the first place, as to musical text, we do wrong to think that it is indifferent to musical composition. All grand compositions have an excellent text, for the subject cannot be indifferent to the artist who avails himself of it. The first condition of a good text is solidity of thought. Not all possible skill can disguise an insignificant, trivial, frigid, absurd thought. In compositions of the melodic variety, the text is less important, but yet it exacts a true sentiment. In the second place, the musical text ought not to be a thought too profound or abstract. Philosophic profundity is not suited to music. This is why certain lyric poems cannot be set to music; those of Schiller, for example. On the other hand, the opposite excess is to be avoided, to-wit: insignificance, pretension, the absence of nobleness and dignity. What is necessary here, as in all the arts, is a sentiment natural, true, and profound, without being abstract or metaphysical. The most suitable is a certain mediocre poetry, which indicates, in a few words, a whole situation, and restrains itself from a complete development—a poetry clear, vivid, rapid—a sort of poetic sketch. The words ought not to paint the subject too much in its details, in order not to weaken the unity, the total effect, nor to distract the attention. In lyric poetry, the little pieces of verse, simple, laconic, stamped with a profound sentiment, or the still lighter poems where a lively gaiety breathes, are particularly appropriate to musical composition.

Upon *composition* itself, the rules to be given are very general, and more negative than positive. Talent and genius do not suffer themselves to be directed by recipes, and rules do not supply inspiration.

What must be repeated here, as for all works of art, is that the composer ought to identify himself with his subject, to penetrate it, to endue it with life, to place in it his soul and his whole heart.

Certain faults are to be avoided, into which our contemporaries are ever falling. The principal is the looking after effect—seeking to strike the imagination by violent contrasts, the expression of opposite passions—introducing, in a fragment, foreign motives, discordant oppositions, which break the unity of a subject, and are adverse to harmony

and beauty. It is by wishing thus to characterize too strongly, or to ally the *characteristic* to the melodic, that we break the delicately traced limits of musical beauty; we arrive thus at ruggedness, at hardness, at defect in harmony.

True musical beauty consists in this, that, even in strongly characterizing the passions and the sentiments, melody remains the fundamental trait, as the soul and bond of composition. Here to reach the true standard is very difficult, perhaps still more difficult in music than in the other arts. Hence the differing judgments according to the predominance of the two elements, some preferring melody, others the characteristic and great rigor of expression. This is a source of dispute between schools and connoisseurs.

Having reached the question of the different varieties of music, the author restricts himself to characterizing briefly *religious* music, *lyric* music, and *dramatic* music. He gives the preference to Catholic over Protestant music, which seems to him to discard more and more its aim, and to wander into vagueness—to become a learned exercise rather than a living production. Lyrical music is scarcely alluded to. As to dramatic music, he yields also the superiority to the moderns, for the reasons developed above. According to him, ancient music was only designed to bring into relief the musical-sound of verse, and to cause the sense of it to penetrate deeper into the soul. Among moderns, dramatic music, after being perfected in the music of the church, has reached a high perfection in lyric expression, and obtained an independent place in the modern opera. It is to be regretted that these points were not treated at the length that they merit.

Under the name of *independent music*, Hegel treats of *instrumental* music. It accompanies, it is true, the voice; but it is independent in that it is no more bound to a precise sense expressed by words, or to a text. Music, truly free, enfranchises itself, then, from the text, in order to seize a subject, to determine its movement and the mode of expression. Already, in vocal music, this enfranchisement is taking place through the melodic element, as in the opera, especially in the Italian opera. But this independence manifests itself especially in instrumental music. For instruments, the necessity of a text no more exists. The orchestra which executes symphonies is all-

sufficient. This is a purely musical performance. It consists of learned accords, melodies, and masses of harmony. Hence this is the proper domain of the connoisseur and the dilettante. The uninitiate loves more characterized expression; the connoisseur, secret accords, musical relations of sounds and instruments, learned combinations, all of which cause him to admire the talent of the artist—in a word, music for the sake of the music. The composer, on his side, while developing exclusively a content of ideas, troubles himself less for the thought than for the musical structure. The reef to be avoided is vacuum of composition, frigidity, absence of ideas and expression. The true course consists in combining the two sides, in following at the same time the thought and the musical structure, and this even in instrumental music. Here, however, there is dominant the personal will of the artist, sometimes pushed even to caprice and fancy. Without doubt, general rules—the laws of art—do not completely lose their empire. But in this limitless circle, where the originality of the artist revolves, it can give itself up to flashes and fancies, can abandon itself to the free play of his imagination. Nowhere, in any other art, is there a place for similar independence, a liberty so great.

This theory of music ends with some observations on *musical execution*. There is no art, in fact, where the execution may be so intimately bound to the art itself, of which it makes an integral part. In order that composition may be living and produce its effect, it is necessary that it be executed by a musician who has himself talent, and at times inspiration. Now in execution, as in musical expression, we can distinguish two tendencies, two principal styles: the first, where the musician, charged with rendering a composition, loses himself, is absorbed in his subject, and is contented simply to reproduce it with fidelity; the second, where he frees himself from it more or less, and

creates for himself the expression, the mode of exposition, not only after the work of the composer, but with his personal resources. In the first case, he resembles a rhapsodist who sings an epic; in the second, an actor who creates his rôle. The choice and the rule to follow here depend on the nature of the subject. If the composition is solid, substantial, to the extent that the subject has passed wholly into it, the reproduction ought to be faithful. The player should here submit himself to it—should be an obedient organ, which does not mean to say that he should be an automaton. In place of machine playing, he ought to vivify the work by a full expression of soul in the sense and in the spirit of the composer, to resolve difficulties with ease and facility, to attain to the same elevation as the genius of the composer. Here is true liberty for him. In subjects of less solidity, where the imagination of the composer has given itself free rein, has abandoned itself to caprice and fancy, the execution also will be more unrestrained. Here the musician can display all the boldness of his genius and of his culture—can finish, deepen, animate that which seems to him destitute of soul—can show himself, in his turn, free and a creator.

This liberty is yet greater for instrumentation than for the voice. The musician can use an instrument as the organ of his soul, and reveal the power which he exercises over it by playing with difficulties apparently insurmountable; can abandon himself to all his eccentricities, to his whims and his fancies, even producing on one instrument sounds and effects which belong to other instruments. He shows thereby that no bound can stay him; he reveals the marvellous secret by which an instrument becomes like an animate organ, which with him forms a body, wherein his soul has wholly passed, and which it governs with its will. It is the most perfect fusion of conception and execution.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT.

[Translated from the German of G. W. F. HEGEL.]

[All marks of subdivision included in brackets [] are not in the original, but are employed here to facilitate reference to the portions taken up in the commentary which follows. Adjectives and participles used substantively are capitalized to prevent confusion.—EDITOR.]

A. CONSCIOUSNESS.

II.

Perception, or the Thing and the Deception.

[P. 82 of the original.] [a] The immediate certitude itself does not take the True, for the truth is the Universal, but it endeavors to take the This. Perception, on the contrary, takes that which for it is the existent, as universal. Just as Universality is its principle in general, so likewise are the moments which are distinguished immediately within it, the Ego a Universal, and the object a Universal. The mentioned principle has become for us, and our apprehension of perception is therefore no longer a seeming apprehension like sensuous certitude, but a necessary one. In the becoming of the principle, the two moments have at the same time become, which only fall out of it in appearance; the one, namely, the activity of showing up; the other, the same activity, but as simple: the former, the perceiving; the latter, the object. The object, according to its essence, is the same as the activity: the latter, the unfolding and, distinguishing of the moments; the former, the state of their being grasped together. For us, or in itself, the Universal is as principle the essence of perception; and opposed to this abstraction, the two which have been distinguished as the perceiving and the perceived are unessential. [p. 83] But in point of fact, since both are universal or the essence, they are both essential; since again they are related to each other as contraries, so far as thus related, only one of them can be the essential, and the distinction of essentiality and unessentiality must be parcelled out between them. The one determined as the simple, the object, is the essence—indifferent, therefore, whether it is perceived or not;—but the perceiving as the activity is the Inconstant, which may or may not be, and thus is unessential.

[b] This object is now to be determined more definitely, and this determination is to be developed briefly out of the result which has adduced itself; the exhaustive

development does not belong here. Since its principle, the Universal, is a Mediated in its simplicity, it must express this as its nature; for this reason it exhibits itself as the *Thing with many properties*. The wealth of sensuous knowing belongs to perception, not to immediate certitude, which rather it continually eludes; for it is only the former that has *negation*, distinction, or manifoldness, in its essence.

[c] The This is therefore posited as not-This, or as cancelled, and therefore not *pure* nothing, but *determined* nothing, or a *nothing of a content*—namely, of the *This*. Through this the sensuous is itself still extant, but not as it was intended to be in the immediate certitude—i. e. as the meant particular individual—but as universal, or as that which will be determined as *property*.

Cancelling here displays its true two-fold signification, which we previously saw in the case of the negative; it is a negating and a preserving at the same time; the nothing, as *nothing of the This*, preserves the immediateness and is itself sensuous, but a universal immediateness.—But Being is a Universal through the fact that it has the mediation or the Negative in it; since it expresses this in its immediateness, it is a distinct, determined property. [p. 84] With this there are at once many such properties posited, the one the negative of the other. Since they are expressed in the simplicity of the Universal, these determinatenesses—which in reality become properties through an additional determination which is added to them—relate to themselves and are indifferent towards each other: each is by itself free from the other. The simple, self-identical universality is however itself again distinguished and free from these its determinatenesses; it is the pure relation of itself to itself, or the *medium* in which all these determinatenesses are, and thus interpenetrate each other in it as in a simple unity without interfering with each other; for precisely through their participation in this universality are they indifferent and by themselves.—This abstract universal medi-

um, which may be called the *Thing-ness* in general, or the pure essence, is nothing else than the Here and Now as above exhibited, namely, as a simple Together of many, or the many are in their determinateness itself simply universal. This salt is a simple Here, and yet a manifold; it is white and *also* acrid, *also* of cubical shape, *also* of definite weight, etc. All these many properties are in one simple Here, in which they thus interpenetrate each other; no one of them has a different Here than another, but each is everywhere in the same Here in which the other is; and at the same time, without being separated through different Heres, they do not affect each other in this interpenetration; the white does not affect or change the cubical, both together not the acridness, etc.; but since each itself is simple, relating to itself, it leaves the other quietly alone, and relates to it simply through the indifferent *Also*. This *Also* is therefore the pure Universal itself, or the medium—the *Thing-ness* which grasps them together.

[d] In this relation, which has adduced itself, the character of the positive universality has for the first time been observed and developed; but still another side offers itself, which must also be taken up. [p. 85] If, namely, the many definite properties were absolutely indifferent ones, and related only to themselves, then they would not be definite ones, for they can be this only in so far as they are distinguished and related to others as opposites. But in this opposition they can not be together in the simple unity of their medium, which is just as essential to them as their negation; the distinction between them, in so far as it is not an indifferent one but an excluding—one that negates others—falls, therefore, outside of this simple medium; and this is, therefore, not merely an *Also*, an *indifferent* unity, but likewise a *One*, an *excluding* unity.—The one is the moment of negation, as it relates in a simple manner to *itself* and excludes others; and through it the *Thingness* is determined as *thing*. In the property, negation exists as determinateness, which is immediately one and the same with the immediateness of Being, which through this unity with negation is universality; but it is *One* only in so far as it is freed from this unity with the object, and is in and for itself.

[e] In these moments taken together is the thing as the True of observation, com-

pleted, so far as it is necessary to develop it here. It is (a) the indifferent passive universality, the *Also* of the many properties or rather matters, (β) the negation likewise as simple, or the *One*, the excluding of opposite properties, and (γ) the many properties themselves, the relation of the first two moments; the negation as it relates to the indifferent element and expands itself in it as a number of distinctions: the point of individuality in the medium of extantness, raying out into multiplicity. According to the side on which these distinctions belong to the indifferent medium, they are universal, relate merely to themselves and do not affect each other; but, according to the side on which they belong to the negative unity, they are at the same time excluding: but have this hostile relation necessarily to properties which are removed outside of their *Also*. [p. 86] The sensuous universality or the immediate unity of Being and the negative is *property*, therefore, in so far as the *One* and the pure universality are developed out of it and distinct from each other, and it unites them together; and this, its relation to the pure essential moments, first completes the *Thing*.

[f] This, then, is the nature of the thing of perception; and the consciousness is determined as perceiving, in so far as this thing is its object; it has only to take it and to assume towards it the attitude of pure apprehension; what results through this is the True. If it (the consciousness) itself, during this "taking up," were to be active, it would through such addition or subtraction change the truth. Since the object is the True and universal, that which is self-identical, but consciousness is the changeable and unessential, it may happen that it apprehends the object incorrectly and thus deceives itself. The perceiving is conscious of the possibility of deception; for in the universality, which is the principle, that other-being itself is immediately for it, but as the negatory is the cancelled. Its criterion of truth is therefore to be apprehended as self-identity, and its procedure in relating, as self-identical. Since at the same time the Different is for it, it is a relating of the different moments of its apprehensions to one another; but if want of identity appears in this comparison, it is regarded not as an untruth of the object (for the object is the self-identical), but as an untruth of perception.

[g] Let us see now what the experience of consciousness is which it makes with reference to actual perception. It is already contained for us in the development of the object, just now given, and in the relation which consciousness assumes towards it will be only the development of the contradictions contained therein — The object which I take up presents itself as simply one; I perceive also the property belonging to it, which is universal, and through this the object transcends its individuality. [p. 87] The first being of the objective existence as a One was therefore not its true being; and since it is the True, the untruth falls within me, and the apprehending it was incorrect. In consequence of the *universality* of the property, I have to apprehend the objective existence rather as a *commonness* in general. Moreover, I observe the property to be a Determined, opposed to another and excluding it. I therefore did not apprehend the objective existence correctly when I determined it as a community with others, or as a continuity, and must on account of the determinateness of the property separate the continuity and posit it as an excluding One. On the isolated One I find many such properties which do not affect each other, but which are indifferent towards each other; hence I do not apprehend the object correctly when I apprehend it as an *excluding* One, but it is, as before, merely a continuity in general; thus now a universal *common medium* in which exist many attributes as sensuous universalities—each for itself and as determined, each excluding the other. But the Simple and True, which I perceive, is thus also not a general medium, but the single property by itself, which however, in this shape, is neither property nor a determinate being; for it neither belongs to a One, nor is it in relation to another. But it is a *property* only in connection with a One, and *determined* in relation to others only. As this pure relation to itself, it remains merely sensuous Being in general; and since it has no longer the character of negativity, and the consciousness for which now a sensuous being is, is mere meaning (opining); i. e. it is entirely out of perception and has gone back into itself. The sensuous Being and the *Meaning*, however, go over into perception; I am thrown back to the beginning, and am again led into the same circular movement which

cancels itself in each moment and as a whole [p. 88].

[h] The consciousness, therefore, necessarily goes through it again, but at the same time not in the manner that it pursued before. It has, namely, made the experience concerning perception that the result of the True thereof is its dissolution, or that it is the reflection into itself out of the True. It has thus determined itself for the consciousness according to the nature of its perception to be, namely, not a pure simple apprehension, but to be in its apprehending at the same time reflected out of the True into itself. This return of the consciousness into itself, which mixes itself up with the pure apprehension—for it has adduced itself as essential to perception—changes the True. The consciousness recognizes this side at the same time as its own and takes it upon itself, and by this act it thinks to retain the true object purely. Thus there is here present in *Perception*—just as it happened in *sensuous certitude*—the phase in which consciousness is pressed back into itself, but not precisely in the sense in which it occurred before: as if it fell into the *truth* of perception; but it recognizes rather that the *untruth* which occurs therein belongs to it (consciousness). But through this knowledge it is at the same time able to cancel the untruth; it distinguishes its apprehending of the True from the untruth of its perception, corrects the latter, and, inasmuch as it undertakes this correction itself, the truth of course, as truth of perception, falls into the same consciousness. Thus the attitude of consciousness, which is now to be considered, is of such a nature that it does not any longer merely perceive, but is also conscious of its reflection into itself, and separates this from the simple apprehension itself.

[i] I perceive therefore, at first, the thing as One, and I have to retain it in this true determination; if in the activity of perception something occurs to contradict this, it must be recognized as my own reflection. [p. 89] Now in perception there occur different properties which appear to be properties of the thing; the thing however is One, and, as regards this diversity through which it would cease to be one, we are conscious that it belongs to us. This thing is therefore white only in so far as it is brought in contact with our eye, *also* sharp to our tongue, *also* cubic to our touch, etc. The en-

tire diversity of these sides we do not receive from the thing, but from ourselves. Thus they (the sides) fall asunder on our senses (tongue, eyes, etc., which are separate from each other). We are therefore the universal medium in which such moments isolate themselves, and are for and by themselves. Through the fact, therefore, that we consider the determinateness as universal medium to be our reflection, we retain the self-identity and truth of things as One.

[j] But these different sides which consciousness takes upon itself are determined each for itself, as it is found in the universal medium; the White is merely in opposition to the Black, etc., and the thing is One precisely through the fact that it opposes itself to others. But it does not exclude others from itself through being One, for to be One is the universal relation to itself, and from the fact that it is One it is rather *like* to all; but it excludes through its *determinateness*. Things are therefore in and for themselves determined; they have properties through which they are distinguished from others. Since the property belongs to the thing, or is a determinateness of the thing itself, the thing has *several* properties. For, in the first place, the thing is the True—it is in itself; and what there is in it, is in it as its proper essence and not in consequence of others; hence, in the second place, the determined properties are not merely in consequence of other things and for other things, but in it itself; but they are *its* determined properties only because they are several and distinct from each other; and, thirdly, since they are thus in the *Thingness*, they are in and for themselves and indifferent to each other. [p. 90] It is therefore, in truth, the thing itself which is white, and *also* cubic, and *also* acrid, etc.; or the thing is the *Also*, or the universal medium in which the many properties subsist outside of each other without interfering with and cancelling each other; and thus the thing is taken as truly perceived.

[k] Now as regards this perception, the consciousness is at the same time aware that it is also reflected into itself, and that in the perception there occurs the moment opposed to the *Also*. But this moment is the unity of the thing with itself, which excludes the distinction from itself. It is this distinction, therefore, which the consciousness has to take on itself; for the thing itself

is the subsistence of the many diverse and independent properties. It is therefore said of the thing, that it is white, also cubic, also acrid, etc. But in so far as it is white it is not cubic, and in so far as it is cubic and white it is not acrid, etc. The positing of these attributes in unity belongs only to consciousness, which therefore must not let them fall together into One in the thing. For this purpose it produces the "*In-so-far*," through which it keeps them apart and preserves the thing as the *Also*. Closely stated, the One-Being is taken upon itself by the consciousness in such a manner, that that which was called property is represented as *free matter*. The thing is in this manner elevated to the true *Also*, since it becomes a collection of materials, and, instead of being One, it becomes a mere including surface.

[l] If we look back to that which the Consciousness took upon itself previously and does take now, what it previously attributed to the thing and does attribute now, it becomes obvious that it alternates from making itself a pure One devoid of multiplicity and the Thing an *Also* dissolved into independent matters, to the opposite of this, making the *thing* a *One* and *itself* the *Also*. [p. 90] Consciousness finds, therefore, through this comparison, that this diversity of apprehending and going back into itself is not merely a subjective affair pertaining to its own mode of knowing, but that the True itself—the thing—exhibits this twofold form. Thus the experience is made that the thing shows itself for the apprehending consciousness in a definite form, but at the same time that it is reflected out of the form in which it offers itself, and into itself; or that it has in itself an opposed truth.

[m] Hence the Consciousness is also beyond this second mode of procedure in perception, namely, that in which it takes the thing as the true Self-identity, and itself for the Non-identical, for that which is out of identity and has gone back into itself; and the object is now this entire activity which was previously parcelled out between the object and the Consciousness. The thing is One, is reflected into itself; it is for itself; but it is also for another, and moreover it is a different one for itself from that which it is for another. According to this, the thing is, in its relation to itself and to another, a different twofold being; but it is also One;—the Being-one, however, contradicts this its

diversity; the consciousness would therefore, according to this, again have to take upon itself this positing-in-one and keep it off from the thing. It would therefore have to say that the thing, in so far as it is for itself, is not for others. However the Being-one does also belong to the thing itself, as the consciousness has experienced; the thing is essentially reflected into itself. The Also or the indifferent distinction falls therefore just as much in the thing as the Being-one does; but, since the two are different, not into the same, but into different things; the contradiction which belongs to the objective essence in general divides on two objects. Thus the thing is indeed in and for itself, like itself, yet this unity with itself is interrupted through other things; thus the unity of the thing is preserved, and at the same time the other-being is outside of it as well as outside of the consciousness.

[u] Now although the contradiction of the objective essence has been divided between different things, yet the distinction will have to come to the isolated single thing. The different things are thus posited for themselves, and the contradiction falls into them reciprocally, so that each is not different from itself but only from the other. But with this each is itself determined as a Distinguished, and possesses the essential distinction of the other in it; but at the same time not so that this would be an opposition in it itself, but it for itself is simple determinateness which constitutes the essential character that distinguishes it from others. Although in point of fact, since the diversity is in it, the same is necessary as *actual* distinction of a manifold nature in it. Since, however, the determinateness constitutes the essence of the thing, through which it is distinguished from others and is for itself, this otherwise manifold nature is unessential. Thus the thing has in its unity the twofold *In-so-far* attached to it, but with unequal values; and through this, therefore, the opposition does not become an actual opposition of thing to itself, but, in so far as this comes into opposition through its absolute distinction, it has it towards another thing outside of it. Although the other manifoldness is also necessary to the thing so that it cannot be left out, yet it is not essential to it.

[o] This determinateness, which constitutes the essential character of the thing and distinguishes it from all others, is now

determined so that the thing is through it in opposition to others, but yet so that it shall preserve itself therein for itself. A thing, however, or a for-itself-existing-One, it is, only in so far as it stands not in this relation to others, for in this relation its connection with others is posited, and connection with others is the ceasing of Being-for-itself. [p. 93] Through the *absolute character* precisely and its opposition it stands in relation to others and is essentially nothing but this act of relation; but the relation is the negation of its independence, and thus the thing is destroyed through its essential property.

[p] The necessity of the experience for the consciousness, that the thing perishes precisely through the determinateness which constitutes its essence and Being-for-itself, may be briefly considered in an exhaustive manner (*nach dem einfachen Begriffe*) as follows: the thing is posited as Being-for-itself, or as absolute negation of all other-being; hence absolute negation which relates itself only to itself; but the negation relating to itself is a cancelling of itself, or the having its essence in another.

[q] In point of fact, the determination of the object as it has adduced itself contains nothing else; it shall possess an essential property which constitutes its simple being-for-itself, but, in addition to this simplicity, it shall also possess the diversity, which, although it is said to be necessary, shall not constitute the essential determinateness. But this is a distinction which lies merely in the words; the *Unessential*, which is to be at the same time *necessary*, cancels itself, or is that which was just called the negation of itself.

[r] Thus the final *In-so-far* which separated the Being-for-itself and the Being-for-others falls away; the object is rather from one and the same point of view the opposite of itself—for itself in so far as it is for others and for others in so far as it is for itself. It is for itself, reflected into itself, One. But this Being-for-itself, reflected-into-itself and One, is in a unity with its opposite, with the Being-for-another, and therefore only as cancelled; or this Being-for-itself is as unessential as that which was given out as the unessential alone, namely, the relation to others [p. 94].

[s] Thus the object is cancelled in its pure determinatenesses, or in the determinatenesses which were supposed to constitute

its essence, just as much as it was cancelled in its sensuous Being. From the sensuous Being it became a Universal; but this Universal—since it is derived from the sensuous—is essentially conditioned through it, and therefore not truly self-identical in general, but a universality which is affected with an antithesis, and for this reason separates into the extremes of individuality and universality—of the *One* of the properties and the *Also* of the free matters. These pure determinatenesses seem to express the essentiality itself, but they are in fact merely a Being-for-itself which is involved with a Being-for-others; since, however, both are essentially in the same unity, there is now before us the *unconditioned absolute universality*, and the consciousness here enters for the first time truly into the realm of the UNDERSTANDING.

[t] The sensuous individuality thus vanishes in the dialectic movement of immediate certitude and becomes universal, but merely *sensuous* universality; the “meaning” (opining) has vanished, and perception takes the object as it is in itself, or as universal in general; hence the individuality manifests itself on it as true individuality—as the Being-in-itself of the *One*, or as Being-reflected-into-itself. But it is still a conditional Being-for-itself, by the side of which there occurs another Being-for-itself which is opposed to the individuality and universality that is conditioned through it. But these two contradictory extremes are not only side by side, but are in the same unity, or, what is the same thing, the Being-for-itself, that which is common to both is involved with the antithesis, i. e. it is not a Being-for-itself [p. 95]. The sophistry of perception seeks to save these moments from their contradiction, and to grasp the True through a distinction of the Unessential from the Essence opposed to it. But this expedient, instead of concealing the deception from the apprehension, proves rather to be nugatory, and the True, which was expected from this logic of perception, adduces itself as self-antithetic in one and the same respect, and hence as having for its essence the Universality devoid of distinction and determination.

[u] These empty abstractions of the individuality and of the universality opposed to it, as well as of the essence which is connected with an Unessential, of an Unessential which is at the same time necessary,—

these are the powers whose play constitutes the perceiving, so-called, “sound common-sense” of mankind. This which takes itself as a completed real consciousness is in perception merely the sport of these abstractions; it is always poorest there, where it thinks itself richest. While it is haunted by this nugatory essence and is thrown by the one abstraction into the arms of the other, and endeavors through its sophistry to maintain interchangeably, now the one and then precisely the opposite abstraction, it places itself in opposition to the True, and volunteers its opinion that Philosophy is occupied with mere thought-distinctions. And, indeed, Philosophy *has* to do with these and nothing else, and it recognizes them for the pure essence, for absolute elements and powers; but it at the same time recognizes them in their *determinateness*, and is for this reason master over them, while the mentioned perceiving understanding takes them for the True, and is sent by them from one fool's errand to another. The perceiving understanding itself does not arrive at the consciousness that they are such simple essences which are active within it, but it is of the opinion that it has to do with quite solid material and content, just as sensuous certitude does not know that the empty abstraction of pure Being is its essence; but in point of fact they are that with which the understanding deals in all material and content [p. 96]. They hold it together and rule it, and constitute alone that which the *sensuous* as essence is for the consciousness, what determines its relations to it, and concerning which the activity of the perception and its truth is occupied. This course—a continuous unchangeable determination of the Truth and a cancelling of this determination—constitutes in reality the daily constant life and endeavor of the *perceiving* consciousness, which thinks that it is active in the very centre of truth. It proceeds in it irresistibly to the result of the same cancelling of all these essential essences or determinations, but is conscious in each moment only of this one determinateness as the True and then again of the opposite one. Yet it suspects their unessentialness; to save them from the threatening danger it passes over to sophistry, and asserts that as true which it just now asserted as not true. While the nature of these untrue essences tends to force this Understanding to bring together the thoughts of this

disorder—namely, of the Universality and Individuality, of the Also and the One, of the mentioned essentiality which connected with a necessary unessentiality, and of an Unessential which is nevertheless necessary—to bring these thoughts together and thus to cancel them, the understanding strives mightily against this, and endeavors to hold them asunder by using the “*In-so-far*” as a prop, and by taking “different points of view,” or by referring one thought to itself [the understanding] in order to retain the other separate and as the true one. But the nature of these ab-

stractions brings them, in and for themselves, together. The “sound common sense” is their prey, and they drive it around in their whirling circle. While it (the Understanding) endeavors to give them truth through the fact that it now takes their untruths upon itself, and then calls the deception an “appearance of the unreliable things,” and separates the essential from what is necessary to it, but nevertheless unessential—and preserves the former as their truth against the latter; it does not retain their truth for *them*, but it *does give itself* the untruth.

THE NEW SCHOOL OF MUSIC.

By EDWARD SOBOLEWSKI.

Pakæophil's letters,* criticising music, and dated June 30, 1759, contained the following lamentation:

“For some time past Music has been flooded with heterodox writings, thereby causing the same to become corrupt. If you are so much interested in the welfare of this art as I am, you will gladly aid me with all your power in maintaining its purity.

“Let us chastise these desperate writers, who molest us with their new-fangled notions, and sow a spirit of opposition and independence in the heads of the young generation, contrasting with our adopted mode of teaching music.

“Ask your honest Amisalos, if, in his early years, men knew anything of trills and turns. If a flourish was desired, it was produced by executing a *mordente* on the second-last note of any piece; and such as were unable to execute this flourish, simply let it alone.

“At his glorious time no distinction existed between E flat and D sharp, neither were number, place, or chords of musical intervals decided upon. Attention was paid only to the useful and necessary parts of the art, and the possibility of executing twenty tones or chords more, troubled no one.

“If the pupil dared to ask the teacher, ‘Why, in the chord of the tritone, the low-est part must be resolved,’ the teacher

would answer, ‘Because the highest part cannot do so.’ If he should venture to ask any reason for this rule, the teacher would silence him with answering, ‘It is unbecoming in any young man to ask such impudent questions!’”

We now smile at such angry eruptions a century old, and yet we cannot boast of having greatly advanced.

The race of Philistines has not diminished in spite of harmonious King David and his adherents.* New beings, years and troubles, with their usual suit of jealousy and hate, as Byron has it, proceeded from the ark of Noah. The Muses have grown old and quarrelsome since they tore Thamyras' sight from him.

Many exist who cannot boast of one favored look from their muse, and thus more than ever are blind to the *growing power* which ever creates and lives.

Many teachers of our day answer the question of a pupil, why the seventh resolves low and the second high; these answers can be found in thousands of musical books. Yet that which is not contained in these books is scoffed at and abhorred by men wearing the dress of the nineteenth century, but in every other respect dried and withered.

This decline from life and youth must not

* R. Schumann and his Contributors to the *New Music*, a paper read at Leipsic.

* Berlin by Birnstiel.

be understood to be synonymous with age in years. Age in music is of no consideration. Music, of all fine arts, is followed by many young in years, yet old and withered in feeling and conception, and, *vice versa*, many of old age, who still glow with the energy and fire of youth in all their musical creations.

Voltaire's expression, "Un vieux poète, un vieil amant, un vieux chanteur, et un vieux cheval, ne valent rien," is as seldom true as its author. Goethe confutes this saying in these words:

"The strength of youth, my friend, will tower
When angry foes to battle chime,
When with fond, overwhelming power
Sweet maids their arms around thee twine,
When far the wreaths of honor wink
To test thy speed and youthful spright,
When 'mid the starry night we drink
And revel in the waltz's delight:
Yet from the harp's melodious strings
To call the soft, enchanting power
Needs not the years of Youth!"

Hayden composed his "Creation" and Handel his "Israel in Egypt" when past sixty.

As little do we intend to defend those who call themselves disciples of future-music, many of whom consider themselves martyrs of the new school, because they know nothing, and do not try or even wish to know anything of the same. They remind me of those who, in order to postpone their bankruptcy as long as possible, harangued, in 1759 of blessed memory, about the decay of the arts. A work like *Lohengrin*, by R. Wagner, excites from such men a sarcastic smile, and exclamations of "Acoustic experiments!" Such are Hauptmann's words. Where may his own composition, "And let us, e'en while trials frown", be properly classed?

Let us return to our theme; let us say what our object is. "*We desire nothing more than what Socrates desired over two thousand years ago, namely, 'To explain NATURE by the laws of REASON.'*" This shall be our supreme law in spite of the opposition of all who prefer interest to reason, and whose number is not small amongst the disciples of music.

In referring to the past history of the art, we find but too often that what was condemned in one year was commended in the next. Only one illustration, which to-day is universally admitted as very extraordinary:

Previous to Orlando Tasso's time, the third of the common chord was neither used

at the beginning nor ending of any composition in the first and last chord.

Prætorius, in his "Organography," tells us that all the old masters did not consider thirds and sixths as concords, but as discords; "Therefore," he says, "shall no man be so presuming and imagine himself so wise as to think he understands this better than Ptolemaus, Bætius, Euclides, and other eminent *musici*."

Palestrina was the first who disregarded this accustomed rule, and it is but natural that he suffered in the beginning.

Gluck, Mozart and Beethoven had to fight similar battles, yet many a long established rule and form died with them, many instruments were emancipated and permitted to appear in the orchestra, and to the orchestra-score was granted the privilege of being enlarged a few staves. This music produced good effect and consequently was accepted.

Could genius always depend upon itself, if genius were always in the right, it would be needless for us to try and penetrate the mysterious darkness floating around all creation, but simply say: "Do not compose if you are void of genius; yet if you are endowed with the same, write your inspirations!" Yet no man will deny genius to Schumann or Wagner, in spite of which we have heard much just censure regarding their "Manfred" and "Faustus" Overtures.

Considering all this, it would be but proper to study the solution of this difficult problem.

"*Music, by the use of tones, gives form to what we feel.*"—Close reasoning regarding the life of feeling in man leads many to the daring question: "Is man possessed of a soul within his body, immortality encased in mortal frame; or is the power of life contained in the body the soul of the same and does it perish with it?"

Be this as it may, it is a matter of impossibility to separate the mental powers from the physical in the feeling of man; be this mental feeling excited to activity by an invisible power or by immediate earthly causes and influences, the physical will always be found to act in unison with the same. Marx says, "*To hear* is the first germ of music;" I say, "*To feel.*" If this feeling is powerful, it will flow like a magnetic fluid throughout the whole nervous system, and naturally escape through the throat in a joyous or complaining form, high or low, the

tones coming in contact with pulsation.—Such is the first germ of music.

The creation of form is governed by the degree of nervous excitement existing. Pulsation will establish a certain order, *time*; and the elevation or depression of feeling, continuing until finally exhausted, will in itself form a higher rhythm.

All this will be naturally and correctly produced, for nature never fails; and only when the physical construction is imperfect or diseased will the shaping of the feeling thereof into form, act injuriously upon the body. Not even a lunatic is void of this feeling; some musical idea may enter his brain, yet it will lack consistency. The so-called *Pot-pourris* differ from the compositions of a lunatic in this respect only, that the *intention* to appear lunatic is plainly discernible.

We have involuntarily made use of the word "Idea." It has become naturalized in music, and expresses about the same as thought, theme, or *sujet*. We would even prefer it to the three latter, as there is something superlatively real and primitive conveyed in its meaning, which cannot be as positively expressed in the word "thought," and still less in the words "theme" or "*sujet*." An Idea is something unexplainable; like the sudden flashing of a meteor in the blue and serene ether, sending its brilliant sparks through all spheres with a velocity almost beyond conception; an idea occurs, lives, and is expressed in word, tone, or picture, animating its possessor.

The formation of ideas into tones excites in listeners to the same, a feeling similar to that in its author. We say similar only, for, as the feeling is excited by means of the vocal organs, it is but secondary in its effect, whereas the composer received the same in its full, primary, and intense force—even as an effusion of his own soul.

We described "Idea" as something unexplainable, yet we entertain the opinion that some organic matter relative to the same must exist in our mental construction. Many men are capable of feeling only what has been already felt, and are entirely unable to invent, although well and thoroughly versed in all forms and rules appertaining to music. Such men are either minus this organ, or possessed of one of but imperfect development. They have but the inferior organ, the ear, through which channel they are enabled to receive similar impressions, secondary only in force and effect. Yet

even this secondary feeling will cease to communicate itself to those whose vocal organs are deficient, or where a certain peculiar construction for the reception of *tones* does not exist; for there are many possessed of a quick ear, and yet unable to conceive a distinction of sound between high and low tones, and who consequently are incapable of appreciating feeling transformed into notes.

Perfect construction of the vocal organs, sensitiveness of the nervous system regarding tones, and the inexplicable organ of musical ideas, compose Genius. If one of these be not in a state of perfection, the production will show the defect.

Yet many imperfections can be overcome to some degree. As the strength of muscle is increased by exercise of the same, so may the more delicate parts of our system be strengthened and polished in the same manner. Fugues and Contrapoint are gymnastic exercises for the composer, yet this alone will not enable him,

"With little wit and glorious might,
To swing his soul beyond all height."

No; yet, properly practised, such exercises will strengthen the mind, regulate the vibrations of feeling, and hasten Phantasy, without engulphing it in misty depths.

We do not consider Fugues as the most elevated form possible of attainment. Handel has written complete Oratorios without including a single Fugue; yet it would have been impossible for him to compose these Oratorios if Fugues had not been within his power.

We may safely say that there never existed a real master of the art, who did not, at some time during his musical career, wholly abandon himself to the thematic surroundings of the Fugue. Accepting genius in a composer (as the voice in a vocalist) as ninety-nine parts of the requisite requirements, we may consider for the hundredth part "Dexterity in the adaptation of Fugues!"

The Fugue principally strengthens the Logic of tone-language, which is required. It would be absurd to place a double contrapoint in an *eighth*, *ninth*, *tenth*, or to employ a reversed or retrograding imitation merely for the sake of contrapoint or imitation; all must be naturally created, and not *manufactured*.

Aristotle says: "Whenever you create, follow nature; in it no disconnected ingredients occur, as in many Tragedies. A seed,

received by the womb of the earth, lives, germinates, grows in the light of the sun, producing blossoms and fruit in accordance with its nature." Thus it is with Ideas;—they likewise must expand according to their nature, although they may receive a peculiar coloring through some peculiarity of the individual, as plants are influenced by soil and climate.

Fugue and Rondo are the Basis of the entire old system of form.—The compositions were either a thematic work, or a mere compilation of two or three different melodies, appearing at intervals in different keys, by the repeating, displacing, imitating or transposing of parts more or less prolonged. Hayden, Mozart and Beethoven often combined both forms in their compositions.

In favor of the first form it might be said, that it retains the same character, weight, and motion of time, throughout. The second is made interesting merely by an interesting theme. It was principally favored by such composers as Maria Von Weber, Meyerbeer, and the entire host of Italian and French composers of the first half of the nineteenth century; especially for their instrumental compositions.

The Rondo-form also furnished the type for all Airs, Duos, Trios, Finales, etc. Until of late no composer could entirely cast off this straight-jacket; as poets cut the same in this fashion, or were forced to do so in order to justify musical critics.

The disciples of Schumann and the principal founders of the new school now ask: "Why do you not emancipate all poets and yourselves? Must the poet be ever forced to form his creations into such shape that the composer may adapt his two or three themes to the same? Or must we never dare to compose an Opera, the poetical part of which prevents us from giving it this Rondo-form? Or, if the Libretto is too attractive, shall we twist, repeat, expand and contort every word into every variety of shape, in order to obtain the old musical form, to such a degree, that if the poet should hear his words after undergoing this transformation, he would feel inclined to wish composer and all to the regions where Orpheus once was?"

"We will emancipate poets and ourselves," exclaimed the disciples of Schumann, and consequently they condemned all forms appertaining to this old theory. To this the Conservatives answered, "If you do so,

your compositions will be formless!" But the former retorted, "*The life of feeling becomes shape, and every shape is possessed of form.*" This form, no matter of what nature, is good, so long as all parts retain a harmonious relation to each other.

Thus the supreme law of music may be designated by the word "HARMONY." Consequently, every combination of tones is correct if they retain a harmonious relation in their construction; be this based on theory or not, it is all the same. To this day, many combinations of tones in Bach's works cannot be explained by theoretical laws, although our feeling tells us that these combinations are good, and consequently correct. For this reason no pupil should be chained to the laws of form *in the moment of conception.*

Kimberger, Weber, Marx, and others, according to the old school, insist upon a certain progressive succession of chords. The new school studies the succession of chords on a larger scale; it examines into the nature of tones and guides them, as a zephyr guides the tones of an Æolian harp, by deeper laws than those adopted by dry Theoreticians. These deeper laws the young composer must try to explore.

In my *Debates on Music** I have explained thirty-three progressive movements of the seventh chord in the Dominant; there are still more existing, although Theory permits but two, at the farthest three. The same may be said of other combinations of tones.

Harmonies of disagreeable effect, such as pure fifths, are of course forbidden; such mistakes are ranked in the same category with improper execution, and what school would defend such?

"*The laws of Modulation are Elevating and Depressing.*"—The repugnance of the old school to diverging into distant keys is frequently but a feeling of aversion to lawlessness. Very distant Diversions are often much milder in effect than nearer keys; it is principally the eye, and not the ear, which is confused by many sharps and flats. The periods of a musical part, the musical parts of a scene, and the various scenes of an Opera or Oratorio, must all remain in harmonious relation to each other.

One or more chords of the *Dissonante* are followed by one of the *Consonante* (the lull

* Bremen, Kranz & Co., Publ.

after a storm); thus music is rising and sinking. This elevation and depression is incited to motion, melody is the *inciting power*.

Tone, chord, modulation, rhythm and instrumentation are merely external means. In our day they are nearly all fully explained, thus enabling one thoroughly conversant with the laws of theory to create a large and extensive work, looking very much like a composition, although properly but a compilation of forms.

No art can boast of so many means to deceive as music! A poet may be ever so lavish with beautiful words, yet, unless they can be understood, he will be censured and scoffed at. Yet in music it is different. We often hear tones entirely unsuited to the words they are intended to express, and but few will notice it. Yes, many even say, "What do I care for words or rhyme! If I have but proper chords void of fifths and eighths, a proper rhythm, and the whole composition of an effect that may be produced by vocal and instrumental combination, no more is needed!

"Of what use, then, are words?"—If music breathes the feeling that words express, it would be better to compose instrumental music only, placing the words to be expressed, as a preface to the same.—Lizt, in his symphonic poems, as also sometimes Mendelssohn and Schumann, employed this mode of prefacing the music with the words. The old-fashioned, with a glance of contempt, call this *Programme-music*; yet, mildly judged, many of their own Cantatas, Operas, and Oratorios, are nothing but mere *Programme-music*! For instance: Hauptmann, the first teacher on Composition at the Conservatory of Music at Leipsic, repeats the words "And though I roam this gloomy vale" three times in succession, then follow four interluding measures, and finally the main clause, "I fear no misfortune!" What else is this but *Programme-music*? The same effect might be obtained by placing the words to be expressed in the hands of the audience, while the performers execute solfeggios on the vowels A or E.

If words are sung, it is likewise necessary that they be understood; yet this is impossible if the words are not properly accentuated, or too widely separated, which leads to the same end. Let us take this sentence for illustration: "I see you." Does this

mean, "I see you," or "I see you," or "I see you"? What human being, endowed with common sense, will deny that the composer who makes use of these words is obliged to express their proper sense in his music?

I do not wish to be misunderstood. The words must remain the dry and withered grains, which, when touched by music, send forth their fragrant odor. Although the composer is obliged to follow the declamation in his music, yet he has not only to *speak*, but also to *sing*. Music must be far richer in tones to return wholly all variations of the sound of words: this richness was probably peculiar to the old Greek music, which possessed many more notes of different value (several thousand) than our music.

"We must be satisfied with our Scale."—This is not intended to mean: "You have the privilege of placing the short or almost silent syllables on more prolonged or higher notes than the accentuated syllables;" as M. v. Weber in his *Air of Max*, "Eyes so gloomy." He gives to the syllable "gloom—" two-eighths and to "-y" four-eighths, and not only the high but even the accentuated note of the Syncope. Here again it is Harmony, which must correspond in word and tone.

The same law governs Instrumentation. As much as I would prefer nothing but beautiful Italian violins in an orchestra, so much I would exclude every brass or wood instrument not possessed of a certain *noblesse* of sound. It must not be imagined that Instrumentation may be *learned*. We may learn the character and technical construction of the various instruments, yet the adaptation of the same, the Instrumentation, is again a matter of Genius. It must harmonize with the feeling to be expressed.

"What, then, is the secret of the new school?"—That the disciples of the same must possess more knowledge than those of the old. They are not only required to possess the most extended knowledge of the expansion of voice and modulation combined with the same, but also great dexterity in contrapoint works, knowledge of voice and instrument, and finally a thorough understanding and perception of the language chosen for their vocal music; above all, they must possess *genius*. Although the disciples of Schumann, the principal founders of this new

school, may be said to differ in many points, "il est impossible que tous les esprits prennent la même direction; leur marche dif-

fère comme le vol des oiseaux";—yet all lift their souls nearer to heaven, and worship immortal HARMONY!

INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER X.

THE UNIVERSAL.

Those who know of no other universal than that obtained by abstracting differences, and seizing the common marks of objects, have no philosophical conception of the universal. It is to be regretted that in the English language the word "general," which is the best word for the purpose, has sunk into a synonym of "common," and has a merely discursive use. From its root, *GEN*, we could expect a suggestiveness in it of the creative significance of the "universal." In such words as *genius*, *generous*, *genial*, we have the meaning referred to, and *general* was used by the spirit of our language (*Sprach-Geist*) to express the true idea of that which is "all-common" and at the same time the creative essence. In German we have *Allgemein* and *Gattung* to express the two meanings.

In this chapter we hope to make clear how the *common* and *creative* have the same root, and to show in what sense the Universal or Generic may be said to be the only true existence.

THE PARTICULAR.

Seize upon the world of reality as it offers itself and it breaks up into an infinite concourse of individuals,—side by side in space and succeeding each other in time. Each one seems to be peculiar and distinct from all the rest, and it is as impossible for us to find any two objects exactly alike as it was for the ladies of the Court at which Leibnitz resided, to find any two leaves of the forest exactly alike, though they searched with care. If we look upon each object as absolutely determined, fixed in its being, and at the same time attribute to it independent validity and real existence.—this is the "common sense" view, and is held by those who are most opposed to idealism. Over against the particular it holds the *common* or *general*.

Experience is always engaged in discovering resemblances. What is *common* to *different* objects is found, and the process called generalization. The common or general element is looked upon as more or less accidental or contingent; perhaps even regarded as subjective, and a mere reflection, made by the spectator.

Words stand for the common elements, and, the differences being abstracted, of course it follows that the general concepts for which words stand correspond to nothing real, but are merely figments of the mind, and are either arbitrary or the product of mental laws.

Such, in substance, is the view of those who never rise above the stages of sense and reflection. But in reflection arises a side which results finally in overthrowing this view;—it is the *dynamic* view, wherein all is treated as

THE RELATIVE.

If we seize the particular, and demand of it what it is that gives it distinctness or separation from others, we are at once engaged in noting its complication with other particulars. We find that what constitutes it a *particular individual* is to be stated as a series of defects and potentialities which manifest themselves as we pursue our investigation. (See Chap. VIII., I.) Through these lacks or wants or deficiencies it is related to and dependent upon an outlying sphere of existence, which needs to be added to it to complete it. The particular, in short, exhibits its whole series of phases as a tendency to lose its distinguishing characteristics in attaining to a completer realization of the entire compass of its existence. That which is partial is so far forth affected with a mortal malady, and the wholeness of its universality is the healthy (whole-some) state which it needs.

The particular can only be seized by transcending it. Its own existence, too, is a self-transcending, for it has its *properties*

through its relation to the Beyond. It is therefore only in the total compass or sphere that includes it, as a mere complemental part thereof.

The particular things in time and space are all self-transcendent: each is heavy, i. e. is attracted to a body outside of it, and thus is a part of the unity formed by this relation. Earth and Moon and Sun make a system together, of which neither is independent. So, too, the Solar systems make a system, and this is a part of another system. The individual in space and time is what it is through its relation, and relation is a transcending of the individual. Since what it is, is through its relation, it is an embodied contradiction—it is its own negation. And hence what *is*, is

THE UNIVERSAL.

For if we analyze the content of this phenomenal relativity we shall discover two sides which belong to the same essence: *1st*, the deficiency, want or lack manifested in its relativity, is the activity of the including totality or "negative unity"; *2d*, itself is negative to its including totality, for it loses its separate independence if the latter has full sway. Both these factors are actively united in what is called a *phenomenon*. It would not be phenomenal, i. e. transient, unless the negative unity of the including total annulled the real and caused the potential to become real. (See Chap. VIII. again; also "*Essence and Phenomenon*" in Vol. I. Jour. Sp. Phil., p. 14.) Therefore in the activity which constitutes a phenomenon we have a manifestation of the including totality in its entire compass. Here we find the GENERIC. The Constant under the Variable is the *generic*, and *it*, we see, is the only true individual, for it alone abides and does not pass over into another, as the particular of space and time does continually. Hence words as expressing the *generic*, express the only actuality or the only *Being for itself*. That the Universal is that which preserves its identity, and the changing and variable, is the principle which gives a basis to Realism as opposed to Nominalism. It is a strange spectacle to witness the very men who hold to the doctrine of the *Correlation of forces* take the position of Nominalists. They, in effect, say: All change or phenomenality is the play of forces which have no permanent individuality, for they are in perpetual transition,

one force never retaining for a single instant its own identity, but always in process of becoming another different force. From this it results that there is no individuality either in given material shapes—for these are dependent on the play of forces—nor in the given forces, *heat, electricity*, etc., for these are ceaselessly changing their forms. Hence the Correlationist must and *does* hold that the *generic* entity of force is the only abiding, and hence the only true individual. Stated in the terms we have been using in these chapters: The *negative unity*, which is only one of the moments of the comprehension (see Chap. VII.), is named *force*, and the Correlationist does not rise to the standpoint of IDEA, and hence does not get beyond an abstract Pantheism, wherein all finite existence suffers birth and decay, and even intelligence is regarded as a finite when brought before this abstract Force. What he omits to consider is the fact that such abstract force, when thus elevated to the Universal, is necessarily spontaneous, i. e. self-determining or self-originating. For if force moves to restore the destroyed equilibrium of a given entire system—and no other concept of it will suffice—then, to have a continual or abiding force, we must have a continual destruction of that equilibrium. This restoring and destroying of an equilibrium is the realization of the pure potentiality and the return to the same, and is the Universal in its actuality as *Ego*, or the *Generic*, which is the root of consciousness.

When the "Positivists," and all others in that stage of knowing which deals with THE RELATIVE, come to perceive this other side and ascend to its comprehension, they will have attained the *aperçu* of Aristotle and Hegel, and become Theistic.

INSTITUTIONS OF SPIRIT.

The embodied realization of the Universal or GENERIC, in its immediate form, is the Ego, as above intimated. But its embodiment in the individual has this difficulty: that the Ego is not completely possessed of itself until it frees itself from Nature, i. e. from the senses and from the reflective intellect. Its means of retaining itself as universal while in these lower stages are the INSTITUTIONS OF SPIRIT. Among the lowest forms of these is *fashion*—the commonness of humanity indicated by the prevailing fashion, and the difference thereof, indica-

ted by the same. Then habits and customs, moral and ethical, constitute a deeper community of spirit. The FAMILY, next after the individual, is his first realization of the *universal*. In the family the *tension of sex*, wherein the highest stage of Nature is reached, is cancelled. Nature never gets beyond this *tension of opposites* in any individual form; when we come to consciousness only, do we find a series of stages wherein this tension is solved and the two sides collapse into one-ness, just as the Ego knows itself, and this act is its fundamental characteristic. Man as *animal* is male and female, but as spirit he is his own object, and therefore celebrates this fact in the first institution of spirit—marriage, wherein he lays the basis of all culture and civilization. The individual longing, i. e. desire, which makes it a finite and dependent being is here annulled by being joined to the object of its desire, which object again reflects back the same dependence upon the first. Thus instead of a simple finite existence commencing with a given individual and ceasing with the same, we have by means of the family a realized universality, which receives the individual at birth and cares for him, and also lives on beyond him, and performs the last offices for him.

In CIVIL SOCIETY we have a higher realization of universality, wherein each man, through division of labor, is enabled to concentrate all his faculties on a speciality, and yet be sure of a supply of all the other specialities from the other individuals engaged like himself, only on different specialities; so that it is the whole *community*, only, that furnishes the complete outfit for each individual, and hence it acts as one organism, and each individual, through this act of transcending himself and making himself *for all*, receives in turn the service *of all*; and thus all are for him, and he is *for himself* through the reciprocal relation thus established. Hence civil society is an organism which serves the purpose of making Man universal in so far as the life in time and space is concerned; it makes all for and through each, and each for and through all. The relation begins from the individual and goes out to the many, but returns through them back to the individual.

Property is a realized universality of the individual will—nature transformed into a spiritual somewhat by being forced into the service of the spiritual. Again, property has

a universal solvent—*money*,—wherein all property becomes fluid and transferable, thus making it completely the instrument of Society. Thus each is made free and self-dependent; for in so far as he energizes and relates himself to the community, just so far does the community relate itself back to him, and he gets the fruit of his own deed.

But civil society is not thus complete as an instrument of realization of the universal without an obverse side—THE STATE. It is the State which holds the wheels of civil society in their places and renders all permanent and secure. Were there only positive or useful deeds—productive deeds—possible from the individual, then government would not be necessary, for civil society could go on by itself. But in that case, moreover, the institutions of spirit would not be for the genesis and nurture of spirit, for that presupposes rudimentary or germ forms of spirit wherein the complete consciousness has not yet been reached. Institutions are to take the undeveloped individual (whether infant or criminal) and guide him to self-guidance (i. e. negate his negativity). But no self-determination can begin without negating its own determinations, and hence its first acts must be evil; for its own determinations, those of nature, and of the moral organization in which it exists, are in and for themselves right. But it—the individual will—has the right to be self-determined, and hence to cancel these limits as imposed upon it from without, through education, etc. But the first acts of the will are mere “self-will” and the opposite of the rational will, and must necessarily be so. Hence the State is absolutely indispensable as the highest institution of spirit (so long, at least, as the state of childhood exists), and its functions are obviously these: it makes the individual’s deed his own, whether positive or negative. If he negates the rational organism of civil society or the family, the state interposes and adds the link which brings his deed home to him, and he finds himself negating himself and suffering the consequences. Thus he learns to will rational deeds, i. e. deeds which have a universal content, and will not hurt the doer when they come back to him. The doer is made universal by the state in the fact, that whatever the doer does, he does to himself, and is a complete circle. The state protects each from all and all from each, and each

from himself, by this function it exercises of universalizing each deed: the individual reaping the result of his own deed from the beginning, finds that evil deeds negate his power of doing at all. By the mediation of the prison and the gallows, his deed, if evil, hurts him alone and saves every other individual of the community from injury. By the completeness of the mediation each deed recoils soon enough to prevent an accumulation great enough to annihilate the individual by its return stroke. This function of universalizing man as free-doer (which belongs to the state) is not an exceptional one, but the very means by which all arrive at a rational will—a will that does not forever contradict itself, as caprice does. If now and then a man grows up uncorrected and murders or steals, it is evidence of the imperfection of the realization of the universalizing power, but it is also a warning example of what we *all* should be, were there no state.

While the state stands for the highest realization of the universal on the practical side, there are spheres above it in which this is achieved in a far more adequate manner. In Art there is a subordination of the natural into the rank of a mere symbol for spirit. In this, spirit realizes its universality in being able to remove all alien *appearance to the senses*.

In Religion spirit recognizes its unity with the supersensuous essence that it has attained to by thought. It places the Universal before itself as its ideal.

In Philosophy, spirit, the Universal is to be reached as the form of Speculative Insight, and this is the highest form of spirit. (*Η θεωρία το ἡδιστον καὶ ἀριστον.*)

Thus Art symbolizes the Universal in material forms; Religion makes it an object of conception, while Philosophy comprehends it concretely.

CONCLUSION.

With the consideration of the Universal our Introduction may conclude. If any one seizes the Universal as we have attempted to characterize it here, he will have seized the key to all thinking and Being, and will be prepared to accompany us through a consideration of the different systems of Philosophy that have prevailed and now prevail.

But this series would not be complete without giving a hasty review of our pro-

gress from Chapter I. to Chapter X., and showing that each *aperçu* was a phase of the Universal, and luminous for that very reason. We may sum up, therefore, our results as follows:

CHAPTER I.

Time and Space are *a priori*, and yet the logical conditions of the world; hence Mind, which is the source of what is *a priori* (and hence, for the reason mentioned, is the logical condition of the world in Time and Space), must be the Universal and a solvent of all that exists.

CHAPTER II.

The Finite and Infinite distinguished: the Finite, "that which is limited by something other than itself;" and the Infinite, that which is its own "other" or limit, and hence, instead of *limiting* itself, *continues* itself, and is thus universal.

CHAPTER III.

Categories, or general predicates, are the means by which we cognize, and as instruments must be presupposed by all knowing. Thus generalized, we must find a primitive category at the root or starting-point of our Knowing; and this is the category of Being. This category is the simple act of the mind in judgments—the "is"-ing—and hence we see that the primitive category is the Ego itself in its simplest form posited objectively, and hence the fundamental act of knowing is an act of distinguishing the self and identifying it with the self. All further knowing is the same process repeated, and hence it is the realization of the Universality of the Ego as intelligence. The Ego can have no other than itself as object for it.

CHAPTER IV.

Being is dependent or independent—determined through itself or through another.—In all cases, dependent Being or Being through another, is a *moment* (or complementary element) of a complex whole which is, as such, independent and self-determined.—Hence the Self-determined is the Basis of all Being, and it is hence the Universal or all-present form. Besides, since it is *self-determined* it is spontaneous and originating, creative of the special and destructive of the same. It is thus *Generic*.

This is the most easy ascent to the foun-

tain-idea of Speculative Philosophy that I now of. It is the most elementary form of the *conscious* apprehensions of the Universal. It is the key to all great *aperçus* of Speculative Philosophy, and should be seized fully by the one who wishes to make anything out of the works of Genius.

The self-determined, if seized more clearly, proves to be dual—subject and object—and a unity constituting the individual. From which, if carefully considered, there follows conscious personality as the Supreme principle of the Universe; this and all other spiritual truths ray out from this great central point of speculation.

CHAPTER V.

"Necessity and Chance" lead us to consider the subject of determination more fully.* An example of the *dialectic* is af-

* The doctrine of the Universal is the cure for that form of fatalism now current in literature as a species of "Positivism." An example in point will be found in the "Atlantic Monthly" for September, 1868, entitled "The Impossibility of Chance," wherein the externality of all determination is insisted upon to the exclusion of all spontaneity. It requires only the tracing out of the train of thought there started, to its ultimate consequences, to see how unwarrantable are the inferences there drawn:

Facts are not absolute, individual, and definite existences; they are relative syntheses. The shallowest thinker seizes the merest unessential phase as the "fact" for him. The deeper the thinker, the wider and more comprehensive the synthesis included in his "fact." Newton thought the whole celestial mechanism in the fact of the fall of an apple. It depends on how far back one traces the causes, or how widely the "totality of conditions"; for each fact implies the whole Universe as the totality of its conditions. But this doctrine frees us completely from the tyranny of *immediate sensuous* facts, for it is evident that what the senses can perceive of a fact is a very small portion of the immense orbit which it fills. The "Negative Unity" which is arrived at by this degree of reflection is elevated above the *things* of sense, and can be apprehended only by thought.

But, in order to reach the Universal, one step more is requisite. The totality of conditions must be posited by itself since it has no externality conditioning it again. If we now inquire for the source of the determinations which arise in it, we have no resource but to acknowledge their spontaneity. Reflection is here "cornered," for it cannot go outside of the "All." If externality of conditioning rests ultimately on self-determination, the latter must be set up as the supreme principle and the former as a derivative one, or one that forms a mere phase of the latter. Hence "the impossibility of necessity" would be as rational a title as the one above alluded to. Chance is to be applied to the immediate form of spontaneity, and Necessity is the mediate form of the same, while Freedom is the same in its entirety.

forded in the treatment given in this chapter. Assuming, first, the standpoint of fatalism—all is determined from without by external causes—we see if this is thought as universal, that the all or Total must be without (or outside of) itself, and thus, at all events, self-determined. Hence Necessity must presuppose self-determination, and can apply only to the part and not to the whole or totality, which is universal and free.

CHAPTER VI.

A more general form of treating the same subject (i. e. determination) is given in the chapter on Mediation.

The Immediate—that which is out of relation; the Mediate, that which is only in relation. Made Universal, we have Absolute Mediation—Self-relation—Self-determination, or the Universal again.

(a) The Immediate cannot be a determined somewhat, and is naught; (b) the Mediate is determined, and thus dependent or finite; (c) the Absolute Mediate is the self-relation, which is the Independent and True.

N. B.—The True and Universal is not a stuff, or material, or thing, or rigid substance; but is a relation to itself which can subsist only in activity, or in a process. Hence the Universal is not a simple Immediate nor a simple Mediate, but both in one, and the Active is the permanent substance.* The Universal, moreover, as a multiplicity in unity, is a system, an *organic* whole.

CHAPTER VII.

We now trace further the insight into the nature of the Universal as a system. As *comprehension* it is the "negative unity" together with the "moments," and this is not the Absolute Universal which the *IDEA* is. It must be not merely a totality, but a totality of totalities, in order to be the Idea,† which is the highest thought of Philosophy. In this connection, the doctrine of pure Theism, in contradistinction to Pantheism or Atheism, gets established.

* The Active is the ground of all Being. This doctrine distinguishes all Speculative Philosophy from its opposite. Plato, Aristotle, Heraclitus, Proclus, Plotinus, Hegel, Leibnitz, and others, hold this doctrine in some one of its various forms.

This is one of the first points for the student of Philosophy to direct his attention to. Until he can see *in his own way* this important doctrine, he can have at best only a historical knowledge of the various systems, and they will pass for mere opinions.

† Idea is used in this sense by Hegel alone.

All mere limitation from without vanishes in the sphere of the Idea, and instead of it we find *Recognition* as its form of relation to the "other-being."

CHAPTER VIII.

In the "Idea" we found the true system which the Universal is, as the Absolute Mediation; in this chapter we have the Universal as the Actual. The moments of the Actual are *reality* and *potentiality*—a process of reciprocal action wherein the total is involved, and in which it maintains itself as absolute mediation or self-determination, or as the Universal. The "Form of Eternity" is the world's essence and actuality. The Phenomenal, seen from this standpoint, is an exhibition of the validity of the Eternal which abides in the activity (the "wrath of the wicked" turned into "praise," and all finitude in a state of being annulled by its own imperfections). The Finite is thus only a field for the display of the Idea.

CHAPTER IX.

Finally, we approach the Universal from the standpoint of Pure Thought, and consider the question of *distinction* and *identity* in the most general form. Here again, as in Chapter V., we have an example of the dialectic.* The method which distinguishes

But it signifies the standpoint of Aristotle, and it is the speculative basis of the Christian Theology, especially as relating to the dogma of the Trinity. Leibnitz founded his Monadology on that *opereu*. So, too, the national form of government of the United States is a realization of it. Recognition and Tolerance are the accompaniments of its realization.

* The ascent from the part to the whole is a

Pure Thought is this: it places the subject treated of, under the form of the Universal (the "form of Eternity") and considers the result. In such a crucible all baser metals give way and vanish, and leave the pure gold. To speak without metaphor: all categories when tried by this standard show their deficiency, or what they lack in order to give them independent Being. Thus *Identity*, if not simple immediateness or vacuity, is a self-relation, and involves distinction, and hence is Universal; self-distinction is thus the basis of identity. That negation of negation is the form of all Being or identity is here made manifest. This chapter may be called The Genesis of the Comprehension of the Universal.

CHAPTER X.

In the last chapter we recognize the soul of the method that has hovered before us in so many different shapes. The Universal is the creative source of principles, the solvent of all multiplicity, the criterion of truth, the abiding essence under the Phenomenal, the root of conscious identity. It is the Philosopher's stone, and by its alchemy the base dross of mere opinion may be converted into the pure gold of science.

dialectical process. A part taken as a whole shows its deficiencies as its presuppositions. It cannot be a part without presupposing the whole. But the dialectic is only a kind of ladder for the novice and for the preliminary stage of comprehension, and the speculative knowing uses the Idea, or the "knowing by wholes," as Thomas Taylor calls it. To see the necessary unity of independent totalities is the highest and most difficult step to attain; but the philosopher must not rest satisfied until he has attained this insight.

ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY.

II.—PERCEPTION.

(See page 150.)

In the previous chapter, our "voyage of discovery" had explored the shores of sensuous certitude for Truth; but no satisfactory result was arrived at within its domain, and we were forced to go out into a region of mediation, in our pursuit. It became evident that those who speak of immediate knowing, do not use the word "immediate" with any care as to its etymological signifi-

cation, for all knowing involves mediation—indeed, it is an act of mediating. Whether, on the one hand, it is the materialist, who holds that all our knowing is through the senses, and that we know best when we are sensuously intuiting, and that our knowledge becomes dimmer and dimmer by our removal from the object of the senses—or, on the other hand, it is the idealist, who holds that our only certain knowledge is immediate intuition *within*—inspiration, as it were—in either case, the same error ob-

tains: there can be no immediate intuition of Truth (i. e. knowledge of Truth without mediation), for Truth itself involves mediation, and hence can be known adequately only through mediation. It is this *leaving out of mediation* that makes this doctrine of intuition defective. What we must reach is a doctrine of immediateness that is a *result* of mediation. That is the true immediateness which belongs to Personality. The reader of Plato and Aristotle will be reminded of the doctrine which forms the foundation of their systems, to-wit: that we can know only through our own activity; that the perfect being is an *energy*. In the shape this doctrine takes here, we should say that Truth requires a mediating activity of the mind in order to be perceived.

But at present we are not very far advanced with our doctrine, and our remarks are rather external reflections than a statement of what the consciousness of humanity seizes at this point. And Hegel's greatest merit is in this, that he never confuses his own insights which break in upon any given point—flashing as it were from pole to pole of the world of thought—with the unfolding in its natural order of whatever object he is considering. This is his method, of which much has been said, and that mostly so erroneous as to mislead even the sober and considerate. Advantage has been taken of the common ignorance and prejudice with regard to those doctrines upon which all speculative thinkers have been agreed, and a few shallow *aperçus* are paraded as the basis of the Hegelian method!

Whatever our reflections may be on the subject, the only point of importance here is to seize correctly that which the experiencing consciousness is driven to accept at this point, for that will determine what phases we shall now consider. In arriving at the Universal as the truth of sensuous certitude, we must not assume consciousness as taking this in all its significance, otherwise we should end our *Phenomenology* at this point, for such would not be a *phase*, but rather a comprehensive totality of all phases of knowing.

Our translation accompanying this article commences at *Perception* (*Wahrnehmung*), or *the thing and the deception*. In it we have ([a] to [f] inclusive) a concise logical treatment of the categories which occur in the stage of perception so as to render clear the

three successive attitudes assumed by the Ego in its attempts to *perceive* the True. Then follows ([g] to [o]) the treatment of these three attitudes of Consciousness and the exhibition of the dialectic, by which they pass over into each other. Then ([p] to [u]) we make some reflections upon the whereabouts of our result.

We will now take up the consideration in detail.

[a] Immediate consciousness, we have seen, did not grasp the truth it was seeking, for the reason that the truth is the Universal, and not a mere *this* which that stage of knowing tries to seize. (Read [q. r. s.] on p. 102 present volume of this Journal.) To get at anything, it must transcend it (cancel it) and seize it in identity with a higher totality which includes the object and its limits. We perceive only by limits or differences; every limit or difference involves two elements—a *this* and a *not-this*—which must be both seized in the act of perception. Thus we have the activity of perceiving on the one hand, which is the subjective part, and the result of the act—the synthesis of the *this* and the *not-this*—which is the object perceived. The Ego as subject, being an activity, is not the Ego of simple certitude, but is the Ego as a Constant under the different phases of its activity as perceiving. This Ego is, then, a Universal. The object is likewise a Universal (in the sense of being the unity of particulars—a unity both negative and positive).^{*} This object, which results from the act of perception, seems to be a necessary synthesis; while the Ego, whose activity is inconstant and arbitrary, seems for this reason to be unessential to the truth of the object.

[b] Through mediation such as we have considered, the Ego has united a number of particulars in a negative unity. It has found, in brief, a *thing with properties*. Let us analyze its proceeding:

[c] In seizing a *this*, it transcended it through its limits which separate it from the *not-this*, and hence it seized the *this* as *not* (some other) *this*. Hence the sensuous immediateness remains in our result as a “cancelled” (*aufgehoben*), i. e. as having validity in conjunction with another, or by and

^{*} The reader is referred to Chapter X. of the *Introduction to Philosophy*, published in this number of the Journal, for a fuller consideration of the Universal or Generic, which is here spoken of in a summary manner.

through another. Thus "cancel" (*aufheben*) has a twofold meaning (like *ἀναιρέω*): to annul and to preserve in its effects. A "nothing of the This" is a "not this particular," but is some other particular in general. "Being with negation" (or somewhat and its other) is a total, and hence a Universal. This complex, grasped together—which forms the Universal, in which we have both identity and difference—the identity as a common ground in which the Different seems to inhere,—is the Thingness, and the inhering Different constitutes properties.

[d] This is the positive Universality: the abstract medium of Thingness, in which all the many properties abide; they live together without quarrelling, "each indifferent towards the other." The white color, acrid taste, cubical form, hardness, etc., all inhere in one unity which allows them to exist each for itself. But there is another side, according to which each property excludes its opposite, and this makes the thing an "excluding unity." Thus the positive universality of the *thingness* becomes *thing* by and through this negative or *excluding* relation of the many properties.

[e] To sum up our description of the Thing, we see that it is threefold (and whether the reader understands the logical genesis of the "Thing" or not, it does not so much matter provided he notes carefully this mentioned *threefoldness* pertaining to it): *its first phase* being its "indifferent passive generality," in which the different properties are collected without being related to each other (the whiteness, cubicalness, acridness, etc., not mutually excluding but tolerant each of the other); *its second phase* being its negative or excluding phase, wherein the Thing appears as a unity and in opposition to other things; *the third phase* is the union of the positive and negative moments just described, and the many properties are each possessed of this twofold character in that they are negative to their opposites and indifferent to their unity with other properties in the Thing.

[f] The Thing as just described is the object of Perception, and it is very clear from the nature of the object what the course of experience will be. If there should arise any discrepancies—any contradictions or inconsistencies—in the experience, it is evident that consciousness will refer them to its own imperfection, and endeavor to correct the same by subsequent endeavor.

For our experience to this point has demonstrated that if we take things immediately we shall not get their truth but their untruth, and on this account the *subject perceiving* is in a measure responsible for the untruth that will inevitably occur unless the proper mediation is made.

I.

[g] We will now go through the actual experience in the light of the principles just established. We are to expect contradictions because the "Thing" involves them in its own nature.

1. I take an object as *one*, but I must seize it by some one characteristic mark or property. Such characteristic mark or property is determined by its relation to other things, and thus *transcends* the Thing which I am holding as a pure and simple *one*. 2. I correct my mistake (for I am liable to make mistakes in my haste), and now regard the object as the continuity or relation which embraces two sides. But I instantly perceive that this relation or property is determined as negative, or opposed to, another, hence as *excluding*. This contradicts continuity or participation, and forces me to a second correction: 3. I posit it as an excluding again, or as a one separated from others. But I am still in difficulty; for as I examine carefully the object to see if I have now seized it in its truth, seeing that I have it now entirely by itself, I become aware of a multiplicity of properties closely—nay, inseparably—united to the one property by which I distinguished and cut off the Thing from others. A third correction: 4. It is a common medium—a combination, a collection of properties, each independent of the other—each property a *relation* to other things, and yet excluding other properties, thus an including-excluding, a self-transcending, which we have called a *Universal*. After this third correction, I find that the Thing is a collection of independent Universals; and as I am in search of the simple and true, and do not care to take a handful at a time, 5, I concentrate my attention upon one of the properties—of course, I get a collection of several by seizing one at a time and adding them together—it is clear that my perception is the act of seizing single properties, and hence these are my objects and the truth of the objective world.

But this fourth correction, scanned more closely, proves to have landed me at the

standpoint of immediate knowing, and I am trying the impossible feat there attempted—that of holding a single individual out of all relation. An isolated property could not be a *definite* one if thus taken out of relation to others; nor indeed could it be a property at all, for a property belongs to a *thing*, and hence cannot be isolated. I find myself trying to seize the truth by supposing a pure abstraction which exists nowhere out of my fancy (or “meaning”).

II.

[h] I give up this attempt as soon as I become conscious of it, and commence again with a new mode of procedure. I cannot pursue the same policy as before, for I have learned this from experience: that if I take the object just as it seems, there will be a series of *seemings* or phases which will succeed each other and drag me after them until I find myself entirely alone by myself and grasping convulsively an abstraction—a shadow of my fancy. I am inevitably “reflected out of the object and into myself.” I get mixed up with the object in spite of myself. I see, upon close scrutiny, that this is owing to the fact that I referred every phase that occurred, to the object at once; and when a new one appeared, I took the latter up as though the former was a mistake and had no validity against the second. I now see that there are two necessary sources of the phases that occur in Perception: the object, and the subject—myself.

I see now how to get over the difficulties heretofore encountered: I, the perceiving consciousness, must not only give attention to the Thing but also to myself; and whatever proceeds from my own activity must be subtracted from the result, so that I may apprehend the object purely and without mixing up my activity with it.

[i] 1. I perceive the Thing as *one*, and, in accordance with the new insight which guides this my second stage of Perception, I refer to my own reflection these manifold properties which persistently force themselves upon my attention. I, therefore, escape the former perplexity by saying: “The Thing is *one*, and as for these properties, they severally arise through the circumstance that this *one object* is related to me by means of my several senses. Thus one and the same indivisible essence (the salt) appears *white* as related to the eye, *acid* to the tongue, *cubic* to the touch, etc. This

diversity does not concern the simple oneness of the object, but it arises in my own constitution, which has a manifold of organs of perception. I am thus the “universal medium” in which these many properties isolate themselves. By this explanation I remove the contradiction which arose in experience.

[j] 2. While I complacently regard this simple one, which I no longer allow to be contradicted by the influx of the manifold properties, all at once a suspicion crosses my mind, that, in avoiding one danger, another and a greater danger may have been incurred! For, as I was endeavoring to hold the One in its pure and simple existence and actuality, I surprised myself continually in the act of distinguishing it from other things. For to be One is to be negative to others, and this I found it could not be without properties. In my generous intention of relieving the object from contradiction, I had deprived it of its means of self-defence, and left it to perish through lack of the wherewith to distinguish it from others. *White, acid, cubic*, etc.—these properties are determined only through their opposites, *black, sweet, round*, etc. The Thing is individualized and distinct from others precisely through its possession of these properties. Therefore the Thing must possess properties, and they must be in it *essentially* and not merely *for others*. Hence the Thing is now a common medium in which the *white, acid, cubic*, etc.—the many properties—subsist as independent of each other.

[k] And having attributed to the object this multiplicity and the general medium, I now see that my predicating unity or oneness to it was gratuitous; I did it by reason of a subjective habit belonging to my consciousness, but it is clear that the Thing cannot be both many and one at the same time. I now subtract the predicate of one-ness, and leave the object a “mere including surface” which surrounds the different properties; and these different properties should, since they are independent, be called *materials* or *stuffs* (*substances*). The Thing is now a collection of substances, and *in so far as* it is white it is not cubic, and *in so far as* it is white and cubic it is not acid, etc.

[l] It is evident that I now again must regard one of these independent substances or materials as the pure simple truth, as the constant under the various forms. Fatal circle! I am again thrown back to the stage

of sensuous certitude, wherein I endeavor to take the This for and by itself. I cannot take a property out of its relation without destroying it and making it a mere impossible phantom; of this I was convinced in [g], and now I find that my second stage of Perception ends in the same reflection into myself that the first stage did. I cannot avoid the conclusion that the Thing possesses all the diversity which I have been attempting, in vain, to explain by assuming a part as belonging to me. The Thing must be both one and manifold—the one-ness and the properties with the common medium, all exist, objectively and independently.

III.

[m] Consciousness has therefore to try a new mode of explanation. It grows clearer on the subject of the Thing at each step, and must eventually come to recognize its threefoldness and unity, as we saw from the logical analysis at the beginning. But at present, although it is forced to posit the entire movement as objective, it separates the movements thereof and endeavors still to explain away the contradiction. It says: 1. The Thing is one, for and by itself. But it is also for others. And its *Being for itself* is different from its *Being for others*. Thus it is a twofold Being: *in itself*, one; *for others*, a manifold of properties. In so far as both these sides are considered as belonging to One thing, it is consciousness that is responsible for it—a subjective affair that must be taken into account in order to get rid of the threatening contradiction. I therefore withhold this positing of them in one and say: *in so far as the Thing is for itself, it is not for others*. The oneness and the “general medium” fall asunder, so that the former belongs to the Thing regarded as *by itself*, while the same Thing regarded as in relation to different things becomes a *general medium* for the subsistence of manifold properties. We have pushed our multiplicity entirely out of our simple object, and it is no longer an object of consciousness.

[n] 1. But what does it avail to waste our energies in striving to save the Finite from self-contradiction? Even though we offer to bear the contradiction ourselves, it does not save the object from the fatal stroke!—“The contradiction must come to the isolated single Thing,” for it must have distinction, difference, determination, in order to

be different from the others. 2. Each of the things is a different one from the rest. Its essential character distinguishes it from them. Its manifold of properties still belong to it, but are not *essential*; i. e. they are secondary or resultant from the reciprocal action of the primary, essential character, with other things. The opposition or antithesis does not lie between the essential character and the manifold properties, but between the former and the external things.

[o] Thus the thing is in its essential character one side of an antithesis, the other side being the outside things. This Antithesis is essential, and hence the manifold properties in the thing which arise through this essential relation are necessary to the Thing, just as a permanent cause must produce constant results. But what have we gained! In order to get the antithesis of one-ness and multiplicity out of the Thing, we have made the Oneness directly *dependent* upon external things, and thus its “Absolute character is only a *relation* to others.” Hence the very result we have all along sought to avoid now stares us full in the face, and this time we have no sophistry more to shield us, for we have arrived at a universal conclusion: either the Thing is one and many in itself—and this Scylla we sought to avoid and thus sailed straight into the Charybdis—or else the Thing is itself a mere phase of a totality which includes it and other things as reciprocally determining elements, each of which may be said to be in their not-being. For the dependent is being outside of itself; what it is lies beyond it, and it is mere PHENOMENON. The Phenomenon is a play of mediation wherein negativity forms two sides: 1st, the immediate; 2d, the negation of the immediate.

[p] [s] Absolute negation or self-related negation is self-negation or self-cancelling, which in its first phase is called the Phenomenal. The next chapter will treat of the Phenomenal under the category of FORCE. It belongs to the UNDERSTANDING and not to PERCEPTION, for the latter deals with a conditioned Universal—a Thing that is through mediation and yet not *wholly* through mediation.

[t] The unconditioned Universal is that which is, in one and the same respect, the opposite of itself, i. e. pure mediation.

[q] The property of the Thing was, as we saw in [e], a self-transcending, and this is exactly the first verdict of our experience.

The "necessary unessential" is self-nugatory. It is produced essentially by the Thing, and yet is unessential for the reason that were it otherwise it would contradict the thing!

[r] Thus the last "in so far" falls away. This twofold "in so far" spoken of in [n] (of the original) was, *1st*, the *important* one: in so far as the Thing is one, its Absolute determinateness is antithetic to outside things—it negates them; *2d*, in so far as it has manifoldness (this is unimportant) it is a result of the relation of the essential determinateness of the Thing to other things, and hence is unessential—it is rather an external reflection of the one who compares the two sides together.

But the first "in so far" placed the Thing in a state of complete interdependence with other things, and thus destroyed its claim to simple self-existence. Hence, the second "in so far" goes too. For the manifoldness is seen to be the very essence of the oneness of the Thing.

In so far as it is *for itself*, it is *for others*, and *vice versa*.

[u] These empty abstractions are the content of "common sense," and the play between them is the common occupation of the same, only it deals with such under concrete forms. It is so *naïve* as to forget one moment what it admitted the moment before. In this chapter we have had an exhaustive treatment of all the forms of its sophistry. It always cries out "Sophistry," when a speculation or true result is shown it; yet it unceasingly moves "in the whirling circles" of these contradictions, and withal is so serious and good-natured as to offer to take on its own shoulders all the contradictions it finds in Things.

To sum up the course:

First Stage.

The Ego followed the different phases, one by one, as they came to its notice, until it found itself face to face with an undetermined determination, which should relate but did not.

Second Stage.

It sees that there is duality involved in its perception, but will not yet regard it as objective. I. It takes on itself the manifold properties, and regards the Thing as one. II. It finds that this destroys the Thing, so it gives the Thing the manifold, and takes on itself the act of attributing unity to the same. And then it has arrived at the same

undetermined determination, etc., as in the first stage.

Third Stage.

It has learned that both manifoldness and unity belong to the Thing, but attempts to explain away the contradiction: I. By keeping the Thing as one for itself and the Manifold in its relation to others. But as the Thing cannot be One without determination, it is obliged to explain it more explicitly. II. That the One is determined as against other things, and hence there adheres to it some multiplicity of necessity because this relation of the One to the others is essential.

Here it discovers the dilemma it is in; for it has pushed matters so far in order to save the Thing from contradiction, that it has brought it in and for itself into absolute contradiction. It has made its essential character a mere relation to the external things, in order to explain the necessity of the manifold properties.

The whole content of this chapter may be treated concisely thus:*

It is the passage from the conditioned Universal to the unconditioned Universal, from a Mediated through another to a mediated through itself. But self-mediation is not fully reached until the close of the next chapter (the *Understanding*). Here it gets out of Perception when it sees that Pure Mediation is the truth of all before it. That self-mediation is the truth of Pure Mediation is very easy to see as a doctrine by itself, but to see how the categories of the Understanding arise and vanish on the way which consciousness travels to that result—this is a labor to which the whole twelve of Hercules were a mere child's play. The reader shall see this in the next chapter, however, and we will merely prepare the way here here by giving the "concise treatment" announced above, without more ado.

A.

Things are posited as existent. They are determined, each definite and distinct from the others. Each has manifold properties.

B.

I. But there can be no such thing as a *real* contradiction. Our finite minds may be involved in contradictions by reason of their limits, but the Actual is always self-identical.

* See p. 52 present volume of this Journal for a treatment of this problem.

II. Hence we must endeavor to explain how the manifold properties consist with the unity of the Thing.

III. They evidently arise through complication of each thing with the others.* (Of course it has a right to assume just as many "others" as it pleases; they do not cost anything.)

IV. But, in order that this may explain anything, (a) each must be something in itself, and (b) yet in relation to others which are different.

This contains the very contradiction that was to be avoided.

C.

I. A, B, C, D, etc., stand for things, each in itself something unique, entirely different from the others.

* Note how reflection always pushes a contradiction back into some other sphere, and leaves it there as if it were solved. The ostrich has a similar trick of putting its head in the sand when it wishes to hide from its pursuers.

II. A is different from B, C and D, and each of the latter from each of the others.

III. Thus A is different from B, but it must have a different difference from C, and so also from D. But thus its own determination is determined, and it falls in the same category with each as regards the others; it is thus like to and different from each one, and the respect in which it is like is different from the respect wherein it differs from each. Therefore difference falls within it, and it is self-opposed.

D.

To trace this to self-determination, it requires only to hold the result as strict and absolute. That which is purely and absolutely self-opposed is self-determined.

It must be left to our next chapter, however, to show in detail what artifices the Understanding will invent to conceal from itself the full significance of the position just gained.

WINCKELMANN'S DESCRIPTION OF THE TORSO OF THE HERCULES OF BELVEDERE IN ROME.

Translated by THOS. DAVIDSON.

I lead you to the very famous, and never sufficiently extolled torso of a Hercules, to a work which is the most perfect in its kind, and is to be numbered among the highest products of art which have come down to us. But how shall I describe it to you, seeing that it is bereft of the most comely and important parts which naturally belong to it? Like the bare trunk of a grand old oak which has been felled and shorn of its branches and boughs, the statue of the hero sits, mangled and mutilated—head, legs, arms, and the upper part of the breast gone.

The first glance will, perhaps, discover to you nothing more than a misshapen stone; but if you are able to penetrate into the mysteries of art, you will behold one of its miracles, if you contemplate this with a quiet eye. Then will Hercules appear to you as in the midst of all his labors, and the

hero and the god will at once become visible in this stone.

At the point where the poets leave off, the artist has begun. The former are silent as soon as the hero is admitted among the gods, and has wedded the goddess of everlasting youth; the latter shows him to us in deified form, and, as it were, with an immortal body, which, nevertheless, has retained strength and elasticity equal to those great labors which he has accomplished.

I see in the powerful outlines of this body the unconquered might of the vanquisher of the puissant giants who rose against the gods, and were overthrown by him on the Phlegrean plains; and, at the same time, the soft traits of these outlines, which render the build of the body light and supple, represent to me its rapid movements in the

combat with Achelōus, who, with all his manifold changes of shape, could not escape from his hands. In each portion of the body is manifested, as in a picture, the whole hero engaged in a particular deed; and we see here, as in a correct plan representing a rationally constructed palace, the purpose which each subserved, and the deed which it was intended to symbolize. I cannot look at the small portion of the left shoulder which is still visible, without calling to mind that upon its outstretched strength, as upon two mountains, the whole burden of the circles of the heavens has rested. With what grandeur the breast expands, and how glorious is the heaving curve of its arch! Such a breast must that have been against which the giant Antæus and the three-bodied Geryon were crushed. No breast of a thrice or four times crowned Olympian victor, no breast of a Spartan warrior born of heroes, can have showed so glorious, so sublime.

Ask those who know all that is most beautiful in the nature of mortals, whether they have seen a side to be compared with the side of this torso. The action and reaction of its muscles are equated with a skilful measure of alternating movement and swift strength, and the body, on account of them, had to be made massive and suitable for everything which he wished to accomplish. As in a swelling movement of the sea the previously smooth surface sprouts with a vague unrest into rippling waves, whereof one swallows another and again throws it out and rolls it forward, so, with the same soft swell and ripple, does the one muscle pass into the other, and a third, which rises between them and seems to strengthen their movement, loses itself in the first, and our gaze is, as it were, swallowed up at the same time.

I would fain stop here, to give space for our contemplations, to impress upon the imagination an ever-enduring image of this side; but the lofty beauties are here in indivisible union. What a conception we gather from those thighs, whose solidity clearly shows that the hero has never flinched, and never been forced to bend! At this moment my spirit traverses the remotest regions of the earth through which Hercules passed, and I am borne to the boundaries of his toils, and even to the monuments and pillars where his foot rested, by the sight of those thighs, of inexhaustible strength and god-like length, which have

borne the hero over a hundred lands, even to immortality. I was beginning to reflect on these distant features, when my spirit was recalled by a glance at his back. I was charmed when I looked at this body from behind, as a person who, after admiring the gorgeous portal of a temple, is conducted to the top of it, where the vaulted roof, which he cannot see over, throws him anew into amazement. I see here the principal edifice of the bones of this body, the origin of the muscles, and the basis of their arrangement and motion; and all this looks like a landscape desiered from the summits of mountains, a landscape over which Nature has poured out the manifold wealth of her beauties. As its aerial heights with gentle slope lose themselves in hollow valleys, which narrow here and widen there; so, manifold, splendid, and beautiful, rise the swelling hills of muscle, round which wind, like the stream of the Meander, depths almost imperceptible, manifest rather to touch than to sight.

If it appear inconceivable how power of thought can be shown in another part of the body besides the head, then learn here how the hand of a creative master is capable of informing matter with spirit. It seems to me as if the back, which appears bent in lofty contemplations, formed a head which is busy with glad remembrances of his amazing deeds; and while such a head, full of majesty and wisdom, rises before my eyes, the other missing limbs begin to take form in my thought; an efflux from what is before me gathers, and produces, as it were, a sudden restoration.

The might of the shoulder indicates to me how strong the arms must have been that strangled the lion upon Mount Cithæron, and my eye tries to give shape to those which bound and carried off Cerberus. His thighs and the remaining knee give me an idea of the legs, which were never weary, and which pursued and caught the brazen-footed stag. By a mysterious art, the spirit is borne through all the deeds of his strength to the perfection of his soul; and in this torso is a monument thereto, such as no one of the poets, who celebrate only the strength of his arms, has erected; the artist has surpassed them all. His image of the hero leaves no room for a thought of violence or licentious love; in the repose and quiet of the body is manifested the great collected spirit, the man

who, from love of justice, has exposed himself to the greatest perils, who has given security to countries, and rest to their inhabitants.

This exquisite and noble form of a nature thus perfect is, as it were, wrapped round in immortality, and the form is but as a vessel to contain it; a loftier spirit seems to have taken the place of the mortal parts, and to have expanded in their stead. It is no longer a body which has still to fight with monsters and destroyers of peace, it is that which has been purified upon Mount Oeta from the dross of humanity, now smelted

away from the original source of likeness to the father of the gods. Neither the loved Hyllus nor the tender Iole ever saw Hercules so perfect. Thus he lay in the arms of Hebe, of everlasting youth, and inhaled an undying influence. His body is nourished by no mortal food or coarse particles; he lives on the food of the gods, and he seems only to taste, not to eat, and altogether without being filled.

*Εἰ γὰρ κεν καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπὶ σμικρῷ καταθεῖο,
Καὶ θανάτῳ τοῦτ' ἔρδοις.**

THE IDEAL.

By A. C. B.

Weary steps shall press in vain
Forward still, its height to gain—
But one summit to attain;

All around, the summits thin,
Dark or sunny, close thee in;
All, at once thy feet must win.

Hands that seek it here, or there,
Losing labor may forbear;
It eludeth everywhere.

What thou lovest, must thou hold;
When the new becomes the old,
Then thy hands shall all enfold.

Eyes that look straight on are blind,
Missing what they strain to find,—
Seeing not what lies behind.

For a perfect circle, lies
The horizon for thine eyes,
Till within itself it dies.

Through and round the changing show,
Where its shining footsteps go,
Learn its changeless self to know.

All that has been and may be,
One, it waits and comes for thee
In the still Eternity.

* Hesiod. Works & Days, 361 sq.

WHAT IS MEANT BY "DETERMINED."

[The following discussion, which is a continuation of the one in a former issue called "Nominalism and Realism," may serve a good purpose to clear up any confusion that may exist regarding some of the important technical expressions employed.—EDITOR.]

To the Editor of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*.

SIR:—Your remarks upon my inquiries concerning Being and Nothing are very kind and courteous. Considered as replies, they are less satisfactory than they might have been had I succeeded better in making my difficulties understood.

I suspect that there must be some misunderstanding between us of the meaning of the various terms cognate with "determined." Perhaps, therefore, I shall do well to state more fully than I did before, the manner in which I understand Hegel (in common with all other logicians) to use them. Possibly, the original signification of *bestimmt* was "settled by vote"; or it may have been "pitched to a key." Thus its origin was quite different from that of "determined"; yet I believe that as philosophical terms their equivalence is exact. In general, they mean "fixed to be *this* (or *thus*), in contradistinction to being *this*, that, or the other (or in some way or other)."—When it is a concept or term, such as is expressed by a concrete noun or adjective which is said to be more determinate than another, the sense sometimes is that the logical extension of the former concept or term is a part and only a part of that of the latter; but more usually the sense is, that the logical comprehension of the latter is a part and only a part of that of the former.

In my former letter (page 60, column 1) I sufficiently expressed my own understanding of "determined" as applied to a concept or term such as is expressed by an abstract noun. *Determinate* is also used either in express application or with implicit reference to a second intention or term of second denomination. In such an acceptance, we may speak either of a singular as indeterminate, or of a conception of Being, in gene-

ral, as determinate. Every singular is in one sense perfectly determinate, since there is no pair of contradictory characters of which it does not possess one. Yet if the extension of the term be limited, not by additions to its comprehension, but by a reflection upon the term itself—namely, that it shall denote but one—it is called an indeterminate singular. In this sense, "some one horse" is an indeterminate individual, while "Dexter" is a determinate individual. In a somewhat similar way, every universal conception of Being is quite indeterminate in the sense of not signifying any particular character. Yet, if the reflection is explicitly made (*gesetzt*) that every thing to which it applies has its particular characters, it is called by Hegel, *determinate being*. Hegel teaches that the whole series of categories or universal conceptions can be evolved from one—that is, from *Seyn*—by a certain process, the effect of which is to make actually thought that which was virtually latent in the thought. So that this reflection which constitutes *Daseyn* lies implicitly even in *Seyn*, and it is by explicitly evolving it from *Seyn* that *Daseyn* is evolved from *Seyn*. (Hegel's *Werke*, Bd. 3, S. 107.) The term "What is" has reference to pure *Seyn* only; the term "What is somehow" has reference to *Daseyn*.

This is my understanding of the term "determinate." It must differ from yours, or you would not say that animality, in general, is determined in respect to humanity: so when you say that were animality and humanity, in general, undetermined with respect to each other they would be identical, I take the example of "highness of pitch in general" and "loudness of sound in general," and I conclude again that we are taking the word "determine" in different senses. May I ask you to reperuse my 4th question? (p. 60)

You have apparently understood me as applying the term "abstract" to any concept the result of abstraction. But, as I intimated (p. 57), I adopt that acceptance in which "whiteness" is said to be abstract and "white" concrete. For this use of the terms, I refer to the following authorities: Andrews and Stoddard's Latin Gram-

* Wherein is the force of this "*in contradistinction to*" which our correspondent employs here? *Determination*—as we understand the Hegelian use of the term—implies all difference, property, mark, quality, attribute, or, in short, any distinction whatever that is thought as belonging to a subject. This would include its "being this, that, or the other." Thus "highness of pitch" and "loudness of sound, in general," are through their determinateness distinct.—EDITOR.

mar, § 26, 5; Scotus, *Super Prædicamenta*, qu. 8; Durandus à Sancto Porciano, *In Sentent.*, lib. 1, dist. 34, qu. 1; Ockham, *Summa Logices*, pars 1, cap. 5; Chauvin, *Lexicon Rationale*, sub. V. *Abstractum*; Mill, *Logic*, Bk. 1, cap. 2, § 4; Trendelenburg, *Elementa Logices Arist.*, 6th ed., p. 117, note; Überweg, *Logik*, § 51 (where Wolff, also, is cited); Hoppe, *Logik*, §§ 256, 257. This misapprehension affects the relevancy of most of your remarks.

I think that I have not, as you suppose, greatly mistaken the sense in which Hegelians use the term Pure Being. At least, my definition seems to be in accord with the explanations of almost all, if not all, the commentators and expositors of Hegel. I would submit respectfully, that your own remarks upon p. 117 of Vol. I. of this Journal contradict, almost in terms, what you say (Vol. II., p. 57) in reply to me.*

Once or twice you use such expressions as "We do not profess to speak for Hegelians," "Hegelians may understand this as they please." &c. Have I been wrong, then, in supposing that the passage to which my

* The passage here referred to is in Chapter III. of the "Introduction to Philosophy," wherein there is no reference whatever to the Hegelian use of the term. It is a psychological investigation of the significance of the first predicate which is a determinate somewhat, and "Being" is used in the popular sense of "something" (i. e. a being, and its origin traced to the substantive-making activity of the Ego, which in its first exercise seizes itself as the fundamental basis of all. Just as, according to Kant, Time and Space, the forms of the mind, are made the basis of what the mind sees; so, too, Being as a universal predicate is the pure activity objectified. But *the making it substantive*, at the same time, determines it.—EDITOR.

queries related was a professed defence of Hegelian doctrine?*

I am sorry to learn that I have done you injustice in saying that you profess to be self-contradictory. Yet I do not see in what sense you object to the remark. To say that a man is self-contradictory is, of course, but a way of saying that what he believes is self-contradictory. You believe that "finite things contradict themselves"; that is, as I understand it, that contradictions exist. Therefore, what you believe in, appears to be self-contradictory. Nor can I see how a person "escapes self-contradiction by not attempting to set up non-contradiction as the first principle of things"; that is, by not professing to be otherwise than self-contradictory.†

I do not see that you notice query 3.‡

* Of course, our correspondent would not consider "a defence of Hegel" as identical with a championship of the Hegelians. It is the latter, only, that we object to, for the reason mentioned in the article on Janet, viz., that the term is used so vaguely as to include those who differ essentially from Hegel.—EDITOR.

† We hasten to assure our correspondent that we do not "believe in the self-contradictory." We are sorry we were so unhappy in our expressions as to convey such a meaning. The *Abiding* or the Total Process is not self-contradictory, neither is it an abstract identity, but is (as we described it on p. 54, 2d col. of this volume) "self-identical through self-distinction." The self-determining is what we believe in, and it alone exists, while the fleeting show whose reality rests on contradiction is (and this is not Hegelian merely, but older than Plato's mingling of Being and non-Being. One who sets up the principle of contradiction ignores one side of the process, and thus involves himself in that which he tries to avoid.—ED.

‡ If any point is involved in question 3d that is not answered in the discussion of the other queries, we fail to seize it.—EDITOR.

INTUITION vs. CONTEMPLATION.

Through a singular chance, the present number of the Journal contains two notes from two contributors on the proper translation of the German word *Anschauung*. Mr. Kroeger holds that the word *Anschauung*, as used by Fichte and also by Kant, denotes an act of the Ego which the English word *Intuition* does not at all express, but for which the English word "contemplation" is an exact equivalent. Mr. Pierce suggests that no person whose native tongue is Eng-

lish will translate *Anschauung* by another word than *Intuition*. Whether there is a failure to understand English on the one hand or German on the other, the Editor does not care to inquire. It is certain that while intuition has been adopted generally as an equivalent for the word under consideration both by English and French translators, yet it was a wide departure from the ordinary English use of the term. Besides this, we have no English verb *intuite* (at least in the

Dictionaries), and the reader will find that the verb used by Meiklejohn (in the translation of Kant's *Kritik*) for it is *contemplate*, and the same rendering is given by Smith in his excellent translation of Fichte's Popular Works (London, 1849).

Perhaps the following passage from Fichte himself (*Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. 1, p. 342) will enable the reader to decide for himself this question: "Such an act is called *contem-*

plation (or *intuition—Anschauung*). The Ego contemplates (intuites) a non-ego. In the contemplation (intuition) the Ego posits itself as absolutely independent of the non-Ego—contemplates (intuites) it *because it does so*—without outward force. It posits by its own activity, and with the consciousness of its activity, each of the characteristics of the non-ego (*ein Merkmal nach dem andern*).

BOOK NOTICE.

TABLETS: By A. Bronson Alcott. Published by Roberts Brothers, Boston, 1868.

This book, which has been looked for a long time, takes its readers somewhat by surprise. They find in it what they had not expected: not a mere collection of fragmentary paragraphs and sentences mostly embodying audacious paradoxes, but a connected series of delightful, serene, contemplative, sunshiny essays, perfumed with choice quotations from the best writers and with poetic gems from his own muse. This at least so far as "Part I, Practical," goes. "Part II, Speculative," however, will doubtless afford material to justify in some degree the first expectation. A careful reading will, we think, remove all difficulty on this score also. It is next to impossible for one who has thought the "solvent word" of the universe to think or write otherwise than systematically. If he be a poet, the unity will appear as a kind of "organic unity" and give to his productions an art form. If he be a philosopher, he will, in each sentence, expressly or by implication, show the relation of his theme to the Whole. For it is the study of philosophy that continually disciplines the mind in the habit of viewing a subject comprehensively and exhaustively. This will explain how it is that a book with very few threads of relation visible super-

ficially, may become the deepest and most vital unity. And such has been our experience with this book of Mr. Alcott's, that, starting out with a prejudice against its method—and this prejudice partly created and fostered by Mr. Alcott's own confessions—we have come to think it one of the most systematic and exhaustive. We found at first a few obvious suggestions in the chapter on *Genesis*, and following these out we were astonished to find a certain consequence in the arrangement of the topics of the several sections that could not possibly have originated through accident. And this in turn gave a more profound meaning to the contents of those sections, and we saw that the whole chapter had a presupposition in the chapter on *Mind*. The latter chapter was an enigma to us for a long time. But finally we discovered in it a link to the system of Mr. Alcott which we had all along supposed to be entirely missing in it, and had criticised it as thus defective.

We recommend this book to those who wish to see the problem of the "lapse" and the "return" treated far more satisfactorily than by Plotinus; in brief, where personality is restored to its supremacy as the first principle, and Pantheism replaced by Theism.

THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

Vol. II.

1869.

No. 4.

FOUNDATIONS OF VALIDITY OF THE LAWS OF LOGIC: FURTHER CONSEQUENCES OF FOUR INCAPACITIES.

[By C. S. PEIRCE.]

If, as I maintained in an article in the last number of this Journal, every judgment results from inference, to doubt every inference is to doubt everything. It has often been argued that absolute scepticism is self-contradictory; but this is a mistake: and even if it were not so, it would be no argument against the absolute sceptic, inasmuch as he does not admit that no contradictory propositions are true. Indeed, it would be impossible to move such a man, for his scepticism consists in considering every argument and never deciding upon its validity; he would, therefore, act in this way in reference to the arguments brought against him.

But then there are no such beings as absolute sceptics. Every exercise of the mind consists in inference, and so, though there are inanimate objects without beliefs, there are no intelligent beings in that condition.

Yet it is quite possible that a person should doubt every principle of inference. He may not have studied logic, and though a logical formula may sound very obviously true to him, he may feel a little uncertain whether some subtle deception may not lurk in it. Indeed, I certainly shall have, among the most cultivated and respected of my readers, those who deny that those laws of logic which men generally admit have universal validity. But I address myself, also, to those who have no such doubts, for even to them it may be interesting to consider how it is that these principles come to

be true. Finally, having put forth in former numbers of this Journal some rather heretical principles of philosophical research, one of which is that nothing can be admitted to be absolutely inexplicable, it behooves me to take up a challenge which has been given me to show how upon my principles the validity of the laws of logic can be other than inexplicable.

I shall be arrested, at the outset, by a sweeping objection to my whole undertaking. It will be said that my deduction of logical principles, being itself an argument, depends for its whole virtue upon the truth of the very principles in question; so that whatever my proof may be, it must take for granted the very things to be proved. But to this I reply, that I am neither addressing absolute sceptics, nor men in any state of fictitious doubt whatever. I require the reader to be candid; and if he becomes convinced of a conclusion, to admit it. There is nothing to prevent a man's perceiving the force of certain special arguments, although he does not yet know that a certain general law of arguments holds good; for the general rule may hold good in some cases and not in others. A man may reason well without understanding the principles of reasoning, just as he may play billiards well without understanding analytical mechanics. If you, the reader, actually find that my arguments have a convincing force with you, it is a mere pretence to call them illogical.

That if one sign denotes generally ev-

everything denoted by a second, and this second denotes generally everything denoted by a third, then the first denotes generally everything denoted by the third, is not doubted by anybody who distinctly apprehends the meaning of these words. The deduction of the general form of syllogism, therefore, will consist only of an explanation of the *suppositio communis*.* Now, what the formal logician means by an expression of the form, "Every *M* is *P*," is that anything of which *M* is predicable is *P*; thus, if *S* is *M*, that *S* is *P*. The premise that "Every *M* is *P*" may, therefore, be denied; but to admit it, unambiguously, in the sense intended, is to admit that the inference is good that *S* is *P* if *S* is *M*. He, therefore, who does not deny that *S* is *P*—*M*, *S*, *P*, being any terms such that *S* is *M* and every *M* is *P*—denies nothing that the formal logician maintains in reference to this matter; and he who does deny this, simply is deceived by an ambiguity of language. How we come to make any judgments in the sense of the above "Every *M* is *P*," may be understood from the theory of reality put forth in the article in the last number. It was there shown that real things are of a cognitive and therefore significative nature, so that the real is that which signifies some-

thing real. Consequently, to predicate anything of anything real is to predicate it of that of which that subject [the real] is itself predicated; for to predicate one thing of another is to state that the former is a sign of the latter.

These considerations show the reason of the validity of the formula,

S is *M*; *M* is *P*;
 \therefore *S* is *P*.

They hold good whatever *S* and *P* may be, provided that they be such that any middle term between them can be found. That *P* should be a negative term, therefore, or that *S* should be a particular term, would not interfere at all with the validity of this formula. Hence, the following formulae are also valid:

S is *M*; *M* is not *P*;
 \therefore *S* is not *P*.

Some *S* is *M*; *M* is *P*;
 \therefore Some *S* is *P*.

Some *S* is *M*; *M* is not *P*;
 \therefore Some *S* is not *P*.

Moreover, as all that class of inferences which depend upon the introduction of relative terms can be reduced to the general form, they also are shown to be valid. Thus, it is proved to be correct to reason thus:

Every relation of a subject to its predicate is a relation of the relative "not X'd, except by the X of some," to its correlate, where X is any relative I please.

Every relation of "man" to "animal" is a relation of a subject to its predicate.

\therefore Every relation of "man" to "animal" is a relation of the relative "not X'd, except by the X of some," to its correlate, where X is any relative I please.

Every relation of the relative "not X'd, except by the X of some," to its correlate, where X is any relative I please, is a relation of the relative "not headed, except by the head of some," to its correlate.

\therefore Every relation of "man" to "animal" is a relation of the relative "not headed, except by the head of some," to its correlate.*

At the same time, as will be seen from this example, the proof of the validity of

* "If any one will by ordinary syllogism prove that because every man is an animal, therefore every head of a man is a head of an animal, I shall be ready to—set him another question."—*De Morgan*: On the Syllogism No. IV. and on the Logic of Relations.

* The word *suppositio* is one of the useful technical terms of the middle ages which was condemned by the purists of the *renaissance* as incorrect. The early logicians made a distinction between *significatio* and *suppositio*. *Significatio* is defined as "rei per vocem secundum placitum representatio." It is a mere affair of lexicography, and depends on a special convention (*secundum placitum*), and not on a general principle. *Suppositio* belongs, not directly to the *vox*, but to the *vox* as having this or that *significatio*. "Unde significatio prior est suppositione et differunt in hoc, quia significatio est vocis, suppositio vero est termini jam compositi ex voce et significatione." The various *suppositiones* which may belong to one word with one *significatio* are the different senses in which the word may be taken, according to the general principles of the language or of logic. Thus, the word *table* has different *significationes* in the expressions "table of logarithms" and "writing-table"; but the word *man* has one and the same *significatio*, and only different *suppositiones*, in the following sentences: "A man is an animal," "a butcher is a man," "man cooks his food," "man appeared upon the earth at such a date," &c. Some later writers have endeavored to make "*acceptio*" do service for "*suppositio*"; but it seems to me better, now that scientific terminology is no longer forbidden, to revive *suppositio*. I should add that as the principles of logic and language for the different uses of the different parts of speech are different, *suppositio* must be restricted to the acceptance of a *substantive*. The term *copulatio* was used for the acceptance of an adjective or verb.

these inferences depends upon the assumption of the truth of certain general statements concerning relatives. These formulæ can all be deduced from the principle, that in a system of signs in which no sign is taken in two different senses, two signs which differ only in their manner of representing their object, but which are equivalent in meaning, can always be substituted for one another. Any case of the falsification of this principle would be a case of the dependence of the mode of existence of the thing represented upon the mode of this or that representation of it, which, as has been shown in the article in the last number, is contrary to the nature of reality.

The next formula of syllogism to be considered is the following:

S is other than P ; M is P ;
 $\therefore S$ is other than M .

The meaning of "not" or "other than" seems to have greatly perplexed the German logicians, and it may be, therefore, that it is used in different senses. If so, I propose to defend the validity of the above formula only when *other than* is used in a particular sense. By saying that one thing or class is other than a second, I mean that any third whatever is identical with the class which is composed of that third and of whatever is, at once, the first and second. For example, if I say that rats are not mice, I mean that any third class as dogs is identical with dogs and rats-which-are-mice; that is to say, the addition of rats-which-are-mice, to anything, leaves the latter just what it was before. This being all that I mean by S is other than P , I mean absolutely the same thing when I say that S is other than P , that I do when I say that P is other than S ; and the same when I say that S is other than M , that I do when I say that M is other than S . Hence the above formula is only another way of writing the following:

M is P ; P is not S ;
 $\therefore M$ is not S .

But we have already seen that this is valid.

A very similar formula to the above is the following:

S is M ; some S is P ;
 \therefore Some M is P .

By saying that some of a class is of any character, I mean simply that no statement which implies that none of that class is of that character is true. But to say that none

of that class is of that character, is, as I take the word "not," to say that nothing of that character is of that class. Consequently, to say that some of A is B , is, as I understand words and in the only sense in which I defend this formula, to say that some B is A . In this way the formula is reduced to the following, which has already been shown to be valid:

Some P is S ; S is M ;
 \therefore Some P is M .

The only demonstrative syllogisms which are not included among the above forms are the Theophrastean moods, which are all easily reduced by means of simple conversions.

Let us now consider what can be said against all this, and let us take up the objections which have actually been made to the syllogistic formulæ, beginning with those which are of a general nature and then examining those sophisms which have been pronounced irresolvable by the rules of ordinary logic.

It is a very ancient notion that no proof can be of any value, because it rests on premises which themselves equally require proof, which again must rest on other premises, and so back to infinity. This really does show that nothing can be proved beyond the possibility of a doubt; that no argument could be legitimately used against an absolute sceptic; and that inference is only a transition from one cognition to another, and not the creation of a cognition. But the objection is intended to go much further than this, and to show (as it certainly seems to do) that inference not only cannot produce *infallible* cognition, but that it cannot produce cognition at all. It is true, that since some judgment precedes every judgment inferred, either the first premises were not inferred, or there have been no first premises. But it does not follow that because there has been no first in a series, therefore that series has had no beginning in time; for the series may be *continuous*, and may have begun gradually, as was shown in an article in No. 3 of this volume, where this difficulty has already been resolved.

A somewhat similar objection has been made by Locke and others, to the effect that the ordinary demonstrative syllogism is a *petitio principii*, inasmuch as the conclusion is already implicitly stated in the major

premise. Take, for example, the syllogism,

All men are mortal;
Socrates is a man;
∴ Socrates is mortal.

This attempt to prove that Socrates is mortal begs the question, it is said, since if the conclusion is denied by any one, he thereby denies that all men are mortal. But what such considerations really prove is that the syllogism is demonstrative. To call it a *petitio principii* is a mere confusion of language. It is strange that philosophers, who are so suspicious of the words *virtual* and *potential*, should have allowed this "implicit" to pass unchallenged. A *petitio principii* consists in reasoning from the unknown to the unknown. Hence, a logician who is simply engaged in stating what general forms of argument are valid, can, at most, have nothing more to do with the consideration of this fallacy than to note those cases in which from logical principles a premise of a certain form cannot be better known than a conclusion of the corresponding form. But it is plainly beyond the province of the logician, who has only proposed to state what forms of facts involve what others, to inquire whether man can have a knowledge of universal propositions without a knowledge of every particular contained under them, by means of natural insight, divine revelation, induction, or testimony. The only *petitio principii*, therefore, which he can notice is the assumption of the conclusion itself in the premise; and this, no doubt, those who call the syllogism a *petitio principii* believe is done in that formula. But the proposition "All men are mortal" does not in itself involve the statement that Socrates is mortal, but only that "whatever has man truly predicated of it is mortal." In other words, the *conclusion* is not involved in the meaning of the premise, but only the *validity of the syllogism*. So that this objection merely amounts to arguing that the syllogism is not valid, because it is demonstrative.*

A much more interesting objection is that a syllogism is a purely mechanical process. It proceeds according to a bare rule or formula; and a machine might be constructed

which would so transpose the terms of premises. This being so (and it is so), it is argued that this cannot be *thought*; that there is no life in it. Swift has ridiculed the syllogism in the "Voyage to Laputa," by describing a machine for making science:

"By this contrivance, the most ignorant person, at a reasonable charge, and with little bodily labor, might write books in philosophy, poetry, politics, laws, mathematics, and theology, without the least assistance from genius or study."

The idea involved in this objection seems to be that it requires mind to apply any formula or use any machine. If, then, this mind is itself only another formula, it requires another mind behind it to set it into operation, and so on *ad infinitum*. This objection fails in much the same way that the first one which we considered failed. It is as though a man should address a land surveyor as follows:—"You do not make a true representation of the land; you only measure lengths from point to point—that is to say, lines. If you observe angles, it is only to solve triangles and obtain the lengths of their sides. And when you come to make your map, you use a pencil which can only make lines, again. So, you have to do solely with lines. But the land is a surface; and no number of lines, however great, will make any surface, however small. You, therefore, fail entirely to represent the land." The surveyor, I think, would reply, "Sir, you have proved that my lines cannot make up the land, and that, therefore, my map *is not* the land. I never pretended that it was. But that does not prevent it from truly representing the land, as far as it goes. It cannot, indeed, represent every blade of grass; but it does not represent that there is not a blade of grass where there is. To abstract from a circumstance is not to deny it." Suppose the objector were, at this point, to say, "To abstract from a circumstance *is* to deny it. Wherever your map does not represent a blade of grass, it represents there is no blade of grass. Let us take things on their own valuation." Would not the surveyor reply: "This map is my description of the country. Its own valuation can be nothing but what I say, and all the world understands, that I mean by it. Is it very unreasonable that I should demand to be taken as I mean, especially when I succeed in making myself understood?" What the objector's reply to this

* Mr. Mill thinks the syllogism is merely a formula for recalling forgotten facts. Whether he means to deny, what all logicians since Kant have held, that the syllogism serves to render confused thoughts distinct, or whether he does not know that this is the usual doctrine, does not appear.

question would be, I leave it to any one to say who thinks his position well taken. Now this line of objection is parallel to that which is made against the syllogism. It is shown that no number of syllogisms can constitute the sum total of any mental action, however restricted. This may be freely granted, and yet it will not follow that the syllogism does not truly represent the mental action, as far as it purports to represent it at all. There is reason to believe that the action of the mind is, as it were, a continuous movement. Now the doctrine embodied in syllogistic formulæ (so far as it applies to the mind at all) is, that if two successive positions, occupied by the mind in this movement, be taken, they will be found to have certain relations. It is true that no number of successions of positions can make up a continuous movement; and this, I suppose, is what is meant by saying that a syllogism is a dead formula, while thinking is a living process. But the reply is that the syllogism is not intended to represent the mind, as to its life or deadness, but only as to the relation of its different judgments concerning the same thing. And it should be added that the relation between syllogism and thought does not spring from considerations of formal logic, but from those of psychology. All that the formal logician has to say is, that if facts capable of expression in such and such forms of words are true, another fact whose expression is related in a certain way to the expression of these others is also true.

Hegel taught that ordinary reasoning is "one-sided." A part of what he meant was that by such inference a part only of all that is true of an object can be learned, owing to the generality or abstractedness of the predicates inferred. This objection is, therefore, somewhat similar to the last; for the point of it is that no number of syllogisms would give a complete knowledge of the object. This, however, presents a difficulty which the other did not; namely, that if nothing incognizable exists, and all knowledge is by mental action, by mental action everything is cognizable. So that if by syllogism everything is not cognizable, syllogism does not exhaust the modes of mental action. But grant the validity of this argument and it proves too much; for it makes, not the syllogism particularly, but all finite knowledge to be worthless. However much we know, more may come to be found out.

Hence, all can never be known. This seems to contradict the fact that nothing is absolutely incognizable; and it would really do so if our knowledge were something absolutely limited. For, to say that all can never be known, means that information may increase beyond any assignable point; that is, that an absolute termination of all increase of knowledge is absolutely incognizable, and therefore does not exist. In other words, the proposition merely means that the sum of all that will be known up to any time, however advanced, into the future, has a ratio less than any assignable ratio to all that may be known at a time still more advanced. This does not contradict the fact that everything is cognizable; it only contradicts a proposition, which no one can maintain, that everything will be known at some time some number of years into the future. It may, however, very justly be said that the difficulty still remains, how at every future time, however late, there can be something yet to happen. It is no longer a contradiction, but it is a difficulty; that is to say, *lengths of time* are shown not to afford an adequate conception of futurity in general; and the question arises, in what other way we are to conceive of it. I might indeed, perhaps, fairly drop the question here, and say that the difficulty had become so entirely removed from the syllogism in particular, that the formal logician need not feel himself specially called on to consider it. The solution, however, is very simple. It is that we conceive of the future, as a whole, by considering that this word, like any other general term, as "inhabitant of St. Louis," may be taken distributively or collectively. We conceive of the infinite, therefore, not directly or on the side of its infinity, but by means of a consideration concerning words or a second intention.

Another objection to the syllogism is that its "therefore" is merely subjective; that, because a certain conclusion syllogistically follows from a premise, it does not follow that the fact denoted by the conclusion really depends upon the fact denoted by the premise, so that the syllogism does not represent things as they really are. But it has been fully shown that if the facts are as the premises represent, they are also as the conclusion represents. Now this is a purely objective statement: therefore, there is a real connection between the facts stated as

premises and those stated as conclusion. It is true that there is often an appearance of reasoning deductively from effects to causes. Thus we may reason as follows:—"There is smoke; there is never smoke without fire: hence, there has been fire." Yet smoke is not the cause of fire, but the effect of it. Indeed, it is evident, that in many cases an event is a demonstrative sign of a certain previous event having occurred. Hence, we can reason deductively from relatively future to relatively past, whereas causation really determines events in the direct order of time. Nevertheless, if we can thus reason against the stream of time, it is because there really are such facts as that "If there is smoke, there has been fire," in which the following event is the antecedent. Indeed, if we consider the manner in which such a proposition became known to us, we shall find that what it really means is that "If we find smoke, we *shall* find evidence on the whole that there has been fire"; and this, if reality consists in the agreement that the whole community would eventually come to, is the very same thing as to say that there really has been fire. In short, the whole present difficulty is resolved instantly by this theory of reality, because it makes all reality something which is constituted by an event indefinitely future.

Another objection, for which I am quite willing to allow a great German philosopher the whole credit, is that sometimes the conclusion is false, although both the premises and the syllogistic form are correct.* Of this he gives the following examples. From the middle term that a wall has been painted blue, it may correctly be concluded that it is blue; but notwithstanding this syllogism it may be green if it has also received a coat of yellow, from which last circumstance by itself it would follow that it is yellow. If from the middle term of the sensuous faculty it be concluded that man is neither good nor bad, since neither can be predicated of the sensuous, the syllogism is correct; but the conclusion is false, since of man in the concrete, spirituality is equally true, and may serve as middle term in an opposite syllogism. From the middle term of the gravitation of the planets, satellites, and comets, towards the sun, it follows cor-

rectly that these bodies fall into the sun; but they do not fall into it, because (!) they equally gravitate to their own centres, or, in other words (!), they are supported by centrifugal force. Now, does Hegel mean to say that these syllogisms satisfy the rules for syllogism given by those who defend syllogism? or does he mean to grant that they do not satisfy *those* rules, but to set up some rules of his own for syllogism which shall insure its yielding false conclusions from true premises? If the latter, he ignores the real issue, which is whether the syllogism as defined by the rules of formal logic is correct, and not whether the syllogism as represented by Hegel is correct. But if he means that the above examples satisfy the usual definition of a true syllogism, he is mistaken. The first, stated in form, is as follows:

Whatever has been painted blue is blue;
This wall has been painted blue;
∴ This wall is blue.

Now "painted blue" may mean painted with blue paint, or painted so as to be blue. If, in the example, the former were meant, the major premise would be false. As he has stated that it is true, the latter meaning of "painted blue" must be the one intended. Again, "blue" may mean blue at some time, or blue at this time. If the latter be meant, the major premise is plainly false; therefore, the former is meant. But the conclusion is said to contradict the statement that the wall is yellow. If blue were here taken in the more general sense, there would be no such contradiction. Hence, he means in the conclusion that this wall is now blue; that is to say, he reasons thus:

Whatever has been made blue has been blue;
This has been made blue;
∴ This is blue now.

Now substituting letters for the subjects and predicates, we get the form,

M is P ;
 S is M ;
∴ S is Q .

This is not a syllogism in the ordinary sense of that term, or in any sense in which anybody maintains that the syllogism is valid.

The second example given by Hegel, when written out in full, is as follows:

Sensuality is neither good nor bad;
Man *has* (not *is*) sensuality;
∴ Man is neither good nor bad.

* "So zeigt sich jener Schlusssatz dadurch als falsch, obgleich für sich dessen Prämissen und ebenso dessen Konsequenz ganz richtig sind."—Hegel's Werke, vol. v., p. 124.

Or, the same argument may be stated as follows:

The sensuous, *as such*, is neither good nor bad;
Man is sensuous:
∴ Man is neither good nor bad.

When letters are substituted for subject and predicate in either of these arguments, it takes the form,

M is P ;
 S is N ;
∴ S is P .

This, again, bears but a very slight resemblance to a syllogism.

The third example, when stated at full length, is as follows:

Whatever tends towards the sun, *on the whole*, falls into the sun;
The planets tend toward the sun:
∴ The planets fall into the sun.

This is a fallacy similar to the last.

* I wonder that this eminent logician did not add to his list of examples of correct syllogism the following:

It either rains, or it does not rain;
It does not rain:
∴ It rains.

This is fully as deserving of serious consideration as any of those which he has brought forward. The rainy day and the pleasant day are both, in the first place, day. Secondly, each is the negation of a day. It is indifferent which be regarded as the positive. The pleasant is Other to the rainy, and the rainy is in like manner Other to the pleasant. Thus, both are equally Others. Both are Others of each other, or each is Other for itself. So this day being other than rainy, that to which it is Other is itself. But it is Other than itself. Hence, it is itself Rainy.

Some sophisms have, however, been adduced, mostly by the Eleatics and Sophists, which really are extremely difficult to resolve by syllogistic rules; and according to some modern authors this is actually impossible. These sophisms fall into three classes: 1st, those which relate to continuity; 2d, those which relate to consequences of supposing things to be other than they are; 3d, those which relate to propositions which imply their own falsity. Of the first class, the most celebrated are Zeno's arguments concerning motion. One of these is, that if Achilles overtakes a tortoise in any finite time, and the tortoise has the start of him by a distance which may be called a , then

Achilles has to pass over the sum of distances represented by the polynomial

$$\frac{1}{2}a + \frac{1}{4}a + \frac{1}{8}a + \frac{1}{16}a + \frac{1}{32}a \&c.$$

up to infinity. Every term of this polynomial is finite, and it has an infinite number of terms; consequently, Achilles must in a finite time pass over a distance equal to the sum of an infinite number of finite distances. Now this distance must be infinite, because no finite distance, however small, can be multiplied by an infinite number without giving an infinite distance. So that even if none of these finite distances were larger than the smallest, (which is finite since all are finite,) the sum of the whole would be infinite. But Achilles cannot pass over an infinite distance in a finite time: therefore, he cannot overtake the tortoise in any time, however great.

The solution of this fallacy is as follows: The conclusion is dependent on the fact that Achilles cannot overtake the tortoise without passing over an infinite number of terms of that series of finite distances. That is, no case of his overtaking the tortoise would be a case of his not passing over a non-finite number of terms; that is (by simple conversion), no case of his not passing over a non-finite number of terms would be a case of his overtaking the tortoise. But if he does not pass over a non-finite number of terms, he either passes over a finite number, or he passes over none; and conversely. Consequently, nothing more has been said than that every case of his passing over only a finite number of terms, or of his not passing over any, is a case of his not overtaking the tortoise. Consequently, nothing more can be concluded than that he passes over a distance greater than the sum of any finite number of the above series of terms. But because a quantity is greater than any quantity of a certain series, it does not follow that it is greater than any quantity.

In fact, the reasoning in this sophism may be exhibited as follows:—We start with the series of numbers,

$$\begin{array}{c} \frac{1}{2}a \\ \frac{1}{2}a + \frac{1}{4}a \\ \frac{1}{2}a + \frac{1}{4}a + \frac{1}{8}a \\ \frac{1}{2}a + \frac{1}{4}a + \frac{1}{8}a + \frac{1}{16}a \\ \text{\textit{f.c. f.c. f.c.}} \end{array}$$

Then, the implied argument is

Any number of this series is less than a :
But any number you please is less than the number of terms of this series:
Hence, any number you please is less than a .

This involves an obvious confusion between the number of terms and the value of the greatest term.

Another argument by Zeno against motion, is that a body fills a space no larger than itself. In that place there is no room for motion. Hence, while in the place where it is, it does not move. But it never is other than in the place where it is. Hence, it never moves. Putting this into form, it will read:

No body in a place no larger than itself is moving;
But every body is a body in a place no larger than itself:
∴ No body is moving.

The error of this consists in the fact that the minor premise is only true in the sense that during a time sufficiently short the space occupied by a body is as little larger than itself as you please. All that can be inferred from this is, that during no time a body will move no distance.

All the arguments of Zeno depend on supposing that a *continuum* has ultimate parts. But a *continuum* is precisely that, every part of which has parts, in the same sense. Hence, he makes out his contradictions only by making a self-contradictory supposition. In ordinary and mathematical language, we allow ourselves to speak of such parts—*points*—and whenever we are led into contradiction thereby, we have simply to express ourselves more accurately to resolve the difficulty.

Suppose a piece of glass to be laid on a sheet of paper so as to cover half of it. Then, every part of the paper is *covered*, or *not covered*; for “not” means merely outside of, or other than. But is the line under the edge of the glass covered or not? It is no more on one side of the edge than it is on the other. Therefore, it is either on both sides, or neither side. It is not on neither side; for if it were it would be *not* on either side, therefore not on the covered side, therefore not covered, therefore on the uncovered side. It is not partly on one side and partly on the other, because it has no width. Hence, it is wholly on both sides, or both covered and not covered.

The solution of this is, that we have supposed a part too narrow to be partly uncovered and partly covered; that is to say, a part which has no parts in a continuous surface, which by definition has no such parts. The reasoning, therefore, simply serves to reduce this supposition to an absurdity.

It may be said that there really is such a thing as a line. If a shadow falls on a surface, there really is a division between the light and the darkness. That is true. But it does not follow that because we attach a definite meaning to the part of a surface being covered, therefore we know what we mean when we say that a line is covered. We may define a covered line as one which separates two surfaces both of which are covered, or as one which separates two surfaces *either* of which is covered. In the former case, the line under the edge is uncovered; in the latter case, it is covered.

In the sophisms thus far considered, the appearance of contradiction depends mostly upon an ambiguity; in those which we are now to consider, two true propositions really do in form conflict with one another. We are apt to think that formal logic forbids this, whereas a familiar argument, the *reductio ad absurdum*, depends on showing that contrary predicates are true of a subject, and that *therefore* that subject does not exist. Many logicians, it is true, make affirmative propositions assert the existence of their subjects.* The objection to this is that it cannot be extended to hypotheticals. The proposition

If *A* then *B*

may conveniently be regarded as equivalent to

Every case of the truth of *A* is a case of the truth of *B*.

But this cannot be done if the latter proposition asserts the existence of its subject; that is, asserts that *A* really happens. If, however, a categorical affirmative be regarded as asserting the existence of its subject, the principle of the *reductio ad absurdum* is that two propositions of the forms,

If *A* were true, *B* would not be true,
and

If *A* were true, *B* would be true.

may both be true at once; and that if they are so, *A* is not true. It will be well, perhaps, to illustrate this point. No man of common sense would deliberately upset his inkstand if there were ink in it; that is, if any ink would run out. Hence, by simple conversion,

If he were deliberately to upset his inkstand, no ink would be spilt.

* The usage of ordinary language has no relevancy in the matter.

But suppose there is ink in it. Then, it is also true, that

If he were deliberately to upset his inkstand, the ink would be spilt.

These propositions are both true, and the law of contradiction is not violated which asserts only that nothing has contradictory predicates: only, it follows from these propositions that the man will not deliberately overturn his inkstand.

There are two ways in which deceptive sophisms may result from this circumstance. In the first place, contradictory propositions are never both true. Now, as a universal proposition may be true when the subject does not exist, it follows that the contradictory of a universal—that is, a particular—cannot be taken in such a sense as to be true when the subject does not exist. But a particular simply asserts a part of what is asserted in the universal over it; therefore, the universal over it asserts the subject to exist. Consequently, there are two kinds of universals, those which do not assert the subject to exist, and these have no particular propositions under them, and those which do assert that the subject exists, and these strictly speaking have no contradictories. For example, there is no use of such a form of proposition as “Some griffins would be dreadful animals,” as particular under the useful form “The griffin would be a dreadful animal”; and the apparent contradictories “All of John Smith’s family are ill,” and “Some of John Smith’s family are not ill,” are both false at once if John Smith has no family. Here, though an inference from a universal to the particular under it is always valid, yet a procedure which greatly resembles this would be sophistical if the universal were one of those propositions which does not assert the existence of its subject. The following sophism depends upon this; I call it the True Gorgias:

Gorgias. What say you, Socrates, of black? Is any black, white?

Socrates. No, by Zeus!

Gor. Do you say, then, that no black is white? *Soc.* None at all.

Gor. But is everything either black or non-black? *Soc.* Of course.

Gor. And everything either white or non-white? *Soc.* Yes.

Gor. And everything either rough or smooth? *Soc.* Yes.

Gor. And everything either real or unreal? *Soc.* Oh, bother! yes.

Gor. Do you say, then, that all black is either rough black or smooth black? *Soc.* Yes.

Gor. And that all white is either real white or unreal white? *Soc.* Yes.

Gor. And yet is no black, white? *Soc.* None at all.

Gor. Nor no white, black? *Soc.* By no means.

Gor. What? Is no smooth black, white? *Soc.* No; you cannot prove that, Gorgias.

Gor. Nor no rough black, white? *Soc.* Neither.

Gor. Nor no real white, black? *Soc.* No.

Gor. Nor no unreal white, black? *Soc.* No, I say. No white at all is black.

Gor. What if black is smooth, is it not white? *Soc.* Not in the least.

Gor. And if the last is false, is the first false? *Soc.* It follows.

Gor. If, then, black is white, does it follow, that black is not smooth? *Soc.* It does.

Gor. Black-white is not smooth? *Soc.* What do you mean?

Gor. Can any dead man speak? *Soc.* No, indeed.

Gor. And is any speaking man dead? *Soc.* I say, no.

Gor. And is any good king tyrannical? *Soc.* No.

Gor. And is any tyrannical king good? *Soc.* I just said no.

Gor. And you said, too, that no rough black is white, did you not? *Soc.* Yes.

Gor. Then, is any black-white, rough? *Soc.* No.

Gor. And is any unreal black, white? *Soc.* No.

Gor. Then, is any black-white unreal? *Soc.* No.

Gor. No black-white is rough? *Soc.* None.

Gor. All black-white, then, is non-rough? *Soc.* Yes.

Gor. And all black-white, non-unreal? *Soc.* Yes.

Gor. All black-white is then smooth? *Soc.* Yes.

Gor. And all real? *Soc.* Yes.

Gor. Some smooth, then, is black-white? *Soc.* Of course.

Gor. And some real is black-white? *Soc.* So it seems.

Gor. Some black-white smooth is black-white? *Soc.* Yes.

Gor. Some black smooth is black-white?

Soc. Yes.

Gor. Some black smooth is white. Soc.

Yes.

Gor. Some black real is black-white?

Soc. Yes.

Gor. Some black real is white? Soc.

Yes.

Gor. Some real black is white? Soc. Yes.

Gor. And some smooth black is white?

Soc. Yes.

Gor. Then, some black is white? Soc. I think so myself.

The principle of the *reductio ad absurdum* also occasions deceptions in another way, owing to the fact that we have many words, such as *can*, *may*, *must*, &c., which imply more or less vaguely an otherwise unexpressed condition, so that these propositions are in fact hypotheticals. Accordingly, if the unexpressed condition is some state of things which does not actually come to pass, the two propositions may appear to be contrary to one another. Thus, the moralist says, "You ought to do this, and you can do it." This "You can do it" is principally hortatory in its force: so far as it is a statement of fact, it means merely, "If you try, you will do it." Now, if the act is an out-

ward one and the act is not performed, the scientific man, in view of the fact that every event in the physical world depends exclusively on physical antecedents, says that in this case the laws of nature prevented the thing from being done, and that therefore, "Even if you had tried, you would not have done it." Yet the reproachful conscience still says you might have done it; that is, that "If you had tried, you would have done it." This is called the paradox of freedom and fate; and it is usually supposed that one of these propositions must be true and the other false. But since, in fact, you have not tried, there is no reason why the supposition that you have tried should not be reduced to an absurdity. In the same way, if you had tried and had performed the action, the conscience might say, "If you had not tried, you would not have done it"; while the understanding would say, "Even if you had not tried, you would have done it." These propositions are perfectly consistent, and only serve to reduce the supposition that you did not try to an absurdity.*

The third class of sophisms consists of the so-called *Insolubilia*. Here is an example of one of them with its resolution:

THIS PROPOSITION IS NOT TRUE.

IS IT TRUE OR NOT?

Suppose it true.

Then,

The proposition is true;

But, that it is not true is the proposition:

∴ That it is not true is true;

∴ It is not true.

Besides,

It is true.

∴ It is true that it is true,

∴ It is not true that it is not true;

But, the proposition is that it is not true,

∴ The proposition is not true.

∴ Whether it is true or not, it is both true and not.

∴ It is both true and not,
which is absurd.

Suppose it not true.

Then,

It is not true.

∴ It is true that it is not true.

But, the proposition is that it is not true.

∴ The proposition is true.

Besides,

The proposition is not true.

But that it is not true is the proposition.

∴ That it is not true, is not true.

∴ That it is true, is true.

∴ It is true.

* This seems to me to be the main difficulty of freedom and fate. But the question is overlaid with many others. The Necessitarians seem now to maintain less that every physical event is completely determined by physical causes, (which seems to me irrefragable,) than that every act of will is determined by the strongest motive. This has never been proved. Its advocates seem to think that it follows from universal causation, but why need the cause of an act lie within the consciousness at all? If I act from a reason at all, I act voluntarily; but which of two reasons shall appear strongest to me on a particular occasion may be owing to what I have eaten for dinner. Unless there is a perfect regularity as to what is the strongest motive with me, to say that I act from the strongest motive is mere tautology. If there

is no calculating how a man will act except by taking into account external facts, the character of his motives does not determine how he acts. Mill and others have, therefore, not shown that a man always acts from the strongest motive. Hobbes maintained that a man always acts from a reflection upon what will please him most. This is a very crude opinion. Men are not always thinking of themselves.

Self-control seems to be the capacity for rising to an extended view of a practical subject instead of seeing only temporary urgency. This is the only freedom of which man has any reason to be proud; and it is because love of what is good for all on the whole, which is the widest possible consideration, is the essence of Christianity, that it is said that the service of Christ is perfect freedom.

Since the conclusion is false, the reasoning is bad, or the premises are not all true. But the reasoning is a dilemma; either, then, the disjunctive principle that it is either true or not is false, or the reasoning under one or the other branch is bad, or the reasoning is altogether valid. If the principle that it is either true or not is false, it is other than true and other than not true; that is, not true and not not true; that is, not true and true. But this is absurd. Hence, the disjunctive principle is valid. There are two arguments under each horn of the dilemma; both the arguments under one or the other branch must be false. But, in each case, the second argument involves all the premises and forms of inference involved in the first; hence, if the first is false, the second necessarily is so. We may, therefore, confine our attention to the first arguments in the two branches. The forms of argument contained in these are two: first, the simple syllogism in Barbara, and, second, the consequence from the truth of a proposition to the proposition itself. These are both correct. Hence, the whole form of reasoning is correct, and nothing remains to be false but a premise. But since the repetition of an alternative supposition is not a premise, there is, properly speaking, but one premise in the whole. This is that the proposition is the same as that that proposition is not true. This, then, must be false. Hence the proposition signifies either less or more than this. If it does not signify as much as this, it signifies nothing, and hence it is not true, and hence another proposition which says of it what it says of itself is true. But if the proposition in question signifies something more than that it is itself not true, then the premise that

Whatever is said in the proposition is that it is not true,

is not true. And as a proposition is true only if whatever is said in it is true, but is false if anything said in it is false, the first argument on the second side of the dilemma contains a false premise, and the second an undistributed middle. But the first argument on the first side remains good. Hence, if the proposition means more than that it is not true, it is not true, and another proposition which repeats this of it is true. Hence, whether the proposition does or does not mean that it is not true, it is not true, and a proposition which repeats this of it is true.

Since this repeating proposition is true, it has a meaning. Now, a proposition has a meaning if any part of it has a meaning. Hence the original proposition (a part of which repeated has a meaning) has itself a meaning. Hence, it must imply something besides that which it explicitly states. But it has no particular determination to any further implication. Hence, what more it signifies it must signify by virtue of being a proposition at all. That is to say, every proposition must imply something analogous to what this implies. Now, the repetition of this proposition does not contain this implication, for otherwise it could not be true; hence, what every proposition implies must be something concerning itself. What every proposition implies concerning itself must be something which is false of the proposition now under discussion, for the whole falsity of this proposition lies therein, since all that it explicitly lays down is true. It must be something which would not be false if the proposition were true, for in that case some true proposition would be false. Hence, it must be that it is itself true. That is, *every proposition asserts its own truth.*

The proposition in question, therefore, is true in all other respects but its implication of its own truth.*

The difficulty of showing how the law of deductive reasoning is true depends upon our inability to conceive of its not being true. In the case of probable reasoning the difficulty is of quite another kind; here, where we see precisely what the procedure is, we wonder how such a process can have any validity at all. How magical it is that by examining a part of a class we can know what is true of the whole of the class, and by

* This is the principle which was most usually made the basis of the resolution of the *Insolubilia*. See, for example, *Pauli Veneti Sophismata Aurea. Soph.* 50. The authority of Aristotle is claimed for this mode of solution. *Sophist. Elench.*, cap. 25. The principal objection which was made to this mode of solution, viz., that the principle that every proposition implies its own truth, cannot be proved, I believe that I have removed. The only arguments against the truth of this principle were based on the imperfect doctrines of *modales* and *obligationes*. Other methods of solution suppose that a part of a proposition cannot denote the whole proposition, or that no intellection is a formal cognition of itself. A solution of this sort will be found in Occam's *Summa Totius Logices*, 3d part of 3d part, cap. 38. Such modern authors as think the solution "very easy" do not understand its difficulties. See Mansell's *Aldrich*, p. 145.

study of the past can know the future; in short, that we can know what we have not experienced!

Is not this an intellectual intuition! Is it not that besides ordinary experience which is dependent on there being a certain physical connection between our organs and the thing experienced, there is a second avenue of truth dependent only on there being a certain intellectual connection between our previous knowledge and what we learn in that way? Yes, this is true. Man has this faculty, just as opium has a somnific virtue; but some further questions may be asked, nevertheless. How is the existence of this faculty accounted for? In one sense, no doubt, by natural selection. Since it is absolutely essential to the preservation of so delicate an organism as man's, no race which had it not has been able to sustain itself. This accounts for the prevalence of this faculty, provided it was only a possible one. But how can it be possible? What could enable the mind to know physical things which do not physically influence it and which it does not influence? The question cannot be answered by any statement concerning the human mind, for it is equivalent to asking what makes the facts usually to be, as inductive and hypothetic conclusions from true premises represent them to be? Facts of a certain kind are usually true when facts having certain relations to them are true; what is the cause of this? That is the question.

The usual reply is that nature is everywhere regular; as things have been, so they will be; as one part of nature is, so is every other. But this explanation will not do. Nature is not regular. No disorder would be less orderly than the existing arrangement. It is true that the special laws and regularities are innumerable; but nobody thinks of the irregularities, which are infinitely more frequent. Every fact true of any one thing in the universe is related to every fact true of every other. But the immense majority of these relations are fortuitous and irregular. A man in China bought a cow three days and five minutes after a Greenlander had sneezed. Is that abstract circumstance connected with any regularity whatever? And are not such relations infinitely more frequent than those which are regular? But if a very large number of qualities were to be distributed among a very large number of things in almost any way,

there would chance to be some few regularities. If, for example, upon a checker-board of an enormous number of squares, painted all sorts of colors, myriads of dice were to be thrown, it could hardly fail to happen, that upon some color, or shade of color, out of so many, some one of the six numbers should not be uppermost on any die. This would be a regularity; for, the universal proposition would be true that upon that color that number is never turned up. But suppose this regularity abolished. then a far more remarkable regularity would be created, namely, that on every color every number is turned up. Either way, therefore, a regularity must occur. Indeed, a little reflection will show that although we have here only variations of color and of the numbers of the dice, many regularities must occur. And the greater the number of objects, the more respects in which they vary, and the greater the number of varieties in each respect, the greater will be the number of regularities. Now, in the universe, all these numbers are infinite. Therefore, however disorderly the chaos, the *number* of regularities must be infinite. The orderliness of the universe, therefore, if it exists, must consist in the large *proportion* of relations which present a regularity to those which are quite irregular. But this proportion in the actual universe is, as we have seen, as small as it can be; and, therefore, the orderliness of the universe is as little as that of any arrangement whatever.

But even if there were such an orderliness in things, it never could be discovered. For it would belong to things either collectively or distributively. If it belonged to things collectively, that is to say, if things formed a system the difficulty would be that a system can only be known by seeing some considerable proportion of the whole. Now we never can know how great a part of the whole of nature we have discovered. If the order were distributive, that is, belonged to all things only by belonging to each thing, the difficulty would be that a character can only be known by comparing something which has with it something which has it not. *Being, quality, relation*, and other universals are not known except as characters of words or other signs, attributed by a figure of speech to things. Thus, in neither case could the order of things be known. But the order of things would not

help the validity of our reasoning—that is, would not help us to reason correctly—unless we knew what the order of things required the relation between the known reasoned *from* to the unknown reasoned *to*, to be.

But even if this order both existed and were known, the knowledge would be of no use except as a general principle, from which things could be deduced. It would not explain how knowledge could be increased, (in contradistinction to being rendered more distinct,) and so it would not explain how it could itself have been acquired.

Finally, if the validity of induction and hypothesis were dependent on a particular constitution of the universe, we could imagine a universe in which these modes of inference should not be valid, just as we can imagine a universe in which there would be no attraction, but things should merely drift about. Accordingly, J. S. Mill, who explains the validity of induction by the uniformity of nature,* maintains that he can imagine a universe without any regularity, so that no probable inference would be valid in it.† In the universe as it is, probable arguments sometimes fail, nor can any definite proportion of cases be stated in which they hold good; all that can be said is that in the long run they prove approximately correct. Can a universe be imagined in which this would not be the case? It must be a universe where probable argument can have some application, in order that it may fail half the time. It must, therefore, be a universe experienced. Of the finite number of propositions true of a finite amount of experience of such a universe, no one would be universal in form, unless the subject of it were an individual. For if there were a plural universal proposition, inferences by analogy from one particular to another

would hold good invariably in reference to that subject. So that these arguments might be no better than guesses in reference to other parts of the universe, but they would invariably hold good in a finite proportion of it, and so would on the whole be somewhat better than guesses. There could, also, be no individuals in that universe, for there must be some general class—that is, there must be some things more or less alike—or probable argument would find no premises there; therefore, there must be two mutually exclusive classes, since every class has a residue outside of it; hence, if there were any individual, that individual would be wholly excluded from one or other of these classes. Hence, the universal plural proposition would be true, that no one of a certain class was that individual. Hence, no universal proposition would be true. Accordingly, every combination of characters would occur in such a universe. But this would not be disorder, but the simplest order; it would not be unintelligible, but, on the contrary, everything conceivable would be found in it with equal frequency. The notion, therefore, of a universe in which probable arguments should fail as often as hold true, is absurd. We can suppose it in general terms, but we cannot specify how it should be other than self-contradictory.*

Since we cannot conceive of probable inferences as not generally holding good, and since no special supposition will serve to explain their validity, many logicians have sought to base this validity on that of deduction, and that in a variety of ways. The only attempt of this sort, however, which deserves to be noticed is that which seeks to determine the probability of a future event by the theory of probabilities, from the fact that a certain number of similar events have been observed. Whether this can be done or not depends on the meaning assigned to the word probability. But if this word is to be taken in such a sense that a form of conclusion which is probable is valid; since the validity of an inference (or its correspon-

* Logic, Book 3, chap. 3, sec. 1.

† *Ibid.* Book 3, chap. 21, sec. 1. "I am convinced that any one accustomed to abstraction and analysis, who will fairly exert his faculties for the purpose, will, when his imagination has once learnt to entertain the notion, find no difficulty in conceiving that some one, for instance, of the many firmaments into which sidereal astronomy divides the universe, events may succeed one another at random, without any fixed law; nor can anything in our experience or mental nature constitute a sufficient, or indeed any, reason for believing that this is nowhere the case.

Were we to suppose (what it is perfectly possible to imagine) that the present order of the universe were brought to an end, and that a chaos succeeded, in which there was no fixed succession of events, and the past gave no assurance of the future," &c.

* Boole (*Laws of Thought*, p. 370) has shown, in a very simple and elegant manner, that an infinite number of balls may have characters distributed in such a way, that from the characters of the balls already drawn, we could infer nothing in regard to that of the characters of the next one. The same is true of some arrangements of a finite number of balls, provided the inference takes place after a fixed number of drawings. But this does not invalidate the reasoning above, although it is an important fact without doubt.

dence with facts) consists solely in this, that when such premises are true, such a conclusion is generally true, then probability can mean nothing but the ratio of the frequency of occurrence of a specific event to a general one over it. In this sense of the term, it is plain that the probability of an inductive conclusion cannot be *deduced* from the premises; for from the inductive premises

$$\begin{array}{l} S', S'', S''' \text{ are } M, \\ S', S'', S''' \text{, are } P, \end{array}$$

nothing follows deductively, except that any M , which is S' , or S'' , or S''' is P ; or, less explicitly, that some M is P .

Thus, we seem to be driven to this point. On the one hand, no determination of things, no *fact*, can result in the validity of probable argument; nor, on the other hand, is such argument reducible to that form which holds good, however the facts may be. This seems very much like a reduction to absurdity of the validity of such reasoning; and a paradox of the greatest difficulty is presented for solution.

There can be no doubt of the importance of this problem. According to Kant, the central question of philosophy is "How are synthetical judgments *a priori* possible?" But antecedently to this comes the question how synthetical judgments in general, and still more generally, how synthetical reasoning is possible at all. When the answer to the general problem has been obtained, the particular one will be comparatively simple. This is the lock upon the door of philosophy.

All probable inference, whether induction or hypothesis, is inference from the parts to the whole. It is essentially the same, therefore, as statistical inference. Out of a bag of black and white beans I take a few handfuls, and from this sample I can judge approximately the proportions of black and white in the whole. This is identical with induction. Now we know upon what the validity of this inference depends. It depends upon the fact that in the long run, any one bean would be taken out as often as any other. For were this not so, the mean of a large number of results of such testings of the contents of the bag would not be precisely the ratio of the numbers of the two colors of beans in the bag. Now we may divide the question of the validity of induction into two parts: 1st, why of all inductions, premises for which occur, the generality should hold good, and 2d, why men are not fated always to light upon the

small proportion of worthless inductions. Then, the first of these two questions is readily answered. For since all the members of any class are the same as all that are to be known; and since from any part of those which are to be known an induction is competent to the rest, in the long run any one member of a class will occur as the subject of a premise of a possible induction as often as any other, and, therefore, the validity of induction depends simply upon the fact that the parts make up and constitute the whole. This in its turn depends simply upon there being such a state of things that any general terms are possible. But it has been shown, p. 155, that being at all is being in general. And thus this part of the validity of induction depends merely on there being any reality.

From this it appears that we cannot say that the generality of inductions are true, but only that in the long run they approximate to the truth. This is the truth of the statement, that the universality of an inference from induction is only the analogue of true universality. Hence, also, it cannot be said that we know an inductive conclusion to be true, however loosely we state it; we only know that by accepting inductive conclusions, in the long run our errors balance one another. In fact, insurance companies proceed upon induction;—they do not know what will happen to this or that policyholder; they only know that they are secure in the long run.

The other question relative to the validity of induction, is why men are not fated always to light upon those inductions which are highly deceptive. The explanation of the former branch of the problem we have seen to be that there is something real. Now, since if there is anything real, then (on account of this reality consisting in the ultimate agreement of all men, and on account of the fact that reasoning from parts to whole, is the only kind of synthetic reasoning which men possess) it follows necessarily that a sufficiently long succession of inferences from parts to whole will lead men to a knowledge of it, so that in that case they cannot be fated on the whole to be thoroughly unlucky in their inductions. This second branch of the problem is in fact equivalent to asking why there is anything real, and thus its solution will carry the solution of the former branch one step further.

The answer to this question may be put into a general and abstract, or a special detailed form. If men were not to be able to learn from induction, it must be because as a general rule, when they had made an induction, the order of things (as they appear in experience), would then undergo a revolution. Just herein would the unreality of such a universe consist; namely, that the order of the universe should depend on how much men should know of it. But this general rule would be capable of being itself discovered by induction; and so it must be a law of such a universe, that when this was discovered it would cease to operate. But this second law would itself be capable of discovery. And so in such a universe there would be nothing which would not sooner or later be known; and it would have an order capable of discovery by a sufficiently long course of reasoning. But this is contrary to the hypothesis, and therefore that hypothesis is absurd. This is the particular answer. But we may also say, in general, that if nothing real exists, then, since every question supposes that something exists—for it maintains its own urgency—it supposes only illusions to exist. But the existence even of an illusion is a reality; for an illusion affects all men, or it does not. In the former case, it is a reality according to our theory of reality; in the latter case, it is independent of the state of mind of any individuals except those whom it happens to affect. So that the answer to the question, *Why is anything real?* is this: That question means, “supposing anything to exist, why is something real?” The answer is, that that very existence is reality by definition.

All that has here been said, particularly of induction, applies to all inference from parts to whole, and therefore to hypothesis, and so to all probable inference.

Thus, I claim to have shown, in the first place, that it is possible to hold a consistent theory of the validity of the laws of ordinary logic.

But now let us suppose the idealistic theory of reality, which I have in this paper taken for granted to be false. In that case, inductions would not be true unless the world were so constituted that every object should be presented in experience as often as any other; and further, unless we were so constituted that we had no more tendency to make bad inductions than good ones. These facts might be explained by the be-

evolence of the Creator; but, as has already been argued, they could not explain, but are absolutely refuted by the fact that no state of things can be conceived in which probable arguments should not lead to the truth. This affords a most important argument in favor of that theory of reality, and thus of those denials of certain faculties from which it was deduced, as well as of the general style of philosophizing by which those denials were reached.

Upon our theory of reality and of logic, it can be shown that no inference of any individual can be thoroughly logical without certain determinations of his mind which do not concern any one inference immediately; for we have seen that that mode of inference which alone can teach us anything, or carry us at all beyond what was implied in our premises—in fact, does not give us to know any more than we knew before; only, we know that, by faithfully adhering to that mode of inference, we shall, on the whole, approximate to the truth. Each of us is an insurance company, in short. But, now, suppose that an insurance company, among its risks, should take one exceeding in amount the sum of all the others. Plainly, it would then have no security whatever. Now, has not every single man such a risk? What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul? If a man has a transcendent personal interest infinitely outweighing all others, then, upon the theory of validity of inference just developed, he is devoid of all security, and can make no valid inference whatever. What follows? That logic rigidly requires, before all else, that no determinate fact, nothing which can happen to a man's self, should be of more consequence to him than everything else. He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole world, is illogical in all his inferences, collectively. So the social principle is rooted intrinsically in logic.

That being the case, it becomes interesting to inquire how it is with men as a matter of fact. There is a psychological theory that man cannot act without a view to his own pleasure. This theory is based on a falsely assumed subjectivism. Upon our principles of the objectivity of knowledge, it could not be based, and if they are correct it is reduced to an absurdity. It seems to me that the usual opinion of the selfishness of man is based in large measure upon this false theory. I do not think that the facts

bear out the usual opinion. The immense self-sacrifices which the most wilful men often make, show that wilfulness is a very different thing from selfishness. The care that men have for what is to happen after they are dead, cannot be selfish. And finally and chiefly, the constant use of the word "*we*"—as when we speak of our possessions on the Pacific—our destiny as a republic—in cases in which no personal interests at all are involved, show conclusively that men do not make their personal interests their only ones, and therefore may, at least, subordinate them to the interests of the community.

But just the revelation of the possibility of this complete self-sacrifice in man, and the belief in its saving power, will serve to redeem the logicity of all men. For he who recognizes the logical necessity of complete self-identification of one's own interests with those of the community, and its potential existence in man, even if he has it not himself, will perceive that only the inferences of that man who has it are logical, and so views his own inferences as being valid only so far as they would be accepted by that man. But so far as he has this belief, he becomes identified with that man. And that ideal perfection of knowledge by which we have seen that reality is constituted must thus belong to a community in which this identification is complete.

This would serve as a complete establishment of private logicity, were it not that the assumption that man or the community (which may be wider than man) shall ever arrive at a state of information greater than

some definite finite information, is entirely unsupported by reasons. There cannot be a scintilla of evidence to show that at some time all living beings shall not be annihilated at once, and that forever after there shall be throughout the universe any intelligence whatever. Indeed, this very assumption involves itself a transcendent and supreme interest, and therefore from its very nature is unsusceptible of any support from reasons. This infinite hope which we all have (for even the atheist will constantly betray his calm expectation that what is Best will come about) is something so august and momentous, that all reasoning in reference to it is a trifling impertinence. We do not want to know what are the weights of reasons *pro* and *con*.—that is, how much odds we should wish to receive on such a venture in the long run—because there is no long run in the case; the question is single and supreme, and ALL is at stake upon it. We are in the condition of a man in a life and death struggle; if he have not sufficient strength, it is wholly indifferent to him how he acts, so that the only assumption upon which he can act rationally is the hope of success. So this sentiment is rigidly demanded by logic. If its object were any determinate fact, any private interest, it might conflict with the results of knowledge and so with itself; but when its object is of a nature as wide as the community can turn out to be, it is always a hypothesis uncontradicted by facts and justified by its indispensableness for making any action rational.

THE LAÖKOÖN AS A WORK OF ART.

[Translated from the German of Goethe by E. S. MORGAN.]

[The editor takes pleasure in being able to offer in this number two of the most remarkable interpretations of Art-work that exist in all literature. Winckelmann and Goethe stand unrivalled among moderns for their appreciation of classic art. Goethe does more than recognize classic art—he esteems all styles of art each in its true spirit and time. This has been shown in the essay on Da Vinci's "Last Supper." The intensity of Winckelmann's admiration of the Classic art was well shown in the article on the "Torso" published in the last number of the *Journal*. But his appreciation extends only to outlines, and he is filled with disgust when he sees the paintings of the greatest Italians. Color does not distract his attention from the outlines. He who would see the beautiful in classic art must practise the same abstraction from color as well as from the action portrayed. Let him look at Correggio's "Night," for example; first, forgetting the outline in the magic of the coloring, and secondly, confining his attention merely to the forms, and he will see how beautiful and how ugly a picture may be, when viewed from two different standpoints.—EDITOR.]

A genuine work of art, like a work of nature, remains forever inexhaustible by the understanding. It is looked at, it im-

presses us, it produces an effect, but cannot be wholly comprehended, much less can its essence, its real value, be expressed in words.

So what is here said of the *Laökoön* by no means presumes to exhaust the subject; we rather make this admirable work of art the occasion than the subject of our remarks. May it not be long before it is again so placed that every lover of art may be able to enjoy it and speak of it, each in his own way! It is hardly possible to speak of a great work of art without speaking of art in general, since the latter is comprehended in the former, and each one of us, according to his powers, can develop the Universal out of such a particular case; we therefore offer first some remarks of a general nature. All high works of art express humanity; the plastic arts have for their special object the representation of the human form; for the present we speak only of these.

Art has many grades, in each of which distinguished artists may appear; but a perfect work of art embraces all the excellencies which are found separately in lesser works. The highest works of art known to us, exhibit *living, highly organized natures*. We expect before anything else knowledge of the human body in its parts, proportions, inward and outward, adaptations, forms and motions in general.

Character. Knowledge of the variation of the parts in form and action. Peculiarities are discriminated and exhibited separately. Thus characters originate, and by this means several art-works may be brought together in important relations, just as when a single work is composed of parts, these parts have a like important connection with each other. The subject may be *at rest or in motion*. A work or its parts may be either self-centred, showing its mere existence in a state of rest, or it may be represented as moved, active, full of passionate expression.

Ideal. For the attainment of success here, the artist has need of a profound, thorough, persevering mind, to which must be added a still higher sense, that he may comprehend the subject in its whole extent; seize the supreme moment proper for representation, as well as lift it out of its narrow actuality, and give to it in an ideal world proportion, limit, reality and dignity.

Agreeableness. But the subject and the manner of representing it are subordinate to the sensuous laws of art, viz., order, comprehensibility, symmetry, contrast, etc., whereby it becomes beautiful; that is, agreeable to the eye.

Beauty. It is further subject to the law

of spiritual beauty which originates in proportion; to which, one cultivated in the production or creation of the beautiful, knows how to subordinate everything, even extremes. Having first stated the conditions which we demand in a high work of art, I can say much in a few words, when I assert that our group fulfils them all; may more, that they could be developed out of it.

It will be conceded that it shows knowledge of the human form and its characteristics, as well as expression and passion. In how high and ideal a way the subject is seized, will be evident from what follows—that the work is beautiful no one will doubt who recognizes the justness with which the extremes of physical and mental suffering are here represented. On the other hand, it will seem paradoxical to many when I maintain that this group is at the same time pleasing. A few words upon this point also. Every work of art must prove itself as such, and this it can do only through what we call sensuous beauty or grace. The ancients, far removed from the modern delusion that a work of art must have the appearance of a work of nature, stamped their works as such by the studied arrangement of parts; by means of symmetry they educated the eye to an insight into relations, so that a complicated work became comprehensible. Through this symmetry and through opposition (of parts) the highest contrasts became possible by means of slight variations. The care of the artists was most happily bestowed in placing complicated masses in contrast, especially with groups in bringing the extremities into a harmonious position, so that every work of art, if we disregard its import, and see only its most general outlines from a distance, still strikes the eye as an harmonious whole. The antique vases furnish hundreds of examples of such agreeable grouping, and it would, perhaps, be possible to give a series of beautiful instances of such symmetrically artistic and pleasing compositions from vase-sculptures of the simplest repose, up to the passionate life of the *Laökoön*. I therefore venture to repeat that the group of *Laökoön*, besides its other recognized merits, is also a model of symmetry and variety, of rest and motion, of contrast and gradation, which makes an impression upon the spectator, partly sensuous, partly spiritual, and which excites an agreeable sensation by the exquisite pathos of the representation, and tempers the storm

of suffering and passion by grace and beauty. —It is greatly to the advantage of a work of art to be self-existent, complete. A subject at rest shows itself as merely existing, and is therefore complete in and through itself. A Jupiter with a thunderbolt in his lap; a Juno reposing on her majesty and feminine dignity; a Minerva absorbed in herself.—are subjects which alike have no external relations; they rest on and in themselves, and are the earliest favorite subjects of sculpture. But within the splendid domain of the mystic sphere of the arts, in which the isolated, self-existing natures stand, there are smaller circles where the single forms are conceived and represented with reference to other existences. For example, the nine Muses led by Apollo, are conceived and represented individually; but in the grand, complex choir, each becomes far more interesting. If art passes over to a more passionate significance, it proceeds in the same manner; it presents us either a circle of figures which have a passionate relation to each other, like Niobe and her children pursued by Apollo and Diana, or it exhibits in one work both the emotion and its cause. We have now in mind only the beautiful boy taking the thorn from his foot; the wrestler, the two groups of Fauns and Nymphs in Dresden, and the life-like, splendid group of Laökoön.

Sculpture is, with reason, so highly esteemed because it can, and must, bring the art of representation to its highest point, since it divests man of everything that is non-essential. Thus, in the group, Laökoön is a mere name: the artists have stripped him of his priesthood, his Trojan nationality, of all poetic and mythologic accessories: he is nothing of all that the fable makes him. It is a father with two sons, in danger of being overcome by two fierce animals—neither are these latter sent by the gods, but merely natural serpents, powerful enough to vanquish several men, but by no means in their form or treatment supernatural, avenging, punishing beings. In accordance with their nature, they glide up, coil and intertwine themselves, and one, being irritated, bites. If I should interpret this group, without recognizing any broader significance, I should call it a tragic idyl. A father is sleeping near his two sons; they are encircled by serpents, and now awaking, they struggle to free themselves from the living net.

This work of art is especially powerful through the seizure of the moment. In order that a work of art may really seem to pass before the eye, a passing moment must be chosen; a moment earlier, no part of the whole would have been found in this position; a moment later, every part must have left this position; because of this (happy choice of a moment) the work will ever be fresh and living to millions of spectators.

In order rightly to comprehend the intent of the Laökoön, let one stand before it with closed eyes and at a proper distance; then, let him open his eyes and immediately shut them again: he will see the whole marble in motion; he will fear, when he again opens his eyes, to find the whole group changed. I might say, as it stands there, that it is a flash of lightning fixed; a wave turned into stone at the moment that it moves towards the shore. The same effect is produced when the group is seen at night by torch-light. The condition of the three figures is wisely represented in gradation; the elder son has only the extremities entangled, the other, more encumbered, has his breast especially compressed; by the movement of his right arm, he tries to get breath; with the left, he gently holds back the head of the serpent, to prevent its making another fold around his breast; the serpent is in the act of escaping from his hand, but evidently does not bite him; on the contrary, the father attempts by violence to free himself and his children from these entanglements; he seizes the other serpent, and this one, being irritated, bites him on the hip.

In order to account for the attitude of the father, as well as the position of the several parts of his body, it seems decidedly best to assign as the cause of the whole motion, the sudden pain from the wound. The serpent has not bitten, but is biting, and that in a sensitive part of the body, above and a little back of the hip. The head of the serpent as restored, has never been in a position to bite. Fortunately, traces of the upper and under jaws are still to be seen upon the back of the statue, if, indeed, these convincing evidences be not lost in the present sad alterations. The serpent wounds the unfortunate man in a part where one is very sensitive to any irritation, where even a slight tickling causes the motion which we here observe occasioned by the wound. The figure recedes to the opposite side, the body is drawn in, the shoulders pressed

downwards, the chest expands, the head sinks toward the wounded side. The rest of the foregoing situation or treatment is shown in the imprisoned feet and struggling arms; hence from struggle and shrinking, from action and suffering, from effort and failure, arises a harmony of effect which would, perhaps, under no other circumstances, be possible. We are lost in astonishment at the wisdom of the artists, if we try to imagine the wound in any other place; the whole position would be changed, and it is not possible to conceive it more skilfully. It is important to remark here that the artist having represented a sensuous action, also shows us the sensuous occasion of it. I repeat it, the place of the bite determines the present action of the limbs; the movement of the lower part of the body as if to escape, the drawing in of the abdomen, the expansion of the chest, the drawing down of the head and shoulders, nay, the expression of the face, are all rendered necessary by this sudden, painful, unexpected irritation. But far be it from me to destroy the unity of human nature, to deny the influence of the spiritual powers, of this nobly perfect man; to misunderstand the conflict and suffering of a great nature. Anxiety, fear, terror, fatherly affection, all these I see coursing through these veins, heaving this breast and furrowing this brow; willingly, I admit, that besides the physical, the highest degree of mental suffering is here represented, only let us not be too quick to transfer the effect which the work produces upon us, to the work itself; especially, let us not imagine the effect of poison on the body which the fang of the serpent has but this moment reached. There is no death-struggle to be seen, in this noble figure, which is resisting, vigorous, scarcely even wounded. Here I must be allowed an observation which is of importance in the plastic arts: the highest pathetic expression which they are able to represent, hovers in transition from one state to another. Suppose an active child running with all the energy and joy of life, springing full of delight, then perhaps unexpectedly severely struck by playmates, or otherwise physically or morally hurt; this new sensation is imparted like an electric shock to all his limbs. Such a transition is in the highest sense pathetic; it presents a contrast of which one can form no idea without having seen it. Here, evidently,

the spiritual as well as the physical receives a shock. If in such a transition there remain evident traces of the preceding condition, there arises one of the noblest subjects for plastic arts, as is the case in the *Laokoön*, where struggle and suffering are united in the same moment. So, for example, Eurydice bitten in the heel by a snake, as she goes joyfully through the meadow, with her gathered flowers, would make a most pathetic statue, as not only the falling flowers, but the direction of all the limbs and the fluttering of the drapery, would indicate the twofold state—the joyful advance and the painful arrest.

If we have now clearly conceived the principal figure, in this sense, we can freely and safely glance over the relations, gradations and contrasts of the collective parts of the whole work. The choice of subject is one of the happiest that we can conceive; men struggling with dangerous animals, and animals which do not act with concentrated force or mass, but with divided powers; which do not threaten from one side, or demand a combined opposition, but animals which by the expansive nature of their organization are capable of paralyzing one man or several men without further injuring them. It is owing to this paralyzing power that with the most violent action a certain repose and unity pervades the whole. The effects of the action of the serpents is shown in gradation. One only enfolds its victim, the other becomes irritated and bites its antagonist.

The three figures are also most wisely chosen. A strong, well-built man, but one already past the years of energy, less able to withstand pain and suffering; imagine in his stead a robust youth, and the group loses its whole value. Partners in his suffering are two boys, small in comparison with him, but still two natures which are susceptible of pain. The younger struggles impotently; he suffers an agony of fear, but is unhurt. The efforts of the father are powerful but ineffectual, and rather tend to produce an effect contrary to what he desires—he exasperates his opponent, and is wounded. The elder son is least encumbered; he feels neither pressure nor pain; he is terrified at the sudden wound and motion of his father; he cries out, while he endeavors to free his foot from the serpent's fold;—here, then, is at once a spectator and participant, and the work is complete.

I will here repeat what I have already alluded to in passing, viz., that each of the three figures shows a double treatment and has a twofold action. The younger son tries to get his breath by holding up his right arm, and with the left hand pushes back the serpent; he wishes to mitigate the present evil and to prevent a greater—the highest degree of activity which remains possible in his constrained position. The father struggles to free himself from the folds of the serpent, and at the same time his body shrinks back from the sudden bite. The elder son is terrified at his father's motion, and seeks to free himself from the lightly-wound serpent. The climax of the moment represented has already been commended as the great merit of this work of art, and here there is something to be specially remarked.

We assumed that these were natural serpents, which had wound themselves around a father and his sons while sleeping, whence in the contemplation of the moment we saw before us a climax. The first instant of the encircling of the sleepers is full of breathless interest, but not significant for art. A sleeping young Hercules, encircled by serpents, might perhaps be made, but his appearance and repose would indicate what we might expect from his awakening.

If we now go further, and consider the father, who with his children, no matter how it happens, feels the folds of serpents, there is but one moment of supreme interest: if the one is rendered incapable of defending himself—the other, though wounded, still capable of defence—and the third, still having the hope of escape. In the first condition we see the younger son; in the second, the father; in the third, the elder son. Let one endeavor to discover another possible case: let him try to distribute the parts otherwise than as they are here distributed! If we now consider the treatment from the beginning to the end, and see that at this moment it has reached the climax, we shall immediately become aware, in reflecting upon the events which would naturally follow, that the whole group must change, and that no time could be found equal to this in artistic importance. The younger son will either be suffocated by the folds of the serpent, or if, in his helpless condition, he should irritate the serpent, will certainly be bitten. Either case would be mendurable, because either is too extreme for repre-

sentation. As to the father, he would either be wounded in other parts, by which the whole position would be changed and the first wound become invisible to the spectator, or, if made visible, would be loathsome; or the serpent may turn and attack the elder son; his interest would then be absorbed in himself; the scene thus loses the witness, the last gleam of hope disappears from the group; it is no longer a tragic but a terrible conception. The father, now centred in his own greatness and suffering, would, in that case, turn toward the son and become but a sympathizing subordinate.

Man has for his own and for the sufferings of others but three sensations, viz., apprehension, horror, and compassion—the anxious premonition of a coming evil, the unexpected realization of a present one, and sympathy with the present or past sufferings of others: all three are exhibited and excited in this work of art, and, moreover, with the truest gradation. The plastic arts aiming at the effect of the moment, in choosing a pathetic subject, seize on those which awaken terror; while poetry, on the contrary, prefers such as excite apprehension or pity. In the group of the *Laokoön*, the father's suffering excites horror, and that in the highest degree; Sculpture has done her utmost for him; but partly to complete the circle of human sensations, partly to soften this expression of horror, she excites pity for the situation of the younger son and apprehension for the elder, inasmuch as for him there is still hope. So, in the midst of complexity, the artists have produced a certain equipoise, softened and heightened effects, and thus completed a spiritual and sensuous whole. Enough; we may now boldly assert that this work of art exhausts its subject and happily fulfils all the conditions of art. It teaches us that if the artist can infuse his sense of beauty into quiet and simple subjects, the same sense of beauty can be shown in its greatest energy and dignity when it manifests its power in the creation of complicated characters, and knows how by artistic imitation to temper and restrain the passionate outbreak of human nature. In the sequel we shall give a full description of the statues known by the name of the *Niobe family*, as well as of the group of the *Farnese Bull*; these belong to the few pathetic representations of antique sculpture which remain. Modern artists

have generally blundered in their choice of such subjects: for instance, when Milo, with both hands fast in the cleft of a tree, is attacked by a lion, it is vain for art to attempt to create a work which can command our unmingled sympathy. A twofold suffering, a useless struggle, a helpless condition, a sure defeat,—these can excite only horror, if, indeed, they leave us not quite unmoved.

Finally, a word concerning the relation of this subject to poetry. We are doing Virgil and the poetic art a great injustice when we compare, even for a moment, this most perfect master-piece of sculpture with the episodical treatment of the same subject in the *Æneid*. As the unhappy exile, Eneas, is called upon to relate how he and his countryman have been guilty of the unpardonable folly of bringing the famous horse into their city, the poet has to devise an excuse for their act. This is the origin of the whole,

and the story of the Laökoön stands here as a rhetorical argument by which an exaggeration, if it be judicious, may well be approved. Hence, monstrous serpents with crested heads come out of the sea, rush upon the children of the priest who has injured the horse, coil themselves around them, bite and cover them with venom, twist and entwine themselves around the head of the father who hastens to the assistance of his children, and rear their heads in triumph while the unhappy victim beneath their folds cries in vain for help. The people are terrified and immediately flee; no one dares to remain a patriot; and the listener, horrified at the strange and dreadful tale, willingly permits the horse to be brought into the city.

Thus the story of Laökoön, in Virgil, serves but as a means to a higher end; and it is still a grave question, whether the occurrence be in itself a poetic subject.

WINCKELMANN'S REMARKS ON THE LAÖKOÖN.

[Translated by E. S. MORGAN.]

[The following passages are translated from *Winckelmann's Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums. Wien, im akademischen Verlage, 1776.*]

Winckelmann's Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums.

The feet of the Egyptian statues in the Campidoglio, which have been preserved, are, like those of the Apollo Belvidere and Laökoön, of unequal length; the right foot, which bears the weight of the body, is, in one of them, three inches of a Roman palm longer than the other. But this inequality is not without reason, for they wished to give to the foot which stands behind, as much as it might lose to the sight from being at a greater distance from the spectator. (p. 71.)

[In speaking of the relative merits of the Laökoön, he says:—The Laökoön is a much more learned work than the Apollo. Agesander, the maker of the chief figure of the Laökoön, must have been a much more experienced and skilled artist than the designer of the Apollo had need to be; but the latter must have been gifted with a sublimer genius and a more susceptible soul. Apollo has the sublimity which found no place in the Laökoön. (p. 266.)

[After speaking of the use which the artist makes of his knowledge of muscular action, he says:]

This is made still more manifest in the same set of muscles in Laökoön (a nature

elevated through the Ideal) when compared in this part of the body with the figures of gods and deified men such as the Hercules and Apollo Belvidere. The action of these muscles in Laökoön is exaggerated beyond the true to the possible; they form hillocks which close upon each other, and express the highest exertion of strength in suffering and resistance. (p. 295.)

Laökoön is a picture of the most sensitive pain, which here shows itself in all the muscles, nerves, and veins: the blood is in the greatest agitation, caused by the deadly bite of the serpent, and every part of the body is represented as strained and suffering, in which the artist exhibited all the instincts of human nature as well as his own great wisdom and art. But in the representation of this outward suffering appears the tried soul of a great man who struggles with necessity, and will stifle and repress any expression of his pain—which I have endeavored to make still more evident to the reader in my description of this statue in Part II. (p. 326.)

Of the statues entirely wrought with the chisel, the Laökoön is the most beautiful; and here an observant eye will remark with

what masterly precision and unwavering confidence the chisel must have been guided in order not to spoil the most skilful lines by accidental slipping. The outer surface of this statue, which seems somewhat rough compared to those which are smooth and polished (it looks like a soft velvet compared to the shining Atlas), is like the skin of the old Greeks, which was not loosened by the constant use of warm baths, or rubbed smooth with scrapers, (as happened from the prevailing habits of the more effeminate Romans,) but on which a healthy evaporation produced a soft down like the first announcement of the covering of the chin. (p. 515.)

[From p. 696:—]Amidst the destruction of innumerable works of art belonging to this time of Art's greatest perfection, the statue of Laökoön, of those which escaped entire, is the most valuable monument, if the artists who made it lived in the time of Alexander the Great; this, however, we have no means of proving, although the perfection of the statue makes it probable: for Pliny mentions this as a work which must be ranked above all other efforts in painting as well as in sculpture. The authors were Agesander, Polydorus, and Athenodorus of Rhodes, of whom the third was a son of the first, as, in all probability, was also the second; for that Athenodorus of Rhodes was a son of Agesander, the following inscription on the base of a statue in the villa Albani bears witness:—"Athenodorus the Rhodian, son of Agesander, made this": and the statue of Laökoön renders it probable that Polydorus was also the son of Agesander, because upon any other supposition we cannot explain how three artists could (I will not say, work on one and the same statue, but) distribute their labors, because Laökoön the father is a much more considerable and important figure than his two sons. Consequently, Agesander must have wrought out the figure of the father, and his two sons, the figures of the sons of Laökoön.

The well known base which was discovered in the ruins of the old Antium of the Lord Cardinal Alex. Albani, is of black marble; but a statue of white marble was joined to it. A piece of this statue, a part of a mantle hanging in folds which was a chlamys, was found near the base; but no trace of the figure itself could be found.

The statue of Laökoön stood formerly in the palace of the Emperor Titus, and was discovered there (not as Nardini and others assert, in the so-called seven saloons or reservoir of the baths) in the arch of a hall which seems to have been a part of the baths of this Emperor; but it indicates, by just this discovery, the precise situation of the imperial palace as it was connected with the baths. Here stood the Laökoön in a large niche at the end of the frescoed saloon already alluded to, from the paintings of which the falsely so-called Coriolanus-under-the-cornice has been taken.

Pliny mentions that the three figures of the Laökoön were hewn out of a single block of stone—which seemed so to him because no seams were discoverable, not that it was really so; for a couple of thousand years have revealed a scarcely perceptible seam which shows that the elder of the two sons was separately sculptured, and afterwards joined to the other figures. Michael Angelo conceived the idea of completing the right arm of Laökoön, which was wanting, and which had been supplied by one of burnt clay; accordingly he made one roughly out of marble, but never finished it; since that time this piece has lain at the base of the statue. This arm, encircled by serpents, would have bent over the head of the statue, and (inasmuch as the rest of the figure was free) it may have been the design of this artist to intensify the conception of suffering in Laökoön by approaching this arm to the head as in two united ideas, and by the repeated coils of the serpent to centre here the place of the pain, which the old artists had reconciled with the beauty of the figure, as both the suffering and beauty find expression here. But it seems as if this arm bent above the head would have distracted the principal attention, which the head demands, for the glance would have been directed at the same moment to the many coils of the serpent. Therefore, Bernini supplied an arm of burnt clay extended so as to leave the head free, and to bring no other part in close proximity above the head.

The two steps at the lower part of the base upon which the principal figure rests probably indicate the steps of the altar where the occurrence here represented took place.

Inasmuch as this statue was prized as the

highest work of art by so many thousands of the most celebrated artists brought from all parts of Greece to Rome, it deserved so much the more attention and admiration from a degenerate posterity which knew how to produce nothing which should even remotely compare with this work. The wise man finds here matter for research, the artist finds endless subjects for study, and both will be convinced that in this picture more lies concealed than meets the eye, and that the mind of the master was even greater than his work.

Laokoön is a nature in extremity of suffering, represented in the form of a man who seeks to gather up the conscious strength of his spirit to subdue it; and while suffering swells the muscles and contracts the nerves, the spirit armed with strength displays itself in the furrowed forehead,—the breast heaves with interrupted respiration, and with the suppression of the outbreak of feeling in his effort to contain and shut up the pain within himself. The anxious inward sigh, and the breast drawn in, exhaust the abdomen and hollow the sides, which allows us to judge of the action of the intestines. But his own suffering seems to distress him less than the suffering of his children, who turn their faces to him and cry for help; for the father's heart reveals itself in the sorrowful eyes, and com-

passion seems to swim in them in a dim mist. The face is mournful, but there is no outcry; the eyes are upturned toward the highest help. The mouth is full of sadness, and the sunken nether lip is heavy with it; but in the upper lip, which is drawn back, this expression is mingled with that of pain, which, with a movement of anger as if an unmerited, unworthy sorrow, extends to the nose, swells it, and manifests itself in the distended and widened nostrils. Below the forehead, the struggle between pain and resistance is portrayed with the greatest wisdom; for while pain elevates the eyebrows, the effort to resist it presses the flesh just over the brows down upon the upper lid, so that the protruding brow almost covers it. Nature which the artist could not improve, he has sought to develop and represent in its greatest strength and power; for where the greatest suffering is portrayed, there the highest beauty is possible. The left side, where the serpent's maddening bite has injected the poison, is the one which, from its proximity to the heart, seems to be most capable of suffering, and this part of the body may well be called a marvel of artistic skill. He raises his legs involuntarily as if to run from the evil: no part is at rest; even the strokes of the chisel seem to aid the significance of this rigid surface.

GÖTHE'S SOCIAL ROMANCES.

[Translated from the German of ROSENKRANZ by THOS. DAVIDSON.]

WILHELM MEISTER'S APPRENTICESHIP.

We have found the problem broached in the *Apprenticeship* to be the setting forth of that culture to which the individuality must submit itself, in order to become for itself what it is in itself. Culture is a process, which, at the same time, is becoming a progress. As a process, it is, in form, always the same round of exertion. The individual is driven, by his own deficiency, towards the element which corresponds to his peculiarity. So long as he has not found this, he must seek it, and be unquiet.

We find Wilhelm Meister exerting himself honestly in order to discover his vocation, to supply the defects of his knowledge and accomplishments, to grind down the

corners of his demeanor, and to heighten the basis of his culture. In these exertions, so far as their form is concerned, he remains always the same. With deep sorrow he becomes aware of his own deficiencies; with ardor he dashes into that activity which seems to promise a means of ascent to something higher; with astonishment he perceives that he obtains no absolute satisfaction through the one-sided effort to which he has been devoting himself, and is thereupon inclined to regard his whole labor as a mistake. This, however, is a piece of self-deception, which lasts only until he has recognized, in enmity and disgust, the finger-post to a new problem, the transition to a higher activity, which, without his previous

culture, would be impossible to him. The process has points of rest, which lie between the various stages as crises. Raised to their highest power, they make up the *apprenticeship*, the *fellowship*, and the *mastership*; for the ascending series, as a system of qualitative moments, does not run out into the spurious infinite, but only far enough to enable the individual to recognize the essence of his individuality, and to attain the completeness necessary to enable him to set himself forth. At this moment begins the tranquil process of perfection, as it proceeds spontaneously, intensively and extensively, in the practical activity. The stages through which Wilhelm passes appear always also as distinct spheres, which he lives through. His individuality is destined for harmonious totality. Hence, in presence of one-sided natures, characters which have already assumed a decided cast, he appears as bereft of character. He is not so much the hero of the novel as its supporter. But he would not be capable of being its supporter even, unless he were serious about the pursuit of culture, and unless he were actually organized for an all-sided harmony, which in the end does not prevent him from devoting himself to one particular activity. There has been a great deal of discussion in regard to Wilhelm, in connection with this. Fouqué, Neumann, and Varnhagen, with good-natured humor, attacked his passivity with *persiflage* in a random novel, *Charles's Endeavors and Obstacles*, which they wrote together in Halle, and which has been reprinted in Neumann's collected works. The amount of spontaneity and energy resident in Goethe's *Wilhelm* was discovered only by the innumerable imitations which it called forth, concluding with the Hermann in Immermann's *Epigoni*, of which Mundt, in the first part of his *Characters and Situations*, justly remarks that the hero subordinates himself too much to the persons with whom his career brings him in contact, accepts almost an obsequious position towards them, wears himself out in an almost encyclopædic bustle of activities, and almost always seems so used up that one would be glad to see him in a quiet nook in an hospital.

In his process of culture, he passes, as an apprentice, through the stages of commercial activity, theatric art, aristocratical free exhibition of self, before he recognizes the higher significance of life itself—before he is met, in the hall of the past, by the inscrip-

tion on the sarcophagus, *Remember to live!* As a merchant, he already occupies an attitude toward the whole world: for trade tends to equalize the inequalities of nature, culture, and chance. Through the one-sidedness of the occupation however, through the predominance of calculation, through narrowness of the pursuit of gain, it may interfere with the more general culture, so that the merchant divides up his day, quite abstractly, between business and recreation, and seeks the latter in the evening, sometimes in the theatre, sometimes at the gambling-table. Wilhelm, too, sets out in this manner. At first, he wants to find his recreation in the theatre. The amiability of an actress fetters him with its charm. He visits Mariana also at her residence. From being an admirer of the *artiste*, he becomes her lover. The recollections of his childhood, of the pleasure which he had derived from a puppet-show, the account which he gives of it to Mariana, still draw him insensibly more and more into art-criticism.

A business tour gives him an opportunity of becoming acquainted with dramatic art, from its natural, rude beginnings, up through all its gradations. The play which the miners act—the company of acrobats—the doings of the unengaged actors in the small town—the representations in the castle of the baron, who plays the *dilettante* even in the theatrical—finally, the mature survey of the whole dramatic art, given by Serlo and Aurelia,—contain a progressive view of it consequent in itself. The central point of it is the consideration of the great dramatist Shakspeare, which connects itself with the representation of his *Hamlet*. This introduction of *Hamlet* is among the most remarkable of Goethe's inventions—first, on account of the relationship between Wilhelm and *Hamlet*, for the latter is a reflective character, a seeker, a self-observer, like Wilhelm; second, because *Hamlet* makes the play the very means of rousing the consciences of his mother and his uncle from apathy, of discovering the truth through art, and because he even gives to the players whom he makes represent this piece, good instructions, a compendious and classical summary of the *ars dramatica*. Hence, it is not to be wondered at that many persons have always been of the opinion that in the *Apprenticeship* Goethe intended to exhibit the whole of dramatic art generally: and he himself, it is true, once expresses himself

somewhat to this effect in a letter to Merk. Others have generalized the thing, asserting that he intended to exhibit not dramatic art but art generally, and took dramatic art as a starting-point because it is the *resumé* and solution of the other arts. Granted that Göthe had this intention once while he was engaged on the work, everything else is at variance with such an assumption. In that case, he could not have written the *Apprenticeship*; Wilhelm, the theatrical reformer, could not from the beginning have belonged to practical life; he could not have been tormented with such an incessant reflection on the essence of culture generally. Wilhelm merely makes his passage through the theatre, because it brings *man* to himself. He keeps company with the actors, because, by the power of fancy, they are continually forced to change their individuality into assumed personalities, and to equip these with the whole charm of the living truth of nature. The actor who does not possess the entire talent of self-metamorphosis will therefore probably incur the danger of having no character at all of his own—perhaps, like Madame Melina, of becoming a mere sentimentalist—or else of transferring too much of his own individuality to his acting, and hence of not playing well except when he has an opportunity of actually representing his own character. Such is the case with the pedant, who, in the small troupe, plays the part of the old, grumbling, good-natured, blustering *paterfamilias*; with Aurelia, who charms the public in the Countess Orsina, because she can pour her own inmost soul into that part.

In the last century the profession of actor did not enjoy that position in society which it occupies at present, when it unquestionably stands on an equal footing with other professions. It had then something ambiguous about it, and was, particularly in its finances, by no means, very orderly, or, in regard to love, inclined to very strict principles. I shall not however, I hope, be misunderstood if I assert that many advantages in the way of art are connected with this position. The actors formed a world by themselves, had to make themselves valid by dint of talent, lived entirely for the moment, and hence were much more mobile and diligent, more ardent than so many of our court players are wont to be, who have made their income secure. When Wilhelm passes from the counting-house to the theatre, this,

measured by the conditions of last century, is one of the strongest contrasts. Instead of the calculating understanding, the whim of fancy seizes him; instead of carefulness for the future, the light and ready devotion to the moment; instead of care for the course of business, the unhampered culture of æsthetic egoism. But this world of beautiful seeming falls to pieces. Wilhelm, who thought himself destined to be an actor, because he had succeeded in several things, particularly in *Hamlet*, convinces himself that he has no sufficient talent for dramatic art.

In the baron's castle, he has become acquainted with the nobility. This opens up to him a new subject for consideration, viz., freedom of manner, personal dignity, which exhibits itself externally with aristocratic reserve, and yet with delightful absence of constraint. The examples which he has before him are not precisely the best; but the impression which they make upon him is deep and lasting, and the beautiful, elegantly attired countess, who forgets herself so far as to kiss him, becomes his ideal. It cannot be denied that Göthe has here put a fine irony into his whole description of the nobility. He likes to play at theatre, because he himself is theatrical in his representation. This is the point of coincidence in which nobility and theatre meet. The actor exhibits himself as different from what he is: the nobleman exhibits himself, but in such a way that he shall receive applause. That is to say, that in the last century it was still the case that the nobility actually were able to lay special claim to the exhibition of free, beautiful personality. Now-a-days, when the feudalism of the middle ages is broken up, when all those privileges which gave the nobility such an enormous advantage have been taken away, we must no longer by any means look for the most courteous behavior, or that which evinces the freest personality, in what is called exclusive society alone.

To this point we see Wilhelm rise in the fifth book. Through the nobility he gains a notion of that culture which is its own aim and end. Nevertheless, before we enter this sphere, the sixth book intervenes, containing the *Confessions of a Beautiful Saint*. These have been often regarded as an element heterogeneous to the whole, as having the character of an interloper. Judging from his letters to Schiller, Göthe knew very well what, as an artist, he meant them for. On

the one hand, he intended to make a conclusion; on the other, an introduction. It was meant that the falling asunder of theatrical appearance and the discovery of the foibles of the aristocratic world should be followed by this absolute concentration of the soul upon itself. It would have to be confessed that in the rich life-picture, an essential element would have been wanting if religion had not been touched upon at all. How Goethe came into possession of these views, or in how far Miss Von Klettenberg may have been the occasion of them, may be considered as a matter of indifference. We adhere to the necessity, from which the poet was not able to escape, and which, of all the critics, Frederick Schlegel, in his excellent *Characteristics of the Apprenticeship*, 1798, has best seen, at least from an æsthetic point of view. I say, from an æsthetic point of view, for from a religious one he has taken the beautiful saint too negatively. I believe that her confessions must be brought into harmony with the argument of the whole novel. This argument is the formation of individuality, the æsthetic apprehension of the whole of life. The beautiful saint has the courage to make the peculiarity of her religious conviction, from the point where she became conscious of it, valid against every one, even against her father, and against her beloved betrothed husband. From all the education which she acquires, from all the distractions into which she is drawn, from all the vicissitudes of fortune which she experiences, she always returns to the communion with her invisible friend. She behaves like a religious *artiste*, endeavoring freely to subject her whole existence to the necessity of her principle. The orthodox church of Protestantism, as well as all the sects which have sprung from its bosom, during the last century held firmly to the idea that the religious life of the individual had to pass through the nocturnal horror of a penitential combat, in order to become conscious, in its violent passage to mercy, in an outwardly fixed moment, of illumination from on high, justification before God, and assurance of everlasting bliss. The formality with which dogmatism had drawn out this process of regeneration into its individual moments had likewise to be reproduced in the experience of the individual. Many, however, on comparing themselves with the process prescribed in the dogma, could discover in themselves no analogy to

it, and then harrowed themselves with fear about their salvation. In opposition to this orthodox system, the beautiful saint develops a cheerful religion which knows nothing of limitation of freedom or of repentance. Under all circumstances she has a glad confidence in God, through however many phases of religious consciousness she passes. She comes in contact with the quietists in the country, with the Herrnhuters; she reveres the chief court preacher of the orthodox church, eagerly attends his discourses, excuses the acerbity of his polemics against the Herrnhuters, and bewails the good man when he dies, with a tear of sincerity. But she never becomes fanatical; she always, like an artist, keeps herself within the limits of moderation. Neither does she become at all a quietist, but unexceptionably performs all her duties in the most conscientious manner; nurses her sick, suffering mother, and her old, often peevish father, for long years, with self-sacrificing affection, and as a canoness occupies herself without reproach in well-doing. Christianity, as the religion of the world, is the religion of free individualization. We must not copy Christ's life; the attempt to do so begets diseased tendencies; there arises from it an unnatural distortion of the reality, which at present comprehends real conditions quite different from those which existed in the time of Christ. Every one must work up the same content which we find in the life of Christ, in the peculiar form of his own destiny, into a new biography. This is the protestant meaning of the "Confessions of a Beautiful Saint." Inasmuch as she maintains the freedom of individualization, she remains accessible to criticism, against which ladies who are strongly aroused to piety are wont to be completely fortified. For example, she sees through the want of taste and the kind of caricature that exist in the religion of the Herrnhuters, and is led by her uncle to a free and dignified appreciation of art, towards which exclusive piety in general holds only a negative relation. Specially must we mention her view of sin. She can find in herself no trace of it, in the manner in which the ecclesiastical doctrinal conception demands of her. Neither, as regards the Supreme Being, can she feel herself estranged from him. But, nevertheless, she comes to the conviction that the possibility of even the worst of crimes dwells in her completely; that she could be a Ravallac, a Daniens; that from

an unguarded impulse she might suddenly become a criminal of the most hideous kind.

These "Confessions of a Beautiful Saint" form the conclusion of the theatrical and aristocratical worlds, which not unfrequently merge into the frivolous. The physician had communicated them to the sick Aurelia, when she, after her representation of the Countess Orsina, had half-intentionally, on her way home, caught a deadly cold in the piercing north wind. The dying Aurelia sent Wilhelm to Lothario, and thus opened to him the gate to a higher existence. Wilhelm is now about to receive an idea of a grander life, which unfolds a very manifold activity. In this world, PROPERTY forms the basis, upon which, as means, men may rise to the fullest freedom of life, and make culture for its own sake their aim. In the mercantile world, from which Wilhelm originally set out, property was regarded with too much one-sidedness as aim and end. Werner represents this point of view. When he again meets with Wilhelm, he cannot wonder enough at the neat, rounded person that the latter has become, whereas he himself has grown round-shouldered and old at his desk. With a narrow kind of pleasure he tells him about his domestic arrangements, about his children, how they know arithmetic already, and buy and sell with their small sums of pocket money. It is only by contrast with this, his old trusty friend, that Wilhelm sees what progress he has really made in the higher apprehension of life.

On the other hand, among the actors property was taken only as a means. Philine throws to the beggars gift upon gift, and when she has exhausted her purse, does not hesitate, in her thoughtless good nature, to give away her hat and scarf. The actors know quite well that without money they cannot perform anything. From this point of view, they lay the greatest value upon it. What an advantage would even two hundred dollars have been to Melina, merely to get up a small troupe! When they have money, however, they pay too little regard to it, and do not economize it. How touching, in this respect, is the story of the unfortunate Mariana. She wants to pay for everything in cash, and with this punctiliousness is unsuitable for the loose life of the actors. Old Barbara, who informs Wilhelm of Mariana's death, and brings him his son Felix, is reproached by Wilhelm as a vile

panderess. But how well she is able to defend herself! How she hurls back the curse upon him! How well she is able to depict the worthlessness of the higher classes, whose sons, with frivolous desire of enjoyment, pluck the virginal blossom of the daughters of the *proletariat*, and are the cause why women like Barbara exist! Has Wilhelm any right to despise her? But the old sibyl remarks, too, how pure such a relation, stigmatized with the name of prostitution, may often be, as compared with *mariages de convenance*, in which mothers, after having exposed their daughters for show at balls and assemblies, make a bargain for their souls with rich or aristocratic suitors. She lays bare the whole abyss of helplessness into which the unprotected destitute female among us may often sink, and then, under the pressure of difficulties, in the misery of starvation, from the lack of any moral support, only too easily succumb to seduction; against which, immediately, public moralists raise their hypocritical howl—as if the men were not just as guilty as the women.

Among the nobility themselves, property seems the condition of their superiority, of their free personality and graceful bearing. By reason of his landed property, the nobleman, from the very beginning, is placed beyond the reach of all those anxieties which so often hamper ordinary people. He is removed away from the common, and, hence, can so easily attain that gracefulness of bearing which Wilhelm finds so imposing. Göthe here shows us the conflict between personal and landed property, which receives a still more circumstantial treatment in the "Journeyman'ship." The purest form of personal property is money; for it is the means of attaining every other particular property. Hence we see Werner's commercial house entering into competition with the secret association at the sale of estates.

Wilhelm, in passing into the higher sphere of this association, falls into one more mistake, that, namely, of placing the economical interest too high. The clearness of understanding, the aimfulness of action, the large effects of a comprehensive, well-ordered activity, as they all appear in Lothario and Theresa, make him think he has found his ideal in Theresa, whereas all the time it is Natalia. He arrives at this knowledge, after he has shuffled off his past, which he does partly because he learns the death of Mari-

ana, and takes his son to him, partly because he becomes master of his property and comes to an understanding with his early friend Werner, partly because he discovers the painful consequences of his aberrations; for example, the fate of the countess, who during her illness atones with the most tormenting puritanical melancholy for the kiss she gave him; partly because the shapes which have remained *immovable* points while he has been making progress, are severed by death from his fortunes. These shapes are Mignon and Augustino. From the first they win the reader's favor to the novel, and have been imitated in many second and third class novels. Mignon's longing, the harper's madness, the dark back-ground of their life, the romantic, grotesque element in their demeanor, have from the first powerfully excited the fancy. Both are demonic shapes whose depth is shown astoundingly in the flashes of their natural tones. They are a riddle to themselves, but often utter, as it were prophetically, the deepest riddles of human nature generally. Mignon's swan's-song is among the sublimest efforts of lyric poetry, and the songs of the harper who stiffens into an almost timeless condition, have sent their earnest admonitions thrilling through the lives of many among us, particularly the verses:

Who never ate with tears his bread,
Who never through night's weary hours
Sat weeping lonely on his bed,
He knows ye not, ye heavenly powers.
Ye bring us hither into life,
Ye let the wretch with sin be blighted;
Then leave him to the bitter strife;
For every sin's on earth requited.

These mysterious shapes, who have been queathed to German novel literature such a numerous posterity of acrobatic children and crazy mendicant musicians, disappear from the story as soon as Wilhelm has arrived at complete up-clearing with regard to himself. In the ground-work of their history Goethe has introduced Catholicism, and the uneasy ferment of its miracle-seeking fancy as an offset to the struggles of protestant Beautiful-Saintship. Mignon, who has gradually transformed herself from a gloomy half-boy and climbing kobold into a girl and kindly companion for a walk, actually dies of passionate jealousy, when Wilhelm decides for Theresa. The fact that in a history, in which everything works towards the highest culture, madness and indomitable natural force of individuality cross the intel-

ligent action of men has great poetical effect. One feels that there are exceptional natures which are placed by fate altogether outside of the ordinary course of life and emphatically bring before our minds the limits of human strife. Mignon and the harper are really in an unhistorical condition, inasmuch as they are penetrated by only one idea, one feeling, and desire nothing else. There are men who have no history, because they do not culture themselves, because they are merely machines. The unchangeableness of the old harper and of Mignon is of such a kind. It does not spring from emptiness, as in the case of dry men of habit, but from over-fulness and brokenness of heart.

Out of the region of the useful, Wilhelm is at last elevated into that of the beautiful itself by being bound with the spell of plastic art and vocal music. The exequies of Mignon comprehend all the lofty and imposing elements that architecture, sculpture, painting and vocal music can unitedly accomplish. Wilhelm now understands how the useful is compatible with the beautiful. This union appears to him in personal form in Natalia, whose whole constitution is so entirely love, that love does not appear in her as a particular emotion. This gracious charming Natalia is at the same time exceedingly practical, and an inexhaustible fountain of quiet activity distributing its ings in all directions. This *kalokagathia* (*καλοκαγαθία*) which Wilhelm's indenture expresses significantly in many different phrases, is therefore the result of the apprenticeship.

If, however, we now look back, we must immediately be struck with the fact, that throughout the whole novel we do not meet with a single case of domestic life. We find the different individuals partly occupied with the development of their personality, partly with the quest for matrimony. The family relations which lie back of the individuals are, as a whole, ethically unsatisfactory. Theresa herself is a supposititious daughter. Lothario can reproach himself with many romantic outrages. The clearing-up of Mignon's history gives us a glance into a wilderness of fatal aberrations. She is the daughter of the harper, whom he has begotten in unwitting incest with his sister Sperata. Wilhelm is in quest of matrimony and goes from Mariana to Philina, from her to the beautiful countess, from her to Theresa, and finally, from her to Natalia, while

Madame Melina, Aurelia, and even Mignon, have a leaning towards him besides. Towards the end of the *Apprenticeship*, his son Felix causes him perplexity, as to how he, a motherless child, shall be brought up. If we now consider the marriages which are in progress at the end of the whole, they are all what are called misalliances, that is, the conventional distinction of rank is cancelled by culture and similarity of character. Frederick, Natalia's brother, marries the theatrical and nimble Philina; Lothario marries Theresa, who is not altogether his equal, and the *bourgeois* Wilhelm, Natalia. If we consider this, it becomes evident to us, how in the mind of the poet the necessity might arise of making matrimony itself the subject of particular treatment, and of showing that culture and property are alone not sufficient, if a man does not in matrimony attain a transfiguration of his own individuality in another. The depiction of this from the tragic side is the subject of the *Elective Affinities*. Those misalliances are the victory of the free individuality over the prejudices of rank, but they are intended merely to lay the basis of matrimony. Matrimony, therefore, required a peculiar and distinct treatment.

THE ELECTIVE AFFINITIES.

In attempting to develop the idea of the *Elective Affinities*, which I have already stated in general terms, I must begin by touching upon a few of the misconceptions from which we are not yet free, although Göthe himself, Eckermann (in his *Contributions to Poetry*, 1824, p. 150, sq., Göschel, Rötcher (in the second number of his *Essays on the Philosophy of Art*, Berlin, 1838), and Boumann in the *Berlin Annual of Scientific Criticism*, in a review of Rötcher, have already done a great deal to bring about a more correct appreciation of it. It is strange that this novel has been regarded as having a tendency the opposite of that which it really has. Tendency is not the right word here; for as a work of art, in self-repose, it does not show so much as a trace of purpose or any *thought* in particular. The didactic element comes out naturally in the terrible impression which it makes; but it is not sought. The *Elective Affinities* represent to us a tragic fate, in the development of which occurs also the unhappy error of what is called moral adultery. Are we, then, really to suppose that we must draw from this

occurrence a justification of such conduct? What consequences it would entail, if every event which a literary work portrayed were regarded immediately as tending to legalize it, or a similar occurrence? The absurdity of such a supposition being manifest, it has been insinuated that the passion is portrayed by the poet as too violent. Passion hurries a man on to perverse action, to immoral behavior. If the poet represents it, can he exhibit it otherwise than as a power which governs the man? If not, would he be portraying the truth? When the emptiness of this objection is forced to be conceded, when, besides this, it must be admitted that the poet has described all the torments, all the combats which belong to a passion having no moral justification, refuge is at last taken in regret that the book cannot be placed in the hands of young people, particularly of young girls. This regret is an absurdity. It is all right and proper that young people should not read all sorts of things indiscriminately, that their reading should have rational guidance, that their views in regard to the relations of the sexes should not be precocious. Would any other conclusion follow except this, that unripe minds are not to be trusted with this novel? But supposing the case, that as a part of of Göthe's works, it did fall into their hands, I, for one, am convinced that, from the fullness of life which it contains, the thorough ethical delicacy, which casts a halo of the deepest earnestness about the very smallest event in it, it will do no harm and excite no unholy passions. Göthe, moreover, is not the first person who has treated the idea of the *Elective Affinities*. In the legend of Tristan, the middle ages were familiar with it (*vide my History of German Poetry in the Middle Ages*, 1830, pp. 315, sq.), but only from one side, inasmuch as Isolde and Tristan, who through the agency of the philtre, that is, the magic of natural individuality, belong to each other, stand opposed merely to Mark who is cheated by them, and have no combat. In recent times, George Sand has treated this theme in a masterly, though also in a one-sided manner, in her *Jacques*. Fernande and Octave stand opposed to Jacques; the latter is not supplied with an elective correlate. Sylvia points to the need of one, but is not one. As compared with the legend of Tristan there is here a progress, inasmuch as Fernande and Octave battle for a long time with themselves before the so-

phistry of passion overcomes their fidelity, and Jacques is not merely the deluded, weakling, but the hero, who, as soon as he understands Fernande, sacrifices himself consciously to her happiness. Goethe stands poetically and ethically higher. Not only does he cancel the one-sidedness of the relationship, and therefore set before us two pairs, but he also makes the hero of the tragic collision go down in himself.

That the *Elective Affinities* portray the true nature of marriage, we have already shown above. In connection with this, the demand might be made for an ideal picture of marriage without any shadow—the happiness of a Philemon and a Baucis. That, however, would be an idyl and not a tragic novel. If the depth of matrimony is to be shown, it is necessary that the negative powers also, which work its destruction, should come into view. This necessity I explained in 1835, in a treatise on the poetical treatment of adultery, which was afterwards printed in the first volume of my *Studies*, and to which, for brevity's sake, I may here refer. It is only by the exhibition of falsehood along with truth, seeming along with earnestness, disorder along with order, that the idea can be completely unfolded. In marriage husband and wife must live into each other so as to form a unity, which shall comprehend in it not only their spirits but their natural tendencies. These latter, as forming the ground of their individuality, must, in the process of affectional absorption, get rid of their brittleness. They furnish the ground why the husband and wife love each other precisely as *these* [particular persons]; inasmuch, however, as they love each other, all exclusiveness of personal independence [*Fürsichsein*—being for itself, ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ εἶναι—Tr.] is cancelled in the unreserved self-surrender to each other. If, however, we suppose that on one side, or on both sides, the *immediate sympathy* of the individuality, the real drawing of the heart is wanting, the marriage is manifestly imperfect. Its reality does not correspond with its idea. Husband and wife may, however, yield to the sacredness of the legal bond, and although lacking the highest satisfaction, enjoy a moral sufficiency. If, however, we further suppose that the married couple—whether it be, as in *Jacques*, only one of them, or, as in Goethe's *Elective Affinities*, both—are brought in contact with that individuality which has

an elective affinity for them, which is predestined by the magic of nature, which from the first, from all eternity, is the harmonious one,—then the unity of marriage, which hitherto existed as a moral reliance, must be shattered; for the temptation to follow the bent of the heart must arise. It must now come to a conflict. It must now be shown which shall win the victory, the divine or the human law. Now all the depths of the emotional nature must quiver. Now the individuals must gather all their strength in order to avoid offending the genius of morality, by indulgence shown toward the force of nature, and challenging fate against themselves.

Goethe exhibits to us all the degrees of marriage. Edward and Charlotte have formerly both belonged to *mariages de convenance*. Both have been set at liberty by death. This time they think that in marrying they are hitting the mark, for previously to their former marriages they had from their youth been accustomed to regard themselves as a couple. But they err. Their marriage is one of *friendship*, not of love. It is only after they are married that *love* develops in them. But now it is too late. What they would now have to do would be to dissolve their marriage, and that they are averse to.

Goethe, moreover, has exhibited all the collisions within marriage, and their comic as well as their tragic solution. When I say all the collisions, that is going too far, inasmuch as they are all reducible to one, viz., that it is only in wedlock that the *passion of love for another* awakes, or, having been entertained before, is carried over into it.—The comical solution of the collision that thus arises, is the *frivolous* intercourse of lovers, which degrades their true marriage into a seeming one, and goes along without conscience or concern about such profanation. This undermining of marriage is exhibited in the count and the baroness. The count brings forward all the theories that have been inflicted upon us by the St. Simonians and others, in the name of emancipation of the flesh, as the creation of free womanhood. Charlotte is deeply hurt by this encroachment upon the indissolubility of wedlock. Experimenting with marriage, a temporary wedlock for five years, and the like, rouse her indignation, more particularly because these views are stated at table in the presence of Ottilie. The tragic solu-

tion of the difficulty is *resignation*. It again may even assume a twofold shape. On the one hand, it may arise from the pure spirit of morality accompanied with a cheerful surrender to the necessity of obedience to the law of marriage. This is the case with Charlotte and the captain. Although they are both conscious of belonging by inclination to each other to the innermost depths of their soul, their battle against their passion is pure and decisive. Particularly in the case of Charlotte the poet has portrayed, in a manner which cannot be surpassed, the quiet majesty of a moral will clear to itself. The other form of resignation is not so pure, but springs from *consciousness* of wrong. Not from the consciousness of what is called a coarse sin, which common natures are satisfied with refraining from, but from a consciousness of having given way inwardly to the passion, and favored the dissolution of an existing marriage. This is the case with Otilie and Edward. The latter is the more guilty. He, therefore, does not attain any true reconciliation, or the determined courage of resignation, but follows Otilie, who does practise resignation, to death, inasmuch as her existence conditioned his.

Wedlock becomes perfect only through legitimate offspring, for it is only in them that love becomes a reality, and the language of common life very correctly calls the child a pledge of love. Children form the strongest tie between husband and wife. What will not parents do for the sake of their children! What sacrifices will they not make for their sake, in order to preserve themselves as a unity for them! Edward and Charlotte are childless. But on that night when they meet, he filled with the image of Otilie, she with that of the captain—Edward has just led the count down through the corridor to the baroness, and thus *countenanced adultery in his own house*—a young life is lit under the heart of Charlotte! Hideous! The husband and wife are entitled by law to the sweetest surrender to each other. This surrender, though perfectly legitimate, is notwithstanding *immoral*; for in his arms she has thought of the captain, in hers he has thought of Otilie. In the moment of their closest self-divestment, they have been most profoundly estranged from each other! This, then, is *moral adultery*. Goethe, in a few lines, has, on one side, stated the psychological mo-

tives of the whole scene with most chaste pen, and without embellishing anything; for, when Edward awakes next morning, *the dawning day seems to him to illuminate a crime*. He steals away from his wife's couch, and Charlotte, when she awakes, finds herself alone.

Edward, hurried along by his love, wants to be divorced, and, with this view, to negotiate with Charlotte through Mittler. Then Mittler learns that she feels herself a mother, and the child draws the bonds between husband and wife tighter again. But when it is born, the nocturnal secret is revealed. It has the captain's features and Otilie's eyes. The child must forever remind the parents that inwardly they are sundered. It owes its existence to a lie. Hence the catastrophe is introduced into its life. Edward hurries away to the war in quest of death. In this search for death, he shows himself a man. We recognize that his weakness shows itself only in love. But when he fails to find death, when he returns from the war covered with honors, he takes his life as a token from fate that it approves his union with Otilie. Even Charlotte also begins at last to reconcile herself to the idea of a divorce. And exactly at this point the unexpected happens. Edward, so near to the realization of his wishes, is drawn away by Otilie, in order that she may freely confess her love for him. In doing so, she gets belated before she can return to the castle, where Charlotte is already waiting for her. In order to arrive sooner, she gets into a small boat, with the fatal child, which she has taken along, in order to cross the pond. The oar slips out of her hands. She gives a sudden lurch, and the child falls, without means of rescue, into the water! The child loses its life through her fault—the child which, in a certain sense, was also hers. From this moment she surveys the whole course of events. She also discovers that she has been guilty, and is now resolved to renounce herself forever. However, as she has been guilty really without guilt, as she has been guilty only on the side of *nature* and not with her will, she is absolutely rent within herself. For a while everything continues, to all appearance, as before; but then life in her refuses to renew itself. She can no longer take food. She dies from within, in the deepest religious excitement. She attains the *transfiguration* of her individuality. Not so Edward, who having

through her death lost all stay, merely follows her to death, merely goes down within himself, does not resolve himself into God.

I must, of course, presuppose acquaintance with the novel. It would be impossible for me to go through all the different ways in which the poet shows us the resistlessness with which the moral spirit in tragic fate triumphs over the might of the spirit of nature. The crowning fault always remains, that of Edward and Charlotte *in having married each other at all*. It is the false character of their wedlock that prepares their fate for them. Charlotte herself had thought of Otilie as a wife for Edward, but he had quite overlooked her when she was first introduced to him. Though, as I have already stated, I cannot enter into detail, it will still be possible for me to bring into view certain features of the composition; for while the *Elective Affinities* stand exceedingly high, as a *moral action* of the poet, they stand equally high as an *æsthetic* one. The development of the characters, the variety of the situations, the tension of contrasts in the upward gradation of fatalistic superstition and free reflection, the simplicity and beauty of the style, are classic. It has always been a theme of admiration how Göthe placed the occupations of the lovers alongside their passion, and thus made the latter more intelligible. Trees are planted, roads made, streams turned, houses built, chapels painted—*man rules over nature*. His understanding, his will, subject it to him. But to conquer himself is not so light a task. In the landscape the small lake appears quite naturally. Water, as Novalis says, is the eye of the landscape. It mirrors heaven and its own shores. This pond becomes the fated element; for on Otilie's birthday, on which Edward gives a display of fireworks in honor of her, a boy falls into the water and is rescued by the captain. The captain goes across with Charlotte in the boat which Edward, at great expense, has brought from a distance, lands at a reedy part of the shore, and carries Charlotte to land, an accident which gives them the opportunity of declaring their love; after which, however, there follows an immediate reaction of their sense of nobleness, bidding them show themselves worthy of their love, by raising themselves above themselves. And this same pond devours the child of Edward and Charlotte, this hybrid shadow, which, if it had lived on, could have continued to exist only as

the living accusation of the parents, as a continual reminder of their error. The *secret* power with which the passion lays the basis of the occurrences is analyzed down to the finest sophistries of the understanding, the slightest movements of feeling. In Edward in particular the superstition is characteristic, with which he holds fast what seems favorable to him, and either overlooks or in action defies what seems likely not to bode good luck to him. In the course of events it afterwards often appears that what he has taken for a favor of fortune, turns directly against him in its consequences and makes shipwreck of all his deceitful hopes. When a man allows himself to be determined by passion, when he abandons free self-command, he becomes through this very *laissez aller* obnoxious to fate; fate comes not from without, but from within; we ourselves give it birth. It produces great effect, therefore, when the *dramatis personæ*, however far they may ramble away towards the circumference, nevertheless always return to the same spot, as if they were banished to this castle, to this lake.

The subordinate personages are managed with extraordinary skill. They are all centred upon Otilie, for she is in every sense the chief personage; she is, as Göthe himself says, the strange hapless victim. Luciana, Charlotte's daughter by her first marriage, educated in the same boarding-school as Otilie, is, through her sensational disposition tending to external show, and her endeavors to make herself the admired centre of every social circle—by the jocund, coquetish exhibition of her beauty and talent—exactly the opposite of Otilie, whose depth of nature loses itself in the mystical, and who, with all her extraordinary solidity of heart, has a bearing whose outward characteristics are absence of show and charming unobtrusiveness. For this reason she fetters men all the more. For a while Charlotte also connects her with the captain. The assistant in the boarding-school, who has seen her excellent qualities develop themselves, and often been obliged to express himself in opposition to the judgment of the lady-principal and the other teachers of the institute, wishes to marry her. The architect—that excellent, delicate spirit—is unable to refrain from cherishing secretly the deepest affection for her, and by giving the Queen of Heaven, which he paints in the chapel, the features of Otilie, makes a secret-public

confession of his attachment. Even the visit of the travelling Englishman, however accidental it may seem, illustrates the whole, partly by letting the great image of the world shine into the bondage of these narrow circumstances, partly by communicating portions of his varied experiences, and thus relating a contribution to the history of the *Elective Affinities*; for it often happens that another has no inkling of what strings he renders harmonic by his words, in circles in which he is not closely acquainted. Mittler has to utter the meaning of the whole story. He occupies with regard to it

the same position as the chorus did in ancient tragedy. He, the man who is everywhere ready to settle differences, would not remain a single night under the same roof with any one who did not respect the sacredness of the marriage institution. Göthe therefore puts into his mouth that eloquent passage, so often and so justly quoted, that marriage is the beginning and the summit of all culture; and there cannot be any sufficient ground for the separation of a married couple who have lived together for a considerable period and become in so many things each other's debtors.

THE SĀṆKHYA KĀRIKĀ;

Or Memorial Verses on the SĀṆKHYA PHILOSOPHY.

[By ISWARA KRISHNA, as received by tradition from the great KAPILA.]

[The following is a reprint from Colebrook's translation — a very scarce work — and contains the memorial verses without the commentaries printed in the collection of the Oriental Translation Fund Committee for Great Britain and Ireland. It is printed here for convenient reference in the new commentary to follow it.—EDITOR.]

I.

The inquiry is into the means of precluding the three sorts of pain; for pain is embarrassment: nor is the inquiry superfluous because obvious means of alleviation exist, for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished.

II.

The revealed mode is like the temporal one, ineffectual, for it is impure; and it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in others. A method different from both is preferable, consisting in a discriminative knowledge of perceptible principles, and of the imperceptible one, and of the thinking soul.

III.

Nature, the root (of all), is no production. Seven principles, the *Great* or intellectual one, &c., are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions (unproductive). Soul is neither a production nor productive.

IV.

Perception, inference, and right affirmation, are admitted to be threefold proof; for they (are by all acknowledged, and) comprise every mode of demonstration. It is from proof that belief of that which is to be proven results.

V.

Perception is ascertainment of particular objects. Inference, which is of three sorts, premises an argument, and (deduces) that which is argued by it. Right affirmation is true revelation.

VI.

Sensible objects become known by perception; but it is by inference (or reasoning) that acquaintance with things transcending the senses is obtained: and a truth which is neither to be directly perceived, nor to be inferred from reasoning, is deduced from revelation.

VII.

From various causes things may be imperceptible (or unperceived); excessive distance, (extreme) nearness, defect of the organs, inattention, minuteness, interposition of objects, predominance of other matters, and intermixture with the like.

VIII.

It is owing to the subtlety (of nature), not to the non-existence of this original principle, that it is not apprehended by the senses, but inferred from its effects. Intellect and the rest of the derivative principles are effects; (whence it is concluded as their cause) in some respects analogous, but in others dissimilar.

XLVII.

There are five distinctions of obstruction; and, from defect of instruments, twenty-eight of disability: acquiescence is ninefold; perfectness, eightfold.

XLVIII.

The distinctions of obscurity are eightfold, as also those of illusion; extreme illusion is tenfold; gloom is eighteenfold, and so is utter darkness.

XLIX.

DEPRAVITY of the eleven organs, together with injuries of the intellect, are pronounced to be disability. The injuries of intellect are seventeen, by inversion of acquiescence and perfectness.

L.

Nine sorts of acquiescence are propounded; four internal, relating to nature, to means, to time, and to luck; five external, relative to abstinence from (enjoyment of) objects.

LI.

Reasoning, hearing, study, prevention of pain of three sorts, intercourse of friends, and purity (or gift), are perfections (or means thereof). The forementioned three are curbs of perfectness.

LII.

Without dispositions there would be no subtle person; without person there would be no pause of dispositions: wherefore a twofold creation is presented, one termed *personal*, the other *intellectual*.

LIII.

The divine kind is of eight sorts; the grovelling is fivefold; mankind is single in its class. This, briefly, is the world of living beings.

LIV.

Above, there is prevalence of goodness: below, the creation is full of darkness: in the midst, is the predominance of foulness, from BRAHMA' to a stock.

LV.

There does sentient soul experience pain, arising from decay and death, until it be released from its person; wherefore pain is of the essence (of bodily existence).

LVI.

This evolution of nature, from intellect to the special elements, is performed for the deliverance of each soul respectively; done for another's sake as for self.

LVII.

As it is a function of milk, an unintelligent (substance), to nourish the calf, so it is the office of the chief (principle) to liberate the soul.

LVIII.

As people engage in acts to relieve desires, so does the undiscere (principle) to liberate the soul.

LIX.

As a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectator, desists from the dance, so does nature desist, having manifested herself to soul.

LX.

Generous nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself) the wish of ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities.

LXI.

Nothing, in my opinion, is more gentle than nature; once aware of having been seen, she does not again expose herself to the gaze of soul.

LXII.

Verily not any soul is bound, nor is released, nor migrates; but nature alone, in relation to various beings, is bound, is released, and migrates.

LXIII.

By seven modes nature binds herself by herself: by one, she releases (herself), for the soul's wish.

LXIV.

So, through study of principles, the conclusive, incontrovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither I AM, nor is aught mine, nor do I exist.

LXV.

Possessed of this (self-knowledge), soul contemplates at leisure and at ease nature, (thereby) debarred from prolific change, and consequently precluded from those seven forms.

LXVI.

He desists, because he has seen her; she does so, because she has been seen. In their (mere) union there is no motive for creation.

LXVII.

By attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the rest become causeless; yet soul remains a while invested with body, as the potter's wheel continues whirling from the effect of the impulse previously given to it.

LXVIII.

When separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished.

LXIX.

This abstruse knowledge, adapted to the liberation of soul, wherein the origin, duration, and termination of beings are considered, has been thoroughly expounded by the mighty saint.

LXX.

This great purifying (doctrine) the sage compassionately imparted to A/SURI, A/SURI

taught it to PANCHASIKHA, by whom it was extensively propagated.

LXXI.

Received by tradition of pupils, it has been compendiously written in *Arya* metre by the piously disposed I/SAWARA KRISHNA, having thoroughly investigated demonstrated truth.

LXXII.

The subjects which are treated in seventy couplets are those of the whole science, comprising sixty topics, exclusive of illustrative tales, and omitting controversial questions.

HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT.

[Translated from the German of G. W. F. HEGEL.]

[All marks of subdivision included in brackets [] are not in the original, but are employed here to facilitate reference to the portions taken up in the commentary which follows. Adjectives and participles used substantively are sometimes capitalized to prevent confusion.—ED.]

A.—CONSCIOUSNESS.

III.

Force and Understanding—The Phenomenal and the Supersensuous World.

[p. 97.] [a] In the dialectic of sensuous certitude, consciousness has completely lost the senses—hearing, seeing, &c.—and as perception it has arrived at *thoughts*, which however it as yet only brings together in the unconditioned Universal. This Unconditioned would now itself again be nothing else than the one-sided extreme of *being-for-itself*, if it were taken as quiescent simple essence, for thus the no-essence (disorder) would stand in opposition to it; but related to the latter, the former would be unessential itself, and the consciousness would never come out of the deception of perception: it has, however, adduced itself as a somewhat which has gone out of such a conditioned being-for-itself back into itself.—This unconditioned Universal, which is now the true object of consciousness, is still as *object* of the same; it has not as yet apprehended its comprehension as *comprehension*. The two procedures should be carefully distinguished; consciousness has experienced that the object has gone back out of the relation to

another into itself, and has thus become *in itself* comprehension; but the consciousness is not yet *for itself* the comprehension, and for this reason it does not recognize itself in that reflected object. *For us* this object has become in such a manner through the activity of consciousness, that the latter has intertwined itself in the becoming of the same, and the reflection is the same on both sides, or merely one. But since the consciousness in this activity had merely the objective essence, and not the consciousness as such for its content, the result is to be posited in an objective signification for it, and the consciousness still withdrawing from that which is become, the latter is to it, as objective, the essence.

[p. 98.] [b] Although with this the understanding has cancelled its own untruth and the untruth of the object; and what has become for it through this, is the comprehension of the True as the True *existent in itself*, which is not as yet comprehension, or which lacks as yet the being-for-itself of consciousness, and which the understanding, without knowing itself in it, lets alone. The latter pursues its road by itself, so that the consciousness has no part or portion in its free realization, but only looks on and ap-

prehends it purely. We have therefore at first to occupy its place, and we must be its comprehension which develops what is contained in the result; in relation to this developed object which offers itself to the consciousness as existent, it first becomes an apprehending consciousness for itself.

[c] The result was the unconditioned Universal, at first in the negative and abstract sense, that the consciousness negated and abstracted its one-sided concepts, and gave them up. But the result has the positive significance that in it the unity of the being *for itself* and the being *for others*, or the absolute antithesis, is posited immediately as the same essence. It seems at first to have reference only to the form of the moments as related to each other; but the being *for itself* and the being *for others* is just as well the *content* itself, since the antithesis can have, in its truth, no other nature than the one which has adduced itself in the result, that, namely, the content held as *true* in perception, does in point of fact belong only to the form, and dissolves itself in its unity. This content is at the same time universal; there can be no other content which would withdraw itself through its peculiar character—to go back into this unconditioned universality. Such a content would be some determined mode of being-for-itself and of relation to others. But *to be for itself*, and to relate in general to others, constitutes its nature and essence, whose truth is to be unconditioned universality; and the result is absolutely universal.

[p. 99.] [d] But since this unconditioned Universal is object for the consciousness, the distinction of form and content makes its appearance on it, and in the shape of *content* the moments appear at first to present themselves, on the one hand, as universal medium of many extant matters, and on the other, as *one* reflected into itself, wherein their independence is destroyed. The former is the dissolution of the independence of the thing, or the passivity which is a being for others; but the latter, the being for itself. It is to be seen how these moments adduce themselves in the unconditioned universality which constitutes their essence. It is first of all evident, that through the fact that they are merely in this [universality], they no longer lie asunder, but that they are essentially, in themselves, self-cancelling sides, and nothing but their transition into each other is posited.

[e] The one moment appears thus as the essence which has become one side of the antithesis, as universal medium, or as the extantness of independent matters. But the independence of these matters is nothing else than this medium; or this Universal is the multiplicity of such different Universals. But that the Universal is in unseparated unity with this multiplicity, means that these matters are each where the other is; they interpenetrate each other reciprocally, without however touching each other, since conversely the many distinguished [ones] are just as independent. With this there is at once, also, their pure porosity posited, or their being cancelled. This being-cancelled again, or the reduction of this diversity to the pure being-for-itself, is nothing else than the medium itself, and this again is the independence of the distinctions. Or the somewhat posited as independent pass immediately over into their unity, and their unity immediately into the unfolding, and the latter again back into the reduction. This movement, however, is what is called *force* [*Kraft*]: the one moment thereof, namely, it, as expansion of the independent matters in their being, is its utterance; [p. 100] but it as the vanished-being of the same, is the force held back from its utterance, or force *proper*. But, in the first place, the confined force must utter itself; and secondly, in the utterance it is just at well in-itself-existent force as it is in this being-in-itself, utterance. Thus while we retain both moments in their immediate unity, the understanding, to which the conception of force properly belongs, is the comprehension which supports the distinguished moments as distinguished; for in force itself they are maintained not to be distinguished; the distinction is hence merely in the thought. Or in the above there is merely the conception of force posited and not its reality. But in point of fact force is the unconditioned Universal which is for another what it is in itself, or which has the distinction in itself, for it is nothing else than the being for others. Hence, in order that the force may be in its truth, it must be let alone entirely by thought, and be posited as the substance of these distinctions, i. e. at one time, as this whole force remaining essentially in and for itself, and then again its distinctions as substantial, or as for-themselves-subsisting moments. Hence the force, as such, or as confined, is for itself as an ex-

cluding one, for which the unfolding of the matters is another extant essence, and thus there are two distinct, independent sides posited. But the force is also the Whole, or it remains what it is, according to its comprehension; namely, these distinctions remain pure forms, superficially vanishing moments. The distinctions of the proper force confined in itself, and of the unfolding of the independent matters, would not be at all if they did not have extantness, or the force would not be if it did not *exist* in this antithesis; but that it exists in this antithesis, means nothing else than that both moments are at the same independent. [p. 101.] This activity of the two moments rendering themselves continually independent and again cancelling themselves, is that which is to be considered. It is obvious, in general, that this movement is nothing else than the activity of perception, in which the two sides, the Perceiving and Perceived, are at the same time first as the apprehension of the True, one and undistinguished; but, secondly, each side is just as well reflected into itself or for itself. Here these two sides are moments of force: they are in one unity, and this unity, which appears as middle in contradistinction to the extremes which are for themselves, always redissolves itself precisely into the extremes which are first through this. The activity which adduced itself previously as the self-destruction of the contradictory comprehensions, has here therefore the objective form and is the activity of force, as the result of which the unconditioned Universal makes its appearance as non-objective or as the internal of things.

[f] The force is, as it has been determined while it is represented as such or as reflected into itself, the one side of its comprehension; but as an extreme, rendered substantial, and that, too, posited under the determinateness of the one. Through this the extantness of the developed matters is excluded from it, and another than it. Since it is necessary that it itself be this extantness, or that it should utter itself, this utterance represents itself in this manner that the mentioned other comes to it and solicits it. But in point of fact, since it necessarily utters itself, that which was previously posited as another essence belongs to it itself. We must change the statement that it was posited, as a one, and that its essence to utter itself was posited as another which came to it from without; it is rather itself this uni-

versal medium of the extantness of the moments, as matters; or it has uttered itself, and that which was to be the other soliciting somewhat is rather it itself. It therefore exists now as the medium of the unfolded matters. [p. 102.] But it has likewise essentially the form of the being-cancelled of the extant matters or it is essentially *one*; this one-being is thus, now that it is posited as the medium of matters, another than itself, and it has this, its essence, outside of itself. But since it must necessarily be this, as which it is not as yet posited, the other somewhat adds itself to it and solicits it to a reflection into itself, or cancels its utterance. In fact, however, it is itself this being-reflected-into-itself, the cancelled-being of the utterance; the one-being vanishes as it appeared, namely, as another; it (force) is thus therefore *itself*—it is force pressed back into itself.

[g] That which makes its appearance as other and solicits it as well to the utterance as to the return into itself, is, as at once adduces itself, force; for the other shows itself to be as well universal medium as One; and thus each of these shapes makes its appearance at the same time as vanishing moment. Hence force, through this, that another is for it, and that it is for another, has in general not as yet gone out of its comprehension. But there are at the same time two forces extant: the comprehension of the two is the same, but it is gone out of the unity into duality. Instead of the antithesis remaining merely essential moment throughout, it appears to have withdrawn itself through the duplication, into entirely independent powers, from the dominion of unity. The nature of this independence is now to be more closely investigated. At first, the second force makes its appearance as the soliciting, and that too as the Universal or general medium according to its content against the one which is determined as solicited; but since the former is essentially the interchange of these two moments and itself force, it is in point of fact also then first universal medium only when it becomes solicited to it, and just so moreover merely negative unity, or a soliciting to the return of force through the fact that it is solicited. Thus also the distinction which seemed to exist between the two, that the one was the soliciting and the other the solicited, changes itself [p. 103] into the same exchange of determinatenesses with each other.

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versal medium of the extantness of the moments, as matters; or it has uttered itself, and that which was to be the other soliciting somewhat is rather it itself. It therefore exists now as the medium of the unfolded matters. [p. 102.] But it has likewise essentially the form of the being-cancelled of the extant matters or it is essentially *one*; this one-being is thus, now that it is posited as the medium of matters, another than itself, and it has this, its essence, outside of itself. But since it must necessarily be this, as which it is not as yet posited, the other somewhat adds itself to it and solicits it to a reflection into itself, or cancels its utterance. In fact, however, it is itself this being-reflected-into-itself, the cancelled-being of the utterance; the one-being vanishes as it appeared, namely, as another; it (force) is thus therefore *itself*—it is force pressed back into itself.

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[h] The play of these two powers consists thus in this being-determined contrariwise, in their being for each other in this determination, and in the absolutely immediate confounding of the determinations—a transition through which alone these determinations are, in which the forces seem to adduce themselves as independent. The soliciting, for example, is posited as general medium, and in contradistinction to it the solicited as force confined; but the former is universal medium itself only through the fact that the other is confined force; or the latter is rather the soliciting for the former, and renders it first a medium. The former has merely through the other its determinateness, and is soliciting only in so far as it is solicited by the other to be soliciting; and it loses just as immediately this determinateness given to it; for this goes over to the other, or rather is already gone over to it; the foreign, that which solicits the force, adduces itself as general medium, but only through the fact that it has been solicited to it by the force; in other words, it posits it in this manner, and is rather itself essentially general medium; it posits the soliciting in this manner for the reason that this other determination is essential to it, i. e. for the reason that it is rather itself.

[i] For the completeness of the insight in the comprehension of this activity, it may be remarked, in addition, that the distinctions themselves adduce themselves in a twofold distinction, at one time as distinctions of the content when the one extreme is force reflected into itself, the other being medium of the matters; the other time as distinctions of form, when the one is soliciting, the other solicited—the former active, the latter passive. According to the distinction of the content they are in general, or for us, distinct; but according to the distinction of the form they are independent, and in their relation opposed and repellant towards each other. [p. 104.] So that the extremes, according to these two sides, are nothing in themselves; but these two sides, in which their distinguished essence is said to consist, are merely vanishing moments, are an immediate transition of each into the opposed one; *this* is the result for the consciousness in the observation of the activity of force. But for us there was, as already mentioned above, this additional, that in themselves the distinctions, as distinctions of content and of form, vanished;

and according to the side of form the active, soliciting, or the being for itself, was essentially the same as that which upon the side of content, was in itself confined force; and the passive, solicited, or the being for another, on the side of form, is the same as that which on the side of content exhibited itself as the universal medium of the many matters.

[j] From this it is obvious that the comprehension of force through its duplication into two powers becomes actual, and also how it becomes. These two forces exist as for-themselves-existing essences; but their existence is such an activity against each other, that their being is rather a pure-positing-being through another, i. e. that their being has rather the pure signification of vanishing. They are not as extremes which retain something permanent for themselves, and only send an external property against each other in the middle and in their contact; but what they are, they are only in this middle and in this contact. In it there is just as well, immediately, the being-confined, or the being-for-itself of force, as the utterance; the soliciting as well as the being solicited; hence these two moments not parcelled out into two independent extremes which offer themselves only one antithetic point, but their essence is at once this—to be each only through the other, and at the same time what each is thus through the other, to be it immediately no longer while it is. They have thus, in point of fact, no substances of their own which would support and preserve them. The comprehension of force preserves itself rather as the essence in its very actuality; the force as actual is only in the utterance, [p. 105] which is at the same time nothing else than the cancelling of itself. This actual force represented as free from its utterance, and as existent for itself, is the confined force; but this determinateness is in point of fact, as it has adduced itself, merely a moment of the utterance. The truth of force, therefore, remains merely the thought thereof; and the moments of its actuality hurl resistlessly its substance and activity together into an indistinct unity, which is not the force confined in itself (for the latter is itself merely such a moment), but this unity is its comprehension as comprehension. The realization of force is at the same time the loss of reality; it has rather become an entirely Different; namely, this universality which

the understanding recognized at first as its essence, and which also proves itself as its essence in its maintained reality on the actual substance.

[k] In so far as we regard the first Universal as the concept of the understanding in which the force is not as yet for itself, the second is now its essence as it adduces itself in and for itself. Or, conversely, if we consider the first Universal as the Immediate which was to be an actual object for the consciousness, then the second is determined as the negative of the sensuously objective force; it is *it* as it is in its true essence merely as object of the understanding; the mentioned first would be the in-itself-confined force, or it as substance; but this second is the internal of things as the internality, which is identical with the comprehension as comprehension.

[l] This true essence of things has now determined itself thus: that it is not immediately for the consciousness, but that the latter has an immediate relation to the internal, and as understanding it looks through this middle of the play of forces into the true background of things. [p. 106.] The middle which unites the two extremes, the understanding and the internal, is the developed being of force, which is now for the understanding itself a vanishing. It is therefore called phenomenon; that being we call an appearance, which is in itself immediately a *not-being*. But it is not only an *appearance*, but a phenomenon, a *totality* of appearance. This totality as totality or Universal is that which constitutes the Internal, the play of forces, as reflection of the same into itself. In it the essences of perception are posited for the consciousness in an objective manner, as they are in themselves; namely, as moments which change themselves immediately into their opposites, without rest or being, the *one* immediately into the *Universal*, the Essential immediately into the Unessential, and *vice versa*. This play of forces is therefore the developed negative; but the truth thereof is the positive, namely, the Universal, the in-itself-existing object. The being of the same for the consciousness is mediated through the activity of the *appearance*, in which the being of perception and the sensuously objective in general has merely negative signification, hence out of which the consciousness reflects itself into itself as into the True; but as consciousness makes again this True to an objective Inter-

nal and distinguishes this reflection of things from its reflection into itself, just as the mediating activity is for it an objective one. This Internal, therefore, is for it an extreme in contradistinction to it; but it is for it the True, for the reason that in it, as in the *in-itself*, it has at the same time the certitude of itself, or the moment of its being for itself; but it is not as yet conscious of this ground, for the being for itself, which the Internal was to have in itself, would be nothing but the negative activity; but this is as yet for the consciousness the objective vanishing phenomenon, and not as yet its *own* being for itself; hence, although the Internal is for it comprehension, it does not as yet know the nature of the comprehension.

[p. 107.] [m] In this internally True as the absolute Universal, which has become purified from the antithesis of the Universal and the Individual, and become for the understanding, in the first place opens up for itself a Supersensuous as the true world beyond the sensuous, as the phenomenal world beyond the vanishing *this-side*, as an abiding Beyond; a being in itself which is the first, and therefore imperfect manifestation of reason, or which is merely the pure element wherein the True has its essence.

[n] Our object is therefore now the syllogism, which has for its extremes the Internal of things and the understanding, and for its middle the phenomenon; but the moment of this syllogism adduces the further determination of that which the understanding sees through the middle in the Internal of things and the experience, which it makes with reference to this relation of the being-united.

[o] The Internal is as yet pure Beyond for the consciousness, for it does not as yet find itself in it; it is empty, for it is merely the nothing of the phenomenon, and positively the simple Universal. This mode of being of the Internal is that spoken of by those who say that the Internal of things is not to be known; but a different reason would have to be assigned for this. Of this Internal, as it here immediately is, there is of course, no knowledge extant; but not because reason is too short-sighted or limited, or whatever it may be called (of which nothing is as yet known, for we have not as yet entered so deeply into the subject), but in consequence of the simple nature of the subject-matter itself, for there is nothing in the void to be known nor anything to be

said concerning the other side, for the simple reason that it is determined as the *Beyond* of consciousness. The result, of course, is the same, if a blind man looks into the wealth of the supersensuous world (if it has any, whether it be the peculiar content of the same, or whether consciousness itself be this content), [p. 108] and if a seeing one looks into the pure darkness, or into the pure light by itself, the seeing one sees as little in his pure light as in his pure darkness, and just as much as the blind man in the fulness of wealth which lies before him. If there were nothing else in the Internal, and in the being-united with it through the phenomenon, there would remain nothing for us but to hold fast to phenomenon—i. e. to take something as true which we know to be untrue—in order that there might be in this vacuity, which merely resulted as the vacuity of objective things, but must as vacuity in itself be also taken as void of all spiritual relations and of the distinctions of consciousness as consciousness. In order, therefore, that there be something in this entire void, which is also called the *Holy*, it would be better to fill it up with dreams, phenomena which the consciousness begets for itself. It would not deserve anything better than this, since even dreams themselves are better than this absolute vacuity.

[p] But the Internal or the supersensuous Beyond has become, it results from experience, and it is its mediation; or the phenomenon is its essence, and in point of fact that which fills it up. The Supersensuous is the Sensuous and the Perceived posited as it is in truth; but the truth of the Sensuous and the Perceived is to be phenomenon. The Supersensuous is, therefore, phenomenon as phenomenon. If it is understood by this that the Supersensuous is the sensuous world, or the world as it is, for the immediate sensuous certitude and perception, this is a misunderstanding; for the phenomenon is not the world of sensuous knowing and perception as existent, but *it*, posited as cancelled, or in truth as internal. It is commonly said that the Supersensuous is *not* the phenomenal; [p. 109] but by this expression is understood not the phenomenon, but rather the sensuous world as itself real actuality.

[q] The understanding, which is our object, finds itself precisely in this place, that the Internal has resulted for it merely, first as the Universal still undeveloped in itself;

the play of forces has precisely this negative signification: to be not in itself and merely this positive—to be the Mediating, but the External to the understanding. Its relation to the Internal, however, through the mediation, is its activity, through which it will obtain a content. The play of forces is for it immediately; but the True for it is the simple Internal; the activity of force is hence merely as simple in general, the True. But we have seen that this play of forces possesses this characteristic, that the force which is solicited by another force is likewise the soliciting for this other force which itself first becomes soliciting through this. There is in this, likewise, merely the immediate exchange or the absolute barter of the determinateness, which constitutes the only content of that which adduces itself, either to be universal medium or negative unity. In its definite appearance it immediately ceases to be that as which it appears; it solicits through its definite appearance the other side, which utters itself through this; i. e. the latter is immediately now that which the first was to be. These two sides, the relation of solicitation and the relation of the definite opposed content are, each for itself, the absolute inversion and exchanging. But these two relations are themselves again the same, and the distinction of the form to be the Solicited and the Soliciting is the same as the distinction of the content, the solicited as such, namely, the passive medium; the Soliciting, on the contrary, the active, the negative unity, or the One. Through this, all distinction of particular forces, [p. 110] which were to be extant in this activity in contradistinction to each other in general, vanishes; for they rested alone upon the mentioned distinctions, and the distinction of forces falls likewise with the mentioned two, together in one. It is, therefore, neither the force nor the soliciting and being solicited, nor yet the determinateness to be subsisting medium and in-itself-reflected unity; it is neither somewhat singular by itself, nor yet are they different antitheses; but what there is in this absolute exchange is merely the distinction as a Universal, or as a One into which many antitheses have been reduced. This distinction, as universal, is therefore the Simple in the play of force itself and the True thereof; it is the *law* of force.

[r] In the simple distinction, the absolutely exchanging phenomenon becomes

through its relation to the simplicity of the Internal or of the understanding. The Internal is at first the Universal in itself; but this in-itself-simple Universal, is essentially just as absolutely the universal distinction; for it is the result of the exchange itself, or the exchange is its essence; but the exchange as posited as in the Internal, is taken up into the same, as it is in truth, hence just as absolute universal distinction which has become quiet and remains equal to itself. Or the negation is the essential moment of the Universal, and it or the mediation in the Universal is universal distinction. It is expressed in the law as the constant picture of the unstable phenomenon. The supersensuous world is thus a quiet realm of laws, although beyond the perceived world, for the latter only exhibits the law through a constant change, but yet just as well present in the same and its immediate quiescent picture.

[8] This realm of laws is the truth of the understanding which has for its content the distinction in the laws; but it is at the same time only its first truth, and does not fill up the phenomenon. [P. 111.] The law is present in it, but it is not its entire presence; it (the law) is always under different circumstances a different actuality. Through this remains a side to the phenomenon for itself, which is not in the Internal; or it is not as yet in truth posited as phenomenon, as cancelled being for itself. This defect in the law must also adduce itself on it (the law). That which appears to be its defect consists in this: that although it has the distinction in it itself, yet it has it as a general One, as an undetermined One. But in so far as it is not *the law* in general but *a law*, it has the determinateness in it; and with this there are an indefinite number of laws extant. This multiplicity is itself, however, rather a defect; it contradicts rather the principle of the understanding, for which, as the consciousness of the simple Internal, the in-itself-universal unity is the True. Hence it has rather to reduce the many laws into one law, as e. g., the law according to which the stone falls, and the law according to which the heavenly spheres move, have been comprehended as one law. But with this unifying, the laws lose their determinateness; the law becomes more and more superficial, and in this there is in point of fact discovered not the unity of these determined laws, but a law which leaves out

their determinateness; just as the one law which unites within itself the law of the fall of bodies on the earth and of the heavenly motions, does not in point of fact express them both. The uniting of all laws in the universal attraction expresses no content farther than precisely the mere comprehension of the law itself which is posited in it as existing. The universal attraction says only this, that everything has a constant distinction from others. The understanding thinks that it has found in this a universal law which expresses the general reality as such; but it has in point of fact merely found the comprehension of the law itself, yet in such a manner that it at the same time expresses this also, that all reality is in itself according to law. The expression [p. 112] of a universal attraction has, therefore, in this respect, great importance, since it is directed against the thoughtless representation for which everything offers itself in the form of contingency and for which the determinateness has the form of sensuous independence.

[9] Thus, therefore, the universal attraction or the pure comprehension of the law stands opposed to the definite law. In so far as this pure comprehension is considered as the essence or as the true Internal, the determinateness of the determined law belongs itself still to the phenomenon, or rather to the sensuous being. But the pure comprehension of law does not merely go beyond the law which, itself a determined one, stands opposed to other determined laws, but it goes even beyond the law as such. The determinateness of which we spoke is really itself a vanishing moment which cannot occur here any more as essential; for the law alone is here extant as the True; but the comprehension of the law is turned against the law itself. In the law, namely, the distinction is *immediately* apprehended and taken up into the Universal, but with this a subsistence of the moments, whose relation it expresses as indifferent and in-themselves-existing essences. But these parts of the distinction in the law are at the same time determined sides; the pure comprehension of law as universal attraction, must be apprehended in its true significance as follows: that in it as the absolute Simple, the distinctions which are contained in the law as such, go themselves back again into the Internal as simple unity; it is the internal necessity of the law.

[10] The law is through this extant in a

twofold manner; first, as the law on which the distinctions are expressed as independent moments; secondly, in the form of the simple being gone-back-into-itself, which may again be called force, but in such a manner that it is not the confined [p. 113] force, but force in general, or as the comprehension of force, an abstraction which draws within itself the distinctions of that which attracts and is attracted. Thus, for example, simple electricity is force; the expression of the distinction, however, falls into the law; this distinction is positive [p. 113] and negative electricity. In the movement of a falling body the force is the simple gravity—which has the law that the magnitudes of the different moments of the movement (the times and spaces passed over) stand in the ratio to each other of the root to its square. Electricity itself is not a distinction in itself or in its essence the twofold existence of positive and negative electricity; for which reason it is customary to say that it is its law to be in this manner, also that it has the property to manifest itself thus. This property, of course, is the essential and peculiar property of this force; or it is necessary to it. But necessity is here an empty word; the force must, precisely *because* it must, dualize itself. Of course, if positive electricity is posited, the negative is in itself also necessary; for the positive is merely a relation to a negative, or the positive is *in itself* the distinction from itself just as likewise the negative is. But that electricity thus divides itself, this is not in itself the necessary; it as simple force is indifferent towards its law to be as positive and negative; and if we call the former its comprehension and the latter its being, then its comprehension is indifferent towards its being; it possesses merely this property; i. e. precisely, it is not in itself necessary. This indifference takes another shape when it is said that it belongs to the *definition* of electricity to be positive and negative, or that this is absolutely its comprehension and essence. In that case its being would be called *its existence* in general; but in the former definition there lies not the necessity of its existence; it is either because [p. 114] one finds it, i. e. it is not necessary at all; or its existence is in consequence of other forces, i. e. its necessity is an external one. But through this that the necessity is laid in the determinateness of being through others we fall again back into

the multiplicity of definite laws, which we just now left behind us in order to consider the law as law; only with the latter is its comprehension as comprehension, or its necessity, to be compared, but which has in all these forms shown itself only as an empty word.

[v] The indifference of law and of force, or of comprehension and of being, is extant in still another form than the one adduced. In the law of motion, e. g. it is necessary that the movement separate into time and space, i. e. into distance and rapidity. Since motion is merely the relation of these moments, it is most assuredly the Universal, here considered in itself separated; now, however, these parts, time and space, or distance and rapidity, do not express in themselves this origin from One; they are indifferent towards each other; space is represented as possible without time, time without space, and distance at least as possible without rapidity; so likewise it is represented that their magnitudes are indifferent towards each other, since they do not stand in relation as positive and negative, hence do not relate essentially to each other. Thus, also, the necessity of the division is here extant, but not the necessity of the parts for each other. For this reason, however, the first necessity itself is merely a false seeming necessity; the movement itself, namely, is not represented as simple or as pure essence, but as already sundered; time and space are its independent parts or essences in themselves, or distance and rapidity are modes of being or representation, one of which may very well be without the other, and the movement is therefore merely their superficial relation and not their essence. Represented as simple essence [p. 115] or as force, it is gravity, which, however, does not contain these distinctions in general within it.

[w] The distinction is, therefore, in both cases no distinction in itself; either the Universal, the force is indifferent towards the separation which is in the law, or the distinctions, the parts of the law, are indifferent towards each other. But the understanding has the comprehension of this distinction in itself, precisely in the fact that the law is partly the Internal, the in-itself-existent, but is in it at the same time distinguished; that this distinction is thus internal distinction is involved in the fact that the law is simple force, or as comprehension thereof, hence a distinction of the

comprehension. But this internal distinction falls, as yet, still in the Understanding and is not as yet posited in the object itself (*Sache selbst*). It is thus merely a necessity of its own making, that the understanding expresses; a distinction which it makes in such a way that it expresses at the same time that the distinction is no distinction of the object itself. This necessity, which is merely in the word, is thus the repetition of the moments which constituted the circle thereof; although they are distinguished, yet their distinction is at the same time expressed as no distinction of the object itself, and therefore is itself cancelled again; this movement is called "explaining" (*erklären*). Thus a law is enunciated; from this its in-itself-universal, or the ground, is distinguished as the force; but this distinction is said to be none, but that the ground is entirely of the same nature as the law. The individual occurrence of lightning, for example, is apprehended as a Universal, and this Universal is expressed as the law of electricity: explanation then reduces the law to the force as the essence of the law; this force is of such a nature that if it manifests itself, there occur opposite electricities, which again vanish in each other, i. e. the force is just of the same nature as the law; it is said that the two are not at all distinguished. The distinctions are the pure [p. 116] universal manifestation, or the law and the pure force; but both have the same content, the same nature; the distinction as distinction of the content, i. e. of the object (*Sache*), is likewise again taken back.

[x] The understanding continues this tautological activity, as is obvious, while the object remains a quiescent unity, and the activity falls only within the former, and not in the object; it is an explaining which not merely explains nothing, but it is clear that although it makes preparations to say something different from what has already been said, yet it says nothing new, but only repeats the same. In the object itself, nothing further originates through this activity, but it comes into consideration only as an activity of the understanding. In it, however, we now recognize precisely that which was missed in the law, namely: the absolute change itself; for this activity, if we consider it closely, is precisely the opposite of itself. It posits, namely, a distinction, which is not merely no distinction for us, but which it itself cancels as distinction.

This is the same interchange which adduces itself as the play of forces; in it there was the distinction of the solicited and the being-solicited, of the force which manifested itself and which was confined; but they were distinctions which in truth were none, and thus were immediately cancelled again. The mere unity is not only extant, so that no distinctions were posited, but it is this activity that of course has made a distinction; but since it is none, it is again cancelled. With the explaining, therefore, the procedure and change which was previously outside of the Internal, and merely in the phenomenon itself, has now penetrated into the Supersensuous itself; but our consciousness has now gone out of the Internal as object, over to the other side into the Understanding, and has in it the interchange.

[x] This interchange is therefore not as yet an interchange in the object itself, but reduces itself rather as a pure interchange, [p. 117] precisely through the fact that the content of the moments of the interchange remain the same. But since the comprehension as comprehension of the Understanding is the same as the Internal of things, this interchange becomes the law of the Internal for it (the understanding). It experiences therefore, that it is the law of the phenomenon itself, that distinctions become which are no distinctions; or that the Homonymous (*das Gleichnamige*) repels itself from itself, and likewise that the distinctions are of such a kind as in truth are none, and which cancel themselves; or that the Heteronymous attracts itself; a second law, whose content is opposed to that which was previously called law, namely, the distinction which remained like itself continually; for this new law expresses rather the becoming unlike of the like, and the becoming like of the unlike. Comprehension requires of thoughtlessness that it bring both laws together and become conscious of their antithesis. The second is a law, it is true, or an internal self-identical being, but a self-identity of the unlikeness rather, a constant inconstancy. On the play of forces, this law adduced itself as precisely this absolute transition and as pure interchange; the Homonymous, the force, dirempts itself into an antithesis, which appears at first as an independent distinction, but which proves itself to be, in point of fact, no distinction; for it is the Homonymous which repels itself from

itself, and that which is repelled therefore attracts itself essentially, for it is the same; the distinction made, since it is none, therefore cancels itself again. It adduces itself therefore as distinction of the object itself, or as absolute distinction, and this distinction is hence nothing else than the Homonymous which has repelled itself from itself, and therefore posits only an antithesis which is no antithesis.

[2] Through this principle the first supersensuous, the quiet empire of laws, the immediate picture of the perceived world is transformed into its opposite; the law, as well as its distinctions, [p. 118] was that which remained constantly like itself; but now there is posited that each is rather the opposite of itself; that which is like itself repels itself rather from itself, and that which is unlike posits itself rather as like. In point of fact, the distinction is only with this determination, the internal one, or distinction in itself, since the like is unlike itself, and the unlike is like itself. This second supersensuous world is in this manner the inverted world; and that, too, since the one side is extant already on the first supersensuous world, the inverted one of this first world. The Internal is through this, completed as phenomenon. For the first supersensuous world was merely the immediate elevation of the perceived world into the universal element; it had its necessary counterpart in the latter, which still retained for itself the principle of change and mutation; the first realm of laws lacked this, but it retains it as inverted world.

[aa] According to the law of this inverted world, therefore, the Homonymous of the first is the unlike of itself, and the unlike of the same is in the same manner like to itself, or it becomes like to itself. In definite moments this will adduce itself as follows: that which in the law of the first world is sweet, will, in this inverted (world) be in itself sour; what in the first was black, will in this be white. What, in the law of the first, is the north pole to a magnet, is in its other supersensuous, being-in-itself (in the earth, namely), south pole; but what is there south pole, is here north pole. Likewise what in the first law of electricity is oxygen-pole, will be in its other supersensuous essence the hydrogen-pole; and conversely, what is there the hydrogen-pole will be here the oxygen-pole. In another sphere, that which according to the immediate law,

is revenge on an enemy, is the highest satisfaction of the injured individuality. But this law, to show myself as an essence to him, who does not treat me as self-essence, and rather to cancel him, as an essence, changes itself through the principle of the other world [p. 119] into the opposite, viz., re-establishment of myself as essence, through the cancelling of the foreign essence in self-destruction. Now if this inversion, which is exhibited in the punishment of vice, is made the law, then it again is also merely the law of a world which has an inverted supersensuous world over against it, in which what is despised in the former is honored, and what is honored in the former is despised. The punishment which, according to the law of the first world, annihilates and puts man to shame, changes itself in its inverted world into the pardon which preserves his essence and elevates him to honor.

[bb] Superficially regarded, this inverted world is thus the converse of the first, in such a manner that it has the same outside of it, and repels from itself the mentioned first as an inverted actuality; that the one is the phenomenon, but the other the Being-in-itself; the one is it as it is for others, the other on the contrary as it is for itself; so that, to use the previous examples, what tastes sweet, tastes *really* or internally in the thing, sour; or what on the real phenomenal magnet is north pole, would be on the inner or essential being, south pole; what makes its appearance on the manifested electricity as oxygen-pole, would be on the non-manifested electricity the hydrogen-pole. Or an action which is transgression in *appearance*, might be internally really good (a bad action, having a good motive); punishment, merely punishment in appearance, but in another world a blessing for the transgressor. Such antitheses, however, of internal and external, of appearance and the Supersensuous, as of two different kinds of actualities, are here no longer extant. The repelled distinctions do not divide themselves again into two substances, which would support them and furnish them a separate subsistence, through which the understanding would again fall back out of the Internal to its former place. The one side or substance would again be the world of perception in which the one of the two laws would perform its function, and opposed to that world there would be an internal

world, just such a sensuous world as the first, but *in imagination*; it could not be shown as a sensuous, could not be seen, heard, tasted, and yet it would be conceived as such a sensuous world. But in point of fact if the one posited is a Perceived, and its being-in-itself, as the converse thereof, is just such a sensuously represented somewhat, then the sour which was to be the *in-itself* of the sweet thing, is just as real a thing as it, a sour thing; the black which would be the in-itself of the white, is the real black; the north pole, which would be the in-itself of the south pole, is the north pole extant on the same magnet; the oxygen-pole which is the *in-itself* of the hydrogen-pole, is the extant oxygen-pole of the same battery. The real transgression has its inversion, and its in-itself as possibility in the motive as such, but not in a good one; for the truth of the motive is only the act itself. The transgression, according to its content, has its reflection into itself, or its inversion in the real punishment; this is the reconciliation of the law with the actuality opposed to it in the transgression. The real punishment finally has its inverted reality in that it is a realization of the law, through which the activity which it has as punishment cancels itself; that it becomes out of the Active again quiet and valid law, and the activity of the individuality against it, and of it against individuality, is extinguished.

[*cc*] Out of the conception of inversion, which constitutes the essence of one side of the supersensuous world, the sensuous conception of the rendering permanent of the distinctions in a different element of subsistence is therefore to be removed, and this absolute comprehension of the distinctions is to be apprehended as internal distinction, [*p. 121*] repulsion from itself of the Homonymous as Homonymous, and to be exhibited and apprehended as the identity of the Unequal as Unequal. The pure change or the opposition in itself, the contradiction, is to be thought. For in the distinction which is an internal one, the opposed is not merely one of two; otherwise it would be an Existent and not an Opposed; but it is the Opposed of an Opposed, or the other is in it immediately extant. Although I may place the opposite in this place, and the other, or that of which it is the opposite, in that place—thus the opposite on one side, in and for itself, without

the other—yet precisely for the reason that I have here the opposite in and for itself, I have the opposite of itself, or it is in point of fact the other immediately to itself. Thus the supersensuous world, which is the inverted one, has at the same time encroached upon the other and has it in itself; it is for itself the inverted, i. e. the inverted of itself; it is itself and its opposite in one unity. Only in this way is it the distinction as internal, or distinction in itself, or is as infinitude.

[*dd*] Through the infinitude we see the law completed in itself to necessity, and all the moments of phenomenality taken up into the Internal. The simplicity of the law is the infinitude, i. e. according to what has adduced itself, (*a*) it is a somewhat like to itself, which however is the distinction in itself; or it is the Homonymous which expels itself from itself, or which duplicates itself. That which was called *simple* force duplicates itself, and is through its infinitude the law. (*β*) The duplicated (dirempted) which constitutes the parts represented in the law, adduces itself as subsisting (somewhat); and if they are considered without the comprehension of the internal distinction, then space and time, or distance and velocity, which appear as moments of gravity, become as well indifferent and without necessity for each other, or for gravity itself, just [*p. 122*] as this simple gravity is then opposed to them, or simple electricity to the positive and negative. (*γ*) But through the comprehension of the internal distinction, this Unlike and Indifferent, space and time, etc., is a distinction which is no distinction, or only a distinction of the Homonymous, and its essence the unity; they are as positive and negative vitalized against each other; and their Being consists rather in this, to posit themselves as not-being and to cancel themselves in the unity. Both distinctions subsist; they are in themselves—they are in themselves as opposed, i. e. the opposite of themselves; they have their other in them and are merely one unity.

[*ee*] This simple infinitude, or the absolute comprehension, is to be called the simple essence of life, or the soul of the world, or the universal blood, which, everywhere present, is interrupted by no distinction nor troubled, which is itself rather all distinctions as well as their annulment, which pulsates within itself without moving itself, and which shudders within itself without becoming unquiet. It is self-identical, for the dis-

inctions are tautological; they are distinctions which are none. This essence, which is self-identical, relates itself therefore only to itself. To itself: thus that to which it relates itself is another, and this relation to itself is rather the diremption, or that self-identity is nothing but internal distinction. These dirempted (somewhats) are therefore in and for themselves each an opposite of another; thus in them the other is already expressed; or it is not the opposite of another but merely the *pure opposite*; thus it is, therefore, in itself the opposite of itself. Or it is in general not an opposite but purely for itself, a pure self-identical essence which has no distinction in it; thus we need not ask—much less need we regard the torment with such questions as Philosophy—or hold them for unanswerable—“*how the distinction or the other-being comes out of this pure essence*”; for [p. 123] the diremption has already occurred, the distinction is excluded from the self-identical and has been set aside; that which was intended to be the self-identical is therefore one of the dirempted somewhats instead of being the absolute essence. The self-identical dirempts itself, i. e. it cancels itself as already dirempted. It cancels itself as other-being. The unity, of which it is ordinarily said that the distinction cannot come out of it, is, in point of fact, itself merely one of the moments of the diremption; it is the abstraction of simplicity which is opposed to the distinction. But since it is the abstraction, merely one of the opposites, it is already said that it is the dirempting; for if the unity is a negative somewhat, an opposite, then it is posited precisely as that which has the opposition in it. The distinction of diremption and becoming self-identical is therefore precisely this activity of the self-cancelling; for while the self-identical, which should first become dirempted or its opposite, is an abstraction or already itself a Dirempted, its diremption is thus a cancelling of that which it is, and hence the cancelling of its being-dirempted. The becoming self-identical is likewise a dirempting; that which becomes self-identical enters into opposition to the diremption; i. e. it sets itself aside in this, or rather it becomes a Dirempted.

[ff] The infinitude, or this absolute restlessness of the pure self-moving, that which is determined in any possible manner, as e. g., Being, is rather the opposite of this determinateness, and though it has been

already the soul of all that has preceded, yet in the internal it has first freely manifested itself. The phenomenon or the play of forces manifests it already, but as *explanation* it manifests itself freely; and when it finally becomes object for the consciousness, as that which it is, then is consciousness self-consciousness. The explanation—the activity of the understanding—makes first of all [p. 124] only the description of that which is self-consciousness. It cancels the distinctions which are contained in the law and have already become purified, but which still remain in different distinctions, and posits them in one unity—force. But this becoming-like is immediately a diremption; for it cancels the distinctions and posits the one of force only through this, that it makes a new distinction between law and force, but which at the same time is no distinction; and for the reason that this distinction is no distinction, it itself proceeds to the point that it cancels this distinction again, since it makes the force, of the same nature as the law. But this movement or necessity is thus still necessity and movement of the understanding, or it as such is not its object, but it (understanding) has for its object positive and negative electricity, distance and velocity, attractive force, and a thousand other things, which constitute the content of the moments of the activity. For this reason there is so much solid satisfaction in explaining; for the consciousness, so to speak, carries on an immediate monologue with itself, and enjoys only itself; it appears, indeed, to have to do with something entirely different, but in point of fact it has only to do with itself.

[gg] Although in the opposite law, or inversion of the first law, or in the internal distinction, the infinitude itself becomes object of the understanding, yet it (the understanding) misses it again as such, since it divides the distinction in itself—the repulsion of the Homonymous, and the Unlike which attract, into two worlds, or into two substantial elements. The activity as it is in experience, is for it here an occurrence and the Homonymous and the Unlike are predicates, whose essence is an existent substratum. The same which is object for the understanding in the sensuous hull, is object for us in its essential form as pure comprehension. [p. 125] This apprehending of the distinction as it in truth is, or

the apprehending of the infinitude as such, is for us or in itself. The exposition of its comprehension belongs to science; but the consciousness, as it possesses this comprehension, immediately again makes its appearance as a proper form or new shape of consciousness which does not recognize in the preceding its essence, but takes it for something entirely different. Thus while this comprehension of infinitude is its object, it is thus consciousness of the distinction as a distinction which is just as much immediately cancelled; it is for itself the distinguishing of the Undistinguished, or self-consciousness. I distinguish myself from myself, and it is in this immediately for me that this Distinguished is not distinguished. I, the Homonymous, repel myself from myself; but this Distinguished, this which has been posited unlike, is immediately, while it is distinct, no distinction for me. The consciousness of another, of an object in general, is itself necessary self-consciousness, being reflected into itself, consciousness of itself in its other being. The necessary progress from the forms of consciousness hitherto considered, whose truth was a thing different from themselves, expresses precisely this: that not merely is the consciousness of a thing possible for self-consciousness, but that this latter alone is the truth of the mentioned forms. But this truth is only extant for us not as yet for the consciousness. The self-consciousness has first become for *itself*, not yet as unity with the consciousness in general.

We see that in the Internal of the phenomenon the understanding experiences in truth nothing else than the phenomenon itself, not, however, as it is the play of forces, but

the same in its absolute universal moments, and their activity, and in point of fact only itself. Elevated above Perception, consciousness manifests itself united with the supersensuous through the middle term of Phenomenon, through which it looks into this background.

[p. 126] The two extremes, the one the pure Internal, the other the Internal (understanding) which looks into this pure Internal, have become now identified, and they as extremes as well as the middle term, as something different from them, have vanished. This curtain has, therefore, been removed from before the Internal and the looking of the Internal into the Internal is extant; the looking of the undistinguished Homonymous which repels itself, posits itself as distinguished Internal, but for which, at the same time, the indistinguishableness of both immediately is—the self-consciousness. It is obvious that behind the so-called curtain which was to cover up the Internal, there is nothing to be seen if we do not ourselves go behind it, not only in order that something be seen, but that something be behind it which can be seen. But it is at the same time also obvious that it is impossible to go behind it without some ceremony, for this knowing what the truth of the conception of the phenomenon and its Internal is, is itself only the result of a fully developed activity through which the modes of consciousness, *opinion*, *perception*, and *understanding*, vanish; and it will also adduce itself that the recognition of that which the consciousness knows while it knows itself, requires still further detail, an exposition of which remains to be given.

THE "SINFONÍA ERÓICA."

[Read before the St. Louis Art Society, December, 1863, by CHS. L. BERNAYS.]

The "*Sinfonía Eróica*" is the third symphony written by Beethoven, but the first in which the great *maestro* abandoned the old style of Haydn and Mozart, and wherein he followed exclusively—in matter and form—the inspirations of his own great genius. With this symphony Beethoven, in

fact, abandoned every particular style, and did not even establish a new one; but his full-grown genius henceforth objectified itself upon the various stages of its own development, and, without precisely intending to represent anything in particular, he revealed himself in his creations, leaving to the world

the image of one of the most powerful and richest souls that ever breathed in a human frame.

The *Sinfonia Eroica* was written in the fall of 1803, and finished during the first months of 1804. It was originally dedicated to General Bonaparte, at the time when he was first Consul for life. Beethoven had it copied and bound, and he wrote with his own hand

"BONAPARTE"

on the top of the first page, and

"LUIGI VAN BEETHOVEN"

at the foot of it. "Not one word besides," says Mr. Ries, his favorite disciple. The work was to be forwarded to the first Consul by the French ambassador at Vienna, when the news arrived that Bonaparte intended to make himself Emperor. When Beethoven heard of this, he tore in pieces the title-page with his inscription, threw the fragments on the floor with savage imprecations against the despot, and for many weeks refused to show the piece to any of his friends; but a few months afterwards it was performed at the residence of Prince Lobkowitz. To Napoleon there was no longer any allusion. It appeared in print under the title, "*Sinfonia eroica, composta per festeggiare il sovvenire di un grand uomo*," and was dedicated to Prince Lobkowitz. The symphony originally had only three parts: the *Allegro con brio*, a *Scherzo*, and the last movement, an *Allegro molto*, which terminates with a short *Presto*. When Bonaparte had ascended the throne, he seemed as one dead to the great musician, and he composed the *Marchia funebre*, inserting it as the second part, and an *Adagio assai* into the symphony. When the news of the despot's death reached Beethoven, he said that seventeen years ago he had composed the music for this event!

This, in short, is the external history of the origin and the completion of the Heroic Symphony. When I first heard that Beethoven had so admired Napoleon Bonaparte as to dedicate to him this stupendous musical composition, I called to mind the enthusiasm with which my father used to speak of his old general, and I instantaneously seized the connection between those two giants among men. Though endowed with a very warm heart, my father did not become enthusiastic about many things. He belonged to what the younger generation

(in which I also counted myself) used to call the good Kantian school—a school which gave so many massive characters to Germany, men of generous instincts and of great integrity, who fulfilled all their duties as subjects, but who, precisely because they complied even with very hard obligations, thought themselves the better entitled to criticise, from the standpoint of reason and morality, the condition imposed on them by a higher force. And yet, when he spoke of Napoleon, he seemed to forget altogether the ordinary categories under which he would have judged the actions of other common mortals. The standard by which he would have rated the proudest historical character, seemed still insufficient to him to measure the grandeur of this giant among all the great men of his epoch. In my whole vocabulary I can find nothing like the expressions which he would use in speaking of Napoleon. He had an exceptional language for him, just as if the whole mechanism of his ordinary thinking gave way and made room for a peculiar mode of reasoning, by which anything which related to the great captain must be treated.

A genius like Beethoven evidently stood many degrees nearer to the stupendous capacity of Bonaparte than a man of the intellectual force of my father; but the difference between the activity of the two great men was still so enormous, and the fields upon which they exerted their capacity so widely separate from each other, that the admiration of Beethoven for Bonaparte had a sufficiently explicable basis. Never before had any single man used so powerful levers in the accomplishment of his destiny, and never was there a seemingly greater purpose to be carried out than the one which was believed to be that of Bonaparte. By almost all the Germans of culture of the epoch of the consulate, Bonaparte was regarded as the embodiment of Democracy. They looked upon him as if it were his destiny to carry the ideas of the French revolution over the whole globe. Liberty and the victories of Bonaparte were synonymous terms in the understanding of many of the best men; and it seems very natural that Beethoven would look upon the whole world as an immense battle-field upon which Bonaparte had organized the victory of liberty against that crowned despotism which during the last millennium asserted the divine origin of one man's power over a whole nation.

Under a similar impression, I am convinced the *Eroica* had its origin; but more than to give the first impulse to Beethoven's creation, neither Bonaparte nor his victories had anything to do with this symphony. It never entered my mind that Beethoven had intended musically to describe a battle-field by the first movement of the *Eroica*, or even to give a picture of his own sentiments at the thought of one. I had seen so many paintings by Horace Vernet, and others, which represented modern battles, that if there were any similarity between these and the musical description of a battle it could not have escaped my perception. The *Battle of Vittoria*, composed by Beethoven, that of *Hohenlinden*, and many others of like character, had the same features as those printed "*battle-pieces*," and they were so utterly different in structure and thought from the *Eroica* that I could not even force my mind to discover any resemblance between them. The so called battle-pieces are a compound of imitations of cannonading and platoon fire, of the flourish of trumpets, the tramping of regiments, and the lamentations of the wounded, without even the vestige of any pervading thought, just as those painted battles of Horace Vernet; whilst the *Eroica* was at first sight, if nothing else, an amplification of one great musical idea, which even the most superficial mind could not confound with the sounds which accompany the clash of a battle. What the *Eroica* was *not*, very soon became clear to me; to discourse of the positive thought of which it was the expression, was not so easy, and I succeeded only after a study of many years in seizing it, though from the beginning it never failed to impress me more powerfully than any other composition; for, musically, not one of Beethoven's greater works is so easily understood as the *Eroica*. It is based upon the three fundamental tones of the E flat major, growing out of this simple germ into an immense organic creation, just as a palm-tree grows from a small seed to its majestic shape. A work like the first movement of this symphony is the inspiration of an instant, and, though it required months to write it out and remember all its details, it nevertheless then stood in the mind of its creator in the same completeness as the world, in its infinite manifold forms, stood in the mind of God when he conceived of its creation. To bring it into its finite shape

required space and time; to think it in its unity was the work of one of those happy moments which occur only in the life of a genius. The timeless instant is not less eternity than the endless, extended infinitude. Extended in space and time, the original inspiration of an instant becomes a work of art, precisely as the falling of drops of calcareous water, for a long series of years, forms wonderful stalactite caves. Every drop is of the same nature in itself, and yet what an astounding structure do they form in the end! They drop down or hang from the roof of the vault according to the same law, and yet they form a forest of pillars and columns, and the walls and the vaults are covered with innumerable crystals brighter than stars! Just so is the musical structure of the *Eroica*. It develops itself out of the simplest musical form until it becomes a world of beauty and earnestness. Only one single measure in this whole composition does not admit of a strictly musical interpretation, a point which reminds me of certain limits in any system of natural philosophy whence we have to leap over into metaphysics in order to find the key to it. It is that celebrated and much disputed place, where the first and second violins in a *tremolo* hold B and A flat, and the horn sets in with the original *fanfare* E flat, G, E flat, B; the two E flats half notes, the G and B only fourths.

This long-sustained and undissolved dissonance was so offensive to a mind which only thought of a mere contrapuntistic musical exploration, such as the theory of harmonization could furnish, that, at the first rehearsal of the symphony, a very superior musician, and a pupil of Beethoven besides, stopped the orchestra after the setting in of the horn, and cried out, "This sounds infamously bad! It must be a mistake." The stupid remark so incensed Beethoven that he was very near boxing the ears of his pupil for it. The dissonance, in reality, can only be explained by the spirit, the meaning and the plan of the whole movement, and it is precisely this point which opened my own understanding to it.

I asked myself how it was, that about in the middle of the first movement, whose determined, massive character was at first sight as clear to me as to anybody else, the composer inserted some soft, if not sentimental, measures immediately before that celebrated dissonance which puzzled so ma-

ny of its interpreters. And I believe that I have found the correct answer. The undertaking of the composer was immense. He intended to carry out the same thought in his symphony which he supposed to have animated Bonaparte when he swept the old continent by his victorious legions; and just as he thought that the great conqueror might have stood still for a moment in the midst of his glorious career, asking himself whether it was well done or not that he destroyed so many lives for the victory of a new cause, and whether that new cause was right in itself; just so did the composer arrest the onward march of his musical columns, and gave room to a doubt whether his own course was right, and whether he should fight on and struggle on in the same determined manner in which he had advanced so far. This uncertainty made him suffer, and drew from him sounds of grief and deep melancholy, when he at once heard a signal from above which no poetical mind could mistake for a single moment. It was as if a voice from another world had sounded in his ear the mysterious echo of his own fundamental thought; and, after this celestial sound had died away, the poet without further hesitation resumes his work and with fresh inspiration carries it to the end. In this manner alone can that dissonance be explained. It is the sanction from above of a struggle in which the poet embarked, and it shows with unmistakable clearness the whole aspect of that part of the symphony. It is not to describe a battle, but it means musically to represent the struggle of the new mode of thinking, living, and acting, against the old decaying despotism in all its manifold failures. I will not deny that, here and there, Beethoven may have used some of the musical forms and instruments which remind us of a battle-field, because they in the easiest and clearest manner expressed his thoughts; but the few measures in the composition which may be explained in this manner certainly do not give character to the whole. The principal character of the symphony is rather that of a firm and unwavering determination to carry out the great new thought, and to crush all difficulties which it may meet on its way. The thought of a battle is widened into that of an immense struggle of two contradictory principles, and that of the victory of one of two great armies, into the victorious march of a new

idea across a whole world, in arms for its old prejudices, privileges, and dogmas. — Never was the determination to fight and to win more gloriously expressed in any work of art. This determination is expressed in the first four measures by a mere transposition of the keynote; the third and fifth of the E sharp major accord.* This short and emphatic melody is triumphantly carried through the whole movement, with the sole exception of those four measures which indicate a doubt of the righteousness of the poet's own course, until it is removed by that voice *d'outre tombe*.

Here we close; for a musical composition is the most universal form in which any thought may be expressed æsthetically, and it seems to us that it does not admit of any detailed explication without falling into the mistake of those who analyze a musical composition like a philosophical theory, or who, by means of the intellect alone, explain it as a mere translation of natural circumstances and historical events into the language of musical sounds and phrases. A composition of the character of this sym-

* It is not from a mere whim or a pure accident that this symphony is written in E sharp major. This key is by preference the key in which triumphant determination is rendered by musicians, just as E is the key for solemn and B the key for mysterious or diabolical compositions. I dare not attempt to explain this rather singular coincidence. It is the more mysterious to me, as by the subsequent raising of the Viennese diapason more than one half a tone in the course of this century, E flat is in fact changed into F, and B into B sharp or C. The compass of the human voice certainly has much to do with this choice of the various keys in vocal music; but in instrumental music the same considerations exist only in so far as the instruments now in use have a certain limit of sounding capacity (*Klangfähigkeit*) which they can not exceed;—the violin, for instance, after the modern raising of the diapason has reached its highest limits. But violins might be made one or two inches longer, and the diapason of instrumental music might still be raised, whilst that of vocal music might remain stationary. In this manner, therefore, we do not reach an explanation of the different characters of the various keys. Yet the fact is undeniable, and the ugly effect of the arbitrary transposition of any great composition from one key into another shows that there is an essential connection between a composition and the key in which it is written, and the explanation must be looked for in another direction. We suppose it to lie in the proportions of the various intervals, which, as any piano tuner knows, are not exactly the same in all the scales. That key in which a composition was at first and originally conceived by a musician, can therefore alone express the musical thought in its completeness and purity.

phony never can be explained in this way. The heart is always the principal recipient of any musical thought; but as there is no heart which does not receive a part of its education from the intellect, just so must every composition be also understood by the intellect in order to be the better seized in all its mysterious bearings by that greatest of all mysteries—the human heart.

The secondary phrases and episodes (*Seitengaenge*) of this symphony are so ingeniously interwoven with the principal thought that the interest in the great theme is increased at every repetition or variation. The new melody especially, which at the end of the first *Allegro* swells the triumphant march of the original theme into a perfect outcry of the composer's conviction that now the *victory is achieved*, is as perfect a creation as nature can present in its own domain. Here we feel that music is not like the other arts, the mere ideal expression of things, thoughts, circumstances, or actions, as they may belong to the external world, but that it is the art which represents the world as it is in itself; so that nature and music may be regarded as two different representations of the same absolute thought, music being the more universal of the two.

"The universality of the language of music," says Arthur Schopenhauer, "is not the vague universality of abstraction, but is throughout combined with the clearest determinateness. It is the metaphysical complement of all physical phenomena, the thing-in-itself of any representation. The analogy between the two, therefore, originates in the immediate recognition of the

essence of the world without the aid of the intellect, and it should never be a mere imitation mediated by concepts, nor conceived in the continuity of a conscious intention. If it results from any direct intention, music does not express the innermost essence, i. e. the will in itself, but it only imitates its external appearance in that insufficient manner which is peculiar to any imitative music. Parts of *The Four Seasons* of Haydn, of his *Pygmalion*, and the so-called battle-pieces, are instances of this imitative *genre* of music, which is nearly worthless. The unspeakable intimacy of feeling created by all good music, which shows itself to us as an unattainably distant paradise, altogether plain and yet inexplicable, results from this, that it presents all the emotions of our innermost being, without any relation to reality and its vexations. At the same time there is that deep earnestness which is so essential to good music, that it absolutely excludes from its domain any ridiculousness based upon the fact that music does not take its objects from the represented world, in regard to which deception and ridiculousness are alone thinkable; but that its objects are taken from things in themselves—that is, from the *will*, i. e. the absolutely earnest in the world. Music, therefore, never represents distinct images or scenes of human life or of nature, and they are never connected with it by absolute necessity; but they stand in relation to it rather like examples to a general conception. They are, in the determinateness of reality, what music tells only in the universality of the mere form."

CORRESPONDENCE.

[During the two years that the Journal has now been published, the editor has received a great many letters from different parts of the world bringing words of sympathy and encouragement, and in some instances friendly criticisms upon various articles that have appeared upon these pages. One of the criticisms alluded to has been printed in No. 1 of the present volume ("Nominalism vs. Realism"), and its positions commented upon. A continuation of the same discussion has been found in No. 3 ("What is meant by Determined?"). The following communication, bearing on the same subject, is here printed with the hope that it may further elucidate the difficult questions there met with.—EDITOR.]

BEING AND NOTHING—IN WHAT SENSE THEY ARE IDENTICAL.

MR. EDITOR:—I have been reading with interest your "Nominalism vs. Realism." Your critic, Mr. —, is acute, and I hoped he would have his say. Shall I state very briefly my apprehension of the matter in

controversy? You will see whether I understand you.

The nominalist assumes the actual universe, or his impression of it, to begin with. This is the object of thought, but he does

not think it; he gets it at a jump before beginning to think. Then by thought he merely thinks *away* from it to abstractions, shadowy concoctions of the mind, got up for purposes of convenience, and serving that purpose, but never true so much as they are untrue. To think, he must generalize; by generalizing, he makes abstractions; abstractions are fallacious by the very fact of being abstractions. He will tell you that they are in fact only the compromises of the mind with its own incapacity. The concrete is the true; he can think only the abstract; his truth is not the true, not what is, but only a fiction, which he has come to by thinking away from that which is, abstracting some of his impressions, and making an intellectual cobweb out of them. He is nearest to the true, that which *is*, before beginning to think, while resting in sensuous perception. Then he has the concrete at first hand. Afterwards, when he begins to denominate this concrete by thought, he begins to wander from it into the shadow-world of abstractions, ghosts, things that have a being only in name. So much as he thinks, he deceives himself, save as he rescues himself by unthinking his thought, and going back to the concrete as it is to him without thought.

Is not this jump to the concrete world at the outset a bold leap? I respect my mind more than my eyes; I shall believe in the universe if I can think it. "Seeing is believing." Yes; believing that one sees, has certain impressions. But I shall think that the universe *is*, when I find its being in thought, and necessarily *as* thought. This is the task, as I apprehend it, to which the speculative thinker addresses himself, as the truly initial labor.

Now, just here it is, at the outset that the nominalist and the speculative thinker part company, setting off in opposite directions. The former has got his world before thought, and can only think away from it; the latter is to find his world in thought, having obtained the *hint* of it from sensuous perception. The eye sees only picture, the senses know only picture; he believes in picture as picture, and proceeds to find in reason what *is*. Since the world exists *to thought* only when found in thought, therefore found as thought, therefore found as consubstantial with the principle of thought—found, that is, in its out-being (ex-isting) from reason—it follows that the work of the

speculative thinker is, not to assume that picture-concrete, given in sensible impression, as pure datum and *plenum* of the veritable, from which thought can only wander away to somewhat less veritable, but to discover the universe intellectually, discover it in its coming-to-be, in its rational subsistence, in its interior consubstantiality with reason. You and your critic look on existence together; you proceed to find its *subsistence* in reason; he to find—what shall I say?—ex-existence, abstractions from existence, semi-fallacious hints of the truth of appearance. When you find and indicate the principles of existence in reason, or that by which it subsists, he of necessity, looking from his point of view, regards these as mere abstractions from apparent fact—not the subsistence or interior verity and substantiality of the concrete, but its outward and imperfect reflection in the mind. You seem to him, therefore, to be making the reflection of the fact primary, and the fact itself secondary—to derive the man from his image in the looking-glass. I can readily imagine that to the nominalist looking at the matter in this way, the speculative philosopher must seem to talk astounding nonsense; and I think what a gentleman he must be to treat it courteously!

What is implied to thought in the fact of existence? Is not that the question you would answer by a system of Logic? What is implied, what are the "moments" in reason, which go the production of the apparent world? Certainly *not* abstractions from existence as already given and complete in sensuous impression—not its partial image in the mirror. It seems to me that if your critic would put your question, and put it in earnest, resolutely, it would instantly alter his apprehension of your statements. Nor does it seem to me that he can possibly understand you, despite any vigor of mind, until he does put it.

What is implied to thought in the fact of existence? I seek first the pure primitive. What is it?

To answer this question, we must note one fact. That which makes anything a thing in particular is limitation. Determinate being is determinate only as limited. In the order of thought, that which limits comes after that which it limits. This seems plain. To arrive at the pure, primitive, therefore, we must cast aside all which gives determinate character, all which

makes anything what it definitely is. And now what remains? Only *is*—being, wholly indeterminate. *Is*, being, the substantive verb, is the ground on which all lines of definiteness must be drawn. *Being* antecedes *determinate* or *limited* being, in the order of thought. How limit or determine what is not.

But being wholly indeterminate is indistinguishable from non-being. It is, but it is no thing, for *thing* is obtained only when limit, specific negation, denial of universality, comes. Again, non-being, which is not the non-being of any *thing*, is not *nothing*. Well, then, it is. Being that is not anything, and non-being that is not nothing, merge.

"But this is nonsense?" Certainly it is

non-sense. We come to sense and the thing-world at the same time. These are merely the pure primitives of thought, the "moments" of existence, which evermore disappear that the world open to sense may appear.

It seems to me that if the nominalist would demand of himself a thought absolutely primitive and absolutely simple, he would find that this thought is of necessity Being without determinateness, and then would find that this thought is a dual identity, which he must designate now as being and now as non-being, and by each include the other.

Pardon my bringing my peck of coals to Newcastle. Yours truly,

D. A. WASSON.

PHASES OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

[The following passages from a letter written by Mr. Clay of Detroit will recall some of the points discussed in the first two numbers of the Journal.—EDITOR.]

* * * * * As regards the work in a pecuniary point of view to yourself, I am somewhat afraid; yet as a medium for foreign thought to the thinking minds of this country, its failure would be a serious loss, for it is just such a work as has been needed for many years. That we have native talent among us, is sufficiently proven by the masterly Review of Spencer as given in the first number of this Journal.

The three-fold phase of modern culture is well drawn, as taking its points of departure from the enthymeme of Descartes; imperfectly understood by Hobbes, Locke, Condillac, and others of the same school, producing merely a psychological fact which needs must end in Sensism.

From "*Cogito, ergo sum*," their reasoning is that nothing can be in the conclusion which is not affirmed in the premise. Hence they reason that we cannot conclude from the *cogito* to the *esse* of God or the universe, but merely to the *esse* of ourselves.

Descartes himself did not fully understand this *cogito*; for his system as drawn from it is sophistical, since it rests entirely on thought regarded as a purely psychological fact.

Now if the *esse* of the conclusion is not affirmed in the premise *cogito*—or, what is the same, that we may think without a something to think of, without an object, without a truth objectively considered—as a logical inference, then truth is only a subjective

imaginary creature, or only an objective uncogitable spectre.

Yet, if rightly defined, this principle — *cogito* — would lead neither to sensism nor to sentimentalism, neither to idealism nor to pantheism, but would lead to an absurd pretension to demonstrate God, his Universe and Logos.

Cogito, or reasoning, consists in deducing conclusions from given premises. It can neither operate without premises nor furnish its own premises, and therefore it does and must always proceed from premises furnished or given to the mind prior to all reasoning or logical process.

Cogito, ergo sum! Why not? *Dormio, ergo sum*, is the same. *Cogito* — can I think without an object? No. Can this object be a non-entity, or what is called a self-delusion? No; every thought is produced by and occupied about a reality, unless we venture to assert that the nothing is imaginable. Then what is the object of my *cogito*, without which it cannot be conceived? Do I think myself? No; it is consciously objective; it is a law to my mind. But what is its object? the universe as phenomena? No; the phenomenon is incomprehensible in itself, unless subsumed by abstraction under a *noumenon*, i. e. a subjective-objective principle. And this principle, which is itself subjectively given as an object and which connects all phenomena into a unity, is God, and God is truth—my truth.

From this principle we have *Cogito Deum!* —not only my own existence, but God and the Universe are deducible. *Cogito Deum, ergo Deus, ergo* and *mundus est*.

The philosopher may start either from the subject or the object. If he starts from the subject, he may either take realities existing outside of our mind, or the representations in our mind. Reason determines the realities, and consciousness or intimate sense determines the images. The object of Reason is the intelligible, while the proper object of consciousness is the sensible contained in the internal modification of the mind. The one is Ontological, the other Psychological.

Many of our errors have their root in a psychological confusion of the sensuous imagination with the non-sensuous reason, hence the necessity of keeping the two things apart. Two imaginative conceptions may be compared, or two abstract propositions; but to oppose an imaginative conception to an abstract proposition, is to create confusion that will be prolific of absurdities both in philosophy and theology.

Ontology is the basis of primitive speculative thought. We find it the foundation of the Oriental philosophy, from which it passed into the schools of Pythagoras, the Eleatics, and of Plato among the Greeks. Ontologism was taught in the schools at Alexandria by the Christian Fathers, and by the Realists of the middle ages. It was opposed by the Nominalists and the Conceptualists, and especially by Descartes (the real father of Psychologism), by placing the internal sensible as an object of reason to the exclusion of the objective intelligible.

The Psychologists assume that it is the subject that at once affirms the object and itself. It affirms itself, and then affirms what it sees as not itself. But only Being can affirm itself; only God can say, in and of himself I AM.

The Ontologist starts from thought, indeed, but from thought in the sense that it is objective as well as subjective, in which it reveals and affirms the subject. Yet if we assert an exclusive Ontology, as taught by Plato and the Gentile schools, we evidently fall into Pantheism, for we assert Being to the exclusion of Existence; while, on the other hand, by adopting a purely Psychological method we fall into Materialism, for no one who adopts this method, and strictly follows it, can do otherwise than make all begin and end with the soul.

No doubt the point of departure for philosophy is thought; but thought is never a purely subjective fact, and it is only by treating simultaneously the logical, psychological and the ontological parts that we can arrive at the true science of things. In every thought there is object as well as subject, and it is the object that affirms the subject, not the subject that affirms the object.


We are greatly indebted to the Scholastics for many of our definitions, yet I cannot but think that between Nominalism and Realism there is an impassable gulf; for the *nominalists* contend that abstract ideas are pure words, or nothing; the *realists*, that they are realities: between the two contradictions there is no medium; one must be true, the other false. Which is true? If nomin-

alists are right, materialism is unavoidable, because matter, with them, is the only reality. Why take so much pains to make philosophical abstractions if we have nothing but mere names by them?

Moreover if I can make nureal abstractions, it would seem as if I could think the nothing. I am always in favor of reality. I hate the nothing, for it is the battle-field of error. I think that the Essence of the Phenomenon is living ideas—ideas not created by my brains, but thought by God, and, as divine ideas, of course, necessary and eternal, and really living objects of my intuition anterior to all actual existences or phenomena, and hence I utterly reject the possibility of God in Creation. All reality is in God. In Him there is no possibility. All in Him is real, actual; and hence the Schoolmen say, He is *Actus purus*.

The world has been created from eternity, for prior to its creation there was no time, and this prior is only in the logical (not the chronological) order; neither is there space between the power to create and the actual creation, for the creative act is eternal and exerts its force in eternity, and time attaches only to the effect. I admit a psychological or logical possibility (if the Logos of our own minds, or of the world, is hereby understood), but never an ontological or theological possibility.

I may think a new formation of a formless or formed reality, but never a new reality. I do not admit, that possibility, as conceived by the human mind, though an abstraction, is in itself nothing, else all ideas of the mind would be nothing. And what is abstraction but the process of setting the idea free from the form? With respect to God himself, it is nonsense to talk of possibility, or of an ability anterior to creation, for with Him there is no anterior. It is anthropomorphism. It conceives God as subject to time, as if He was once thinking what He was to do at another time, or as thinking what is not because not yet, hence as having thoughts which are void and vain; as possessing a dead power, which is inactive, and hence, during this inactivity, really powerless. For us there is, of course, a wide distance from the first day of creation up to this moment, from the resolution or idea to the power and effect. But it is not so with God. The past and the future are one present and eternal now before Him. His thoughts are the creation; what He thinks is essentially, by this very thinking of Him. To create, therefore, as far as God is concerned, is *not* to reduce potentiality to actuality, except it be understood in that sense which St. Paul seems to have had present to his mind when he wrote (Heb. xi. 3): "By faith we learn that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear." This evidently implies, that the visibility is only the accidental form of an invisible essence; that things may cease to be in time and space without losing their *esse*, because the word of God, His eternal Idea, is their constitutive element.



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